In the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
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Case 19-01038-M Document 69 Filed in USBC ND/OK on 08/11/20 Page 1 of 20 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA IN RE: Filed/Docketed Aug 11, 2020 SHELDON E. LANDON, Case No. 19-11005-M Chapter 7 Debtor. CHRISTOPHER W. KANAGA and LARAJA & KANAGA, P.C., Plaintiffs, Adversary No. 19-01038-M v. SHELDON E. LANDON, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Before the Court is the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”),1 filed by Christopher W. Kanaga (“Kanaga” or “Mr. Kanaga”) and Laraja & Kanaga, P.C. (collectively “Plaintiffs”); a Response,2 filed by Sheldon E. Landon (“Defendant”); and a Reply,3 filed by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs hold multiple state court judgments against Defendant and filed this adversary proceeding to except two of those judgments from discharge in Defendant’s present bankruptcy 1 Docket No. 36. 2 Docket Nos. 42 and 43. Defendant’s Response is spread across two sprawling pleadings. Although Plaintiffs raised the issue that the pleadings did not conform with the Court’s local rule regarding page limitations for a response to a motion for summary judgment, they did not expressly object to the Court’s consideration of both pleadings. After review, the Court determines that it will consider the pleadings together to make up the Defendant’s Response to the Motion. 3 Docket No. 53. Case 19-01038-M Document 69 Filed in USBC ND/OK on 08/11/20 Page 2 of 20 case.4 The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are made pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056. Jurisdiction This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b),5 and venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409. Reference to the Court of this matter is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). Determination as to the dischargeability of a debt is a “core” proceeding as that term is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). Summary Judgment Standard The United States Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit has held that Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue is ‘genuine’ if there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way.” Adler v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998). “An issue of fact is ‘material’ if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim.” Id. Put differently, “[t]he question . is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). “On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (quotation omitted). The Court will apply this standard to the Motion. 4 The Court notes that Plaintiffs discuss numerous other judgments and grievances against Defendant in both the Complaint and the Motion, but concludes that they seek a finding of non- dischargeability for only the two judgments discussed herein. See Complaint, at Docket No. 1. Because the Court cannot find reason to muddy the analysis, the Court will restrict its discussion of facts and law to those judgments that Plaintiffs seek to be held excepted from discharge. 5 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to sections of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. 2 Case 19-01038-M Document 69 Filed in USBC ND/OK on 08/11/20 Page 3 of 20 Findings of Fact Kanaga is an individual who resides in Massachusetts. Laraja & Kanaga, P.C. is a Massachusetts professional corporation. Both are judgment creditors of Defendant. On May 14, 2019, Defendant filed a petition for relief under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, Case No. 19-11005-M. 1. The Defamation Judgment Long before these matters reached the present forum, Plaintiffs filed an action in Massachusetts Trial Court, Barnstable Superior Court Department (the “Massachusetts Court”), Civil Action No. 1572-00335, against Defendant for defamation (the “Defamation Action”), based on an allegedly defamatory Facebook post, among other statements. Plaintiff Kanaga was awarded a judgment after a trial on the merits before a jury (the “Defamation Judgment”).6 In the Defamation Action, with respect to Kanaga’s claim only, a Massachusetts jury found that: a. “Plaintiff Christopher Kanaga has proved by preponderance of the evidence that [Defendant] published one or more of the following statements of and concerning Mr. Kanaga and that they were false: [1] he attempted to pay off [Defendant]’s own lawyers; [2] he attempted to pay off judges; and [3] he attempted to pay off members of law enforcement, including a police officer from Cohasset.” b. “[Defendant] published the false and defamatory statement or statements either negligently, or recklessly or intentionally[.]” c. The amount of $100,000 “would fairly and reasonably compensate Mr. Kanaga for damages caused by [Defendant] in defaming him[.]”7 In addition, the jury answered the following “additional advisory factual questions for the benefit of the court”: 6 Docket No. 36-4. 7 Docket No. 36-3 at 1–2. Although Defendant denies making the defamatory statements, she does not raise a genuine dispute that Kanaga alleged that she made such statements, or that a Massachusetts jury ultimately found that she made such false statements by a preponderance of the evidence. 3 Case 19-01038-M Document 69 Filed in USBC ND/OK on 08/11/20 Page 4 of 20 Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that [Defendant] published one or more of the following statements either knowing that they were false or in reckless disregard as to whether each statement was false: [1] Mr. Kanaga attempted to pay off [Defendant]’s own lawyers; [2] Mr. Kanaga attempted to pay off judges; and [3] Mr. Kanaga attempted to pay off members of law enforcement, including a police officer from Cohasset.8 The jury answered each question in the affirmative. On February 21, 2019, the Massachusetts Court entered the Defamation Judgment based on the jury verdict in the amount of $144,064.90, which included the jury’s damages, court costs, and pre-judgment interest.9 The Defamation Judgment is currently on appeal by Defendant.10 2. The Sanctions Judgment The parties were simultaneously engaged in litigation in Oklahoma, where Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act in the District Court in and for Tulsa County, Oklahoma (the “Tulsa County Court”), Case No. CV- 2016-1634 (the “Tulsa County Action”).11 On August 1, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions against Defendant in the Tulsa County Action, which was served on Defendant the same day.12 Defendant filed a response, with permission of the Tulsa County Court.13 On August 25, 2017, Defendant was given notice of a hearing to be held on September 28, 2017, regarding the 8 Id. at 3. 9 Docket No. 36-4. 10 Docket No. 56-10, at 332. 11 At some point, this action was consolidated with Tulsa County Court Case Number CJ- 2018-3751. Reference to the “Tulsa County Action” will therefore include both cases. 12 Docket No. 54-2, at 194, 201. 13 Docket No. 54-3, at 1. 4 Case 19-01038-M Document 69 Filed in USBC ND/OK on 08/11/20 Page 5 of 20 Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions.14 On September 28, 2017, the Tulsa County Court held the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion, at which Defendant did not appear.15 On that same day, the Tulsa County Court entered a journal entry making various findings and awarding unspecified fees to Plaintiffs. On October 11, 2017, the Tulsa County Court reiterated its findings and entered a judgment for sanctions against Defendant (the “Sanctions Judgment”) in the amount of $5,591.45.16 In the Sanctions Judgment, the Tulsa County Court found: 1. The Defendant has violated OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2011(B) by filing herein the: (1) February 16, 2017 Motion to Vacate; (2) March 6, 2017 Motion to Dismiss Court Order for “Judgment Debtor” to Attend March 9-17 Hearing; (3) April 4, 2017 Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment; and (4) July 14, 2017 Motion to Vacate Bond, Order of Judgment. 2. Defendant’s pleadings were presented improperly and frivolously to harass, unnecessarily delay, and needlessly increase the cost of the litigation. 3. Defendant’s pleadings did, in fact, unnecessarily delay and needlessly increase the cost of the litigation. 4. Defendant’s pleadings contained claims, defenses, and other legal contentions that were unwarranted by existing law. 5. Defendant’s pleadings contained allegations and factual contentions that did not have evidentiary support and were not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. 6. Defendant’s pleadings contained denials of factual contentions that were not warranted on the evidence. 7. Defendant’s behavior with respect to this litigation was conducted in bad faith and was oppressive. 8. Defendant should be sanctioned therefor and Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their attorney fees and costs incurred herein.17 Section 2011(B) of title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which the Tulsa County Court found Defendant to have violated, states: 14 Docket No.