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Bingham Institute 2013 Global Debt Restructuring: Not What It Used To Be October 15, 2013 Timothy B. DeSieno [email protected] +1 212 705 7426 Table of Contents AGENDA ................................................................................................................................................ Tab 1 BIO: KEYNOTE SPEAKER, ROBERT KAHN ..........................................................................................Tab 2 REFERENCE MATERIALS OFFICIAL INTERVENTION ......................................................................................................... Tab 3 Necessity Trumps Law: Lessons from Emerging Markets for Stressed Developed Markets? Panel Bios: Tim DeSieno, Moderator, Bingham McCutchen Jacob Steinfeld, JP Morgan Chase Christian Halasz, Bingham McCutchen Roman Popadiuk, Bingham Consulting SPOTLIGHT: US MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY ............................................................................ Tab 4 Pension Obligations in Chapter 9 What is Next for the City of Detroit? Report on the Municipal Securities Market, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Panel Bios: Chris Cox, Moderator, Bingham Consulting Bill Lockyer, California State Treasurer Hal Horwich, Bingham McCutchen Ed Smith, Bingham McCutchen Soren Reynertson, GLC Governor Pete Wilson, Bingham Consulting CORPORATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING ...................................................................................... Tab 5 A Practical Guide to Japanese Insolvency Procedures Overview of People’s Republic of China Reorganization Proceedings European Restructurings and Insolvencies UK (England & Wales) Chapter - PLC Cross Border Restructuring and Insolvency Handbook Update on German Insolvency Law and German Bond Act Panel Bios: Mark Deveno, Moderator, Bingham McCutchen Yuki Sakai, Bingham McCutchen Naomi Moore, Bingham McCutchen James Roome, Bingham McCutchen Table of Contents (cont’d) SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING ................................................................................................... Tab 6 The Role of Markets in Sovereign Debt Crisis Detection, Prevention and Resolution When Bad Things Happen to Good Sovereign Debt Contracts: The Case of Ecuador Sovereign Debt and Debt Restructuring - Behind the 2012 Greek default and Restructuring From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s Default Panel Bios: Tim DeSieno, Moderator, Bingham McCutchen Hung Tran, Institute of International Finance Arturo Porzecanski, American University Bruce Wolfson, Bingham McCutchen BINGHAM INSTITUTE GLOBAL DEBT RESTRUCTURING: NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE October 15, 2013 AGENDA 1. Registration & Lunch (11:45 ‐ 12:45) 2. Welcome and Introduction (12:30 ‐ 12:45) Tim DeSieno, Bingham McCutchen 3. Keynote Address (12:45 ‐ 1:15) Robert Kahn, Senior Fellow for International Economics, Council on Foreign Relations 4. Official Intervention (1:15 ‐ 2:15) Moderator: Tim DeSieno, Bingham McCutchen ‐‐LatAm policy: Brazil electricity, Venezuelan nationalizations, Vitro law reform Jacob Steinfeld, JP Morgan Chase ‐‐European banking: UK, Germany, and recent history Tim DeSieno and Christian Halasz, Bingham McCutchen ‐‐Ukraine: different approach, risks/benefits for investors Roman Popadiuk, Bingham Consulting 5. Spotlight: US Municipal Bankruptcy (2:15 ‐ 3:45) Moderator: Chris Cox, Bingham Consulting ‐‐California: perspective from the Treasurer’s Office Bill Lockyer, California State Treasurer ‐‐Detroit: ongoing developments and significance for investors Hal Horwich and Ed Smith, Bingham McCutchen ‐‐Jefferson County: proceedings, settlement, implications Soren Reynertson, GLC ‐‐States’ views: objectives, tools, practicalities Gov. Pete Wilson, Bingham Consulting 6. Coffee Break (3:45 ‐ 4:00) 7. Corporate Debt Restructuring (4:00 ‐ 5:00) Moderator: Mark Deveno, Bingham McCutchen ‐‐Japan: restructuring/insolvency hot topics Yuki Sakai, Bingham McCutchen ‐‐China: RTOs and solar industry Naomi Moore, Bingham McCutchen ‐‐Europe: exit consents, consent fees, cross‐border issues James Roome, Bingham McCutchen 8. Sovereign Debt Restructuring (5:00 ‐ 6:00) Moderator: Tim DeSieno, Bingham McCutchen ‐‐IIF Principles: recent deployment and next steps Hung Tran, Institute of International Finance ‐‐Greece: “voluntary” deal and market perception Tim DeSieno, Bingham McCutchen Arturo Porzecanski, American University ‐‐Argentina: equal treatment ruling and implications Bruce Wolfson, Bingham McCutchen Arturo Porzecanski, American University 9. Concluding Remarks (6:00 ‐ 6:15) Tim DeSieno, Bingham McCutchen Jay Zimmerman, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Bingham McCutchen 10. Cocktail Reception (6:15) Keynote Speaker: Robert Kahn Council on Foreign Relations [email protected] Robert Kahn is the Steven A. Tananbaum senior fellow for international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington, D.C. Dr. Kahn has held positions in the public and private sectors, with an expertise in macroeconomic policy, finance and crisis resolution. Prior to joining CFR, Dr. Kahn was a senior strategist with Moore Capital Management, where his portfolio spanned G-7 monetary and fiscal policy, regulatory reform, debt policy and debt workouts, and the crisis in Europe. Prior to that, he was a senior adviser in the financial policy department at the World Bank, where he focused on financial sector assessments for developing economies and was the Bank’s liaison to the secretariat of the Financial Stability Forum. Dr. Kahn also held staff positions at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where he worked on public policy and the resolution of debt crises in emerging markets. He was a member of the IMF team that worked closely with Korean authorities in 1997-98 to develop a system for comprehensive monitoring and reporting of external debt and reserves, and subsequently was involved in development of the Fund’s policy for private sector involvement in crisis resolution. Dr. Kahn has held various senior-level positions at Citigroup and was the managing director and head of the sovereign advisory group. He served as the head of the Office of Industrial Nations at the U.S. Treasury from 1995 to1996. He was also a senior economist at the Council of Economic Advisers from 1990 to 1991, as well as the Federal Reserve Board from 1984 to 1990 and 1991 to1992. Dr. Kahn received his BA from the University of Chicago and his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Official Intervention Presented by: Tim DeSieno, Bingham McCutchen (Moderator) Jacob Steinfeld, JP Morgan Chase Christian Halász, Bingham McCutchen Roman Popadiuk, Bingham Consulting INSOL International Necessity Trumps Law: Lessons from Emerging Markets for Stressed Developed Markets? January 2013 Technical Series Issue No. 25 INSOL International Technical Series Issue No 25 Necessity Trumps Law: Lessons from Emerging Markets for Stressed Developed Markets? Contents i Acknowledgement ii Introduction 1 Crises in the 1990s and early 2000s: Governments’ Behavior and Global Responses 1 A. The East Asian Financial Crisis 1 B. The Argentine Case 4 C. Best Practices 5 Global Financial Crisis of 2008: Governments’ Behavior and Investor Responses 5 A. Ireland 6 B. Greece 7 C. Spain 9 D. Iceland 10 Patterns, Lessons, and Next Steps 11 Annex A 12 Annex B 20 INSOL International 6-7 Queen Street, London, EC4N 1SP Tel: +44 (0) 20 7248 3333 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7248 3384 Copyright © No part of this document may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission of INSOL International. The publishers and authors accept no responsibility for any loss occasioned to any person acting or refraining from acting as a result of any view expressed herein. i INSOL International Technical Series Issue No 25 Acknowledgement INSOL is delighted to present the 25th Technical Paper under our Technical Paper Series titled “Necessity Trumps Law: Lessons from Emerging Markets for Stressed Developed Markets? written by Tim DeSieno and Katherine Dobson of Bingham McCutchen LLP, USA. In this paper the authors examine the financial crisis experienced by the East Asian countries in the 1990s and also the sovereign debt crisis faced by Argentina in early 2000s and how the respective governments responded. On a more global scale - leading International Organisations responded to these crises by developing best practices for debt restructuring which were widely adopted by many countries and these are highlighted in this paper. Several years later the world saw another financial crisis in 2008 and the paper covers the struggles in Europe among over-leveraged sovereign debtors and the cases of Ireland, Greece, Spain and Iceland are discussed. In the concluding part, the authors look at the short and long term policy ramifications including lessons from solutions previously deployed in stressed emerging markets. INSOL would like to sincerely thank Tim DeSieno and Katherine Dobson for taking the time to write this excellent paper. January 2013 ii INSOL International Technical Series Issue No 25 Necessity Trumps Law: Lessons from Emerging Markets for Stressed Developed Markets? By Timothy B. DeSieno and Katherine Dobson* Bingham McCutchen LLP Introduction1 Since the Asian currency crisis of 1997-1998 and the Argentina crisis of 2001-2002, global institutions have been very focused on international best practices in debt restructuring exercises. For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),2 the World Bank,3 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
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