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Sensorimotor Enactivism Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2020) 19:653–684 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-019-09647-0 A match made in heaven: predictive approaches to (an unorthodox) sensorimotor enactivism María Jimena Clavel Vázquez1,2 Published online: 20 December 2019 # The Author(s) 2019 Abstract It has been pointed out that Sensorimotor Enactivism, a theory that claims that perception is enacted and brought about by movement, says very little about the neural mechanisms that enable perception. For the proponents of the predictive approach to Sensorimotor Enactivism, this is a challenge that can be met by introducing predictive processing into the picture. However, the compatibility between these theories is not straightforward. Firstly, because they seem to differ in their stand towards representations: while Sensorimotor Enactivism is said to belong to the non-representational wing of cognitive science, predictive processing has a representational profile. And secondly, because they exhibit different explanatory strategies: while Sensorimotor Enactivism prioritizes the interactions of the embodied agent, predictive processing has internalist commitments. The aim of this paper is to address these concerns and show that a predictive approach to Sensorimotor Enactivism is viable. More specifically, I focus on the Free-Energy approach, a theory that falls within the ballpark of predictive processing. In this paper I argue for the following claims. I argue that (a) both Sensorimotor Enactivism and the Free-Energy approach may be understood for some systems in representational terms. The non-representational reading of Sensorimotor Enactivism is not mandatory and neither is the representational reading of the Free-Energy approach. (b) Sensorimotor Enactivism is, in this respect, compatible with both representa- tional and non-representational interpretations of the FEA. So, the position towards repre- sentations of these frameworks should not stand in the way of a predictive approach to Sensorimotor Enactivism. I also show that (c) the Free-Energy approach allows for an account that prioritizes the interaction of the embodied agent with the environment. This is the explanatory strategy followed by Sensorimotor Enactivism. To justify this strategy and following other proponents of Sensorimotor Enactivism, I argue that by referring to the interactions of the embodied agent a better account of the phenomena in question is provided. On this basis, I claim that (d) Sensorimotor Enactivism and the Free-Energy approach are compatible in what concerns their explanatory strategy as well. Thus, making the case for the viability of the predictive approach to Sensorimotor Enactivism. * María Jimena Clavel Vázquez [email protected] Extended author information available on the last page of the article 654 M. J. Clavel Vázquez Keywords Sensorimotor Enactivism . Predictive processing . Free-energy approach . Perception . Perceptual experience 1 Introduction From the perspective of sensorimotor enactivism (henceforth SMEn), perception is “something we do” mediated by something we know (O’Regan and Noë 2001,p. 970).1 This theory joins other enactivist proposals in understanding cognition, action, and perception as active processes that are deeply intertwined, and that should be explained by referring primarily to the agent’s bodily constitution and her interactions with the environment. Perception is, for SMEn, enacted and brought about by move- ment. It is an interactive phenomenon that is assimilated to an exploratory activity through which the agent probes the environment as it offers possibilities for action. In that sense, perception is understood, at least in part, as the process of accessing sensory information from the world as an external memory, thus opposing other views of perception, according to which this would consist in the process of constructing a model of the world. According to this theory, perception requires the possession and skilful execution of sensorimotor knowledge: an implicit and practical knowledge of the lawful ways in which sensory input changes given certain interactions between the perceiver and the object perceived. Consider, for instance, how one spontaneously squints the eyes when an image looks blurry (Noë 2004, p. 1). We do this in order to make the image appear clearer, perhaps to get a better focus. Squinting our eyes in this case suggests that we know how the image would change after doing this. SMEn claims that perception is constituted by our handle on the way sensory input system- atically changes after an interaction. SMEn is a theory of perception that aims at explaining perception from the point of view of the agent and the agent’s experience. Nonetheless, it is a naturalistic theory that is taken to be continuous with a causal account of perception. For SMEn, a theory of perception must straddle both levels, the agential and the causal (Noë 2004,pp.31–32). The causal story that is favored by SMEn is one that accounts for perception in terms of the interactions of an embodied agent with her environment.2 This might explain something that has been pointed out in the literature: SMEn says very little about the neural mechanisms that are involved in perception (Chemero 2009;Clark2009;Seth 2014, 2015; Downey 2017). It is important to consider that this lack of neuro-talk is not seen as a challenge within the framework. After all, SMEn starts from the claim that looking inside the head does not take us too far in our understanding of perceptual experience. SMEn emphatically rejects that an account of the neural mechanisms of perception is sufficient for perceptual experience. The latter is constituted by the interactions of the agent with her surroundings. 1 See Hurley (1998), O’Regan and Noë (2001), Noë (2004), O’Regan (2011). 2 The agential and the causal are continuous in the sense that the former depends on the latter: features exhibited at the agential level emerge from the complex sensorimotor interactions between the agent and the environment. Hurley (1998) illustrates this continuity with the case of a circus performer whose complex movements are both a source of and dependent upon complex dynamic feedback loops between herself and the environment. As Hurley puts it: the content of the performer’s intentions and perceptions depends on this complex causal flow (Hurley 1998,p.2). A match made in heaven: predictive approaches to (an unorthodox)... 655 Nonetheless, the theory does not deny that the brain is involved in perception. See, for instance, the following claim by Noë: “The brain has a job to do (…) a careful examination of the way experience and the brain’s activity depend on each other makes plausible the idea that the brain’s job is, in effect, to coordinate our dealings with the environment. It is thus only in the context of an animal’sembodiedexistence,situated in an environment, dynamically interacting with objects and situations, that the function of the brain can be understood” (Noë 2009, p. 65). Neural mechanisms, although not sufficient, are nevertheless necessary for perceptual experience. Furthermore, these should be understood within the wider context of the interactions of the embodied agent. So, does SMEn owe us an account of the way the brain is involved in perception? One thought might be that it does not. Surely the brain plays a role in supporting perceptual experience, but a story at the neural level does not place a strong constraint on our account of perception because perception is explained at the level of the whole organism and its interactions with the environment. Nonetheless, by claiming that the causal and the agential level are continuous, SMEn establishes a tighter link between the two levels. The causal story goes hand in hand with the story at the level of the agent’s interactions. And part of that causal story is about the neural structures that underpin perceptual experience. The causal story is not complete until some account of the role of the brain is provided. The latter seems to be the thought behind the proposals for a predictive approach to SMEn. Predictive processing3 offers an account of the neural mechanisms involved in perceptual experience that might allow SMEn to explain how the brain contributes to perceptual experience. For instance, Adrian Downey (2017) appeals to predictive processing in order to respond to the objection advanced to sensorimotor approaches to perception that claims that they are empirically vacuous, while Anil Seth (2014) appeals to predictive processing to provide, among other things, a causal story that accounts for sensorimotor knowledge. At the outset, a predictive approach to SMEn is appealing because both theories share a view of perception as an anticipatory phenomenon.4 While for SMEn, one squints the eyes expecting an image to appear more focused, predictive processing claims that the brain advances predictions about the object of perception. That said, there are at least two good reasons to think that these views are incompatible and that, in consequence, they do not belong together. Firstly, predictive processing has a representational profile that seems incom- patible with the non-representational profile that is traditionally associated with SMEn (see e.g. O’Regan and Degenaar 2014; Di Paolo et al. 2017). Secondly, SMEn’s explanatory strategy might clash with predictive processing. While predictive processing is a theory that is usually interpreted as centred around the brain, SMEn prioritizes the interactions of the embodied agent over the specification of the neural mechanisms that enable perception. 3 For a philosophical overview of predictive processing, see Clark (2016) and Hohwy (2013). In section 3 of this paper, I offer a review of the framework. 4 They are both what Bruineberg et al. (2018) call future-oriented frameworks. 656 M. J. Clavel Vázquez Importantly, as has been shown by Clark (2016, 2017b), a description of predictive processing as a neuro-centric approach is not mandatory. For him, there are some valuable lessons to be learned from developments in embodied cognition. For instance, that problem-solving can be distributed between brain, body and world (Clark 2016,p.
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