14 2013 SERGEI GRITS/AP/SIPA GRITS/AP/SIPA SERGEI Good cop or bad cop? Sanctioning by Ondrej Ditrych

Sanctions (or restrictive measures) seem to have freedom of speech and assembly as well as to the become one of the EU’s weapons of choice to ef- continued consolidation of powers by ­Alexander fect change beyond its borders. Ranging from Lukashenka, the Union first decided to freeze the limitations on official or diplomatic contacts and ratification of the Partnership and ­Cooperation the withdrawal of benefits (either under existing Agreement (PCA) and then suspend the ­support agreements or through redirection of aid) to arms that Belarus received through the Technical embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes and restric- ­Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent tions targeting specific sectors and commodities, States (TACIS) programme. Travel bans were then EU sanctions are used in trade and security policy imposed in response to the regime’s effort to evict mainly to project the Union’s ‘normative power’ in the diplomats of some member states from their the areas of human rights, fundamental liberties residences in the Drazdy neighbourhood in and the rule of law. Some 31 countries, in addition in 1998. By contrast, no consensus was reached in to a number of non-state entities associated with the Council on a new travel ban list when the local terrorist activities, are now subject to the sanctions OSCE office was closed by the authorities (with its specifically adopted under the Common Foreign staff accused of violating their mandate and denied and Security Policy (CFSP) framework. new visas) in 2002, but further travel restrictions were subsequently implemented by most member In this context, the case of Belarus testifies in par- states separately. ticular to the Union’s ambition to conduct coercive diplomacy. Yet, despite the various steps taken by Little more than one year later, however, in ­reaction the EU (with some degree of flexibility) over the to flawed parliamentary elections, a referendum past years, little lasting success has been achieved to remove limits on the number of presidential so far in enforcing meaningful change in Europe’s terms, the repression of political protests, and the ‘last dictatorship’. continued failure of the authorities to launch an ­investigation into the mysterious disappearance of A troubled relationship four opposition politicians and journalists, the EU issued new travel restrictions under the CFSP to The EU has imposed, suspended, lifted and those deemed responsible. These were expanded ­re-imposed a variety of sanctions on the regime in in 2006 following another fraudulent presidential Belarus since 1996. Reacting to legal restrictions on election but this time around, and for the first time,

European Union Institute for Security Studies March 2013 1 President Lukashenka himself was put on the EU in international relations and, notably, in its blacklist. Shortly thereafter, despite initial opposi- own neighbourhood; they signal ­legitimate tion from some central European member states, moral ­indignation, acting as an indirect means Belarus was punished economically in 2007 by of ­promoting norms of good governance ­being withdrawn from the EU’s ­generalised scheme ­worldwide; and they also ostensibly punish the of preferences (GSP) as a response to its failure to regime, perhaps preventing it from taking steps comply with International Labour ­Organization that it ­otherwise would have contemplated. (ILO) conventions. ­Notwithstanding the above, all evidence seems to suggest that the sanctions appear to be ineffective, However, these restrictions did not just ­accumulate at least in terms of achieving their primary aims: over time, as the EU political prisoners remain also proved responsive behind bars ­(unless they to ­conciliatory gestures ‘...all evidence seems to suggest bend to pressure and, like made by the regime. Andrei Sannikov, ask for Technical assistance was that the sanctions appear to be a presidential pardon), resumed when the OSCE ­ineffective, at least in terms of and the regime has yet to ­Advisory ­Monitoring ­create a more permissive Group office opened achieving their primary aims.’ political environment. in Minsk in 1999. The This ­impasse can to a first travel ban was lifted when an agreement large extent be explained through a complex po- was reached with the Belarusian ­government on litical constellation in which there are a number ­diplomatic residences, and the ‘national’ travel of players with different interests and conflict- bans were discontinued when the OSCE office ing strategies which possess various means to reopened in 2003. Finally, most of the subsequent ­pursue them. sanctions were suspended (and the ­possibility of lifting them altogether openly floated) in 2008 First, there is President Alexander ­Grygorievich when Minsk ­released political prisoners in the Lukashenka’s regime. It is primarily interested in context of a détente between the EU and ­Belarus; political survival, rhetorically ­coated as ­preserving a détente which was primarily prompted by en- the country’s independence. ­Lukashenka’s sur- ergy disputes with and concerns about vival strategy consists of ensuring internal ­Moscow’s policy in its ‘near abroad’ following ­stability and balancing out external influences the ­Russia- war. This phase also saw the that threaten to unsettle the status quo. ­Despite EU reach out to the regime and offer positive in- his occasional ­erratic behaviour and mismanage- centives in the form of increased financial and ment of the country’s economy, he has proven to ­technical assistance and even membership of the be a fundamentally ­rational and pragmatic ­leader, Eastern ­Partnership (EaP). relying on ­Russia as a powerful backer while ­simultaneously resisting - not ­unlike ­colleagues Events, however, took yet another turn for the in , ­Armenia or ­Abkhazia - ­attempts by worse following the violent repression of ­political the Kremlin to increase its influence. He also protests in the aftermath of the presidential elec- understands that, to preserve the ­political status tion in December 2010. In 2011-2012, travel quo, Minsk’s ­unreformed (post-) ­Soviet ­economy bans were imposed on 243 individuals and assets and administration need to be modernised. Re- were frozen of 32 entities associated with three cent statements in which he voiced concerns that business tycoons - Vladimir Peftiev (the first to be Belarus must reform in ­order to avoid the fate of targeted), Yuri Chyzh and Anatoly Ternavski. In Greece (on which ­reform was imposed) seem to addition, an arms embargo and a ban on the ex- reflect this reasoning. port of equipment that could be used for internal ­repression were initiated. The Union also promised The role the EU is assigned in this strategy to ­quadruple funding for civil society projects in ­includes counter-balancing Russia’s influence Belarus, secured the adoption of a Human Rights and ­providing financial and technological trans- Council resolution on the domestic situation of fers, albeit foreseen without any conditionality the country (2011), and issued a number of state- on ­political ­reform. Any attempt to get closer to ments critical of Minsk’s domestic policies. Brussels would likely be opposed by the regime’s siloviki with direct ties to Moscow. It cannot The playground be entirely ruled out that the December 2010 ­violent ­crackdown on the ­opposition was or- Sanctions may well have a number of positive chestrated by those elements precisely to under- side effects: they showcase the Union’s ­‘actorness’ mine ­Lukashenka’s short-lived flirt with the EU.

European Union Institute for Security Studies March 2013 2 According to the surveys conducted by the as a dependent variable of Belarus’ own ambitions ­Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and and concerns over Russia. ­Political Studies (IISEPS), based in Lithuania, a large part of Belarusian society does not see their Scrutinising sanctions country moving in the right direction and holds the government accountable for the current state Part of the explanation why EU restrictive ­measures of affairs. Opinion polls also suggest that criticism have not achieved their objectives vis-à-vis­ is increasingly focused on Lukashenka himself. ­Lukashenka seems to be the manner in which Paradoxically, most continue to pin they are designed. The aims of the sanctions are their hopes of their situation improving on the ­rather extensive, while the ‘disutility’ they cause ­president. In other words, ‘public opinion’ - ­insofar – a ­variable usually defined as encompassing the as it can be identified as such - encompasses­highly share of GDP loss, decline in trade or (for targeted diverse groupings unlikely to be mobilised for any sanctions) reputational and other personal costs - common political purpose. Decreasing support is rather limited. for the country’s leadership, therefore, does not necessarily translate into increased support for Their core objective, in fact, is not merely a change the ­opposition. There is no doubt that, in morally of policy (e.g. unconditional release of political resisting the authoritarian regime, the dissidents prisoners) but rather of politics, as reflected in the show considerable personal bravery. But the op- demands to make changes to the electoral code position is fragmented, has no experience of gov- to assure free and fair elections, and to introduce ernment, is relatively isolated and is also divided freedom of expression and assembly. True, the over EU sanctions, with some elements supporting most recent Council Conclusions (15/10/2012) more restrictive measures and others considering seem to indicate that the release and rehabilita- them somewhat counterproductive. tion of political prisoners is ‘essential’ for review- ing the sanctions, whereas other demands have As a consequence, the regime is been somewhat toned down. History ­neither on the brink of collapse nor shows, ­however, that no amount of under significant pressure to make incentives will make a regime carry concessions at a domestic level. Its out policies it deems to be poten- relative stability, however, is mainly tially damaging to its vital interests. due to the lifeline - in terms of special This has happened even with some energy prices, subsidies (amount- EU candidate countries in the past, ing to approx. 70% of foreign direct despite the much more attractive ­investment), privileged market access ­incentives on offer in the form of full and credit - provided or facilitated by membership. Russia. This generous support, vari- ously estimated at being 10-20% of In terms of scope, the sanctions annual GDP, comes without the sort ­employed conform to the defini- of conditionality the EU employs ov/AP/SIPA tion of ‘smart’ or targeted sanctions, toward its ENP partners - though ai P etr with no sectoral embargoes or simi- kol i it does not come without strings N lar ‘crippling’ measures ­having been ­attached either. implemented. The rationale behind

President Alexander Lukashenka traditional sanctions was to achieve Moscow is primarily interested in political gain through ­economic pain keeping Minsk within its sphere of influence. To (with an assumed positive correlation ­between ensure this whilst simultaneously pursuing its the two). Past experience, however, suggests that business interests, Russia has also penetrated the the likelihood of their success in ­authoritarian Belarusian market, purchasing key shares in the regimes where the opposition is weak and frag- banking and media sectors, and gradually gain- mented is even lower than in other cases. Some ing full control of Beltransgaz (the state gas transit research ­suggests that, in such conditions, targeted company) on behalf of . Fears concern- ­sanctions can be more effective since they limit ing Moscow’s ‘neo-imperial’ ambitions and actions rentier ­opportunities for key regime supporters deemed hostile to Minsk’s interests (including the and turn them into advocates of change in lieu of decision to build the Nordstream pipeline bypass- the (marginalised) civil society/opposition. ing Belarus in 2007) have at times led Lukashenka to take incremental steps (e.g. the release of politi- Yet this scenario has not materialised in Minsk. cal prisoners in 2008) towards improving relations There is plenty of evidence that the lives of those with EU. At best, however, such relations are seen targeted in Belarus have been made uncomfort-

European Union Institute for Security Studies March 2013 3 able because of the sanctions. But it also seems that including a recent one in the same Eastern neigh- the damage inflicted has not been heavy enough to bourhood (Transnistria). Last but not least, the turn key supporters of the regime into the agents of upcoming Lithuanian Presidency of the Council is change the EU would like to see, although restrictive likely to focus more attention on Belarus. measures have been expanded ­(overcoming initial uneasiness in the Baltic states due the ­foreseeable A ‘smart’ opening move could be to suspend decline in transit fees) both quantitatively and quali- the restrictions on Foreign Minister ­Uladzimir tatively since 2011. Makey as both a gesture of good will and a ­practical means of facilitating diplomatic dialogue. Good cop and bad cop It is crucial that any package then proposed to That EU restrictive measures do not work does not Minsk includes two items: first, clear and explicit mean that they are useless. But instead of recom- assurances that closer cooperation is conditional mending that the blacklists be expanded (e.g. to in- on positive steps by Belarus, whilst not going so clude other prominent businessmen like ­Aleksandr far as to threaten the regime. Although it cannot Moshensky or Aleksandr Shakutin), or that entire be entirely ruled out that President Lukashenka sectors be targeted (which would cause three main would remain in power even if free elections were adverse effects: increase dependence on Russia, neg- held tomorrow, the current regime will never ac- atively impact society, and lead to further economic cept sweeping changes in politics, not least because losses for EU member states), their timely suspen- such external intervention would present it as weak. sion might well be taken into consideration. Para- doxically, the best way to make sanctions effective Second, a possible package could include a clear may be to terminate them. roadmap of what would follow were Minsk to make the first step and release its political prison- This should not be an isolated step but rather the ers. ­Belarus could thus be allowed to immediately result of a bargaining process which also reviews begin to reap benefits, which would then increase the current policy of ‘critical engagement’ (with if Lukashenka proceeds with administrative and ­‘engagement’ being limited to civil society). The EU economic modernisation and allows the transfer had previously attempted to employ both carrot and of expertise – which, in turn, could strengthen the stick in 2008-2010, but the infamous ­ending of that ­regime’s independence from Moscow. détente left a sour taste and undermined faith that anything durable could be achieved. As a result, the It is important to stress that, by agreeing to such a list of targeted persons and entities grew dramati- roadmap, the EU would not betray its own princi- cally, possibly to punish the regime for ‘cheating’ the ples but merely follow the logic of relative differenti- EU. It is now time to move beyond that position and ation, of distributing benefits based on changes from adopt a more pragmatic policy. a previous state of affairs. Engagement of civil soci- ety should not be given up on, but perhaps it would Admittedly, from a geopolitical perspective, the win- complicate relations with the regime less if it were dow of opportunity that was once open is now closed. carried out by a few interested member states rather But while relations between Minsk and Moscow than by the EU as a whole. Some ­pragmatic con- have normalised, Lukashenka is wary of excessive straint in rhetorical terms - avoiding the ­impression dependence on Russia and continues to see relations that the Union is on a civilising mission in the neigh- with the EU as a constituent part of his balancing bourhood - could also be welcome. act. At the same time, there seems to be a more acute awareness that changes in governance need to be It is by no means guaranteed that Lukashenka would made to guarantee the regime’s longer-term survival, agree to the offer. And he is not ­omnipotent: ­pressure and EU assistance in this ­regard would be most wel- by spoilers, both internal and external, would also come. Lastly, the Union is ­becoming an ever more undoubtedly occur. In other words, making the important trading partner for Belarus, increasing its package acceptable is not a sufficient condition for a lead over Russia as the most important destination positive outcome; it is, however, a necessary one. It for its exports - a fact which could propel the regime is also preferable to a policy that is unlikely to yield to seek better relations. positive results in the foreseeable future. The EU – most likely driven by the Council - would be ready to suspend sanctions following Ondrej Ditrych is an Associate Fellow at the ­unconditional release of political prisoners. the EUISS, where he deals with the Eastern ­Historical precedents of this kind exist in response ­Neighbourhood, and a Research Fellow at the to limited accommodation by a target of sanctions, ­Institute of ­International Relations in Prague.

European Union Institute for Security Studies March 2013 4

QN-AK-13-014-2A-N | ISSN 2315-1110