CEU eTD Collection In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Arab Spring andthe Resilience ofArab Department of International Relations European Studies Monarchies: theCaseofBahrain Supervisor: Professor Thomas Fetzer Central European University European Central Budapest, Hungary Anar Abdullayev Word Count: Submitted to Submitted May, 2012 13, 535 By CEU eTD Collection demands. Meanwhile, the other two theories maintain a stronger explanatory power. through analysisthe of narrativesopposition which are dividedeconomic into andpolitical is achieved result This Bahrain. in stability regime the explaining of in terms plausible least isthe legitimacy monarchical theory the of found that have and theories three the test monarchical legitimacy, rentier state, and alliance building theories. In my thesis I have put to Arab Arab monarchies the resilience of Spring. Thus, Gulf is explainedusually through than the Arab republics in theto regime change more been have resilient Arab monarchies that It isgenerally acknowledged Arab Spring context. I study Bahrain as a critical case of the ABSTRACT i CEU eTD Collection BIBLIOGRAPHY CONCLUSION TESTING THEORY THREE: CHAPTER ARAB LEADINGTO THE CONTEXT SPRING OVERVIEWBAHRAINSOCIO-ECONOMIC ANDTHE OF HISTORIC TWO: CHAPTER ...... 5 1: LITERATURE FRAMEWORK,CHAPTER REVIEWANDMETHODOLOGY THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION Contents 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 Three Theories Revisited...... 38 Theory Alliance of Building ...... 32 RentierTheory State ...... 29 Theory Monarchicalof Legitimacy ...... 26 Bahrain andthe Arab Spring ...... 23 CurrentSocio-Economic Context ...... 19 Sunni-ShiaThe Relationship ...... 17 HistoricBackground ...... 14 41 ...... 42 ...... 1 ...... 26 ...... 14 ii CEU eTD Collection future endeavours. future support. their valuable guidance during thesis-writing period. Last but not least I am grateful to my mother who has always been supportive of my of supportive been always has who my mother to grateful am I least not but Last Special go toIryna thanks and Viktoriya whohaveprovidedme with emotional I am sincerely thankful to Professor Thomas Fetzer and Professor Emel Akcali for ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii CEU eTD Collection http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/bt/directory/Documents/CaseStudy4%202HBQR11PRINT.pdf. 307, 2011), Sage, 2 Moroccan parliament. 1 monarchical wouldmonarchical regime inBahrain context Arab the bean within Spring empirical puzzle of stability Thus, the here. presented theories the against puzzle empirical the test case to studyingmake acritical case enablemeto would logical deductions.” problem. it If is valid for this case,itis valid for all many)(or cases.” Thus the of purpose general the inrelation to importance havingstrategic “be as case defined can usually Critical Arab Spring. caseof the acritical as Bahrain my thesis,Ianalyse Hencein resilient. street protests since February its2011 andyet monarchical regime type sofar remains significant seen have to monarchy Gulf only is the it case: adeviant as out stands Bahrain regime change. immuneto far so remain monarchies the Gulf Middle East, in the Amid turmoil political andongoing regime Egypt faceda Libyahave change. complete entirein Middle East form the farof So chain only reaction. Arabrepublicsthe of Tunisia, thatarebeing Arabhaverevolutionary observed in impact on upheavals asimilarcountries comparisonbe could the ‘Spring of of Nations’ 1848 Revolutions across Europe. The French its Revolution far is impactof 1789 as ason Europe concerned.Another historic developments. latest of essence the the for understanding space of events is unpredictable,Arabia, Bahrain and clashes still continueand in Syria as this thesis isit being written. The outcomeis reasonable Tunisia,regimes inEgypt, Libya,and into demonstrations Bloody Yemen. erupted street Saudi engage in academic researchMiddle as East,it creates known as the Arab Spring.INTRODUCTION The region has seen the toppling of authoritarian BentFlyvbjerg, “Case Study,” in Moroccois the only monarchy where thereformist King enacted laws which increase the powers ofthe The transformative magnitude of magnitudeThe transformative of Arab Springhasthe resemblancetothe historic in Arab the turmoil of political thehas since beginning passed More than a year The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research 1 , 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: 2 I will use this critical 1 Inthis regard, CEU eTD Collection http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4D7E494272218/. 5 Institute, April2012. http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201204.yom.monarchy-arab-spring.pdf. 4 two important variables: external support and the institution of monarchy. revolutions unlike the Arab Republics. The key explanation of the endurance of Arab monarchies is centered on 3 initiated by the Gulf Cooperation Councilfamily $2,600. as an economic aid to Bahrain and Oman.offer spending social to each ambitious inform thean madeconcessions presumably of So the government the example, For expenditure. in social increase overall and creation job more in3. Soonafter theunrests erupted February Al-Khalifa King2011, the has promised Salman iseconomy mostly in defined of which external terms aid bewill in further discussed chapter known that Bahrain is not a major oil producer anymore and the rentier element of Bahrain’s producing Gulf Bahrain’sCountries, in share isoil production small.is rather It largely oil Unlikein other power. explanatory strong alsoretains rentierism context Bahraini assistance’ and the ‘rentier place. took state’ factors Syriaan or Tunisia, revolutions whereregime Libya change not Arab Egypt, republic like better explain theexplanatory variable. criticalBahrain is differentfrom others as well. Among other things, Bahrain is a strong being as case monarchy of institution the consider of scholars many Bahrain. monarchy of resilience minority was almost identical to that rentier and state statecraft, alliancebuilding. legitimacy/institutional in Egypt orresilience Tunisia – remainedthe region? on-goingpoliticalturmoilinother stable amid parts of way: following in the framed is and thesis this of of monarchy in Bahrain I will test three theoretic approaches: cultural Stephens, Research Policy Foreign Spring.” Arab the During of Monarchy Resilience the “Understanding Sean. Yom, change regime to immune been have monarchies Arab the why of explanations numerous are there Overall, Michael. “Bahrain: At Risk of a Proxy Sectarian War?” Rusi, n.d. It would be safe to assume that the initial framework for political activism in Bahrain in activism political for framework initial the that assume to safe be would It . Bahrain also has a resemblance to other monarchies in the region. To explain the 3 Some others, like Sean Yom (2012), point to the fact that the ‘international 5 The lion’s share of this financial aid come the so-called “Gulf Marshall Plan” Marshall “Gulf so-called the come aid financial this of share lion’s The 2 why has Bahrain’s monarchical regime why Bahrain’smonarchical has the majoritysuppressedbypolitical To explain To the 4 In the In CEU eTD Collection us-canada-12762500. 6 to reinforce the necessity of “national dialogue” instead of regime change. instead of regime “national dialogue” necessity of reinforce the to the U.S to the unrest by Shiites. The farthest that the State Department’s statements went was of reaction explains silent rather that the isfactor in a Bahrain fleet Fifth U.S the of location The in Bahrain. involvement future Iran’s of question the open leaves Bahrain in majority ideological blessing of Iranian Ayatollahs. and spiritual a receive majority Shiite the in circles radical most The latter. the with relationship hostile ina inherently is family Al-Khalifa Sunni population minority by ruled Shiite majority The Bahrain. in protesters of composition sectarian and ethnic task for the formidable isa Al-Khalifamajority Shiite the of grievances the minority, is Sunni there dynasty ruling family.the that fact the and Hence, Islam of sect Shiite the to belongs population in Bahrain’s of 70% that the Arab Springfact the given example, For factors. these of all link context,inherently I chapter, third in the building we should alliance of theory the test I When factorRegion. Gulf in the coalition emerging newly a as Council in the Cooperation Gulf the of and Iran securitization United States, the with alliance relations its division, sectarian domestic Bahrain’s factors: several consider I approach tis theoretic regime. existing an of stability the maintaining thereby dissent social growing the assumption is the benefitsfrom external rents were essentially utilized in a strategy to subdue the case with casewith the Libya. markets and, instability, asa of bemuchhigherandmore would thanin serious result regional commodity global in volatility price entail would supply oil of Disruptions region. Eastern Middle the from supplies oil the of majority the of point choke the is at Bahrain “ClintonCriticises BahrainProtester overClashes.” BBC, March 16,2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- Thus, unlike other regime change revolutions, a regime change in favor of the Shiite the of favor in change a regime revolutions, change regime other unlike Thus, The third explanatory variable is Bahrain’s international alliance building pattern. In 3 6 And finally, CEU eTD Collection of monarchical regime in Bahrain. regime monarchical of critical case of Bahrain to identify the against the I willtheories test Here, earlier. mentioned whether of theories three perspective they are plausible the from Bahrain in events of enoughanalysis the with deal will tochapter third explainThe regimes. the stability countriesother inmainly the region, Arab somerepublics have of which seenthe of toppling with it compare will I case, critical the of essence the explain To issues. social and economic political, andcurrent historical of overview the with Bahrain caseof for thecritical context critical case of Bahrain against three theoretic approaches. In the second chapter, I will set the frameworks on regimewill I theoretical definethe on, Further to thisliterature related thesis. existing reviewing the stability in the Arab world. I will test my hypothesis based on the This thesis will follow the following pattern: in the first chapter I will start by 4 CEU eTD Collection was true, for example, of the pharaohs who ruled ancient Egypt….” or “the emperors of powerful because monarch has been the a seen as religious ordivinely figure.approved This has“in been very and manycases,this “divine rulers”, Monarchs aremostly as defined governance. monarchical of elements essential as culture and religion maintains monarch considerations. Cultural legitimacy serves as a traditional power-base of a certain monarch. A This thesis. stems from approach building. alliance and monarchical legitimacy arerentier be state, tested to theories puzzle in thesis, Icarry this out theory testing. Asmentioned in the introduction the part, research my explain to apursuit In Spring. Arab the on discourse the of much dominates that promotion democracy of rhetoric normative the with contradiction into comes stability how regime necessity the of of illustration case isan critical the speaking, Precisely revolts. Arab other to casecompared is a critical Bahrain makethat an assumption I this thesis, In East. Middle entire inthe turmoil ongoing the amid type regime monarchical Bahraini the of of endurance the an puzzle empirical with begins This research building. and alliance the monarchy of institutional statecraft state, rentier frameworks: theoretical atthree look have a against background the of in change revolutionsregime necessaryis it Arab republics, to understand why monarchies, Arab the in Bahrain,particular have maintained regime stability approaches key the theoretical andwill explore building theories alliance and legitimacy monarchical which are utilized in this ANDMETHODOLOGY REVIEW thesisCHAPTER 1:THEORETICAL LITERATURE FRAMEWORK, to explain the critical case of Bahrain. To Monarchical institution is the first explanatory variable of the empirical puzzle in this puzzle empirical the of variable explanatory first isthe institution Monarchical state, deals rentier that with literature existing the review will chapter The following cultural legitimacy cultural 5 and institutional statecraft CEU eTD Collection Yale University Press, 1968). University Yale 7 context: republics across region?the As LucasRussel places thisissue within the Arab Spring authoritarian falling amidst Monarchies Gulf Arab of stability exceptional the explain legitimacyArab within monarch is: essentialquestion contextthe the Spring the of does a As is farasmonarchy concerned institution selectiveof limited liberalization. the or space for keep popular political Jordan legitimacy have to both: control under and create managed Bahrainand Morocco, as such monarchies And of some the legitimacy. yet, losing popular The facedprincipal challenge bymonarchs in the20 dilemma”: “king’s as face they 9 TarrytownNY: Marshall Cavendish Benchmark, 2008. the obsolescence of in 20 monarchies obsolescenceof the monarchies.and consider argumentabout Forexample,SamuelHuntington’s durability of legitimacy political the over questions serious have raised authors history, In amore recent in herbook. RebeccaSteffof argues Byzantine the monarchy…” to gavelegitimacy empire inemperor –called authority Thevision supreme of –wasthe both. basileus a Christian and the state, the defined church The atheocracy. was Empire “TheByzantine statehood, 1945.” Japan alsoworshipped asdivine until were 8 Limited, 2005. Samuel Huntington, Nathaniel Harris. “Divine Rulers.” In Rulers.” “Divine Harris. Nathaniel Steffof, Rebecca. “The Changing Roles of European Rulers.” In of of political consciousness (p.177). system mademinimizeand efforts to the disruptive uponit effects of broadening the monarchythe could bemaintained asthe of principal source authority in the political in combine made monarchical authority system.and political popular Or to same the Ormightbe aconscious effortin and was vested parliaments. parties, people, the promote movementto amodern, toward constitutional monarchy in which authority and authority monarchical of roleend the reduce orto to attempt He [monarch] could Political Order in Changing Societies (Systems ofGovernment) Monarchy th century and named the cumulative challenges that challenges cumulative the named and century 9 6 (Harvard University. Center for International Affairs: 7 History is replete with examples of such of examples with replete is History th century was how to liberalize without Political Systems of theWorld: Monarchy , pp. 7–8. London: Evans Brothers Evans London: 7–8. pp. , , 62. 8 CEU eTD Collection 11 http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/06/is-king-s-dilemma-only-for-presidents/6bpf. 10 in the way that commoner presidents are.’ The are.’ presidents commoner in way that the and shieldedbybureaucratic institutions, monarchs social areseldom exposed to opposition of families.’finalizes their own He hispoint byarguing that‘…buffered byelite retainers by this they would simply be ‘scape-goating appointed political servants, including members monarchsTherefore,may sack ministerswell certain appoint or performing notenough and king’s sack any authority to canbeofficial legitimized by constitution the of monarchy. atstatecraft excel since leaderscolleagues better than monarchical tend to republican their governance as‘strategies institutionalof manipulation management.’and opposition Thus, thismode mechanism.can of with defines statecraft” “authoritarian Yom rule so-called the on constitution. basis the the legitimate of can monarch be power of who considered a existence of be elections, itparliamentary municipal, or underminenot would theabsolute mere speaking,the Precisely else. bysomeone monarch aparticular bereplaced that would reforms have or parliamentary elections which is invariably a verylinked to low possibility cultural and functional arguments, he proposes the alternative explanation which essentially which explanation alternative the he proposes arguments, functional and cultural intervention, the dismissing By University. Abdulaziz King the from Al-Otaibi asSaud such liberalization.’ at better been have some but – election for stood has sultan or emir, king, no – republics have thatArabmonarchies‘atdemocratization have contends performed further Russel than better RusselLucas. E. 2011.“Is the King’s Dilemma Only forPresidents?” Sada. Ibid. of how to democratize without losing dilemma’’ ‘king’s control the faced altogether. who monarchs than rather presidents increasingly was it andthat republics of the systems political frozen than democratization at more nimble were monarchies Arab it traditional seemed the that year’s events, thisBefore [2011] Another element of the monarchical legitimacy is personal power of who of a monarch power personal is legitimacy monarchical of the element Another 11 In other words, there is less fear for Arab monarchs to engage in engage certain to monarchs Arab is lessfear for there words, In other 7 statecraft argument 10 is reinforced byothers CEU eTD Collection Quaterly 106 (1): 1–15. 13 Saudi Arabia.” Journal of King Abdulaziz University 10 (2): 69–80. 12 by the collapsed endof 1970s.Here, the the had who andAlgeria Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Tunsia, Egypt, of monarchies Arab earlier argument. This statecraft backuphisinstitutional to elements strategy key as and control administrative argument was strategy coercion leadership, charismatic of importance the also1902 and1929. Heemphasizes challenged dynasties three and other inhistoricthe between affinity with existing Arabian the Peninsula by Yom who made sharescultural monarchy Al-Saud the that fact the fardue to secondly and, so most durable a historic reference hasbeen the monarchy Saudi the that assumption basedon the Arabia case study Saudi of to Anderson presents most of the institutional legitimacy explanations rather weak. rather explanations legitimacy institutional the of most presents Anderson by reference historic the Thus, policy.’ imperial European the of instruments initially logic of the Great Power imperial tothe monarchy Middlebe should inthe occurrence of attributed Indeed, historically East the policy: ‘that is to say, the monarchies of the region were explanations unsatisfactory grounds:on two andin MiddleEast rendersthecultural cultural andregional the determinism exceptionalism The cultural arguments areifpower experienced monarchies well-managed institutionally failures of regime stability. also dismissed explanatory a strong has argument by statecraft the what extent to is debatable It weaknesses. Lisa Anderson. She factors into her analysis statecraft. institutional through legitimacy monarchical the highlights Lisa Anderson. 1991. “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarhcy in the Middle East.” Political Science Political East.” Middle the in ofMonarhcy Resilience the and “Absolutism 1991. Anderson. Lisa of Study A Case Reconsidered: East Middle the in ofMonarchy Resilience “The 1998. Al-Otaibi. M. Saud and political change. political and social – modern say to not – nontraditional foster even and accommodate to monarchs fails toexplain ability historical authenticity Eastern apparent of the Modern its alleged type, ifregime traditional itwere a even Second, liberal than democracy. monarchyFirst, currently inas understood Middlethe Eastis moreno indigenous 13 institutional statecraft 8 argument reveals certain 12 He carries out the CEU eTD Collection 15 AfricanStudies, University of London 1970: Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, 1970. Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Riseof Islam ..., p.428. Schoolof Oriental and 14 addressed by Beblawi and Luciani: purposes of this thesis Iwill operate with the notion an of Since I am analyzing the critical case of Bahrain inmy research, for the methodological analysis: intheir factor oil the highlight Luciani, Giacomo amounts of external rent.” basis substantial a regular ason receive that “countries rentier states Mahdavy. Hedefines theory. A commonly accepted thesis. this of definition 3 inchapter betested will Thistheory Bahrain? caseof critical inmonarchy the of resilience the explain argument of institution monarchical Can a puzzle? research main classical the with connection rentier this leave usin and Wheredoes Jordan. are Morocco monarchies of such Examples state in as monarchical would governance keyexecutive powers still bevested the a monarch. was of set paradigm fundamental the challenge not do by essentially reforms those However, Hossein launch even andconstitutional the accommodation of religious groups into public realm. Moreover, monarchs can safely an outcome monarchicalof legitimacy. Itessentially refers strategiesto of cooptation of elites reforms which create the visibility of democratic governance. Cook, M., ed. “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development inRentier States: The Case of Iran.” In Ibid. particular the oil phenomenon, on the nature of the state in the Arab region.” in developments, economic of impactrecent the help but elucidate to a state such “the purpose of an attempt to define a rentier state is not toreach an abstractnotion of The second explanatory variable of regime stability used in this thesis is rentier state beinmonarchies as of can defined authoritarian context the statecraft Institutional or 14 Other scholars of rentier state theory, Hazem Beblawi and 9 external rent external which is substantially which 15 CEU eTD Collection in Turkey andIran,”in 19 18 17 51 1987).p. 16 economy.” economy the sustain substantial, if can, hand, other the on rent external “an in rent-seeking, factor without external an of importance the reinforce further Hencethey state. rentier particular a of nature a strongtrue the explain not does internal rent merely of existence the fact that to the They point productive domestic sector, hence the epithet of a rentier accountability of of authorities: accountability is that most isis of rentscomeby backed from extraction that and the Thisargument oil production. assumption general the context, Eastern Middle In rents. external of form the in revenues its most of asan receiving entity it therentier much state of defines literature, As seenfrom the issues: society-government Shambayati notes the “social class” aspect of a retnier economy when discussing the civil HootanShambayati, “The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and theParadox of Autonomy: State and Business Michael Ross, “The Political Economy of Resource Curse,” of Resource Economy Political “The Ross, Michael Hazem Beblawi, Giacomo Luciani, Ibid. govern. societies they to the less accountable become levy and taxes need domestic the to from freed they are foreign assistance, or rents such resource as sources, from external revenues their of most gain governments when that contend state rentier of Theories economy, existence of an internal rent, even substantial,The is not sufficienteconomy. tocharacterize arentier of a concept the to crucial is origin rent the of externality “the challenges to the state.” the to challenges of base organizational main be the cannot andclass is impeded, stratification social Asaresult, population. domestic the of exploitation forneed economic and the ability of the economic elite to enrich itself through of rent sectors economic productive for underdevelopment The potential class conflict. seeking eliminate the “The dependence of the entrepreneurial classes on external rents alsominimizes the 17 Michael and furthers by this Ross combining externalfactors debate 18 Comparative Politics though itthough could indicate a existencethe of strong The Rentier State 19 26, no. 3 (April 1994):309. 26,no.3(April (Croom Helm Australia: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 10 World Politics 51 (January 1999): 51 312–313. 1999): (January rentier class rentier or group.” rentier 16 CEU eTD Collection Institute, AprilInstitute, 2012. http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201204.yom.monarchy-arab-spring.pdf. 20 tangible role in insulating royal leaders from leaders from internal royal tangible pressures.’ ininsulating role externalera, current the ‘In that maintains He terms. economic and factorsin geopolitical rent external in the Thus,inYom Yom this issue thenatureof the ArabSpring context. who discusses defines form of geopolitical support and oil wealth have played a more against rising againstfrom adangerous social trend. discontentinto Thesedeveloping be would the this thesis I argue thatunrest. they In other (monarchs) words, social massive of monarchsin areas communities to aid financial use reasonable offer essentially would it external which by rents to buy offseek domestic to socialimplement mechanismsmonarchical Bahrain,hasdeveloped the regimethere Specifically speakingof discontent. Inpreventive measures of Bahrain. in case the especially true identify. is seeks to current thesis This and rentierregime theory stability the which issue not critical address the of does available literature the Moreover, rentier economy. comes close to definingtheory. those In thiscases case wherediminishing oil andhenceproduction classic challenge the assumptions of a rentier state Mahdavy’s oil does generalnot which a play on rentierexperience states lacksanalysis available theliterature However, definitiona significant of stave social off unrest. a any meansemerging necessary to with regime provide an autocratic rolerentier in a state’sstate getting alargebudget. inmanyMoreover, revenues these state cases constitute share of transactions “external help” andfrom related from exports oil Revenues of economies. type largely rentier with be states Many of the Gulf countries, the majority of which are Arab monarchies, can be consideredwould essentially to mean substantial revenues from oil export and rents from external transit Gulf, fees of Persian oil.the in specifically and context Eastern Middle the In monarchies. explainingfactors Arab of and durability the important oil support external most are the Yom,Sean. “Understanding the Resilience of Monarchy During the Arab Spring.” Foreign Policy Research 11 20 Thus, in his analysis, his in Thus, CEU eTD Collection 21 to be mechanisms prove States with Bahrain’sand the United governmentprotests, GCC the relations alliance of threatifThus, can effectivelyIran influence Bahrain’s populationShia fuellingthereby anti- containment in domestic linkedinherently stability the isformer. perception to of threat Bahrain’s Iran Iran. from emanating threat from the containing of is that Bahrain, for particularly and Region, Iran and subsequently theGulf of monarchies for Arab behavior of strategic pattern the War period In thepost-Cold Middle realitiesand irrelevant East. tothe present-day probably sufficient regimenot is rivalry superpower of stability pattern the is over, War Cold the that Now well. as balancing in intra-regional of challenge an ledever-increasing to formation inducedalliance externally Union, Soviet andthe theUSA between be to perceived was modeconfrontation of primary This argument canbe in interpreted a following way in although that abi-polar world the these states act primarily to balance one another.” history insuperpower alliances the of strongly the Middle supports proposition East that “The he contends, East Middle the to it.reference In appease to choose they or of threat source major confront to choose states whether on is contingent system anarchical in an state a certain of behavior international the that Walt Stephen argues of source threat. the against hegemon another with balance or threat of source the with bandwagon caneither states forms: two take can This hegemon. regional by another posed growing threat the to a reaction buildingis best defined bystructural neorealist theory. Alliance-building by is a certain state for regime stability in the Arab monarchies of the Gulf Region. The pattern of alliance be acrucial factor allianceto or assistance politico-military external the considers approach Thistheoretical building. is alliance puzzle variable research the of The explanatory third 3.in chapter plausible explanations of a rentier state and the theory testing of rentierism will be carried out Walt, Stephen. Walt, The Origins of Alliances . New York: Cornell University, 1987.p. 153 12 21 CEU eTD Collection 22 in forEast. Middle regimethe stability explanation Bahrain. GCC stands for Gulf Cooperation Council Cooperation Gulf for stands GCC 22 The available literature on alliance building provides a strong and plausible and strong a provides building alliance on literature available The 13 CEU eTD Collection As a result, the majority colonies majority former nowhaverepublican As a East Middle the France’s result, of Mediterranean. Eastern Africa and ofNorth territories itsmodes protectorate in governance influencedextenta great the France to in transformations French. The political domestic imperial the By contrast, regimes protectorate inAlgeriaby andTunisiathe wereestablished inBahrain. particularly and region Gulf inthe type regime monarchical of resilience standing endurancemonarchy. legitimate monarchy of The in largely Britain long- the explains by was FrenchRevolution hadBritain which timethe of the remainedasolid constitutional were transforming the Westernregime type in itselfBahrain established thearound time when anti-royalistthe revolutions nation-states.monarchical the accounts, all By Region. Gulf entire in the also but Bahrain The in only not major imperial Empire British the of interests the served power historically monarchy of institution the inperspective, the Gulf Region monarchical over BahrainwasFrom ofgovernance.this supportive of strongly the type The imperialBritish1783 and remained undertheBritish1971 Bahrain protectorate. rule Bahrain. of realities present-day to relate they how identify and isprovide historic a key republics. analysis events to of critical chapter the of purpose The Arab namely Countries, Gulf with other framework in comparative the place Bahrain will Bahraini monarchy. this chapter overview Then the emergenceandevolution of the of CONTEXTLEADINGTOTHESOCIO-ECONOMIC ARABSPRING OFBAHRAINANDTHE CHAPTER TWO:HISTORICOVERVIEW 2.1 The emergence of the Al-Khalifa family as a ruling eliteHistoric Background dates back to 1783. Between brief a caseof forBahrain with thecritical will context set the I In this chapter 14 CEU eTD Collection 25 129–143. 11,no.3 (2000): Quarterly 24 protectorates. An exception to this trend is Morocco, still a monarchy but former French protectorate. types. Meanwhile, Jordan and most of the Gulf Kingdoms (except forSaudi Arabia) are former British 23 identity.” years developmentof tothe a specifictwo agendahascontributed “this expanded Shiite Within tookplaceand 1996. between 1994 protests massive most phaseof anti-government protectorates. regime types while most of the monarchies in the Gulf Region are former British The domestic political landscape 2000s wasof largely with set initiationthe a numberof of opposition rulingto the Sunnielite. 1980s, with Shiites asking mainly for two things; jobs and constitutional reforms.” “StreetdemonstrationsBahry notes, by Shiitesthe were acommon phenomenon the during weredifferent both The agentsin of Assecular andprotests. nature: protests Louay religious. form street of in the their grievances articulated Shia community from the representatives Shia movementinback activeopposition increasingly became the and 1990s. 1980s The the struggle. Thus, meansof political legitimate heardmakevoice through to sought their society. The growing Bahraini the of segment suppressed most the majority remained Shia laws the emergency marginalization led of regime alongthe under in For time powerbase Bahrain. andalegitimate enduring to the formation of opposition1975 and2002 the monarchicalinstitute Bahraini an enacted laws authorities emergency to movementsand in 1975 itby wasabolished emirIsathe binSalman Al-Khalifa. In periodthe betweenwhich monarchy. inAlthough adopted first1971, the constitution more notlastdid fivethan years Ibid. p. 131 Bahry, Louay. “The Socioeconomic Foundations of the Shiite Opposition in Bahrain.” Mediterranean For example, Syria and Lebanon are former French protectorates. Now they both have republican regime In AlKhalifaibn 1999 HamadIsa his throne afterreceived the death father. of In 1971 Bahrainbecame independent andan state was established asa constitutional 25 Thus, the sectarian identity of Shias in Bahrain was essentially shaped by their by shaped essentially was Bahrain in Shias of identity sectarian the Thus, 23 15 24 The CEU eTD Collection the direct rule.” directthe and exercises thus appointments make “all cabinet to is Kingauthorized the newconstitution, 29 USA: CongressionalResearch Service, May 14, 2012. p. 6, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf. 28 opposition movement Al-Wifaq as a party. factions or societies participating in elections.However, many commentators refer to, for instance, the 27 effectively mean the impossibility of majority veto voting. factions was about the equal size (40 seats each) of the Council of Representatives and the Shura. Itwould a new “National Action Charter” as well as the new Constitution.3) The major resentment ofthe Shia political 26 so-called andthe Council Representatives of Shias with each winning19seats. (Shuracompositionwas between Sunnis evenly Council) UpperHouse the distributed and of in seats Councilthe Representativesof from in17 2006 to18in 2010 whereas sectarian the political for societies 2006and the As ran 2010 elections. of increased Shiites 2010, the their wereheld. elections national/municipal parliamentary and several and 2010 significantly increased.2002, 2006, In inreforms Bahrain. civic competition throughout 2000s the and Political activism in adopted 2002. newwas constitution reforms byKing HamadbinIsa popularal-Khalifa. ThenewKinginstituted elections and a Katzman, Katzman, Kenneth. Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy. CRS Report for Congress. Washington DC, According to Bahraini Law, all the political parties are banned assuch. Instead there are only political 1) The official name of the monarch was now King, not Emir anymore. 2) In 2002 a referendum was held on Ibid answerable for businessthe ofhis Ministry. is Minister each and policy, government general for him to answerable jointly are Ministers Ministers. his through and directly powers his exercises King The c. organisations. constitution law, andcaresand the for rights the individualsand freedoms of and the of supremacy the and government the of legitimacy the safeguards King The b. of national unity. inviolate. He is the loyal protectora. TheKing is and Head of State, its nominalrepresentative, is andhisperson of the religion and the homeland, and the symbol 29 The2002Constitution stipulates thelegitimate for grounds theKing’s rule: 28 The new Constitution also established the elected the established also ThenewConstitution 26 27 This was the beginning of a new era of political Having boycotted boycotted 2002elections,the Shia the Having 16 Shura (Consultative) Council. According to the to According Council. (Consultative) CEU eTD Collection I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2005)., p. 44 31 http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ba00000_.html. 30 strategic control: As Iran’sthe Juan Cole notes intellectual influence and spiritual on Bahrain was stronger Safavid torule Shias started and inBahrain in1602their domination continued until 1717. 2.2 as an evolution of domestic political processes started in that 2000s and inearlier 1990s. the Bahrain in events of essence the attribute I movements. bottom-up and top-down of function a is Bahrain of liberalization visible the away, In Spring. Arab the for context the set that reasons, butmost of all,it helps one understand the nature of political and economic demands formation of civil society. historic Bahrain’s period of 2000sisimportantthe for many events have paved away for opening the of political space inBahrain andhaveto contributed legitimizemonarchicalhasin its regime soughtto itself the historic eyes populace. These of how the of are examples a newconstitution and elections parliamentary of institutionalization monarchy has embarked on substantial political reform beginningsince the of 2000s.Thethe his is inviolate. With ofKing’slegitimacy,nature this dual the Bahraini power considered andKing’s heis protector rule: the ultimate of of freedoms and rights the populace Bahrain’s The constitution of Bahrain provides us with a contextual understanding of legitimacyof the Juan Ricardo Cole, “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain”, February14, 2002. The Sunni-Shia Relationship they met this strategic and logistical problem, in part, with an ideological solution. ideological an with part, in problem, logistical and strategic this met they Ottomans, attacks.Asthey and off warding Portuguese 16 within did The facedSafavids island, the problem of arelatively borderingruling distant the The special place. a deserves relationship the Sunni-Shia perspective In historic and dismisses Ministers by Royal Decree as proposed by the Prime Minister. d. The King and appoints dismisses Primethe Minister byRoyal andOrder, appoints Sacred Space And Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ite Islam 17 th century Iran, century (NewYork: 30 31 CEU eTD Collection with majority the populationShia by ruled minority the Al-Khalifa family.Sunni Theoverall sectarian composition of Bahrain is unique for the entire Gulf Region. Itis the only monarchy the Nowadays, faced. have communities both the that challenges the and power-sharing Sunnis and has utmost Shias importance for understanding the historic roots of domestic statusandthe treatmentof Bahraini Thestructure Shias. of relationshipthe between the Columnfrom and thereby within.destabilize Bahrain use ShiaFifth willseek the to Iran Bahrain, with U.S.-backed the military confrontation By increase. adirect avoiding ifnot same help the will remain onexternal dependence Bahrain’s that assume to is safe it Bahrain, in southern stationed is Fleet U.S. Fifth fact the Given competing regional that powers. involveBahrain would the potentially two in conflict Sunni-Shia the in Egypt protests anti-Mubarak or Libya in war civil inter-tribal an Bahrain,butprotecting projecting and Sunnism in in GulfRegion.the Thus, comparison to as forces not stabilizing monarchiescanbeArab andinfactthe GCC regarded troops other for contagious be can example Bahraini The in government. are now Shias the where isin Iran by happened than Other inspiredreestablished. exampleof what the Iraq that, to its territory. andstate merging idea the to reanimate recognize asanindependent of Bahrain kingdom the This Bahrain.to be goal Iran’s clandestine seems obvious: to torevise the which 1970 agreements is how, as theafter the Islamic revolution, Iran hasIranian attempted to export the ideology of a Shia Muslim state way Bahrainrhetoric Iran showed reluctance to recognize Bahrain as anindependent state. Moreover, putslonghistory. Inthe 29 it, a has it and huge is Shias the Bahrain’s on influence Iranian the that shown has Spring Arab historic The justice will be Moreover, Iran’s involvement in domestic affairs of Bahrain is inherently linked to linked inherently is Bahrain of affairs in domestic involvement Iran’s Moreover, th century Iran’s special treatment of Bahrain was exemplified in the 18 CEU eTD Collection also be transposing their homegrown prejudices onto Bahrain’salso be homegrown onto theirstruggle.” transposing prejudices may foreigners] in [Sunni “some Yemen” and light of demonstrations and latest Pakistan, the of from consists force of like police Bahrain’s Sunni foreigners, Syria, recruited countries majority. The of recent findings investigativethe journalist suggest Malinowski “Much that, Shiasarein the population-wise the Secondly, arrived. tribes Arab the Al-Khalifa area before political representation in Bahrain grounds: basedon two first,historically Shiashadinhabitedthe this their for claim legitimate most the hold they that believe Shiites positions. high-ranking critical the for hired not are they usually and forces security in the existent non- is almost presence Their Bahrain. in representation political least the have they yet, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/07/prison_island. 34 beginning of2000s the Shias constituted theoverwhelming majority. 1950s, the Sunniand Shia populations were almost evenly divided, with a slight Shiite majority”, inthe 33 factbook/geos/ba.html. 32 immensehydrocarbon reserves. Bahrainhas been itsoperating fields oil since 1934 and 2.3 sectof Islam. the Shia to belonged Persians as in opposition indigenous wasrooted thefactan the SunniArabs against the Arabs that and speaking communities And it.within Thisis casenow. the yet,the overarching unity of sense afewPersian Arab with predominantly was population Shia the of composition ethnic Bahrain belongs to the Shia sect of Islam, they must bePersian. Infact, the pre-Al-Khalifa in since majority the makethat is conclusion to family. not This ahastened Al-Khalifa ruling of favor Sunnis which a would and presumably legitimateguarantee strong powerbasefor the in in Bahrain composition change sectarian the seeksto government the argue, some Shias Muslim population of Bahrain is 81%. MALINOWSKI, TOM. “Prison Island.” Foreign Policy, May 7, 2012. For the last sixty years the growing imbalance of population has changed in favor of Shias. If “In the early “Bahrain.” Cia World Factbook, n.d. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- Current Context Socio-Economic Unlike in other Gulf monarchies, the geological Gods have notendowed Bahrain with 32 Shia Bahrainis constitute about 70% out of it. 19 34 In doing so, as In so, doing 33 And CEU eTD Collection invested in financial sector. In short, the field of financial services is now considered to be the its economy and thanks toanincreasing numberof qualified workers it guest has heavily nowadays:diversify Thus, they made true Bahrainhasmanagedwhich holds aprediction to Sinclairback in 1979 concluded: its economy as well.While Bahrain’s Birks capacity foranalyzing diversification, and Abu Saafa oil field with Arabia.Saudi joint the explores Bahrain in Currently, a decade. deplete probably most gas reserveswill promising either. The same report claims that with the current rateof consumption, Bahrain’s 38 http://www.oilandgasdirectory.com/research/Bahrain.pdf. 37 36 USA: CongressionalResearch Service, May14, 2012. P. 30,https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf. 35 of the of 67,000 bdp, has whileconsumption increasedby almost 46%since 2002”isin the said report inproduction stagnant hasbeen Bahrain thelast over – sixyears, averaging 50,000 about simultaneouslyin Bahrainstarted with a declineof inoil “Oil early production 2000s. liberalization political of process the that indicative is It years. 15 or 10 in reserves oil of out of gas. meters cubic trillion and 5.3 barrels of oil million at210 estimated are gas reserves and oil Bahrain’s currently J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, “Bulletin:(British Society for Middle Eastern Studies)” 6, no. 1 (1979): 48. Kingdom of Bahrain. Oil and Gas Directory Middle East, 2011. Bahrain is the only oil exporting Gulf Monarchy not a member of the OPEC. Katzman, Kenneth. Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy. CRS Report for Congress. Washington DC, Oil andGasDirectory economies” their diversify to first the being of advantage the nor resources, human of follow. Despiteto impossible it find states their oil-exporting other that stronger example an setting be might financial base they have In neitherany case, whatever path is followed in foran preparing oil-less future, Bahrain the flexibility in terms diversify to hasattempted Bahrain rent, on external its dependence remaining Despite 38 35 for 2011 36 According to the most optimist estimates, Bahrain will run will Bahrain estimates, optimist most the to According . 37 The prospects for future natural arenot forgas reserves natural future The prospects 20 CEU eTD Collection world-factbook/geos/ba.html. 39 and or the TV radio, police, state like in defense, sectors never employment allowed consideredbe can as this and regime a the of rentendurance in the interest vested for a have family loyalAl-Khalifa Shias.the to loyal are “However”,who Those business. or position a governmental in Bahraini Shiite single asno Faramazi argues, “…Shiitesopportunity, the probability of social unrestincreases as well.are Thisis not to claim that there isalmost higher level of employment among a for account casecannot in sector Bahraini the non-oil of assume development the that to the Shia population. In the Stemmingabsence is factor from discontent. Itleadsthis thenecessity external me receiving rent. of of real employment effective means remains the increase of social welfare payments so that to buy off the most the conditions, these Under solution. be animmediate cannot programs creation job ambitious thelong-term then sector, financial serves for andqualification skills necessary alreadyShias lack local of to the If the grievances undereducated population. existing Shia number migrantsConsequently, from of increasing the worker has countries other contributed requiresinternational highlyqualifiedimport and workforce them. hasto Bahrain frequently and skills the lackdiscriminated of financial forappropriate which services sector the unemployment of the large for reason of for underlying all The ofjobin society. segments terms the inclusive creation segment of the Shia population is two-fold: Shias are more with 20%. being overallunemploymentthe around Shias are them of majority the unemployed, the of division sectarian the in distinction clear most pressing issues of the present-day Bahrain.Although the official figures tend not to set a UAE suchthe andQatar. giants major innon-oil sector facingBahrain, where isBahrain by increasing competition regional “CIA “CIA Bahrain.” Central Intelligence Agency, May 3, 2012. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- A notwithstanding, non-oil developing sector unemploymentremains asone of the 21 39 The non-oil sector has not been not has sector non-oil The CEU eTD Collection agreed to the GCC-initiated “Gulf Plan.” Marshall GCC-initiated agreed tothe Bahrain perspective, short-term in the jobs create to unable and own, its of means financial in an effort to head off social protest” this has not been the case in Bahrain. case the been not has this protest” social off head to effort an in heavyweights drastically expanded their welfare entitlements and developmenthydrocarbon expenditures world’s Arab “the while Thus, rent. external through se per unrest the off stave essential realized hasbeen only in Thepriority most short-term to perspective. long-term the population. Sunni majority the over rule towards Shias the Bahrain wasfuelled bythesituationof in Alawite wherethe Syria Shias brutal attitude their Arab unrest Spring forces during the and security the for were recruited 44 AprilInstitute, 2012. http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201204.yom.monarchy-arab-spring.pdf. 43 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/07/prison_island president faces in viewofthe popularelections could mean the loss of realpower. For more info Since Syria has a republican type of regime, his legitimacy is based on elections and the dilemma that the power struggle shifted in favor of Shia Alawites who are in minority. The ruling Asad family belongs ruling elite in Syria haveto always thisbeen the Sunni dynasties.sect. However, after Syria got independence in 1971, 42 41 40 Bahrain now, and most of them are working for the security forces.”in seen be can Bedouins Syrian many that doubt no is There population. native the of percent number“such 50,000additional13 of families implies a large about 40,000to population, or that contends al-Jamri Mansur expats, Syrian to reference In forces. security in striking most countries come to and settle inBahrain workforce.as The presence of Sunni expat Muslims is otherMuslim favorable authorities of the Sunnis for conditions or neighboring from creating information ministry, though there’s no law barring them.” no there’s though ministry, information This generous financial package in the amount of $ 10 billion is often referred to as “Gulf Marshall Plan”. Yom,Sean. “Understanding the Resilience of Monarchy During the Arab Spring.” Foreign Policy Research Thesituation in the Syrian Arab Republic has many resemblances to that of Bahrain. Thus,historically the Al-Jamri, Mansoor. “State and Civil Society in Bahrain.” 7. Chicago, IL., USA, 1998. 12,2011):41–42. (September The Nation inBahrain.” Faramarzi. “Clampdown Scheherzade, The promises of more job creation announced by the Bahraini government can be can government Bahraini the by announced creation job more of promises The 42 22 44 40 However, many many accuse Shias However, 41 TheSunniSyrians 43 See: Lacking CEU eTD Collection 45 authorities fail achieveto any viable solution to the political deadlock, then the situation risks in way. a radical opponents political react to to tendency ruling family either. the for was yearsby deadline The unacceptable opposition lasthispower. setthe the 10 of significantly damaged the reputation of the King who has positioned himself as a reformer for offers.accept This not those did movement Shiite leadersthe Al-Wefaq the of However, of Kingthe air toopposition.on following went request andmadeareasonable address the Prince Crown The dialogue. national a of announcement the after even place taking still were protests the However, opposition of detainedthe most protesters. dialogue released and national a declared authorities the forces, and security between demonstrators streets the on wereShias. February 2011. The Inmid-February,protesters majority of violentafter clashes group. represented politically but majority least Bahrain the are the others due itsto strategic position in the Gulf Region. Unlike other Gulf monarchies, Shias in type whileBahrainisamonarchy. Bahrain more Moreover, isrelatively vulnerable than what was going on in other during theArab winter of 2011. The situation in Bahrain had similaritiesstates. with and differences from All of the abovelikefor uprising. the inTunisia,and Egypt, Just Libya, in “Arab the erupted Spring” Bahrain countries have republican are factors of whichhaveshapedtheircause fundamental structural Bahrainis the grievances regime earlierin hadThe which started 2011. was impact Arab of revolutions the factor other immediate leading factor and The uprising. the astructural factor immediate between an 2.4 Thedeadline set by the opposition basically presupposed the soonest resignation of the government. Bahrain andthe Arab Spring Meanwhile, the Al-Wefaq leadership made it fairly clear that if the opposition and the and opposition if the that clear fairly it made leadership Al-Wefaq the Meanwhile, since mid- growing were government against Bahraini the reaction of the The protests distinction a make to important is it Spring, Arab the and Bahrain analyzing When 45 Obviously, this has more todo with the lack of political culture and the 23 CEU eTD Collection 47 reserves. 46 place monarchy.call foran Afterall June took in Bahrain that violation end to 29, on the shouting protesters be Family”. “Down with Al-Khalifa the regardedasanobvious Thiscan more and changedwith of demands nature the protesters at shooting had after faced, they that inequality about more were opposition Bahraini the of demands chief the shooting than the Prime Minister who ordered toshoot Shiite atthe protesters. whoordered thePrime Minister than Constitution. This shows that in Bahrain there is more Ibntrust towards the IsaCrown Prince ratherAl-Khalifapolitical. essentially were they social, to just than more discusswere opposition jointly Shiite demands of the ShiiteIndeed,the political of the demands opposition. satisfy broader new reformauthorities followed with of murderbutregard tothe several not they demonstrators did plan, as bythe of Bahraini declared athree-month state apologies emergency. The government well as the stabilizeof domesticthe assisting to authorities the Bahraini situation. March 15the On draft of the Thus forces Bahrainon Arabia March headedby GCC purpose 13 the with the entered Saudi new Arabia Iran. and Saudi of confrontation of a largerregional asa“micro-reflection” be seen Bahraini “Fifth Column”.as Shias a In way, the Shia-Sunniconfrontation in could Bahrain Bahrain liveinduce itself position view Iran interests asadefenderto of their andto the of Bahrain their from get support spiritual The conditionsIran. underwhich Shiasof the factor. If the Bahraini royal family has a strong affiliation with the Saudi monarchy, the Shias this by explained is in Bahrain involvement military GCC the and is strong monarchies Saudi areasof populated Arabia.Eastern Shia- the onto effect contagious a have to Bahrain in instability the expect rightly may who get to out of incontrol.Saudi message Thisasense, was, analarmingArabian to authorities Therefore, initially the conciliatory communication took place between the King and the opposition. InSaudi Arabia the Shias are in minority but the areas they inhabit - the eastern Saudi Arabia -has huge oil There was an offer by the Shiite opposition to the Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad CrownPrinceSalman the by to opposition Shiite the offerThere wasan 46 The solidarity between the Saudi and Bahraini 24 47 If before the act of CEU eTD Collection http://www.biciactions.bh/wps/portal/BICI/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3gLAxNHQ093A3f3A 50 49 Congressional Research Service, May 14, 2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf., p.12 AL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/EGOV+English+Library/BICI/Actions+Taken/ RUBACcUdSf/dl3/d3/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9ZQnZ3LzZfT0FISUdHRzBHT0Q5OTBJUFAzR0RLNDIwVTU!/?WCM_GLOB EcjA88AQ09DFwtDYwMzY_1wkA48Kgwh8v6OHp7u7iB5c0tLoLyrhatzkKmxgYkxRN4AB3A00PfzyM9N1S_Izg6ycF 48 compensate victims.” compensate and investigate abuses committed andto peaceful violenceprotesters against future protesters.” against and forced useof force, confessions, including excessive torture “systematic anddeliberate found Amongin things,made BICIwerethe November2011. other the report public as basisnational of the dialogueincludedindependentlegal it five as Theexperts. findingsof King the2011, the initiated Bahrain BICI served Commission Independent Inquiry of (BICI). investigation of violence, followed by the implementation of the National Commission. National the of implementation the by followed violence, of investigation the aim launchto a “parliament with full authority”, the King Hamad formed the BICI for the mechanisms. For example, the Crown Price Salman initiated “seven principles” program with monarchy has largelylegitimize soughtto its through power enactmentthe of conciliatory practice.” international in with best accords a way andmedia sectors that services policing,security rights, human justice, the reform to Government the with hard worked has “Commission that, saying recommendations of implementation the towards efforts government’s the praised principle National inCommission issued final on turn the March report in report20, 2012.The The recommendations. of implementation the administer to established was Commission a National 26, November on and BICIrecommendations implementthe to importance Full text of the National Commission Report is available at: Kenneth Katzman, Ibid., p. 13 From the analysis of events unfolding in Bahrain it should be assumed that the that be assumed should it Bahrain in unfolding events of analysis the From Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy 48 The includedBICI also specific to“prevent onhow recommendations 49 50 Upon the release of the report, King report, Hamad acknowledged the Uponthe of the release 25 , CRS Report for Congress (Washington DC, USA: CEU eTD Collection maintain their legitimacy through institutionalization of liberal reforms. However, Bahrain is Bahrain However, reforms. liberal of institutionalization through legitimacy their maintain to managed largely have monarchies the that means essentially which, Monarchies Arab in been any of regime changerevolution the and a single Therehas not Morocco Jordan. form legitimate monarchical is of inArab specifically governance monarchies,present Gulf that the rule of a monarch is rooted in institutional foundations of statecraft. Currently from stems assumption the legitimacy monarchical of concept The legitimacy. monarchical 3.1 explanation. aplausible whether they provide explain for in the reason regime andof identify Bahrain stability is purpose the section this to seek three theoriesto which has introduced faced.monarchies have Thisthesis not other both – continuing stability monarchicalof regime and a higherdegree of social unrest which of ithas thecombination case: asacritical Bahrain whyIresearch is reason Spring. the This in face Arab resilientthe the of remained has essentially monarchy Bahraini the However, heightened political instability in theform demonstrationsof street since February 2011. escaped not has it States, United the with particularly relations alliance and legitimacy monarchical legitimacy. of economies,strategicwithwhichoutside alliance and powers enjoy major strong stability instates whichshare patterns similar ofbehavior i.e.stateswhich have rentier type My hypothesis is following:the Bahrain. in stability regime to building) alliance and state, rentier legitimacy, (monarchical Theory ofMonarchicalLegitimacy Theory In this chapter I will test three theoretical approaches introduced in chapters earlier introduced approaches will theoretical three I In thistest chapter The second theory to be tested in relation to the critical case of Bahrain is with strongmonarchical state asarentier Bahrain islargely Although regarded CHAPTER THREE: THEORY TESTING These three wouldtheories predict monarchical regime 26 CEU eTD Collection (Beacon Press, 2005). p.61 2005). Press, (Beacon 52 51 an obvious exception to the tendency of resilient stability in monarchical monarchical instates. stability tendency the an resilient of exception to obvious Wefaq took activeWefaq took partin formation the relativelyof more vibrantcivil society. Thisis notto Al- as such movements opposition Shia main The Bahrain. in processes political of nature parliamentary elections.place since 1999and it allowed of theparticipation banned previously political societies in It also taken has in Bahrain space paved of political liberalization relative The Bahrain. in a wayliberalization for a more open and 1999, Kinghimselfthe hassocial beenrathersupportive ofa certain degree of political discussion on assumptionthe of institutional statecraft of monarchy. First of all, since his inception to power in Qatar, and Bahrain, which enjoy some aspects of democracy and afree press.” occasional relatively bright spot in the Arab world, such as the three Gulf countries, Kuwait, analysis of democracy issuesin the Arab Rashidworld, Khalili “thereargues, is the his In hybrid regimes. and autocracies pure of asthose monarchies arecategorized Gulf any the change, to is asaregion resilient seen in what usually speaking, monarch? Generally of parliamentary strong Minister, of powers over the control the institutionalization and Prime of government the is be changed to need what but legitimacy, holds still monarchy legitimacy in the eyes of its population,monarchy inBahrain? be it Sunni or Shia?critical question in this is:regard If no, then would it mean thatmost Hence, the groups. by of nature getasensedemands opposition the of necessary to is it population, its of face the in legitimacy holds still monarchy Bahrain’s why understand To more unstable. beenrelatively has Bahrain monarchies Gulf with other comparison in yet, and Bahrain, in change regime actual been not has there Tunisia, and Syria, Egypt, Rashid Khalidi, Chapter threeelaborates on thedetails of what took in place Bahrain since February of 2011. The legitimacy of the Bahraini monarch Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa is based on the on based is Khalifa Al Isa bin Hamad monarch Bahraini the of legitimacy The Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints And America’s Perilous Path In The Middle East If yes, would it mean that the Bahraini monarchy has lost its Do BahrainiShiaoppositiongroups demand theendto 27 52 51 Unlike in CEU eTD Collection ttp://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ba00000_.html. 53 family has a lotin common with Saudi Arabia since this is where the Al-Khalifa tribes such The SaudiArabia. Bahraini of royal world by as Arab accepted the weight” “heavy the is Bahrain how on depends foremost and first legitimacy The well. as neighbors Arab The monarchical basedrule onthe Sharia Lawhas a strong appeal for Bahrain’s regional legitimized: withwhich starts name and of the God virtues the by which monarch is rulethe of constitution Bahraini the of preamble the in highlighted is Islam on based rule monarchical stability through institutionalizationthe of formalsome the of elements democracy. ensure political domestic Bahraini monarchy the seeksto powerbase, losingits legitimate increaseoff an of wavesthrough imitationthe opposition riskdemocracy. Thus,without of itinfend factaims hybridbut to democratic rule, the of perception monarch Bahraini creates of institutionalthe statecraft the monarch. Therefore, of Bahraini the powers executive the on limitation any entail not would in Bahrain space political of liberalization visible the inbe questioned. it Hence, principlecannot state, the of constitution by institutionalized the is consequences competition.Becausemonarch’s rule an open unexpected of political within of monarchy:statecraft amonarch institutional the is essentially secure from framed inWest.The liberalization should be healthough hiseducation theaim of received claimininterest King had developing Hamad agenuinethat political pluralismin Bahrain “The “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain”, February14, 2002, responsibilities; international and pan-Arab national, our of awareness and faith, certainty, determination, our with line in Bahrain, of Kingdom the of Sovereign Khalifa, Al Isa In name the on high,God of and with His blessing,and with His help, weHamad bin The Bahrain. in legitimacy monarchical the of source second is the Religion 53 28 CEU eTD Collection resources in particular oil. Secondly, such a state is also a recipient of external military and military of external a recipient is astate also such oil.Secondly, in particular resources of natural exports from the generated revenues and oil resources with significant a state wouldmean arentier state context, Eastern Middle the In rent. and economic/military exports 3.2 stability. explain regime to explain to Based analysisinstitution monarchy onthis wecantheory of is the that of observe plausible and religious factorsother words, the Arabneed Spring provides us with a contextual framework into which the economic be set apart so notitbut does mean the that opposition awhole demandsas theendofmonarchythat per se.In to comprehend themonarchy. componentof This monarchialthe isapproach statecraft substantially challenged, true nature of events. limitation on the eyes of the Shia population but the central demand of the disenfranchised population isput to true in terms of ensuring stability.means It that theAl-Khalifafamily is still legitimate in the to assume that the religious legitimacy component of the monarchical statecraft theory holds Shia-Sunni factor does notplay a significant role in the structure of the conflict, then itis safe Moreover, many claim that the structure of the conflict is not sectarian but economic. If the during did recent the upheavalsdemand themajority not protesters of end the monarchy. notin favor of complete regime change which would mean the end monarchy of per se. Even basis,but majority is the everyday Shia of discrimination on place takes though, Shias the of Bahrain distinguish notbetween does Sunni the and segments Shia of population. The of constitution The family. ruling the of legitimacy religious the of view in relationship common values of the Sharia system of governance. originally from.bonds bilateral Strong came Arabia in between andBahrainSaudi are rooted Rentier State Theory State Rentier In this section two forms of external rent will be discussed: rent generated from oil Bahrain, however, is essentially a critical case when it comes to the Sunni-Shia constitutional powers of makeKing i.e. constitutional Bahrain a of to the true 29 CEU eTD Collection http://www.oilandgasdirectory.com/research/Bahrain.pdf. 57 Arabia or Iran. 1994. However, it wasten times less than the production levels of regional “natural gashegemons” like Saudi production: the natural gasproduction inBahrain increased 4.5 fromin 1985, to 6.0 billioncubic meters in 56 55 Press, 2008)p.145. University 54 diversify its economy. As a result of it, the non-oil sector started to develop. For example, 100years.another almost and todeplete in Kuwait of lastArabia, expected for Qatar will 10-15 whereas those Saudi are reserves oil now, Bahrain’s As of economy. typeof a rent-seeking of emergence for the considered as amajor oil producer on regionalthe level, itsbut oil production was sufficient never was Bahrain Thus, organization. this of a member not is itself Bahrain giants, Moreover, despitethe fact thattheislandmonarchy is surrounded with oil-exporting OPEC oilto the section production by 1996,1997andthe of British 1999reports Petroleum. since beginningthe of 2000s the has significantly decreased. Bahrain even not was included decline Gulf the oil production and 1990s,Bahrain’s the came to Region.gradually During there was no serious population pressure economy. Bahrain’s of diversification the arrange to weresufficient revenues the as Bahrain’s population was one of theof its revenuessmallest in the form of rent from oil exports. in territory of Bahrain. Around the when time Bahrain its independencegained it most received the on discovered were Region Gulf Persian in the fields oil first the Historically production. political stabilityin Bahrain? is: section this of question central case.The theory Bahraini state on the rentier inmind,the economic Iapply this aid. Having Forreference see BP reports onnatural resources. A reverse trend is seen with Bahrain’s natural gas Oil and Journal, Oil Gas J.H. Bamberg, Kingdom of Bahrain Decreasing oil reserves notwithstanding, Bahrain has successfully managedto successfully has Bahrain notwithstanding, reserves oil Decreasing and oil exports oil Bahrain’s analyze Iwillfirst factor, state rentier the understand To British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975: The Challenge of Nationalism (Oil and Gas Directory Middle East, 2011), East, Middle Directory Gas and (Oil Word Petroleum Report, 1968 57 Is rentierismastrongfactorexplaining thedurability of Petroleum, (British August 12,1968). 30 54 With less than 500 bpdin oil production (Cambridge 55 Moreover, 56 CEU eTD Collection http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/02/139877.html. 59 Shia Bahraini middle class. discrimination of the majority of Shias and their inability to join theworkforce impedes the emergence of the 58 Bahrain isand Oman) around 1.35billion USD. public,open to amount estimated the of of surplus assets members GCC the (excluding not is aid financial the of amount exact the Although payments. welfare into money more injecting by Bahrain, of stability domestic short-term maintain to is Plan” Marshal “Gulf the of goal ultimate the essence, In Plan”. Marshall “Gulf asthe known Council Cooperation from Gulf economicthe package aid significant has received Bahrain of unrest, the dependence onforeign buy aid “to its way of Subsequently,out trouble”. since beginning the rising in The popularBahrain hasrevealedmonarchy’s unrest. particularly uprising growing revenues from makeoil production the authorities increasingly unable tobuy off currently the a sustainable development. lead to maynot economy how a semi-diversified/hybrid-rentier illustrated Shia majority and the of discontent fundamental the solve not did economy its diversify to efforts Bahrain’s workforce simply because they lack the necessary educational degrees and skills. educational degrees necessary lack simply because the they workforce employment. The poorly layers educated of Shiathe population are unabletojoin this require qualified laborforce,only fraction a tiny of local population could getsuch an population is Sincecomposed of expats. most of in jobs the international banking andfinance growing This workforce. largelyexplains reason why almost the athird of Bahraini the the into majority Shia the integrate to failed has government Bahraini the where is this however in Bahrain; opportunities and employment investment more of also came economy diversification the With Region. Gulf the of hub banking a become has Bahrain 1990s since “GulfStates toAid Unrest-hit Bahrain, Oman: Report,” Although there are successful Shia entrepreneurs, their numbers are very small. Moreover, the Therefore, Bahrain’s recent uprising is often traced to the fact that its dwindling fact to the that traced is uprisingoften Bahrain’s recent Therefore, 31 59 Al-Arabiya , March 2,2011, 58 Inshort, CEU eTD Collection presence, the United States also seeks to project its power vis-à-vis that of Islamic of the that vis-à-vis its power project seeks to also States United the presence, military substantial its through Secondly, particular. in Bahrain and Monarchies Gulf majority of by the Iran towards perception from a common threat stems cooperation security this then, Clearly alliance. – Bahraini U.S the of meaning special the conditions essentially This factor Fleet. Fifth American of the location strategic of because the place a special taken has region, the of monarchy island only the Bahrain, States. United the with ties security bilateral UAE, haveArabia, all strong Kuwait and Qatar, Saudi key security provider. provider between representa classicfirstandforemost, relationship ties, Bahraini strategic has of the U.S- powers relationshipnature alliance.Thus, the dual reflected other the with Bahrain’s strategic context, Arab Spring inthe alliance, – Bahraini U.S. the With regard to hand.other the on alliance Bahrain-GCC the and hand one the on States United the and Bahrain between relationship strategic the explain regimethrough stability seeksto the essentially approach 3.3 areas throughforeign aid. in distressed grievances of addressingsocial people achievedby would beultimately stability short-term that I conclude behavior, rentier Bahrain’s of analysis the through Therefore, foreign aid. of recipient the has become changed Bahrain since the nothas economy of nature rentier the however, oil revenues, of share due todecreasing context Middle Eastern ina rentier state a classic beconsidered cannot Bahrain theory: state rentier the supports foreign for aid.The evidence thenecessity economic of mostaccepting plausible explanation Theory of Alliance Building 3.1.1 theoretical This building. alliance is section in this tested be to theory final The the provides ultimately theory state rentier the framework, theoretical In ageneral and a The U.S – Bahraini Security Alliance security seeker security . For the majority theof Gulf monarchies, the United States is a 32 a security CEU eTD Collection 60 Bahrain being as part of Iran’s sphere of influence part or of Iranian the cultural areal. Bahrain as independent an state ruled by Sunni the Al-Khalifa dynasty and considered see to reluctant been have leaders Iranian Hardline independence. Bahrain’s of years initial Gulf monarchies. In particular, the history of Bahrain’s securitization of Iran dates back to the fragility of the statehood istowards of inthe military region the perception Western presence for heavy reason Another in Gulf Region. Western oil the interests to threat as permanent Iran of legacy andsecuritization colonial tothe linked isinextricably presence in Gulf the region military American andlater TheBritish actors. security of motivations the understand outcome ofstrategicrelationship United betweenBahrainandthe States? would be: Persian the Gulf above,is Havingsaidthe key self-explanatory. the question of this section supply uninterrupted of from oil is region the heavy concerned,the U.S military in presence well as its aspirations to gain more control of the Strait of Hormuz. As far as the Republicpotential projection in for current Iran’s of Iran. power the PersianGulfisas real of of countries against Middlethe wereusedas Sovieta expansionism. Eastern the proxies In explains Bahrain’s balancingprevailing stanceagainstIran. is that of a security seekerpowers such as the USA. As mentioned earlier, the relationship between Bahrainand and the U.S. a security from outside seeksecurity former to the hasIran caused Bahrain towards perception of threat provider. Thus, the securitizationbelongs to the Shia sect ofof IslamIranan makes largelyattempt them a potential for targetcoup out in1981 carried and 1971 independenceafter recognize Bahraini to forwas overtly reluctant d’etat Iran to manipulate. in Bahrain. The The fact that the majority of population in Bahrain 70 % of the population of Bahrain consists of Shias. To analyze the prevailing pattern of behavior in the Gulf Region, it is necessary to necessary is it Region, Gulf in the behavior of pattern prevailing the analyze To Balancing was present during the Cold War aswellhoweverBalancing waspresentduringmost Cold the time period atthat is alliance building aplausible theory forexplainingregime stability asan 33 60 Iran CEU eTD Collection 62 International System 61 was Although Iran internal affairs. inBahrain’s interfering of tosendaccuse Iran started eruption the after protests inviolentof street February-March Bahraini 2011, the authorities Bahraingrounds securitizes Iran hence a and tiltsbalancing towards behavior. Thus,soon period. Iranin inbehavior post-Cold War the to relation Bahrain of explains thebalancing accurately goal of the U.S policy is to prevent the emergence of a regional the whereas power. other This each picturebalance to seek that states regional is the it nowadays and inwards assumedin that a post-Cold War Gulf modeRegion of the balancingbehaviorhas shifted been emergingasan ambitious regional United tothe counter-balance States. Thus, itcan be has ambitions enrichment uranium its with Iran hand, other the On increased. tremendously toppling Saddam Hussain, role of the in Unitedthe States security issues of has region the of moment the Since Iraq. against War 2003 the until up policy regional of matrix this was the primary U.S objective Region Gulf the from dominating Arab state a single preventing that contends further Ayoob during the war against Iraq. intervention inintervention Kuwait Ayoob Mohammad argues, rivalrypower ambitions for Iraqi regional became Analyzingdominance Iraq’s obvious. major competing powers were Israel, Iraq and Iran. In the absence of Cold War - style super-post-Cold the relations Warperiod have into evolved adifferentmode. Until 2003 three Ibid. p. 123 Mohammed Ayoob, Putting this analysis into the Arab Spring framework helps to identify on which on identify to helps framework Spring Arab the into analysis this Putting in the Middle East in favor of the Soviet Union.” country would not be viewed byWashington majoras a shiftin thebipolar equation relaxed the of nature superpower relations, an given Iraqi move into asmall, neighboring that perception leadership’s Iraqi the on in part least at based been have “The end of the Cold War also influenced the Iraqi decision. This decision seemed to (Lynne Rienner 1995) p.122. Publishers, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the 34 61 62 The USA largely maintained largely USA The CEU eTD Collection CongressionalService, Research May 14, 2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf. p.25 65 http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf. p. 387 the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 64 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704547804576261222747330438.html. 63 affairs of Bahrain though: Bahrain of affairs internal the into involvement Iranian of evidence no found has Government Bahraini the support from Iran aswell. withprovided only support, claimingspiritual others thatBahrainisin fact received material thatIran claiming with some precise either, intelligence isnot from U.S the information The protesters. the material to help it provided allegedly that denies the accusations openly political supportive of ofShia aspirations official opposition the groups, Tehran Bahrain” domestic affairs,The BICI buthas “theessentially report blames disproved Iran’s claims media thatfor incitementIran was actively of the situationinvolved inin Bahrain’s the former to opposition protests. In other words, the Shia opposition of Innot formerthe toopposition Shia words,other the Bahrain did of protests. opposition outcome of the U.S – Bahraini strategic alliance relationship conditioned the silent reaction of its interest of security into Followingprovider. the Arab further this the context, Spring Fleet arecrucial components of projectionpower and hence stability in is Bahrain in the Fifth U.S of the existence andthe of location Bahrain strategic key Gulf The the Region. in projection its power for U.Sfaces the necessity the with logically This squares projection. seeker from the alliancementioned Hence,Iran, as Bahrainhas historic earlier,be roots. regardedasasecurity should with the United States with the aim to balance the Iranian power Kenneth Katzman, Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni,Badria Al-Awadhi,Nigel Rodley,Philippe Kirsch,Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Adam Entous, Matthew Rosenberg, “U.S. Says Helps CrackdownIran in Syria,” and March 2011 and the Islamic Republic of Iran. in Bahrain February during incidents occurred specific that linkbetween discernable a establish not does Bahrain of affairs internal in the Iran of Republic Islamic The evidence presented to the Commission by the GoB on the involvement by the 65 The findingsmay but Bahrain’s of report the sound convincing, suspicion towards Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy 63 The Independent Commission by The Inquiry of Commission (BICI)established Independent (Manama, Bahrain, 23,2011), November Bahrain, (Manama, 35 , CRS Report for Congress (Washington DC, USA: 64 Wall Street Journal , 14, April Report of CEU eTD Collection the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 66 the across elements terrorist subversive and“its Iran counter to was deployment military security,intelligence and defense advisorto GCC the said thatthebasic motive behindthe deployment,during Dr.Sami aninterview when reason asked aboutthe fora troop Alfaraj, perception of the Bahraini government and the Bahraini opposition is different. For example, protests orwell-calculated movetoshow toIran? muscles is: question relevant Andhence the Bahrain. to military of deployment GCC the definepattern causal the seek to Gulf Council in March-April Cooperation as aresult will 2011. Thissub-section uprisings of variable. explanatory a plausible alliance through stability render factors These region. to this stability projectsubstantial by to interest U.S. agreater havegenerated of supplies oil contain andsecure Monarchies, provide security for Gulf necessity Iran, to to the considered, alsosources, but waslargely bysuchguided hegemona regional as All Iran. things the Bahrain political organization stemmedfrom though, the notonly opposition of domestic of case the In domestic. caseswas inthose the opposition of foundation political as the lostTunisia, and political The Libya side legitimacy was too. U.S.position with protesters to leaders uprisings Egypt, since there of theirpopulation of own during with killings the wasdifferent Tunisia. Therhetoric or Egypt, Syria, in stanceLibya, casesof U.S the to the “national dialogue” started there had been dozens killed protests. killed hadduring there dozens been started dialogue” “national by step asidethe time the even urge Kingto though the butdidnot a “national dialogue”, for called has repeatedly Administration Obama The of U.S. the support political receive the Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni,Badria Al-Awadhi,Nigel Rodley,Philippe Kirsch,Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The answer tothis question iswho on obviously depends being Theasked. threat The second building form of aid ismilitary alliance Bahrain that from received the 3.1.2 The GCC– Bahraini Security Alliance was themotive behind themilitaryaid, prevention ofgrowing social . p.166 . 36 66 This is in contrast is in This Report of CEU eTD Collection oil. 68 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/2011626112649845386.html. 67 documents illustrates that the GCC troop deployment is more in line with the concept of concept the with line in more is deployment troop GCC the that illustrates documents official of examination careful the defense, of framework collective into the situation examples of alliance building. Thus,although officialthe narrative byBahrainis place to the are of concepts these defense.Both security and collective collective building: alliance andstates domestic is the military external stability achievedthrough political aid. building theory. Put simply, alliance deployment isin theGCCwithin an of security troop collective accounts, example the case of Bahrain the source of threat comes from within GCC”. Arabia to step up efforts so thatKingdom, securitization the instability in incentiveof wasasa Bahrain strong for Saudi to maintain a zone of stabilityKeeping inmind that Saudi Arabia alsohas Shiaa significant in population eastthe of the in the Gulf region. strategic player of the GCC and has a vested interest in motive underlying of Arabia Saudi toleadsubduing thedeployment. troop SaudiArabia is a key the Shia rebels of Bahrain. notfrom emerge with is framework from but Collective within.outside true security also the threats security: collective of concept the in linewith is more reaction GCC the case, In this instability GCC, the inis by Bahrain caused which by groups terrorist the are regulated Iran. the For Iran. and Bahrain between war actual of evidence is no there secondly, and defense, an of isnotcollective because organization GCCitself first, the defense: of collective document.by GCC In this the cannotbe military deploymentcontext, concept the explained in entire “military” word the of mentioning no is there that shows Charter the of examination The GCC by its Charter does not set collective defense as one of its objectives. Careful In In Saudi Arabia the Shias are in minority unlike in Bahrain. But they mostly inhabit the territories rich with ShenazKermali, “The GCC Is Expanding ItsArmy, but for What?”, July2, 2011, 67 In sum, presentsection the has identified of two patterns withinengagement the However, here the line between collective security and collective defense isblurred. defense security collective and linebetween herethe collective However, 37 68 By all CEU eTD Collection memberstates, troop deployment a collectivein security framework is mostly regarded as on-demand basis. anNATO is example of collective defense. If collective defense presupposes permanent military bases in 69 being a security seeker and the U.S being a security provider. Acting as a deterrent against a deterrent Acting as being provider. asecurity U.S seeker andthe beinga security Bahrain nature: dual is of relationship this earlier mentioned As in Bahrain. regime political monarchical regime would have faced challenges more serious of survival. of thestability help external in economic of absence toassumethe that reasonable by of and outcome the inLibya, politicalthe upheavals it Tunisia, Egypt, be would Judging rent. astrategic considered is now Marshal form “Gulf aidinthe Plan” of economic external the transformed: has been of rent-seeking pattern the that showed Arab Spring is itsystem thatpreviously used toreceive mainlyfrom rents The oil and exports. production rent-seeking theBahraini of peculiarity The inBahrain. system rent-seeking the of nature thechanging explains accurately theory state rentier case,the in Bahraini the Particularly plausible explanation for the durability of monarchical regimes in the Gulf region. similar characteristics. Out of three theories, rentier state and alliance building retain the most theabovementioned instates stability regime would predict state rentier and building alliance legitimacy, monarchical of theories the that was assumption The Bahrain. of case critical 3.4 is deploymenttherefore for the stability. necessity tomaintain troop and forces of securitization domestic Bahrain’s security explains collective Meanwhile, Bahrain’s securitization of Iran andis hence, ensuingthe balancing Iran. behavior towards with line in is defense collective that shown has analysis the Thus, GCC. the and U.S the collective defenseallows us understandto the mechanism Bahrain’s allianceof building with security. collective An example of collective security framework is the League of Nations and later the United Nations whereas Three Theories Revisited Theories Three The alliance building theory retains the most explanatory power for the stability of the tothe in relation applied approaches theoretical has three analyzed The third chapter 69 The distinction between the concepts of collective security and security collective of concepts the between distinction The 38 CEU eTD Collection events of the Arab Spring poses a serious challenge to the concept of legitimacy. monarchical concept of tothe challenge Araba serious poses of events Spring the during the actors of narrative of King.The the powers the limits on more constitutional questionthe of Shia the whether demand opposition groups the endofmonarchy itself or internal members threats. from to Bahrain other and deploymentmandate of theGCC aimed GCC.Thus, the troop atproviding collective security the opposes threat of nature the over rhetoric official in a case Bahrain to deployment troop better explanation within the concept of collective security. Having said that, I argue the GCC difficult to regardis it the threat external GCC a real of absence operationthe in that shown have I my research In asperceived. an example of collective defense whereasis deployment theway be troop the and unclear its affects seems to defense collective it finds a and security collective between this line of In Bahrain, case critical the threat. Iranian intervention,by official accordingcarriedrhetoric of to out was containingconsiderations the GCC the Iconclude that its mandate, of examination of GCCandcareful the charter to the By toArabmonarchies. reference further spreadof unrest to preventthe activities or terrorist” “Iranian the contain to way a as deployed were troops GCC the either explanation: motivequestion deployment aboutthe troop for the by atwo-fold GCC.Ipresented the maintaining alliance stability building. Bahrain’simportancethrough for the GCC the raised politicalthe immunity to monarchicalthe leadership of Bahrain. harsh criticism of the Bahraini governmentraise to States United the of The reluctance protests. of opposition crackdown government or lack of demands for a regime changestrategic largely relationship United States with the explains USA’ssilentreaction on ensured hegemon. Thus, theIran in Gulf the Region, Washington’s primary is toprevent theemergence of a regional importance of Bahrain’s location close to the Gulf oil fields and the The theoretical approach of monarchical legitimacy provide monarchical to legitimacy The theoretical ananswerto sought of approach of element second the is Bahrain of territory the on deployment troop GCC The 39 CEU eTD Collection partially partially inconsistentfor explaining the nature of monarchical stability in Bahrain. theory legitimacy monarchical the found has research my Hence, Bahrain. of Constitution of politicalmajority the Meanwhile, system. monarchical the within people of grievances economic the demandsaddress to but monarch the remove to not is aim the because Bahrain in family aimmonarchical to limit ruling the of legitimacy political the challenge not do demands economic prevailing the powers the that hasrevealed research Thus, the his legitimacy. monarch the and towards attitudes of the King thewhich true natureare legitimizedunderstand bemade to should demands andpolitical economic between a distinction chapter, of events.in this mentioned as Therefore, demands. economic and Whether political both have who those and in thethe demandsof the areKing. competencies politicalthe Moreover, on limitation more and constitution the of change the among demand movements theor majority economicopposition Shia the of majority the Shia,However, Bahrain. of constitution the in there legitimized determines are those who put forwardthe monarchy constitutional is with wrongly executiveof power the monarch perceived the political ambiguityfor the of reinforces Thedemand stronger about theargumentdemands. The narrative in of mostly movement by opposition the Bahrain groups represented Shia the 40 CEU eTD Collection stability in Bahrain through the analysis of external factors. external of analysis the through Bahrain in stability of nature the explain seek to and theory building the alliance within coexist essentially concepts Both security. of collective explained concept the is through relationship better – BahrainiU.S. strategic relationship is of that collective defense,while the GCC –Bahraini the that found have I analysis, my In relationship. strategic Bahraini – GCC the and Bahraini – U.S. the between distinguished have I thesis this In building. is alliance power explanatory strongest the with theory The power. explanatory strong a has aid external of form the from the GCC. Therefore, I have concluded that the transformed nature of rentier economy in discontent social of the contain to itsmeans a as aid external on Shia dependent become population.increasingly has Bahrain The example of form Meanwhile, withrevenuesof hugerent. inthe oil rentier state Eastern Middle classic such a rent is the economicrentier hasbeen economy a Thus,Bahrain beconsideredtransformed. anymorecannot as aid received of power. Inmyparticularly in found Ihave the outthat nature analysis the Bahraini case explanatory stronger a has state rentier a of Theory Constitution. the by legitimized principle putin limitationessentially constitutional of to Kingwhichare demanded on the powers the demands political of form the in grievances their expressed who those Meanwhile, monarch. demandingmore economic rights have tendency not tochallenge the political legitimacy a of opposition. of narratives the of analysis on the based this conclusion to come have I plausibility. I explanatory least have the to legitimacy monarchical of theory has found analysis madeMy building. alliance and state, rentier distinction legitimacy, monarchical theories: three of testing the have ofmonarchical Arab explain inBahrain through I regime sought to stability the Spring. between economic and political demands. Thus, those The current thesis has been the study of a critical case of Bahrain in the context of the CONCLUSION 41 CEU eTD Collection J.H. Bamberg.J.H. “Clinton Criticises Bahrain over Protester Clashes.” Bent Flyvbjerg. “Case Study.” In Bahry, Louay. “The Socioeconomic Foundations of the Shiite Opposition in Bahrain.” Hootan Shambayati. “The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: Luciani. Hazem Giacomo Beblawi, “Gulf States to Aid Unrest-hit Bahrain, Oman: Report.” Cook, M. “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case “CIA Bahrain.” “Bahrain.” Al-Jamri, Mansoor. “State and Civil Society in Bahrain.” 7. 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Taylor&Francis Group, Islam ... of Iran.” In RINT.pdf. http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/bt/directory/Documents/CaseStudy4%202HBQR11P Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage,2011. ml. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704547804576261222747330438.ht Journal for the further theresearch take to seeks theories three of these The combination http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12762500. Cia World Factbook British Petroleum andGlobal Oil, 1950-1975: TheChallenge ofNationalism , April 14, 2011. , p.428. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 1970: Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Studies inthe Economic Historyofthe FromMiddle East: theRiseof , n.d.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 11, no. 3 11, (2000): 129–143. The SageHandbookofQualitative Research BIBLIOGRAPHY The RentierState , May 3, 2012. 42 Comparative Politics BBC . 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