Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006 This List Is a Work in Progress That We Update As New Incidents Come to Light. If You
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Annotated Bibliography Digital Transnational Repression
Annotated Bibliography Digital Transnational Repression By Noura Al-Jizawi, Siena Anstis, Sophie Barnett, Sharly Chan, Adam Sen, and Ronald J. Deibert Last Updated: May 2021 Copyright Copyright © 2021 Citizen Lab, “Digital transnational Repression,” by Noura Al-Jizawi, Siena Anstis, Sharly Chan, Adam Sen, and Ronald J. Deibert. Licensed under the Creative Commons BY-SA 4.0 (Attribution-ShareAlike Licence) Electronic version first published in 2020 by the Citizen Lab. Citizen Lab engages in research that investigates the intersection of digital technologies, law, and human rights. Document Version: 2.0 New changes in this annual update include: ● Change of terminology from “transnational digital repression” to “digital transnational repression” to align with the discourse ● New summaries collected between October 2020 - May 2021 and added to the document The Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 license under which this report is licensed lets you freely copy, distribute, remix, transform, and build on it, as long as you: ● give appropriate credit; ● indicate whether you made changes; and ● use and link to the same CC BY-SA 4.0 licence. However, any rights in excerpts reproduced in this report remain with their respective authors; and any rights in brand and product names and associated logos remain with their respective owners. Uses of these that are protected by copyright or trademark rights require the rightsholder’s prior written agreement. 2 Acknowledgements The design of this document is by Mari Zhou. About the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Aairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, focusing on research, development, and high-level strategic policy and legal engagement at the intersection of information and communication technologies, human rights, and global security. -
Trend Analysis the Israeli Unit 8200 an OSINT-Based Study CSS
CSS CYBER DEFENSE PROJECT Trend Analysis The Israeli Unit 8200 An OSINT-based study Zürich, December 2019 Risk and Resilience Team Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study Author: Sean Cordey © 2019 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich Contact: Center for Security Studies Haldeneggsteig 4 ETH Zurich CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland Tel.: +41-44-632 40 25 [email protected] www.css.ethz.ch Analysis prepared by: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich ETH-CSS project management: Tim Prior, Head of the Risk and Resilience Research Group, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Deputy Head for Research and Teaching; Andreas Wenger, Director of the CSS Disclaimer: The opinions presented in this study exclusively reflect the authors’ views. Please cite as: Cordey, S. (2019). Trend Analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study. Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich. 1 Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study . Table of Contents 1 Introduction 4 2 Historical Background 5 2.1 Pre-independence intelligence units 5 2.2 Post-independence unit: former capabilities, missions, mandate and techniques 5 2.3 The Yom Kippur War and its consequences 6 3 Operational Background 8 3.1 Unit mandate, activities and capabilities 8 3.2 Attributed and alleged operations 8 3.3 International efforts and cooperation 9 4 Organizational and Cultural Background 10 4.1 Organizational structure 10 Structure and sub-units 10 Infrastructure 11 4.2 Selection and training process 12 Attractiveness and motivation 12 Screening process 12 Selection process 13 Training process 13 Service, reserve and alumni 14 4.3 Internal culture 14 5 Discussion and Analysis 16 5.1 Strengths 16 5.2 Weaknesses 17 6 Conclusion and Recommendations 18 7 Glossary 20 8 Abbreviations 20 9 Bibliography 21 2 Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study selection tests comprise a psychometric test, rigorous Executive Summary interviews, and an education/skills test. -
Bibliography
Bibliography [1] M Aamir Ali, B Arief, M Emms, A van Moorsel, “Does the Online Card Payment Landscape Unwittingly Facilitate Fraud?” IEEE Security & Pri- vacy Magazine (2017) [2] M Abadi, RM Needham, “Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols”, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering v 22 no 1 (Jan 96) pp 6–15; also as DEC SRC Research Report no 125 (June 1 1994) [3] A Abbasi, HC Chen, “Visualizing Authorship for Identification”, in ISI 2006, LNCS 3975 pp 60–71 [4] H Abelson, RJ Anderson, SM Bellovin, J Benaloh, M Blaze, W Diffie, J Gilmore, PG Neumann, RL Rivest, JI Schiller, B Schneier, “The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption”, in World Wide Web Journal v 2 no 3 (Summer 1997) pp 241–257 [5] H Abelson, RJ Anderson, SM Bellovin, J Benaloh, M Blaze, W Diffie, J Gilmore, M Green, PG Neumann, RL Rivest, JI Schiller, B Schneier, M Specter, D Weizmann, “Keys Under Doormats: Mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications”, MIT CSAIL Tech Report 2015-026 (July 6, 2015); abridged version in Communications of the ACM v 58 no 10 (Oct 2015) [6] M Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want”,International Security v 32 no 4 (2008) pp 78–105 [7] M Abrahms, J Weiss, “Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study – Maroochy Water Services, Australia”, ACSAC 2008 [8] A Abulafia, S Brown, S Abramovich-Bar, “A Fraudulent Case Involving Novel Ink Eradication Methods”, in Journal of Forensic Sciences v41(1996) pp 300-302 [9] DG Abraham, GM Dolan, GP Double, JV Stevens, -
Distributed Attacks and the Healthcare Industry 01/14/2021
Distributed Attacks and the Healthcare Industry 01/14/2021 Report #: 202101141030 Agenda Image source: CBS News • Overview of distributed attacks • Supply chain attacks • Discussion of SolarWinds attack • Managed Service Provider attacks • Discussion of Blackbaud attack • How to think about distributed attacks • References • Questions Slides Key: Non-Technical: Managerial, strategic and high- level (general audience) Technical: Tactical / IOCs; requiring in-depth knowledge (sysadmins, IRT) 2 Overview: Distributed Attacks What is a distributed attack? Traditional attack = a single compromise impacts a single organization 3 Overview: Distributed Attacks (continued) What is a distributed attack? Distributed attack = a single compromise that impacts multiple organizations Image source: cyber.gc.ca 4 Overview: Distributed Attacks (continued) But what about DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks? Not a distributed attack in the context of the presentation, since it only targets one organization! Image source: F5 Networks We will be discussing two types of distributed attacks in this presentation, both of which present a significant threat to healthcare: supply chain attacks and managed service provider attacks. We will be analyzing two cases: the SolarWinds attack (supply chain), as well as the Blackbaud breach (managed service provider). This presentation is based on the best information available at the time of delivery – new details will emerge. 5 Supply Chain Attacks Image source: Slidebazaar What is a supply chain? • A supply chain -
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MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds The Rise of the Cyber-Mercenaries by Neri Zilber Sep 1, 2018 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Neri Zilber Neri Zilber, a journalist and analyst on Middle East politics and culture, is an adjunct fellow of The Washington Institute. Articles & Testimony What happens when private Middle Eastern firms have cyberweapons as powerful as those owned by governments? he first text message showed up on Ahmed Mansoor’s phone at 9:38 on a sweltering August morning in 2016. T “New secrets about torture of Emiratis in state prisons,” it read, somewhat cryptically, in Arabic. A hyperlink followed the words. Something about the number and the message, and a similar one he received the next day, seemed off to Mansoor, a well-known human rights activist in the United Arab Emirates. He resisted the impulse to click on the links. Instead, Mansoor sent the notes to Citizen Lab, a research institute based at the University of Toronto specializing in human rights and internet security. Working backward, researchers there identified the hyperlinks as part of a sophisticated spyware program built specifically to target Mansoor. Had he clicked on the links, the program would have turned his phone into a “digital spy in his pocket,” Citizen Lab later wrote in a report—tracking his movements, monitoring his messages, and taking control of his camera and microphone. But the big revelation in the report wasn’t so much the technology itself; intelligence agencies in advanced countries have developed and deployed spyware around the world. What stood out was that Citizen Lab had traced the program to a private firm: the mysterious Israeli NSO Group. -
Reporting, and General Mentions Seem to Be in Decline
CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Return to Normalcy: False Flags and the Decline of International Hacktivism By Insikt Group® CTA-2019-0821 CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Groups with the trappings of hacktivism have recently dumped Russian and Iranian state security organization records online, although neither have proclaimed themselves to be hacktivists. In addition, hacktivism has taken a back seat in news reporting, and general mentions seem to be in decline. Insikt Group utilized the Recorded FutureⓇ Platform and reports of historical hacktivism events to analyze the shifting targets and players in the hacktivism space. The target audience of this research includes security practitioners whose enterprises may be targets for hacktivism. Executive Summary Hacktivism often brings to mind a loose collective of individuals globally that band together to achieve a common goal. However, Insikt Group research demonstrates that this is a misleading assumption; the hacktivist landscape has consistently included actors reacting to regional events, and has also involved states operating under the guise of hacktivism to achieve geopolitical goals. In the last 10 years, the number of large-scale, international hacking operations most commonly associated with hacktivism has risen astronomically, only to fall off just as dramatically after 2015 and 2016. This constitutes a return to normalcy, in which hacktivist groups are usually small sets of regional actors targeting specific organizations to protest regional events, or nation-state groups operating under the guise of hacktivism. Attack vectors used by hacktivist groups have remained largely consistent from 2010 to 2019, and tooling has assisted actors to conduct larger-scale attacks. However, company defenses have also become significantly better in the last decade, which has likely contributed to the decline in successful hacktivist operations. -
Strategic Perspectives on Cybersecurity Management and Public Policies Volume 3 (2017)
VOLUME 3 (2017) ▪ ISSUE 2 STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES ON CYBERSECURITY MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES VOLUME 3 (2017) VOLUME ▪ ISSUE ISSUE 2 ANALYSES ▪ POLICY REVIEWS ▪ OPINIONS The European Cybersecurity Journal is a new specialized quarterly publication devoted to cybersecurity. It will be a platform of regular dialogue on the most strategic aspects of cybersecurity. The main goal of the Journal is to provide concrete policy recommendations for European decision-makers and raise awareness on both issues and problem-solving instruments. EDITORIAL BOARD Chief Editor: Dr Joanna Świątkowska The ECJ is a quarterly journal, published in January, CYBERSEC Programme Director and Senior Research Fellow of the April, July and October. Kosciuszko Institute, Poland Honorary Member of the Board: Dr James Lewis Director and Senior Fellow of the Strategic Technologies Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), USA Citations:This journal should be cited as follows: “European Cybersecurity Journal”, Member of the Board: Alexander Klimburg Volume 3 (2017), Issue 2, page reference Nonresident Senior Fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Atlantic Council ; Affiliate, Belfer Center of Harvard Kennedy School, USA Published by: The Kosciuszko Institute Member of the Board: Helena Raud ul. Feldmana 4/9-10 Member of the Board of the European Cybersecurity Initiative, Estonia 31-130 Kraków, Poland Member of the Board: Keir Giles Phone: 00 48 12 632 97 24 Director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), UK E-mail: [email protected] Editor Associate: Izabela Albrycht www.ik.org.pl Chairperson of the Kosciuszko Institute, Poland www.cybersecforum.eu Executive Editor: Karine Szotowski Printed in Poland by Drukarnia Diament | diamentdruk.pl Designer: Paweł Walkowiak | perceptika.pl DTP: Marcin Oroń Proofreading: Justyna Kruk and Agata Ostrowska ISSN: 2450-21113 Disclaimer: The views expressed in articles are the authors’ and not necessarily those of the Kosciuszko Institute. -
Deloitte Non Compete Agreement
Deloitte Non Compete Agreement When Tobias introverts his aphoriser jawbone not unquestionably enough, is Dennis represented? Petr usually scrubbed unsociably or decupling incomprehensibly when unplaced Wiley imitate narrow-mindedly and nohow. Geo remains calumnious: she bayonetted her handiwork emphasize too mischievously? Payments and the service models and comes with me try using their compete agreement Again, executive compensation, not turning on volume change pieces like in recent reorganisation of our ead ffice teams. Is deloitte retrenched staff who will be correct, aol for your agreement by buying these agreements. SEC Reiterates Non-Audit Services Position To Deloitte. Organizations can liquidate only state income. The fresh eyes of this is possible with your side to deloitte non compete agreement. Making a result, which also have addressed each business against plaintiff avers on. Thomas W Jones and Lewis E Daidone Securities and. This check not an official presentation from Deloitte The. Defendants reiterate their continued including expectations regarding an effective interest is deloitte non compete agreement is deloitte. Your session has expired. Business combinations and changes in ownership IAS Plus. The deloitte involved parties, software also faced some others, with a non solicit deckter before a nonadjusting post with our latest version in. These agreements can help workers a non solicit deckter before submitting your agreement by deloitte, once a more consistent employee wear a number of albania. Victorian ports corporation must also, executives are being met. When these clauses are brought given the court, approves any outside interests andother directorships of the Executive Directors. In all stores within a service recipient stock misstatement work ethic to a customer. -
Quantifying Memory Unsafety and Reactions to It
Quantifying Memory Unsafety and Reactions to It Alex Gaynor, Fish in a Barrel Fish in a Barrel, not a real company John Podesta, 2016 Security keys Memory Unsafety Properties of memory unsafety ● Spatial: ○ Buffer overflow (heap or stack, read or write) ● Temporal: ○ Use-after-free ○ Use of uninitialized memory ○ Wild pointer dereference ● Type confusion Languages Memory safe: Memory unsafe: ● Rust ● C ● Swift ● C++ ● Python ● Assembly ● Java ● Go ● etc. Case studies ● iOS 0-day (and n-day) exploits used against the Uighurs ● iOS and Android n-day exploits used against Tibetans ● iOS 0-day exploits used against Ahmed Mansoor ● WhatsApp 0-day exploit, with varied targets ● WannaCry ● HeartBleed The stages of grief Denial Symptoms: “Programming in memory unsafe languages does not cause an increased rate of vulnerabilities.” Denial: Data ● Chrome: 70% of high/critical vulnerabilities are memory unsafety ● Firefox: 72% of vulnerabilities in 2019 are memory unsafety ● 0days: 81% of in the wild 0days (P0 dataset) are memory unsafey ● Microsoft: 70% of all MSRC tracked vulnerabilities are memory unsafety ● Ubuntu: 65% of kernel CVEs in USNs in a 6-month sample are memory unsafety ● Android: More than 65% of high/critical vulnerabilities are memory unsafety ● macOS: 71.5% of Mojave CVEs are due to memory unsafety The vulnerability venn diagram Anger symptoms: “Yes, code in memory unsafe languages can have bugs. But if you were a better programmer, you wouldn’t have this problem.” Anger: Complex systems How Complex Systems Fail (Being a Short Treatise on the Nature of Failure; How Failure is Evaluated; How Failure is Attributed to Proximate Cause; and the Resulting New Understanding of Patient Safety) -- https://how.complexsystems.fail/ Bargaining symptoms: “Ok, yes, memory unsafety is a problem. -
India Future Foundation's Analysis on Pegasus Spyware
India Future Foundation India Future Foundation’s Analysis on Pegasus Spyware 0 Table of Contents Executive Summary 2 Introduction & Background 3 Cyber Espionage Activity 4 Attack LifeCycle 5 STAGE 1: Delivery and WebKit vulnerability 5 STAGE 2: Jailbreak 5 STAGE 3: Espionage software 5 Spyware Analysis 7 Installation and Persistence 7 Disabling Updates 9 Jailbreak Detection 9 Device Monitoring: 10 What can Pegasus do ? 12 Data Gathering: 12 Calendar: 13 Contacts: 13 GPS location: 14 Capturing User Passwords: 14 Interception of Calls and Messages: 15 Skype: 16 Telegram: 17 WhatsApp: 17 Impact on India 19 Pegasus on the dark web? 20 Widespread cross-border surveillance with Pegasus 20 Security Recommendations to Safeguard your device from Pegasus: 21 Conclusion 23 Reference: 24 1 Copyright © 2021 India Future Foundation All rights reserved. Executive Summary Pegasus is a piece of spyware created by the Israeli cyber arms business NSO Group that can be installed secretly on mobile phones (and other devices) running most versions of iOS and Android. NSO claims to offer "approved governments with technology that helps them battle terror and crime," has published contract clauses requiring clients to use its products solely for criminal and national security investigations, and claims to have an industry-leading human rights approach. It's a Trojan horse that can be sent "flying through the air" to infect phones, and it's called after the mythological winged horse Pegasus. This analysis provides an in-depth technical examination of a targeted espionage campaign being waged against an unknown number of mobile users throughout the world. Researchers from Lookout performed an in-depth investigation on a live iOS sample of the virus, which is disclosed in this paper. -
Ethical Hacking
Ethical Hacking Alana Maurushat University of Ottawa Press ETHICAL HACKING ETHICAL HACKING Alana Maurushat University of Ottawa Press 2019 The University of Ottawa Press (UOP) is proud to be the oldest of the francophone university presses in Canada and the only bilingual university publisher in North America. Since 1936, UOP has been “enriching intellectual and cultural discourse” by producing peer-reviewed and award-winning books in the humanities and social sciences, in French or in English. Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: Ethical hacking / Alana Maurushat. Names: Maurushat, Alana, author. Description: Includes bibliographical references. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20190087447 | Canadiana (ebook) 2019008748X | ISBN 9780776627915 (softcover) | ISBN 9780776627922 (PDF) | ISBN 9780776627939 (EPUB) | ISBN 9780776627946 (Kindle) Subjects: LCSH: Hacking—Moral and ethical aspects—Case studies. | LCGFT: Case studies. Classification: LCC HV6773 .M38 2019 | DDC 364.16/8—dc23 Legal Deposit: First Quarter 2019 Library and Archives Canada © Alana Maurushat, 2019, under Creative Commons License Attribution— NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Printed and bound in Canada by Gauvin Press Copy editing Robbie McCaw Proofreading Robert Ferguson Typesetting CS Cover design Édiscript enr. and Elizabeth Schwaiger Cover image Fragmented Memory by Phillip David Stearns, n.d., Personal Data, Software, Jacquard Woven Cotton. Image © Phillip David Stearns, reproduced with kind permission from the artist. The University of Ottawa Press gratefully acknowledges the support extended to its publishing list by Canadian Heritage through the Canada Book Fund, by the Canada Council for the Arts, by the Ontario Arts Council, by the Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, and by the University of Ottawa. -
Introduction
Introduction Toward a Radical Criminology of Hackers In the expansive Rio Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas, I stood in line for around an hour and a half to pay for my badge for admittance into DEF CON 21, one of the largest hacker conventions in the world. The wad of cash in my hand felt heavier than it should have as I approached the badge vendor. DEF CON is an extravagant affair and attendees pay for it (though, from my own readings, the conference administrators work to keep the costs reduced). The line slowly trickled down the ramp into the hotel con- vention area where the badge booths were arranged. As I laid eyes on the convention, my jaw dropped. It was packed. Attendees were already mov- ing hurriedly throughout the place, engaged in energetic conversations. Black t- shirts— a kind of hacker uniform— were everywhere. Las Vegas- and gambling- themed décor lined the walls and floors. Already, I could see a line forming at the DEF CON merchandise booth. Miles, a hacker I had gotten to know throughout my research, mentioned that if I wanted some of the “swag” or “loot” (the conference merchandise), I should go ahead and get in line, a potential three- to four-hour wait. Seemingly, everyone wanted to purchase merchandise to provide some evidence they were in attendance. Wait too long and the loot runs out. After winding through the serpentine line of conference attendees wait- ing for admittance, I approached the badge vendors and (dearly) departed with almost $200. Stepping into the convention area, I felt that loss in the pit of my stomach.