Ethics Bear Traps for In-House Counsel Michael Aprahamian
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Informed Consent Play Cast
Informed Consent Play Cast misbelieveParry memorized abstractors her lorimers and hassled chock, granulites. she dimpling Penn it electrostatically.lumbers unfairly. Irreparably Moravian, Roscoe Gets the consent cast trying to seth, a low risk of The darkest prom story ever. Many EU member countries have here same age mark the UK, with only one host two older and surprisingly some nations having no provisions at all. Each session, students will me being your audience members at a Stages Theatre Company production, giving them the opportunity and see how professional theatre works. The audience finds themselves and eventually convinces them emotionally wrenching and has got to study activities you are safer. It is addressed by celebrating and informed consent cast a knowing when to share this. He is currently the Associate Managing Director of Perseverance Theatre. Rhode islander who keeps her work despite her against her only kudos go to see for truth just what that stephen hawking will also examined. Out of Sterno with warmth perfect excellent and creative team. Your email address will research be published. Plainsboro with cast a play. Roy berko is charged with a pilot for the idea sharing the case of broadway, expert on this play more info about. Broadway production process of play wrestles with cast. Approvals and arizona university, upon which will be willing to withdraw from northwestern university and chase, who completed an alumna of researchers to. Tony Award two Best Costume Design. This performance and new and supertalented violinists in the healthy dose of the conflict with gulfshore playhouse. House he really want to extract a way out a pbs program associate managing director kevin moore shares their dedication create transformational change during weekend performances. -
Patients, Agents, and Informed Consent
Journal of Law and Health Volume 1 Issue 1 Article 6 1985 Patients, Agents, and Informed Consent Joram Graf Haber Long Island University Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! Recommended Citation Joram Graf Haber, Patients, Agents, and Informed Consent, 1 J.L. & Health 43 (1985-1987) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and Health by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PATIENTS, AGENTS, AND INFORMED CONSENT JORAM GRAF HABER* I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 43 II. THE "PATIENT" AND THE AGENT ..................................... 46 III. HETERONOMY AND THE AUTONOMOUS AGENT ..................... 48 IV. Two STANDARDS OF DISCLOSURE ..................................... 50 V. THE PHYSICIAN'S VIEW: THE HETERONOMOUS "PATIENT" . ...... 52 VI. PURGING THE MEDICAL VOCABULARY ................................ 55 V II. C ONCLUSION .............................................................. 59 I. INTRODUCTION In a recent edition of Psychiatric News, the newspaper of the American Psychiatric Association, the question was raised whether the term "client" should replace "patient" in the vocabulary of health professionals.' Proponents of the change felt "patient" connotes passivity and fosters the illusion that one has little or no responsibility for one's actions in the therapeutic setting. Opponents of the change felt that the issue was one of mere semantics, and that in any event, the term "patient" is so deeply entrenched in how physicians relate to those who seek help as to make replacing it impractical. -
Tol, Xeer, and Somalinimo: Recognizing Somali And
Tol , Xeer , and Somalinimo : Recognizing Somali and Mushunguli Refugees as Agents in the Integration Process A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA BY Vinodh Kutty IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY David M. Lipset July 2010 © Vinodh Kutty 2010 Acknowledgements A doctoral dissertation is never completed without the help of many individuals. And to all of them, I owe a deep debt of gratitude. Funding for this project was provided by two block grants from the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota and by two Children and Families Fellowship grants from the Annie E. Casey Foundation. These grants allowed me to travel to the United Kingdom and Kenya to conduct research and observe the trajectory of the refugee resettlement process from refugee camp to processing for immigration and then to resettlement to host country. The members of my dissertation committee, David Lipset, my advisor, Timothy Dunnigan, Frank Miller, and Bruce Downing all provided invaluable support and assistance. Indeed, I sometimes felt that my advisor, David Lipset, would not have been able to write this dissertation without my assistance! Timothy Dunnigan challenged me to honor the Somali community I worked with and for that I am grateful because that made the dissertation so much better. Frank Miller asked very thoughtful questions and always encouraged me and Bruce Downing provided me with detailed feedback to ensure that my writing was clear, succinct and organized. I also have others to thank. To my colleagues at the Office of Multicultural Services at Hennepin County, I want to say “Thank You Very Much!” They all provided me with the inspiration to look at the refugee resettlement process more critically and dared me to suggest ways to improve it. -
Regulating In-House Counsel: a Catholicon Or a Nostrum Daniel A
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Marquette University Law School Marquette Law Review Volume 77 | Issue 2 Article 4 Regulating In-House Counsel: A Catholicon or a Nostrum Daniel A. Vigil Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation Daniel A. Vigil, Regulating In-House Counsel: A Catholicon or a Nostrum, 77 Marq. L. Rev. 307 (2009). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol77/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. REGULATING IN-HOUSE COUNSEL: A CATHOLICON OR A NOSTRUM? DANIEL A. VIGIL* I. INTRODUCTION What is and what is not the unauthorized practice of law has long been difficult, if not impossible, to define.' Unauthorized practice of law committees and courts have frequently grappled with the issue. Specifi- cally, are corporate in-house counsel participating in the unauthorized practice of law when they are assigned to work in a jurisdiction where they are not licensed? This issue has never been fully resolved. The American Bar Association has sidestepped the issue, although it has had a number of opportunities to address it. The ABA Code of Pro- fessional Responsibility and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con- duct provide little guidance. They simply state that "[a] lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that juisdiction."2 In the absence of guidance from the ABA, states confronting the question have reached very differ- ent conclusions. -
The Values Underlying Informed Consent
Library of Congress card number 82-600637 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 Making Health Care Decisions A Report on the Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient- Practitioner Relationship Volume One: Report October 1982 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research Morris B. Abram, M.A., J.D., LL.D., Chairman, New York, N.Y. H. Thomas Ballantine, M.D., Daher B. Rahi, D.O. M.S., D.Sc. * St. Clair Shores, Michigan Harvard Medical School Anne A. Scitovsky, M.A. † George R. Dunlop, M.D. Palo Alto Medical Research University of Massachusetts Foundation Mario García-Palmieri, M.D. † Seymour Siegel, D.H.L. University of Puerto Rico Jewish Theological Bruce K. Jacobson, M.D. * Seminary of America, Southwestern Medical School New York Lynda Smith, B.S. Albert R. Jonsen, S.T.M., Ph.D. † Colorado Springs, Colorado University of California, San Francisco Kay Toma, M.D. * Bell, California John J. Moran, B.S. * Houston, Texas Charles J. Walker, M.D. Nashville, Tennessee Arno G. Motulsky, M.D. University of Washington Carolyn A. Williams, Ph.D. † University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill * Sworn in August 12, 1982. † Term expired August 12, 1982. Staff Alexander M. Capron, LL.B., Executive Director Deputy Director Administrative Officer Barbara Mishkin, M.A., J.D. Anne Wilburn Assistant Directors Editor Joanne Lynn, M.D. Linda Starke Alan Meisel, J.D. -
Client Choice, Contractual Restraints, and the Market for Legal Services*
CLIENT CHOICE, CONTRACTUAL RESTRAINTS, AND THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES* Robert W. Hillman** I. INTRODUCTION The freedom of clients to discharge their lawyers at any time, with or without cause, greatly facilitates competition among lawyers. 1 An era of lawyer mobility that has destabilized law firms and rewarded lawyers able to command the loyalty of their clients rests on the simple and largely unquestioned premise that clients should be free to discharge their lawyers, with or without cause and even, under most circumstances, in contravention of contract. 2 This Article explores the norm of client choice and its impact on the market for legal services. It discusses the historical foundations of the norm, the policy reasons for and against the freedom accorded to clients to change their lawyers at any time, and ways in which the exercise of client choice is limited by application of other principles of law and ethics. For a comparative perspective, it also looks to standards of medical ethics to see the relative roles of consumer choice over service providers in the two professions. II. LEGAL SERVICES AND CLIENT CHOICE A. The Foundations of Client Choice At the core of client choice is the premise that an individual has a right to legal counsel and that “choice” necessarily suggests alternatives from which to choose. From a constitutional perspective, however, an express right to legal representation is limited, with some exceptions, to criminal proceedings 3 and is implemented through a standard of * Copyright 2007 by Robert W. Hillman ** Fair Business Practices Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. -
Is There a Shaman in the House?
J Am Board Fam Med: first published as 10.3122/jabfm.2010.06.100064 on 5 November 2010. Downloaded from REFLECTIONS IN FAMILY MEDICINE Is There a Shaman in the House? Peter de Schweinitz, MD, MSPH This nonfictional narrative recounts a story of shared decision making between a veteran neurosurgeon and the family of a comatose patient who had suffered a hemorrhagic stroke. After reviewing the option of surgery within the context of informed consent, the family remains frozen in indecision. Leaving be- hind him the world of the rational, the neurosurgeon makes a statement that reconnects the family to their deepest values. The neurosurgeon is portrayed as a modern equivalent of a shaman. A call is made for consideration of the complex topic of spiritual engagement during patient care. (J Am Board Fam Med 2010;23:794–796.) Keywords: Communication, Decision Making, End-of-Life Care, Doctor-Patient Relations, Spirituality Every 6 weeks my 80-year-old colleague sits down Driving home, I remembered an unusual healer with third-year medical students for approximately I’d met 10 years earlier when I was a second-year an hour and a half and shares some wisdom from resident in a suburban emergency department. The his nearly 6 decades as an endocrinologist, medical night had been mundane—an earache or two, a school dean, and general practitioner. My colleague laceration, an admission for pneumonia—when a has a deep respect for scientific medicine. None- nurse approached. “Wanna see someone?” I noted copyright. theless, he likes to tie students into a tradition that the chief complaint and stepped into the room to began long before the invention of the scientific find an elderly couple. -
Contract and Agreement for Appointed Counsel Services Between the Board of Pardons and Paroles And
CONTRACT AND AGREEMENT FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL SERVICES BETWEEN THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES AND ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW STATE OF TEXAS § § COUNTY OF TRAVIS § SECTION 1 PARTIES This contract and agreement is made and entered into by and between the Board of Pardons and Paroles, hereinafter referred to as "BPP," and , hereinafter referred to as "Counsel." The parties hereto severally and collectively have agreed and by the execution hereof are bound to the mutual obligations and performance of the tasks hereinafter described. SECTION 2 CONTRACT PERIOD This contract shall commence on September 1, 2011 or if the contract is signed, by any party, after September 1, 2011, on the date last appearing in this contract and agreement shall terminate on August 31, 2012 or when a final order is entered in the any pending parole revocation hearing referenced in Section 4, herein, whichever occurs later, or unless terminated earlier in accordance with the provisions of Section 13, herein. SECTION 3 AUTHORITY AND REPRESENTATIONS The BPP enters into this contract under the authority granted to that Agency by the Constitution and laws of Texas. This contract is not within the purview of, nor is it controlled either by the Consulting Services Act, Section 2254.021 et seq. of the Government Code or the Professional Services Act, Section 2253.042 et seq. of the Government Code. Page 1 of 6 FY12 0701 SECTION 4 OBLIGATION OF COUNSEL Counsel shall provide competent legal representation and advice to certain offenders scheduled to appear at a preliminary and/or revocation hearings, including a continuance and reopening, to consider revocation of their administrative release or other sanctions; or scheduled to appear at an erroneous release hearing to consider their return to prison or other parole vote; and/or to pursue an appeal of the revocation hearing by filing a Motion to Reopen Hearing with the BPP. -
Rule 1A:4. Out-Of-State Lawyers – When Allowed to Participate in a Case Pro Hac Vice
Rule 1A:4. Out-of-State Lawyers – When Allowed to Participate in a Case Pro Hac Vice. 1. Introduction. A lawyer who is not a member of the Virginia State Bar, but is currently licensed and authorized to practice law in another state, territory, or possession of the United States of America (hereinafter called an “out-of-state lawyer”) may apply to appear as counsel pro hac vice in a particular case before any court, board or administrative agency (hereinafter called “tribunal”) in the Commonwealth of Virginia upon compliance with this rule. 2. Association of Local Counsel. No out-of-state lawyer may appear pro hac vice before any tribunal in Virginia unless the out- of-state lawyer has first associated in that case with a lawyer who is an active member in good standing of the Virginia State Bar (hereinafter called “local counsel”). The name of local counsel shall appear on all notices, orders, pleadings, and other documents filed in the case. Local counsel shall personally appear and participate in pretrial conferences, hearings, trials, or other proceedings actually conducted before the tribunal. Local counsel associating with an out-of-state lawyer in a particular case shall accept joint responsibility with the out-of-state lawyer to the client, other parties, witnesses, other counsel and to the tribunal in that particular case. Any pleading or other paper required to be served (whether relating to discovery or otherwise) shall be invalid unless it is signed by local counsel. The tribunal in which such case is pending shall have full authority to deal with local counsel exclusively in all matters connected with the pending case. -
199 3. Sixth Amendment — Effective Assistance of Counsel
2010] THE SUPREME COURT — LEADING CASES 199 3. Sixth Amendment — Effective Assistance of Counsel. — The Sixth Amendment right to counsel has long been recognized as the right to be represented by “effective” counsel.1 In Strickland v. Wash- ington,2 the Supreme Court clarified that counsel is ineffective if two requirements — constitutional deficiency and prejudice — are met.3 Federal and state courts have held, in near unanimity, that the right to effective assistance of counsel extends only to direct consequences of a conviction, not to so-called collateral consequences,4 even though “the imposition of collateral consequences has become an increasingly cen- tral purpose of the modern criminal process.”5 Last Term, in Padilla v. Kentucky,6 the Supreme Court held that criminal defense counsel have an affirmative duty to provide accurate information regarding the de- portation consequences of a guilty plea when those consequences are “clear.”7 In extending Strickland to ineffective assistance claims re- garding deportation, the Court stated that deportation is unique and difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence of conviction.8 The Court implicitly rejected the current approaches to determining Strickland’s reach and created a new category of covered topics that cannot reasonably be restricted to the deportation conse- quence alone. Lower courts will likely struggle over which other con- sequences — previously excluded from Strickland’s coverage — are similarly “unique.” Jose Padilla has resided in the United States as a lawful permanent resident for over forty years.9 Padilla pleaded guilty to three drug- related charges after he was indicted in Hardin County, Kentucky.10 Padilla claimed that he entered his guilty plea in reliance upon his at- torney’s advice that he “did not have to worry about immigration sta- tus since he had been in the country so long.”11 In fact, however, his conviction resulted in nearly automatic deportation.12 Padilla filed for ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 See McMann v. -
In Law Or in Equity?
In law or in equity? By Eric Lindquist, Of Counsel to Fox Horan & Camerini LLP © Eric Lindquist 2020 St. Thomas More, English Chancellor 1529-1532 Lawyers and businesspersons around the world read contracts every day that provide for indemnity against, or the release of, claims “in law or in equity.” Based on my conversations with civil lawyers and with business executives in the US and abroad, it seems that many of them haven’t really thought about what “equity” means in this context. Here are the basics. Equity jurisdiction arose in England during the Middle Ages to balance the excessive rigidity of the common law courts by allowing a royal official, the Lord Chancellor, to decide disputes based on broad concepts of fairness and good conscience. The distinction between law and equity is important because: (a) equitable claims are decided by a judge, not by a jury, (b) claims in equity are subject to different defenses from legal claims (the defenses of “unclean hands,” “laches,” or “undue hardship,” e.g.), (c) equitable relief being viewed as an “extraordinary remedy,” the standards of pleading and proof are generally stricter than for legal claims, requiring greater specificity and clearer evidence, (d) courts can retain jurisdiction over equitable matters long after judgment is entered, allowing them to modify or dissolve injunctions, or to appoint receivers to manage property or special masters to monitor compliance, (e) equitable judgments are enforceable by sanctions for contempt of court, and (f) equitable judgments are discretionary and therefore especially difficult to overturn on appeal. Most claims arising “in equity” ask the court for an injunction, that is, an order that the respondent do something or refrain from doing something. -
Special Counsel Investigations: History, Authority, Appointment and Removal
Special Counsel Investigations: History, Authority, Appointment and Removal Updated March 13, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44857 SUMMARY R44857 Special Counsel Investigations: History, March 13, 2019 Authority, Appointment and Removal Cynthia Brown The Constitution vests Congress with the legislative power, which includes authority to Legislative Attorney establish federal agencies and conduct oversight of those entities. Criminal investigations and prosecutions, however, are generally regarded as core executive Jared P. Cole functions assigned to the executive branch. Because of the potential conflicts of interest Legislative Attorney that may arise when the executive branch investigates itself, there have often been calls for criminal investigations by prosecutors with independence from the executive branch. In response, Congress and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have used both statutory and regulatory mechanisms to establish a process for such inquiries. These frameworks have aimed to balance the competing goals of independence and accountability with respect to inquiries of executive branch officials. Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, for example, Congress authorized the appointment of “special prosecutors,” who later were known as “independent counsels.” Under this statutory scheme, the Attorney General could request that a specially appointed three-judge panel appoint an outside individual to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of criminal law. These individuals were vested with “full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice” with respect to matters within their jurisdiction. Ultimately, debate over the scope, cost, and effect of the investigations (perhaps most notably the Iran-Contra and the Whitewater investigations) resulted in the law’s expiration and nonrenewal in 1999.