DOCSLIB.ORG

Download Original 489.8 KB

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Download Original 489.8 KB Frazer 1 Risky Behavior: Understanding Iranian Foreign Policy Sarah Frazer Class of 2019 Senior Honors Thesis Government 490 Advisor: Professor Jennifer Kibbe Department of Government Franklin & Marshall College Date of Honors Defense: 1 May, 2019 Frazer 2 Acknowledgements Firstly, I would like to thank Professor Jennifer Kibbe for being my thesis advisor and guiding me through this process with support and enthusiasm. Thank you for always pushing me to do my best and for this great opportunity. I would not have thought to pursue an honors thesis without your suggestion and confidence in me. I have greatly enjoyed working with you over this past year.. To my mom, thank you for always encouraging me and believing in me. I’m grateful that you raised me to work hard and follow through to accomplish my goals. Lastly, thank you to my sister, Marie, for many hours and late nights of listening to my ideas, editing drafts, and giving constructive criticism. Frazer 3 Abstract Since its founding in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has played a pivotal role in Middle East politics and beyond; therefore, understanding the factors that influence Iran’s international behavior is essential to understanding regional politics. In this paper, I will analyze Iran’s foreign policy towards three neighboring states: Saudi Arabia, Iran’s archrival; Turkey its “frenemy,” and Syria, its closest state ally. I will consider Iran’s relations with these countries during the Khatami (1997-2005) and Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) presidencies and will apply prospect theory to explain Iran’s behavior. Through my research, I discovered that the Islamic Republic’s behavior is best explained by prospect theory, which contends that Iran will behave differently when it is in a domain of loss as opposed to when it is in a domain of gain. When facing a domain of loss, Iran will be risk seeking, and when in a domain of gain it will be risk averse. Indeed, Iran’s foreign policies towards Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria consistently follow this pattern. This finding is important to any state that interacts with Iran since applying it would allow states to make better decisions towards Iran. For example, the United States and other Western actors should avoid placing Iran in a domain of loss that would influence Iran to take more aggressive or more risky choices, such as increasing aid to Hezbollah and other terrorist groups. Frazer 4 Table of Contents: Introduction……………………………..……………………………………………………....5-7 Literature Review…………………………………………………………………………...…8-25 Case Studies……..…………………...…….............................................................................26-80 Saudi Arabia…………………...……..........................................................................26-47 Turkey……………………………...…………………………………………………48-64 Syria…………………………...……………………………………………………...65-80 Analysis………………………………...….…………………………………………………81-97 Conclusion…………………………………..........................................................................98-102 Tables……………………………………………………………………………………….......103 Bibliography……………………………..….……………………………………..……....104-109 Frazer 5 Introduction Since its founding in 1979, the Islamic Republic has played a pivotal role in the regional politics of the Middle East. Along with its allies, Iran has posed a formidable foe to all of its adversaries and has effectively countered the hegemonic ambitions of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein. For this reason, understanding how Iran makes and conducts its foreign policy is critical for policymakers and anyone who wants to understand Iran’s place in regional politics and the future of the Islamic Republic and of the Middle East. As will be shown in the following pages, Iranian foreign policy has a clear, discernible pattern that it usually applies to its policies towards other state actors, be they a friend, an enemy, or something in between. Specifically, Iran’s behavior is risk seeking when it is in a domain of loss; conversely, when in a domain of gain, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy is both more risk averse and more dependent on who is in office at the time. This paper will examine the evolution of Iran’s bilateral relations with three states in the Middle East, namely Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria, during Mohammad Khatami’s and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidencies (1997-2013) since Iran was under the leadership of two quite different administrations during this period. The Khatami administration (1997-2005) led the reformist camp and pursued an open, ‘dialogue of civilizations’ type policy. In stark contrast, the Ahmadinejad administration (2005-2013) led the conservative faction and favored a ‘clash of civilizations’ approach in its foreign affairs. After detailing all three cases, I will analyze Iran’s policies towards these states by applying prospect theory to each, in the hopes of drawing overarching conclusions regarding Iran’s foreign policy and, based on my analysis, potential policy implications for international decision-makers. Frazer 6 Case Selection To better understand Iran’s foreign policy, this paper will analyze Iran’s policies towards three states: Saudi Arabia, Iran’s archrival; Turkey, a “frenemy” of the Islamic Republic; and Syria, Iran’s staunchest ally. Research on Iranian foreign policy disproportionately focuses on its relations with the United States and to a lesser extent Israel. Though some scholars have studied Iran’s foreign policy towards Middle Eastern states like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria, as well as its ties to the EU, India, Russia, and countries in Africa and in South America, this research is far less prevalent in the literature. The bulk of the literature still has a singular focus on Iran’s policy towards the US. While this aspect of Iranian foreign policy is undoubtedly consequential, it is not all that matters. The study of US-Iranian relations overshadows all other aspects of Iranian foreign policy to the extent that it limits our ability to understand how Iran develops and executes its policies towards everyone else. Since the US is by no means like any other state that Iran deals with, seeing as it is not a regional power and operates as perhaps the world’s only superpower, we cannot learn much about how Iran would act in general by looking at the US as a case study. To remedy the above problem, I will be analyzing three case studies of Iranian foreign policy towards three less-studied countries to see how Iran behaves as an international actor. The three states are Syria, the closest thing Iran has to an ally; Saudi Arabia, Iran’s arch rival in the region and usually its enemy; and Turkey, a wildcard state which Iran has both worked with and against depending on the situation. I have chosen these cases since they represent the range of relationships Iran has within the Middle East and since they are all comparable to each other as regional, middle power states. At the same time, they have key differences which determine Frazer 7 Iran’s relations with them. Thus, more research on each of these key bilateral relationships will provide a better understanding of Iran’s foreign policy. The time frame I will be observing, 1997-2013, spans two presidential administrations: President Mohammad Khatami’s (1997-2005) and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s (2005-2013). I chose these two presidencies for a few reasons. I chose these two administrations because Khatami and Ahmadinejad are the most recent presidents to have completed two terms in office. President Hassan Rouhani was elected in 2013 and is still in office today; studying his presidency would be problematic since it is too recent and not yet finished. Second, and most importantly, Khatami was a reformist, and Ahmadinejad was a conservative hardliner, meaning that their foreign policies should theoretically represent a wide range of possible Iranian policies. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is not the focus of this paper. It is true that since his assumption of the role of Supreme Leader in 1989, he has had considerable sway over Iran’s foreign policy and can limit the actions taken by Iran’s president.1 Nevertheless, Khamenei is not the only one with decision-making power in the Islamic Republic. Whoever is president of Iran exerts influence over its foreign policy. More to the point, any effect the Supreme Leader would have on that policy would remain consistent throughout both presidential administrations. The Supreme Leader does not seem to be going anywhere anytime soon, so any difference in Iran’s policy would come primarily from the president, possibly along with Iranian voters. Thus, Khatami’s and Ahmadinejad’s foreign policies paint a good picture of Iran’s policy overall. 1 Jerrold D. Green and Frederic Wehrey Green, Charles Wolf (2009), Understanding Iran, (Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation), 7-10. Frazer 8 Literature Review Since the days of the Safavid Empire (1501-1722), Iran has been a key actor in the Middle East and the surrounding region; perhaps equally important, Iran has been a leader of Shia Muslims around the world for just as long. Given Iran’s geopolitical importance, international relations scholars worldwide have sought to understand the process by which Iran makes its foreign policy. Following the Revolution of 1979, the newly declared Islamic Republic of Iran dramatically shifted its foreign policy and its foreign policy decision-making process. Much has been written about the Islamic Republic's foreign policy; this literature can be broken down a few different ways.2 Here, it will be analyzed and divided according to the questions its authors seek to answer. First, scholars are divided on whether Iran’s foreign policy is driven mainly by ideology or by pragmatism. Second, another way scholars have framed this question is whether Iran’s behaviour is best explained by a neorealist, neoliberal, or constructivist worldview. Lastly, the literature is broken up according to the Islamic Republic’s relations with specific countries, namely the United States and Israel, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, Turkey and other regional powers, and other non regional states.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • UK Home Office
    Country Policy and Information Note Syria: the Syrian Civil War Version 4.0 August 2020 Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies: x A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm x The general humanitarian situation is so severe as to breach Article 15(b) of European Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive) / Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules x The security situation presents a real risk to a civilian’s life or person such that it would breach Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules x A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) x A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory x A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and x If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 30 March - 5 April 2020
    WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 30 March - 5 April 2020 SYRIA SUMMARY • NORTHWEST | Levels of Conflict in northwest Syria remained elevated for the second consecutive week, as Turkish military personnel and equipment continued to arrive to Idleb. Inside the Turkish-held areas of northern Aleppo Governorate, opposition armed groups continued their looting and extortion activity against civilians. An attack against an opposition affiliated National Police Officer highlighted the growing number of attacks against the entity in the previous month. • SOUTH & CENTRAL | Tensions over kidnapping and clashes continue between communal militias Dara’a and As-Sweida. Government of Syria (GoS)-aligned personal faced continuing attacks in Daraa Governorate. • NORTHEAST | Shelling exchanges around Turkish-held Operation Peace Spring areas increased, while Turkish-backed opposition armed groups and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) clashed on the ground. Jailed ISIS members staged a riot to escape a prison in Hassakah. ISIS also attacked SDF and pro-Iran forces in Deir-ez-Zor. Members of the Asayish (Kurdish Intelligence) and National Defense Forces (NDF) exchanged fire in Qamishli City. Figure 1: Dominant actors’ area of control and influence in Syria as of 5 April 2020. NSOAG stands for Non-state Organized Armed Groups. Also, please see the footnote on page 2. Page 1 of 5 WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 30 March – 5 April 2020 NORTHWEST SYRIA1 For a second consecutive week, there were elevated levels of conflict activity in the northwest of Syria. The Government of Syria (GoS) shelled 14 locations, 26 times2 during the week, compared to 22 locations targeted 36 times by shelling and small arms fire the previous week.
    [Show full text]
  • The Virtual Entrepreneurs of the Islamic State
    Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Objective • Relevant • Rigorous | March 2017 • Volume 10, Issue 3 FEATURE ARTICLE FEATURE ANALYSIS The Virtual Entrepreneurs The Islamic of the Islamic State State’s War on How the group’s virtual planners threaten the United States Turkey Seamus Hughes and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens Ahmet S. Yayla FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Threat to the United States from the Islamic State’s Virtual Editor in Chief Entrepreneurs Paul Cruickshank Seamus Hughes and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens Managing Editor FEATURE ANALYSIS Kristina Hummel 9 The Reina Nightclub Attack and the Islamic State Threat to Turkey Ahmet S. Yayla EDITORIAL BOARD Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. ANALYSIS Department Head Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point) 17 The German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: The Updated Data and its Implications Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Price, Ph.D. Daniel H. Heinke Director, CTC 23 Australian Jihadism in the Age of the Islamic State Brian Dodwell Andrew Zammit Deputy Director, CTC 31 The Taliban Stones Commission and the Insurgent Windfall from Illegal Mining Matthew C. DuPée CONTACT Combating Terrorism Center U.S. Military Academy In our feature article, Seamus Hughes and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall focus on the threat to the United States from the Islamic State’s “virtual entrepreneurs” who have been using social media and encryption applica- West Point, NY 10996 tions to recruit and correspond with sympathizers in the West, encouraging and directing them to Phone: (845) 938-8495 engage in terrorist activity. They find that since 2014, contact with a virtual entrepreneur has been a Email: [email protected] feature of eight terrorist plots in the United States, involving 13 individuals.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East
    CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and EDUCATION AND THE ARTS decisionmaking through research and analysis. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service INFRASTRUCTURE AND of the RAND Corporation. TRANSPORTATION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY Support RAND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Purchase this document TERRORISM AND Browse Reports & Bookstore HOMELAND SECURITY Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East F. Stephen Larrabee, Alireza Nader C O R P O R A T I O N NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East F.
    [Show full text]
  • An Assessment of the Methods That Are Used to Recruit College Students Into the Turkish Hezbollah
    Virginia Commonwealth University VCU Scholars Compass Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 2010 An assessment of the methods that are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah. TUNCAY UNAL Virginia Commonwealth University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons © The Author Downloaded from https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/123 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars Compass. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Tuncay Unal 2010 All Rights Reserved An assessment of the methods that are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah. A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University by Tuncay Unal B. A., Turkish Police Academy, Ankara, 1995 M.P.A., Virginia Commonwealth University, 2006 Director: William W. Newmann, Ph.D. Associate Professor L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs Virginia Commonwealth University Richmond, Virginia June, 2010 ii Acknowledgment I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the chair of my dissertation committee, Dr. William W. Newmann who I was able complete this dissertation with his invaluable time, support, directions, and understanding. I also would to thank to my other committee members, Dr. Geary, Dr. Twigg, Dr. Kirkpatrick, and Dr. Levy for their time and their invaluable input to my dissertation. My special thanks to my family for their support and understanding during my education.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorist and Extremist Movements in the Middle East: the Impact on The
    CSIS _______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775 -3270 Access Web: ww.csis.org Contact the Author: [email protected] Terrori st and Extremist Movements in the Middle East : The Impact on the Regional Military Balance Anthony H. Cordesman Center for Strategic and International Studies With the Assistance of Bobby Roshan Working Draft: Revised March 29, 2005 Please note that this document is a working draft and will be revised regularly. To comment, or to provide suggestions and corrections, please e -mail the author at [email protected] . Cordesman: Terrorist and Extremist Movements in the Middle East 3/29/05 Page ii Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 3 II. THE PROBLEM OF I SLAMIC EXTREMISM AND VIOLENCE ................................ ................................ .. 3 THE REGIONAL AND GLOB AL IMPACT OF ISLAMIC EXTREMIST TERRORISM ................................ .............................. 4 THE CLASH WITHIN A C IVILIZATION , THE ARAB -ISRAELI CONFLICT , AND THE WESTERN COUNTER -REACTION ..... 5 III. STATE SUPPORT O F TERRORISM AND THE USE OF TERRORIST PRO XIES ................................ ... 6 IDENTIFYING STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM AND REGIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ................................ ... 6 IV. KEY VIOLENT AND EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST A ND NORTH AFRICA .. 7
    [Show full text]
  • Explaining Turkey's Partnership with Russia
    EXPLAINING TURKEY’S PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND IRAN IN THE POST-ARAB SPRING ERA A thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree Master of Arts In International Relations By Colin Giacomini San Francisco, California May 2019 CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL I certify that I have read EXPLAINING TURKEY’S PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND IRAN IN THE POST-ARAB SPRING ERA by Colin Giacomini, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree: Master of Arts in International Relations at San Francisco State University. Professor of International Relations EXPLAINING TURKEY’S PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND IRAN IN THE POST-ARAB SPRING ERA Colin Giacomini San Francisco, California 2019 ABSTRACT This thesis seeks to explain why Turkey in the post-Arab Spring era pursued a strategic partnership with Russia and Iran. Through utilizing the theory of neoclassical realism, the results of this analysis indicate that Turkey’s behavior can be attributed to fundamental changes in the regional structure that occurred around 2016, which precipitated a hostile environment that threatened Turkey’s national security. During this time, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government faced a series of domestic problems that jeopardized the survivability of the ruling regime. The severity of this internal crisis significantly limited the foreign policy choices available to respond to external pressures, and effectively precluded Turkey’s ability to rely on the United States for assistance. Forging a pragmatic and transactional partnership with Russia and Iran mitigated these complex threats.
    [Show full text]
  • A Conceptual Map for Understanding the Terrorist Recruitment Process: Observation and Analysis of DHKP/C, PKK, and Turkish Hezbollah Terrorist Organizations
    A CONCEPTUAL MAP FOR UNDERSTANDING THE TERRORIST RECRUITMENT PROCESS: OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS OF DHKP/C, PKK, AND TURKISH HEZBOLLAH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS Samih Teymur, B.S., M.S. Dissertation Prepared for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS August 2007 APPROVED: Brian O’Connor, Major Professor Samantha K.Hastings, Committee Member Emile Sahliyeh, Committee Member Herman L. Totten, Dean of the School Library and Information Sciences Sandra L. Terrell, Dean of the Robert B. Toulouse Graduate School Teymur, Samih. A conceptual map for understanding the terrorist recruitment process: Observation and analysis of DHKP/C, PKK, and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations. Doctor of Philosophy (Information Science), August 2007, 152 pp., 80 tables, 1 illustration, references, 68 titles. Terrorism is a historical problem; however, it becomes one of the biggest problems in 21st century. September 11 and the following Madrid, Istanbul and London attacks showed that it is the most significant problem threatening world peace and security. Governments have started to deal with terrorism by improving security measurements and making new investments to stop terrorism. Most of the governments’ and scholars’ focus is on immediate threats and causes of terrorism, instead of looking at long-term solutions such as root causes and underlying reasons of terrorism, and the recruitment style of terrorist organizations If terrorist recruitment does not stop, then it is safe to say terrorist activities cannot be stopped. This study focused on the recruitment process by observing two different terrorist organizations, DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah. The researcher brings 13 years of field experience and first-person data gathered from inside the terrorist organizations.
    [Show full text]
  • Norsk Rapport
    FFI-rapport 2013/01230 Violent Islamism in Turkey – an overview Trine Østereng Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt FFINorwegian Defence Research Establishment FFI-rapport 2013/01230 Violent Islamism in Turkey – an Overview Trine Østereng Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) 2 April 2013 FFI-rapport 2013/01230 1164 P: ISBN 978-82-464-2244-2 E: ISBN 978-82-464-2245-9 Keywords Jihadisme Terrorisme Islamisme Tyrkia Midtøsten Approved by Tore Nyhamar Project Manager Espen Skjelland Director 2 FFI-rapport 2013/01230 English summary This report is a preliminary study of violent Islamism in Turkey, intended to serve as a starting point for future research. It surveys the existing literature, traces the broad historical trends, and profiles the main actors. Militant Islamism in Turkey emerged in the 1980s, and since then a large number of attacks of different size and character have been executed by Turkish Islamists. Four organizations, known as al-Qaida, Hezbollah, IBDA-C and The Caliphate State, have had the highest level of activity during this period. These groups have different ideologies, organizational structures, and targeting preferences, but they are all Sunni Muslim, criticize the secularism of the Turkish state, and have perpetrated acts of violence. Several of the organizations have cooperated at different points in time, and a number of activists have moved between organizations. Turkish Islamists are active on the Internet, using both regular web sites and social media, such as forums and Facebook. A chapter of the report is therefore dedicated to Turkish activity on the Internet, using examples to illustrate how different violent Islamist groups present themselves and communicate on the Internet.
    [Show full text]
  • Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism: Differences That Matter
    Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Occasional Paper Series Sunni and Shi ’a Terrorism Differences that Matter COL Thomas F. Lynch III December 29, 2008 1 Contents About the Author……………………………………………..………..... 4 Acknowledgements……………………………………………………… 4 Executive Summary……………………………………………………... 6 Introduction ………………………………………………………….….. 10 Part 1: Sunni and Shi’a Terrorist Evolution………………………….. 15 Part 2: Waves, Campaigns, and the Subtle Patterns of Terror that 28 Matter Part 3: Assessing the Differences: The Six Significant Points of 40 Diversion Part 4: Policy Implications: Preparing Now for Then……………... 59 Conclusion ……………………………………….……………………... 64 Appendix A: Notes on Methodology……….………………………... 66 2 Tables and Maps Table 1: Five Campaigns of Shi’a Terrorism (1981‐2006)..………..... 23 Table 2: Four Waves of Sunni Terrorism (1981‐2006)……………… 28 Table 3: Shi’a vs. Sunni Population Numbers and Official Iranian 49 Presence Table 4: Recorded Shi’a Terror Activities in Non‐Combat Zones: 53 1981‐2006 Map 1: Sunni vs. Shi’a Terrorist Incidents Outside Combat Zones: 31 Turkey, Levant, Arab Peninsula and South Asia Map 2: Sunni vs. Shi’a Terrorist Incidents Outside Combat Zones: 32 Western Europe Map 3: Sunni vs. Shi’a Terrorist Incidents Outside Combat Zones: 33 Africa Map 4: Sunni vs. Shi’a Terrorist Incidents Outside Combat Zones: 34 South America Map 5: Sunni vs. Shi’a Terrorist Incidents Outside Combat Zones: 35 Asia and Russia Map 6: Sunni vs. Shi’a Terrorist Incidents Outside Combat Zones: 36 North and Central America 3 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Thomas F. Lynch III is an active duty U.S. Army Colonel. He completed this study of non‐combat zone Sunni and Shi’a terrorism while serving as U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorism and Global Security
    GLOBAL ISSUES TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY Ann E. Robertson Foreword by James O Ellis III Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 0i-viii_GI_Terrorism_fm.indd i 8/1/07 4:31:46 PM GLOBAL ISSUES: TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY Copyright © 2007 by Infobase Publishing All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage or retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher. For information contact: Facts On File, Inc. An imprint of Infobase Publishing 132 West 31st Street New York NY 10001 ISBN-10: 0-8160-6766-X ISBN-13: 978-0-8160-6766-4 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Robertson, Ann E. Terrorism and global security / Ann E. Robertson; foreword by James O Ellis III. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8160-6766-X (acid free paper) 1. Terrorism—United States. 2. Terrorism—Case studies 3. Terrorism— Psychology. 4. Terrorism. 5. Security, International. I. Title. HV6432.R59 2007 363.3250973—dc22 2006029477 Facts On File books are available at special discounts when purchased in bulk quantities for businesses, associations, institutions, or sales promotions. Please call our Special Sales Department in New York at (212) 967-8800 or (800) 322-8755. You can fi nd Facts On File on the World Wide Web at http://www.factsonfi le.com Text design by Erika K. Arroyo Cover design by Salvatore Luongo Diagrams by Jeremy Eagle Printed in the United States of America MP Hermitage 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Th is book is printed on acid-free paper.
    [Show full text]
  • Policy Brief 09 November, 2016
    www.meri-k.org Policy Brief 09 November, 2016. Vol. 3, No.17 Yet Another Complication in Nineveh: Retaking Tal Afar Tomáš Kaválek* Hashd al-Shaabi launched an offensive on Tal Afar on 29 October; the looming recapture of Tal Afar prompted a strong reaction from Turkey, which maintains ties to the Turkmen population there. Tal Afar is thus yet another flashpoint of competing interests between Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad, and Tehran and can possibly further destabilise the situation in Nineveh. Background On 29 October, the Iraqi state-sponsored forces the Hashd al-Shaabi (HS) opened another front against the Islamic State (IS) in Nineveh. Advancing to the northwest through desert areas, its ultimate goal is to defeat IS in Tal Afar. The move provoked a strong reaction from Turkey, including their move to amass additional troops along the Iraqi border on 01 November. Turkey maintains strong ties with Sunni Turkmens and cited fears over possible sectarian violence against them incited by HS. Additionally, Turkey has been voicing concerns over the presence of Kurdistan Workers’ Party-linked forces (PKK) in Nineveh, namely in Shingal. There have been various unconfirmed reports regarding the possibility of the PKK entering Tal Afar along with the HS. Containing the PKK in the region is one of Turkey’s core interests. Moreover, given the already deteriorated relations between Ankara and Baghdad and competition between Iran and Turkey, Tal Afar is another flashpoint that adds to the complex situation. The question is why Tal Afar is strategically and symbolically important for Turkey, Baghdad and Tehran, and to what extent a looming struggle over its fate can lead to further destabilisation? Tal Afar’s Strategic Importance and Symbolism Pre-IS, the sub-district of Markaz Tal Afar was inhabited mainly by Turkmen, with a minority of Sunni Arabs and Kurds.
    [Show full text]