DOCSLIB.ORG

Financial Globalization: Culprit, Survivor Or Casualty of the Great Crisis?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Financial Globalization: Culprit, Survivor Or Casualty of the Great Crisis? Financial Globalization Culprit, Survivor or Casualty of the Great Crisis? A publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization Financial Globalization Culprit, Survivor or Casualty of the Great Crisis? A publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization From the proceedings of a conference by the same name, held on November 12 and 13, 2009 Yale University New Haven, Connecticut Financial Globalization: Culprit, Survivor or Casualty of the Great Crisis? A Yale Center for the Study of Globalization eBook Yale Center for the Study of Globalization Betts House 393 Prospect Street New Haven, CT 06511 USA Tel: (203) 432-1900 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ycsg.yale.edu ©Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2010 The papers contained in this book are based on presentations from the conference Financial Globalization: Culprit, Survivor or Casualty of the Great Crisis?, organized by the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut on November 12 and 13, 2009. The conference was made possible by generous support from the Ford Foundation. Yale Center for the Study of Globalization The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization (YCSG) was established in 2001 to enhance understanding of this fundamental process and to promote exchanges of information and ideas about globalization between Yale and the policy world. The Center is devoted to examining the impact of our increasingly integrated world on individuals, communities, and nations. Globalization presents challenges and opportunities. The Center’s purpose is to support the creation and dissemination of ideas for seizing the opportunities and overcoming the challenges. It is particularly focused on practical policies to enable the world’s poorest and weakest citizens to share in the benefits brought by globalization. It also explores solutions to problems that, even if they do not result directly from integration, are global in nature, and can therefore be effectively addressed only through international cooperation. In addition to drawing on the intellectual resources within the Yale community, the Center actively collaborates with institutions and individuals across the globe. Financial Globalization Culprit, Survivor, or Casualty of the Great Crisis Part One Taking Stock of the Causes and the Damage So Far Moderator: William Nordhaus Sterling Professor of Economics, Yale University Raghuram Rajan Eric J. Gleacher Distinguished Service Professor of Finance, University of Chicago Booth School of Business Jan Kregel Senior Scholar, The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Willem Buiter Professor of European Political Economy, European Institute, LSE Jeffry Frieden Department of Government, Harvard University James Galbraith Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. Chair in Government/Business Relations, Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin Viral Acharya Professor of Finance, Stern School of Business, NYU Carmen Reinhart Department of Economics, University of Maryland Part Two International Financial Architecture, Financial Regulation, and the Future of Financial Innovation Moderator: William Brainard Arthur M. Okun Professor Emeritus of Economics, Yale University Avinash Persaud Chairman, Intelligence Capital Charles Goodhart Programme Director, Regulation & Financial Stability, LSE Professor Emeritus of Banking and Finance Rakesh Mohan Stanford Center for International Development Richard Portes Professor of Economics, London Business School Ronald McKinnon William D. Eberle Professor of International Economics, Department of Economics, Stanford University Dimitri Papadimitriou Executive Vice President of the College, The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Anne Krueger Professor of International Economics, School of Advanced International Studies Keynote Address Containing Too Big To Fail E. Gerald Corrigan Managing Director, Goldman Sachs Former President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Part Three National and Regional Perspectives Moderator: T.N. Srinivasan Samuel C. Park, Jr. Professor of Economics, Yale University C.P. Chandrasekhar Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University Padma Desai Gladys and Roland Harriman Professor of Comparative Economic Systems and Director, Center for Transition Economies, Columbia University Wing Thye Woo Department of Economics, University of California, Davis Guillermo Ortiz Governor, Central Bank of Mexico Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa President, Notre Europe; Former Minister of Economy and Finance, Italy Roundtable Discussion Globalization After the Crisis Ernesto Zedillo Frederick Iseman ’74 Director, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization Jagdish Bhagwati University Professor, Columbia University Niall Ferguson Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School Harold James Professor of History and International Affairs, Princeton University Part One Taking Stock of the Causes and the Damage So Far Economists are still debating what are the key causes of the crisis, or at least the weight that each should be given. It will still be a matter of question how long it will take before the crisis is over and a recovery is achieved. Also it is a subject of contention whether, if and when the recovery takes place, growth with price stability can be resumed as before the crisis. This section of the conference is intended to address these and related questions. William Nordhaus Sterling Professor of Economics, Yale University Moderator Since the name of the session is “Taking Stock Of The Causes and Damage So Far,” I was reminded of Keynes’s phrase in one of his marvelous passages, which I’ll paraphrase, that we overstate the power of vested interests but understate the power of vested ideas. There is a passage from the transcript of a House hearing just after the Lehman bankruptcy, where Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) asked Alan Greenspan about his views. He said, “Dr. Greenspan, do you think you made a mistake?” And Greenspan said, “Yes, I found a flaw in the model that I perceived as a critical functioning structure that defines how the world works. I was shocked because I’d been going for 40 years or more” (so that takes it back to 1968 or more), “with the very considerable evidence that it was working well. I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders. So, the problem here is something that looked to be a very solid edifice, and indeed a critical pillar to market competition, and free markets did break down. And that shocked me, and I still do not fully understand why it happened.” This is, as much as anything, a testament to the power of vested ideas and a good introduction to this session. Raghuram Rajan University of Chicago, Booth School of Business We do understand the global roots of this crisis. Ken Rogoff, my predecessor as chief economist at the IMF, and I, were going on and on while we were at the Fund about global current account imbalances. I think Ken, perhaps more than I did, recognized that the way they might come down might just be through a financial crisis. But I think none of us saw the magnitude of what might happen. What I want to do here is talk a little bit about why it was the banks that got hit, and I’m going to offer some hypotheses. I don't think we really know the answer, but to my mind this suggests that we have to be very careful when we’re thinking about regulation. Since we don’t really know what the answer is, we have to be careful that whatever regulation we put in place can actually mitigate the kinds of problems we saw this time, even while helping to ward off future problems -- the unknown unknowns so to speak. If you drill down to what was happening in the financial sector in industrial countries, especially in the United States and the U.K., you will conclude that the financial firms were taking a variety of tail risks – low probability risks with very costly consequences if they occurred. For the macro-international economist, this is often known as peso risk. For the micro-finance types, this is tail risk, the classic example being earthquake insurance. The point about writing earthquake insurance is if you can collect the premium up front and nobody knows that you’re writing earthquake insurance, you look like a genius. You’re making money with absolutely no risk. And that allows you to pay the premiums out to yourself or to the firm’s shareholders as big dividends. The problem, of course, is when the earthquake actually hits. People ask you to pony up the insurance. And if there’s none left, you go to the government and say, “Surprise. It’s your baby now – you own the problem.” That, in reduced form, is essentially what happened -- two broad kinds of tail risk were being taken. One was default risk. Now, default risk -- idiosyncratic default risk -- is not really a tail risk. Firms go bust all the time. But there was risk being taken on the collective default -- for example, on mortgage-backed securities -- which pooled mortgages across the country. The tail risk there was the low probability event that house prices across the country could fall and create severe distress in the housing sector. This kind of default risk was being taken, for example, by AIG, writing insurance against the super senior pieces of mortgage-backed securities; and by UBS, doubling and tripling the size of its balance sheet, investing in AAA mortgage-backed securities, borrowing at UBS’s cost of capital, making the little spread, and multiplying that many times. Default risk was one form of tail risk. The other form of tail risk that was being taken was liquidity risk; a lot of banks were funding illiquid positions with very short-term debt. A classic example of this was the off-balance sheet Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) and conduits that banks had created to hold mortgage-backed securities.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 2019 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report
    LEADING RESEARCH ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) is an independent nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization dedicated to strengthening prosperity and human welfare in the global economy through expert analysis and practical policy solutions. Led since 2013 by President Adam S. Posen, the Institute anticipates emerging issues and provides rigorous, evidence-based policy recommendations with a team of the world’s leading applied economic researchers. It creates freely available content in a variety of accessible formats to inform and shape public debate, reaching an audience that includes government officials and legislators, business and NGO leaders, international and research organizations, universities, and the media. The Institute was established in 1981 as the Institute for International Economics, with Peter G. Peterson as its founding chairman, and has since risen to become an unequalled, trusted resource on the global economy and convener of leaders from around the world. At its 25th anniversary in 2006, the Institute was renamed the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics. The Institute today pursues a broad and distinctive agenda, as it seeks to address growing threats to living standards, rules-based commerce, and peaceful economic integration. COMMITMENT TO TRANSPARENCY The Peterson Institute’s annual budget of $13 million is funded by donations and grants from corporations, individuals, private foundations, and public institutions, as well as income on the Institute’s endowment. Over 90% of its income is unrestricted in topic, allowing independent objective research. The Institute discloses annually all sources of funding, and donors do not influence the conclusions of or policy implications drawn from Institute research.
    [Show full text]
  • Power Seeking and Backlash Against Female Politicians
    Article Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin The Price of Power: Power Seeking and 36(7) 923 –936 © 2010 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc Backlash Against Female Politicians Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0146167210371949 http://pspb.sagepub.com Tyler G. Okimoto1 and Victoria L. Brescoll1 Abstract Two experimental studies examined the effect of power-seeking intentions on backlash toward women in political office. It was hypothesized that a female politician’s career progress may be hindered by the belief that she seeks power, as this desire may violate prescribed communal expectations for women and thereby elicit interpersonal penalties. Results suggested that voting preferences for female candidates were negatively influenced by her power-seeking intentions (actual or perceived) but that preferences for male candidates were unaffected by power-seeking intentions. These differential reactions were partly explained by the perceived lack of communality implied by women’s power-seeking intentions, resulting in lower perceived competence and feelings of moral outrage. The presence of moral-emotional reactions suggests that backlash arises from the violation of communal prescriptions rather than normative deviations more generally. These findings illuminate one potential source of gender bias in politics. Keywords gender stereotypes, backlash, power, politics, intention, moral outrage Received June 5, 2009; revision accepted December 2, 2009 Many voters see Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton as coldly politicians and that these penalties may be reflected in voting ambitious, a perception that could ultimately doom her presi- preferences. dential campaign. Peter Nicholas, Los Angeles Times, 2007 Power-Relevant Stereotypes Power seeking may be incongruent with traditional female In 1916, Jeannette Rankin was elected to the Montana seat in gender stereotypes but not male gender stereotypes for a the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • What Is Minsky All About, Anyway?
    DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES What is Minsky All About, Anyway? Korkut Ertürk Gökcer Özgür Working Paper No: 2009-08 University of Utah Department of Economics 1645 East Central Campus Dr., Rm. 308 Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9300 Tel: (801) 581-7481 Fax: (801) 585-5649 http://www.econ.utah.edu 1 What is Minsky All About, Anyway? Korkut Ertürk Gökcer Özgür Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Ken Jameson for his helpful comments without implicating him for any possible mistakes there might be. 2 The financial crisis has been billed a “Minsky moment” in the mainstream media, turning Hyman P. Minksy into a household name. One would think that this was at long last Minsky’s moment of posthumous vindication, and in a way it was. But, oddly, a couple of post-Keynesian luminaries would have none of it. Paul Davidson, the Editor of JPKE , and Jan Kregel, senior scholar at the Levy Institute of Bard College where Minksy had spent the last of his years, were both eager to set the record straight: the current financial debacle did not qualify as a Minskyan crisis because how it unfolded differed from Minsky’s depiction of crises in his writings (Davidson 2008, Kregel 2008a). Of course, whether we think Minsky is relevant for the current crisis or not depends on what we make of him. If Minskyan work means solely his own writings and their restatement, then, Davidson and Kregel are probably right – one cannot help but focus on what is different about the current crisis. But, if instead Minksyan refers to an evolving literature that emanate from but transcend his work, their arguments miss their mark.
    [Show full text]
  • How Do British Political Parties Mobilise and Contact Voters To
    How do British political parties mobilise and contact voters to increase turnout? Submitted by William Stephen King to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of MA by Research in Politics In August 2018 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. Signature: ………………………………………………………….. 1 Abstract This thesis will explore how British political parties over the period 2010-2017 have developed their mobilisation and contacting methods. Looking at social media, demographics, and other salient issues, I will construct a coherent and clear narrative of how British political parties have reacted to new technology, and what the advantages and disadvantages of doing so are. I shall be looking in particular at youth political mobilisation and contact, as this demographic has a poor election turnout record, so I shall explain why this is and how British political parties are attempting to contact and mobilise them (and how they have done so successfully). Looking at the 2010, 2015, and 2017 General Elections as well as the 2014 EU and 2016 referendums, this will enable me to take a look at Britain in different political times and differing levels of technology, from the first TV debates in 2010 to the first social media election in 2017.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 CURRICULUM VITAE David Graham Blanchflower Department
    CURRICULUM VITAE David Graham Blanchflower Department of Economics, Dartmouth College Hanover, New Hampshire, USA, 03755 Tel: (603) 632 1475; Cell: (603) 359-2077 Email: [email protected] Web page: www.dartmouth.edu/~blnchflr Date of birth: March 2nd, 1952. Nationality: Dual US and UK citizen. Children: Daniel John aged 27; Jennie age 32 and Kathryn age 34. Grand children: Lincoln James Denney (age 2); Angus Daniel Ross Davies (age 2); Hadley Davies; Isla Davies (age 1); Oliver Denny (age 9 months). Married: Carol Blanchflower Qualifications 1973 B.A. Soc. Sci. (Economics), University of Leicester, UK. 1975 Postgraduate Certificate in Education - (PGCE). Pass with distinction in teaching; Dudley College of Education, University of Birmingham, UK. 1981 M.Sc. (Econ), University of Wales, UK. 1985 Ph.D., University of London (Queen Mary College), UK. 1996 M.A. (Honorary), Dartmouth College. 1996 Honorary member of Phi Beta Kappa, Dartmouth chapter for ‘services to liberal scholarship’. 2007 Honorary Doctor of Letters (D.Litt.) for ‘services to economics’, University of Leicester, UK. 2009 Honorary Doctor of Science (D.Sc.), Queen Mary, University of London, July. 2011 Honorary Doctor of Letters (D.Litt.), University of Sussex, UK. 2014 Honorary Fellowship, Cardiff University, Wales, UK. Previous academic positions Northicote High School, Wolverhampton, UK, teacher, 1975-1976. Kilburn Polytechnic, London, UK, Lecturer, 1976-1977. Farnborough College of Technology, Hampshire, UK, Lecturer, 1977-1979. Institute for Employment Research, University of Warwick, UK, Research Officer, September 1984-July 1986. Department of Economics, University of Surrey, UK Assistant Professor (Lecturer), August 1986- August 1989. Associate Professor, Dartmouth College, 1989-1993. Department Chair, Department of Economics, Dartmouth College, July 1998 – June 2000.
    [Show full text]
  • On Israel's "Hyperinflation"
    SAE./No.127/September 2018 Studies in Applied Economics ON ISRAEL'S "HYPERINFLATION" Tal Boger Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise On Israel's \Hyperinflation” Tal Boger∗ Johns Hopkins University Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise. September 2018. Abstract Affected by the worldwide ”Stagflation” of the 1970s caused by sharp oil price rises in 1973 and 1979, Israel experienced elevated inflation rates in the 1970s. These inflation rates not only continued but also accelerated into the 1980s, as Israel saw its inflation hit triple digits at the turn of the decade. This inflation worsened, and peaked in 1984 and 1985. Noticing the sharply rising in- flation rates in Israel, many journalists and academics dubbed Israel's bout of inflation a hyperinflation, and have questioned its exclusion from the Hanke-Krus World Hyperinfla- tion Table. However, an analysis of Israel's CPI data - as reported by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics - shows that Israel's inflation rates fell short of hyperinflation by a sizable margin. Analyzing Israel's primary CPI data, we find conclusive evidence that Israel did not hyperinflate in the 1980s, despite many credible analyses to the contrary. Keywords: Hyperinflation, Israeli inflation 1. Introduction On October 14, 1984, Hobart Rowen wrote an article for The Washington Post titled \Israel's Hyperinflation: Ravaged State of Economy a Threat to Israel's Survival." In the article, Rowen writes that \[Israel] now must deal with the reality of a hyperinflation that is running over 400 percent, and in a few days may be measured at the incomprehensible level ∗Tal Boger is a senior at Beth Tfiloh Dahan Community High School.
    [Show full text]
  • The Socialization of Investment, from Keynes to Minsky and Beyond
    Working Paper No. 822 The Socialization of Investment, from Keynes to Minsky and Beyond by Riccardo Bellofiore* University of Bergamo December 2014 * [email protected] This paper was prepared for the project “Financing Innovation: An Application of a Keynes-Schumpeter- Minsky Synthesis,” funded in part by the Institute for New Economic Thinking, INET grant no. IN012-00036, administered through the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. Co-principal investigators: Mariana Mazzucato (Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex) and L. Randall Wray (Levy Institute). The author thanks INET and the Levy Institute for support of this research. The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection presents research in progress by Levy Institute scholars and conference participants. The purpose of the series is to disseminate ideas to and elicit comments from academics and professionals. Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, independently funded research organization devoted to public service. Through scholarship and economic research it generates viable, effective public policy responses to important economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in the United States and abroad. Levy Economics Institute P.O. Box 5000 Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000 http://www.levyinstitute.org Copyright © Levy Economics Institute 2014 All rights reserved ISSN 1547-366X Abstract An understanding of, and an intervention into, the present capitalist reality requires that we put together the insights of Karl Marx on labor, as well as those of Hyman Minsky on finance. The best way to do this is within a longer-term perspective, looking at the different stages through which capitalism evolves.
    [Show full text]
  • What Men Have to Do with It | Executive Summary 4
    what menhave to do with it Public Policies to Promote Gender Equality coordinated by the International Center for Research on Women and Instituto Promundo ABOUT THE MEN AND GENDER EQUALITY POLICY PROJECT The Men and Gender Equality Policy Project (MGEPP), coordinated by Instituto Promundo and the International Center for Research on Women, is a multi-year effort to build the evidence base on how to change public institutions and policies to better foster gender equality and to raise awareness among policymakers and program planners of the need to involve men in health, development and gender equality issues. Project activities include: (1) a multi-country policy research and analysis presented in this publication; (2) the International Men and Gender Equality Survey, or IMAGES, a quantitative household survey carried out with men and women in six countries in 2009, with additional countries implementing the survey in 2010 and thereafter; (3) the “Men who Care” study consisting of in-depth qualitative life history interviews with men in five countries, and (4) advocacy efforts and dissemination of the findings from these components via various formats, including a video produced by documentary filmmaker Rahul Roy. Participating countries in the project, as of 2009, include Brazil, Chile, Croatia, India, Mexico, South Africa, and Tanzania. The project’s multiple research components aim to provide policymakers with practical strategies for engaging men in relevant policy areas, particularly in the areas of sexual and reproductive health, gender-based violence, fatherhood and maternal and child health, and men’s own health needs. PHOTO CREDITS cover (left to right): © Ping-hang Chen, Influential Men; © Richard Lewisohn, Influential Men; (top right) © Marie Swartz, Influential Men; Shana Pereira/ICRW back cover: © Sophie Joy Mosko, Influential Men what menhave to do with it Public Policies to Promote Gender Equality AUTHORS: CONTENTS: Gary Barker Margaret E.
    [Show full text]
  • The Making of Hawks and Doves: Inflation Experiences on the FOMC
    The Making of Hawks and Doves? Ulrike Malmendier1,∗ UC Berkeley, NBER, CEPR, and CESIfo Stefan Nagel2 University of Chicago, NBER, CEPR, and CESIfo Zhen Yan3 Cornerstone Research Abstract Personal experiences of inflation strongly influence the hawkish or dovish leanings of central bankers. For all members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) since 1951, we estimate an adaptive learning rule based on their lifetime inflation data. The resulting experience-based forecasts have significant predictive power for members' FOMC voting decisions, the hawkishness of the tone of their speeches, as well as the heterogeneity in their semi-annual inflation projections. Averaging over all FOMC members present at a meeting, inflation experiences also help to explain the federal funds target rate, over and above conventional Taylor rule components. Keywords: Monetary policy, Experience effects, Availability bias, Inflation forecasts, Federal Funds rate JEL: E50, E03, D84 ?We thank Scott Baker, Michael McMahon, Ricardo Reis, David Robinson, Christina Romer, David Romer, Jeremy Stein, and workshop participants at the Bank of Finland (Finlands Bank/Suomen Pankki), Bank of Sweden (Sveriges Riksbank), Harvard University, London School of Economics, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Northwestern University, Stanford University, Stockholm School of Economics, Temple University, UC Berkeley, University of Bonn, University of Chicago, University of Michigan Economics Department and Law School, Vanderbilt University, as well as the NBER SI Monetary Economics meeting and the American Economic Assocation meeting, Research in Behavioral Finance Conference 2016, and Annual Research Conference of the European Central Bank for helpful comments. Canyao Liu, Jonas Sobott, Marius G¨unzel,Jeffrey Zeidel, and Albert Lee provided excellent research assistance.
    [Show full text]
  • The Pro-Cyclical Effects of the New Basel Accord” Stephany Griffith-Jones and Stephen Spratt 199
    1D5250-Omsl FONDAD 19-11-2003 13:47 Pagina 1 New Challenges of Crisis Prevention New José María Fanelli, Stephany Griffith-Jones, Jan Kregel, José Antonio Ocampo, Yung Chul Park, Chi-Young Song, John Williamson, and others New Challenges of Crisis Prevention Addressing Economic Imbalances in the North and Boom-Bust Cycles in the South Edited by Jan Joost Teunissen FONDAD FONDAD 1D5250-Fondad I 19-11-2003 18:47 Pagina 1 New Challenges of Crisis Prevention: Addressing Economic Imbalances in the North and Boom-Bust Cycles in the South From: New Challenges of Crisis Prevention, FONDAD, December 2001, www.fondad.org 1D5250-Fondad I 19-11-2003 18:47 Pagina 2 Forum on Debt and Development (FONDAD) FONDAD is an independent policy research centre and forum for international discussion established in the Netherlands. Supported by a worldwide network of experts, it provides policy-oriented research on a range of North-South problems, with particular emphasis on international financial issues. Through research, seminars and publications, FONDAD aims to provide factual background information and practical strategies for policymakers and other interested groups in industrial, developing and transition countries. Director: Jan Joost Teunissen From: New Challenges of Crisis Prevention, FONDAD, December 2001, www.fondad.org 1D5250-Fondad I 19-11-2003 18:47 Pagina 3 New Challenges of Crisis Prevention Addressing Economic Imbalances in the North and Boom-Bust Cycles in the South Edited by Jan Joost Teunissen FONDAD The Hague From: New Challenges of Crisis
    [Show full text]
  • Venezuela's Tragic Meltdown Hearing
    VENEZUELA’S TRAGIC MELTDOWN HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MARCH 28, 2017 Serial No. 115–13 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 24–831PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 May 02, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 F:\WORK\_WH\032817\24831 SHIRL COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas RON DESANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J.
    [Show full text]
  • The Limits of Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis As an Explanation of the Crisis
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Palley, Thomas I. Working Paper The Limits of Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis as an Explanation of the Crisis IMK Working Paper, No. 11/2009 Provided in Cooperation with: Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK) at the Hans Boeckler Foundation Suggested Citation: Palley, Thomas I. (2009) : The Limits of Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis as an Explanation of the Crisis, IMK Working Paper, No. 11/2009, Hans-Böckler- Stiftung, Institut für Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung (IMK), Düsseldorf, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-201101312750 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105923 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have
    [Show full text]