Time-Varying Noise Trader Risk and Asset Prices∗
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Charles River Trader - Equity Full Order and Execution Management
Charles River Trader - Equity Full Order and Execution Management Consolidate Systems in a Single Platform Available as a stand-alone module or as part of the Charles River Investment Management Multi-Asset Class Support Solution (Charles River IMS), Charles River Trader provides order management and • Equities execution management in a single, fully customizable user interface that gives traders • Fixed Income complete market visibility. Users can monitor real-time data and create, place and execute • Rate and Credit Derivatives orders. • Foreign Exchange Charles River Trader is integrated with more than 150 trade and liquidity providers and 550 • Options global Charles River FIX Network brokers. Interfaces with more than 60 algorithmic brokers • Commodities offer direct access to over 600 global and regional trading strategies. • Futures . Key capabilities include: • Manage single stock and list/portfolio execution strategies • Monitor real-time market, order, and analytic data, including order P&L • Quickly organize orders based on multiple criteria, with spreadsheet-like filtering, grouping and sorting • Monitor compliance throughout the entire order lifecycle • Easily add new brokers, strategies, and placement templates • Synchronize all multi-monitor displays to active order Traders can customize multiple blotter displays to show all necessary trade information on one or more monitors – real-time Level I and Level II pricing, pre-trade TCA, order benchmarking, time and sales, and watch lists – saving keystrokes and enabling faster order execution. Order and Execution Management (OEMS) Charles River Trader provides a real-time dashboard for managing daily trading operations, OMS Capabilities workflows and execution. Dynamic Trader Blotter columns visually show real-time data • Direct Brokerage changes – execution status, order status and gain/loss – via color and magnitude displays. -
Chapter 2. Participants of Financial Market
Chapter 2. Participants of financial market In the financial markets, there are more topics to consider, than it may seem at first glance when you open a trading platform and enter your orders. Various entities in the financial market also have completely different approaches and purposes for operating in the financial market. To correctly understand the entire financial market, you also have to know other participants in the global financial market. Retail traders – These are speculators. You and your friends probably fall into this category, along with many other traders who are reading this text. In the financial market, retail traders operate to invest their capital and their main goal is profit. Retail traders typically trade over the trading platform QUIK, MetaTrader, Wealth-Lab, TSLab, or through other specific platforms or technology solutions from their broker. Retail traders in the financial market are trading via a provider, called a broker. Profitability of traders depends on their trading strategy, money management, experiences and also how fair and solid their broker is, and it can vary considerably from 10% to 50%. According to the statistics, the higher the trader's capital, the higher success rate he is usually able to achieve because he is better at managing risk. Brokers. Their goal is to provide trading to their clients and provide access to financial markets. For executing their clients' trades, the broker usually gets a commission. In the world, there are hundreds of brokers with very different approaches to their clients. The fact is that the vast majority of retail traders lose their capital in the financial market, and many brokers put their own profits ahead of creating a profitable trading environment for their clients. -
Scandals and Abstraction: Financial Fiction of the Long 1980S
Scandals and Abstraction Scandals and Abstraction financial fiction of the long 1980s Leigh Claire La Berge 1 1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 © Oxford University Press 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data La Berge, Leigh Claire. Scandals and abstraction : financial fiction of the long 1980s / Leigh Claire La Berge. pages cm Includes index. ISBN 978-0-19-937287-4 (hardback)—ISBN 978-0-19-937288-1 (ebook) 1. -
Foreign Exchange Training Manual
CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED BY BARCLAYS SOURCE: LEHMAN LIVE LEHMAN BROTHERS FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRAINING MANUAL Confidential Treatment Requested By Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. LBEX-LL 3356480 CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED BY BARCLAYS SOURCE: LEHMAN LIVE TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................................... PAGE FOREIGN EXCHANGE SPOT: INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1 FXSPOT: AN INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN EXCHANGE SPOT TRANSACTIONS ........... 2 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 2 WJ-IAT IS AN OUTRIGHT? ..................................................................................................... 3 VALUE DATES ........................................................................................................................... 4 CREDIT AND SETTLEMENT RISKS .................................................................................. 6 EXCHANGE RATE QUOTATION TERMS ...................................................................... 7 RECIPROCAL QUOTATION TERMS (RATES) ............................................................. 10 EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS ................................................................................... 11 SHORTCUT ............................................................................................................................... -
The Guide to Securities Lending
3&"$)#&:0/%&91&$5"5*0/4 An Introduction to Securities Lending First Canadian Edition An Introduction to $IPPTFTFDVSJUJFTMFOEJOHTFSWJDFTXJUIBO Securities Lending JOUFSOBUJPOBMSFBDIBOEBEFUBJMFEGPDVT Mark C. Faulkner, Managing Director, Spitalfields Advisors Spitalfields Managing Director, Mark C. Faulkner, First Canadian Edition 5SVTUFECZNPSFUIBOCPSSPXFSTXPSMEXJEFJOHMPCBMNBSLFUT QMVTUIF64 BOE$BOBEB $*#$.FMMPOJTDPNNJUUFEUPQSPWJEJOHVOSJWBMMFETFDVSJUJFTMFOEJOH TFSWJDFTUP$BOBEJBOJOTUJUVUJPOBMJOWFTUPST8FMFWFSBHFOFBSMZZFBSTPG EFBMFSBOEUSBEJOHFYQFSJFODFUPIFMQDMJFOUTBDIJFWFIJHIFSSFUVSOTXJUIPVU Mark C. Faulkner, Managing Director DPNQSPNJTJOHBTTFUTFDVSJUZ 0VSTUSBUFHZJTUPNBYJNJ[FSFUVSOTBOEDPOUSPMSJTLCZGPDVTJOHJOUFOUMZPOUIF Spitalfields Advisors TUSVDUVSFBOEEFUBJMTPGFBDIMPBO5IBUJTXIZXFPGGFSBMFOEJOHQSPHSBNUIBUJT USBOTQBSFOU SJTLDPOUSPMMFEBOEEPFTOPUJNQFEFZPVSGVOETUSBEJOHBOEWBMVBUJPO QSPDFTT4PZPVDBOFYDFFEFYQFDUBUJPOT ■ (MPCBM$VTUPEZ ■ 4FDVSJUJFT-FOEJOH ■ 0VUTPVSDJOH ■ 8PSLCFODI ■ #FOFmU1BZNFOUT ■ 'PSFJHO&YDIBOHF &OBCMJOH:PVUP 'PDVTPO:PVS8PSME XXXDJCDNFMMPODPN XXXXPSLCFODIDJCDNFMMPODPN $*#$.FMMPO(MPCBM4FDVSJUJFT4FSWJDFT$PNQBOZJTBMJDFOTFEVTFSPGUIF$*#$BOE.FMMPOUSBEFNBSLT ______________________________ An Introduction to Securities Lending First Canadian Edition Mark C. Faulkner Spitalfields Advisors Limited 155 Commercial Street London E1 6BJ United Kingdom Published in Canada First published, 2006 © Mark C. Faulkner, 2006 First Edition, 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, -
Why Have Exchange-Traded Catastrophe Instruments Failed To
Why Have Exchange-Traded Catastrophe Instruments Failed to Displace Reinsurance? Rajna Gibson¤ Michel A. Habiby Alexandre Zieglerz ¤Swiss Finance Institute, University of Zurich, Plattenstrasse 14, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland, tel.: +41- (0)44-634-2969, fax: +41-(0)44-634-4903, e-mail: [email protected]. ySwiss Finance Institute, University of Zurich, Plattenstrasse 14, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland, tel.: +41- (0)44-634-2507, fax: +41-(0)44-634-4903, e-mail: [email protected]; CEPR. zSwiss Finance Institute, University of Lausanne, Extranef Building, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland, tel.: +41-(0)21-692-3359, fax: +41-(0)21-692-3435, e-mail: [email protected]. We wish to thank Pauline Barrieu, Jan Bena, Charles Cuny, Benjamin Croitoru, Marco Elmer, Pablo Koch, Henri Loubergé, Peter Sohre, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, and seminar participants at the CEPR Conference on Corporate Finance and Risk Management in Solstrand, the EFA meetings in Ljubljana, the EPFL, the ESSFM in Gerzensee, the SCOR-JRI Conference on New Forms of Risk Sharing and Risk Engineering in Paris, and the Universities of Geneva, Konstanz, and Zurich for helpful comments and discussions, and Swiss Re for providing illustrative data. Financial support by the National Centre of Competence in Research Financial Valuation and Risk Management (NCCR FINRISK), the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant no. PP001102717), and the URPP Finance and Financial Markets is gratefully acknowledged. Why Have Exchange-Traded Catastrophe Instruments Failed to Displace Reinsurance? Abstract Financial markets can draw on a larger, more liquid, and more diversied pool of capital than the equity of reinsurance companies, yet they have failed to displace reinsurance as the primary risk-sharing vehicle for natural catastrophe risk. -
Securities Lending, Market Liquidity and Retirement Savings: the Real World Impact November 2015 ______
Securities Lending, Market Liquidity and Retirement Savings: The Real World Impact November 2015 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Securities Lending, Market Liquidity and Retirement Savings: The Real World Impact November 2015 Josh Galper Managing Principal PO Box 560 Concord, MA 01742 USA Tel: 1-978-318-0920 http://www.Finadium.com © 2015 Finadium LLC. All rights reserved. Reproduction of this report by any means is strictly prohibited. Securities Lending, Market Liquidity and Retirement Savings: The Real World Impact November 2015 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents Why Securities Lending Matters ........................................................................ 1 Sizing the Market ........................................................................................................ 2 The Uses of Securities Loans ..................................................................................... 4 Securities Lending, Market Efficiency and Economic Growth ........................ 6 Evidence on Equity Market Liquidity and Short Selling .............................................. 7 Efficient Markets and Economic Growth ................................................................... 10 How Much Do Investors Earn from Securities Lending? ............................... 12 Where Is the Risk in Securities Lending? -
INSTITUTIONAL FINANCE Lecture 07: Liquidity, Limits to Arbitrage – Margins + Bubbles DEBRIEFING - MARGINS
INSTITUTIONAL FINANCE Lecture 07: Liquidity, Limits to Arbitrage – Margins + Bubbles DEBRIEFING - MARGINS $ • No constraints Initial Margin (50%) Reg. T 50 % • Can’t add to your position; • Not received a margin call. Maintenance Margin (35%) NYSE/NASD 25% long 30% short • Fixed amount of time to get to a specified point above the maintenance level before your position is liquidated. • Failure to return to the initial margin requirements within the specified period of time results in forced liquidation. Minimum Margin (25%) • Position is always immediately liquidated MARGINS – VALUE AT RISK (VAR) Margins give incentive to hold well diversified portfolio How are margins set by brokers/exchanges? Value at Risk: Pr (-(pt+1 – pt)¸ m) = 1 % 1% Value at Risk LEVERAGE AND MARGINS j+ j Financing a long position of x t>0 shares at price p t=100: Borrow $90$ dollar per share; j+ Margin/haircut: m t=100-90=10 j+ Capital use: $10 x t j- Financing a short position of x t>0 shares: Borrow securities, and lend collateral of 110 dollar per share Short-sell securities at price of 100 j- Margin/haircut: m t=110-100=10 j- Capital use: $10 x t Positions frequently marked to market j j j payment of x t(p t-p t-1) plus interest margins potentially adjusted – more later on this Margins/haircuts must be financed with capital: j+ j+ j- j- j j+ j- j ( x t m t+ x t m t ) · Wt , where x =xt -xt 1 J with perfect cross-margining: Mt ( xt , …,xt ) · Wt 3. -
Noise Traders - Detailed Derivation
University of California, Berkeley Summer 2010 ECON 138 Noise Traders - Detailed Derivation A common response to the behavioral anomalies we have discussed in this course is that they have little impact on the long run, because investors with such anomalies are not maximizing optimally, and would thus be driven out of the market. We shall show, however, that noise traders—traders who are not maximizing—can indeed survive even in a very simple market setting. The model is taken out of De Long et al, "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," The Journal of Political Economy, Aug. 1990. I. Setting . Two-period model. Invest in the first period, consume in the second . CARA utility . One risk-free asset with return r and infinite supply . One risky asset with price and pays a dividend of r. Supply is fixed to 1. noise traders and rational traders, . Noise traders misperceive the expected price of the risky asset in the second period by II. Derivation 1. Utility Function We start off with CARA utility Where is the rate of absolute risk aversion and is wealth in dollars.1 If the return of the risky asset is normally distributed, is also normally distributed, and thus utility is log-normally distributed. As we did in the first lecture, we can take log of the utility function and use to get Dividing the above by gives us . 1 This is a bit different from the CARA utility we have seen before, as we are not having a as the numerator. This is alright because is a positive constant as long as the investors are risk averse. -
Arbitrage, Noise-Trader Risk, and the Cross Section of Closed-End Fund Returns
Arbitrage, Noise-trader Risk, and the Cross Section of Closed-end Fund Returns Sean Masaki Flynn¤ This version: April 18, 2005 ABSTRACT I find that despite active arbitrage activity, the discounts of individual closed-end funds are not driven to be consistent with their respective fundamentals. In addition, arbitrage portfolios created by sorting funds by discount level show excess returns not only for the three Fama and French (1992) risk factors but when a measure of average discount movements across all funds is included as well. Because the inclusion of this later variable soaks up volatility common to all funds, the observed inverse relationship between the magnitude of excess returns in the cross section and the ability of these variables to explain overall volatility leads me to suspect that fund-specific risk factors exist which, were they measurable, would justify what otherwise appear to be excess returns. I propose that fund-specific noise-trader risk of the type described by Black (1986) may be the missing risk factor. ¤Department of Economics, Vassar College, 124 Raymond Ave. #424, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604. fl[email protected] I would like to thank Steve Ross for inspiration, and Osaka University’s Institute for Social and Economic Studies for research support while I completed the final drafts of this paper. I also gratefully acknowledge the diligent and tireless research assistance of Rebecca Forster. All errors are my own. Closed-end mutual funds have been closely studied because they offer the chance to examine asset pricing in a situation in which all market participants have common knowledge about fundamental valuations. -
Limits of Arbitrage and Corporate Financial Policies*
LIMITS OF ARBITRAGE AND CORPORATE * FINANCIAL POLICIES Massimo Massa INSEAD Urs Peyer INSEAD Zhenxu Tong INSEAD This Version: July 2006 Abstract: We focus on an exogenous event that changes the cost of equity of the firm—the addition of its stock to the S&P 500 index—and we use it to test capital structure theories in a controlled experiment, where the effect of the index addition on the stock price is exogenous from a manager’s point of view. We investigate how firms modify their corporate financial and investment policies as a reaction to the addition to the index. Consistent with both traditional theories and Stein’s (1996) market timing theory, we find bigger increases in equity issues and investment - partly through more acquisitions – in response to bigger drops in the cost of equity. However, in the 24 months after the index addition, firms that issue equity and increase investment display negative abnormal returns and they perform worse than firms that issue but do not increase investment. This finding is consistent only with the market timing theory of Stein (1996) and supports a “limits of arbitrage” story in which stocks display a downward sloping demand curve and firms themselves act as “arbitrageurs” taking advantage of the window of opportunity provided by the stock price change around the S&P500 index addition. JEL Classification: G32; G30. Keywords: index addition, corporate policy, behavioral finance, limits of arbitrage. *Department of Finance, INSEAD. Please address all correspondence to Massimo Massa, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, 77300 Fontainebleau France, Tel: +33160724481, Fax: +33160724045 Email: [email protected]. -
10.4 Excess Volatility in the Models of Financial Markets We
David Romer July 2016 Preliminary – please do not circulate! 10.4 Excess Volatility In the models of financial markets we have considered so far – the partial-equilibrium models of consumers’ asset allocation and the determinants of investment in Sections 8.5 and 9.7, and the general-equilibrium model of Section 10.1 – asset prices equal their fundamental values. That is, they are the rational expectations, given agents’ information and their stochastic discount factors, of the present value of the assets’ payoffs. This case is the natural benchmark. It is generally a good idea to start by assuming rationality and no market imperfections. Moreover, many participants in financial markets are highly sophisticated and have vast resources at their disposal, so one might expect that any departures of asset prices from fundamentals would be small and quickly corrected. On the other hand, there are many movements in asset prices that, at least at first glance, cannot be easily explained by changes in fundamentals. And perfectly rational, risk neutral agents with unlimited resources standing ready to immediately correct any unwarranted movements in asset prices do not exist. Thus there is not an open-and-shut theoretical case that asset prices can never differ from fundamentals. This section is therefore devoted to examining the possibility of such departures. We start by considering a model, due to DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), that demonstrates what is perhaps the most economically interesting force making such departures 21 possible. DeLong et al. show departures of prices from fundamentals can be self-reinforcing: the very fact that there can be departures creates a source of risk, and so limits the willingness of rational investors to trade to correct the mispricings.