Disaster’ Research Proposals
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Project Title The 2013-2014 UK Floods: a critical appraisal of two ‘disaster’ research proposals. Written for Somerset County Council, November 2014. Author Henry Lennon (PhD researcher), Sheffield Hallam University. Outline In response to your recent inquiry, this project outlines two research proposals investigating the management and response of the recent floods that hit the UK over the 13-14 winter period, with particular focus given to their underlying ontological and epistemological origins and current uses. Although you stipulated desire for both of these proposals to favour the objectivist-(post)positivist approach, several problems have been identified. Thus, as the first proposal introduces a conventional objectivist-(post)positivist approach, its problems in relation to the second proposal, the constructionist-interpretivist (discourse-analytical) approach, will be discussed. The second approach addresses the ontological and epistemological limitations of the objectivist-(post)positivist proposal, and although there are also limitations, these are surmountable for the disaster and questions being studied. Recommendations The project advises that the objectivist-(post)positivist approach is unsuitable to study the disaster due to problems regarding: 1. Researcher neutrality and data/actor positionality; 2. Predictive and phenomenological complexity; 3. The action orientation (rather than mere referentiality) of language. These problems are underlined by reliance on discovering/asserting causal laws reflecting a world simply ‘out there’ rather than one constituted through human action. The latter approach, informed by constructionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology, is instead recommended to investigate how the disaster was situated within the conventions, structures, and practices of the key actors/institutions involved. This focus enables critical engagement with constructed versions of the disaster, thus exploring sense-making procedures of accountable bodies implicated within the event. This also justifies the rationale to consider how victims themselves constitute the disaster as a phenomenological concern in their discursive accounts. Terms ‘Ontology’ and ‘epistemology’ unavoidably shape research approaches. Broadly, ontology “...refer[s] to the study of what might exist” (Smith, 2003:155). In social/human sciences, claiming ‘what’ exists, what ‘it’ looks like, what makes ‘it’ up and/or how units interact are all controversial ontological issues (Blaikie, 2000). All theories are ontological insofar that they are “theories of reality” (Lincoln, 2005:230; cited in Lincoln & Guba, 2011) which underpin the researcher’s thoughts and practices. Epistemology involves defining the boundaries and efficacy of knowledge by asking “how do we know?” (Lincoln & Guba, 2011:86). Often ontological assumptions afford/occlude certain epistemological positions (by guiding inquiry towards ‘existing’ objects), and, conversely, epistemological positions necessitate specific ontological assumptions (knowable objects necessarily ‘exist’). Although both entail asking different questions they are both synonymous with critical intellectual movements (Parker, 1989; Marshall, 1992). The research proposals involve discussion of their underlying philosophical positions and how they conceptualise and approach the social world. Introduction: two-faces of the ‘context’ Disasters are complex phenomena. How they are understood and defined requires reflection on how philosophical assumptions position such accounts and contextualise their implications in practice. Thus, even introducing ‘the context’ involves careful philosophical thought, and accordingly I provide two accounts of what the disaster context ‘was’, with the research proposals following each in turn. Broadly they are both concerned with asking what disasters ‘are’ and how they can be studied. ‘The context’: an objectivist-(post)positivist view Disasters are low incidence, high impact events that are afforded less priority and resourcing in policy and planning, hence their effects being essentially avoidable in future (McConnell & Drennan, 2006). Lindell (2013:797), summarising Fritz (1961), discusses how disasters are often concentrated in time and space, leading to the harm, disruption, and the impairment of subdivisions of society. Floods are the most common disasters (Das & Sarker, 2014; Feng & Luo, 2009). The European Union defines floods as events where overflows of water submerge land which is usually dry (Directive 2007/60/EC). The National Audit Office (2011) estimate that floods in the United Kingdom [UK]) cost around £1.6 billion pounds in 2011. The Environment Agency (2009) add that around 5.2 million (1/6) properties are currently at risk from local water sources (rivers, sea, and surface water) with increasing exposure for lowland (e.g. reclaimed) properties/areas (such as the Somerset Levels). Flooding often leads to transport and infrastructure problems (e.g. railways/roads/runways delays/closure, energy/utility disruption) (Feng & Luo, 2009), however often they can have more protracted consequences for affected local people, ranging from physical (e.g. property damage), financial (e.g. lost earnings, insurance rises), to psychological (e.g. stress, anxiety). By January, the 2 | P a g e winter 2013-2014 flood killed seven people due to sudden unanticipated overflows (House of Commons Library, 2014). Thus, disaster studies focus upon improving future practice by minimising uncertainty (Feng & Luo, 2009) and identifying risk points, thus facilitating affirmative and preventive measures (Williams, 2008:1116; Lindell, 2013). Objectivist-(post)positivist research proposal Objectivism often begins with existence as perceptually self-evident (e.g. Ayn Rand 1905-1982) (Jonassen, 1991; Cronje, 2006). As an axiomatic claim, reality determines and structures phenomenological experience of it (Cronje, 2006:390). Thus, there is potential and indeed aspiration to explore and study reality as it is intended to convey meaning (Pegues, 2007). This view is visible in Auguste Comte’s work (1798-1857), whereby ideas of ‘positive science’ incorporating empiricist methods (scientific inquiry) to study humans and society were adopted (Bourdeau, 2014). Termed ‘positivism’, this epistemology built on the ontological tradition advocating empirical separation between ‘reality’ and the perceiver (cartesian dualism; see Potter, 1996, 2000). This 19th/early 20th century epistemology marged logical positivism and logical empiricism (Friedman, 1999:xiv). Termed ‘neopositivism’, it involved studying the ‘social’ world as other scientists did the ‘natural’ world to discover (underlying) governing laws (Benton & Craib, 2011). Importantly, this epistemology entails that valid ‘knowledge’ derived only from logical or empirical statements, which generally involved using thought experiments (using rationale) and physical experimental methods (using control, manipulation, and prediction) (Friedman, 1999). Due to its failure to establish a workable verifiable principle, neopositivism was eventually replaced by its contemporary ‘post-positivism’, a ‘milder’ version with more affinity towards different conceptual and methodological procedures than just strictly controlled experiments (Taylor & Medina, 2013). Investigation draws on Karl Popper’s (1959) falsification critique, whereby observational scepticism replaced the previous use of inductive logic (thereby only disproving theories based on deviant cases). Roy Bhaskar’s (1975) experimental reductionism critique lead to more depthful engagement with systems of variables rather than mere relationships between individual ones. The researcher also became more concerned with ‘bracketing’ subjectivities rather than denying it outright (Moustakas, 1994) to promote ‘meta-analytical’ thinking. However, conventional scientific methods, statistical analysis and qualitative research as optional ‘first stage’ exploration remain the methodological default (Bevan & Kessel, 1994; Phillips, 1997), exemplifying desire to develop scientifically legitimated knowledge using ‘neutral observation language’ (Fay, 1975:13) and ‘empirical’ ways of speaking about one’s research conduct (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). This position could consider how the floods were managed and responded to by investigating how macro factors (e.g. hazard exposure, physical and social vulnerability) mapped against specific 3 | P a g e locational/contextual characteristics, their response(s) and recovery (Lindell, 2013). Here, the objectivist-(post)positivist view of an independent ‘world’ to be defined would extract key information to ask: How were risks defined and measured (e.g. geographical area and risk level compared to actual disaster occurrence/severity); How accurately were possible victim-groups (e.g. based on socioecomomic, geographical and/or psychological measures) identified and protected (e.g. by resources allocated before/after); What mechanisms were in place (e.g. additional staffing; third-sector agreements; extra funding), how they were designed (e.g. threshold measurements [e.g. rainfall per day in millimetres] realistic compared to previous data) and implemented (e.g. location compared to predictions); Were mechanisms sufficient predictors of flood zones (by geographical area), were they deployed efficiently (uses of initiative/did they require prompting [yes/no]); What factors (e.g. response timing/resource type compared to location) exacerbated the disaster’s effects;