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Risky Behavior: Understanding Iranian Foreign Policy

Sarah Frazer Class of 2019

Senior Honors Thesis Government 490 Advisor: Professor Jennifer Kibbe Department of Government Franklin & Marshall College

Date of Honors Defense: 1 May, 2019

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Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank Professor Jennifer Kibbe for being my thesis advisor and guiding me through this process with support and enthusiasm. Thank you for always pushing me to do my best and for this great opportunity. I would not have thought to pursue an honors thesis without your suggestion and confidence in me. I have greatly enjoyed working with you over this past year..

To my mom, thank you for always encouraging me and believing in me. I’m grateful that you raised me to work hard and follow through to accomplish my goals.

Lastly, thank you to my sister, Marie, for many hours and late nights of listening to my ideas, editing drafts, and giving constructive criticism.

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Abstract

Since its founding in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has played a pivotal role in Middle East politics and beyond; therefore, understanding the factors that influence Iran’s international behavior is essential to understanding regional politics. In this paper, I will analyze Iran’s foreign policy towards three neighboring states: Saudi Arabia, Iran’s archrival; Turkey its “frenemy,” and Syria, its closest state ally. I will consider Iran’s relations with these countries during the Khatami (1997-2005) and Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) presidencies and will apply prospect theory to explain Iran’s behavior. Through my research, I discovered that the Islamic Republic’s behavior is best explained by prospect theory, which contends that Iran will behave differently when it is in a domain of loss as opposed to when it is in a domain of gain. When facing a domain of loss, Iran will be risk seeking, and when in a domain of gain it will be risk averse. Indeed, Iran’s foreign policies towards Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria consistently follow this pattern. This finding is important to any state that interacts with Iran since applying it would allow states to make better decisions towards Iran. For example, the United States and other Western actors should avoid placing Iran in a domain of loss that would influence Iran to take more aggressive or more risky choices, such as increasing aid to Hezbollah and other terrorist groups.

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Table of Contents:

Introduction……………………………..……………………………………………………....5-7 Literature Review…………………………………………………………………………...…8-25 Case Studies……..…………………...……...... 26-80 Saudi Arabia…………………...……...... 26-47 Turkey……………………………...…………………………………………………48-64 Syria…………………………...……………………………………………………...65-80 Analysis………………………………...….…………………………………………………81-97 Conclusion…………………………………...... 98-102 Tables………………………………………………………………………………………...... 103 Bibliography……………………………..….……………………………………..……....104-109

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Introduction

Since its founding in 1979, the Islamic Republic has played a pivotal role in the regional politics of the Middle East. Along with its allies, Iran has posed a formidable foe to all of its adversaries and has effectively countered the hegemonic ambitions of the United States, Saudi

Arabia, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein. For this reason, understanding how Iran makes and conducts its foreign policy is critical for policymakers and anyone who wants to understand

Iran’s place in regional politics and the future of the Islamic Republic and of the Middle East. As will be shown in the following pages, Iranian foreign policy has a clear, discernible pattern that it usually applies to its policies towards other state actors, be they a friend, an enemy, or something in between. Specifically, Iran’s behavior is risk seeking when it is in a domain of loss; conversely, when in a domain of gain, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy is both more risk averse and more dependent on who is in office at the time.

This paper will examine the evolution of Iran’s bilateral relations with three states in the

Middle East, namely Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria, during Mohammad Khatami’s and

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidencies (1997-2013) since Iran was under the leadership of two quite different administrations during this period. The Khatami administration (1997-2005) led the reformist camp and pursued an open, ‘dialogue of civilizations’ type policy. In stark contrast, the Ahmadinejad administration (2005-2013) led the conservative faction and favored a ‘clash of civilizations’ approach in its foreign affairs. After detailing all three cases, I will analyze Iran’s policies towards these states by applying prospect theory to each, in the hopes of drawing overarching conclusions regarding Iran’s foreign policy and, based on my analysis, potential policy implications for international decision-makers.

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Case Selection

To better understand Iran’s foreign policy, this paper will analyze Iran’s policies towards three states: Saudi Arabia, Iran’s archrival; Turkey, a “frenemy” of the Islamic Republic; and

Syria, Iran’s staunchest ally. Research on Iranian foreign policy disproportionately focuses on its relations with the United States and to a lesser extent Israel. Though some scholars have studied

Iran’s foreign policy towards Middle Eastern states like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria, as well as its ties to the EU, India, Russia, and countries in Africa and in South America, this research is far less prevalent in the literature. The bulk of the literature still has a singular focus on Iran’s policy towards the US. While this aspect of Iranian foreign policy is undoubtedly consequential, it is not all that matters. The study of US-Iranian relations overshadows all other aspects of

Iranian foreign policy to the extent that it limits our ability to understand how Iran develops and executes its policies towards everyone else. Since the US is by no means like any other state that

Iran deals with, seeing as it is not a regional power and operates as perhaps the world’s only superpower, we cannot learn much about how Iran would act in general by looking at the US as a case study.

To remedy the above problem, I will be analyzing three case studies of Iranian foreign policy towards three less-studied countries to see how Iran behaves as an international actor. The three states are Syria, the closest thing Iran has to an ally; Saudi Arabia, Iran’s arch rival in the region and usually its enemy; and Turkey, a wildcard state which Iran has both worked with and against depending on the situation. I have chosen these cases since they represent the range of relationships Iran has within the Middle East and since they are all comparable to each other as regional, middle power states. At the same time, they have key differences which determine

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Iran’s relations with them. Thus, more research on each of these key bilateral relationships will provide a better understanding of Iran’s foreign policy.

The time frame I will be observing, 1997-2013, spans two presidential administrations:

President Mohammad Khatami’s (1997-2005) and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s

(2005-2013). I chose these two presidencies for a few reasons. I chose these two administrations because Khatami and Ahmadinejad are the most recent presidents to have completed two terms in office. President Hassan Rouhani was elected in 2013 and is still in office today; studying his presidency would be problematic since it is too recent and not yet finished. Second, and most importantly, Khatami was a reformist, and Ahmadinejad was a conservative hardliner, meaning that their foreign policies should theoretically represent a wide range of possible Iranian policies.

The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is not the focus of this paper. It is true that since his assumption of the role of Supreme Leader in 1989, he has had considerable sway over Iran’s foreign policy and can limit the actions taken by Iran’s president.1 Nevertheless,

Khamenei is not the only one with decision-making power in the Islamic Republic. Whoever is president of Iran exerts influence over its foreign policy. More to the point, any effect the

Supreme Leader would have on that policy would remain consistent throughout both presidential administrations. The Supreme Leader does not seem to be going anywhere anytime soon, so any difference in Iran’s policy would come primarily from the president, possibly along with Iranian voters. Thus, Khatami’s and Ahmadinejad’s foreign policies paint a good picture of Iran’s policy overall.

1 Jerrold D. Green and Frederic Wehrey Green, Charles Wolf (2009), Understanding Iran, (Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation), 7-10.

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Literature Review

Since the days of the Safavid Empire (1501-1722), Iran has been a key actor in the

Middle East and the surrounding region; perhaps equally important, Iran has been a leader of

Shia Muslims around the world for just as long. Given Iran’s geopolitical importance, international relations scholars worldwide have sought to understand the process by which Iran makes its foreign policy. Following the Revolution of 1979, the newly declared Islamic Republic of Iran dramatically shifted its foreign policy and its foreign policy decision-making process.

Much has been written about the Islamic Republic's foreign policy; this literature can be broken down a few different ways.2 Here, it will be analyzed and divided according to the questions its authors seek to answer. First, scholars are divided on whether Iran’s foreign policy is driven mainly by ideology or by pragmatism. Second, another way scholars have framed this question is whether Iran’s behaviour is best explained by a neorealist, neoliberal, or constructivist worldview. Lastly, the literature is broken up according to the Islamic Republic’s relations with specific countries, namely the United States and Israel, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, Turkey and other regional powers, and other non regional states. Often times, these cases are selected and analyzed to further an argument about one of the first two questions.

Before delving into the divides in the literature on Iran’s foreign policy, it is first necessary to understand the divides in Iran’s politics. Iran is generally understood to have three competing factions: the conservatives, the pragmatists, and the reformists. According to Jerrold

D. Green, Frederic Wehrey, and Charles Wolf in Understanding Iran, the conservative faction, ​ ​

2 The conclusions drawn in this paper are based solely on English-language sources.

Frazer 9 also known as “the revolutionary cluster… argue[s] for a patriarchal Islamic government, consolidation of the revolution’s gains, preservation of a traditional style of life, promotion of self sufficiency with no dependence on the outside world, and cultural purity.”3 When the conservatives were in power during this period, their leader was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. On the other end of the spectrum, the reformist or ijtihadi faction supports “a pluralist, democratic

Islamic political system. Some of its leading figures, most importantly [Seyyed Mohammad]

Khatami, argued for promotion of civil society, relaxation of political and social control, economic openness, cultural renaissance, and more interaction with the outside world,” including the West.4 The final faction is the pragmatic or centrist faction, which, as its name implies, exists between the conservatives and reformists. This faction, which “crystallized around [Akbar

Hashemi] Rafsanjani” supports economic modernization, so “it argued for increased technical and financial cooperation with the West, including the United States…”5 Together, these factions comprise Iran’s political landscape and play a key role in the analysis of Iran’s foreign policy decision making, as is discussed in the pages that follow.

In this section, I will outline the debates surrounding the making of Iranian foreign policy, including the literature about the theoretical explanations for it. Then, I will suggest a new framework for analyzing Iran’s foreign policy-making process: prospect theory. This theoretical lens is not often applied to Iran’s foreign policy, nor is it commonly used to describe any state’s whole foreign policy. Yet prospect theory can shed a great deal of light on the way

Iran’s foreign policy is made; especially when the Islamic Republic is in a domain of loss, prospect theory offers the most compelling explanation for Iran’s behavior.

3 Green, Wehrey, and Wolf (2009), “Introduction” In Understanding Iran, 25-26. ​ ​ 4 Ibid., 26. 5 Ibid., 27.

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Ideology versus Pragmatism Debate

The Case for Ideology

To many Iran observers, Iran’s foreign policy is more ideological than pragmatic in nature, often to the point of seeming irrational. This viewpoint appears reasonable, as Iran claims to be an ideological state and religion and religiosity are central to the Islamic Republic’s constitution and legitimacy. Indeed, when Ayatollah Khomeini consolidated the Revolution in

1979, he proclaimed the necessity of a theocratic Islamic state, one which would “export the revolution,” to other countries in the Muslim world and beyond. This emphasis on ideology and apparent devotion to religion has led many onlookers to conclude that Iran’s foreign policy is driven primarily by its ideology. While the consensus in the literature refutes this widely held view, it has nonetheless remained popular among Western policy makers and commentators.6

Furthermore, even if the Islamic Republic has not always chosen ideology over pragmatism, ​ ​ many scholars emphasize that there have been time periods or geographic areas where Iran consistently has favored its ideology over pragmatism, often to the detriment of its national security interests.

Specifically, scholars note that Iran often neglects pragmatic considerations when it deals with either its mortal enemies, meaning the United States and Israel, or its closest allies, meaning

Shi’a regimes and groups throughout the region, such as in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain.

While Iran does not act purely ideologically in its dealings with any of these groups, some scholars argue that the Islamic Republic’s relations with them provides compelling evidence for

6 See footnote 14.

Frazer 11 the prominence of ideology in its foreign policy. Specifically, Iran has supported Shi’a militias and non-state actors throughout the Middle East despite the sectarian tensions this policy foments and the animosity it breeds in Iran’s Sunni-ruled neighbors that surround it.7 Indeed, as

Green, Wehrey, and Wolf note, “Iran has long pursued a policy of speaking over the heads of

Arab regimes, taking its message directly to Arab populations.”8 In response, Arab leaders, particularly those in the Gulf, have expressed concern “that Iran is pursuing a divisive sectarian policy, attempting to agitate Arab Shiite populations and inspire them to greater activism and even militancy.”9

Likewise, these scholars argue that the Islamic Republic promotes an ideological foreign policy during periods of conservative or radical rule, when the pragmatists in the center lose the battle for the state’s foreign policy.10 For example, in an examination of Iranian activism in

Africa, Eric Lob explains that when the conservative faction gained power, at the expense of the radicals and pragmatists, its “religious proselytization and ideological propagation interfered with [Iran’s] diplomatic and commercial priorities.”11 The ideological discourse shifted from

“rescuing the oppressed and fighting imperialism” to themes of “economics and religion,” which

7 Vatanka, Alex (2018). “Iran’s Use of Shi’i Militant Proxies: Ideological and Practical Expediency Versus ​ Uncertain Sustainability.” (Washington, DC, Middle East Institute), 1-24; Robinson, Heather M., Ben Connable, David E. Thaler, and Ali G. Scotten (2018). “Sectarianism in the Middle East Implications for the United States,” (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation), 20-22; Laurence, Jonathan (2017). “In Sunni North Africa, fears of Iran’s Shia shadow,” Middle East Monitor, (London, The Middle East Monitor). 8 Green, Wehrey, and Wolf (2009), “Introduction” In Understanding Iran, 33. ​ ​ 9 Ibid., 36. 10 Eric Lob (2016), “The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Foreign Policy and Construction Jihad’s Developmental Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa,” (Cambridge University Press, International Journal of Middle East Studies), 318-320; According to Lob, the radical faction in Iranian politics dominated the government in the early 1980s. Led by president Mohammad-Ali Rajai in 1981, they pursued anti imperialist foreign policy goals. In Africa, their foreign policy was “based on self-help, alliance making, and power balancing through ideological propagation and military build up.” Their political decline began in the mid 1980s. Notably, many radicals became reformists. 11 Eric Lob (2016), “The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Foreign Policy and Construction Jihad’s Developmental ​ Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa,” (Cambridge University Press, International Journal of Middle East Studies), 319.

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Other scholars also note that the influence of ideology over Iran’s foreign policy has faded over time. During the formative years of the new regime after the Revolution, Iran was more likely to make ideologically-based decisions. As time went on, the Islamic Republic became more pragmatic. Reza Ekhtiari Amiri, et al., note that Iran’s policy towards Saudi Arabia has changed, ultimately for the better, in the decades since the revolution. After 1979, the Hajj became a political event, a time for Iranian pilgrims to demonstrate against “the infidels,” otherwise known as the Saudi monarchy. In 1987, tensions reached a peak after the massacre of

Iranian pilgrims during the Hajj, at which point Iran cut diplomatic ties with the Saudis for three years. Since that time, however, given many regional developments and Iran’s economic troubles in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War, relations have improved. These developments include the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.13

Since the incident in 1987, the ice between Iran and Saudi Arabia began to thaw under the pragmatists and reformists although tensions have risen sharply in the past few years since the start of the bloody proxy war the two states are waging in Yemen. Lastly, it should be emphasized that the Islamic Republic often pretends to act ideologically even if its actual behavior suggests otherwise. Often, Iran will justify its actions with religion or ideology, rather than with its own national interests and security,which are the true motivations for its activities.

For example, during the 1980s, when the radicals had control over Iran’s foreign policy, they

“[i]deologically… interpreted and framed their efforts to export the revolution to Africa and

12 Ibid., 319-320. 13 Reza Ekhtiari Amiri and Ku Hasnita Binti Ku Samsu and Hassan Gholipour Fereidouni (2011), “The Hajj and Iran’s Foreign Policy towards Saudi Arabia.” (Sage Publications, Journal of Asian and African Stud.), 679-681.

Frazer 13 elsewhere as fulfilling the revolutionary and anti-imperialist, global mission of ‘recognizing, attracting, educating, and organizing the destitute and oppressed masses…’” to “fight against the arrogance of imperial powers.”14 In actuality, Iran’s goal had more to do with gaining political influence and potential new economic partners in Africa. This framing by the Islamic Republic has proven successful, as is evident in the common American misconception of Iran as an irrational actor and debate persists over this question.15

The Case for Pragmatism

Perhaps to the surprise of many Americans then, the case for Iran’s choosing pragmatism over ideology is more popular among Iran experts. While they acknowledge that ideology and religion influence Iranian decision-making, most argue that ideology is more often than not superseded by pragmatism. For instance, in “Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran's Foreign Policy,”

R.K. Ramazani argues that “a streak of pragmatic national interest existed even in the earliest, most volatile, and ideological phase of Iranian foreign policy.”16 He cites the Iranian purchase of arms from “the Great Satan” (the U.S.) and “the Lesser Satan” (Israel) in the 1980s as evidence of the dominance of pragmatism in Iranian foreign policy. Ramazani further argues that

President Khatami’s address to the American people a decade later, his “first major foreign policy statement,” likewise undermines the notion that ideology drives Iran’s foreign policy.

Khatami “drew parallels between the American and the Iranian Revolutions by emphasizing the

14 Eric Lob (2016), “Construction Jihad’s Developmental Activities,” 318. ​ ​ 15 See, for example: Aaron Goldstein (2012). “Iran’s Regime is Inherently Irrational,” (Alexandria, The American Spectator LLC); Michael Oren (2015), “Why Obama is wrong about Iran being 'rational' on nukes,” (Los Angeles, Los Angeles Times); Terry Jeffrey (2007), “Is Iran Irrational?” (Online, Townhall,com); Lee Harris (2012), “Weekly Standard: Is Iran A Rational Actor?” (NPR). 16 R.K. Ramazani (2004), “Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran's Foreign Policy,” (Washington, DC, Middle East Institute), 556.

Frazer 14 compatibility of religion and liberty.”17 By suggesting that the US was anti-imperialist rather than an imperialist nation itself and, perhaps, was even righteous in some way, Khatami’s rhetoric completely contradicted Khomeini’s ideology, which was part of the driving force behind the revolution in 1979. While this tone did not go anywhere with the Bush administration, which did not respond to Iran’s efforts to negotiate after 9/11, Iran’s change in posture did benefit it throughout the rest of the world, as Iran improved ties with Saudi Arabia,

Lebanon, Jordan, and, perhaps most importantly, Europe. According to Ramazani, “the principal stumbling block in Iran-European relations had been Khomeini's life-threatening fatwa against

Salman Rushdie.”18 Khatami “distanc[ed]” Iran from the Supreme Leader’s decree. In 1998,

“[i]n a news conference… Khatami suggested that the fatwa was the expression of Khomeini's own view as an Islamic jurist,”19 a stunning rebuke of the supremacy of the Ayatollah, itself a founding principle of the Islamic Republic.

David Menashri concurs with Ramazani about the importance of pragmatism in Iranian foreign policy. He contends that, after years in power, the Iranian regime has been forced by the realities of the international environment to pursue a more pragmatic approach, which they have continued to take into the twenty-first century. Indeed, according to Menashri, “[w]ith few exceptions, state interests ultimately superseded revolutionary dogma in foreign relations.”20 For example, the Islamic Republic’s ideology did not prevent its forming an alliance with

“Arab-nationalist and secular-Baathist Syria,” now its premier ally in the region.21 Another

17 Ibid., 557. 18 Ibid., 558. 19 Ibid. 20 David Menashri (2007), “Iran’s Regional Policy Between Radicalism and Pragmatism,” (Columbia, Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board), 155. 21 Ibid., 155.

Frazer 15 notable demonstration of Iran’s pragmatism was “Iran's non-support for the Shi[a] uprising in southern Iraq in 1991. Given the Shia affinity with Iran, their struggle against Saddam Hussein, their pledge to form an Islamic Republic and their anti-American attitude, Iraqi Shias could have expected Iranian support. Yet, at the time, Tehran did not come to their aid…”22

Factionalism as a Determinant of Pragmatism

Among those who argue that Iran’s foreign policy is driven mainly by pragmatic considerations are those who explain the fluctuating importance of pragmatism in terms of factionalism in Iranian politics. According to this theory, how pragmatic or ideological Iran is depends largely on who is in power at the time. In this case, when the conservative faction is in power, Iran is the least pragmatic and most ideological. In contrast, the pragmatic and reformist factions favor pragmatism over ideology; it is not totally clear if either of these two factions pursues a more pragmatic policy than the other. What is apparent is that both have chosen pragmatism and national interest over ideology time and again. In “The Foreign Policy of Iran,”

Anoushiravan Ehteshami provides another example of Iranian pragmatism, spurred by the pragmatist coalition. During the Kuwait crisis in 1990, “President Rafsanjani was clear on Iran's position, despite grave reservations by the more radical forces: ‘The Iraqis must definitely pull out. ... Here, we have no objection to [the 'foreign forces'] obstructing aggression; anybody may help in any way.’”23 This pragmatic stance, which explicitly goes against Iran’s revolutionary principles of anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism, was protested by the more conservative and more radical elements of the Iranian political elite. These more extreme factions also established alliances with and “cultivated [Islamist] movements in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi

22 Ibid., 156. 23 Anoushiravan Ehteshami. “The Foreign Policy of Iran,” (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 301. ​

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Arabia, Afghanistan, and, of course, Lebanon, among other places.”24 Crucially, for Rafsanjani and his pragmatists to have taken the position they did would not have been possible had

Rafsanjani not had the backing of Ayatollah Khamenei, his close ally. Khamenei sided with

Rafsanjani despite the fact that he, himself, is a conservative, who “favor[s] a reasonable distance between Iran and the West and oppos[es] any Westernization of Iranian society.”25 The

Supreme Leader likely supported many of the pragmatists’ policies then to oppose the radical forces in Iran’s political system; either way his support complicates the idea of rigid factions.

Kayhan Barzegar agrees that the pragmatists and reformists place much more weight on pragmatic considerations than do the conservatives. He explains that while both Rafsanjani and

Khatami “prioritized an accommodating foreign policy toward states like Kuwait and Saudi

Arabia,” Ahmadinejad reversed these priorities.26 His foreign policy focused more on strengthening Iran’s relations with its allies in the region, namely Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and

Shi‘ite factions in Iraq. Yet, even under Ahmadinejad, Iran acted pragmatically when it deemed it necessary. For instance, Barzegar argues that in his first and second terms, Ahmadinejad sought to “avoid both a new round of rivalry with its Arab neighbors and a new security dilemma in its relations with the United States” by pursuing an “accommodating policy,” as his predecessors had done before him.27 Barzegar posits, therefore, that “[d]espite Ahmadinejad’s tendencies to indulge his eccentricities, the logic of Iran’s foreign policy decision making process always ensures this return to pragmatism.”28 As these scholars argue, while Iran’s

24 Ibid., 292. 25 Ibid., 292. 26 Kayhan Barzegar (2010), “Iran's Foreign Policy Strategy after Saddam,” (Cambridge, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), 181. 27 Ibid., 173. 28 Ibid., 173.

Frazer 17 foreign policy-making process always involves some degree of pragmatism, the influence of such considerations is weakened or strengthened depending on the faction in power at the time.

Theoretical Perspectives Debate

Another subset of the literature on Iran’s foreign policy takes a slightly different approach. Instead of considering pragmatism versus ideology, these experts consider which theoretical lens best explains Iran’s foreign policy. Iran scholars are broadly divided among the neorealist, neoliberal, and constructivist perspectives, all of which will be presented in the following pages.

The Case for Neorealism

Many Iran observers contend that neorealism drives Iran’s foreign policy. Neorealists view the international system as inherently anarchic; their number one, driving motivation is survival in this system. This desire for survival leads states to try to maximize their power.

Furthermore, neorealists seek to establish a balance of power and to favor stability in the international system. Neorealists do not trust other states, even their allies, as alliances are only formed out of self interest and are not permanent. Given the structure of this system, neorealism predicts that states will form alliances for the sake of power-balancing. Moreover, the variations in the distribution of resources and capabilities will create variation in how states pursue a balance-of-power strategy.29 For example, according to Graeme A. M. Davies, Iran learned that it could not trust or work with the U.S. after it tried to negotiate with the Bush administration after the American invasions of Afghanistan and of Iraq. Since it perceived the U.S. as a threat, the

Islamic Republic pursued more hardline policies and took a more hostile posture towards it. The

29 Joseph S. Nye (1998), "Neorealism and neoliberalism." World Politics 40, no. 2, 241.

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Bush administration’s lack of willingness to engage with Iran undermined the moderates in the government and increased support for the hardline conservative faction.30 In “Iran’s Foreign

Policy After 11 September,” Kaveh Afrasiabi and Abbas Maleki agree with Davies that Iran has pursued a foreign policy underpinned by neorealism. While they note Iran’s efforts to improve diplomatic relations with various countries, the U.S. included, the authors articulate an Iranian policy focused on counterbalancing threats and forging alliances with the enemies of its enemies, namely with Russia in this case. By 2005, Iran and Russia increased their economic, energy, and military cooperation, as Russia sold as much as $5 billion-worth of “(peaceful) nuclear technology and conventional arms” to the Islamic Republic.31 As is consistent with a neorealist theoretical viewpoint, however, Afrasiabi and Maleki assert that Iran trusted no one, including its new strategic partner Russia. They argue that “[Iran’s] cushion of comfort, against a Russian

‘sellout of Iran,’ however, [was] based on their calculation with respect to… Russia's own fear of undue U.S. influence on its traditional turf requiring the Iran card.”32 Afrasiabi and Maleki note that Iran was not in any multilateral security agreement at that time, nor did it appear that they would enter into one in the immediate future, “save a mostly symbolic observer status at SCO

[Shanghai Cooperation Organization] and GCC.”33

30 Graeme A. M. Davies (2012), “Coercive Diplomacy Meets Diversionary Incentives: The Impact of US and Iranian Domestic Politics during the Bush and Obama Presidencies,” (Oxford, Oxford University Press), 316-319. 31 Kaveh Afrasiabi and Abbas Maleki (2003), “Iran's Foreign Policy After 11 September,” (Providence, Brown Journal of World Affairs), 261. 32 Kaveh Afrasiabi and Abbas Maleki (2003), “Iran's Foreign Policy After 11 September,” (Providence, Brown Journal of World Affairs), 260-61. 33 Ibid., 264.

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The Case for Neoliberalism

To other Iran experts, however, the Islamic Republic operates based on neoliberal principles. Neoliberals, also called liberal institutionalists, believe that entering into international agreements and institutions can reduce the uncertainty of the anarchic international system and induce cooperation. Iranian leaders may be acting according to this worldview when Iran prioritizes cooperation with states, including adversarial ones. Kayhan Barzegar expresses the neoliberal perspective well in “Iran's Foreign Policy Strategy after Saddam.” Barzegar posits that

“Iran currently [as of 2009] views security in the region as a non-zero-sum game in which the best action for securing Iran’s national interests is to advance a win-win game. President

Ahmadinejad pursued a policy of accommodation, “which consisted of expanding cooperation after Saddam’s fall with the main Arab world actors, principally Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and seeking direct talks with the United States.”34 Furthermore, Barzegar explains that if then-President Obama wanted to ease tensions with Iran, the Islamic Republic would require “a genuine change of policy” from the Bush era policies; such a change “would involve changing the traditional policy of balance of power, which is itself a source of tension and potential conflict in Iran’s relations with its neighbors.”35 The policy would “amoun[t] to a balance of interests in which all actors’ interests -- regional or transregional -- are secured.”36 Here,

Barzegar is arguing that Iran’s policy at this time, which sought to make absolute gains with both its regional rival, the Saudis, and non-regional arch nemesis, the United States, is best explained by neoliberalism. If Barzegar is correct, then Iran’s apparent belief that making such gains is

34 Barzegar, “Iran’s Strategy after Saddam,” 173. 35 Ibid., 177. 36 Ibid.

Frazer 20 possible and that shifting away from a balance-of-power mentality is preferable is, indeed, a neoliberal one.

According to Barzegar, in the wake of the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran sought to find a “middle ground” with the United States and to maintain “amicable relationships mostly through reassurance and cooperation” with the Saudis and Egyptians.37 After 9/11, Iran reached out to the US and claimed to be prepared to negotiate about anything and everything, though this effort at easing tensions was not reciprocated. Barzegar argues that “[t]o tackle the threats emerging on its immediate borders, Iran’s defense strategy has mainly focused on constructing the concept of ‘interconnected security,’”38 which suggests its policy is neoliberal because it supports the idea that states can collectively improve security through cooperation.

In their analysis of Iranian-Saudi relations, as examined through tensions over the Hajj,

Reza Ekhtiari Amiri, et al., also find that Iran’s foreign policy appears to be driven by neoliberalism. They sum up Iran’s neoliberal stance towards the Saudis succinctly when they say, “Iran’s pragmatic foreign policy from the early 1990s, which was based on the reduction of tension, confidence-building and strengthening of regional cooperation, led to the Hajj being more peaceful. Meanwhile, both countries learned how to collaborate gradually, in terms of settling problems through negotiation.”39 This focus on cooperation and using negotiation to solve problems represents a clear neoliberal worldview.

The Case for Constructivism

According to constructivists, what the aforementioned neorealist and neoliberal explanations lack is an assessment of the role of identity in Iranian foreign policy. To

37 Ibid., 179. 38 Ibid., 180. ​ 39 Amiri, Samsu, and Fereidouni, “The Hajj and Iran’s Foreign Policy towards Saudi Arabia,” 683.

Frazer 21 constructivists, Iran has the ability, just as all states do, to shape and construct the world around it. This construction and the way Iran identifies itself in the world and its relationship with other states in the world will determine its foreign policy. For instance, Ehteshami explains that “Iran's historical impotence in the face of foreign influence has left a deep and seemingly permanent scar on the Iranian psyche, which has also been guiding elite thinking for many decades.”40 This aspect of Iran’s identity and the political elite’s “obsessive preoccupation” with it, he argues, has shaped Iran’s foreign outlook. At times, it has “led Iranian policymakers to make serious miscalculations not only about their own country's power and abilities, but also about the power as well as the motives of their adversaries.”41 Furthermore, Iran’s understanding of itself as “one of only a handful of ‘natural’ states in the Middle East” has influenced foreign policy decisions as well.42 Importantly, Iranian foreign policymakers view their country’s role in the region as that of a defender or promoter of Islam, hence Iran’s “overt use of Islam. or at least Islamic symbols.”43 Along the same lines, in “Identity and Change in Iran’s Foreign Policy,” Suzanne

Maloney argues that identity is not innate but chosen, typically by political elites. Furthermore, certain identities are emphasized at various points more than others. In Iran’s case, part of the country’s perception of itself is that it is inherently universalist, which has influenced Iran’s foreign policy in that it seeks to “export the revolution” everywhere, so that every Muslim can be a part of it. Whereas Iran had “no direct historical precedent for governance by the clergy” prior to the revolution, Khomeini successfully emphasized Iran’s Shi’ism and reinterpreted it in an almost unprecedented way, rendering his theocratic rule as authentic to Iranian identity.44 Iran’s

40 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Foreign Policy,” 285. ​ 41 Ibid., 285. 42 Ibid., 286. 43 Ibid., 287-88. 44 Suzanna Maloney (2002), “Identity and Change in Iran’s Foreign Policy,” (Ithaca: Cornell University), 94.

Frazer 22 identity as a devoutly religious nation and an important regional power has had a significant influence on its foreign policy, as has Iranian elites’ conception of the threats Iran has faced throughout its history. For these reasons, several scholars have argued that constructivism offers the best explanation of Iranian foreign policy.

Prospect Theory

Because prospect theory will be central to my analysis, it is necessary to understand its main tenets. In the postwar era, the dominant Western framework for understanding international relations has been rational choice, which underpins both neorealism and neoliberalism. The central contention of rational choice is that a state makes decisions by weighing its options and choosing the one which maximizes its gains.45 However, as political scientists have come to understand more and more, humans do not behave purely logically and often make decisions that are not in their best interest. While decision makers should act according to rational cost-benefit calculations, they often do not for any number of reasons that have to do with human cognition.46

Since students of international relations are concerned with why states act the way they do, and not why they should act in ways that they do not, incorporating human psychology into a theory ​ ​ of international politics is vitally important. Prospect theory explains the gap between rational choice and the actual human choices made by international actors by focusing on the psychology of decision makers.47

As an alternative to the theory of rational choice, prospect theory considers the limitations of decision makers’ capacities to make sound choices. These limitations are the result

45 Jeffrey D. Berejikian (2002). "A cognitive theory of deterrence." Journal of Peace Research, (London: Sage ​ ​ Publication), 167. 46 Ibid., 166-167. 47 Ibid.

Frazer 23 of both the perceptions of the decision makers and the relative weight they give to opportunities for gains or losses.48 In this paper, I will use the definition of prospect theory provided by Jack S.

Levy, according to whom: ​ prospect theory posits that individuals evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference point rather than with respect to net asset levels, that their identification of this reference point is a critical variable, that they give more weight to losses than comparable gains, and that they are generally risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses.49

A central component of this conceptualization of international relations is the greater importance given to losses than to gains. If a state, or more specifically the actors governing that state, perceive that they will suffer a loss, that loss is much more significant and, in a sense, painful than a comparable gain the state would make. This phenomenon is known as the endowment effect, and it posits simply that humans are much more emotionally invested in what they already have.50 This distinction matters because if a state is in a domain of loss, meaning it perceives that it will experience a loss, it will act quite differently than when it is in a domain a gain, meaning that it perceives that it can make some sort of gain. When presented with a credible threat from an enemy, a state is in a domain of loss; according to prospect theory, that state will, in response, engage in risky behavior. Another way to view this tendency is to say that humans have a bias towards the status quo, which manifests itself differently for a state facing a loss versus one facing a gain. For states in a domain of gain, the status quo is acceptable and so they do not want to risk disrupting it; conversely, if the status quo changes to a situation that is unacceptable to the state, meaning that state is in a domain of loss, it will accept greater risk to

48 Berejikian (2002), "A cognitive theory of deterrence." 49 Jack S. Levy (1994), “An Introduction to Prospect Theory” In Avoiding losses/taking risks: Prospect theory and ​ international conflict. (University of Michigan Press), 7. ​ 50 Berejikian (2002). "A cognitive theory of deterrence," 172.

Frazer 24 change its current circumstances back to the status quo that it found acceptable. Prospect theory argues that this tendency is true even when the risky actions a state would take are unlikely to succeed.51

There are two phases in prospect theory: (1) the framing phase, during which a state processes information about a situation and highlights certain facts, including whether it is in a domain of gain or a domain of loss; (2) the evaluation phase, “whereby the specific domain of gains or losses, and relative risk propensity, either acceptant or averse, is discussed and analyzed.”52 Importantly, this process requires “subjective assessments of domain and risk.”53

In the international relations literature on prospect theory, most scholars tend to focus on one specific event or instance when prospect theory seems to have fit as an explanation to a decision making anomaly, one which could not be explained by the model of rational choice.

Examples of these case studies include Carter’s decision to launch the Iranian hostage rescue mission,54 FDR’s actions during the Munich crisis,55 and both Kennedy’s and Khrushchev’s behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis.56 The decision makers in these three cases are clearly in a domain of loss, which may be why the cases were chosen. Indeed, proving prospect theory as the superior explanation for a foreign policy decision may be easier when a state or person is in a domain of loss since that is when they are most likely to contradict rational choice. In doing case studies such as these, scholars find prospect theory to be a good explanation for a state’s

51 Berejikian (2002). "A cognitive theory of deterrence," 173. 52 Rose McDermott (1992), "Prospect theory in international relations: The Iranian hostage rescue mission." Political Psychology, 238. ​ 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid., 237-253. ​ ​ 55 Barbara Farnham (1992), "Roosevelt and the Munich crisis: Insights from prospect theory." Political Psychology, ​ ​ 205-235. 56 Mark L. Haas (2001), "Prospect theory and the Cuban missile crisis." International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 2, ​ ​ 241-270.

Frazer 25 behavior. However, the question remains whether one can analyze a state’s foreign policy as a whole over an extended period of time and towards states that are not purely adversaries through the lens of prospect theory, which I intend to do here.

In this paper, I argue that prospect theory can be applied to a countries foreign policy overall and to its relations with-non enemies since foreign policy always requires making decisions under conditions of risk. I did not set out to apply prospect theory to these cases; rather, after extensively researching all of the cases, I found that prospect theory was the best fit.

Based on the description of prospect theory outlined above, if Iranian policy makers perceive that they are in a domain of gain in any given period, they will avoid risks; whereas, if they see themselves as in a domain of loss, they will seek risks throughout that time and, presumably, in their relations with multiple states.

Conclusion

The literature on Iranian foreign policy can be broken down into a few categories, or debates, about the making of Iran’s policy. What is lacking in the literature is a debate pitting prospect theory against rational choice as the best way to understand Iran policy making choice.

The next section of this paper lays out the case studies of Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia,

Turkey, and Syria, all of which are key actors in the Islamic Republic’s orbit. Following the case studies, an analysis of the cases through the lens of prospect theory will provide insight into the nature of Iran’s foreign policy. From there I will offer policy recommendations for engaging with Iran.

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Iran & Saudi Arabia

In the past few years, the concept of an Iranian-Saudi Cold War in the Middle East has become an increasingly popular lens through which to view politics in the region. Yet, this bipolar system can be traced back to the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 when

Iran and Saudi Arabia went from strategic allies to fierce rivals.57 Whether or not the two countries could be deemed enemies depends on one’s definition of the word. Nevertheless, Iran’s quest for regional supremacy has caused it to be at odds with the kingdom more often than not.

In this chapter, I will explain the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia during

President Khatami’s and President Ahmadinejad’s administrations.

In essence, while Khatami’s rhetorical flourishes about a “dialogue of civilizations” may have signalled a shift in policy towards Saudi Arabia in his first few years in office, his attempts at rapprochement are overstated. Furthermore, after the US invasion of Iraq, the potential rapprochement fell apart. Subsequently, despite Ahmadinejad’s seemingly more combative approach, his Saudi policy was mostly a continuation of his predecessor’s. Like Khatami,

Ahmadinejad prioritized Iran’s relationship with the Arab world, yet by the end of his term,

Iran’s relations with Arab states became much worse due to both Iran’s behavior and external factors. Ultimately, tensions were eased or exacerbated during this period in part due to each president’s own behavior but more so due to external forces. Although Iran’s foreign policy may have been marginally different from Khatami to Ahmadinejad, Iran’s stance towards Saudi

57 Frederic Wehrey, Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza Nader, Jeremy Ghez, Lydia Hansell, and Robert A. Guffey ​ (2009). “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy.” (National Security Research Division: RAND Corp.).

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Arabia and its bilateral relationship with the kingdom remained effectively unchanged between

1997-2013, just as the rivalry and distrust between the two states continues in full force today.

Context

Regional Dynamics from 1997-2013

Iran’s foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia was substantially influenced by what was happening in the broader region at the time. Perhaps the most significant change that occurred was the US invasion of Iraq and the resulting fall of Saddam Hussein. This event had at least three important repercussions for the Iran-Saudi relationship. Firstly, since Hussein’s fall in

2003, the two countries’ rivalry has only intensified, as Iraq ceased to compete to be the most powerful state in the Middle East and left Iran and the Saudis to vie for that position alone.58

Another contributing factor that has increased their rivalry is that, with the collapse of Saddam’s

Sunni regime, Iran capitalized on its considerable influence over Iraq’s Shia majority, leading the

Saudis to feel increasingly threatened. Lastly, the United States’ unpopular war in Iraq strained

US-Saudi relations and gave the Islamic Republic the ability to weaponize the Saudis’ pro-America stance and the sectarian divisions in the country to Iran’s benefit.

The Middle East experienced a great deal of unrest at this time. Along with instability in

Iraq, the Middle East saw sectarian conflicts erupt throughout the region, particularly in Lebanon and Yemen during the first decade of the 2000s. Additionally, the Second Palestinian Intifada began in 2000, and the US ousted the Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan a year later.59

In 2011, the Arab Spring would add to this unrest and instability.

58 Ibid., x. 59 “Lebanon profile - Timeline,” BBC News (2018); “Yemen profile - Timeline,” BBC News (2018); Abrams, Elliott ​ ​ ​ ​ (2013). “Arafat and the Second Intifada,” Council on Foreign Relations; “The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999 – 2018,” Council on Foreign Relations (2019). ​ ​

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Iran-Saudi Relations from 1979-1997

To understand Iran’s foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia in the twenty-first century, it is necessary to examine the Iranian-Saudi relationship in the twentieth. Under the Shah, Iran maintained a decidedly pro-American foreign policy, and together, Iran and Saudi Arabia comprised the two essential parts of the United States’ twin pillar policy, which promoted US interests in the Persian Gulf. For this reason, the Iranians and Saudis cooperated with each other and shared multiple common interests. In essence, “politics dictated a peaceful competition” between the two.60 Both regimes favored stability and viewed revolutionary, democratic governments and movements in neighboring states as existential threats to their hold on power.

Indeed, these fears proved warranted when a revolutionary movement toppled the Shah’s regime in early 1979. Since then, Iran has assumed a more combative, aggressive posture towards the Saudi kingdom. The Islamic Republic is anti-American and opposed to Arab monarchies, such as that in Saudi Arabia, since these monarchies’ preference for the status quo is in direct conflict with Iran’s revolutionary ideology. Moreover, the Gulf monarchies’ Sunnism oftens conflicts with Iran’s Shiism, which is to say nothing of the vast differences between the

Saudis’ pro-American foreign policy versus Iran’s foreign policy, a cornerstone of which is opposition to American involvement in the region. Since the new republic’s founding, Iran has sought to undermine the Gulf monarchies and to catalyze popular uprisings against them.61 The

Islamic Republic derives legitimacy from its supposed divine mandate, which is one reason it competes with Saudi Arabia to be the leader of the Muslim world.

60 Aarts, P.W.H. and Van Duijne, J. (2012). “Saudi Arabia after U.S.-Iranian détente: left in the lurch?” Security and ​ ​ stability in the Middle East, (London: Routledge), 72. ​ 61 Terrill, W. Andrew (2011). “The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security,” Strategic Studies ​ Institute; Wehrey, Frederic, et. al (2009). “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam.”

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While the Saudis routinely weaponize the sectarian divides in the Middle East against the

Shia-led Islamic Republic,62 Iran tends to take a more universalist approach to Islam and purports to be the leader of both Sunni and Shia Muslims. Iranian political leaders publicly downplay both the sectarian divides in Islam and the ethnic divide between Persian Iran and the predominantly-

Arab rest of the Middle East.63 At the same time, Iran has been known to incite civil unrest and even violence among the Shia populations of various Middle Eastern states, including Saudi

Arabia. The Saudi government has faced rebellion from the large Shia population in its Eastern

Province multiple times in the past few decades, including immediately after Ayatollah

Khomeini’s ascension to power in Iran. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic, in collaboration with

Saudi Hezbollah, is widely believed to have been behind the Khobar Tower bombings in Saudi

Arabia in 1996, which killed nineteen American servicemen.64

For its part, Saudi Arabia has caused spikes in tensions between the two countries at various times as well. It backed the Iraqi government during the Iran-Iraq War after Saddam

Hussein attacked Iran. In 1987, the Saudis also massacred over 400 people, most of whom were

Iranian pilgrims embarking on the Hajj, while some were Iranian demonstrators against the Saudi regime.65 One key point of contention between Iran and Saudi Arabia is on the role of the United

States in the Middle East, as the latter wants the US to be active in the region while Iran does not want America to have any role at all.66 The Saudis fear Iran’s ambitions to gain regional influence and power; they rightfully worry about the Islamic Republic upstaging them on

62 “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam.” xi. ​ 63 Ibid., xi-xii. ​ 64 Matthiesen. “Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of The Most Radical Saudi Shi‘a Opposition Group.” 191-193. 65 Gambrell, Jon (2016). “A Timeline of Iran and Saudi Arabia's Crumbling Relations.” Haaretz; Toby Matthiesen. “Hizbullah al-Hijaz.” 184. 66 Wehrey, Frederic, et. al (2009). “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam,” xi. ​

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Palestinian issues, as Iran has taken a much less conciliatory approach to the Arab-Israeli dispute, compared to the Saudis. Iran has positioned itself as the principal protector of the

Palestinian people in order to gain support from Arab publics; in contrast, perceptions of Saudi

Arabia’s support for Palestine are undermined by the kingdom’s alliance with the US.67

Despite these acts of aggression on both sides and the deep distrust that remains between the two countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia have managed to find common ground on a few issues and have achieved limited cooperation in certain areas. Tensions began to ease in the early

1990s, as Rafsanjani and Khatami took a more pragmatic approach than their predecessors.68 It is against this backdrop that I will examine Iran’s Saudi Arabia policy during the Khatami presidency (1997-2005) and the Ahmadinejad presidency (2005-2013).

Khatami’s Saudi Arabia Policy

In 1997, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami ran for and won that year’s Iranian presidential election, making him the fifth in the nation’s history. Khatami spoke of a new approach to domestic and international affairs, of political reform, and of a “dialogue of civilizations.”

Khatami certainly gave the appearance of an easing of tensions and managed to convince many

Iran watchers that he had improved relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran’s other neighbors.

According to Toby Matthiesen, a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford, for instance, “with the accession of Khatami as Iranian President, Saudi-Iranian relations ameliorated considerably.”69 Khatami did seem to make genuine efforts at rapprochement in the early years of his presidency. Yet he did not ultimately enact significant, lasting change in

67 Ibid., ix. 68 Amiri, Reza Ekhtiari, Ku Hasnita Binti Ku Samsu, and Hassan Gholipour Fereidouni (2011). “The Hajj and Iran’s Foreign Policy towards Saudi Arabia.” Journal of Asian and African Studies. 69 Matthiesen, “Hizbullah al-Hijaz,” 197. ​

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Iranian-Saudi relations, as the relationship began to go downhill quickly after the fall of Saddam

Hussein. The two states remained staunch rivals throughout Khatami’s two terms in office and still are today. In the following pages, I will outline Khatami’s effort at rapprochement and what led to its inevitable failure.

Khatami’s Almost Rapprochement (1997-2002)

From the beginning of his term, President Khatami “introduce[d] a period of outreach to the Gulf,”70 and in 1999, he became the first Iranian president to visit the Kingdom since the revolution. In 2001, Saudi King Fahd congratulated Khatami on his reelection victory, and in

April of that year, Iran and Saudi Arabia signed a security agreement “on terrorism and drug trafficking” that bettered their relations.71 This pact was part of a general rapprochement between the Iranians and Saudis. In accordance with the pact, which was signed in the aftermath of the

Khobar bombings, Iran agreed to “stop supporting Saudi Shi‘a opposition activists,” such as

Hizbullah al-hijaz.72 Most members of Saudi Hezbollah were arrested around this time and the group all but disappeared, although many suspects in the Khobar bombings are thought to have gone to Iran afterwards.73 These efforts at bettering relations were a part of an ongoing easing of tensions. Iran’s relationship with Saudi Arabia had been improving since the beginning of the

1990s due to mutual efforts at rapprochement. These efforts were catalyzed in Iran under

Rafsanjani and Khatami, meaning that Khatami was merely continuing the pragmatists’ Saudi policy. Nevertheless, Khatami’s policy towards the Saudi monarchy was genuinely successful at bettering the bilateral relationship to the benefit of both regimes.

70 “Timeline of Iran-Saudi Relations,” The Wilson Center. 2016. 71 Ibid. 72 Matthiesen. “Hizbullah al-Hijaz,” 194. 73 Ibid.

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[W]hen Iran successfully tested Shehab 3 missiles in summer 1998, Saudi Arabia did not respond negatively or aggressively. As they grew closer, Saudi Arabia distanced itself from the Taliban [a staunch enemy of Iran’s] in Afghanistan, recalling their envoy from Kabul and forcing out the Taliban representative in Riyadh.74

In 1999, Iran and Saudi Arabia began to cooperate on OPEC policy, as they both worked to raise oil prices from a twelve-year low and that same year, both signed on to significant production cuts.75 Less than a year later though in April of 2000, Iran criticized the Saudis for accommodating US desires for lower prices. The countries worked together to combat drug trafficking via their 2001 security agreement, which also set terms for Iranian-Saudi cooperation on issues including “money laundering, border surveillance, and the administration of water and territorial matters.”76 Iran proved its commitment to the security agreement in June 2002 “when its security agencies handed over to Saudi authorities 16 Saudi nationals allegedly linked to al

Qaeda.”77 Trade increased dramatically as well between the two countries, rising from $95 million in 1999 to $133 million in 2000 to $248.5 million in 2001.

Though this Iranian-Saudi rapprochement would quickly grind to a halt in the aftermath of the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, a future rapprochement between the two states probably seemed genuinely possible by the summer of 2003. Gwenn Okruhlik, a Fulbright

Research Scholar at the King Faisal Foundation Center for Research and Islamic Studies in

Riyadh, explained that the two countries’ shared common interests of “oil and Islam,” in addition to which they had three key reasons to ease tensions. These were “common domestic circumstances, regional conflicts, and common disillusionment with the United States.”78 By

74 Okruhlik, Gwenn. “Saudi Arabian-Iranian Relations: External Rapprochement and Internal Consolidation,” 118. ​ 75 Ibid. ​ 76 Ibid., 118. ​ 77 Ibid., 119. 78 Ibid., 120.

Frazer 33 domestic circumstances, Okruhlik is referring to “fluctuating oil revenues, plummeting income and stagnant economies,” which provided incentives for both regimes to work with each other.

Regional conflicts in the Middle East at the beginning of the twenty-first century included those in Israel, Iraq, and Afghanistan. On all of these conflicts, Iran and Saudi Arabia shared similar positions, although Iraq is a more complicated matter. For instance, in Afghanistan both the

Iranians and the Saudis wanted “ the careful and legitimate reconstruction of a viable

Afghanistan. Memories of the post-1989 power vacuum are fresh.”79 In terms of disillusionment with the US, both governments were dissatisfied with American foreign policy in the Middle

East, specifically the invasion of Iraq and the US’ “unwillingness to use leverage to rein in

Israeli hard liners.”80 Notably, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, US media outlets became more critical of Islam; the Iranians and Saudis both contested such criticism in defense of Islam. Thus, the US pushed Iran and Saudi Arabia closer together.81

Yet another example of Iran’s conciliatory policy towards the Saudis during the first part of Khatami’s tenure in office was his take on the Saudis’ position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Khatami was “careful to not criticize [then-Crown Prince] Abdullah’s proposal regarding Israel and Palestine too harshly,” since “[r]elations were at a very delicate stage” at that point in the late spring of 2002.82 Thus, while the Saudis remained skeptical of Iran’s plans to gain regional influence, and while Iran certainly was intent on doing what the Saudis feared,

Khatami remained diplomatic towards the Saudi regime in his actions.

79 Ibid. 80 Ibid., 120. 81 Ibid., 120-122. 82 Ibid., 122.

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Despite these modest improvements, Iran and Saudi Arabia were still archrivals by 2002, and their mutual “chronic hostility” remained.83 In a lot of ways, Khatami’s underlying outlook towards the Saudi kingdom does not seem to have been too different from his predecessors, as was proven by the end of his second term in 2005. Though the easing of tensions did not last, the slight rapprochement between the Iranians and Saudis that occured at this time was a relative improvement in an otherwise contemptuous relationship.

Khatami & the Continuation of the Iranian-Saudi Rivalry (2002-2005)

In the waning days of the Khatami administration, the Iranian-Saudi relationship was defined by rivalry and distrust more than anything, and Khatami’s apparent efforts to improve the relationship did not nullify this reality.84 In the wake of the Iraq war and the subsequent gains made by Iraqi Shias, Iran gained significantly more influence throughout the Middle East at this time, a change in the regional power balance that was likely the most consequential contributor to the rise in tensions. During his final few years in office, Khatami’s Iran competed with Saudi

Arabia for superiority in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Bahrain, and Yemen. Iran’s foreign policy towards Arab states manifested itself in two ways: (1) an attempt to engage with the governments of its Arab neighbors and (2) an “Arab Street” strategy of trying to appeal directly to Arab citizens.85 Iran implemented both of these tactics in its relationship with the Saudis at various times.

Around the time of the US invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the

Khatami administration pursued a more active policy of empowering Shia groups in the Middle

83 Wehrey, Frederic, et. al (2009). “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam,” x. ​ 84 ibid., xii-3; Aarts and Duijne. “Saudi Arabia after U.S.-Iranian Détente: Left in the Lurch?” 66. ​ ​ 85 Rakel, Eva Patricia (2007). “VI. Iranian Foreign Policy since the Iranian Islamic Revolution: 1979–2006” in The ​ Greater Middle East in Global Politics. (Boston: International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology), 147-175.

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East. Shia rule in Iraq made Saudi Arabia deeply suspicious that Iran would gain influence as the

Iraqi government would be loyal to the Islamic Republic, the self-proclaimed leader of the

Shias.86 In Lebanon, Iran had sought to gain influence by backing Hezbollah, a Shia terrorist group that by this time had a strong foothold in the country.87 Iran’s support for Hezbollah is detested by the Saudis and other Arab governments, as the Saudis view Hezbollah as a front for

Iranian influence.88 Though Khatami claimed that he and Iran did not support terrorism, he and other top Iranian officials met openly on numerous occasions with leaders of Islamist organizations, including terrorist groups like Hezbollah.89

In the wake of 9/11, the Islamic Republic was also accused by the US of supporting another terrorist group, al Qaeda. In May 2003, al Qaeda launched an attack in Riyadh, Saudi

Arabia. Three car bombs exploded, killing 35 people, nine of whom were bombers. Gary Sick, who served on Carter’s National Security Council and in 2003 was the director of the Middle

East Institute at Columbia University, explained that the suicide attack was aimed at “housing compounds for Americans and other Westerners living and working in the Saudi kingdom.”90 In the following weeks, the “United States released unconfirmed intelligence reports that Iran was sheltering some senior Al Qaeda operatives who may have been involved in planning the attack.”91 While Iran initially denied these allegations, it later admitted that it “had several Al

Qaeda members in custody, reportedly including some very senior individuals,”92 although it not clear what role, if any, Iran played in the attack. Moreover, that Iran held these operatives and

86 Wehrey, Frederic, et. al (2009). “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam.” ​ 87 Ibid. 88 Matthiesen. “Hizbullah al-Hijaz.” ​ 89 Gary Sick (2003), "Iran: Confronting Terrorism." Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4, 93. ​ ​ ​ 90 Ibid., 92. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid.

Frazer 36 did not hand them over to the Saudis angered the kingdom. The Saudis joined the US in blaming

Iran; for instance, Reuters reported that a Saudi newspaper argued that Iran had aided al Qaeda in perpetrating the bombing in Riyadh.93

The Khatami administration also sought to appeal to the “Arab street.” Most notable in this regard is perhaps Iran’s strategic support for Palestinian groups and its aggressive opposition to Israel, which it pursued in an effort to bridge the divide between itself and the populations of

Sunni majority countries,. Because the Islamic Republic is not allied with the United States, like the Saudis are, it can go further than Saudi Arabia in supporting Palestinian groups and opposing

Israel.94 Iran found common cause with Arab publics through its strong, open support for

Palestinian groups. In 1999, “former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati stated… that

‘all our friends and enemies know perfectly well’ that ‘Iran is the supporter of the Hamas and the

Hezbollah in their struggle against Israel.”95 In 2000, at the height of the Second Palestinian

Intifada, Supreme Leader Khamenei deemed Palestine “a limb of our [Iran’s] body.”96 While this effort to appeal to Arab populations by finding common ground on the Israeli-Palestinian issue would be increased by Ahmadinejad it was already in full swing during Khatami’s time in office.

Through its involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran sought to appeal to Arab publics while not antagonizing the Saudi government too much. Indeed, the Khatami administration sought to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with several Arab ministers and

93 “Saudi: Riyadh bomb suspect held,” CNN International.com: World, December 3, 2003 (2005 Cable News ​ ​ Network LP); “Riyadh bombing 'ordered from Iran,'” Al Jazeera, 23 November 2003. ​ ​ 94 Takeyh, Ray. "Iran, Israel and the politics of terrorism." Survival 48, no. 4 (2006), 86. 95 Menashri, David (2007). "Iran's regional policy: between radicalism and pragmatism." Journal of International ​ Affairs, 160. ​ 96 Wehrey, Frederic, Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza Nader, Jeremy J. Ghez, and Lydia Hansell (2009). “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for US Policy.” Rand Corporation, 23.

Frazer 37 leaders, but Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states harbored distrust of and skepticism towards

Iran. As the Bahraini Defense Minister put it, “[Iran]’s a two-sided coin… Khatami, who wishes cooperation, or those who assist [militant Islamist] groups in Lebanon, Bahrain and elsewhere.”97

Saudi officials accurately viewed Iran’s efforts in Palestine as an attempt to win over Arab populations, which would ultimately be to Saudi Arabia’s detriment. Iran was successful in this goal. In other words, Iran claimed to want to work with the Saudis to promote the Palestinian cause, yet Iran’s actual behavior suggested that it used its support for the Palestinians as a weapon against the Saudis to gain influence.

The Saudi Role in Rapprochement

Despite Khatami’s foreign policy, which sought to ease tensions with Saudi Arabia, any rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia from 1997-2005 can hardly be attributed to

Khatami alone. First of all, tensions between the two Middle East powers began to lessen in

1991, six years prior to his presidency.98 Tensions eased at least partially because Crown Prince

Abdullah, in the wake of King Fahd’s debilitating stroke in 1995, wanted to ease them.

According to Okruhlik, “It is not at all clear that rapprochement would have occurred between

Fahd and Khatami as it ha[d] between Abdullah and Khatami.”99 Abdullah’s openness to moderating relations with Iran was due to his willingness to distance Saudi Arabia from the US more than his predecessor, King Fahd. In addition, Saudi Arabia sought to ease tensions with the

Islamic Republic in “the midst of tremendous domestic uncertainty,” which made them more open to, one could perhaps say desperate for, rapprochement with Iran.100 In many ways, it seems

97 Ibid., 123. ​ 98 Okruhlik. “Saudi Arabian-Iranian Relations,” 114. ​ 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid., 117.

Frazer 38 as though Khatami’s Saudi policy was dictated by external forces, including whether or not

Saudi Arabia itself desired rapprochement.101 Under Khatami, Iran did make strides to better its relations with the Saudis, but these improvements and moments of cooperation were undermined and even reversed by the distrust and competition between the two states that followed the Iraq

War. The relationship worsened towards the end of Khatami’s presidency in part because of the

Saudis’ perceptions of increased Iranian influence in the region.

Ultimately, Khatami’s conciliatory rhetoric made Iran’s foreign policy towards the

Saudis appear friendlier than it really was. Despite nods both regimes may have made towards rapprochement between 1997-2002, the underlying essence of the relationship as hostile and competitive became clearer from about 2002-2005, in the wake of the Iraq War and the subsequent political gains made by Iraqi Shias. In the end, the fleeting nature of Iran's attempts at rapprochement is evidence of how weak they were.

Ahmadinejad’s Saudi Arabia Policy

Although the Iran-Saudi relationship did not undergo a directional change during his presidency, Ahmadinejad’s behavior towards the Saudis can also be divided into two periods, namely, his policy before and after the Arab Spring. Generally speaking, Ahmadinejad was much more bombastic and combative than Khatami in his language, yet a change in rhetoric does not automatically equal a real policy shift. Whereas under Khatami Iran’s conflicts with Saudi

Arabia were less pronounced than its attempts at conciliation, under Ahmadinejad the opposite was true. That is, Ahmadinejad tried to work with Arab states in certain respects, yet he was more rhetorically combative and open about the rivalry between the two. Either way, evidence of

101 Ibid. ​

Frazer 39 declining cooperation between the two can be found in regional proxy conflicts both sides waged against each other, which will be discussed in the following pages. As was the case during

Khatami’s presidency, external factors were a driving force behind Iran’s Saudi policy under

Ahmadinejad. Relations likely worsened between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia from

2005-2013 more as a result of external factors that would have caused a rise in tensions regardless of who was in power than due to Ahmadinejad’s leadership. Nevertheless, the

Iran-Saudi rivalry steadily deteriorated during this time.

Ahmadinejad’s Appeal to the Gulf States & Their People (2005-2011)

Like Khatami, during this first period of his time in office, President Ahmadinejad had a two-pronged approach to Arab states like Saudi Arabia: On the one hand he prioritized the development of Iran’s relations with the Gulf monarchies while on the other, he competed with the Saudis throughout the region and sought to win the hearts and minds of their citizens, which threatened the Saudi monarchy.

During this period, Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia and the other

Gulf monarchies was focused on cooperation and forging stronger ties and was not too different from Khatami’s early Saudi policy of cooperation, in the sense that the aim of both these policies was to improve relations from where they were at the particular moment in time. According to

Eva Patricia Rakel, “Iran’s foreign policy [under Ahmadinejad] is less extreme than many observers have predicted.”102 More to the point, Amir M. Haji-Yousefi notes that “the

Ahmadinejad Administration put the improvement and development of relations with regional states as its first foreign policy priority.”103 Haji-Yousefi explains that Ahmadinejad’s chief goal

102 Rakel, “Iranian Foreign Policy since the Iranian Islamic Revolution: 1979–2006,” 169. 103 Amir M. Haji-Yousefi, “Iran's Foreign Policy during Ahmadinejad: From Confrontation to Accommodation,” 9. ​

Frazer 40 was “improving relations with the Islamic countries since Ahmadinejad believe[d] that the

Islamic Republic of Iran ‘has Islamic nature, function and responsibility’ and on this basis,

‘regards Islam as the first and main element and source for Iranian national identity.’”104

Ahmadinejad’s focus on fostering cooperation with the Gulf states led him to travel to Saudi

Arabia four times over the course of two years. Among other goals, Ahmadinejad wanted to assuage Arab concerns about the formation of a “Shiite Crescent,” which he deemed unfounded.

According to Iranian leaders, “the Islamic Revolution is more Islamic than Shiite.”105

Ahmadinejad proposed tangible ways to improve Iranian-GCC relations, which would of course mean an improvement in Iranian-Saudi ties. “In 2007, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad

[sic] became the first Iranian president to attend a GCC summit, he offered to sign a security pact with Gulf Arab leaders. He also suggested forming an organization to improve economic cooperation between Iran and the GCC.”106

The more common perception, in the US and elsewhere, of Ahmadinejad’s Saudi Arabia policy, however, holds that Iran was more confrontational and competitive than conciliatory during his presidency. Indeed, Ekhtiari Amiri et al., deemed Iran’s foreign policy to have experienced “dramatic shifts” in that direction from Khatami’s administration to Ahmadinejad’s.

Though this shift may sound severe, it really was more rhetorical than concrete, as

Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy of appealing to the “Arab street” was an extension of Khatami’s policies. Indeed, the conservative hardliner continued Khatami’s competitive policy towards the

Saudis, as can be seen in Iran’s more hardline stances on the nuclear issue and in its sponsorship of Palestinian and Shia groups throughout the Middle East. Ahmadinejad attempted to appeal to

104 Ibid., 10. 105 Ibid. 106 Khalaji, Mehdi. “Iran's Policy Confusion about Bahrain.” ​

Frazer 41

Iran’s Sunni Arab neighbors by trying to “out-Arab” the Saudis in the Israeli-Palestinian arena.

Ahmadinejad focused on “the Palestinian cause and confronting Washington’s hegemonic schemes in the region” as areas where Iran and Arab states could agree since “[t]here is nothing particularly Shia about the two issues.”107 In political and economic terms, Iran became closer to

Hamas, much to Saudi Arabia’s dismay. Iran’s support for Hamas is notable and troublesome to the Saudis because Hamas is a Sunni group, meaning that, while the Saudis would have expected

Iran to exert influence over Shia Hezbollah, the Islamic Republic’s influence over and potential closeness to Hamas presented a new threat to the kingdom.

While the Saudis have attempted to “cli[p] the wings” of Iran by “bring[ing] Hamas back into the fold,” they have been unsuccessful.108 The Islamic Republic was able to undermine Saudi

Arabia and other Arab regimes because of their lack of action and efficiency in aiding the

Palestinians; in doing so, Iran simultaneously highlighted all of the humanitarian work it had done in Gaza.109 According to Paul Aarts and Joris van Duijne, “[b]y upstaging the Saudis through its support for Hezbollah and Hamas, Tehran has been able to challenge the legitimacy of the Al Saud before regional and domestic audiences.”110 Undermining the legitimacy of the

Saudi absolute monarchy was and has continued to be a goal of the Islamic Republic from its founding. Supporting these two particular groups thus accomplishes two of Iran’s goals: to gain influence for itself and to weaken Saudi influence and standing in the Middle East.

Lebanon is another theater of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry where the Ahmadinejad administration made gains against the Saudis between 2005-2011. Indeed, Iran and Saudi Arabia

107 Paul Aarts and Joris van Duijne. “Saudi Arabia after U.S.-Iranian Détente: Left in the Lurch?” 71. ​ 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid., 71-72. 110 Paul Aarts and Joris van Duijne. “Saudi Arabia after U.S.-Iranian Détente: Left in the Lurch?” 70.

Frazer 42 have had a more open rivalry in Palestine and Lebanon than they do elsewhere in the region.111

Interestingly, though, during and after the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006, Lebanon was both a site of competition and, at times, of diplomatic collaboration when Iranian and Saudi interests coincided.112 On the competition front, the Saudis tried to “rollback” Iran’s influence in

Lebanon, but the Islamic Republic continued to expand its presence there. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Baha El Deen Al Hariri in February 2005 exacerbated tensions between the two countries. On one side of the ensuing conflict was the March 8 Alliance, which included Hezbollah, Amal, and Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement and was backed by Iran and Syria. On the other side stood “the rival pro-Hariri coalition, the ‘March 14 Alliance,’” backed by Saudi Arabia. “The face-off between the March 8 and March 14 Alliances is often considered as a surrogate confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia.”113 Yet while both states viewed Lebanon as a battleground for regional influence, they also worked together to “eas[e] tensions between the Hezbollah-led opposition, on the one hand, and the Siniora government and the Saad Hariri camp, on the other.”114 Iran and Saudi Arabia both benefited from decreased sectarian tension in Lebanon at this time and were thus motivated to work with each other. The

Iranians’ “cooperation was crucial here [in Lebanon], and visits and exchanges of letters between

Saudi and Iranian dignitaries have contributed to calming sectarian and political tensions in

Lebanon.”115

During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran also battled Saudi Arabia for influence in

Bahrain. According to Kevin Downs, “[f]or Iran, meddling in Bahrain provides [high] potential

111 “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam,” 77. 112 Ibid., 77-84. 113 Ibid., 79. 114 Paul Aarts and Joris van Duijne. “Saudi Arabia after U.S.-Iranian Détente: Left in the Lurch?” 71. 115 Ibid.

Frazer 43 benefits with low comparable risks. Even more importantly, the mere perception that it may be involved in Bahraini instability contributes to its influence as it has a direct impact on Saudi policy.”116 During Ahmadinejad’s first term, Iranian officials made territorial claims about

Bahrain; for example, in 2007 and in 2009, different Iranian officials made inflammatory statements about the country. In one of those statements a top Iranian official declared that

Bahrain was a province of Iran’s until 1970.117 Bahrain’s Shia majority, which makes up 70% of the population, is ruled by the Sunni al-Khalifa family, which has oppressed and discriminated against the Shia community in order to maintain its grip on power.118

Iran and Saudi Arabia compete for influence in other states in the Middle East, too. In

Yemen, the Iranians have correctly been accused of backing Houthi rebels, who are trying to overthrow their government. “Starting in 2004, minority Zaydi Shiite [Houthi] religious extremists out of the northern Saada governate (bordering Saudi Arabia) led an armed insurrection against the Yemeni government.”119 Iran supported the Shia rebels with political and media support.120

In post-Saddam Iraq, too, Iran and Saudi Arabia vied for influence and power under

Ahmadinejad. They both viewed Iraq as a zero-sum game, and this perception has caused an increase in competition and, therefore, tension. Initially, right after the fall of Saddam in 2003, the Saudis were inactive in the country and watched from the sidelines as Iran sought to play a more active role in Iraqi politics. By the latter half of Ahmadinejad’s first term, 2007-2008,

116 Kevin Downs. “A Theoretical Analysis of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in Bahrain,” 229. 117 Khalaji, Mehdi. “Iran's Policy Confusion about Bahrain.” ​ 118 Wehrey, et. al. “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam,” 53; Downs. “A Theoretical Analysis of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in Bahrain.” 119 Downs. “A Theoretical Analysis of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in Bahrain,” 223. 120 Ibid.

Frazer 44 however, the Saudi stance on Iraq shifted to a more active approach.121 With regard to the future of Iraq, it is clear that the Iranians and Saudis did not trust each other and felt threatened by interference by the other in Iraq. Iranians from across the political spectrum have been critical and skeptical of Saudi Arabia’s role in Iraq, as the Iranians view the Saudi regime as “a proxy for

U.S. regional policies and [think it was] actively undermining the Shi’a government in Iraq.”122

The US contributed in a not-insignificant way to the animosity Iran has had for the Saudis and is also a wedge Iran can use to divide the Saudi government from its people and other peoples in the Middle East.

In his first six years in power, Ahmadinejad, much like his predecessor, pursued a dual

Saudi policy, which, on the one hand, prioritized the development of cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia and, on the other, sought to appeal to the “Arab street” at the expense of the

Saudi royal family. Ahmadinejad’s pursuit of the latter goal resulted in increased hostility and competition between Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, even more so than they had for

Khatami. In this period, Iran made relative gains against the Saudis in multiple conflict zones in the region; some, if not all, of the gains made by the Islamic Republic were completely out of its hands, especially in Iraq. In the next period of Iran-Saudi relations, tensions would only heighten for reasons that were also mostly out of Iran’s control.

Ahmadinejad & the Further Decline of the Iranian-Saudi Relationship (2011-2013)

The Iran-Saudi rivalry only intensified after the wave of uprisings known as the Arab

Spring that swept through the Middle East in 2011. Iran supported many of these revolts as

Islamic movements inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1979.123 Notably, Iran had already been

121 “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam,” 60-62. 122 Ibid., 64. 123 Shahram Chubin (2012). "Iran and the Arab Spring: Ascendancy Frustrated." GRC Gulf Papers, 17-18.

Frazer 45 supporting such opposition groups in places such as Bahrain and Yemen since at least the beginning of Ahmadinejad’s first term. Nevertheless, after 2011 Iran’s involvement in other countries’ domestic affairs intensified, as the Islamic Republic fought proxy conflicts against the

Saudis. For example, in Bahrain, the Islamic Republic probably stepped up its support for Shia rebels, though its involvement was “less easily ascertained” than the Saudis’ interference.124

Iran’s anti-Saudi rhetoric and diplomatic involvement intensified after the GCC sent forces into

Bahrain to suppress the protests. Inside Iran, “the influential Iranian daily newspaper Kayhan published a statement endorsed by two hundred and fifty-seven members of the Iranian

Parliament. The statement attacked the legitimacy of the Saudi regime.”125 The Islamic Republic expressed support for the Shia rebels, and in doing so, questioned the authority of the monarchy.

In Yemen, the Islamic Republic significantly increased military assistance to the Houthis and financial aid to the southern secessionists. According to Andrew Terrill, Iran increased its involvement in Yemen in 2011 “in response to both the chaotic situation there during the final year of the Saleh regime and the danger that the Arab Spring revolutions would leave Iran increasingly isolated”126 from other Middle Eastern regimes, especially Sunni ones. After 2011, it appeared clear that Iran was supplying the Houthis with weapons, activity, which was less certain prior to the Arab Spring uprisings. The Saudis again intervened on the opposing side to

Iran in Yemen.

However, the Islamic Republic was less enthusiastic about the unrest in Syria, which it labelled neither legitimate nor genuine. In response to the existential threat posed to Bashar al-Assad’s power, the Iranians opposed the Syrian rebels, which will be discussed at greater

124 Mabon, Simon (2012), "The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian Saudi Rivalry." Middle East Policy 19, no. 2, 90. - 125 Brandon Friedman (2012), “Battle for Bahrain: What One Uprising Meant for the Gulf States and Iran,” 79. 126 W. Andrew Terrill (2014), "Iranian involvement in Yemen." Orbis 58, no. 3, 429.

Frazer 46 length in the Syria case study. The important point about the impact of the Arab Spring in Syria is that it constituted a challenge to the regime closest to Iran,127 which made the Islamic Republic feel more vulnerable and as a result, more supportive of sectarian groups elsewhere in the region.

All in all, the new phase in the Iranian-Saudi rivalry that was ushered in by the Arab

Spring represented a change in degree in the temperature of Iran-Saudi relations, but not a change in trajectory. Iran’s foreign policy had been becoming more combative towards the

Saudis and vice versa since around 2003. The Arab Spring simply accelerated this process.

Conclusion

In their campaigns for the presidency and in their posturing during their respective terms,

Khatami and Ahmadinejad expressed quite different sentiments when it came to Saudi policy.128

There was some change in policy from one administration to the next: Khatami tried to ease tensions in the first period of his presidency, and Ahmadinejad heightened animosity between

Iran and Saudi Arabia. Still, most of the change in policy was merely rhetorical and symbolic.

The core view in Iran of how it should conduct policy towards Saudi Arabia remained unchanged between 1997-2013 (and beyond). This view asserted that the two states were archrivals and that Iran could not trust the Saudis and should fear any expansion of Saudi influence. To combat Saudi Arabia, Iran appealed to the Shia populations throughout the region, including Saudi Arabia’s own. Iran also endeavored to win the favor of Sunni Arabs by promoting a non-sectarian version of Islam, one which stood for Palestinian rights and opposed

US interference in the region. Throughout the two administrations, it seems Iran’s rivalry with

Saudi Arabia was exacerbated when one or both states felt threatened, such as after Iran gained

127 Shahram Chubin (2012). "Iran and the Arab Spring: Ascendancy Frustrated," 32-33. 128 Nashat, Bidjan (2009). "Iran’s Tactical Foreign Policy Rhetoric." Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution at 30: ​ ​ ​ 139-141; Rubin, Michael (2009). “Khatami Is Just Ahmadinejad with a Silver Tongue.” Critical Threats. ​

Frazer 47 influence in the Middle East after the US war in Iraq or after the uprising in Syria threatened

Assad, Iran’s main strategic ally in the region. If true, this tendency towards conflict has major policy implications for everyone involved.

Frazer 48

Iran & Turkey

Iran and Turkey have a long history of rivalry and overlapping interests. Both states have, at various times in their histories, enjoyed considerable influence in the surrounding region. Iran and Turkey each occupy a strategically important position in the Middle East, and as neighbors, each is geopolitically important to the other. Iran and Turkey share much in common. Both are majority Muslim countries, even though one is Sunni and the other Shia. In both there persists significant tension between more secular moderates on the one hand and religious fundamentalists on the other. Both have a significant minority population by which they feel internally threatened: Turkey’s regime feels threatened by its Kurdish population, while Iranian officials feel threatened by Iran's own Kurdish and Turkish minorities.

Since 1979, the Iranian-Turkish bilateral relationship has been defined by competition and cooperation, as Iran and Turkey are “frenemies,” which is to say that they get along well sometimes and have deep disagreements at others. This tension between the two will shed light on the differing foreign policy outlooks and styles of Presidents Khatami and Ahmadinejad.

Similar to their policies towards Saudi Arabia, in the end, the two leaders did not conduct their policies towards Turkey too differently, and the easing of relations that developed post-2002 was more a result of Turkish domestic affairs than Iranian foreign relations.

Context

Iran-Turkey Relations from 1979-1997

The history and identity of Iran and Turkey are rooted in the Safavid and Ottoman

Empires, respectively. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of the Great War, the

Frazer 49

Turkish-Iranian relationship entered a new phase, which was characterized by reasonably friendly relations. As the United States became more active in the region after World War II,

Turkey and Iran shared similar ideological precepts. They were both governed by secular and pro-American leaders, and they pursued similar foreign policy aims.129

The circumstances that had led to Iran and Turkey’s friendly relations fell away in 1979 with the dawn of the Islamic Revolution. Iran ceased to be aligned with the United States and

NATO, of which Turkey is a part, and instead tilted towards the Soviets. According to Safak

Bas, a former analyst of the European Stability Initiative in Berlin who is currently working as a freelance journalist, the rivalry that emerged between the two countries was based on ideological rather than religious differences.130 Turkey viewed “Iran’s support for radical Islamic groups, like the Turkish branch of Hezbollah… as an attempt by Iran to export its Islamic revolution” and, therefore, as a threat to the Turkish regime.131 Revolutionary Iran criticized Turkey’s secularism and its alliance with the United States and Israel as “Western perversions” that were “not compatible with a Muslim society.132 Another reason for tense relations was that, at the time,

Turkey was “harboring Iranian opposition groups such as the Mujahedeen-e Khalq

Organization,” although the location of these groups in Turkey was temporary and Turkey was often only a transit country for them.133

Despite these ideological differences, in the aftermath of the Revolution, the Islamic

Republic’s attitude towards Turkey was ultimately pragmatic given its isolation from the Arab

129 Nilüfer Karacasulu and İrem Aşkar Karakir (2011). "Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement," 112. 130 Safak Bas (2013). "Pragmatism and Rivalry: The Nature of Turkey-Iran Relations," 113. 131 Ibid., 114. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid., 115.

Frazer 50 world during the Iran-Iraq War.134 Iran could not use ports in the Persian Gulf; instead, it “was dependent on Turkey’s ports in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Iran bought Turkish goods and received technical assistance from Turkey, in return for mainly oil and gas, which was urgent for Turkey’s then crumbling economy.”135 The Islamic Republic had a strong interest in

Turkey remaining neutral during its war with Iraq. Indeed, both countries benefited from their economic partnership and an expansion of trade with the other during the war.136 Turkey

“adopted a policy of ‘positive neutrality’” throughout the war and capitalized on the economic opportunities the war provided.137

As the Cold War drew to a close, geopolitical competition between the Islamic Republic and Turkey intensified.138 Countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus gained independence from the USSR, and both Iran and Turkey saw an opportunity to assert influence in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the “primary aim” of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy in the Caspian Sea region was “to prevent Turkey and the United States from filling the power vacuum, which had emerged in the region.”139 Another reason for increasing tensions between the two Middle East states was that Iran supported radical Islamist groups in Turkey, some of whom were responsible for assassinations of high-level Turkish intellectuals. Turkey blamed

Iran for training and supporting the perpetrators of these killings, though the Iranians deny

134 Ibid.; Daphne McCurdy (2008). "Turkish-Iranian relations: when opposites attract," 89. 135 Bas, "Pragmatism and Rivalry: The Nature of Turkey-Iran Relations," 115. 136 Karacasulu and Karakir. "Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement," 112. 137 McCurdy, "Turkish-iranian relations: when opposites attract,” 89. ​ 138 Bas, "Pragmatism and Rivalry: The Nature of Turkey-Iran Relations," 117. 139 Ertan Efegil and Leonard A Stone (2003). “Iran and Turkey in Central Asia: Opportunities for Rapprochement in the Post Cold War Era,” (Association of Third World Studies, Inc.), 57.

Frazer 51 culpability.140 Iran’s support for the PKK, a Kurdish separatist group, was particularly threatening from the Turkish government’s perspective.

Despite these tensions, the prospect of an improvement in relations between Iran and

Turkey arose by 1993, as “[b]oth sides expressed their political will to consolidate friendly relations.”141 In practical terms, Russia’s influence over Central Asia and the Caucasus “limit[ed] the two countries’ competition and engagement over Eurasia.”142 In other words, they competed less in that sphere, but not due to their own choices. Yet Iran-Turkey ties did improve at this time. Supreme Leader Khamanei expressed his belief that "the geographical locations and natural resources of Iran and Turkey provide suitable ground for expansion of bilateral relations.”143 In

1994, former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel visited Tehran, where he called on both nations to work towards unity and solidarity in the Muslim World. Additionally, Turkey and the

Islamic Republic increased economic cooperation in these years.144 According to Ertan Efegil and Leonard A Stone, lecturers in international relations, “[i]n 1995, warming bilateral relations gathered momentum. On February 17, 1995, Turkey and Iran discussed religious cooperation. In

October, they signed a cultural cooperation agreement.”145 In 1996, Turkey signed a gas deal with Iran, in spite of strong American objections.146

These good times between Iran and Turkey did not last. In 1996, Turkey experienced political instability and in 1997, Turkish Prime Minister Erbakan was forced to resign since many in the military, the secular elite, and the public objected to his approach to foreign policy.

140 Karacasulu and Karakir. "Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement," 112. 141 Efegil and Stone, “Iran and Turkey in Central Asia: Opportunities for Rapprochement,” 58. 142 Karacasulu and Karakir. "Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement," 112. 143 Efegil and Stone, “Iran and Turkey in Central Asia: Opportunities for Rapprochement,” 58. 144 Ibid. ​ 145 Ibid. ​ 146 Ibid., 59. ​

Frazer 52

“Subsequently, mutual relations between Turkey and Iran deteriorated.”147 Hence, by the time

Mohammad Khatami rose to prominence at the end of the twentieth century, Iranian-Turkish relations were once again tense and rivalrous. By 1997, Iran and Turkey had each banished the other’s ambassador from their countries. Iran was suspicious of the secularists in Turkey, whom

Iran considered anti-Islamic, and of Turkey’s military links to the United States, Israel, and

NATO.148 This quick turnaround suggests the vital role of whomever is leading Turkey at any given moment in determining the nature of its relationship with Iran, which would become important again during Khatami’s presidency.

Khatami’s Turkey Policy

In 1997, Mohammad Khatami ran for and won the Iranian presidency as a reformist, who promised a new approach to foreign and domestic affairs. At the same time that Khatami was pursuing a non-ideological foreign policy, or at least a less ideological one, Islamists in Turkey were gaining traction over this time period. This conservative faction of the Turkish elite resided in the AKP, the Justice and Development Party; its leaders were pragmatic and well versed in political Islam. While Khatami pursued detente, the AKP wanted “zero problems with [Turkey’s] neighbors,” meaning that improving Iranian-Turkish relations was a mutual goal.149 Though a sense of rivalry and distrust remained between the two Middle East states after Khatami left office, the relationship did improve and stabilize significantly over the course of his term, especially after the AKP gained control of the government in 2002.

Khatami’s Turkey Policy before the AKP (1997-2002)

147 Ibid., 60. ​ 148 Bas, "Pragmatism and Rivalry: The Nature of Turkey-Iran Relations,” 117. ​ 149 Ibid., 118. ​

Frazer 53

In the early years of Khatami’s time in office, relations between the Islamic Republic and

Turkey improved, as Turkey perceived the Islamic Republic as less of a threat and Iran saw an opportunity at rapprochement. This shift was due to Khatami’s “‘detente-inclined’ foreign policy,”150 which favored economic development in Iran and cooperation with Turkey. Under

Khatami, “Iran’s quest to export the Revolution and the support for the radical Islamist groups and PKK terrorism had gradually declined,” which in turn meant that Turkey viewed the Islamic

Republic as less of a challenge to its stability.151 Iran’s Turkey policy in the first half of

Khatami’s presidency will be analyzed here through three interwoven issues: economic ties, ideological differences, and security considerations.

Undeniably, economic cooperation and trade relations improved and expanded during the beginning years of Khatami’s term. The twenty-two year, $23 billion natural gas deal that

Turkey and Iran signed in 1996, “in clear defiance of the [United States’] Iran-Libya Sanctions

Act,” was slightly extended to twenty-five years in 2000.152 This deal “include[d] the construction of a 1,600-mile gas pipeline between Tabriz and Ankara. (This pipeline was completed in July 2001, whereupon gas delivery began immediately.)”153 Iran was the primary benefactor of this agreement since it meant that Turkey was more dependent on Iranian energy and that the European market might open up for the Islamic Republic through Turkey. Of course,

Turkey benefited from the arrangement as well since it got to be the intermediary between Iran and the West, which was one of its main goals in this era, and it received a good price for natural gas. Also in 1997, Iran and Turkey “played leading roles in the establishment of the

150 Efegil and Stone, “Iran and Turkey in Central Asia: Opportunities for Rapprochement,” 60. 151 Karacasulu and Karakir. "Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement," 112. 152 Jenkins (2012). “Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran,” (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program), 22. 153 Nader Habibi (2012), “Turkey and Iran: Growing Economic Relations Despite Western Sanctions,” 4.

Frazer 54

Developing-8,” or D-8, which brought “together eight Muslim countries to cooperate in the economic field.”154 This organization was intended to be an alternative in a sense to the G-7 and was one arena where Iran and Turkey worked together economically. The overall trajectory of

Iranian-Turkish trade relations was positive during these years. Still, trade actually decreased between the Islamic Republic and Turkey from $1.1 billion to $953 million from 1996-1997 and again from $953 million to $627 million from 1997-1998, likely due to conflict over security issues. However, between 1998-1999, trade increased to $793 million. A year later in 2000, it rose to $1.05 billion; a year after that trade had increased to $1.2 billion.155

One reason for better bilateral relations at this time was Khatami’s decreased focus on ideology in his foreign policy. Tensions flared between Iran and Turkey in early 1997 before

Khatami was president and before Erbakan was ousted from the Prime Ministership in Turkey.156

That is not to say that relations immediately improved upon the inauguration of the new leaders in the two countries. Instead, tension remained through the end of the year. In December for instance, “Turkish president Süleyman Demirel stormed out of a summit meeting of the

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Teheran after Iran harshly criticized Turkey’s close ties with Israel and its policies towards its Kurdish minority.”157

However, Iranian-Turkish ties did get better in the following year, 1998, as “Turkish

Foreign Minister Ismail Cem began to prioritize improving relations with the country’s neighbors.”158 Khatami had already been pursuing this policy. Ideological incompatibilities between secular Turkey and theocratic Iran did cause rifts. For example, when an elected

154Sinkaya, Bayram (2004). "Conflict and Cooperation in Turkey-Iran Relations: 1989-2001,” 104. 155 Ibid., 106. ​ 156 Jenkins (2012). “Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran,” 23-24. 157 Ibid., 24. ​ 158 Ibid. ​

Frazer 55

Member of the Turkish Parliament wore a headscarf in the Kavakci affair of 1999, outrage ensued. The Turks accused Iran of trying to export its revolution, and the Iranians denounced

Turkish secularism.159 Though ideology caused issues between Iran and Turkey, such disputes were much less important than ones involving security.

Security concerns were the driving force behind bilateral relations at this time. The literature on whether Iran cooperated or competed with Turkey in the security arena is mixed.

One key aspect of security relations between Iran and Turkey is the role of the Kurds, a sizable ethnic minority in both Iran and Turkey, which had long suspected the Islamic Republic of backing the PKK. The Turkish government considered the Kurds an internal threat, and the PKK a terrorist ogranization; as was Turkish Hezbollah, both of which the Turks believed were sponsored by the Islamic Republic throughout the 1990s. For this reason, “the evidence pointing to Iran’s covert activities in Turkey had undermined any existing efforts for security cooperation” during the late 1990s.160 Nonetheless, the 1998 expulsion of PKK leader Abdullah

Ocalan from Syria and his 1999 capture by Turkey opened the door for better relations between

Ankara and Tehran.161 In the beginning years of Khatami’s presidency, Turkey and Iran did seek to cooperate with each other on security matters. In 2000, “Turkish and Iranian officials met in

Ankara to discuss security issues. The official meetings aimed at lowering tensions between the two sides. Both agreed to continue mutual cooperation against terrorist movements[,]” and signed a Memorandum of Understanding.162 After the meeting, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent

159 Nihat Ali Özcan and Özgür Özdamar, "Uneasy Neighbors: Turkish-Iranian Relations Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution,” 110; Neriman Cavdar (2015), “Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran, 1979-2010: An examination of ideological, economic, and security interests,” 44. 160 Cavdar (2015), “Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran, 1979-2010,” 60. ​ 161 Ibid., 62. ​ 162 Efegil and Stone, “Iran and Turkey in Central Asia: Opportunities for Rapprochement,” 61.

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Ecevit promised that “Iran would no longer attempt to support the PKK and Hizbullah terrorist groups and neither will Iran continue attempts at exporting the Iranian revolution,” according to

Efegil and Stone (2003). In February of the next year, Turkish Foreign Minister Cem visited the

Islamic Republic “[u]pon the invitation of [Iranian Foreign Minister] Kharrazi.”163

Khatami’s Turkey Policy after the Ascendance of the AKP (2002-2005)

The bilateral relationship underwent a significant improvement after the AKP gained power in Ankara. Similar to the first part of Khatami’s term, his Turkey policy after the ascendance of the AKP will be broken down into economic relations, ideological factors, and security issues in the following section.

When the AKP came to power in 2002, they ushered in an era of widespread changes to

Turkish foreign policy and a “breakthrough in relations” between Iran and Turkey.164 This breakthrough manifested in increased economic cooperation and interdependence. Starting in

2002, both Iran and Turkey expressed a willingness and desire to increase economic ties,165 and there was ample opportunity for rapprochement. In the twenty-first century, Tehran has considered Turkey “the most suitable market for selling its own oil and natural gas reserves. because it urgently needs large amounts of natural gas and oil.”166 For their part, “Turkish firms have increasingly viewed Iran as an attractive market in which to make investments in non-oil sectors, and indeed to sell their manufactured goods.”167 Economic cooperation continued and strengthened during the final years of Khatami’s presidency.

163 Ibid. ​ 164 Güngör, Nasuhi (2008). “Ahmadinejad's Visit to Turkey: Two Neighbors Oscillate Between Threat and Friendship,” 1. 165 Karacasulu and Karakir. "Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement," 116-117. 166 Efegil and Stone, “Iran and Turkey in Central Asia: Opportunities for Rapprochement,” 62. 167 Ibid.

Frazer 57

The rapprochement that occurred between Iran and Turkey post-2002 was the result of a number of political and ideological factors, as Iran lessened its emphasis on political Islam and

Turkey increased its openness to it. Indeed, the AKP was more open to Islam being a part of politics; furthermore, its foreign policy focused less on Turkey’s relationship with the West, specifically the United States. The AKP’s foreign policy can be boiled down to a “zero problems with neighbours” policy, which “also meant that it would have to go against the interests of its traditional Western allies at times.”168 During this period, Turkey and Iran agreed about a number of regional issues; for example, both opposed the US invasion of Iraq.169 Tehran sought to improve relations with Ankara not necessarily so that they could become friends, but rather to pull Turkey out of America’s sphere of influence.170 The leaders of both Iran and Turkey made a point to show their desire to strengthen ties with other Middle Eastern countries; in doing so,

Iranian and Turkish officials convened face-to-face meetings with increased frequency. “During

2003 alone, there were four high-level visits from Turkey to Iran, including two by Turkish

Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, and six from Iran to Turkey.”171 These visits signalled a desire on both sides to improve the bilateral relationship.

During this period, Iran and Turkey built on their previous security cooperation and expanded their coordination on certain security matters. Specifically, both Iran and Turkey feared the possibility of “the foundation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.”172

Therefore, they possessed “shared interests… in containing Kurdish separatism in the region;”

168 Jules De Neve (2018), “Continuity and Fluctuation in the Turkish-Iranian Relationship 2002-2018,” 18. 169 Ebrahimi et al., (2017). “Economic, Political, and Strategic Issues in Iran–Turkey Relations, 2002–2015,” (India: ​ Sage): 69; Özden Zeynep Oktav (2004). "Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish-Iranian Relations,” 111. 170 Jenkins (2012). “Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran,” 30. 171 Ibid., 32. ​ 172 Oktav, "Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish-Iranian Relations,” 111.

Frazer 58 these interests have encouraged cooperation between the two, even if only in the short term.173 In

2004, the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), an offshoot of the PKK, launched an insurgency in Iran. Meanwhile, the PKK announced an end to a years-long ceasefire in Turkey.

Whereas the PKK had driven Iran and Turkey apart in the past, it was bringing them together at this time. Dealing with the Kurds “was also one of the very few areas where the Turkish military was prepared to put aside its antagonism to the Iranian regime.”174 In 2004, Turkish Prime

Minister Erdoğan visited Tehran where the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding regarding security cooperation meant to target the Kurds.175 Despite these efforts at cooperation, however, Iran and Turkey still competed during this period; in particular, they both wanted influence over Shia Turkmen in Iraq, who had ethnic ties to Turkey and religious ones to Iran. The Islamic Republic ultimately won the battle for influence over the Turkmen and subsequently gained influence in Iraq.176

Some scholars are skeptical of the idea of that relations became increasingly friendly during Khatami’s second term and the AKP government’s first. In “Occasional Allies, Enduring

Rivals, Turkey's Relations with Iran,” Gareth Jenkins contends that, though it may appear as though Iran and Turkey had really strengthened ties under the Khatami and AKP governments, this perception is based on mere rhetoric and posturing, rather than an actual forging of true friendship.177 Jenkins makes a convincing argument: private sector economic cooperation plus official state visits do not add up to an alliance. This point is well taken, and Jenkins’ explanation

173 Ibid., 115. ​ 174 Jenkins (2012). “Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran,” 32. 175 Tolga Demiryol (2013).. "The Limits to Cooperation Between Rivals: Turkish-Iranian Relations Since 2002,” 114; Jenkins (2012). “Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran,” 33. 176 Ibid., 31. 177 Ibid., 6-9.

Frazer 59 of Iran and Turkey’s relationship as being “occasional allies” and “enduring rivals” is well put.

Yet Jenkins neglects the importance of economic ties and high-level state visits as diplomatic tools to forge friendships.178 These events provide considerable evidence for improved relations between the two countries.

Ahmadinejad’s Turkey Policy

Ahmadinejad & Erdogan: Two Peas in a Pod (2005-2011)

Iranian-Turkish rapprochement continued and accelerated under Ahmadinejad’s presidency in economic, political, ideological, and security terms. It does not appear that the

Khatami and Ahmadinejad administrations had very different Turkey policies. Rather, it is more likely the case that Ahmadinejad simply maintained the trajectory of the relationship for as long as was beneficial, meaning until he viewed Turkey as a threat in Syria. However, up until the

Arab Spring and subsequent civil war in Syria, the aim of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy towards

Turkey was improving ties.

In the first years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Turkey’s economic relationship with Iran

“became increasingly more important to both trading partners.”179 The volume of trade between the two Middle East states more than doubled between 2005-2010 from $4.3 billion in 2005 to

$10 billion in 2010. This number would jump dramatically again to $16 billion in 2011.180 The

Islamic Republic signed multiple economic agreements with Turkey during Ahmadinejad’s time in office, more agreements than were signed under his predecessor, Khatami. Some of these joint economic ventures include the following: in July, 2007, Iran and Turkey penned a major natural gas agreement to transfer 30 billion cubic meters of Iranian and Turkmen natural gas to Europe

178 Ibid. 179Jules De Neve (2018), “Continuity and Fluctuation in the Turkish-Iranian Relationship 2002-2018,” 23. 180 Ibid.

Frazer 60 via Turkey. In addition, Iran authorized the Turkish Petroleum Corporation to explore and develop three sections of the South Pars gas field. In February of the following year, “a consortium of four Turkish firms purchase[d] the Razi Petrochemical Company (located in

Southwestern Iran) for $650 million.” In April of 2009, “Iran, Iraq, and Turkey sign[ed] an agreement to link their electric power grids.”181 Iran benefited from increased trade with Turkey since, by trading with the Turks, it hoped to diminish its international isolation and to convince

Turkey to oppose the international sanctions promoted by the US and NATO.182

In addition to increased trade and economic cooperation at the state level, private Iranian investments in Turkey increased over the twenty-first century and vice versa. In 2002, Turkey housed 319 Iranian businesses; by 2010, that number had increased to 1,470 active Iranian firms.

Many of these Iranian firms were set up in Turkey since they benefited from the ability to access the European market from Turkey, as international sanctions prevented firms based in Iran from reaching Europe. On the flip side, approximately 200 active Turkish firms invested in Iran as well, “particularly in the real estate sector.”183 Thus, similarly to Khatami, the Iran-Turkey rapprochement in the economic sector under Ahmadinejad was born largely out of necessity and mutual interests.

In the political and ideological realm, the continued easing of ties was also the result of mutual need and concurrent interests. During his first few years in office, Ahmadinejad and other high-level Iranian officials met with Turkish officials on multiple occasions.184 In an unprecedented move, Ahmadinejad visited Istanbul in August, 2008. This meeting was the first

181 Nader Habibi (2012), “Turkey and Iran: Growing Economic Relations Despite Western Sanctions,” 4. 182 Ibid., 5. 183 De Neve, “Continuity and Fluctuation in the Turkish-Iranian Relationship 2002-2018,” 23. 184 Karacasulu and Karakir. "Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement," 111. ​

Frazer 61 time an Iranian president had visited a NATO country since the Islamic Revolution some 29 years prior. During the trip, “[t]he most urgent issue in Ahmedinejad’s visit was, of course, whether an agreement could be reached on energy issues, especially natural gas.”185 After the meeting, Ahmadinejad “emphasiz[ed] friendship and cooperation between the two countries.”186

Notably, Iran and Turkey negotiated agreements “in such fields as drug smuggling, organized crime and anti-terror measures.”187 Despite the apparent progress that was made, however, the

Iranians and Turks “failed to agree on a new deal on energy, since Turkish officials have [said] that Iran demanded pricing and investment conditions that they could not meet, but some analysts have claimed [it was] due to American pressure.”188 As Nasuhi Gungor notes, “[t]he meetings in Istanbul proved that relations between the two countries were positioned in warm yet turbulent waters,”189 meaning that relations between Iran and Turkey were genuinely improving, but they still had issues. More meetings were held during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, including a meeting in 2009 between Ahmadinejad and Erdogan.190 In 2010, Ahmadinejad visited Turkey yet again to attend an ECO summit and meet with Turkish officials.191

During the early years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the Islamic Republic continued to collaborate with Turkey on particular areas concerning regional security, especially when it came to Iraq’s Kurds. Iran and Turkey continued cooperating against their now-common enemy, the

PKK. During this time, Iran increasingly considered the PKK a threat, as it had since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Iran and Turkey agreed on the need to halt the

185 Güngör, “Ahmadinejad's Visit to Turkey: Two Neighbors Oscillate Between Threat and Friendship,” 5. 186 Ibid. ​ 187 Ibid. ​ 188 Karacasulu and Karakir. "Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement," 116. 189 Ibid. -- Güngör, “Ahmadinejad's Visit to Turkey: Two Neighbors Oscillate Between Threat and Friendship,” 5. ​ ​ 190 Habibi, “Turkey and Iran: Growing Economic Relations Despite Western Sanctions,” 3. 191 Ibid. ​

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“increasing autonomy of Kurds in Iraq, given the potentially destabilizing effect on their own states.”192 Ahmadinejad thus continued Khatami’s cooperation with Turkey in this realm. On the issue of Iran’s nuclear weapons, the AKP was more supportive on Iran’s right to have nuclear technology during this period, and Turkey took an independent stance from Washington on the matter. In 2006, Turkey played a mediating role between the West and Iran over the nuclear issue.193

These diplomatic accomplishments between 2005-2011 do not mean that Iran and Turkey were friends by 2011; however, they suggest that the two neighbors may have been on their way to some sort of alliance or a normalization of their strategic partnership. Ahmadinejad continued

Khatami’s policy of engagement and dialogue with Turkey to much success. Unfortunately, all of this progress would be threatened after the Arab Spring and the ensuing Syrian civil war.

Iran & Turkey after the Arab Spring (2011-2013)

With the advent of the Arab Spring in 2011, Iran’s outlook on Turkey changed drastically. The increase in tensions at this time was due to the two states’ differing beliefs about what should happen in Syria. While Iran considered the Assad regime to be a vital ally (as is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter), Turkey deemed Assad expendable. As Ebrahimi et al., articulate clearly, “Turkey desire[d] Bashar al-Assad’s resignation in the wake of the ongoing crisis in Syria but Iran defend[ed] him as a principal opponent of Israel’s hegemony.”194

Not only did the Islamic Republic and Turkey disagree about the fate of Syria, but early on, Iran accused Turkey of aiding US efforts to overthrow Assad’s government.195 In the wake of the

192 Karacasulu and Karakir. "Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement," 115. 193 Ebrahimi et al., “Economic, Political, and Strategic Issues in Iran–Turkey Relations, 2002–2015,” 74. 194Ibid., 75. 195 Ibid., 78-79

Frazer 63 conflict in Syria, Turkey seized the opportunity to gain influence in the region by mediating between Assad’s government and opposition leaders. From the beginning, Turkey supported the uprising in Syria and advocated for Assad to make reforms, rather than crack down on the protesters. Turkey also backed several Syrian opposition groups, which seriously damaged its relations with Iran.196 Where Turkey saw an opportunity to make gains, Iran saw the possibility of a significant strategic loss, as Assad was the Islamic Republic’s chief ally in the region. In direct opposition to Turkey, the Iranian regime backed the Syrian government and Hezbollah. In the final years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, “Syria ha[d] turned into a battleground for Turkey and Iran, where both [were] fiercely defending their geopolitical goals.”197 Some scholars have even called the conflict in Syria a proxy war between Iran and Turkey.198 Whatever one calls it, the Syrian civil war catalyzed the rapid decline of Iranian–Turkish relations.

Conclusion

Iranian-Turkish relations did appear to genuinely improve over the course of Khatami’s presidency and through much of Ahmadinejad’s. Nevertheless, these improvements were undermined if not totally nullified by Iran and Turkey’s conflict over Syria post-Arab Spring.

Gareth Jenkins perhaps summed up the relationship best when he said: “Historically, relations between Turkey and Iran have been characterized by brief intervals of rapprochement interspersed among considerably longer periods of rivalry and resentment.”199 Iranian-Turkish relations during Khatami’s and Ahmadinejad’s terms underwent mostly positive changes until

2011, after which the relationship entered a new phase of greater rivalry and distrust. The decline

196 Bas, Safak. 2013. "Pragmatism and Rivalry: The Nature of Turkey-Iran Relations,” 121. 197 Ibid. 198 Ibid. 199 Jenkins (2012). “Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran,” 10.

Frazer 64 of the bilateral relationship after the start of the Syrian civil war seems to be an outlier during this time period. However, it seems likely that Iran and Turkey cooperated only until they had something to fight over. In the late-80s and early-90s, it was Central Asia and the Caucasus; after

2011, that something was Syria. Having a good relationship with Turkey is pragmatic and beneficial for the Islamic Republic, especially given that the trade imbalance between the countries favors Iran and that collaborating with Turkey can, indeed, improve Iran’s national security. Yet once Iran’s security interests diverged from or were even in conflict with Turkey’s, the Islamic Republic readily damaged or neglected its relationship with Turkey. This suggests that Iran and Turkey are strategic partners when their interests coincide, but the relationship does not go deeper than that.

Frazer 65

Iran & Syria

Since its formation, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not exactly had the best luck finding friends. It is routinely isolated from its Arab neighbors and the rest of the international community through economic sanctions and political vilification by the US and others. Yet Syria has always been an ally of the Islamic Republic’s. It was the first Arab country to recognize post-revolution Iran in early 1979, and the two countries have maintained a strategic partnership ever since.200 The Iran-Syria alliance has vexed many onlookers who do not understand why a secular, Arab nationalist state would get along with a theocratic, Persian one. From the beginning, there were fundamental differences between the two states which, at times, challenged their relationship, and “Syria’s secular Ba’athist regime was suspicious of Iran’s

Islamist ideology.”201 Indeed, predictions about the inevitable demise of the alliance have been plentiful.202 Contrary to such expectations, however, the Iranian-Syrian relationship has persisted for decades in a region where alliances are not prone to lasting that long.203 Understanding this anomaly is key to understanding Iranian foreign policy. In pursuit of this aim, this chapter will review Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria during the Khatami (1997-2005) and Ahmadinejad administrations (2005-2013).

Context

Global and Regional Dynamics

200 Jubin Goodarzi (2010), "Iran and Syria." In The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and US Policy, 175. ​ ​ 201 Hunter, Iran’s foreign in post-Soviet era, 202. ​ ​ 202 Goodarzi (2009), Syria and Iran: Diplomatic alliance and power politics in the Middle East, 2. ​ ​ 203 Hunter, Iran’s foreign in post-Soviet era, 202. ​ ​

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When Ayatollah Khomeini and his fellow revolutionaries overthrew the Shah in 1979, the Middle East along with the rest of the world was polarized in either the American or the

Soviet sphere of influence in the Cold War. Thus, when the newly-minted Islamic Republic of

Iran established itself in direct and explicit opposition to American involvement in Middle

Eastern affairs, the young regime also pitted itself against America’s allies, namely the Gulf monarchies, Western Europe and NATO, and Israel. This self-inflicted situation posed a problem for Iran, in that it was isolated from potential economic and trade partners and was on the wrong side of a major power imbalance. This problem became clear with the dawn of the Iran-Iraq War, which began in 1980 when Saddam Hussein invaded Iranian territory. For the duration of the war, almost all of Iran’s neighbors were against it, despite the fact that it did not cause the war.

The collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s left a power vacuum in the Middle East which the US did not hesitate to fill; Iran found itself in a new unipolar international environment, a predicament which reached a peak in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing American “war on terror” that followed them. The US’ increased intervention in the

Middle East threatened Iranian security, particularly since the Bush administration labelled Iran a part of the “axis of evil.”204 Additionally, the failure of the Arab-Israeli peace process by the end of the 1990s and the Israeli-Lebanese war of 2006 that followed impacted the Iran-Syria relationship, as will be further discussed. Lastly, the dawn of the Arab Spring in 2011 ushered in a new phase in Iran’s Syria policy and foreign policy more broadly.

Iran-Syria Relations from 1979-1997

204 Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham (2007), "What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran." Middle East ​ Journal 61, no. 3, 421-440. ​

Frazer 67

Since the early days of the Islamic Republic, Iran bonded with Syria over a number of common characteristics and interests. Both countries were authoritarian, anti-Western, and governed by Shia leaders, despite Syria’s majority Sunni population.205 The Islamic Republic, for that matter, helped the rulers of Syria, members of the minority Alawite sect of Shiism, to gain acceptance from mainstream Shias.206 Iran and Syria possessed “shared values of anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism.”207 They held similar stances towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq and had strained relations with the United States.208 Both regimes were looking to maximize their power and influence in the region, and they mutually decided that forming a strategic partnership would be an effective way to do just that. Thus, Iran’s alliance with Syria

“grew out of common cause—and common enemies.”209

The Iran-Syria relationship began as and continues to be a defensive alliance, which started to have material benefits for both during the Iran-Iraq War.210 Syria was one of only two

Arab countries to back Iran during its war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the other being Libya.211

The Syrians provided the Iranians with crucial military and diplomatic support, and the Islamic

Republic was “extremely dependent” on this support.212 By 1982, Iran had pushed Iraqi forces out of most of its territory, and it was Syria’s turn to rely on Iran to “keep Iraq in check and mobilize Lebanon’s Shiites to expel Israeli and Western forces from its backyard,” after the

Israeli invasion of Lebanon.213 This dynamic lasted until 1985 when Iran again needed greater

205 Goodarzi (2010), "Iran and Syria." In The Iran Primer, 175. ​ ​ 206 Shireen Hunter (2010), Iran’s foreign policy in post-Soviet era: resisting the new international order, 202. ​ ​ 207 Nadia Von Maltzahn (2015), The Syria-Iran axis: cultural diplomacy and international relations in the Middle ​ East, 2. ​ 208 Goodarzi (2009), Syria and Iran, 2; Hunter, Iran’s foreign in post-Soviet era, 202. ​ ​ ​ 209 Goodarzi (2010), "Iran and Syria." In The Iran Primer. ​ 210 Goodarzi (2009), Syria and Iran, 3. ​ ​ ​ 211 Alireza Nader (2015), “Iran’s Goals in Syria,” theRANDblog. 212 Goodarzi (2009), Syria and Iran, 5. ​ ​ ​ 213 Ibid.

Frazer 68 cooperation from Syria “to maintain a foothold in the Levant and avoid total regional isolation.”214 Iran depended on Syria through the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988.

The mid- to late 1980s was the most turbulent period for the relationship up through today. Both countries’ resources were drained from the Iran-Iraq War, the Lebanese Civil War, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Most notably, Iran and Syria “developed conflicting agendas in Lebanon at this time, particularly in picking their Shiite allies… Damascus backed a secular and multi-confessional state that fell within its sphere of influence. Iran backed Hezbollah.”215

Nonetheless, eventually Iran and Syria reached an understanding on Lebanon, and the alliance weathered the dispute.

In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, Iran and Syria continued their strategic partnership. Bilateral ties weakened on the one hand, since they were no longer as threatened by

Iraq.216 Moreover, between 1989-1997, Iran and Syria differed on key issues; for instance, Syria expressed a willingness to negotiate with Israel, especially if doing so meant that Israel would give Syria back the Golan Heights. For these reasons, Shireen Hunter argues in Iran’s Foreign ​ ​ ​ Policy in the Post-Soviet Era that relations were strained throughout this period.217 ​ On the other hand, the loss of their mutual Soviet ally drew the two countries closer together. Without the USSR to depend on for arms, Syria looked to Iran to be its arms supplier.

218 Furthermore, they “cooperated in development of ballistic missiles. They collaborated in ​ ​ arming and abetting Hezbollah and Hamas to pressure Israel, as well as to influence events in

214 Ibid. 215 Jubin Goodarzi, author interview over Skype, March 22, 2019; Goodarzi (2010), "Iran and Syria." In The Iran ​ Primer. ​ 216 Tibor Hargitai (2013), “Syrian-Iranian relations — 1979-2013,” Thinking Politics blog. ​ 217 Hunter, Iran’s foreign in post-Soviet era, 208-209. ​ ​ 218 Hargitai (2013), “Syrian-Iranian relations — 1979-2013.”

Frazer 69

Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority.”219 In 1990, Iran and Syria further consolidated their ​ alliance by forming the “Syrian-Iranian higher cooperation committee, which their vice-presidents and foreign ministers chaired. Its main purposes were to meet at regular intervals for consultations and to strengthen their cooperative links.”220 Throughout the 1990s, the US presence in the Middle East, its staunchly pro-Israel stance, and its attempts to isolate Iran by exploiting Gulf Arab-Iran differences and by encouraging the “emergence of a Turkish-Israeli alliance after 1996… reinvigorated Syrian-Iranian cooperation in the period after the Cold War.”

221 Indeed, the specter of rapprochement between Turkey and Israel threatened both countries’ ​ national security. For these reasons, the Iran-Syria axis remained firm throughout the 1990s. ​ Iran and Syria had maintained and solidified an enduring alliance for almost two decades by the time Khatami won the presidential election on a reformist ticket in 1997. Together, the two countries had gained influence in the region, such as in Lebanon, and had pushed back on both Iraqi and US efforts to establish dominance in the region. According to Jubin M. Goodarzi, the enduring nature of the relationship can be explained by several factors: (1) It is a defensive partnership; (2) It is between only two nations and is, therefore, easier to sustain than an alliance in which multiple actors need to cooperate; (3) Iran and Syria each have different priorities:

Iran’s primary concern was the Persian Gulf while Syria’s chief focus was the Levant, specifically the Arab-Israeli dispute and Lebanon. (4) The simple fact that the alliance has lasted for so long means that both allies have invested heavily in it, and its persistence over decades has made it more stable; (5) Finally, Iran and Syria have remained allies, perhaps perplexingly,

219 Goodarzi (2010), "Iran and Syria." In The Iran Primer. ​ 220 Goodarzi (2009), Syria and Iran, 289. ​ ​ 221 Ibid., 290.

Frazer 70 because their ideologies differ so much. For this reason, neither country feels the need to compete with the other “for the mantle of leadership.”222

Khatami’s Syria Policy

President Mohammad Khatami’s regional and global foreign policy was characterized by conciliation and attempts at engagement with the Islamic Republic’s traditional adversaries, including the US and Saudi Arabia. For Iran’s enduring ally in Syria, Khatami did not have a particularly friendly attitude, but he could not have done much to better relations with the Assad regime. Hence, Khatami’s Syria policy was simply a continuation of Iran’s already established alliance with Syria. During his time in office, the Islamic Republic maintained and strengthened its alliance with Syria, and the ebbs and flows of the alliance were a result of the international geopolitical environment more than anything.

Khatami Improves the Alliance (1997-2002)

During this period, Iran’s relations with Syria improved as the two countries worked together on security and economic issues. Perhaps most notably, the Iran-Syria axis increased its involvement and achieved political and military success in Lebanon.

Since 1992, Hezbollah, backed by Iran and Syria, had been waging a war of attrition against Israel in Southern Lebanon.223 After several years of supporting Hezbollah, Iran and

Syria’s efforts began to pay off in the late 1990s. By 2000, Hezbollah had forced Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, which was an unprecedented victory since it was the “first time that

Israel had given up territory and withdrawn to its international frontiers without any prior

222 Ibid., 7-9. 223 Rola El Husseini (2010), "Hezbollah and the axis of refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria." Third World Quarterly, 807. ​ ​

Frazer 71 political agreement.”224 By early 2001, the possibility of another military conflict with Israel had increased, and Syria allowed Iran to arm Hezbollah with many more weapons and more advanced weapons systems through Iranian supply flights to Damascus.225 These shipments to

Hezbollah “intensified” after 9/11.226 Iran and Syria’s involvement in Lebanon continued, and

Hezbollah gained influence in the country in the years that followed.

Meanwhile, in May, 1999, President Khatami visited the Syrian capital, where he

“reaffirmed his country's commitment to the Syria-Iran alliance” and forged agreements “to implement a number of bilateral economic projects.”227 The Khatami administration continued to make bilateral economic deals with Syria throughout his second term. In April, 2002, for instance, Iran signed onto “the establishment of a $50 million fund to finance joint ventures with

Syrian private manufacturers.”228 Iran viewed this economic investment in Syria as a useful tool to strengthen their bilateral relationship.

Around this time, Damascus was also improving its relations with Ankara while Iran’s tensions with Turkey heightened, to the point where, in July of 2001, a military dispute between the two nearly erupted in the Caspian Sea.229 Yet in response to Syrian efforts to improve ties with Turkey, Tehran “watched passively as Damascus bolstered the influence of Amal at

Hizbullah's expense in early 2002” and urged Hezbollah to show restraint.230 Further, the Iranian government sought to reinvigorate its alliance with Syria through economic and security means.

Thus, the Islamic Republic sought to improve its alliance with Syria through diplomatic means,

224 Goodarzi (2009), Syria and Iran, 291. ​ ​ 225 Flynt Leverett (2005), “Bashar and Syria’s Place in the Regional Order,” In Inheriting Syria, 119. ​ ​ 226 Ibid., 120. 227 Fred H. Lawson (2007), “Syria's Relations with Iran: Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance,” 34-35. 228 Rafke Risseeuw, “The Syrian-Iranian Nexus: a Historical Overview of Strategic Cooperation,” 10. 229 Lawson (2007), “Syria's Relations with Iran: Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance,” 36. 230 Ibid.

Frazer 72 even if that meant allowing Syria and Turkey to get closer. A month later, Iran's Minister of

Security, 'Ali Yunesi, visited Damascus to discuss the future of Iraq with the Syrian leader, who had been making strides to improve Syria’s relationship with Iraq. In response to this effort at rapprochement, Iran did not take steps to better its own relations with Saddam’s regime. Rather, the Islamic Republic increased its support for the Iraqi opposition, including Kurdish organizations. After observing these actions, Syria followed suit and held meetings with opponents to the Iraqi regime.231 More important was Syria’s vote in favor of UN Security

Council Resolution 1441, “which required the Iraqi government to give UN weapons inspectors complete access to all suspected chemical, biological, and nuclear production and storage facilities.”232 The Assad regime was forced to support this motion, rather than abstain, lest it upset the Iranians, Saudis, and Egyptians.233 In essence, Iran maintained its alliance with Syria through diplomacy, despite Syria warming up to Iran’s enemies; in reacting this way, Iran chose not to risk upsetting the status quo of its alliance with Syria because the potential benefits of doing so were not worth the potential costs.

Khatami Doubles Down after the Fall of Saddam (2003-2005)

As Goodarzi notes, prior to 2003 scholars had assumed that, so long as Saddam Hussein controlled Iraq, the Iran-Syria axis would remain to keep him in check.234 After his removal from power, many thought that Iran’s cooperation with Syria would end. However, as has always happened in their decades-long alliance, these predictions of its demise were wrong. In the months and years after Iraq’s change in leadership, Iran and Syria only grew closer together, as

231 Ibid., 36-37. 232 Ibid., 37. 233 Ibid., 37-38. 234 Goodarzi (2009), Syria and Iran, 287. ​ ​

Frazer 73

“the September 11, 2001 attacks and the ensuing wars in the region… led directly to a renewed strengthening of the Syrian-Iranian partnership.”235 In the wake of the US invasion of Iraq, Iran and Syria shored up their alliance, as both states felt existentially threatened by the United States.

While Saddam Hussein’s ousting removed from power one of Iran and Syria’s foes in the region, he was merely replaced with a stronger one, namely the United States. Both countries feared they were next in the American “war on terror.”236 Thus, Khatami’s Syria policy continued to be one of increased cooperation and the continuation of their defensive alliance.

Iran and Syria also worried that the US occupation of their neighbor, Iraq, could lead to

America and its allies encircling them.237 They were isolated from the international community due to, in Western eyes, their support for terrorism, and President George W. Bush made menacing speeches aimed, in part, at them. In response, Iran and Syria’s efforts to intensify their relationship and increase coordination of policies included an increase in high-level visits, as

Assad and Khatami both visited each other’s countries.238 In February, 2005, Syrian Prime

Minister Mohammed Naji al-Utri traveled to Iran, where he spoke of Iran and Syria’s “‘united front’ against the challenges they faced in the region.”239 At all of these meetings, the developments in Iraq were at the top of the agenda. According to Goodarzi:

There is little doubt that even if it is not official Iranian policy, at least some factions of the Tehran regime are giving material and financial support to the radical Iraqi Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his followers in a bid to tie down the US-led coalition forces in Baghdad and southern Iraq. Moreover, even if Bashar Assad’s government is no longer aiding and abetting the passage of Sunni Arab and Muslim volunteers from Syria to Iraq (as it did prior to and during the US-led

235 Jonathan Gelbart (2010), “The Iran-Syria Axis: A Critical Investigation,” 39. 236 Goodarzi (2009), Syria and Iran, 293. ​ ​ 237 Ibid. 238 Flynt Leverett (2005), "APPENDIX A: Chronology of Bashar Al-Asad’s [sic] Presidency, June 2000 to December 2004." In Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), 189. ​ ​ 239 Goodarzi (2009), Syria and Iran, 293. ​ ​

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invasion in 2003), it is at the very least looking at such movements with benign neglect.240

Meanwhile, as much as Iran and Syria were deeply concerned about the US presence in

Iraq, they also viewed regime change in the country as an opportunity to gain influence, given

Iraq’s Shia majority and the difficulty the US began to have in controlling Iraq shortly after its invasion.241 Iran gained more and more influence in Iraq throughout the 2000s. The Islamic

Republic was also gaining ground in Lebanon and ramping up its support for Hezbollah, so that by “the end of 2004, estimates of the number of short- and long-range rockets at Hizballah’s disposal in southern Lebanon [ran] from 8,000 to 10,000.”242 Syria supported these tactics because they were a deterrent against Israel.

In 2004, the security cooperation between Iran and Syria manifested itself in a bilateral

Strategic Cooperation Treaty, one goal of which was to “further combat the Israeli threat.” This agreement “symboliz[ed] their closer bilateral relations.”243 Once again, Iran’s and Syria’s strategic security interests aligned on Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, and the United States.

In the economic realm, the Islamic Republic increased its financial stake in Syria throughout Khatami’s years in office, as Iran invested heavily in its ally in the late 1990s and

2000s.244 At a joint meeting of the Syrian-Iranian Economic Commission in 2004, Iran and Syria announced the opening of a car factory near Damascus by Iran’s largest car manufacturer, Iran

Khodro. “Construction of the plant—Syria’s first foray into car manufacturing—[began] on

240 Ibid. 241 Goodarzi (2009), Syria and Iran, 293. ​ ​ 242 Leverett (2005), “Bashar and Syria’s Place in the Regional Order,” 120. 243 Degang Sun (2009). "Brothers Indeed: Syria-Iran Quasi-alliance Revisited." Journal of Middle Eastern and ​ Islamic Studies (in Asia), 75. ​ 244 Hunter (2010), Iran's foreign policy in the post-Soviet era, 207. ​ ​

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October 27.”245 Iranian investment in Syria was notable during this time; still, the security cooperation between the two regimes was by far the most significant part of Iran’s Syria policy by the end of Khatami’s two terms.

Ahmadinejad’s Syria Policy

Though President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is typically known for his bombast, his policy towards Syria was characterized by friendliness and cooperation. From the beginning of his time in office until the end, Iranian-Syrian relations only became more robust and durable. In this way, Ahmadinejad intensified the Iran-Syria alliance before the civil war in Syria gripped the country and threatened to expel Assad from office, and his commitment to supporting Assad became ever more apparent as the war progressed.

Ahmadinejad Deepens the Friendship (2005-2011)

During the first six years or so of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the Iran-Syrian axis strengthened significantly. The Islamic Republic and Syria saw new opportunities to expand their individual and collective influence, particularly in countries with large Shia populations and weak national governments, i.e., Iraq and Lebanon. Iran sought to counter American and Saudi influence in the region; one strategy to do so was by increasing security cooperation and economic ties with Syria. Public diplomacy between the two countries continued to improve at this time as well.

Diplomatically, Ahmadinejad and his Syrian counterpart made strides to show the importance of the Syrian-Iranian special relationship. In 2005, Bashar al-Assad was the first

245 Leverett (2005). "APPENDIX A: Chronology of Bashar Al-Asad’s [sic] Presidency," In Inheriting Syria, 193. ​ ​

Frazer 76 foreign leader to visit newly-elected President Ahmadinejad.246 In the first years of his presidency, tourism between Iran and Syria rose, as “hundreds of thousands of Iranian pilgrims travel[ed] to Syria every year to visit holy Shi’a shrines such as the Tomb of Zaynab south of

Damascus. Syria’s Shi’as also make regular pilgrimages to Qom and other revered sites in

Iran.”247 Iran and Syria made public statements in support of each other, despite potential political costs. For instance, in 2009 after a controversial election in Iran sparked massive anti-government protests, Syria stood by Ahmadinejad’s government, a favor the Iranian president would reciprocate two years later. Syria has firmly supported Iran’s nuclear program, as it has asserted that the Islamic Republic has a right “to develop nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes.”248 Iran publicly spoke out in support of Assad as well. For example, in 2006

“the two sides signed a joint declaration, through which Iran urged [Israel to] return the occupied land to Syria.”249 These displays of friendship, which are both symbolically and materially important, reinforced the alliance and worried regional and international actors who were not a part of it.

Most importantly for Iran’s Syria policy, Ahmadinejad increased coordination with the

Assad regime on the security front: On January 19, 2006, President Ahmadinejad visited Syria, where the two allies signed several bilateral agreements.250 In June of that year, the Iranian and

Syrian Defense Ministers agreed to cooperate militarily against their common enemies, Israel and the United States.251 In March of the following year, Iran and Syria signed “another security

246 Goodarzi (2009), Syria and Iran, 294. ​ ​ 247 Gelbart (2010), “The Iran-Syria Axis: A Critical Investigation,” 40. 248 Ibid. 249 Sun (2009), “Brothers Indeed: Syria-Iran Quasi-alliance Revisited,” 73-74. 250 Ibid. 251 Bani, Nasur Nader-Ibrahim M. (2014), "Syria-Iran Relations (2000-2014)," 82.

Frazer 77 cooperation agreement… which legitimized Iranian export of missiles, facilities and arms to

Syria. Iran also promised to train Syrian personnel and enhance bilateral intelligence, energy and economic cooperation.”252 Through these agreements, Ahmadinejad further intertwined Syrian national security with Iran’s.

Iran depends on Syria’s support for its national defense as well as Syria’s facilitation of

Iranian influence in Lebanon.253 The most notable theater of Iranian-Syrian cooperation during this period is probably Lebanon. In July, 2006, Hezbollah launched an attack against the Israeli

Defense Force (IDF), killing three and kidnapping two of its members, a move that led to a swift

Israeli response and soon precipitated the Lebanon War. To combat Israel, Iran, Syria,

Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shias formed a coalition, commonly referred to as the “Shiite Triangle.”254

The Islamic Republic sent 500 military officials to train Hezbollah and gave the militant group

$100 million. Led by Iran and Syria, the anti-Israel coalition was “so effective that Zeev

Sternhell, an Israeli historian, publicly admitted that, from the Israeli perspective, ‘the Lebanon

War is the least successful throughout Israeli history.’”255 Iran and Syria similarly cooperated in their support for Palestinian groups, including in the Gaza War of 2008-2009. Though Hamas ultimately lost, it survived several Israeli raids mostly due to Iranian and Syrian assistance.256 If the Iran-Syria partnership reached a peak by the end of the decade, the alliance would reach another, higher peak in the years to follow.

252 Sun (2009), “Brothers Indeed: Syria-Iran Quasi-alliance Revisited,” 75. 253 Kazemi (2017), Asghar, Seyed Ali, and Noushin Mirzaee JEGARLOUII. "Study on the role of identity-oriented actors in the Syrian crisis." Juridical Tribune/Tribuna Juridica 7, no. 1, 69-71. 254 Sun (2009), “Brothers Indeed: Syria-Iran Quasi-alliance Revisited,” 77-78. 255 Sun (2009), “Brothers Indeed: Syria-Iran Quasi-alliance Revisited,” 78; Bani, Nasur Nader-Ibrahim M. (2014), "Syria-Iran Relations (2000-2014)," 82. 256 Lawson (2007), “Syria's Relations with Iran: Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance,” 44; Sun, “Brothers Indeed: Syria-Iran Quasi-alliance Revisited,” 78.

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In economic terms, Ahmadinejad’s Syria policy included increased investment and an expansion of economic relations. In a 2005 meeting with a commercial delegation from Iran,

Syria’s Minister of Economics Amir Husni Lufi declared that “Syria hopes to attract Iranian investments in support of the deep political relations which link our two countries,” and he elaborated that “[t]he strategic alliance with Iran has always been extremely fruitful for Syria and we are not afraid to pay the political price for Iranian investments on our territory.”257 The

Ahmadinejad government was eager to oblige such a hope. In 2007, the first Iranian auto-manufacturing plant opened in Syria. By 2008, Iranian investment in Syria reached $3 billion. These investments included a “variety of agricultural and industrial projects in Syria, including a car factory and a cement plant. There are also plans to build an oil refinery in Hama and to export Iran’s natural gas to Syria through Turkey.”258 Also around this time, the Islamic

Republic and Syria announced agreements in twelve other sectors, “ranging from healthcare to information technology to housing and urban development.”259 Iran invested billions in Syria during this period in spite of damaging international sanctions and rampant domestic inflation, both of which plagued Iran at that time.

Ahmadinejad Responds to the Syrian Uprising (2011-2013)

In February 2010, in response to US attempts to weaken the Iranian-Syrian alliance,

President Ahmadinejad proclaimed that “the whole world should know that Iran will stand behind the Syrian nation to the end.”260 This resolute statement was put to the test and proven to be true a year later, as the Ahmadinejad administration firmly stood by Damascus when the Arab

257 Gelbart (2010), “The Iran-Syria Axis: A Critical Investigation,” 39. 258 Hunter (2010), Iran's foreign policy in the post-Soviet era, 207. ​ ​ 259 Gelbart (2010), “The Iran-Syria Axis: A Critical Investigation,” 40. 260 Ibid., 37.

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Spring dawned in Syria and throughout the civil war that erupted in its wake. Iran was dismayed when the 2011 uprisings made their way to Syria. While Iran had been supportive of revolutionary fervor in other Middle Eastern countries, it felt differently when it came to a challenge to its close ally. The Syrian Civil War profoundly changed regional dynamics, especially for Iran, which depended on the Syrian regime’s stable rule. The war threatened Iran’s alliance with Syria insofar as it threatened to remove the pro-Iranian Syrian regime. It jeopardized Iran’s influence in Lebanon and Palestine since Iran had depended on Syria for access to Lebanon and to a certain extent, for access to Palestine. The Syrian war had the potential to take away Iran’s ability to claim that it was not isolated from the entire Arab world since it was friendly with Syria. Ultimately, the Syrian conflict had significantly negative repercussions for Iran in Ahmadinejad’s final two years and put the Islamic Republic on the defensive.

In response to the popular unrest in Syria, the Islamic Republic intensified its support for the Assad regime. Iran gave the Assad regime its full political and military backing. It “provided technical support and expertise to neutralize the opposition,” as well as equipment, guidance, and intelligence to Assad’s “security forces to help them contain and disperse protesters” and to teach them “how to monitor and curtail the use of technology network by the opposition.”261 The

Ahmadinejad government sent “specialist personnel and units from the Iranian security apparatus, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Forces, and intelligence.”262

The Islamic Republic gave Assad billions of dollars in aid and “bolstered the regime’s strength through creating the National Defense Forces – a group of nearly 80,000 Alawites, Shiites, and

261 Bani, Nasur Nader-Ibrahim M. (2014), "Syria-Iran Relations (2000-2014)," 83. 262 Ibid.

Frazer 80 regime loyalists who assist[ed] the Syrian army in combat.”263 Since the outbreak of the conflict, high-level visits have been held in Tehran and Damascus between Iranian officials and Syrian defense officials.264 Ultimately, Iran’s support for Assad “tarnished its reputation in the Arab

Muslim world” and strained its relations with Hamas, which supported the Syrian opposition.265

That Iran made the calculation that supporting the Assad regime would be worth this backlash is evidence of the importance it places on its relationship with Syria.

Conclusion

The Islamic Republic has been allied with Syria practically since its founding; although the two countries have had their differences, the alliance has weathered any tensions between the two countries as well as existential threats to both regimes during the past four decades. Iran deemed the efforts to overthrow Assad as a grave threat to its own security and declared the protests as no more legitimate than the ones against its own government in 2009. In this way,

Iran considered the Syrian regime’s stability and security to be inextricably tied to its own.

Though Iran has, on occasion, rivalled Syria for influence among Shia groups, these times have been few and far between and never called into question Iran’s overarching Syria policy from

1997-2013. Iran’s commitment to its alliance and cooperation with Syria during both the

Khatami and Ahmadinejad presidencies demonstrates that Iran has indeed maintained a lasting alliance. Both Khatami and Ahmadinejad focused on improving and solidifying Iran’s alliance with Syria, and the occasional differences in their policies, such as Syria’s openness to easing tensions with the US or Israel, are likely due to external events or at least never threatened the alliance in this period.

263 Goodarzi (2010), "Iran and Syria." In The Iran Primer. ​ 264 Ibid. 265 Ibid.

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Analysis

Between 1997-2013, Iran’s position in the regional and international order changed dramatically. It went from an isolated nation, trying to form and sustain relationships with its immediate neighbors, to a stronger, more secure power with the capacity to thwart American and

Saudi efforts at regional hegemony and to influence matters in several countries throughout the

Middle East. Iran’s foreign policy adapted to meet its strategic needs and to fit its new environment. Under both Mohammad Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Islamic

Republic pursued similar goals of empowering and engaging with Shia and Palestinian groups, undermining Sunni regimes particularly in the Gulf, combating American involvement in the region, and exporting its revolution when it deemed it beneficial. To understand how Iran makes its foreign policy, I looked at its policies towards three countries with varying relations to Iran over the span of two ideologically different presidential administrations (1997-2013). Overall, I found that the theory that best explains its behavior is prospect theory. When in a domain of loss,

Iranian foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria during this period is best explained by prospect theory. When in a domain of gain, prospect theory offers a good explanation for Iran’s behavior; however, its policy can also be explained by neoliberalism, in

Khatami’s case, and neorealism, in Ahmadinejad’s case.

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To analyze Iran’s foreign policy according to prospect theory and either neoliberalism or neorealism, where necessary, I will consider its policy in four periods: 1997-2002; 2002-2005;

2005-2011; and 2011-2013 since the reference frames for the Islamic Republic changed in between each period and, in turn, its foreign policy shifted.

1997-2002: Khatami in a Domain of Gain

It is somewhat difficult to assess how the Islamic Republic viewed its prospects in the first year or so of the Khatami administration. Iran had reasons for optimism, such as improved relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey throughout the 1990s. Moreover, Iran’s relationship with

Syria was secure, and together they were gaining influence in Lebanon. Iran also had reasons to be wary, though, such as the ongoing US presence in the region and improved relations between

Turkey and Israel. Furthermore, relations between Iran and both Turkey and Saudi Arabia experienced a setback just before Khatami’s term began.266 Ultimately, the reality of the Islamic

Republic’s circumstances is not what matters: according to prospect theory, its perception of its position is what will determine its behavior. During the first years of Khatami’s presidency, the

Khatami administration perceived itself to be in a domain of gain, given its commitment to and optimism about pursuing a policy of detente in its international relations. Iran felt it had the ability to affect real change in its foreign affairs and to make ambitious reforms, which Khatami tried to do at the beginning of his time in office. This domain of gain led Iran to favor continued cooperation with its neighbors and to seek opportunities to improve Iran’s relations with nations across the Middle East. Moreover, under Khatami, Iran sought to maintain the status quo since

266 Amiri, Reza Ekhtiari, Ku Hasnita Binti Ku Samsu, and Hassan Gholipour Fereidouni (2011). “The Hajj and Iran’s Foreign Policy towards Saudi Arabia.” Journal of Asian and African Studies (Sage), 682-685; Safak Bas ​ ​ ​ ​ (2013), "Pragmatism and Rivalry: The Nature of Turkey-Iran Relations,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, 117. ​ ​

Frazer 83 making more than modest gains was not necessarily worth risking a disruption to the status quo over. In line with this framing, Khatami assumed the presidency with a call for a “dialogue of civilizations.” Furthermore, in the later years of this period, Iran was certainly operating from a domain of gain, as the Islamic Republic’s prospects only improved since Khatami’s term began.

Since his election in May, 1997, President Khatami pursued a policy of detente towards

Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. In keeping with his desire to maintain the status quo,

Khatami continued his predecessor’s policy of pursuing increased cooperation with the Gulf monarchies especially Saudi Arabia and had even more success than Rafsanjani, who was president prior to him.267 Khatami built on Rafsanjani’s progress and sought to instill confidence in the Gulf states that Iran was not a threat to them. This successful foreign policy led to security cooperation between the Islamic Republic and Saudi monarchy.268 As a significant signal of the improved relations between the two Middle East states, Prince Abdullah visited Iran in 1997, making him the highest-ranking Saudi official to visit the country since the Islamic Revolution.

In another unprecedented move, President Khatami became the first Iranian leader to visit the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since the 1979 Revolution. These visits led to a security agreement in

April, 2001.269 Prospect theory explains this emphasis on and commitment to cooperation since the Khatami administration was acting in a domain of gain and, therefore, pursued a policy of cooperation that did not disrupt the status quo or if anything, made modest improvements to it.

Likewise, the Islamic Republic sought to cooperate with Turkey during this period. At the beginning of Khatami’s term, tensions between Iran and Turkey were high, as disagreements

267 Reza Ekhtiari Amiri and Ku Hasnita Ku Samsu (2011). "Security Cooperation of Iran and Saudi Arabia,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, 248. ​ 268 Ibid., 248-249. 269 Ibid.

Frazer 84 over security issues flared. Turkey was improving its relations with Israel, and Iran had been supporting the PKK, which posed a threat to Turkish sovereignty.270 Yet this strain in relations was not unusual for the two states, which have competed in the region since the days of the

Safavids and Ottomans. Therefore, Iran’s Turkey policy was not any more combative than usual, and these tensions were short-lived. By 1998, Iran-Turkey relations improved. Trade started rising, and Iran softened its revolutionary rhetoric, which normally expressed its desire to export the revolution to countries like Turkey. Most importantly, the Islamic Republic increasingly began cooperating with Turkey on security issues, especially regarding the Kurds. In 1998, Syria ousted the PKK leader, and a year later he was captured by Turkey. A year after that, Iran and

Turkey held bilateral talks at which both signed a Memorandum of Understanding agreeing to cooperate on security issues to combat terrorism.271 This focus on cooperation and coordination was the result of Iranian leaders being in a domain of gain, where they saw cooperation as possible, useful, and the best course of action. Their behavior was risk averse since they did not want to disrupt the status quo.

In the years following Khatami’s electoral victory, Iran improved relations with Syria as well. The Khatami administration coordinated its economic and security policies with Syria, and, in particular, it saw opportunities to make gains in Lebanon, where Hezbollah was able to force an Israeli withdraw by 2000. During this time Syria worked to improve its ties with Saddam in

Iraq and to empower Amal, rather than Hezbollah, in Lebanon. While displeased with these developments, the Khatami administration essentially accepted Syria’s actions since it accepted

270 Jenkins (2012). “Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran,” Central Asia-Caucasus ​ Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies ​ Program), 23-24. 271 Ertan Efegil and Leonard A. Stone (2003), “Iran and Turkey in Central Asia: Opportunities for Rapprochement in the Post Cold War Era,” Journal of Third World Studies (Association of Third World Studies, Inc.), 61. ​ ​

Frazer 85 that Syria’s primary area of concern was the Levant while its chief focus was the Gulf.272 In Iraq,

Iran increased support for the Kurdish population in an effort to oppose Saddam and bring Syria to do the same.273 Though prospect theory is more frequently applied to how states approach adversaries than how they work with allies, we can still apply it here. Since Iran was in a domain of gain, it valued maintaining the status quo of its alliance with Syria and did not want to jeopardize that alliance, which is why it did not overreact when the Assad regime sought to improve ties with Turkey or Iraq. Nor did Iran do anything too risky when the Amal movement gained more influence in Lebanon “at Hizbullah's expense in early 2002,” in response to which the Islamic Republic urged Hezbollah to show restraint.274 Iran behaved in this way because it was risk averse. It did not want to cause trouble with its chief ally, so instead it opted to use cooperation and diplomacy.

Overall, Iran’s foreign policy in this period was characterized by increased cooperation and an underlying desire to maintain the status quo or to make incremental improvements it. This behavior is especially true with regard to its policies towards Saudi Arabia and Syria. Iran’s cooperative approach to its foreign policy in this period is consistent with prospect theory since, in a domain of gain, Iran would be expected to be risk averse and to prefer making small adjustments rather than big changes. Yet Iran’s policies can also be explained by neoliberalism, which would assume that Iran would seek to increase cooperation with and interdependence between it and its neighbors. Neoliberalism would expect Iran to try to ease tensions with Saudi

Arabia or Turkey as much as prospect theory would, Thus, in this period prospect theory and

272 Jubin Goodarzi, author interview over Skype, March 22, 2019. 273 Fred H. Lawson (2007), "Syria's relations with Iran: Managing the dilemmas of alliance." The Middle East ​ Journal, 36-37. ​ 274 Ibid.

Frazer 86 neoliberalism both provide valid explanations for Iranian behavior. When compared to

Khatami’s final years in office, however, we will see where neoliberalism falls short as an explanation.

2002-2005: Khatami in a Domain of Loss

Until this time, President Khatami had been focusing his efforts on conciliation and cooperation with both Arab and Western governments with limited success. However, Iran’s reference frame shifted as George W. Bush branded Tehran a part of the “axis of evil,” in late

January of 2002, despite its attempts at easing tensions, and as the United States began signalling its intention to go to war with Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The Islamic Republic began to see itself in a domain of loss since it was deeply afraid that it would be the United States’ next target in its

“war or terror.” In concurrence with its change of perspective, Iran’s foreign policy shifted, too, from cooperation to competition and increased hostility.

Iranian-Saudi relations deteriorated during this period as a result of the increasing influence of the Shia population in Iraq and Iran’s increased efforts to challenge Saudi hegemony. In the wake of the US overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s Shia majority gained power and influence in the country. The Islamic Republic capitalized on this shift by increasing its involvement in Iraq, which antagonized the Saudis.275 Furthermore, Iran ramped up its support for Palestinian groups, namely Hamas, an effort which also provoked their Saudi competitors.276

275 Frederic Wehrey, et. al (2009). “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy.” National Security Research Division: RAND Corp.; Gary Sick (2003), "Iran: Confronting Terrorism." Washington Quarterly, 93. ​ ​ 276 Ray Takeyh (2006), "Iran, Israel and the politics of terrorism." Survival, 86. ​ ​

Frazer 87

While Khatami had sought to downplay Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia in the first years of his presidency, he changed his approach in his final years in office because of the perceived existential threat Iran faced from the US. Operating in a domain of loss, Iran accepted more risks in its foreign policy and relied less on cooperation.

Iran’s Turkey policy is an exception to Iran’s overall domain of loss since Iran was in a domain of gain concerning Turkey. Iran’s relations with Turkey noticeably improved starting in

2002 because the new government in Turkey, headed by the AKP, was more friendly to the

Islamic regime in Tehran. Furthermore, the AKP wanted “zero problems with [Turkey’s] neighbours” and focused less on Turkey’s ties with the US.277 During these years, Iran’s trade with Turkey increased significantly, and high-ranking members of the Khatami administration met with high-ranking Turkish officials. Importantly, Iran and Turkey collaborated in the security realm in their policies towards the Kurds.278 Nonetheless, Iran still rivalled Turkey, particularly in Iraq, at this time.279 The Islamic Republic’s warmer relations with Turkey during this period are due to Turkey’s change in leadership, which resulted in a significant gain for the

Islamic Republic, who now had a friendlier partner in Turkey. Given that Iran was in a domain of gain with Turkey, it should be risk averse and seek to cooperate more with Turkey, both of which are true. Prospect theory and neoliberalism both explain Khatami’s behavior towards

Turkey at this time since the Iranian president was willing to cooperate and work with together to the extent that Turkey was willing to work with Iran. Since the beginning of his term, President

277 Jules De Neve (2018), “Continuity and Fluctuation in the Turkish-Iranian Relationship 2002-2018,” (Universiteit Gent), 18; Ebrahimi et al. (2017). “Economic, Political, and Strategic Issues in Iran–Turkey Relations, 2002–2015,” ​ ​ (India: Sage): 69; Özden Zeynep Oktav (2004). "Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish-Iranian Relations,” Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2-68. ​ 278 Oktav, "Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish-Iranian Relations,” 111. 279 Jenkins (2012). “Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran,” 31,

Frazer 88

Khatami proclaimed the mutual benefits that could come from detente and cooperation between

Iran and its neighbors. Iran sought to make gains by working with Turkey, which is consistent both with a neoliberal outlook and with prospect theory when a state is in the domain of gain.

Iran-Syria relations continued to improve during this time, as the mutual threats they faced pushed the two closer together. Iran and Syria coordinated policies on shared security interests in Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel. In 2004, the two states signed a bilateral security agreement, which intensified their coordination on security matters.280 This increase in security cooperation with Syria was paralleled by increased Iranian investment in Syria in the economic realm. Iran’s strengthening its ties with Syria during this period is best explained by prospect theory: Because Iran perceived that it was in a domain of loss, it sought to mitigate its external threats by focusing on its current alliance with Syria and by taking risks throughout the region with Syria. Increasing security cooperation with Syria is risky behavior for Iran since doing so would antagonize the Sunni states, not to mention the US and Israel. Furthermore, Iran and

Syria’s activity in Lebanon or Iraq upset the status quo and caused further instability, which is risk seeking behavior as well. For instance, Iran and Syria sought to gain influence in Iraq despite the sectarian divides such actions might foment between Iran and Sunni Arab states. Iran clearly wanted the Shia majority to come to power in Iraq. If it had been operating under a neoliberal framework, it probably would have cared about who led Iraq less because the Shiism of Iraq’s new leaders would have been less important to the Islamic Republic, or Iran perhaps would have cooperated more with the Saudis there. If Iran’s behavior was neorealist or

280 Degang Sun (2009). "Brothers Indeed: Syria-Iran Quasi-alliance Revisited." Journal of Middle Eastern and ​ Islamic Studies (in Asia), 75; Goodarzi (2009), Syria and Iran, (IB Tauris), 293. ​ ​ ​

Frazer 89 neoliberal than it would not have been so willing to throw away the genuine progress it had made in easing tensions with the Saudis.

Overall, Iran maintained its cooperative, collaborative policies with Syria, its ally, and

Turkey, its sometimes-friend, while it largely abandoned its efforts at rapprochement with Saudi

Arabia, its archrival in the region. Iran’s foreign policy can best be understood by prospect theory, in the cases of its relations with Syria and Saudi Arabia, and through either neoliberalism or prospect theory, in its relations with Turkey at this time. Yet even if neoliberalism can explain

Iran’s Turkey policy in this period, prospect theory is the better explanation since it holds true for every period examined here for Turkey, as well as for Saudi Arabia and Syria. In short, as

Iran felt threatened, its reliance on cooperation with its enemy, Saudi Arabia, took a back seat to its efforts to gain influence and reset the status quo to something with which it could be satisfied.

Iran’s relations with Turkey are explained by neoliberalism and prospect theory, since the ascendance of the AKP put it in a domain of gain with Turkey. The two states cooperated where they shared common stances, namely against Kurdish separatism in their own countries and the

US war in Iraq. Iran’s cooperation with Syria is explained by prospect theory in a different way because the bilateral actions taken by the two countries constituted risk seeking behavior, which threatened to upend the status quo. In all three cases, national security was the driving factor behind Iran’s policies.

2005-2011: Ahmadinejad in a Domain of Gain

As Ahmadinejad came to power in Iran, his presidency faced an increasingly favorable regional environment. Shias gained influence in Iraq, Hezbollah made gains in Lebanon, and

Hamas’ prospects in its struggle against Israel looked promising as well. Moreover, the Islamic

Frazer 90

Republic began gaining traction with the Arab street; the United States’ actions in Iraq were widely condemned by Arab regimes and strained relations between the American and Muslim governments, including the Saudis and Turkey. For these reasons, the Islamic Republic was squarely in a domain of gain, and it acted as such towards Turkey, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.

Though Ahmadinejad’s style was more combative than Khatami’s, the new Iranian president nevertheless favored the status quo in many ways and prioritized cooperation where he saw fit.

Iran’s relationships with Turkey and Syria improved, and its rivalry with the Saudis did not intensify too dramatically at this time.

Ahmadinejad’s Saudi Arabia policy in this era was two-pronged: On the one hand, he spoke of developing and improving relations with the Saudi kingdom; on the other hand,

Ahmadinejad increased competition with Saudi Arabia. In his efforts to better Iran’s relations with the Saudis, Ahmadinejad set developing and strengthening ties with Arab governments as his first foreign policy priority. To this end, the Iranian leader visited the Saudi kingdom four times in two years, and in 2007, he offered to sign a security pact with the Gulf states.281 During this time, the Ahmadinejad administration sought to downplay the sectarian differences between

Iran and Saudi Arabia; instead, Iran emphasized the universal Islamic nature of the two rivals.282

These nods towards cooperation do not nullify the Islamic Republic’s continued competition with the Saudis, yet they are evidence that Iran wanted to maintain the status quo in the region since it was in a position to make gains under the current conditions. Despite his bombastic rhetoric and the West’s reaction to it, Ahmadinejad did not significantly veer from the status quo

281 Amir M. Haji-Yousefi (2010), “Iran's Foreign Policy during Ahmadinejad: From Confrontation to ​ Accommodation,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 9-10; Mehdi Khalaji (2011), “Iran's ​ ​ Policy Confusion about Bahrain.” (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy). 282 Haji-Yousefi, “Iran's Foreign Policy during Ahmadinejad: From Confrontation to Accommodation,” 10.

Frazer 91 in this period of his administration. Iran’s level of cooperation with the Saudis remained at a level where the two states could find common ground in certain issue areas.

During this period, Iran’s relations with Turkey also reflected the domain of gain in which Iran was operating. President Ahmadinejad increased trade with and investment in Turkey substantially.283 In the realm of security, Iran and Turkey agreed to collaborate on a number of shared interests, such as combating terrorism, organized crime, and the PKK, now an enemy of both Iran and Turkey’s.284 Relations improved considerably in these years, as Ahmadinejad became the first leader of the Islamic Republic to visit a NATO capital. After his trip to Turkey in 2008, the Iranian President “emphasiz[ed] friendship and cooperation between the two countries.”285 Though Iran and Turkey would not have been deemed “friends” per se by the end of this phase in their relationship, the two countries did improve relations to a meaningful extent.

Being in a domain of gain, the Islamic Republic sought to increase cooperation with its neighbor,

Turkey, and to make modest improvements to the existing regional balance of power.

Iran-Syria relations remained strong and stable during this time. Iran and Syria saw opportunities to make gains in countries with large Shia populations, namely Iraq and Lebanon.

The two allies bolstered their relations in the economic, diplomatic, and, most importantly, security arenas. Iran signed a bilateral security agreement with Syria in 2006, which called for military cooperation to combat common threats.286 In 2007, the pair signed another security

283Jules De Neve (2018), “Continuity and Fluctuation in the Turkish-Iranian Relationship 2002-2018,” 23. 284 Karacasulu, Nilüfer, and İrem Aşkar Karakir (2011). "Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement." Ege Akademik Bakış Dergisi 11, 115. 285 Nasuhi Güngör (2008), “Ahmadinejad's Visit to Turkey: Two Neighbors Oscillate Between Threat and ​ Friendship.” (Universitäts-und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt: SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research), 5. ​ 286 Nasur Nader-Ibrahim M. Bani (2014), "Syria-Iran Relations (2000-2014)." International Journal of Humanities ​ and Social Science, 82. ​

Frazer 92 agreement, which called for, among other provisions, Iran to send Syria missiles and to train

Syrian personnel.287 Ahmadinejad undoubtedly bettered Iran’s relationship with Syria, and in doing so, he signalled how important Iran viewed its alliance with the Syrian regime. Yet nothing he did was extraordinary, nor did it upset any status quo in terms of any existing relationship between Iran and another state in the region. By making somewhat significant gains while also maintaining the status quo in the region, Ahmadinejad was conducting Iran’s Syria policy in a domain of gain, and his behavior was risk-averse.

Iran’s foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria did not change too much from Khatami’s presidency to Ahmadinejad’s. Since Iran was in a domain of gain at the beginning of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, it sought to maintain the status quo broadly and to make improvements where it could in areas like Lebanon and Palestine. This behavior is consistent with prospect theory since it is evidence of Iran’s risk aversion at the time; notably, Iran’s increased support for Hezbollah and Hamas was not risky since it was a continuation of

Khatami’s policies and, therefore, did not upset the status quo of the time. While prospect theory is one explanation for Iran’s behavior at this time, however, neorealism provides another explanation. While Ahmadinejad cooperated with the Saudis and other Arab states, he ultimately focused on making relative gains to them throughout the region in places such as Iraq and

Palestine. Moreover, Ahmadinejad was less eager than Khatami was to seek cooperation with the

Saudis since he likely thought cooperation would be less beneficial to Iran, as neorealism would predict. Both theories can explain Ahmadinejad’s foreign policies in this time period.

2011-2013: Ahmadinejad in a Domain of Loss

287 Sun (2009), “Brothers Indeed: Syria-Iran Quasi-alliance Revisited,” 75.

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During this final phase of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the Islamic Republic was squarely in a domain of loss as a result of the Arab Spring and the subsequent war in Syria. Prospect theory best explains Iran’s behavior during this time, and Iran’s foreign policy in this period makes a convincing case for prospect theory as a way of understanding international relations. In its relations with Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, Iran acted exactly how prospect theory would expect. The Islamic Republic was in a domain of loss because it faced the possibility of losing its principle ally in Syria, Bashar al-Assad, who quite possibly could have been replaced by a Sunni and/or Western-backed regime. Either of these options would likely have been hostile to Shia

Iran. Essentially, the Assad regime was as friendly to the Islamic Republic as it could have hoped for, given the demographic makeup of Syria, and the civil war threatened to take Iran’s only reliable ally since 1979 away. Iran’s reference point was based on the situation before the Syrian uprising, and it only faced possible losses from there. As prospect theory would predict, Iran’s response to the Syrian conflict was risk-seeking since it sought to preserve the status quo at great costs. According to Levy:

States seem to make greater efforts to preserve the status quo against a threatened loss than to improve their position by a comparable amount. A state might be willing, for example, to fight to defend the same territory that it would not have been willing to fight to acquire, or to accept greater costs in order to maintain an international regime than to create it in the first place.288

This status quo bias in the domain of loss is epitomized by Iran’s response to the Syrian Civil

War. The actions taken by Iran, detailed below, were chosen because of Iran’s loss-frame.

While the Islamic Republic improved ties with Syria, its relationship with Saudi Arabia declined to new lows. The Iranians and Saudis intensified their proxy wars in Bahrain and

288 Jack S. Levy, “ Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems,” Political Psychology, 284. ​

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Yemen, and Syria became a new front for their competition for regional supremacy.289

Deepening its conflict with the Saudis was not strictly rational for the Islamic Republic to do, in light of Assad’s problems in Syria. Still, because Iran was in a domain of loss at the time, it was risk-seeking. The Ahmadinejad government sought to expand Iranian influence around the

Middle East, even if doing so meant antagonizing Saudi Arabia. Iran increased its efforts since it was deeply worried about the potential loss it could face in Syria.

Though Iran and Turkey had been steadily improving their bilateral relationship since the early 2000s, their relations worsened significantly in the wake of the Syrian conflict due to their very different views on the matter. Iran supported the Assad government without reservation while Turkey, in contrast, advocated for Assad to resign and backed Syrian opposition groups.

Moreover, Turkey sought to gain influence in the region in light of the conflict, meaning it increased competition with Iran.290 Indeed, some onlookers have deemed the civil war in Syria to be a proxy conflict between Iran and Turkey.291 Iran’s behavior vis-a-vis Turkey is best explained by prospect theory. For years leading up to 2011, Iran-Turkey relations had been getting better and better, but Iran disregarded all of the strides it had made to cooperate with

Turkey when losing its Syrian ally became a real possibility.

In response to the Syrian civil war, the Ahmadinejad administration increased its support significantly for Assad’s government. The Islamic Republic aided Assad by providing weapons, technical support, military training, and intelligence.292 Iran assisted Syria despite the harm this assistance did to Iran’s reputation in Arab countries and the strain it put on Iran’s relations with

289 W. Andrew Terrill (2014), "Iranian involvement in Yemen." Orbis 58, no. 3, 429; Simon Mabon (2012), "The ​ Battle for Bahrain: Iranian Saudi Rivalry." Middle East Policy 19, no. 2, 90. - ​ ​ 290 Bas, Safak. 2013. "Pragmatism and Rivalry: The Nature of Turkey-Iran Relations,” 121. 291 Ibid. 292 Bani (2014), "Syria-Iran Relations (2000-2014)," 83; Goodarzi (2010), "Iran and Syria." In The Iran Primer. ​

Frazer 95 countries like Turkey. Iran continued to support Assad through the end of Ahmadinejad's presidency, despite the Baathist leader’s grim prospects. The Islamic Republic, being the great beacon for revolution that it claimed to be, should perhaps have supported the rebels in Syria, as it had supported rebels in other countries in the Arab Spring, such as in Bahrain and Yemen. Yet

Iran backed the Syrian government because of its loss-frame and the endowment effect, which made the possibility of losing its ally in Syria more painful than an equivalent gain would have been.

Overall, Iran reacted to the uprising in Syria in a risk-seeking way, which is to say that it dramatically changed its regional policy. Iran operated in a domain of loss since its prospects could only get worse given the existential threat posed to its long-time, chief ally in Syria.

Prospect theory best explains the way Iran behaved here since it explains Iran’s swift, drastic reaction to the Syrian uprising. Neorealism and neoliberalism both would predict that Iran would seek to maintain its relationship with Turkey since Tehran had invested a great deal in that relationship and had made considerable progress towards forging an alliance with Ankara and would perhaps seek to forge new partnerships with the Syrian opposition or other international actors in Syria. If neorealism held true, Iran would have sought to forge a new relationship with the group in Syria that looked like it was going to come to power since that would be the rational thing to do and since, according to neorealism, alliances are worth having only until they no longer serve a state’s interests. Alliances are not permanent. If neoliberalism explained Iran’s behavior, Iran would have sought to cooperate with the Syrian opposition, and other outside state actors for that matter, since it would view diplomacy and cooperation as key to maintaining stability and the status quo, essentially. But Iran did neither of those things. Its decision to

Frazer 96 support Assad unflaggingly -- against all evidence that he was no longer a viable ally -- was based on its cognitive biases, as explained by prospect theory.

Conclusion

Throughout both the Khatami and Ahmadinejad presidencies, the Islamic Republic’s behavior is best explained by prospect theory. Instead of acting according to the net gains or losses Iran could achieve with any given decision, Iranian decision-makers made foreign policy decisions based on their perceptions of whether they were in a domain of loss or a domain of gain. For all of the cases where Iran is in a domain of loss prospect theory holds up as the best explanation for Iran’s foreign policy. When Iran felt it was in a domain of loss, it was more likely to be risk-seeking and to forgo international cooperation, opting instead for increased conflict with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, especially after 2011. Iran often collaborated with and relied on Syria to support and deepen its rivalry with the Saudis. In a domain of gain, Iranian foreign policy could be explained by prospect theory on the one hand and either neorealism or neoliberalism on the other. When the Islamic Republic perceived itself as in a domain of gain, it prioritized cooperation with Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Though it still valued its alliance with

Syria, it was less dependent on the alliance in these times because it perceived itself as being less under threat. Ultimately, though prospect theory is not the only explanation for Iran’s behavior in a domain of gain, it is still the best, most comprehensive explanation for Iran’s behavior since it explains Iranian policies when Iran faced the threat of significant loss.

Prospect theory contends that humans have limited cognitive abilities when it comes to decision making. Furthermore, it posits that states place greater value on something if they have the possibility to lose it than they do if they have the possibility to gain something of equal value.

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Indeed, Iran’s policies even in a domain of gain fit into an interpretation based in prospect theory. It is likely the case that how a state behaves in a domain of loss is more important, or even simply more interesting, than how it behaves in a domain of gain. Thus, even if prospect theory is not the only explanation for Iranian policy in a domain of gain, it is still significant that the theory is the best fit for Iran’s policy in a domain of loss. This finding has important implications for Iran’s foreign policy and for what other states’ policies should be towards the

Iran.

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Conclusion

As with any other state actor, a variety of factors go into the making of Iran’s foreign policy; the most essential of these is Iran’s perception of its prospects relative to other international actors and to the reference point from which it is viewing such prospects for loss or gain. The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy remained relatively consistent from the Khatami administration through Ahmadinejad’s, and when its policies towards Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or

Syria did change, the difference was typically due to external forces or was, otherwise, fairly insignificant. In all cases when it was in a domain of loss, the Islamic Republic behaved as prospect theory would expect towards its enemy, frenemy, and ally. Iran showed a willingness to cooperate with its rivals, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, when it was in a domain of gain, but when it was in a domain of loss, the Islamic Republic pursued more risky policies and was less open to possibilities for cooperation with either country to make absolute gains. Iran’s behavior when in a domain of gain could also be explained by prospect theory; however, other theories, specifically neorealism for Ahmadinejad and neoliberalism for Khatami, explain Iranian foreign policy as well. Yet, that there are other credible explanations for Iranian foreign policy when it perceives itself in a domain of gain does not nullify prospect theory as a useful lens through which to view Iranian decision making, as prospect theory still provides the best explanation for

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Iran’s behavior over the entire time period. While Iran’s foreign policy is predictable, it is not always wholly rational, as when it is in a domain of loss the Islamic Republic sometimes seeks risks that are not strategically optimal.

As the three case studies prove, the Islamic Republic, under either a reformist like

Khatami or a hardline-conservative like Ahmadinejad, is pragmatic in its foreign policy, as is evident in its attempts at cooperation. Still, its foreign policy incorporates ideology as well. For instance, Iran’s relationship with Turkey improved considerably when the Islamist AKP came to power in Turkey, and its alliance with Syria is, in part, explained by the Assad regime’s Alawite religious affiliation. Furthermore, since the dawn of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has competed with the Saudis over who is the true leader of the worldwide Muslim Ummah.

Finally, Iran’s policies towards all three states discussed in this paper need further consideration. Though a sizable amount of research has been devoted to assessing Iran’s foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia, the topic needs more attention. When the Iranian-Saudi relationship is analyzed, scholars tend to view it from Saudi Arabia’s perspective. Much like the overwhelming emphasis on Iranian-US relations, this asymmetry in research can likely be attributed to the fact that US, and presumably even European, scholars have more knowledge of

Saudi decision making due to the United States’ relationship with the Saudis. Furthermore, Iran’s foreign-policy decision-making process is not the most transparent and its intentions are not always clear. But having a better understanding of its aims and its ways of viewing regional conflicts would be helpful to policy-makers in the US, EU, and Saudi Arabia, as well as to others. Similarly, much has been written about Iran-Turkey relations, but this body of research pales in comparison to the America-centric literature on Iranian foreign policy. In terms of the

Frazer 100 literature on Iran-Syria ties, unfortunately, as Jorgen Jensehaugen succinctly put it, “few things have been as over-mentioned and under-studied as the Syrian-Iranian influence on the broader

Middle East, particularly relating to Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq.”293 Especially in comparison to the literature on US-Iran relations but even in comparison to scholarship on Iran’s ties with Saudi

Arabia and Turkey, what has been written about Iran’s relations with-Syria is sparse. This lack of focus on Iran’s regional policy towards these states, all of which play a pivotal role in the region, is a gap in the literature on Iran’s foreign policy. This gap presents a problem for policy makers or anyone trying to understand Iran. For instance, having more insight into the Iran-Syria alliance from 1997-2011 would greatly benefit analyses of why Iran responded the way it did to the civil war in Syria and what that means.

Policy Implications

Assuming Iran does indeed make and execute its foreign policy in accordance with prospect theory, there are important policy implications for engaging with the Islamic Republic.

Foreign actors should be aware of the risks of threatening Iran to the point where it is in a domain of loss and subsequently, makes riskier choices in an attempt to preserve the status quo.

Since the onset of the civil war in Syria, Ahmadinejad seemed to have reached the verdict that he could not accept anything besides Bashar al-Assad remaining in power, despite widespread international and popular domestic support for Syrian opposition groups and Iran’s own ideological commitment to revolutionary movements. Because of the threat of a strategic loss in

Syria, the Islamic Republic stepped up its military support for not only the Syrian regime but

293Jørgen Jensehaugen (2010), Journal of Peace Research, 348. ​ ​

Frazer 101 also for opposition movements throughout the Middle East, both of which set back US,

European, and Saudi interests in the region and caused further instability in places like Yemen.

These cases also show that it is possible to cooperate and negotiate with Iran. The

Khatami administration certainly expressed a willingness to ease tensions with practically all of

Iran’s adversaries but particularly the US when it feared a direct attack from the US military.

However, the Bush administration did not seize the opportunity to negotiate with Iran when it had the chance. Instead of making threats and declarations of who is in an “axis of evil,” foreign policy makers from any country should endeavor to cooperate with the Islamic Republic by emphasizing the gains it can make through cooperation and rapprochement. For instance, the

Obama administration pursued such a policy when negotiating the Iran nuclear deal. Failure to negotiate and engage with Iran in the future will result in increased Iranian military involvement in regional conflicts and support for militant groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Thus, the EU and other international actors should continue to support and uphold the nuclear deal, despite the

Trump administration’s antagonism towards Iran.

Middle East governments, such as those of the GCC, should seek to downplay sectarian divisions and lessen sectarian tensions, which make Iran feel threatened, since doing so will increase regional stability and domestic stability for any state with a sizable Shia population.

Moreover, pitting Sunnis against Shias will compel the Islamic Republic to seek to bolster its legitimacy among Sunni Arab populations, which will lead Iran to challenge the credibility of

Arab states due to their lack of adequate support for Palestinians or lack of opposition to Western involvement in the region.

Suggestions for Further Research

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Lastly, those interested in understanding Iranian foreign policy should focus less on its relations with the US, or with Israel for that matter. Countless books and journal articles have been written about Iran’s US policy and Iran’s Israel policy. What is both more interesting and more useful is a study of Iran’s policies towards other state actors. The Islamic Republic has a deep-seated interest in being at odds with the US and Israel, as its legitimacy domestically and regionally is bolstered by its claims of resistance against the imperialist Great Satan and the

Zionist Little Satan. In this sense, the Islamic Republic will always be less willing to cooperate with both countries. The ideology of Iran is grounded in Islamic fundamentalism, which means the Iranian government can tolerate other Muslim states much more so than non Muslim states.

In the foreseeable future, moreover, neither the United States nor Israel seems open to rapprochement with Iran, so further research about their antagonistic relationship becomes redundant at some point. In contrast, countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria have more opportunities to find common ground with Iran and vice versa, and Iran likely feels comparatively less threatened by any one of those states than by the US or Israel. The Islamic

Republic’s behavior towards Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria is more representative of its foreign policy as a whole and is, therefore, worth further consideration.

Having a better understanding of what influences Iran’s decision making will enable policy makers to make smarter, more informed choices in dealing with Iran. While understanding Iran’s relationships with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria during the Khatami and

Ahmadinejad presidencies provides a helpful window into the making of Iran’s foreign policy, future research of Iran’s behavior towards different countries or under different Iranian leaders would be a good contribution to the literature. For instance, Iran’s relationships with countries

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outside the Middle East, such as India, China, and Russia, or with regional powers like other

members of the GCC or Libya could provide further insight into its international behavioral.

Likewise, an in depth look at other Iranian administrations, such as Rafsanjani’s would be useful,

especially since Khatami and Ahmadinejad are both likely more extreme in their behavior than a

pragmatist like Rafsanjani. Lastly, utilizing different language sources on Iranian foreign policy

would be highly beneficial as well.

Table 1:

Domain & Applicable Theories

1997-2002 2002-2005 2005-2011 2011-2013 President: Khatami Khatami Ahmadinejad Ahmadinejad Domain: Gain Loss* Gain Loss Applicable Prospect Theory Prospect Prospect Theory Prospect Theories: or Neoliberalism Theory or Neorealism Theory * local domain of gain in relationship with Turkey

Table 2:

Iran’s Bilateral-Relationships

1997-2002 2002-2005 2005-2011 2011-2013 Saudi Arabia: Improved Worsened Remained about Worsened the same* Turkey: Improved Improved Improved Worsened Syria: Remained about Improved Remained about Improved the same* the same*

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* meaning maintained status quo

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