Government Tort Liability for Negligence in the Health Sector: a Critique of the Canadian Jurisprudence

Government Tort Liability for Negligence in the Health Sector: A Critique of the Canadian Jurisprudence Lorian Hardcastle" For halfa century, provincialgovernments have had a near monopoly over most physician and hospital services. More recently, in response to growing concerns about cost and quality, they have begun to directly regulatehospital governance and patient care in some respects, and have made structural changes to the health system. This expanded role on the part of governments makes it more important to hold them accountablefor their decisions-a goal which in the author'sview will be furthered by a more receptivejudicial attitude to tort claims againstgovernment. Unlike lawsuits based on constitutionalor administrativelaw principles, tort claims can readily be based on shortcomings in quality of care, not just access to care. In reviewing government actions, courts have certain advantages, in terms of transparency, answerability to injured parties and remedial powers, over such bodies as commissions of inquiry, auditorsgeneral and ombudsmen. In the author'sview, a multifaceted approach that couples reliance on such bodies with a broader scope for tort claims will bring greater accountability. In health sector tort cases, however, courts have been reluctant to find that governments owe a duty of care to individual plaintiffs because of a tendency to assume that any such duty would conflict with statutory duties owed to the public as a whole. The authorfaults the courts for striking claims without due regardfor the novelty, complexity and importance of the issues involved in each claim. The test for a duty of care shouldfocus on the actual relationshipof the parties, taking into account any expectations, representations or reliance. Later stages of the negligence analysis-inparticular, whether the requiredstandard of care has been met-can be relied on to filter out claims based on pure policy decisions by government. Allowing health sector tort claims to proceed to trial,for a full assessment of whether a duty exists and whether the duty has been breached, would more effectively balance the need for governmental accountabilityagainst concerns about undue interference in governmental policy-making. Introduction I. Government's Expanded Role in the Health Sector II. Gaps in Health Sector Accountability III. Mechanisms to Improve Accountability IV. The Health Sector Tort Cases V. A Criticism of the Courts' Application of the Test for Striking Claims VI. A Criticism of the Courts' Application of the Test for Duty A. The Test for Duty B. Proximity L Hardcastle 525 (i) Established Categories of Duty (ii) Proximity Arising from the Parties' Relationship C. Policy Considerationsto Limit Duty (i) The Policy/Operational Dichotomy (ii) Other Policy Considerations Limiting Duty D. Conclusion on Duty Conclusion Introduction Historically, physicians bore sole responsibility for the quality of health care services, while hospitals merely furnished a location to practice medicine and provided nursing staff to assist. Until the middle of the twentieth century, the role of provincial governments' was restricted to providing limited funding for low-income individuals to obtain health services or insurance, and to providing specific health services (primarily public health and mental health services). Accordingly, these actors owed patients few legal obligations. Beginning with the implementation of Medicare, the government's role in the health sector underwent a dramatic expansion, motivated by escalating costs and concerns with the quality of medical services. This expanded role led to calls for accountability, as evidenced by an increasing number of legal claims against provincial ministries of health. In this paper, I explore the relationship between governmental tort liability and health sector accountability-a relationship which raises important legal, fiscal and policy issues. Yet, in contrast to other types of health sector claims, which are the subject of much commentary,2 there is a paucity of literature examining the tort cases. * SJD Candidate, University of Toronto; Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center. My sincerest thanks to Colleen Flood for her comments on an earlier version of this paper. Some of the issues canvassed in this paper were discussed more briefly in Lorian Hardcastle, "Governmental and Institutional Tort Liability for Quality of Care in Canada" (2007) 15 Health LJ 401. 1. Unless otherwise stated, I use the general term "government" to refer to Canadian provincial governments. 2. The constitutional health law cases in particular have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. For example, commentary on Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 791, occupied an entire journal issue ((2006) 44:2 Osgoode 526 (2012) 37:2 Queen's LJ In Part I, I describe the government's growing involvement in the health sector, particularly its control over other health system actors and its influence on the treatment received by patients. I turn to discuss the lack of commensurate accountability for this expanded role in Part II. In Part m, I compare tort law with other mechanisms for reviewing governmental decisions, concluding that the judiciary's reluctance to hear health sector tort claims leaves a gap in accountability. Nearly all of these claims have been struck on pre-trial applications (either motions to strike for lack of a cause of action or class certification motions). In Part IV, I briefly summarize the facts of the health sector tort claims. In Part V, I argue that courts are failing to give sufficient weight to considerations that indicate the health sector tort claims should proceed to trial, such as their complexity and the importance of the issues involved. The health sector tort claims have all been resolved on the issue of whether the government owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Courts have not considered other elements of negligence, such as breach of duty or causation. In Part VI, I discuss the Canadian test for the existence of a duty, using the health sector claims to illustrate my broader criticisms of the test. Specifically, I argue for a contextual approach that makes the parties' relationship central to the duty inquiry, and the use of judicial restraint in allowing policy considerations to negate a duty on a motion to strike. Because the judiciary's reluctance to review governmental health sector decisions seems to be largely attributable to a concern over the judicial reallocation of scarce health resources, I also address this issue. Although I do not advocate widespread governmental liability, I argue that the law could be applied in a manner that better facilitates accountability, by allowing more claims to proceed to trial and to be evaluated at the standard of care stage of the negligence inquiry, where the government would be called upon to justify its decisions. Hall L), a book (Colleen M Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds, Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005)), numerous articles and several conferences. L Hardcastle 527 I. Government's Expanded Role in the Health Sector Beginning in the late 1940s, a number of factors led Canadian provincial governments to assume the role of health system insurer: the increased efficacy of and resulting demand for medical services;3 the post-war expansion of the welfare state;4 the example of Saskatchewan, which successfully surmounted provider opposition to implement universal insurance for hospital services;' and the federal government's offer to share costs with participating provinces.6 Although provincial health insurance plans required a significant financial commitment from governments, the state initially remained a passive payer, reimbursing the cost of services organized and delivered by hospitals and physicians. The doctor-patient relationship and hospital organizational structure remained unchanged by Medicare, with provider self-regulatory bodies 3. Recognizing the importance of access to health services, several provinces already subsidized private insurance. Doctors who feared government insurance would erode their autonomy supported state-subsidized private insurance. For a discussion of the history of Medicare in Saskatchewan, see Ken MacTaggert, "The First Decade: The Story of the Birth of Canadian Medicare in Saskatchewan and its Development During the Following Ten Years" (1972) 106:11 Can Med Assoc J 1234; (1972) 107:(1-6) Can Med Assoc J 64, 159, 236, 337, 444 & 564. 4. The implementation of several other social assistance programs lent legitimacy to universal health insurance. For a general discussion of the development of the Canadian welfare state, see John Ralston Saul, A Fair Country: Telling Truths About Canada (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008). 5. Saskatchewan's premier was deeply committed to public insurance. See Walter Stewart, The Life and Political Times of Tommy Douglas (Toronto: McArthur, 2003); MacTaggert, supra note 3. 6. Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, SC 1957, c 28; Medical Care Act, SC 1966-67, c 64. These statutes were subsumed into the Canada Health Act, RSC 1985, c C- 6. 7. Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Accidental Logics: The Dynamics of Change in the Health Care Arena in the United States, Britain, and Canada (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999) [Tuohy, Accidental Logics] (referring to the relationship of accommodation between providers and governments as

Load more