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Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey CCSDS Historical Document This document’s Historical status indicates that it is no longer current. It has either been replaced by a newer issue or withdrawn because it was deemed obsolete. Current CCSDS publications are maintained at the following location: http://public.ccsds.org/publications/ CCSDS HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Report Concerning Space Data System Standards ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM TRADE SURVEY INFORMATIONAL REPORT CCSDS 350.2-G-1 GREEN BOOK March 2008 CCSDS HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Report Concerning Space Data System Standards ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM TRADE SURVEY INFORMATIONAL REPORT CCSDS 350.2-G-1 GREEN BOOK March 2008 CCSDS HISTORICAL DOCUMENT CCSDS REPORT CONCERNING ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM TRADE SURVEY AUTHORITY Issue: Informational Report, Issue 1 Date: March 2008 Location: Washington, DC, USA This document has been approved for publication by the Management Council of the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) and reflects the consensus of technical panel experts from CCSDS Member Agencies. The procedure for review and authorization of CCSDS Reports is detailed in the Procedures Manual for the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems. This document is published and maintained by: CCSDS Secretariat Space Communications and Navigation Office, 7L70 Space Operations Mission Directorate NASA Headquarters Washington, DC 20546-0001, USA CCSDS 350.2-G-1 i March 2008 CCSDS HISTORICAL DOCUMENT CCSDS REPORT CONCERNING ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM TRADE SURVEY FOREWORD Through the process of normal evolution, it is expected that expansion, deletion, or modification of this document may occur. This Recommended Standard is therefore subject to CCSDS document management and change control procedures, which are defined in the Procedures Manual for the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems. Current versions of CCSDS documents are maintained at the CCSDS Web site: http://www.ccsds.org/ Questions relating to the contents or status of this document should be addressed to the CCSDS Secretariat at the address indicated on page i. CCSDS 350.2-G-1 ii March 2008 CCSDS HISTORICAL DOCUMENT CCSDS REPORT CONCERNING ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM TRADE SURVEY At time of publication, the active Member and Observer Agencies of the CCSDS were: Member Agencies – Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI)/Italy. – British National Space Centre (BNSC)/United Kingdom. – Canadian Space Agency (CSA)/Canada. – Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES)/France. – Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. (DLR)/Germany. – European Space Agency (ESA)/Europe. – Federal Space Agency (FSA)/Russian Federation. – Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE)/Brazil. – Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)/Japan. – National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)/USA. Observer Agencies – Austrian Space Agency (ASA)/Austria. – Belgian Federal Science Policy Office (BFSPO)/Belgium. – Central Research Institute of Machine Building (TsNIIMash)/Russian Federation. – Centro Tecnico Aeroespacial (CTA)/Brazil. – Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)/China. – Chinese Academy of Space Technology (CAST)/China. – Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO)/Australia. – Danish National Space Center (DNSC)/Denmark. – European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT)/Europe. – European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT)/Europe. – Hellenic National Space Committee (HNSC)/Greece. – Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO)/India. – Institute of Space Research (IKI)/Russian Federation. – KFKI Research Institute for Particle & Nuclear Physics (KFKI)/Hungary. – Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI)/Korea. – MIKOMTEK: CSIR (CSIR)/Republic of South Africa. – Ministry of Communications (MOC)/Israel. – National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT)/Japan. – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)/USA. – National Space Organization (NSPO)/Taiwan. – Naval Center for Space Technology (NCST)/USA. – Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO)/Pakistan. – Swedish Space Corporation (SSC)/Sweden. – United States Geological Survey (USGS)/USA. CCSDS 350.2-G-1 iii March 2008 CCSDS HISTORICAL DOCUMENT CCSDS REPORT CONCERNING ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM TRADE SURVEY DOCUMENT CONTROL Document Title Date Status CCSDS Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey, March 2008 Original issue 350.2-G-1 Informational Report, Issue 1 CCSDS 350.2-G-1 iv March 2008 CCSDS HISTORICAL DOCUMENT CCSDS REPORT CONCERNING ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM TRADE SURVEY CONTENTS Section Page 1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1-1 1.1 PURPOSE ANS SCOPE ........................................................................................ 1-1 1.2 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 1-1 2 OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................... 2-1 3 CANDIDATE ALGORITHMS FOR CCSDS ............................................................. 3-1 3.1 GENERAL .............................................................................................................. 3-1 3.2 AES FINALIST ALGORITHMS ........................................................................... 3-3 3.3 GSM/UMTS ALGORITHMS ................................................................................ 3-4 3.4 MISCELLANEOUS ALGORITHMS .................................................................... 3-4 4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................... 4-1 Table 3-1 Potential CCSDS Encryption Algorithm Candidates ................................................... 3-2 3-2 Example of Performance of Algorithms (megabits/sec) on Motorola MPC 185 Security Co-Processor .................................................................. 3-3 CCSDS 350.2-G-1 v March 2008 CCSDS HISTORICAL DOCUMENT CCSDS REPORT CONCERNING ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM TRADE SURVEY 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE This Report presents the results of a survey conducted by the CCSDS Security Working Group, which has been actively engaged in developing security recommendations for CCSDS. The information contained in this report is not part of any of the CCSDS Recommended Standard. In the event of any conflict between any CCSDS Recommended Standard and the material presented herein, the CCSDS Recommended Standard shall prevail. 1.2 REFERENCES [1] Report on the Development of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Gaithersburg, Maryland: NIST, 2002. [2] Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An Example Algorithm Set for the 3GPP Authentication and Key Generation Functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: General. Release 5. Third Generation Partnership Project, 3GPP TS 35.205 V5.0.0 (2002-06). Sophia-Antipolis: ETSI, 2002. [3] Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms; Document 2: KASUMI Specification. Release 6. Third Generation Partnership Project, 3GPP TS 35.202 V6.0.0 (2004-12). Sophia-Antipolis: ETSI, 2004. [4] Comparison of Airlink Encryptions. 1xEV-DO Web Paper. N.p.: Qualcomm, 2003. <http://www.wheresmyload.com/cdma/1xEV/media/web_papers/Airlink_Encryption.pdf> [5] H. J. Lee, et al. The SEED Encryption Algorithm. RFC 4269. Reston, Virginia: ISOC, December 2005. [6] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Federal Information Processing Standards Special Publication 197. Gaithersburg, Maryland: NIST, 2001. CCSDS 350.2-G-1 1-1 March 2008 CCSDS HISTORICAL DOCUMENT CCSDS REPORT CONCERNING ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM TRADE SURVEY 2 OVERVIEW While at first security was thought of as not required for civilian space missions by CCSDS, more recently it has become a much more desirable area of investigation. To that extent, the Security Working Group has been investigating the specification of a CCSDS standard for encryption. At a minimum, this standard would take the form of a CCSDS Recommended Standard for an encryption algorithm. Particulars regarding how the algorithm is actually employed (e.g., network layer, speeds, relationship to FEC, etc.) would not necessarily be standardized upon, at least not at the outset. The first order of business would be to agree upon an encryption algorithm, its mode of operation, and its key length. The algorithm could be adopted or adapted from an existing one, or a new algorithm could be developed. The most expedient and safest way forward would be to adopt an existing algorithm that has been thoroughly crypt-analyzed by the cryptologic community to ensure its security. At the spring 2004 CCSDS meeting held in Montreal, Canada, a proposal was made to adopt the Rijndael algorithm, written in Belgium and chosen as the United States’s Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), as the CCSDS encryption algorithm standard. At the Montreal meeting, those in attendance were given actions to investigate their nationalistic rules and laws concerning the use of encryption and whether or not it would be a national issue to adopt a CCSDS encryption algorithm standard. The results were discussed on the email list as well as at the fall 2004 meeting held in Toulouse, France. The outcome was that while there were many nationalistic issues regarding the use of encryption at one time, most of those issues have gone away with the increased use of commercial encryption. In essence, the issue had become a non-issue. At the Spring 2005 CCSDS meeting held in Athens,
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