Andrew W. Appel, Curriculum Vitae
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Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 855-3 *SEALED* Filed 09/01/20 Page 1 of 56 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION DONNA CURLING, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-2989-AT BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, ET AL., Defendants. DECLARATION OF ANDREW W. APPEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ANDREW W. APPEL, declares, under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the following is true and correct: 1. My name is Andrew W. Appel. 2. I am the Eugene Higgins Professor of Computer Science at Princeton University, where I have been on the faculty since 1986 and served as Department Chair from 2009-2015. I have also served as Director of Undergraduate Studies, Director of Graduate Studies, and Associate Chair in that department. I have served as Editor in Chief of ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, the leading journal in my field. In 1998 I was elected a Fellow of the 1 ny-1984930 v3 Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 855-3 *SEALED* Filed 09/01/20 Page 2 of 56 Association for Computing Machinery, the leading scientific and professional society in Computer Science. 3. I previously provided a Declaration in support of the Curling Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction on December 13, 2019 (Dkt. No. 681-3). My 2019 Declaration is attached as Exhibit A. I have reviewed my 2019 Declaration and my previous findings and analyses remain the same; accordingly, I incorporate by reference my prior Declaration in its entirety, subject to the additional opinions I offer here. 4. My background, qualifications, and professional affiliations were previously identified in my 2019 Declaration and accompanying CV. I have over 40 years’ experience in computer science, and 15 years’ experience studying voting machines and elections. I am not being compensated for my work related to this matter. I expect that my expenses, if any, will be reimbursed. 5. I previously commented on the Declaration of Juan E. Gilbert, submitted 13 November 2019 in my 2019 Declaration. My opinions regarding the shortcomings of Mr. Gilbert’s initial analysis have not changed. In addition, I have read the Supplemental Declaration of Juan E. Gilbert in this case, as well as the Declaration of Jack Cobb, both submitted 26 August 2020. Gilbert Supplemental Declaration 2 ny-1984930 v3 Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 855-3 *SEALED* Filed 09/01/20 Page 3 of 56 6. Professor Gilbert’s Supplemental Declaration attempts to address the question of voter verification of votes cast on BMD systems, but his conclusions do not address (nor dispute) the underlying vulnerabilities associated with the use of BMDs as I understand them to be implemented in Georgia. Professor Gilbert does not address any of my prior conclusions regarding the fundamental insecurities with BMDs. 7. In paragraph 7A, Professor Gilbert makes much of the fact that Georgia’s State Election Board (“SEB”) has issued rules intended to require poll workers to remind voters to review their votes before scanning them. Professor Gilbert cites to recently published research from Kortum, Byrne, and Whitmore that suggests reminders to voters to review their ballots.1 8. But even Professors Kortum and Byrne and Ms. Whitmore acknowledge the limitations of their own study: “it seems that the next logical question is ‘What can be done to get people to take the time to examine their ballots in the first place?’ There are a number of possibilities, all of which would require additional research in order to understand how efficacious they might be.”2 (page 16). And they 1 Philip Kortum, Michael D. Byrne, Julie Whitmore, Voter Verification of BMD Ballots Is a Two-Part Question: Can They? Mostly, They Can. Do They? Mostly, They Don’t (2020) [hereafter Kortum et al.], available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.04997. 2 Kortum et al., 16. 3 ny-1984930 v3 Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 855-3 *SEALED* Filed 09/01/20 Page 4 of 56 explicitly acknowledge the problem raised by Appel, DeMillo, and Stark,3 when they write, “Of course, if such efforts are successful in getting most or all of the voters to check their ballots, then we must also investigate how to effectively deal with people finding errors and making sure that those are viewed not as human mistakes but as warning signs of a potential malicious agent in a BMD.” 4 (page 16) 9. That is: even if some voters detect that the BMD printed fraudulent votes onto their ballot, there’s no effective remedy. That is the problem that Kortum, Byrne, and Whitmore say “we must also investigate.” 10. Importantly, Professor Gilbert does not address this more fundamental problem. Even if a handful of voters in a precinct are able to detect an error, there is no way to prove it and such detection provides no basis to invalidate an entire election, even though the election potentially should be invalidated because of vote- altering malware. 11. In paragraph 12 of his Supplemental Declaration, Professor Gilbert also reiterates his belief that risk-limiting audits (“RLAs”) could help detect the presence of malware, but this conclusion ignores the shortcoming of RLAs when applied to BMDs. RLAs depend on a trustworthy record of the vote expressed by the voter. 3 Andrew W. Appel, Richard A. DeMillo, & Philip B. Stark, Ballot-marking devices (BMDs) cannot assure the will of the voters (2019) [hereinafter Appel et. al.]. A copy of this research is attached as Exhibit B to this Declaration. 4 Kortum et al., 16. 4 ny-1984930 v3 Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 855-3 *SEALED* Filed 09/01/20 Page 5 of 56 When the source of the paper trail is susceptible to hacking, bugs, or other malfunctions, as is the case with BMDs, it is not trustworthy. There simply is no method for checking whether any errors in how BMDs record expressed votes altered election outcomes.5 Cobb Declaration 12. Mr. Cobb is an employee of the firm paid by the Secretary of State to conduct testing of the BMD system for “Georgia-specific election criteria.” (Cobb Decl. ¶ 6.) Mr. Cobb does not profess to be an expert in election security or in computer security. 13. In Paragraph 5 of his Declaration, Mr. Cobb mentions some testing performed on the Dominion BMD system now used in Georgia, calling it a “security test.” Mr. Cobb’s firm did not perform this testing, and he does not describe any specifics of the certification and testing performed by SLI Compliance. Mr. Cobb references standards developed by the Pennsylvania Department of State for “penetration testing,” but it does not appear that Mr. Cobb’s firm has ever performed any penetration testing of any elements of the Georgia BMD system. Mr. Cobb does not point to any documentation that would show the scope, limitations, or any other details of penetration testing performed on the Georgia BMD system (before or after its deployment across the state), nor does he identify the results of such testing. 5 Appel et al., 3, 8-9. 5 ny-1984930 v3 Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 855-3 *SEALED* Filed 09/01/20 Page 6 of 56 14. It is well understood in the cybersecurity industry that penetration testing, even when properly conducted, can only demonstrate the presence of security vulnerabilities. Penetration testing serves to exploit a system’s weaknesses in order to improve security. However, penetration testing cannot demonstrate that a system is free of vulnerabilities, as there may be numerous avenues of attack that are not explored by even comprehensive penetration testing. In addition, penetration testing cannot necessarily demonstrate whether a system has already been infected. This is why penetration testing is used as only one component of a comprehensive risk assessment system. 15. In paragraphs 7 and 8, Mr. Cobb described the acceptance testing his firm performed for Georgia in August 2019, and the use of a hash value to determine that “the correct software” was installed at the time of acceptance. Such reliance on hash values is severely misplaced. It is well understood in the cybersecurity industry that fraudulent software can easily mimic legitimate software by displaying the same hash code. Thus, the use of hash codes does not provide any assurance that the correct software is installed. 16. Based on my preliminary review of the certification report produced by Mr. Cobb’s firm in August 2019,6 the testing performed by Pro V&V appears to have 6 Pro V&V, Test Report Dominion Voting Systems D-Suite 5.5-A Voting System, Georgia State Certification Testing, (Aug. 7, 2019) available at https://sos.ga.gov/admin/uploads/Dominion_Test_Cert_Report.pdf 6 ny-1984930 v3 Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 855-3 *SEALED* Filed 09/01/20 Page 7 of 56 been limited in scope. The report does not represent itself as a security analysis and the testing does not appear to have included any comprehensive security testing. The accuracy and acceptance testing Mr. Cobb describes in Paragraphs 6 and 7 of his Declaration are not a substitute for a full security assessment. 17. There is clear consensus in the election security community that there are many layers between “the application software that implements an election function and the transistors inside the computers that ultimately carry out computations.”7 Any one of these layers could serve as a vector for attack that could introduce fraudulent vote-counting software. Based on my preliminary view of the findings from Pro V&V, it does not appear that any of these layers underlying Georgia’s BMD system were examined.