STANNASHELLBRAZEEL Bachelor of Science Oklahoma State University Stillwater, Oklahoma 2003
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TIIE AL QAEDA TERRORIST TWORK: PRE 9/11 CONDITIONS, POST 9111 RESPONSES By STANNASHELLBRAZEEL Bachelor of Science Oklahoma State University Stillwater, Oklahoma 2003 Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College of the Oklahoma tate University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SClENe December, 2003 THE AL QAEDA TERRORIST NETWORK: PRE 9/11 CONDITIONS, POST 9/11 RESPONSES 11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis was created out of an interest to understand terrorism as it has evolved throughout history and will continue to do so as time probrresses. My hope is that this work can benefit the field ofterrorism study as events unfold in the future. I am eternally grateful to Dr. Hynson for his invaluable expertise, time, and support. I also want to thank my other committee members: Dr. Cross and Dr. Thrasher, each ofwhom gave me critical feedback to develop a solid thesis. I would like to thank Donna Birchler for all of her assistance. Her tireless devotion to students does not go unnoticed or unappreciated. And I would like to thank: the administration and faculty of the School of International Studies for their unrelenting challenges to the students to make a significant contribution to the world. A very personal thanks goes out to an of my family for believing in me. To my parents, Scott and Ivanna, I would like to thank: you for instilling in me the value of hard work, dedication, and the tenacity to never settle for anything less than achieving all of my goals. Finally, I am indebted to my husband Brandon for his pati.ence, reassurance, and encouragement throughout the whole process. 111 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page T. INTRODUCTION 1 Organizational Network of AJ Qaeda 3 Force Field Analysis " .4 Review of Literature 6 Muslim Culture " , '" '" 6 Islam Religion '" 9 Al Qaeda '" , , 12 Propelling Conditions , 16 Restraining Conditions , , '" 23 Research Hypotheses , '" 26 Methodology , , 27 Limitations to Study '" , '" 28 II. PRECIPITANTS FOR THE CREATION OF A TERRORIST '" 30 ORGANIZATION Contrasting ways oflife '" 30 U.S. Presence in the Middle East. 34 U.S. Support of Israel. '" '" 39 The Afghan War 43 The Al Qaeda Network , 45 History of Attacks '" 45 Organizational Network .46 Chapter Summary '" '" ... ... ... .. ... ... ... ... 1 HI. METHODOLOGy _ 53 Overview of Theory and Model. 53 Research Methodology '" .. _ 55 Data 59 P urposlve . SamprJng '" , 60 IV. PRE 9/11 CONDITIONS , 62 Pre 9/11 Propelling Forces '" '" 62 Necessary Conditions , , 64 IV Chapter Page Globalization , , '" 65 Financial Assets , , 71 Strategic Leadership , '" 79 Support of Islamic Law 85 Sufficient Condition , 87 True Believer Status 88 Weaknesses ofRestraining Forces 92 Chapter SUlD1Ilary , 97 V. POST 9/11 RESPONSES 100 Post 9/11 Restraining Forces 101 Necessary Conditions , " 103 Protecting the Homeland 103 Military Operations 117 Freezing Financial Assets 120 Cooperation Among Countries 123 Sufficient condition 129 Popular Opinion 13 1 Weaknesses of Propelling Forces 140 Chapter Summary 141 VI. DISCUSSION _ _ '" '" '" .144 Limitations to Study " 148 Future R.esearch '" 149 Conclusion , , 150 BIBLIOGRAPHY , ,. '" '" '" , 152 v LIST OF TABLES Table Page 2. 1 Known AI Qaeda Members and Placement in the Organization 50 5.1 Gender Response to the emotion ofFright '" 132 5.2 Gender Response WithinRegion 133 5.3 Crosstabulation for Gender Between Large City and Rural Area 135 5.4 Gender Response and Religiosity l36 5.5 Collective Emotional Response 138 LIST OF FfGURES Figure Page 1.1 Example ofLewin's Force Field Analysis 6 2.1 Organization of Al Qaeda Network 49 3.1 Nexus Between Al Qaeda and U. Both Before and After 9/11 .58 4.] Pre 9/11 Conditions 63 5.1 Post 9/11 Conditions , 101 6.1 Differential Conditions 147 VI Al Qaeda 1 Chapter 1 Introduction It has become overwhelmingl apparent that a shift in terrorism organization has occurred. While terrorism has plagued countrie around the world for ears, the evolution ofterrorism has resulted in the transformation of organizations into stronger more adaptive, "super-terrorist" groups (Emerson, 1998). Tb increased resiliency of terrorist organizations is a troubling factor to the anti-terrorism community. Al Qaeda is a case in point of an effective network organizational structure that has pro ed adaptive and difficult to destroy. For more than ten years Al Qaeda built an invisible network that spans across all continents. However the attacks of 9/11 exist as a unique point in time, for the events exposed group factors such as its operational tactics linkages between members, and associations to the radical Islamic belief system that A1 Qaeda is founded upon. It is around the e ents of 9/11 that a conceptual framework for this research is constructed. Within this analysis the evaluation of two parts-the cau e and th effect are synthesized to understand how they interact within th mod I. First a clear r understanding of the A1 Qaeda network is unfolded a well as, an understanding ofthe more daunting questions of how Al Qaeda accompli hed the attacks. econd th research conducted extends to how these attacks affected a ociety and how attacks of such magnitude are being deterred now. How rapid have been ne threat developments? How much ha e the anti-terrorist tactics changed? ignificantl. In Perspective on Terrori 'm Vetter and Perl tein (1991) argued that the continental United States would remain r latively unaffected by much of the violence that seems indigenous in other aJ;eas of the world. Unfortunately, AI Qaeda 2 the attack of9111 ga e the nited tate, as ell a oth r We tern democracies no choice but to take the enero seriousI . Military strategi ts ha e labeled the ne\: threat 'fourth generation warfare'. Fourth generation warfare is characterized b the decreased emphasis ofmilitary action in times of conflict, and the lack of at least one side having a nationally controlled military force. One ofthe first papers written on th subject came from within the military community. The authors vi idly de~rib fourth generation warfare by stating "The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear possibly to the point of having no defmable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' may disappear (Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt. Sutton, and Wilson, 1989 p.25). The description offourth generation warfare, although it is not limited in scope to terrorism significantly resembles the war on terrorism. After the attacks of9/11, opposing forces to terrorism found themselves grappling with how to deal with Al Qaeda and other terrori t groups evolving in the same pattem. The strategies ofthe past do little to guarantee future success. Modem government and military methods had to initiate change and must continue to change if the "war on terrorism" is going to be won. High-tech intelligence equipment will have some success yet it cannot be the main method of attack. New tactics used by students of terrorism are harder to combat becau e they are able to produce activ terror with a wide variety of readily available and less sophisticated weapons (Kushner, 1998). It is crucial that the U.S. is on the same playing field as Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. They must innovate just as the terrorist organizations do in order to be successful. This effort begin with understanding the complex organization of Al Qaeda. AJ Qaeda 3 Organizational etwork of AI Qaeda Al Qaeda's organization represents a n twork hybrid that lie on a spectrum between that oftraditional military hierarch and a full-fledged autonomous cell network (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). Hierarchies are most commonl associated with governments in which there is a central command that holds the decision-making power over all of the procedures and missions. On the other end of the spectrum is the concept of completely autonomous cells that work together for a goal. Th idea of networked organizations is not a recent development. In the 1960's Bums and Stalker sugge ted that organic networks displayed structure of control authority and communication along horizontal lines. However, in the 1970's William Potter Gale and the Posse Comitatus initiated the "leaderless resistance" in which bands ofresistance armies would cooperate on anti-tax demonstrations. The leaderless resistance structure depicts small groups of independent cells that carry out their own acts of violence with no central leader (Garfinkel 2003). Al Qaeda learned from th structural mistakes of other terrorist groups in order to create a resilient network. Cutting off the head of central command could destroy terrorist groups that adhered to a military hierarchy while autonomous cell in the leaderless resistance lacked leadership, which could result in in fighting and a los of focus on the objectives sought. Innovation and the will to survive fostered the formation ofa networked organization that governments find difficult to destroy. Al Qaeda's adherence to some structure is evident in it establishment of different committees that head up the fmances military, and other areas. Yet there are also autonomous cells each carrYing out its own mission with no knowledge of other members or their assignments. Al Qaeda 4 TIllS is a pictur of Al Qaeda s complex organization that until 9/11 was not full understood or acknowledged. Force Field Analysis This study is a two-step process. The first step of analysis is to use Lewin's (1936) force field theoretical model to analyze the AI Qaeda organization and explain the social settings prior to 9/11. Next, using Lewin's model analysis ofthe effects caused by 9/11 and the resulting actions taken is conducted. The particular change model comes from the work of Kurt Lewin who wanted to show how groups make decisions and how events unfold as forces of change.