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Good Cop Or Bad Cop? Sanctioning Belarus by Ondrej Ditrych

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Good Cop Or Bad Cop? Sanctioning Belarus by Ondrej Ditrych 14 2013 SERGEI GRITS/AP/SIPA GRITS/AP/SIPA SERGEI Good cop or bad cop? Sanctioning Belarus by Ondrej Ditrych Sanctions (or restrictive measures) seem to have freedom of speech and assembly as well as to the become one of the EU’s weapons of choice to ef- continued consolidation of powers by Alexander fect change beyond its borders. Ranging from Lukashenka, the Union first decided to freeze the limitations on official or diplomatic contacts and ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation the withdrawal of benefits (either under existing Agreement (PCA) and then suspend the support agreements or through redirection of aid) to arms that Belarus received through the Technical embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes and restric- Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent tions targeting specific sectors and commodities, States (TACIS) programme. Travel bans were then EU sanctions are used in trade and security policy imposed in response to the regime’s effort to evict mainly to project the Union’s ‘normative power’ in the diplomats of some member states from their the areas of human rights, fundamental liberties residences in the Drazdy neighbourhood in Minsk and the rule of law. Some 31 countries, in addition in 1998. By contrast, no consensus was reached in to a number of non-state entities associated with the Council on a new travel ban list when the local terrorist activities, are now subject to the sanctions OSCE office was closed by the authorities (with its specifically adopted under the Common Foreign staff accused of violating their mandate and denied and Security Policy (CFSP) framework. new visas) in 2002, but further travel restrictions were subsequently implemented by most member In this context, the case of Belarus testifies in par- states separately. ticular to the Union’s ambition to conduct coercive diplomacy. Yet, despite the various steps taken by Little more than one year later, however, in reaction the EU (with some degree of flexibility) over the to flawed parliamentary elections, a referendum past years, little lasting success has been achieved to remove limits on the number of presidential so far in enforcing meaningful change in Europe’s terms, the repression of political protests, and the ‘last dictatorship’. continued failure of the authorities to launch an investigation into the mysterious disappearance of A troubled relationship four opposition politicians and journalists, the EU issued new travel restrictions under the CFSP to The EU has imposed, suspended, lifted and those deemed responsible. These were expanded re-imposed a variety of sanctions on the regime in in 2006 following another fraudulent presidential Belarus since 1996. Reacting to legal restrictions on election but this time around, and for the first time, European Union Institute for Security Studies March 2013 1 President Lukashenka himself was put on the EU in international relations and, notably, in its blacklist. Shortly thereafter, despite initial opposi- own neighbourhood; they signal legitimate tion from some central European member states, moral indignation, acting as an indirect means Belarus was punished economically in 2007 by of promoting norms of good governance being withdrawn from the EU’s generalised scheme worldwide; and they also ostensibly punish the of preferences (GSP) as a response to its failure to regime, perhaps preventing it from taking steps comply with International Labour Organization that it otherwise would have contemplated. (ILO) conventions. Notwithstanding the above, all evidence seems to suggest that the sanctions appear to be ineffective, However, these restrictions did not just accumulate at least in terms of achieving their primary aims: over time, as the EU political prisoners remain also proved responsive behind bars (unless they to conciliatory gestures ‘...all evidence seems to suggest bend to pressure and, like made by the regime. Andrei Sannikov, ask for Technical assistance was that the sanctions appear to be a presidential pardon), resumed when the OSCE ineffective, at least in terms of and the regime has yet to Advisory Monitoring create a more permissive Group office opened achieving their primary aims.’ political environment. in Minsk in 1999. The This impasse can to a first travel ban was lifted when an agreement large extent be explained through a complex po- was reached with the Belarusian government on litical constellation in which there are a number diplomatic residences, and the ‘national’ travel of players with different interests and conflict- bans were discontinued when the OSCE office ing strategies which possess various means to reopened in 2003. Finally, most of the subsequent pursue them. sanctions were suspended (and the possibility of lifting them altogether openly floated) in 2008 First, there is President Alexander Grygorievich when Minsk released political prisoners in the Lukashenka’s regime. It is primarily interested in context of a détente between the EU and Belarus; political survival, rhetorically coated as preserving a détente which was primarily prompted by en- the country’s independence. Lukashenka’s sur- ergy disputes with Russia and concerns about vival strategy consists of ensuring internal Moscow’s policy in its ‘near abroad’ following stability and balancing out external influences the Russia-Georgia war. This phase also saw the that threaten to unsettle the status quo. Despite EU reach out to the regime and offer positive in- his occasional erratic behaviour and mismanage- centives in the form of increased financial and ment of the country’s economy, he has proven to technical assistance and even membership of the be a fundamentally rational and pragmatic leader, Eastern Partnership (EaP). relying on Russia as a powerful backer while simultaneously resisting - not unlike colleagues Events, however, took yet another turn for the in Ukraine, Armenia or Abkhazia - attempts by worse following the violent repression of political the Kremlin to increase its influence. He also protests in the aftermath of the presidential elec- understands that, to preserve the political status tion in December 2010. In 2011-2012, travel quo, Minsk’s unreformed (post-) Soviet economy bans were imposed on 243 individuals and assets and administration need to be modernised. Re- were frozen of 32 entities associated with three cent statements in which he voiced concerns that business tycoons - Vladimir Peftiev (the first to be Belarus must reform in order to avoid the fate of targeted), Yuri Chyzh and Anatoly Ternavski. In Greece (on which reform was imposed) seem to addition, an arms embargo and a ban on the ex- reflect this reasoning. port of equipment that could be used for internal repression were initiated. The Union also promised The role the EU is assigned in this strategy to quadruple funding for civil society projects in includes counter-balancing Russia’s influence Belarus, secured the adoption of a Human Rights and providing financial and technological trans- Council resolution on the domestic situation of fers, albeit foreseen without any conditionality the country (2011), and issued a number of state- on political reform. Any attempt to get closer to ments critical of Minsk’s domestic policies. Brussels would likely be opposed by the regime’s siloviki with direct ties to Moscow. It cannot The playground be entirely ruled out that the December 2010 violent crackdown on the opposition was or- Sanctions may well have a number of positive chestrated by those elements precisely to under- side effects: they showcase the Union’s ‘actorness’ mine Lukashenka’s short-lived flirt with the EU. European Union Institute for Security Studies March 2013 2 According to the surveys conducted by the as a dependent variable of Belarus’ own ambitions Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and and concerns over Russia. Political Studies (IISEPS), based in Lithuania, a large part of Belarusian society does not see their Scrutinising sanctions country moving in the right direction and holds the government accountable for the current state Part of the explanation why EU restrictive measures of affairs. Opinion polls also suggest that criticism have not achieved their objectives vis-à-vis is increasingly focused on Lukashenka himself. Lukashenka seems to be the manner in which Paradoxically, most Belarusians continue to pin they are designed. The aims of the sanctions are their hopes of their situation improving on the rather extensive, while the ‘disutility’ they cause president. In other words, ‘public opinion’ - insofar – a variable usually defined as encompassing the as it can be identified as such - encompasses highly share of GDP loss, decline in trade or (for targeted diverse groupings unlikely to be mobilised for any sanctions) reputational and other personal costs - common political purpose. Decreasing support is rather limited. for the country’s leadership, therefore, does not necessarily translate into increased support for Their core objective, in fact, is not merely a change the opposition. There is no doubt that, in morally of policy (e.g. unconditional release of political resisting the authoritarian regime, the dissidents prisoners) but rather of politics, as reflected in the show considerable personal bravery. But the op- demands to make changes to the electoral code position is fragmented, has no experience of gov- to assure free and fair elections, and to introduce ernment, is relatively isolated and is also divided freedom of expression and assembly. True, the over EU sanctions, with some elements supporting most recent Council Conclusions (15/10/2012) more restrictive measures and others considering seem to indicate that the release and rehabilita- them somewhat counterproductive. tion of political prisoners is ‘essential’ for review- ing the sanctions, whereas other demands have As a consequence, the regime is been somewhat toned down. History neither on the brink of collapse nor shows, however, that no amount of under significant pressure to make incentives will make a regime carry concessions at a domestic level. Its out policies it deems to be poten- relative stability, however, is mainly tially damaging to its vital interests.
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