The Conscious Vs. the Intentional Stance. Folk Psychology Strategies in Attributing Conscious States to Other Persons

Adam Mickiewicz University in Pozna´n Faculty of Psychology and Cognitive Science

Michał Wyrwa

The conscious vs. the intentional stance. Folk psychology strategies in attributing conscious states to other persons

Nastawienie ´swiadomo´sciowea nastawienie intencjonalne. Strategie rozpoznawania cudzych stanów ´swiadomych w psychologii potocznej

PhD thesis

Supervisor: prof. UAM dr hab. Andrzej Klawiter

Pozna´n2020

Acknowledgments

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my supervisor Professor Andrzej Klawiter for all the guidance he gave me throughout the years. With- out his wisdom, intellectual vigor, support, inquisitiveness, critical feedback, questions (that most of the time I did not even notice needed an answer), and frequent words of encouragement, I would have not ﬁnished this work. To other dramatis personae of this adventure: Mikołaj Buchwald, Szy- mon Chlebowski, Agnieszka Kubiak, Andrzej Gajda, Bartosz Michałowski, Weronika Potok, Maciej Ra´s,Dawid Ratajczyk, Piotr Styrkowiec. Had I not met you, I would be someone else, somewhere else: luckily I am not. I would also like to thank other colleagues, mentors, and coworkers at the Faculty of Psychology and Cognitive Science at AMU. Especially to all regular and irregular members of the Wednesday seminar group for creating an environment of critical and fruitful discussion, where every attendee is encouraged to speak out and to Professor Grzegorz Króliczak for giving me an opportunity to get a ﬁrst-hand experience in cognitive neuroscience. Lastly, I am grateful to my family for their unconditional support throughout these very long grad studies of mine. Thank you, Ola, Mom, and Dad.

Contents

I Summary

II Streszczenie

Introduction 1

1 Background of the studies 5 1.1 Consciousness as a research problem ...... 5 1.2 Folk psychology as a jack of all trades ...... 12 1.3 The intentional stance ...... 19 1.4 The folk view about consciousness ...... 24 1.4.1 Experimental philosophy studies ...... 25 1.4.2 Mind perception ...... 31 1.4.3 Folk view about consciousness and the moral cognition 35 1.4.4 The conscious stance ...... 38 1.5 Current project. Hypotheses ...... 59

2 Linguistic forms of attributing consciousness in everyday English: three studies 65 2.1 Consciousness-related words ...... 67 2.2 Study 1. WordNet ...... 71 2.2.1 Methods ...... 72 2.2.2 Results and discussion ...... 74 2.3 Study 2. Word embeddings ...... 81 2.3.1 Methods ...... 82 2.3.2 Results and discussion ...... 82 2.4 Study 3. Corpus ...... 86 2.4.1 Data acquisition and hypotheses ...... 86 2.4.2 Methods ...... 88 2.4.3 Results and discussion ...... 90 2.5 Summary discussion ...... 98

3 Questionnaire studies on attributions of conscious states 105 3.1 Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness ...... 106 3.1.1 Methods ...... 109 3.1.2 Results ...... 111 3.1.3 Discussion ...... 115 3.2 Study 5. Consciousness and moral concern ...... 122 3.2.1 Methods ...... 125 3.2.2 Results and discussion ...... 128 3.3 Study 6. Consciousness and moral concern ...... 130 3.3.1 Methods ...... 130 3.3.2 Results and discussion ...... 131 3.4 Summary discussion ...... 134

4 General discussion 139

Conclusions 157

A Additional data from the language studies 159

B Additional data from the questionnaire studies 161

References 171 List of Figures

2.1 Similarity matrix for the synsets of CR-words...... 77

3.1 Results from Sytsma and Machery (2010) and the two replications.107 3.2 Study 4. Responses vs neutral...... 113 3.3 Study 4. Distribution of participants’ responses in each condition.114 3.4 Results of Jack and Robbins’ (2012) study...... 124

B.1 Picture of Timmy...... 164 B.2 Picture of Jimmy...... 164 List of Tables

1.1 Summary of existing research on lay people’s intuitions on consciousness in terms of kinds of conscious states used. . . . 41

2.1 Study 1. Synsets of CR-words along with their labels, ordered by their popularity ...... 76 2.2 Study 1. Mean similarities between words based on chosen synsets...... 78 2.3 Study 1. Mean similarities between ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ and other CR-words...... 79 2.4 Study 2. Cosine similarities (cos(θ)) between CR-words and reference pairs calculated on the fastText pre-trained model of the English language...... 83 2.5 Study 2. Lists of fifteen most similar words from the pre-trained model to the CR-words...... 84 2.6 Study 3. Total and normalized frequencies of CR-words. . . . 90 2.7 Study 3. Percentage of overlap for collocation profiles of CR- words between corpora...... 91 2.8 Study 3. Percentage of overlap for collocation profiles of CR- words within corpora...... 92 2.9 Study 3. Most frequent collocates in the non-academic corpus. 94 2.10 Study 3. Differences in frequencies of collocates shared between corpora for each CR-word...... 95 2.11 Study 3. Differences in frequencies of collocates shared within corpora for selected CR-word pairs...... 96 2.12 Study 3. Overlapping collocates for selected CR-word pairs within each corpus...... 97

3.1 Study 4. Post-hoc results...... 111 3.2 Study 4. Responses vs neutral, Wilcoxon signed rank results. . 113 3.3 Study 5. Participant responses vs baseline...... 128 3.4 Study 6. Participant responses vs baseline...... 132

A.1 Study 1 additional data...... 160

Summary

In this dissertation, I try to answer whether attributing conscious mental states to others consists of attributing phenomenal states to them. For many scholars of consciousness, the basic type of consciousness is phenomenal consciousness, which is supposed to be obvious for and graspable by each person. Despite the popularity of this view, it was never subjected to an exhaustive empirical examination. Moreover, while the few studies on the subject of conscious mental state attributions did focus on phenomenal state ascriptions, they raise validity concerns. For these reasons, the main aim of my research was to test the fundamental assumptions of the phenomenal reading of consciousness: the phenomenal and the obviousness claims. To do this, I performed a series of linguistic tests on the usage of consciousness-related words and questionnaire studies on attributions of conscious mental states. The former was to determine whether lay persons use words with which experts describe phenomenal states the way experts use them. The results indicate that they do not. The outcomes of questionnaire studies, on the other hand, corroborate the validity concerns regarding earlier studies on the subject and indicate that lay persons do not view consciousness as phenomenal. What is then the folk view about consciousness? Based on the analysis of the study of folk psychology, with the emphasis put on Daniel Dennett’s idea of the intentional stance, and the empirical results, I postulate to replace the phenomenal stance, i.e., tendency to attribute phenomenal states to others, with a more broadly understood conscious stance. The dissertation contributes to the ﬁeld of cognitive sciences by providing empirical evidence for rejecting the belief that phenomenal view about consciousness is widespread and by introducing a future, positive research on the consciousness component of folk psychology.

Key words: consciousness, folk psychology, cognitive science, conscious stance, experimental philosophy

Streszczenie

Tematem niniejszej rozprawy jest próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy przypisy- wanie innym osobom ´swiadomychstanów mentalnych polega na przypisywaniu im stanów fenomenalnych. Zdaniem wielu badaczy ´swiadomo´scijej podstawow ˛aodmian ˛ajest ´swiadomo´sćfenomenalna, która ma byćoczywista i uchwytna przez ogół ludzi. Mimo popularno´scitego stanowiska nie było ono dot ˛adgruntownie przebadane. Choćw nielicznych dotychczasowych ba- daniach nad przypisywaniem innym stanów ´swiadomychrówniez˙ skupiano si˛ena atrybucji stanów fenomenalnych, to budz ˛aone w ˛atpliwo´scico do swojej trafno´sci.Z tych powodów, celem przeprowadzonych przeze mnie badań było przetestowanie podstawowych załozeńfenomenalnego˙ uj˛ecia´swiadomo´sci:tez o fenomenalno´scii o oczywisto´sci´swiadomegodo´swiadczenia. Aby tego dokonaćzaprojektowałem seri˛etestów lingwistycznych oraz badań kwestionariuszowych nad przypisywaniem ´swiadomychstanów mentalnych. Pierwsze miały ustalić,czy laicy, osoby bez eksperckiej wiedzy na temat ´swiadomo´sci,posługuj ˛asi˛ewyrazeniami˙ stosowanymi do opisu stanów fenomenalnych tak jak eksperci. Uzyskane wyniki udzielaj ˛ana to pytanie negatywnej odpowiedzi. Rezultaty badańkwestionariuszowych, natomiast, potwierdzaj ˛a w ˛atpliwo´scico do trafno´sciwcze´sniejszych badańoraz wskazuj ˛a, ze˙ laicy nie podzielaj ˛afenomenalnego uj˛ecia´swiadomo´sci z ekspertami. Jaki jest zatem potoczny obraz ´swiadomo´sci?Opieraj ˛acsi˛ena analizie sposobów badania psychologii potocznej, ze szczególnym uwzgl˛ednieniemkoncepcji nastawienia intencjonalnego Daniela Dennetta, oraz wyników eksperymentalnych, postuluj˛ezast ˛apienierozwazanego˙ w literaturze nastawienia fenomenalnego, polegaj ˛acegona przypisywaniu innym stanów fenomenalnych, rozumianym znacznie szerzej nastawieniem ´swiadomo´sciowym.Wkładem dysertacji w ob- szar badańkognitywistycznych jest zatem dostarczenie empirycznego uza- sadnienia dla odrzucenia przekonania o powszechno´scifenomenalnego uj˛ecia ´swiadomo´scioraz nakre´sleniekształtu przyszłego, pozytywnego programu badania ´swiadomo´sciowegoskładnika psychologii potocznej.

Słowa kluczowe: ´swiadomo´sć,psychologia potoczna, kognitywistyka, nastawienie ´swiadomo´sciowe,filozofia eksperymentalna

Introduction

The freshness of the autumn air, the sweetness of the tea with honey in the morning, the soothingness of a cat’s purring, the mellow mood created by late- night cityscapes, and the paradoxically reassuring thought that in the cosmic scale of things we are all equally insignificant. These are some of my most cher- ished subjective experiences. While only ostensively, giving examples such as the above is the least controversial way of describing the phenomenon of consciousness. Moving from examples to general statements, most researchers agree with a phrase: ‘consciousness is the subjective experience’1 (e.g., Block, 1995; Chalmers, 1996; Goff, 2017; Koch, 2004, 2012; Tye, 2017, although look at Dehaene, 2014 for a different view). This view implies that it suffices to have any subjective experience to be conscious. Even if such an experience is purely sensory and comes from one modality: visual, auditory, haptic, olfactory, or gustatory. Research on this topic started to speedily grow in the late twentieth century and, presently, there are numerous philosophical accounts of consciousness (Block, 1995; Carruthers, 2004; Chalmers, 1996; Michael, 2009), as well as diverse, empirically grounded scientific theories (e.g., Baars, 2002; Dehaene, 2014; Dehaene, Lau, & Kouider, 2017; Koch, 2019; Metzinger, 2004; Oizumi, Albantakis, & Tononi, 2014; Tononi & Koch, 2015; Webb & Graziano, 2015). There are even approaches dismissing consciousness (Sutherland, 1989) or postulating that it is only an illusion (Dennett, 1993, 2016; Frankish, 2016; Humphrey, 2008, 2011). As one can expect given the plethora of theories, there is little agreement concerning consciousness (Wiese, 2018). One of the few ideas that many researchers agree on is the obviousness of consciousness (e.g., Chalmers, 1995, 2018; Koch, 2004; Schwitzgebel, 2016; Stoljar, 2006). It states that everyone, an expert on the topic and a non-expert alike, has similar beliefs about what does it mean to be conscious. Such convic-

1Throughout this thesis, I reserve double quotes for direct quotations and figurative speech. Single quotes are used to refer to words and phrases as linguistic expressions. 2 tion emerges from the very act of experiencing which at the same time is the only source of its justification. It means that consciousness does not need any external justification to be acknowledged. If I have a conscious experience, its content suffices to ascertain me that I am conscious. In addition to the indisputability of experiencing, both experts and non- experts are to share a conviction that consciousness is phenomenal, experiential. To be in a phenomenal (conscious) state there needs to be something it is like to be in that state (Chalmers, 1996; Nagel, 1974). In other words, to be in a phenomenal state is to experience something that has a qualitative property. The sweetness of tea with honey is one such property, it is not a specific combination of chemical ingredients or — more generally — a physical property. The “sweetness” is the quality of our subjective experience. It is not, so to speak, out there in the world. Instead, it is a property of a mental state of experiencing tea’s flavor. The above way of understanding consciousness leads philosophers and scientists who follow them to view consciousness as obvious. The advocates of the view, which I propose to call the obviousness claim and elaborate on in the first chapter, insist that the belief about the experiential nature of consciousness is widespread among people and accepted based on their own experiences which they take as indubitable. In effect, it is the concept of consciousness that one uses by default when reading texts such as the first paragraph of this Introduction, where I listed my favorite subjective experiences. Until recently there was no research on the obviousness claim: it was simply accepted without evidence. Today, after multiple empirical investigations, there is inconclusive evidence, allowing both to support the claim (Buckwalter & Phelan, 2013; Knobe & Prinz, 2008) and to reject it (Arico, 2010; Peressini, 2014; Sytsma, 2012; Sytsma & Machery, 2010; Sytsma & Ozdemir, 2019a)2. However, there are two problems with the current body of research. First, there are methodological issues with experimental designs that were used which render conclusions which researchers drew suspicious. Second, little work (Arico, 2013; Phelan, Arico, & Nichols, 2013) was done to locate the non-expert understanding of consciousness within a domain of folk psychology. The latter, understood as beliefs that laymen have about mental life and its function (Stich, 1983), seems to be a category that should include views about consciousness. Moreover, the term ‘folk psychology’ is sometimes used

2Research up to 2014 is nicely summarized in Sytsma (2014a), reprinted in Sytsma (2016). 3 synonymously with ‘theory of mind’ or ‘intentional stance’, which in turn is defined as an ability to predict the behavior of others by attributing beliefs and desires (Dennett, 1988; Frith & Frith, 2005; Gerken, 2017; Nuti, 1999). Clar- ification of the relationship between folk psychology, theory of mind, and intuitions about conscious states is needed. Especially since evidence suggests that we distinguish a vast network of possible mental capacities when it comes to recognizing the minds of other entities (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007a; Weisman, Dweck, & Markman, 2017a). The goal of my project is to resolve both aforementioned issues from the empirical and theoretical perspectives. The empirical aim is to fill in the gaps in research on the obviousness claim by fixing issues with study designs and using new methods. From the theoretical point of view, the aim is to situate the folk view of consciousness as a legitimate area of research on folk psychology and the intentional stance3. Therefore, the dissertation contributes to the field in three ways: (1) it provides new evidence regarding the non- expert understanding of consciousness, (2) it fixes methodological issues and utilizes methods not used before, (3) it develops the conceptual understanding of folk psychology. The structure of this dissertation is as follows. The first chapter shortly introduces consciousness as a research topic and presents a review of the scientific discussions about the folk psychology, with emphasis put on one of the earliest theories, namely that of D. Dennett’s (Dennett, 1971, 1981b, 1988). A critical discussion of the existing research on the subject of non-expert intuitions about consciousness is provided. As most of the studies were performed under the label of the experimental philosophy (Knobe & Nichols, 2008), methodological standards in this field are introduced as well. As a result of the review, hypotheses and experimental plans are put forward. The second chapter describes the first set of experiments, investigating the everyday language with which non-experts use to talk about consciousness. The third chapter reports the results of the second set of experiments, which tested the obviousness claim and investigated how intuitions about consciousness function in folk psychology. While short discussions of the results are provided after each study, in the fourth chapter a general discussion of all results

3Throughout this manuscript, I will use phrases like ‘lay view’, ‘non-expert view’, ‘folk intuitions’, and ‘common-sense view’ interchangeably with the ‘folk view of consciousness’. In Section 1.2, I describe historical differences between notions related to folk psychology and add some details to the way I understand the ‘folk view’. 4 is given, linking experiments’ conclusions with the ﬁndings from the ﬁrst chapter. Final conclusions are presented after the fourth chapter. A synopsis of the thesis can be found in the Summary. Additional details on data and analyzes are located in Appendix A, for the language studies, and Appendix B for the remaining studies. Chapter 1

Background of the studies

1.1 Consciousness as a research problem

As a starting point of this review chapter, I shortly introduce different ways in which consciousness is studied. This will allow to map my and other projects dedicated to studying folk intuitions about consciousness onto a larger field of the science of consciousness. There were times when the word ‘consciousness’ was banned in the labo- ratories around the world, with famous researchers like G. Miller discouraging its usage (Dehaene, 2014, p. 15). Those days are long gone. Web of Science indexes over 50 000 journal papers alone on the topic of consciousness, with over 11 000 of those with ‘consciousness’ in the title and almost 2000 from the years 2018-2019 (Web of Science, 2020). PhilPapers indexes over 29 000 papers in the ‘philosophy of consciousness’ category (PhilPapers, 2020). As listed by A. Klawiter (2012), there are numerous handbooks and edited volumes dedicated to consciousness. Even during the last three years, the number of books by neuroscientists and philosophers on the subject exceeds what a single person can scrupulously read without missing out on the research published in journals (e.g., Faye, 2019; Gazzaniga, 2018; Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019; Glas- gow, 2018; Glattfelder, 2019; Goff, 2017; Graziano, 2019; Koch, 2019; LeDoux, 2019; Revonsuo, 2018; Shepherd, 2018; Tye, 2017). Along with the number of publications goes the funding. Providing just one example: Templeton World Charity Foundation will spend $20 million on experiments designed to 6 1.1. Consciousness as a research problem directly compare different theories of consciousness. The first pair of theories being tested, the Integrated Information Theory (Tononi, 2008) and the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (Dehaene, 2014), will cost a quarter of the budget (Reardon, 2019). While plentiful, most approaches to the study of consciousness fall into one of two categories. The starting point of the first type is consciousness as a subjective experience accessed only by its bearer, while for the second, it is consciousness that could be naturalized, and its properties are intersubjectively accessed. Focusing for a moment on the latter, an example of such property commonly associated with the consciousness is that it is a brain-generated process. Building on that, scientists try to find neural correlates of a given conscious content, e.g., of visual consciousness (Koch, 2004; recent summaries: Koch, Massimini, Boly, and Tononi, 2016; Rees, 2016). Others focus more on the level of consciousness, the differences between being conscious and unconscious, between disorders of consciousness such as coma or minimally conscious state (Boly et al., 2012; Laureys, Owen, & Schiff, 2004; Laureys & Schiff, 2012). Consciousness, listing one more approach emphasizing third- person properties, is also being compared with other cognitive functions, for example with attention (Elliott, Baird, & Giesbrecht, 2016; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007, 2012; Tsuchiya, Block, & Koch, 2012). Examples of approaches that take their starting point to be the experiential character of consciousness are philosophical accounts of the so-called phenomenal consciousness (e.g., Block, 1995; Chalmers, 1996; Nagel, 1974; Schwitzgebel, 2016; Sprigge & Montefiore, 1971). Phenomenal consciousness is, in short, the subjective experience. One has phenomenal states when there is something it is like to be in those states for him/her: each such state has a unique, qualitative character that is felt only by the experiencer. These phenomenal properties are traditionally called qualia1 (e.g., Block, 1978; Block & Fodor, 1972; Shoemaker, 1975). The idea that conscious states have content that is accessible only in the first person is not new. The classic phenomenology was a robust vision of a first-person science of consciousness (Husserl, 1982). Being a proponent of the phenomenal consciousness today, however, does not entail cultivating

1There are two historical sources often cited as the first usages of the term quale in the philosophical literature: Ch. S. Peirce lecture from 1866 (Peirce, 1982) and a book by Lewis (1929). For a more detailed historical investigation into qualia usages, see: Keeley, 2009. 1.1. Consciousness as a research problem 7 phenomenological theories and methodologies. What it does entail is the conviction that a basic task of a theory of consciousness is to explain what are these phenomenal, subjective qualities of experiences, what makes them occur, and what — if anything — is their function (Chalmers, 1995, 2003a). In the words of Noble Prize winner, Gerald M. Edelman: “a scientific analysis of consciousness must answer the question: How can the firing of neurons give rise to subjective sensations, thoughts, and emotions?” (2004, p. xiii). It should be noted here that approaches accepting the postulate of the subjectivity of consciousness can be grounded in empirical research. An example of such a theory is the Integrated Information Theory (IIT), created by G. Tononi and currently being developed with the assistance of Ch. Koch. IIT starts from analyzing the structure of experience (Koch, 2019; Tononi, 2008). Some philosophers note that the divide between the theses about the subjective nature of consciousness and explanations acceptable in natural sciences cannot be sealed (Levine, 1983). In the words of D. Chalmers, the “hard problem [of consciousness] is hard because explaining consciousness requires more than explaining objective behavioural or cognitive functions” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 7). Whether consciousness indeed is a hard problem is not universally accepted, but even researchers rejecting this formulation of the hard problem find it necessary to explain away the phenomenology of experience in their theories (e.g., Cohen & Dennett, 2011; Dennett, 1993, 2001). As M. Graziano, author of the attention schema theory of consciousness, puts it: “[his theory] explains why people might mistakenly think that there is a hard problem to begin with, why that mistaken intuition is built deep into us” (Graziano, 2019, ch. 1). Identifying consciousness with the phenomenality of experience is a default way of understanding it by some of the most influential philosophers of mind and scientists. The difficulty of imagining a person without conscious experiences, described in philosophical thought experiments as a zombie (Kirk, 1974; Kirk & Squires, 1974), is itself a “living proof of the fundamental importance of consciousness to daily life” (Koch, 2004, p. 2). After all: “How can consciousness be an illusion when I obviously have so much going on inside my head?” (Graziano, 2019, ch. 7). When trying to describe what consciousness is by providing examples of conscious states, one realizes that “phenomenal consciousness is the most folk psychologically obvious thing or feature that the positive examples possess” (Schwitzgebel, 2016, p. 230). 8 1.1. Consciousness as a research problem

Conscious experience is “phenomenologically obvious”, to use the phrase from D. Stoljar (2006, p. V), and the phenomenal consciousness itself is “evident just in having experiences like tasting a potato chip or smelling a wet dog. In effect, the claim is that phenomenal consciousness is observed in such experiences and, therefore, cannot be reasonably doubted” (Sytsma, 2009, p. 962). Finally, quoting one of the first neuroscientists of consciousness once again: “The great strength of this commonsense definition — consciousness is experience — is that it is completely obvious. What could be simpler?” (Koch, 2019, p. 3). There are more examples of researchers claiming that there is something inherently obvious about consciousness. Aforementioned Edelman wrote: “we all know what consciousness is” (2004, p. 4). Nevertheless, the difficulty in describing the subjective experience is striking: “even if we cannot say what it is, nonetheless each of us in the privacy of our own minds knows what it is” (Humphrey, 2006, p. 3). Furthermore, “while ‘phenomenal consciousness’ is a technical term, the property it refers to is part of our common-sense picture of the world. Almost everyone believes that there is something that it’s like to be a hamster, but there is nothing that it’s like to be a rock or a planet” (Goff, 2017, p. 2). Let us call the view that to be conscious is to experience and to experience is to feel or live through (Ingarden, 1921)2 qualitative properties (called qualia by philosophers) the phenomenal claim. Until recently it was a mere postulate and was not empirically tested. Being more specific: some researchers reject this claim because it does not seem intuitive to them. They argue that their intuition is closer to scientific thinking and therefore more trustworthy (e.g., Dennett, 2016, p. 2). However, both sides do not bother to confront their intuitions with those shared by lay people. Disagreement on the validity of the intuition itself is not surprising, given that the modern philosophy of consciousness is marinated in the analytic tradition. ‘Intuition’ is a buzzword in today’s metaphilosophy (Andow, 2017; Chudnoff, 2013). Philosophers discuss if methods of cases and conceptual analysis are tainted because of intuitions involved in using them (Alexander & Weinberg, 2007; Andow, 2015, 2016; Ashton & Mizrahi, 2018; Buckwalter, 2012, 2016; Machery, 2017; Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich, 2004; Suhler, 2019; Weinberg, 2007, 2016; Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001), or are the intuition

2German durchleben, Polish intuicja przezywania˙ (Ingarden, 1971). 1.1. Consciousness as a research problem 9 allegations mistaken (Cappelen, 2012; Chalmers, 2014; Deutsch, 2010, 2015; Kauppinen, 2007; Kuntz & Kuntz, 2011; Williamson, 2004, 2007, 2019). This dispute between analytically oriented philosophers is at least in part a result of the emergence of the experimental philosophy movement (Knobe, 2003; Knobe & Nichols, 2008; Nichols, 2004; Sytsma & Livengood, 2016; Weinberg et al., 2001). Loosely speaking, to do experimental philosophy is to “systematically collect and analyze empirical data in attempting to answer philosophical questions or solve philosophical problems” (Sytsma & Livengood, 2016, p. 5; see also: Ku´sand Maćkiewicz,2016 and Ziółkowski, 2015). In Introduction, I wrote about the obviousness claim. In this section, I have so far written, among other issues, about the obviousness of consciousness and the phenomenal claim. Right now I will clarify these three terms, starting with the one in the middle. The obviousness of consciousness is a recognition that being conscious is unquestionable from the perspective of the experiencer. It needs no further justification than the experience itself. In any given moment, if we are experiencing X, we are inclined to accept that we are experiencing X solely on the ground of the experience itself. Simply put, one does not have to justify being conscious any further than simply acknowledging that one has experiences. We know we experience because we experience, and since to have an experience is to be conscious, consciousness justifies itself. I call this reflexive justification of consciousness its obviousness because whenever we are conscious it is always accessible. It is ‘obvious’ as being obvious is, lexically, being “easily discovered, seen, or understood” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2019). Such obviousness is different from what some experientialists hold. They argue that having an experience justifies perceptual belief, i.e., the content of experience justifies perceptual belief (Chudnoff, 2011; Ghijsen, 2014). What I state is that experience justifies itself and, in consequence, consciousness seems obvious. It is not the contents themselves, but the way phenomenal qualities of mental states are given to the experiencer that makes experiencing them seem beyond doubt. 10 1.1. Consciousness as a research problem

To be a proponent of the obviousness claim one needs to acknowledge the aforementioned obviousness of consciousness and one additional premise: that everybody has experiences. From this uncontroversial assumption, if one puts zombie-worlds and solipsistic views aside, the obviousness claim emerges: consciousness is obvious to everybody or at least to those that have a cognitive system similar to that of a healthy human. While the obviousness claim refers to the external property of experience, i.e., that it is justifying itself, the phenomenal claim refers to internal or phenomenal properties, to qualia, contents of experience (Chalmers, 2003b, 2004). It happens so because being a proponent of the phenomenal claim is being a proponent of the concept of phenomenal consciousness. According to the latter, qualia are properties of experiences and not of physical objects (Chalmers, 2003a, p. 135). To be conscious, then, means to be able to grasp the qualities of one’s own experiences. The two claims can be, thus, formulated as follows:

OC Every human being able to experience considers contents of his/her experience unquestionable and having experiences as a sufﬁcient justiﬁ- cation that he/she is conscious

PC Every human being able to experience is able to grasp properties of their mental states (qualia).

It is in the ﬁeld of experimental philosophy that the question about the empirical evidence for the obviousness claim has been pursued the ﬁrst time (Knobe & Prinz, 2008). It quickly became a question about the folk view about consciousness, as Sytsma and Machery (2010) results indicated that philosophers have different intuitions than non-experts. Regardless of the outcomes, to which I return in later sections, the search for empirical evidence caused a third claim to surface. To test how widespread are OC and PC among non-experts, researchers investigate how lay people attribute conscious mental states. Thus, they assume the following consciousness attribution claim:

CAC Every conscious human being is able to recognize the conscious states of others. 1.1. Consciousness as a research problem 11

What CAC enables is the testing for differences and similarities between the expert — the one accepting OC and PC — and the non-expert views. Ac- cepting CAC does not entail the belief about the infallibility of the conscious states’ attributions. It simply states that we, conscious beings, tend to view others as bearers of conscious states. What follows is that such attributed conscious states do not need to be obvious for the one that is attributing them. At ﬁrst contact, CAC might seem unfounded, as there is little philosophical tradition to the exploration of conscious states’ attributions. Nevertheless, the reasons for accepting it are easy enough to ﬁnd. In fact, much of Section 1.4 is devoted to presenting results corroborating the fact that we, conscious beings, tend to treat some agents as having mental states, including conscious mental states. As we will see in further sections, most research about the folk view about consciousness can be labeled as research on the phenomenal claim and its interpretation. However, the obviousness claim seems to be accepted (most often tacitly) by the majority of scholars who study consciousness. Moreover, while the phenomenal claim provokes hot disputes, the obviousness claim is considered uncontroversial and does not attract researchers’ attention3. Even though the issue of the folk view of consciousness might seem to be a “what the people think” problem, an inconsequential issue, it is more than that. The obviousness claim, as I tried to show above, is a vital element in justifying why studying consciousness should not ignore the experienced aspect of consciousness. It should be regarded as such an element by philosophers and scientists alike. Today we have signs that this is happening. A relatively recent volume of the Journal of Consciousness Studies (26, nr 9-10, 2019) was dedicated to discussions on the subject of the so-called meta-problem of consciousness. The latter is a twist on the issue of the obviousness claim, it is “the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of [phenomenal] consciousness” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). To think that there is a meta-problem, in short, is to acknowledge that the phenomenal claim is true.

3Because the expert view accepts both OC and PC, as a shorthand throughout the dissertation I use the phrase ‘obviousness claim’ to refer to the conjunction of both claims. Whenever I refer to the obviousness claim separately, without the accompaniment of the phenomenal claim, I make it clear in the text. 12 1.2. Folk psychology as a jack of all trades

The obviousness claim, however, cannot be studied in a void. In whatever way the non-experts refer to consciousness — if they have any clear understanding of it at all — is a part of the folk psychology, the naive understanding of the mentality. In the next section, I distinguish between different meanings of folk psychology and reconstruct how the lay view of consciousness ﬁts among them.

1.2 Folk psychology as a jack of all trades

Folk psychology and consciousness, as objects of scientific inquiries, share at least one trait. In both cases, there is a fierce discussion in academia on how the mental objects in question should be understood. The history of how the scientific community started and studies both phenomena to this day is, however, strikingly different. In the case of the consciousness research, after a rather long period of ignoring the subject, the number of experiments and theories skyrocketed. The history of the scientific study of folk psychology was more steady. Still, given the sheer number of theories and related notions, it would be a hasty mistake to just accept one of the accounts straight away. Interpretations of folk psychology come in all shapes and sizes. In this section, I describe the dense, historical, landscape of folk psychology and akin ideas. By doing this, I show that there is widespread evidence that people do possess a non-expert view on mentality which they utilize to predict the behavior of others. At the end of this section, I argue that given the goals of my project, having a detailed theory of folk psychology is inconsequential. Finally, I settle on an account that is general enough to encompass the lion’s share of the current research on the topic of the folk view of consciousness. Being overly detail-oriented for a while, the term ‘folk psychology’ was used by psychologists since its early days as an experimental field. W. Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie (1900; 1912) was translated to English as Folk-psychology (1916). Nevertheless, the research program outlined by Wundt bears little resemblance to folk psychology as it is understood today. The contemporary view has two different pillars: philosophical (Stich & Ravenscroft, 1994) and psychological (Grzegorek, 2011). The former is a legacy of W. Sellars’ strike on the myth of the given, an argument showcasing that we cannot be certain that 1.2. Folk psychology as a jack of all trades 13 our mental vocabulary and knowledge is directly linked to the experience. It may be, the argument goes, that concepts in which we think about our mentality are modeled on other concepts, concepts of overt linguistic activities (Sellars, 1956). Sellars’ idea was not only an aftermath of the next wave of analytical philosophers’ settling scores with logical positivism ideas about sense data and protocol sentences (Ayer, 1945; Carnap, 1928). More and more philosophers noticed the ambiguous nature of mental vocabulary and postulated that it is deflationary (Feyerabend, 1963). In the late 60s of the 20th century, re-labeled materialism got popular among philosophers: the eliminative materialism (e.g., Cornman, 1968; Lewis, 1970, 1972, 1974; Lycan & Pappas, 1972; Rorty, 1965). The eradication that the eliminative materialism was all about was the elimination of the common-sense understanding of mind. For an eliminative materialist, there are only brain states, not mental states. With time, the term ‘common-sense psychology’ was replaced by ‘folk psychology’, as is already visible in work by P. M. Churchland (1988; 1981), S. Stich (1983), and in edited collections such as Greenwood (1991). It is also the time when philosophical accounts of folk psychology got more elaborate and started to intertwine more with cognitive sciences. An example of the latter, to which I return later, is the intentional systems theory by D. Dennett in the early 70s (Dennett, 1971). The psychological roots of the scientific study of folk psychology lie on a similar point in time, with work by researchers like F. Heider who, studying social relationships between people, coined the ‘common-sense’ or ‘naive psychology’ as “the unformulated or half-formulated knowledge of interpersonal relations as it is expressed in our everyday language and experience” (Heider, 1958, p. 4). Yet another example is the man-the-scientist figure in G. Kelley’s personal construct theory (1955; 1971), whose modi of living is to make predictions about the world and tests them. The man-the-scientist covers a wider range of domains in which non-experts behave, function, and have predictions about. Sets of beliefs about these different domains, including those about mentality, are sometimes studied as ‘implicit theories’, where implicitness is understood either as being unconscious but capable of reasoning or as the ability to follow certain beliefs regardless of whether their implicit or explicit acceptance (Bruner & Taguiri, 1954; Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2012; Sternberg, 1985). 14 1.2. Folk psychology as a jack of all trades

Relative late to the scene was yet another term often associated with folk psychology, the ‘theory of mind’. It was ﬁrst used by D. Premack and G. Woodruff (1978) to describe chimps’ capacity to attribute mental states to themselves and other chimps. Their research sparked interest since the very beginning, as it was published with already numerous commentaries from psychologists, philosophers, and biologists alike (e.g., Churchland & Churchland, 1978; Dawkins, 1978; Dennett, 1978; Gould, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1978). Theory of mind quickly became an important topic of research in the developmental psychology (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Wellman, 1990; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), and is intensively studied to this day (reviews and meta-analyzes: Henry, Slaughter, Selcuk, & Ruffman, 2016; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). It is in the context of the theory of mind research that terms like ‘mindreading’ and ‘mentalizing’ started to be used more and more frequently. Reportedly (Bateman & Fonagy, 2010), the latter was ﬁrst used by P. Fonagy in 1989. Both terms started to be commonly used in the last decade of the 20th century. They are present, for example, in highly cited work of U. Frith, J. Morton, and A. Leslie (1991), of F. Happe and Frith (1995), S. Nichols and Stich (2003), or in volumes edited by P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith (1996) as well as in the title of the volume edited by A. Whiten (1991). On the other hand, they are not present in earlier research (e.g., Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Baron- Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie, 1987; Wellman, 1990). Recently, approaches that associate interoceptive and emotional processing are starting to be popular (e.g., Ondobaka, Kilner, & Friston, 2017; Shah, Catmur, & Bird, 2017). Lastly, there is the investigation into the folk epistemology: “tacit principles and presuppositions that underlie and guide our everyday cognitive and linguistic epistemic practices [. . .] my central claim is that the word ’knowledge’ and concept _knowledge are central to those everyday practices” (Gerken, 2017, p. 16). Relation of this branch of folk philosophy to folk psychology is interestingly reviewed in 2019 paper by Kitchener, who points to two senses of folk epistemology, the broader, “average folk’s account of the possibility, nature and extent of knowledge”, and the more narrow one, “concerned with the question of how individuals ascribe knowledge to others and to him/herself” 1.2. Folk psychology as a jack of all trades 15

(Kitchener, 2019, p. 524, in both cases). As this concept is relatively new and seems to be specifically concerned with the folk understanding of epistemic concepts, a topic outside of this project’s scope, I limit myself to only high- lighting its existence. Given the plethora of different approaches of scholars coming from various traditions, it is not surprising that there are many senses of what ‘folk psychology’, ‘theory of mind’, ‘mentalizing’, ‘mindreading’, ‘common-sense psychology’, and related terms precisely refer to (Goldman, 2012). The specific differences between authors come from how they perceive the nature of said phenomenon or phenomena. First, folk psychology can be treated as a theory or theory-like construct. It is a set of generalizations about mentality and human behavior, as well as rules governing them, shared by everyone. Approaches in this vicinity are referred to as ‘theory-theory’ explanations of folk psychology (Ravenscroft, 2019), the ‘theoretical view’ (Churchland & Haldane, 1988), and an ‘external’ (Stich & Ravenscroft, 1994) or ‘platitude’ (Stich & Nichols, 2003) accounts. Perhaps given the ‘theory’ in ‘theory of mind’ it is also the understanding sometimes associated with the theory of mind (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). Second, folk psychology can be read as a capacity we have to explain and predict the behavior of other people, i.e., more of a skill than a theory. Such understanding is called ‘mindreading account’ by Stich and Nichols (2003), ‘internal account’ by Stich and Ravenscroft (1994), and — in a more particular sense of recreating states of others by reference to own mental states with help of imagination, perspective-taking, or empathy — a ‘simulation theory’ (Barlassina & Gordon, 2017; Gordon, 1986; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). It is also used by psychologists and neuroscientists as referring to the mentalizing and theory of mind (Frith et al., 1991; Mizuguchi, Nakata, & Kanosue, 2016; Schurz et al., 2014) as well as to the mindreading (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). While robust, the above distinction does not cover all fronts and is not without ambiguities. First, there is the hybrid approach of Stich and Nichols (2003) and the narrative account of Hutto (2009). Second, the status of Den- nett’s theory is unclear. Shanton and Goldman (2010) distinguish rational accounts that treat folk psychology as attributions of rational beliefs and other related mental states. Theory of the intentional stance (Dennett, 1971, 1983b, 1985, 1988) and related proposals (e.g., Gergely & Csibra, 2003) are included in this category. Other authors recognize that though Dennett’s approach 16 1.2. Folk psychology as a jack of all trades is not identified as a full theory-theory account (Barlassina & Gordon, 2017; Ravenscroft, 2019; Shanton & Goldman, 2010), he may have influenced it (Gut, 2016, p. 720). It is easier to put the focus on the ‘theory’ in the ‘theory of mind’ when we already treat theory of mind as having to do with propositional contents and rules necessary for it to take place (Dennett, 1978). However, regardless of the influence and taxonomies described beforehand, Dennett himself denies treating folk psychology in a theory-like way (Jahme, 2013), stating something more akin to the internal accounts distinguished by Stich: “we might better call it a folk craft rather than a folk theory. The theory of folk psychology is the ideology about the craft, and there is lots of rooms, as anthropologists will remind us, for false ideology” (1991b, p. 135). Despite this skill-oriented attitude, Stich included Dennett’s theory in neither his 1994 nor 2003 paper on classifications of approaches to folk psychology. Nevertheless, in their book, Nichols and Stich (2003) include Dennett’s account in the same place as Shanton does, as a kind of rational theory. The variety of ways in which terms related to folk psychology are understood and a variety of potential explanations for its mechanism contribute to little terminological orderliness within the academic community regarding the subject. However, there is little — if any — controversy in a general statement like: people view other agents as having mental states and utilize that view to predicting behaviors of these agents. The term ‘agent’ is used not by coincidence, studies repeatedly show that people tend to attribute mental fac- ulties to all sorts of beings: other humans, animals, mythological and religious figures, robots, and so on (Gray et al., 2007a; Nummenmaa, Hari, Hietanen, & Glerean, 2018a; Weisman et al., 2017a). Decades of studying folk psychology, as visible in previous paragraphs did not contribute to the rejection of the idea that we tend to attribute mental states to other agents. Quite the opposite, they provide strong evidence in favor of the existence of the said phenomenon. It may be argued then that folk psychology is at least a skill. After all, from a skillfully performed activity by an agent, we expect it to be highly replicable and effective. That is, we expect that if put in a similar situation, the agent would be able to perform the same activity with similar success as the first time. If by the skill we mean something like that, then the folk psychology, considering the extensive empirical evidence, is a skill. 1.2. Folk psychology as a jack of all trades 17

Regarding the above, I want to stress that the real nature of folk psychology is inconsequential to the obviousness claim. Folk psychology may be implicit or explicit, i.e., accessible to conscious thought4. It may be a theory that we develop in childhood or it may be just a skill that we learn, a craft. The obviousness claim can be true or false regardless of what mechanism is behind our tendency to view the behavior of other agents in terms of their mental capacities. The non-expert intuitions about consciousness, after all, can stem out of a theory-like cognitive structure as well as out of a more pragmatically understood capacity. Putting it in different words: it is not the structure of the mental mechanism that matters, it is its function that is responsible for making mental actions conscious. This function operates on various forms of mental life: on purely mental activities, such as thoughts about abstract objects, free imagination, reflection, etc.; on perceptions which are anchored to the external world by sensory systems, and on mental components of intentional systems that produce physical actions identifies as intelligent. The conscious agent does not need to realize that their own conscious experiences are products of such a function. They occur to her as flowing spontaneously without the mediation of any bodily expressions. However, the situation changes dramatically, when someone is confronted with the actions of other people. What he/she can directly perceive is a living body and multiple forms of its movement. The studies on mentalization provide evidence that specific complex movements, especially sequences preserving definite patterns, are recognized as being causal effects of mental actions. What still needs explanation is why are these mentally caused actions recognized not only as intelligent but also as consciously performed? Is there something about someone else’s behavior that is unconsciously noticed by an observer and used by her to assess this behavior as conscious? No doubt that such attributions are common, but what is the use of this practice? We attribute beliefs, desires, and cognitive processes to other persons because it allows us to explain or predict their actions. What is the benefit of adding consciousness to these mental activities? The above remarks show that there are at least three problems related to the consciousness of

4The explicit theory of mind, one that can be verbalized in language, is sometimes distinguished from the implicit theory of mind. The latter is fast, unconscious, and develops quicker than the former (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). Evidence indicates that both forms are disturbed differently in the autism spectrum disorders (Schuwerk, Vuori, & Sodian, 2015; Senju et al., 2010; Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). 18 1.2. Folk psychology as a jack of all trades foreign agents. First, what is the mechanism of attributing consciousness to others? Second, how this mechanism works, i.e., what is its function? Third, what is the benefit of perceiving someone else’s action as conscious? These problems are not mainstream in the present consciousness studies, which focus on first-person aspects of experiences. There is no doubt that besides private access to our own conscious experiences we attribute such states to others and even share with them conscious observations or conscious views on politics, moral or aesthetical values, etc. This field of intersubjective research on consciousness is rarely cultivated. My work contributes to the task of studying consciousness attribution. To be more specific, if we assume CAC (consciousness attribution claim) and design experiments in which the function of attributing consciousness is empirically measurable, the obviousness claim can be tested. Thus, the main task of folk psychology in its standard formulation is to find out what components of their mental life the non-experts utilize when they face the behavior of others that needs to be explained or predicted5. I will call this formulation a standard view of folk psychology. This view developed into many varieties. In one of them, the dominant role of beliefs and desires is emphasized (the rational approach to folk psychology), in the other the ability to foresee the behavior of something or someone else is considered as decisive (the predictive approach). In still another, the interference of emotions into cognitive processes is extensively studied (the affective approach). However, virtually in all these approaches, one component is missing: attribution of consciousness and an account for its function in everyday mental life. The new extension of the standard view of folk psychology I want to propose would deal with the role of intuition in attributing mental states. As mentioned in Section 1.1, the usage and the meaning of ‘intuition’ is a hot topic in philosophy today. I refrain from providing a more nuanced account of what intuition is because for the empirical part of my work it suffices to assume that the function that intuitions perform is measurable. Given the dominant role of the experimental philosophy in the research on the folk view of consciousness, such operative understanding of intuitions can be

5Experts can exercise folk psychology as well, but they need to bracket their scientiﬁc knowledge about cognition, i.e., to think about mentality modulo their expert knowledge. 1.3. The intentional stance 19 paraphrased with words of Goldman (2007): [. . .] “philosophers routinely consider actual and hypothetical examples and ask whether these examples provide instances of the target category or concept. People’s mental responses to these examples are often called ‘intuitions”’ (p. 1). Such an account of folk psychology and the role intuition plays in attributing conscious mental states is both operational and functional. The former means that folk psychology extended with conscious states can be studied with methods of measurement, involving usage of mental vocabulary. This account is also functional as it does not go into detail about the nature of intuition but appeals to its use in attributing conscious mental states. The overall scope of both folk psychology and intuitions is determined by the differences in the usage of mental vocabulary. The folk view, then, is a sum of lay people’s intuitions, measured by their responses to a hypothetical scenario. Most often the methodological setup involves asking participants to decide if they would attribute a certain mental state to a given entity in a particular situation (Sytsma, 2014a). The fact that this is indeed a setup used most will often become more evident after the review of the existing research in Section 1.4. I tried to untie a little the terminological knot that restrains the academic discussions surrounding folk psychology, and argued in favor of an operative understanding of basic notions of my project, i.e., the folk psychology-related terms. Before moving to research review, in the next section I elaborate on the intentional stance account. Besides being consistent with the operative interpretation, it was also used by some researchers in their studies on the folk view of consciousness. Reconstructing Dennett’s view, then, is an important step in being able to interpret results obtained by those researchers.

1.3 The intentional stance

Dennett lists three strategies that help us explain current or predict the future behavior of observable complex objects, he calls systems (Dennett, 1987, p. 15–17). We take a physical stance when we use physical knowledge to account for the behavior of a given system. When we turn the doorknob of keyless’ door, we expect that the door will open. If it does not happen, we look for a physical cause (like an obstacle behind the door, broken doorknob, etc.) that blocks the door. The second stance that Dennett describes is the design stance. 20 1.3. The intentional stance

When we take it, we assume that a certain system, an artifact, was designed and produced to satisfy certain function. We explain its behavior by pointing that a constructed object does what it is designed to do. In the design stance, the nature of a physical substance and structure of the given object is of minor importance. Take word processor software: why, often by default, does such application highlights spelling errors? The answer is trivial. It was designed to compare words written by its users with the ones in his lexicon of properly spelled words. If the word written by the user is spelled wrong, it highlights it, thus serving a spellcheck function. A more everyday example would be TV remote controllers. Each manufacturer has its version, but we can use them with no extensive training: we know that they were all designed to satisfy the same function — to control TV set from a distance. A third strategy, the intentional stance, involves attributing mental states (beliefs and desires) to other entities. We expect people to answer our questions because if they speak our language they will know how to react. We utilize the intentional stance, our folk psychology craft, when we observe others behaving a certain way, and we explain their behavior by attributing certain beliefs and desires they ought to have to act successfully. We assume that agents we attribute mental states to are rational. For Dennett, rationality regarding attributed beliefs means that they are consistent with the system’s perceptual capacities, epistemic needs, and its biography and biological needs in regard to attributed desires (Dennett, 1987, p. 49). Providing a further example, it is rational to expect that a person working in the Fukushima neighborhood knows how to use a Geiger counter and adjusts her behavior to instrument readings. It is rational, given this person’s biography, the workplace, and human perceptual capacities, as we can’t detect radiation levels with our senses. The above examples may indicate that the intentional stance is used solely in regard to other humans, which would be an overstatement. The usage of stances is not dependent on the physicality of the system it is used on (Dennett, 1987, p. 22–23). We routinely use the intentional stance when we are in need to predict what animals or even plants will do. Even non-living artifacts such as a chess-playing computer. It plans its moves, it wants to win, and knows how to make a good move. Deities in various mythologies have goals and desires. Our pets also want food and miss us when we are not around them. A more humorous example would be the perversity of inanimate objects: a printer, 1.3. The intentional stance 21 that is refusing to cooperate when we are already late for a meeting and just need to have that one document with us, wants us to fail. An eliminativist will argue that human behavior can in principle be explained in terms of the physical stance. However, this in principle possible explanation has to be postponed to an indefinite future state of scientific knowledge. Similarly, a functionalist can explain human mental activities adopting the design stance and treating the human mind as a computer. However, even though the usage scope of each type of stance is wide, it is not unrestrained (Dennett, 1988, p. 496). Stating that a rock wants to fall from a height, using the intentional stance, gives us no advantage in terms of predictability of that rock’s actions compared to taking the physical stance. Rocks simply do not exhibit behavior complex behavior that needs a reference to a more abstract stance than the physical6. Stances, the craft of folk psychology especially, are adopted because they work. They may not be the best strategies available, but they proved to be easily learned, fast, and effective: “The fact that we are products of a long and demanding evolutionary process guarantees that using the intentional strategy on us is a safe bet” (Dennett, 1988, p. 33). Describing the process of natural selection is itself a good illustration of how strong our tendency to use the intentional stance is. On numerous occasions Dennett states that natural selection works as an algorithmic process — famously in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995, p. 48), but also in From Bacteria to Bach (2017). But he also argues that in an everyday thinking evolutionary processes are seen as favoring solutions that are optimally designed to given conditions. That is why this common view of evolution depicts it as an intelligent mechanism which can detect and favor forms of life that are best equipped to survive. Although this teleological view is far from scientific accounts of evolutionary processes its traces can be found in the intentional stance approach7.

6The issue of how the perceived range of potential behaviors relate to the beliefs and desires attributed in the intentional stance was recently raised by Zalabardo (2019). 7“Encouraged, then, [. . .] I stick to my guns: (1) Adaptationist thinking in biology is precisely as unavoidable, as wise, as fruitful — and as risky — as mentalist thinking in psychology and cognitive science generally. (2) Proper adaptationist thinking just is adopting a special version of the intentional stance in evolutionary thinking — uncovering the ‘free-ﬂoating rationales’ of designs in nature” (Dennett, 1987, p. 283). 22 1.3. The intentional stance

However, while attributions made with the intentional stance are effective, they yield good behavioral predictions, they need to adequately represent neither actual beliefs and desires, nor brain processes of the person that is acting. Dennett is an instrumentalist, and it means that the practical success of folk psychology explanations, for him, does not depend on the adequate recognition of the underlying physical mechanism. The attribution of beliefs and desires is validated from the point of view of its efﬁciency (the effectiveness in predicting behavior), not adequacy. Dennett views mental states in folk psychology as abstracta: constructs, conventions on which we work on when we exercise intentional stance.

Folk psychology is abstract in that the beliefs and desires it attributes are not — or need not be — presumed to be intervening distinguishable states of an internal behavior causing system. [. . .] The role of the concept of belief is like the role of the concept of a center of gravity, and the calculations that yield the predictions are more like the calculations one performs with a parallelogram of forces than like the calculations one performs with a blueprint of internal levers and cogs. Folk psychology is thus instrumentalistic in a way the most ardent realist should permit: people really do have beliefs and desires, on my version of folk psychology, just the way they really have centers of gravity and the earth has an Equator. Reichenbach distinguished between two sorts of referents for theoretical terms: illata — posited theoretical entities — and abstracta — calculation bound entities or logical constructs. Beliefs and desires of folk psychology (but not all mental events and states) are abstracta (Dennett, 1987, p. 52–53).

To provide a different example of this class, consider a political system. It inﬂuences how a country is ruled, how citizens behave, it does have a causal inﬂuence on the world: it is real this way. But it does not exist — or need not exist — as a physical system: one cannot pull a political system out of a drawer. This way of viewing what mental states are allows Dennett to separate between folk psychology as a craft and the psychological, biological, or physical mechanism that generates it. The former involves idealizations, such as the rationality assumption, without dwelling on the implementation details 1.3. The intentional stance 23

(Dennett, 1988, p. 58–65). This is also a reason why the overall idea of the intentional stance with idealized, hypothetical mental states is quite durable with regard to the empirical evidence. To disprove it one would have to present convincing evidence that we do not tend to attribute beliefs and desires to others to predict their behavior. As described in Section 1.2, the evidence we gathered in the last few decades indicates that we do in fact attribute mental states to others, thus leaving Dennett’s account still a viable way of viewing the folk psychology. What is more questionable, given time that passed since first publications on the subject (Dennett, 1971, 1978, 1981a, 1981b, 1983a, 1987), are the details about the intentional stance. Is the rationality assumption indeed the one that governs the selection process of those beliefs and desires that we attribute? Do the basic components of the mental life attributed with the help of the intentional stance — commonly confined to beliefs and desires8 — suffice to explain other persons’ behavior? Or are there more kinds of mental processes that should be considered as well? Dennett’s account allows for expansions, as he shortly considers a fourth stance, the personal stance, that would involve adding moral considerations to the intentional systems (Dennett, 1981a, p. 240). From the perspective of this project, a natural furthering question is: does the intentional stance encompass the folk view about consciousness of other persons? One can expect that if the answer is positive, the folk view of other person’s conscious states can be easily merged with the folk view of their beliefs and desires. If the answer is negative and the evidence suggests that folk do have a view that conscious states cannot be incorporated into the intentional stance, then there is a reason to expand the theory of stances with a new one. In such a case, the operative view of folk psychology described in Section 1.2 should also be expanded, to account for the additional function that mental vocabulary regarding consciousness serves. A candidate for such a strategy will be presented in Section 1.4, dedicated to the discussion on the existing research on the subject of folk view about consciousness. Before moving to it, however, there is one more issue that needs to be addressed. The pursuit after the folk view about consciousness, the part

8This idea is not endorsed only by Dennett. The assumption that folk psychology is just, or at least mainly, about beliefs and desires seems to be a default position in the philosophy of mind (Paprzycka, 2003). 24 1.4. The folk view about consciousness of the folk psychology dedicated to the consciousness, is not the same as the quest after a scientific, intersubjective, explanation of consciousness, i.e., after an empirically grounded theory of consciousness. The former is concerned with what non-experts view about conscious mental life and how they make use of these views in predicting the behavior of other persons. The scientific approach, on the other hand, is concerned with providing an account of the conscious phenomena that use empirical research and theoretical reasoning to explain what is the function of these phenomena in human practice and mental activities. While separate, however, two issues — attributions of beliefs and desires (the intentional stance) and attributions of conscious states (‘conscious stance’) — are connected via the obviousness claim. If solid evidence for accepting this claim will be provided, then the theory of attributing consciousness should search for the function of conscious experience in folk psychology. If the efforts to find such function fail, then one has to conclude that the obviousness claim and the idea of the fundamental nature of experience do not have counterparts in everyday thinking about consciousness. Let me add that the approach presented here does not refer to Dennett’s theory of consciousness (Dennett, 1991a). While both it and the intentional stance account are vital parts of Dennett’s philosophy, he paradoxically did not try to incorporate his views about consciousness into his theory of stances. In the next section, I discuss research done so far on the subject of the folk view about consciousness. Among them, an expansion of the theory of stances will be described. Because of the troubles with this line of research I will then put forward hypotheses, pursued empirically in the following chapters.

1.4 The folk view about consciousness

In nearly all empirical studies dedicated to the non-expert view about consciousness, participants have to attribute or deny attribution of certain mental states to certain objects9. Mental states to be attributed, entities, and the whole context of the situation is provided linguistically, i.e., using mental vocabulary. From participant responses, details about the folk view about consciousness are inferred. Intuitions regarding consciousness are measurable through re-

9Thus, consciousness in this line of research is operationalized broadly in terms of state consciousness rather than creature consciousness(Rosenthal, 1986) 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 25 sponses in a particular usage of mental vocabulary related to consciousness10. In this section, I describe these studies in finer detail. I begin by reviewing the results of experiments that were explicitly — according to authors — testing lay view about consciousness. I omit here most of the methodological details as I return to them later. Next, I describe conclusions from so-called mind perception studies. Itself being a more general scientific issue, folk views about mentality encompass intuitions about consciousness. After that, I reconstruct research done on the folk intuitions about the relationship between consciousness and moral evaluation. Lastly, I argue that there are methodological and content-related flaws within the experimental philosophy studies. In the next section, I put forward hypotheses that are then tested and reported in further two Chapters of this manuscript, which form the empirical part of this dissertation.

1 . 4 . 1 E XPERIMENTALPHILOSOPHYSTUDIES

To the best of my knowledge, the ﬁrst empirical investigation into the folk view about consciousness was performed by Knobe and Prinz (2008). Researchers tested two hypotheses: 1) that non-experts have a concept of phenomenal consciousness and they use it when they ascribe mental states; 2) attribution of phenomenally conscious states depends on the physical constitution of an object (and it does not play any role in attributing states that do not require phenomenal consciousness) (p. 68 and 70). Knobe and Prinz predicted that if their hypotheses are true, then participants asked to attribute mental states to certain object will tend to not attribute states requiring phenomenal consciousness to it if this object is physically different from humans. They will follow this rule even if this object will behave in “a human way”, e.g., react as humans do in socially signiﬁcant situations. It means that they will not attribute phenomenal consciousness to, for example, group agents. By testing to what objects people attribute phenomenal states, Knobe and Prinz tested

10While my interests are limited to the folk view about the consciousness and not consciousness itself, it is worth noting that Dennett’s own proposal on how to study consciousness, heterophenomenology, can be expressed as recording utterances of lay people in which they talk about their own conscious states. However, these expressions are not taken by heterophe- nomenologists as truly reporting conscious states of inquired persons. These utterances are raw empirical data for researchers that need further scientific elaboration before they are used to find out what are the actual conscious states of the inquired persons. According to Dennett, then, utterances of research participants convey their beliefs about consciousness. (Dennett, 1993, 2003, 2007). 26 1.4. The folk view about consciousness the range of applicability of the obviousness claim. The question, then, is: are we acknowledging that there is something obvious only in our, human, consciousness, or can other objects have the same kind of obvious consciousness as we do? Knobe and Prinz speculated that the expression ‘phenomenal consciousness’ is used strictly in philosophical contexts, therefore participants were not instructed to attribute ‘phenomenal states’ to postulated objects. The researchers assumed that non-experts will take into account the physical constitution of an object and attribute to it these mental states which philosophers commonly consider as phenomenally conscious only if it is a human object. In the case of a non-human object, non-phenomenal mental states will be attributed. The object they chose as functionally similar and physically different from humans was a group agent, the Microsoft company. First, Knobe and Prinz checked how many hits did Google show for phrases with phenomenal states ascriptions and phrases with non-phenomenal states ascriptions. Among the former were phrases like ‘Microsoft feels pain’ and ‘Microsoft experiences joy’, among the latter were phrases like ‘Microsoft decides’ and ‘Microsoft wants’. The search engine gave only 2 hits for phrases with phenomenal ascription — for ‘feeling pain’ — and thousands for non-phenomenal ascriptions. The results strongly indicated that people tend not to use phenomenal ascriptions when referring to group agents. Wanting to make sure that this result is related to people treating phenomenal ascriptions as not compatible with group agents, Knobe and Prinz performed additional studies. In the one most often referred to in the literature (e.g., Arico, 2010; Huebner, 2010; Huebner, Bruno, & Sarkissian, 2010; Phelan et al., 2013; Sytsma, 2010b), each participant was presented with 10 sentences in a randomized order about a group agent, the Acme Corporation. Half of them involved phenomenal states and the remaining half involved non-phenomenal states. ‘Acme Corp. is now experiencing a sudden urge to pursue internet advertising’ is an example of the former, while ‘Acme Corp. intends to release a new product this January’ is an example of the latter. Participants were asked to rate each sentence on a 7-point scale (1 — sounds weird, 7 — sounds natural). Consistent with researchers’ prediction, phrases referring to phenomenal states were all rated lower, sounded less natural, than 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 27 phrases referring to non-phenomenal state (Knobe & Prinz, 2008, p. 75). Along with the remaining results reported in the paper, authors argued in favor of non-experts possessing the concept of phenomenal consciousness, although this expression did not belong to their vocabulary.. Knobe and Prinz’s paper received a number of criticisms. In 2009, Sytsma and Machery noticed that the group and individual agents differ in terms of their behavior and functional roles. There are behaviors appropriate for group agents such as corporations (e.g., hiring, suing) but there are also behaviors appropriate only for individuals (e.g., eating, walking). Results obtained by Knobe and Prinz can be explained in terms of phenomenal states being related to individual-appropriate behaviors. Ordinary people, goes the argument, know which actions belong to which agents and that explains results. The fact that phenomenal states — as understood by philosophers — are related to individual actions is not known to non-experts. Another issue raised by Sytsma and Machery, as well as Arico (2010), is that Knobe and Prinz failed to balance their stimuli. Examples of sentences about phenomenal states (e.g., ‘Acme Corp. is feeling upset’) lacked the prepositional phrase whereas the remaining sentences did not (e.g., ‘Acme Corp. is upset about the court’s recent ruling’). When experimental conditions were corrected, the difference in attributions between phenomenal and non-phenomenal states disappeared (Arico, 2010). Yet another issue with Knobe and Prinz’s findings was indicated by Phelan et al. (2013). Their results suggest that when it comes to mental state attributions to group agents, people tend to treat groups distributively. To attribute a mental state to a group, as the results of Phelan et al. (2013) show, is to attribute those states to individual group members. Huebner et al. (2010) showed that phenomenal ascriptions to group agents are culturally varied. Finally, the results of Buckwalter and Phelan (2014) indicate that we tend to attribute states philosophically identified as phenomenal (feeling anger and pain) even to disembodied agents such as ghosts and spirits. The results obtained by Knobe and Prinz, as well as their critics, indicate that the obviousness claim applies only to individual beings. It seems that in the case of groups, something different from the phenomenal vs non- phenomenal distinction drives the differences in attribution patterns: it might be additional contextual information, or it might be whether we deem members of a group capable of being in given states. 28 1.4. The folk view about consciousness

Sytsma and Machery (2010) tried to answer whether philosophers and non-philosophers had the same intuitions regarding subjective experience. They hypothesized that if philosophers tend to think about consciousness in a phenomenal way, then they would attribute typical phenomenal states the same way. If the folk had the same intuitions as philosophers, their responses in the attribution task would be the same. As a typical phenomenal states, they chose perceptual experience and bodily sensation, both attributed either to a human or a robot. Sytsma and Machery results indicate that while philosophers tend to attribute phenomenal states consistently, i.e., they attribute the perceptual experience to the same agents they attribute feeling pain, the non- philosophers do not. Ordinary people tend to attribute perceptual but not bodily states to robots. With the results of their follow-up studies, Sytsma and Machery argued in favor of the valence thesis, i.e., that what drives the folk mental states attributions is the valence (hedonic value) of these state (Sytsma, 2012). The non-experts tend to attribute states that lack valence to the robot but were unwilling to do the same with positive or negative states11. An alternative explanation for Sytsma and Machery (2010) results is the ambiguity objection (Sytsma, 2014a, p. 643), raised by Buckwalter and Phelan (2013); Fiala, Arico, and Nichols (2014); Huebner (2010); Peressini (2014). There are several explications of this objection, one of them goes like this: expressions like ‘seeing red’ are understood phenomenally by philosophers, but informationally by non-philosophers. When the latter attribute the trait of seeing red to an agent, they simply recognize that such an agent is capable of differentiating between red and non-red objects (Huebner, 2010). The objection is sometimes phrased, e.g., by Buckwalter and Phelan (2013), in teleological terms: lay people tend to attribute states that are consistent with the assumed functions of a robot. Peressini (2014) provided evidence for the claim that lay people tend to exclude robots from the category of experiencers (agents possessing phenomenal consciousness). In his study, participants were ﬁrst presented with a description of what experiencers and non-experiencers are, after which they were asked to judge 20 entities on a 7-point scale (1 — clearly not an experiencer, 4 — unsure, and 7 — clearly an experiencer). Results indicate that robots, androids, and other artifacts are considered non-experiencers.

11For a discussion about Sytsma and Machery’ ﬁndings in terms of System One and System Two distinction: Sytsma and Machery (2012a); Talbot (2012a, 2012b). 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 29

Peressini (2014) view is controversial because the participants were taught the concept of experiencer before the main experiment. It is then unclear how his results could be used to make inferences about the non-expert view about consciousness12. Results obtained by Fiala et al. (2014), inconsistent with Sytsma and Machery (2010), were critically discussed by Sytsma (2014b), who — having run a revised version of Fiala et al. study — failed to replicate their results. Moreover, the informational and the teleological readings of the ambiguity objection address Sytsma and Machery (2010), as long as the seeing and pain states are understood as mental states. However, having performed additional studies, Sytsma soon replaced the valence thesis with the so-called naïve account (2010a; 2012). It explains the difference in participant responses observed in Sytsma and Machery (2010). According to Sytsma’s results, people view colors and pains as mind-independent qualities. Colors as traits of objects located in the physical world, and pains as states located in the body. If they are mind-independent, the distinction between the informational and phenomenal sense of perceptual states cannot be made. This line of research is explored in regard to attributions of pains in the work of Reuter and Sytsma (2018) and Reuter, Sienhold, and Sytsma (2019), whose evidence further indicates the non-expert concept of pain as located in the body. Recently, in response to Chalmers’ paper on the meta-problem of consciousness (2018), Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019a) performed an extended version of 2010 study. They included an additional variable in the form of a verb used to describe the mental state that participants were asked about. ‘To experience’ is commonly used in descriptions of the phenomenal consciousness. Sytsma and Ozdemir thought that it is the most natural phrase to elicit intuitions about phenomenal consciousness in lay people, if they have them at all. They hypothesized that changing ‘seeing red’ and ‘feeling pain’ to ‘experiencing red’ and ‘experiencing pain’ would not change the way participants answered in the experiment, i.e., that in new conditions participants would answer the same way as in the original 2010 study. Their hypotheses were correct: the overall results were the same as in 2010 study. Additionally, the authors observed that differences in attributions of perceptual and pain states were quite stable across different demographic groups.

12For a more detailed commentary about the Peressini study, see Sytsma (2014a, p.644) and Sytsma (2018). 30 1.4. The folk view about consciousness

Among other proposals of how conscious state attribution happens, Arico, Fiala, Goldberg, and Nichols (2011) put forward the AGENCY model. They ran a behavioral study in which participants were asked to decide on the attribution of a given mental state or a property to an entity displayed on the monitor. There were eight categories of entities (plants, vehicles, moving natural objects (e.g., cloud), mammals, artifacts, birds, inanimated natural objects (e.g., stone), and insects) and eight properties (‘is colored white’, ‘hunts’, ‘feels pain’, ‘feels pride’, ‘feels anger’, ‘feels happy’, ‘made of metal’, ‘is a living thing’). Authors reported that participants tend to attribute conscious mental state to insects rather than to plants, vehicles, or natural moving objects. Those subjects that rejected conscious states in insects did it slower than those that rejected these states in vehicles and natural moving objects. Arico et al. explanation for results is as follows: we are inclined to attribute conscious states to an entity if we identify this entity as an agent, i.e., an entity with eyes, particular motion trajectories, and exhibiting contingent interaction13. AGENCY model is intriguing because it does not entail any difference in terms of mental states vs conscious mental state attributions. According to Arico’s account, if you identify an agent in an environment, you are as likely to attribute mental states as conscious mental states14. Overall, studies covered so far indicate that there is little evidence that lay people treat mental states — which philosophers treat as conscious or phenomenal — evenly. Such an outcome is problematic for the phenomenal claim, as we would expect, lay people to attribute phenomenal states in a homogeneous manner. However, a number of early research operated under a controversial assumption that mental attributions to group agents can show differences in how we attribute conscious states (i.e., research surrounding the original Knobe and Prinz (2008) study). To some extent, what was tested was not if lay people tend to attribute states assumed to be conscious, but the patterns of such attributions. It was assumed, then, that people do have the tendency to attribute such mental states to other agents. What was tested was how do

13Arico et al. discuss the inﬂuence that the category of being alive may have on the attributions, as they did not observe differences between rejection times for insects vs plants. See p. 341–344 of Arico et al. (2011) for details. 14While not belonging to the experimental philosophy movement, Kelly, Webb, Meier, Arcaro, and Graziano (2014) results on the attention schema theory (Graziano, 2013, 2014, 2019) show that the same cortical regions are involved in attributions of perceptual awareness to oneself and to others. Since authors operated with a notion of awareness it is not clear if what participants were doing can be understood as utilizing intuitions about consciousness 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 31 people attribute these states: which states to which agents, given certain conditions in the experiments. Participant responses in different conditions, then, create a pattern of attributions. It is quite stable. The ﬁndings of Sytsma and Machery (2010) were replicated in the experimental philosophy replicability project (Cova et al., 2018). An even more recent study (Sytsma & Ozdemir, 2019a) indicates that patterns of attributions found by Sytsma and Machery in 2010 remain the same even if we change descriptions of mental states that participants are asked to attribute from ‘seeing’ and ‘feel’ to ‘experience’.

1 . 4 . 2 M INDPERCEPTION

The traditional view of folk psychology, as depicted in Section 1.2, states that what lay people believe about others’ mental activities is used to predict behavior. This focusing on the prediction function is why terms like ‘folk psychology’, ‘theory of mind’, ‘mentalizing’, or ‘intentional stance’ are sometimes used interchangeably. In recent years, however, a substantive amount of research indicates that such an understanding of lay people’s views about mentality is short-sighted. In this subsection, I focus on three influential studies on the topic of mind perception, all involving heavy usage of machine learning algorithms and drawing conclusions from big datasets. In 2007a, Gray et al. published results suggesting that people view minds as more complex devices than simple reservoirs for beliefs and desires. They asked participants to make pairwise comparisons of 13 entities (e.g., baby, the participants himself, robot, frog, God) for 1 of 24 mental capacities (e.g., capacity to feel pain, hunger, fear, having a personality, consciousness, thought, memory) and personal judgments (e.g., which entity would the participant save from destruction, which entity does he or she like more). The authors used principal components factor analysis to look for patterns in data. They found that participants’ responses are best explained by distinguishing two mind dimensions, which they called ‘experience’ and ‘agency’. Capacities: ‘hunger’, ‘fear’, ‘pain’, ‘pleasure’, ‘rage’, ‘desire’, ‘personality’, ‘consciousness’, ‘pride’, ‘embarrassment’, and ‘joy’ were included in the first dimension. The agency dimension consisted of ‘self-control’, ‘morality’, ‘memory’, ‘emotion 32 1.4. The folk view about consciousness recognition’, ‘planning’, ‘communication’, and ‘thought’15. Gray et al. findings were quickly linked with moral cognition (Gray & Wegner, 2009, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Sytsma & Machery, 2012b). I return to them in the next subsection. The two-dimensional account of Gray et al. is not the only one in existence. In 2017a, Weisman et al. published results of a series of large studies indicating that a three-dimensional framework better explains people’s views on mentality. Participants had to decide whether to attribute mental states to different entities. The first dimension, the body, includes mainly bodily sensations: ‘getting hungry’, ‘experiencing pain’, ‘feeling tired’, ‘experiencing fear’, ‘experiencing pleasure’, ‘having free will’, ‘being conscious’, ‘feeling safe’, ‘having desires’, ‘feeling nauseated’, ‘feeling calm’, and ‘having intentions’. The heart factor includes more emotional and socially-related capacities: ‘feeling embarrassed’, ‘experiencing pride’, ‘experiencing guilt’, ‘holding beliefs’, ‘feeling disrespected’, ‘feeling depressed’, ‘understanding how others are feeling’, ‘telling right from wrong’, and ‘exercising self-restraint’. The final dimension, related to perception and cognition, the mind consists of: ‘remembering things’, ‘recognizing someone’, ‘sensing temperatures’, ‘communicating with others’, ‘seeing things’, ‘perceiving depth’, ‘working toward a goal’, ‘detecting sounds’, and ‘making choices’. Few capacities were included in two dimensions, e.g., ‘having thoughts’ and ‘feeling happy’ were included in both body and heart16. The curious ‘having free will’ and ‘holding beliefs’ placement in the body and the heart respectively, was noted by authors. They hypothesized that it may have to do with differences between scientific and folk terminology. Importantly, the three-dimensional view on mentality, at least in the USA, is visible in middle childhood (7-9 years old) (Weisman, Dweck, & Markman, 2018). Younger children (4-6 years old) differentiate the mind component but the distinction between the body and heart components is less accentuated in their mental state attributions. Both Gray et al. and Weisman et al. studies showed patterns of attributions of mental states to others. More recently, Nummenmaa et al. (2018a) presented results on people’s perception of their own mental states. At the time this manuscript is written, it is the most comprehensive research on one’s own

15For methodological details see Gray, Gray, and Wegner, 2007b 16For methodological details see Weisman, Dweck, and Markman, 2017b. It is worth noting that Malle (2019) offers even more robust analyses than Weisman et al. (2017a) but the downside is that they excluded the consciousness component from their study. 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 33 mind perception. In a series of studies, they created a map of 100 subjective feelings17. Among numerous findings, their results indicate that most subjective states belong to one of five clusters: positive emotions, negative emotions, cognitive processes, somatic states and illnesses, and homeostatic and sensory states. Most subjective states clearly differ from each other in their mental saliency (measured by visual analog scale response for ‘how much that feeling is experienced in the mind’ question), emotional valence, and where in the body they are felt. Conscious subjective states are experienced bodily, even cognitive ones like reasoning have a non-trivial bodily saliency score. The stronger is the bodily experience, the more mentally salient it is. Also, most of the subjective states have an emotional valence, i.e., the affective intensity of being a positive or negative feeling. Intriguingly, the analysis revealed a correspondence between the bodily feeling map — where in the body are given states felt — and the mental feeling map (derived from questions on mental saliency, the intensity of bodily sensations, perceived controllability, and pleasantness), as well as between the bodily feeling map and the neural activations associated with given states. Furthermore, Volynets, Glerean, Hietanen, Hari, and Nummenmaa (2019) results indicate that the location of bodily sensations for emotions is culturally independent. Data mining methods used in mind perception studies provide valuable information about patterns and relations between our own experiences of our mental states (Nummenmaa et al., 2018a) and attributions of such states to others (Gray et al., 2007a; Weisman et al., 2017a). Given the quickly growing popularity of big data and machine learning algorithms in social sciences (e.g., Gandomi & Haider, 2015; King, 2011; Lazer et al., 2009; Mason, Vaughan, & Wallach, 2014; Perrykkad & Hohwy, 2019) it is easy to be rapturous about discoveries they produce. I would like to point to two limitations of hitherto research on this topic. The first relates to the emotional component of mental states. Even in the Nummenmaa et al. paper, there were subjective states that had no emotional valence, i.e., scored neutral on the emotional dimension, e.g., urinating, eating, hotness, or hunger. Furthermore, some states did not fit into five discovered clusters. Among them were numbness, urinating, heart- beat, acceleration, forgetting, and hotness. The second limitation is directly related to the main topic of this manuscript: the folk view about consciousness. Being conscious belongs to the cognitive cluster in Nummenmaa et al., but

17For methodological details see Nummenmaa, Hari, Hietanen, and Glerean, 2018b 34 1.4. The folk view about consciousness in Weisman et al. it belonged to the body component. The latter is regarded as mostly physiologically, bodily, related. For the cognitive cluster, the bodily sensation aspect was present, as was for all states in the Nummenmaa et al. study, but not nearly as strong as in the case of states that belonged to the positive and negative emotions clusters. Intriguingly, the latter two clusters were the ones with the highest mental saliency as well. The body component from Weisman et al. involves states from all clusters in Nummenmaa et al. study. These discrepancies suggest that we look at our own mental states as different than when the same states when we attribute them to others. How- ever, it does not mean that there are two distinct processes involved in mind perception. It may be that in the case of mental states attribution to others the difference in the epistemic conditions, what we can experience ourselves vs what knowledge about other agents’ mental life can we gather, is the cause for differences in data patterns observed in Weisman et al. study. Such limitations do not deem findings from reviewed studies irrelevant. I simply argue that they do not provide a complete picture of what is people’s view about mentality. There are, nevertheless, consistencies between these studies and those reviewed in Subsection 1.4.1. In Nummenmaa et al., feeling pain and other illness-related states turned out to be the lowest on the mental saliency and one of the highest on the bodily saliency. This corresponds well to findings reported by Sytsma (2012) and further investigated by Reuter and Sytsma (2018) and Reuter et al. (2019), namely that pain-states are mind- independent for lay people18. What all studies described above demonstrate is that people look at minds as complex systems, far more advanced than simple containers for beliefs and desires within. The traditional view of folk psychology seems radically over- simplified, as it would assume that all the differences and consistencies in how people view mental states in others have to do with predicting (or explaining) behavior. Such claim is a strong one, as there is still an ongoing discussion on both philosophical and psychological ends about what capacities the theory of mind tests actually involve, i.e., do tests like false-belief task require even belief and desire states attributions (e.g., Burge, 2018; Jacob, 2019b. See also Zalabardo (2019) for an analytic elaboration on the subject of predictions in

18However, the same cannot be inferred about the other part of the naïve account. Seeing is a sensory state in Nummenmaa et al. and cognitive in Weisman et al.. In neither cases, the naïve view of colors being the qualities of objects can be inferred. 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 35 the intentional stance). Given the detailed studies of Weisman et al. (2017a) and Nummenmaa et al. (2018a), even the initial two-dimensional, intentional- experience perspective of Gray et al. (2007a) seems to be a simpliﬁed view of how we perceive minds. In the next subsection, I refer to the research linking folk view about consciousness with moral cognition. As some research on this topic is based on Gray et al. (2007a) ﬁndings, the connection between the experimental philosophy studies and studies on the mind perception is further investigated.

1 . 4 . 3 F OLKVIEWABOUTCONSCIOUSNESSANDTHE MORALCOGNITION

The investigation into the function of folk intuitions about consciousness be- gan a few years before Knobe and Prinz original 2008 study. These theoretical considerations were preceded by a number of studies and discussions on the role that theory of mind plays in moral cognition (Knobe, 2005; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006). In this subsection, I focus on research linking moral cognition directly to the folk view about consciousness. Such a direct link can be found in the paper by Robbins and Jack (2006). The authors were interested in answering the question: why there is an explanatory gap (Levine, 1983), i.e., the epistemic gap (mentioned in Section 1.1) between the physical characteristics of a given object (e.g., human being) and the characteristics of its conscious states. The intuition that there is a gap to begin with, according to Robbins and Jack, comes from the opposition between the intentional and the phenomenal stance. They assumed that the intentional stance is identical with the theory of mind or mentalizing, in the sense that researching the latter is researching the intentional stance19. Drawing from

19Since this step is non-trivial given the discussion in Section 1.2, I provide a following, direct wording: “this mode of understanding [the intentional stance — MW] goes by various names: ‘mindreading’ (Baron-Cohen, 1995), ‘mentalizing’ (Frith, 2003), and ‘theory of mind’ (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). All of these terms denote the capacity to ascribe intentional mental states and to predict and explain behavior on the basis of those ascriptions” (p. 62). In the footnote to this passage, authors recognize that the correspondence between the intentional stance and what is studied in psychology is “only a loose and approximate one”. An example of the difference between the two they give is the rationality assumption, present in the intentional stance but almost non-existent in psychology. Nevertheless, “for our purposes, however, the differences between the intentional stance and mindreading won’t matter, so we will use these terms interchangeably” (Robbins & Jack, 2006, p. 80). 36 1.4. The folk view about consciousness numerous social and developmental psychology studies, Robbins and Jack separated mindreading as a cognitive faculty from the capacity to empathize that belongs to the emotional faculty (Robbins & Jack, 2006, p. 67-69). They called the latter the phenomenal stance20. To utilize the phenomenal stance one has to regard the object of attribution as equipped with phenomenal states, i.e., “emotions, moods, pains, visual sensations, etc.” (Robbins & Jack, 2006, p. 69). One can only ascribe these phenomenal states that they previously experienced. Furthermore, phenomenal states are associated with positive or negative, hedonic value, “a kind of emotional sensitivity” (Robbins & Jack, 2006, p. 70). Most importantly, the authors postulated that the phenomenal stance is involved in moral cognition. They hypothesized that regarding something as an object with phenomenal states means being morally concerned about this object. Furthermore, the phenomenal stance does not depend on the intentional stance: as the mindreading capacities can be impaired without distorting emphatic, i.e., moral attitude to the agent’s behavior. Before authors managed to empirically test the phenomenal stance thesis (Jack & Robbins, 2012), the results of Gray et al. (2007a) were already well- known in the scientiﬁc community. Building on them, Gray and Wegner put forward and tested the moral typecasting hypothesis. It stated that there is an inverse relationship between perceptions of moral agency and of moral patiency. The former means performing moral actions, while the latter means experiencing the results of such actions. Attributing the moral agency is to be related to attributing mental capacities high on the agency dimension, in the Gray et al. (2007a) sense. The perception of moral patiency, on the other hand, is to be related to the perception of capacities consistent with the experience dimension. In other words, there is an inherent duality in the moral cognition (e.g., Gray & Wegner, 2010; Sytsma & Machery, 2012b)21. We base our moral judgments on moral evaluation of agents’ intentional actions, but we judge their effects by empathetic insight into feelings of those who personally experience the results of these actions.

20It is striking that they do not mention the design stance at all, in neither 2006 nor 2012 paper. There is no design stance mentioned in the later papers by Jack (2014) and Friedman and Jack (2018) as well. Despite that, they utilize the stances’ framework to explicate their own theoretical account of how cognition is structured. 21See Gray and Wegner (2012b) and Gray et al. (2012) for a review. 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 37

The 2012 paper of Jack and Robbins directly relates to the phenomenal stance claim and, in effect, to the intuitions about consciousness. After all, the experience dimension is supposed to encompass intuitions about consciousness, but it does not mean that each state high on this dimension is treated as conscious. The idea of phenomenal stance, on the other hand, involves phenomenal consciousness explicitly. Authors note both the similarities and differences to the Gray and Wegner approach (Jack & Robbins, 2012, p. 389 and 400). However, in a more recent presentation of the theory, Friedman and Jack (2018) do not refer to even one study on moral typecasting. Their main focus is on how the intentional-phenomenal types of cognition are relevant to past and present philosophy. By doing so they extend the reasoning from the Robbins and Jack (2006) paper beyond the explanatory gap problem. Jack and Robbins in a series of experiments tested how the manipulation of perceived agency and experience levels influenced moral concern toward different entities. Results indicate that moral concern is related to the perceived experience level. Moreover, the level of empathetic concern — measured with a subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index test (Davis, 1980) — correlated with moral concern as well. In later studies, researchers, still utilizing the phenomenal stance construct, were more interested in how emotions vs reason rather than consciousness vs reason influence moral judgments (Jack, Robbins, Friedman, & Myers, 2014). While it is consistent with the claim that phenomenal states have an emotional aspect, it takes us further from testing purely conscious states. In the case of 2012 study, Jack and Robbins explicitly stressed the significance of consciousness in the moral cognition (p. 402). They assumed that people group certain mental states as conscious states. Quoting from 2012 paper by Jack and Robbins:

At the heart of our model are the following claims: 1. In addition to the physical and intentional stances, a third stance is required to account for our capacity to apprehend the experiential states of others. We call this the phenomenal stance. 2. The folk conception of the mind is inextricably linked to moral cognition. Speciﬁcally, there is a tight coupling, in both directions, between regarding something as a bearer of experiential states and feeling moral concern for that thing. [. . .] 38 1.4. The folk view about consciousness

We will present evidence of a bidirectional coupling between moral concern and the attribution of properties and states that are associated with experience (e.g., conscious awareness, feelings) (point 2). This coupling is also shown to be stronger with experience than for the attribution of properties and states more closely associated with agency (e.g., free will, thoughts). This supports the importance of a distinction between the phenomenal and intentional stances. (p. 384–385)

The statement that the folk view about consciousness is closely related to moral cognition, as stated at the beginning of this subsection, is not entirely new. Knobe and Prinz mentioned it in the very first study on folk intuitions about consciousness and performed one study to test this claim (Knobe & Prinz, 2008, p. 67 and 79–82). Some evidence supports a related claim that preconceptions about consciousness influence the attribution of free will, which means the attribution of responsibility for one’s own actions (Shepherd, 2012). Recent work by Nahmias, Allen, and Loveall (2019) is less optimistic. They found that patterns linking free will with consciousness attributions are mediated by the attributions of emotions and not by direct binding with conscious states as such. This last finding is important. Broad evidence indicates that there is a relation between the folk view about states that philosophers name conscious and moral cognition. However, there are not many compelling results that would indicate that it is the folk view of consciousness that influences moral patiency. In the next subsection, I raise more doubts regarding the research on the lay intuitions about consciousness. On their basis, I then put forward hypotheses, which were tested in my empirical research.

1 . 4 . 4 T HECONSCIOUSSTANCE

Overall, the evidence reviewed in this section indicates that the folk view about mentality is complex. People tend to adjust their attributions of mental states taking into account the traits of an agent and a type of her action. Moreover, most results on the topic of intuitions about consciousness seem to support the thesis that the phenomenal claim is false. However, as I argue below, there are doubts if the results of the existing research allow for such an 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 39 interpretation. This subsection is organized as follows: I start by presenting issues that reviewed studies have with the validity (1.4.4.1). Then, I move towards ideas underlying the concept of the conscious stance (1.4.4.2). Finally, I put forward an argument on the necessity of investigating differences in language usage between academic and non-academic vocabulary related to the consciousness (1.4.4.3).

1.4.4.1 The validity problem in the empirical research on the phenomenal consciousness

First, despite the impression that authors of most studies covered in Subsec- tion 1.4.1 investigate intuitions consistent with the concept of phenomenal consciousness, their studies contribute to the phenomenal claim debate in various degrees. This variation results from researchers having different ideas on what phenomenal consciousness is, a fact noticed also by Sytsma (2010b; 2014) and Peressini (2014). Lack of a common understanding of this concept has its consequence. When we look at how phenomenal consciousness was operationalized in the experiments, we see that researchers matched phenomenal states with different types of mental states. I present this data, for studies in which vignettes were used, in Table 1.1. There is no single study reported in which all types of mental states commonly associated as being phenomenally conscious were used. Let me give a short justification for distinguishing four kinds of mental states. If one takes two of the most cited works on phenomenal consciousness, one by N. Block (1995) and the second by D. Chalmers (1996), one finds that both philosophers list phenomenal states related to emotions, sensations produced by external (visual, auditory, and so on) as well as by internal (bodily) stimuli, but also to the imagination and other mental states, e.g., thoughts (Block, 1995, p. 230; Chalmers, 1996, p. 7–9). While it is not extremely common to find a philosopher that would discuss phenomenal aspects of these “other mental states”, e.g., the cognitive phenomenology (Bayne & Montague, 2011), G. Strawson’s experience of understanding a sentence case comes to mind (Strawson, 1994) as well as D. Pitts arguments in favor of phenomenal qualities in intentional states (David, 2004). There is an even more recent work on this topic: both U. Kriegel and E. Chudnoff published books in 2015 on this very subject. But even if we forget about the last column in Table 1.1, there still is no single empirical study on the folk understanding of consciousness 40 1.4. The folk view about consciousness that encompasses the remaining three kinds of mental states. The imaginative states are less controversial as examples of conscious states than the ones discussed in cognitive phenomenology. There is, however, one issue that needs to be clarified here. There are two distinct names used to denote imaginative states: ‘imagination’ and ‘mental imagery’. While both are sometimes used interchangeably, the latter is strongly associated with the famous discussion among cognitive scientists on the nature of mental representation, i.e., the debate between pictorialism and descriptionalism (Kosslyn, 1996; Pylyshyn, 1981, 2002; Tye, 1984). Both mental imagery and imagination were — and are — comprehensively studied by philosophers (Liao & Gendler, 2019; Nigel, 2019). Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that when one speaks about mental imagery, then one is speaking about a kind of imagination. Nagel calls it ‘perceptual imagination’: “to imagine something perceptually, we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling the state we would be in if we perceived it” (Nagel, 1974, p. 446). Van Leeuwen names it ‘imagistic imagining’: “One’s mental representations can be structured in different ways, and some representations seem to be ‘imagistic.’ You can visualize a cat when none is there and auditorily imagine a voice in a silent room. Such experiences are typically called ‘mental imagery’, but unsurprisingly, ‘imagining’ is used as well” (Van Leeuwen, 2013, p. 222). The connection between imagination and mental imagery is visible for other philosophers of imagination: “sensory mental images play important roles within many of our imaginative activities” (Gregory, 2016, p. 107), as well as philosophers of mind: “We use the term ’mental imagery’ to refer to both re-experiences of an original stimulus as well as imagination” (Brogaard & Gatzia, 2017, p. 1).

Types of mental states Emotional Perc. Imag. Others Knobe and Prinz (2008) + − + − Sytsma and Machery (2009) + − + − Arico (2010) + − − − Huebner et al. (2010) + − + − Huebner (2010) + + − − Sytsma and Machery (2010) + + − − Arico et al. (2011) + + − − Jack and Robbins (2012) + + − − Sytsma and Machery (2012b) − + + − Sytsma (2012) + + − − Phelan et al. (2013) + − − − Buckwalter and Phelan (2013) + + − − 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 41

Types of mental states Emotional Perc. Imag. Others Fiala et al. (2014) − + − − Jack et al. (2014)* + − − − Sytsma (2014b) − + − − Buckwalter and Phelan (2014) + − − − Kim, Poth, Reuter, and Sytsma (2016) − + − − Sytsma and Reuter (2017) − + − − Reuter and Sytsma (2018) − + − − Reuter et al. (2019) − + − − Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019a) − + − − Nahmias et al. (2019)* + + − − Shepherd (2012, 2015)*

Table 1.1: Summary of existing research on lay people’s intuitions on consciousness in terms of kinds of mental states used. ‘Emotional’ — emotional states and moods; ‘Perc.’ — perceptual and body states; ‘Imag.’ — imagination; ‘Others’ — other mental states. ‘+’ means that, in at least one of the studies reported in the paper, a given kind of mental state was attributed. ‘−’ — the attribution of a given kind of mental state was not a part of neither of the studies reported in the paper. ‘*’ — in these studies, participants were told, in some conditions, that agents in vignettes were ‘conscious’, without going into detailed kinds of states (creature consciousness).

Coming back to the main point of Table 1.1: if the cited authors cannot agree in a relatively simple problem of which types of mental states should be used in research as paradigmatic examples of phenomenal states, then one can doubt if their inquiries can be treated as probing folk intuitions about phenomenal consciousness. This issue of not representing the broader spectrum of mental states which can be also conscious is a part of what I call the validity problem in studies on the obviousness claim. By validity I mean here a psycho- metric notion, referring to the extent to which a given test measures what it is supposed to measure (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Hornowska, 2007). In other words, how well does our measurement relate to the theoretical construct we are interested in: how successful was the operationalization. However, researchers most often tested attributions of monomodal states like feeling pain or fear, seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, or smelling something (e.g., Buckwalter & Phelan, 2013, 2014; Sytsma, 2012; Sytsma & Machery, 2010). In most studies, the concept of phenomenal consciousness was coupled only with a few types of mental states. The validity problem is visible even in studies that tested a wider range of states, like Peressini (2014). While probing participants on a wide range of statements related to the consciousness, Peressini 42 1.4. The folk view about consciousness instructed them what are the entities that experience (experiencers), making results potentially biased. Having been informed how they are supposed to understand given category participants were not non-experts anymore, in some limited sense they became experts on an artiﬁcial concept of an experiencer.

1.4.4.2 Conscious stance from a phenomenal perspective

The reasons presented above allow to state that research covered in previous subsections did not test the phenomenal claim. But perhaps it tested the obviousness claim? The latter, as explicated in Introduction and Section 1.1, states that non-experts have the same or nearly the same intuitions about consciousness as philosophers. These intuitions are based on the common ability to “live through” (durchleben) experiences that belong to an ordinary mental life of every human being. This ability serves as a warrant that knowledge based on such lived through experience is veridical and does not need any additional, external justification. If for their experiments researchers selected mental states which they consider as conscious, then surely they tested the obviousness claim. However, why do we have to accept their view that mental states they used in their studies are undoubtedly conscious? To provide an example: we have no evidence apart from experts’ belief to support the view that non-experts interpret the expression ‘seeing red’ as denoting a phenomenal, conscious mental state. Yet studies reviewed in Subsection 1.4.1 (e.g., Knobe & Prinz, 2008; Sytsma & Machery, 2010) assumed that they do. On the contrary, there is still an ongoing discussion of what does it mean that this ‘seeing red’ state is conscious. Do we have to accept the “phenomenal interpretation”, widespread among philosophers and expert researchers, and admit that seeing red means to have visual sensory experience which is in a specific way accessed (lived through) by the subject? Research on color perception, in which the conscious aspect of perception is temporarily suspended, indicates that we are still far from answering even this simpler question (Kentridge, Ni- jboer, & Heywood, 2008; Norman, Akins, Heywood, & Kentridge, 2014; Peters, Kentridge, Phillips, & Block, 2017). Although folk psychology studies of color perception are of a different kind than the neuroscientific ones, the former should also be based on the intersubjectively accessible evidence. Reliance on one’s own experience and beliefs about them does not suffice. I will skip the discussion of these problems here and return to them later. 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 43

I think the researchers, so to speak, focused solely on one — phenomenal — side of a coin, while forgetting about the other. The investigation into the lay view about consciousness focused on exemplary conscious states taken from philosophical debates held between scholars trained in the analytic tradition of philosophy. To be honest, it is the only tradition that encourages followers to criticize the achievements of their masters. Thus, when an expert reaches for intuitions about consciousness, she builds them on exemplary cases analyzed in the literature by renowned thinkers. Since these analyzes are mainly based on simple sensory experiences, therefore intuitions drawn from them represent not the general properties of conscious states but only those properties that are characteristic specifically for the sensory type of experience. One can even risk a hypothesis that it is the reason why experts share the same intuitions about conscious states: they consider the same cases and analyze them from the same point of view they learned from their intellectual masters. This is the first side of the coin: if an expert attributes conscious states to another person, she picks up these mental states which she identifies as capable of being experienced and filled in with qualia. In other words, when an expert has to attribute conscious state, she refers to acquired knowledge about conscious states and adjusts the attributed state to the learned pattern. To the basic properties of an exemplary conscious state belong: qualitative character (qualia nature) and experienceness. The first property, being of qualia nature, is widely discussed in the literature and I referred to it earlier in Section 1.1. The second property, the experienceness (cf. Graziano, 2013), means that a mental state takes a form of experience, i.e., the content and coloring (in Frege’s sense) of a mental state are lived through by its subject. Both these properties: qualia nature and experienceness are jointly ascribed to mental states which are called phenomenal. This phenomenal kind of conscious states is predominantly present in experts’ discussions about consciousness. No wonder that when it comes to designing an experiment in which lay people are asked to attribute conscious states to others, experts construct vignettes illustrating the occurrence of phenomenal states. The question is: do the experts’ expectations agree with lay people intuitions of what a conscious state is? 44 1.4. The folk view about consciousness

By this, I mean that from the experts’ point of view lay people do not need to know the expression ‘phenomenal state’, but they should be able to grasp — at least intuitively — what does it mean to be in a mental state of experiencing. Additionally, they should be able to admit that being in a state of experiencing — presented in a form of a concrete example — is identical to being in a conscious state. What if experts err in assuming that their concept of a phenomenal state will be correctly understood by lay people and recognized as conscious in situations presented to them? Is there in the language of folk psychology an expression that could be used as a counterpart to phenomenal state? If experts err and folk psychology language is insufficient to express the meaning of conscious experience, we can ask what in fact do consciousness scholars study? We have to find how lay people interpret situations presented to them. Before considering the plausibility of an alternative approach to the prevailing research patterns, we have to return to basics and carefully study natural language use in situations when the mental states of others are recognized as conscious. Let me try to present the above difficulty in a more detailed manner. As I argued earlier in Section 1.1, the very idea that to be conscious means to have experiences of a form ‘what it is like to Fa’ s relatively new. Even though it is commonly attributed to Nagel as its’ author (Nagel, 1974), it was first introduced by T. Sprigge in 197122 and popularized by philosophers such as Chalmers (1996) and Block (1995). The above expression in quotation marks contains formula Fa that is understood in the following way: F points at a, and F denotes mental state or process, and a denotes an object (it could be a particular or a property). It is easy to notice that Fa represents a basic property of any mental state, namely intentionality (I will neglect here all subtleties related to this concept). If we assume that F stands for an act of visual perception and a for a part of a plant, say flower, then the sentence ‘I see a rose’ communicates that the object of my visual perception is a rose23. The sentence can be extended by adding the adjective ‘red’ to the noun ‘rose’

22Quoting from Sprigge’s part of Sprigge and Montefiore (1971) paper: “consciousness is that which one characterises when one tries to answer the question what it is or might be like to be a certain object in a certain situation. [. . .] An inanimate (or rather, a non-conscious) object has a definite character at every moment and is plenty of things, but there is nothing which is being that object in the relevant sense” (p. 168). 23Taken literally, the formula Fa represents a mental act (state) and its intentional object. However, one has to remember that a mental act does not exist independently. It is always an act of a certain subject. It is clearly visible in linguistic utterances. 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 45 or can be changed by replacing a noun which represents a particular (‘rose’) with an adjective representing a property (‘red’). The mental act of seeing is directed towards a rose, or in other words, a rose is an intentional object of seeing. All this is very well known and trivial even to first-year students of philosophy or cognitive science. However, it is a safe bet that neither the word nor the concept of intentionality belongs to the lexicon of folk psychology or to its basic ideas. This example shows that the concept which is simple and easy to grasp for persons who aspire to become experts might be foreign to lay people. Although the idea of intentionality is the mark of the mental is obvious to present-day scholars of consciousness, it is highly doubtful that they will defend the view that intentionality is also the mark of the conscious24. If we agree that intentionality and consciousness are two separate phenomena of mental life (in consequence, there are mental states or acts which possess both properties and there are such states which possess only of them), we have to answer: how the whole or definite part of the expression ‘what it is like to Fa’ referes to consciousness? There are two possibilities. According to the first, the meaning of an instance of the formula Fa, say ‘see red’, depends on the form of its occurrence. When it occurs in an independent sentence — ‘I see red’, then this sentence exposes the intentionality of the act of seeing, but when the same ‘see red’ is preceded by an expression ‘what it is like to’, then it changes its meaning and exposes the experiential nature of this mental act. This interpretation presents visual perception as having a twofold nature: both intentional and experiential. But even if mental acts have these two separate aspects or Janus’ faces, they could not be defined by the use of the same phrase ‘see red’. If we do not want to accept this flickering of meaning and its dependence on context, we have to turn to the second possibility and assume that the experiential aspect of a mental act or state is expressed in ‘what it is like to’ phrase. The majority of scholars of consciousness will agree with this opinion. It has been explicitly formulated by Dan Zahavi (2003):

24But see Tim Crane’s (1998) reference to Sartre, Pierre Jacob’s (2019a) analyzes of interde- pendencies between intentionality and consciousness, and — more generally — recent work on phenomenal intentionality (Kriegel, 2013; Mendelovici, 2018; Montague, 2010). 46 1.4. The folk view about consciousness

It is relatively uncontroversial that there is a certain (phenomenal) quality of ‘what it is like’ or what it ‘feels’ like to have perceptual experiences, desires, feelings, and moods. There is something it is like to taste an omelette, to touch an ice cube, to crave choco- late, to have stage fright, to feel envious, nervous, depressed, or happy. [. . .] Every conscious state, be it a perception, an emotion, a recol- lection, an abstract belief etc., has a certain subjective character, a certain phenomenal quality, a certain quality of ‘what it is like’ to live through or undergo that state. This is what makes the mental state in question conscious. In fact, the reason we can be aware of our occurrent mental states (and distinguish them from one another) is exactly because there is something it is like to be in those states. The widespread view that only sensory and emotional states have phenomenal qualities must consequently be rejected. Such a view is not only simply wrong, phenomenologically speaking. Its attempt to reduce phenomenality to the ‘raw feel’ of sensation marginalizes and trivializes phenomenal consciousness, and is detrimental to a correct understanding of its cognitive signiﬁcance (p. 67, 71).

The above citation represents the view widespread among experts: the conscious character of the mental act manifests itself in its experiential nature (‘experiential’ and ‘phenomenal’ are often used interchangeably). This view is “relatively uncontroversial” to experts. Let me stress that it exactly mirrors the content of the phenomenal claim, which I introduced earlier. The author cited above goes even further and advocates a more general view that phenomenality is characteristic of mental acts of any kind, not only sensory or emotional, which corresponds well with the aforementioned philosophical discussion on the cognitive phenomenology (Bayne & Montague, 2011). Sadly, the attractive- ness of this idea is not accompanied by a convincing demonstration of how we experience (live through) objects which cannot be directly presented to our senses. Is this experiential nature of mental acts obvious only to experts? We have to remember that they accept not only the phenomenal but also the obviousness claim, which states that lay people have similar views. It means that lay people, when confronted with the phrase ‘what it is like to see red’ 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 47 should understand it as referring to the phenomenal (experiential) and not the intentional aspect of visual perception. Moreover, they should recognize such an expression or any other with similar meaning as an exemplary description of a conscious state or act. The above argumentation supports the thesis formulated at the beginning of this chapter, which says that the majority of consciousness scholars who are sympathetic to the analytic tradition accept both the phenomenal and the obviousness claims. Since this dissertation is devoted to the consciousness component of folk psychology and to empirical research on non-expert attribution of conscious states to others, we have to analyze the content of both claims from a perspective of a lay person, who was not trained in analyzing problems of consciousness from a theoretical perspective. Do her beliefs about the mental life of others contain ideas that can be regarded as similar, if not identical, to the contents of these claims? The situation is embarrassing fo the experts, not for lay people. The experts assume that: (1) every person understands, even if she cannot verbalize it, what does it mean to be in a conscious state and that (2) this awareness of being in a conscious state is evenly distributed among human beings regardless of their education, professional knowledge, or practical skills (the obviousness claim). However, at the same time, experts take for granted that paradigmatic examples of conscious states are phenomenal experiences (the phenomenal claim). In consequence, they should accept the conclusion that lay persons are equally apt to admit that phenomenal experience is an exemplary type of consciousness. The conjecture that the obviousness claim applies both to experts’ beliefs and to folk psychology judgments seems to be justified. The case of phenomenal claim is different. The expectation that when lay people think about consciousness or attribute it to other persons, they intuitively choose or look for instances of phenomenal experience is unsound. Experts’ expectation has its roots in the belief that everyone who is exposed to an exemplification of phenomenal experience (e.g., seeing red or hearing thunder) has no doubt that it is a basic, most evident form of consciousness. Having a specific phenomenal experience means believing that it is a conscious experience. In other words, experts tacitly assume that phenomenal experience apart from having a specific content (seeing red, hearing thunder, etc.) produces awareness of this experience and, in consequence, true belief that it is conscious experience. 48 1.4. The folk view about consciousness

Experts assume that since everyone has phenomenal experience then everyone has knowledge by acquaintance that the experiential state she is in is conscious. This line of reasoning is flawed. Notice, following Fumerton (2005) proposal, that there are three layers of phenomenal experience25: (A) raw experience, (B) the awareness of this experience, (C) belief about certain characteristics of this experience. Let me point out, for the sake of clarity, that the ‘conscious’ aspect of experience does not appear on the layer (A), but only on the layer (B). Thus, a person who is aware of having an experience of seeing red has conscious experience. However, having conscious experience (layer (B)) is by no means identical with knowing that the state one is in is a conscious experience (layer (C)). These layers are not bound in the way the experts assume. They seem to expect that when a person has an experience (sensation) of ‘seeing red’26, then at the same time she is aware that her experience of ‘seeing red’ is a conscious state. They go too far in postulating this type of relationship between layers (A) and (B). In fact, they should only expect that when a person has (lives through) an experience of ‘seeing red’ (layer (A)), then at the same time she is aware of the experience of ‘seeing red’ (layer (B)). It should be stressed that being aware of the experience of seeing red is by no means identical to being aware that seeing red is a conscious state. The latter is a different kind of awareness — if we can call it awareness at all — than the former and there is no easy way to transform the former into the latter. Let me explain it by referring to a simpler example of seeing red and seeing color. There is no doubt that a person who sees red sees color. It is obvious that seeing red is not identical to seeing color. The first expression (seeing red) refers to a sensory experience of a definite type, while the second (seeing color) refers to a concept that applies to a whole class of sensory experiences. This example can be helpful in analysis between being aware of seeing red and being aware of being in a conscious state. Let us start with a trivial observation that the property of redness is a special kind of property of color. The same applies to mental states. When we say that someone is aware of a certain mental state (I confine myself to experiential aspects of these states), we mean that (1) this person is in this state

25“First, as I have already suggested, it seems to me that we need to distinguish experience (sense experience, belief, imagination, desire, fear, and so on) from our awareness of that experience. [. . .] So for any experience E, it seems to me that one should distinguish ontologically 1) E, 2) one’s awareness of E and its various characteristics, and 3) one’s beliefs about the various characteristics exempliﬁed by E” (Fumerton, 2005, p. 125). 26I refer here only to the experiential aspect of ‘seeing red’. 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 49

(e.g., has visual experience of seeing red) and her (2) “experiential” attention is focused on property of that mental state (seeing) in a greater degree than on a property of an external referent of this state (red color). One can be aware of having a visual experience (seeing red), but also of auditory, haptic, kinesthetic, gustatory, olfactory experience. In all these cases adjectives such as ‘visual’, ‘auditory’, etc., denote properties that point at the sensory modality of a given experience. All these experiences are sensory. Can we say that when one is aware of visual experience, one is also aware of sensory experience? It means that her experiential attention is focused on the sensory character of experience. Even if there were something like an awareness of the sensory character of experience (we could imagine that it could be an awareness of a receptive nature of passively flowing experience), this awareness would belong to a different kind than awareness of an instance of experience belonging to a definite sensory modality. This is a pivotal point. Let me assume — although it is a risky assumption — that there is something like an awareness of the sensory character of experience. Is it justified to claim that such awareness produces the belief that my experience is conscious, that is, that I am in a conscious state? From my point of view, we should carefully discern between the state of being conscious and state of knowing or believing that one is in a conscious state. One can be in a conscious state without knowing that the state she is in is conscious. Adherents of the experiential basis of consciousness disagree with it because they seem to accept the view that if a person is conscious (is aware of an experience), then the very fact that she is acquainted — through awareness — with experience produces self-knowledge that she is in a conscious state (Gertler, 2011, 2012, 2020). In other words, they assume that if a person has conscious experience (she is aware of her experience), then by the very fact that she is directly acquainted with this experience, she has self-knowledge about being in a conscious state. This view is so deeply rooted in experts’ acquired knowledge that they consider it as obvious and project it on minds of lay people, whom they inquire about consciousness. As I tried to argue, experts’ assumption if unjustified. Experts’ concept of conscious experience is not extracted from their own personal experiences. If they have acquired it from acquaintance, then this view should be obvious to everyone and would be present in inquiries about consciousness from the origin of this reflection. It can be easily shown that this view is not obvious — if it was, why to study its presence in folk psychology? — and appeared relatively late in 50 1.4. The folk view about consciousness works on consciousness. Until the 1960s prevailed the idea that to be conscious is to be in a mental state. All genuine mental states or acts were considered as conscious; if something deserved to be called mental, then it was also conscious. This view was typical of Husserlian phenomenology27. The shift in understanding consciousness was initiated by famous Thomas Nagel’s paper (1974) and petrified by a flood of further publications, exploiting his idea of consciousness as an experience of ‘what it is like’ form. It is this concept that contemporary researchers of folk consciousness take as obvious and attribute it to an average bread eater. It should be stressed here that what is evident for an expert, who many times read about the conscious experience in numerous professional publications dealing with consciousness need not be familiar to a lay person. Although lay persons have conscious experiences, they know about having conscious experiences (in the Nagel or Chalmers sense) only as much as Monsieur Jourdain knew about speaking prose. The problem we face is the following: consciousness researchers use empirical methods to find out how this phenomenon is understood in folk psychology and how — if at all — conscious states are attributed to other persons. Designing their experiments, they create exemplary cases of conscious states modeling them on their concept of the conscious state as a phenomenal experience. This way of proceeding confines studies on the consciousness component of folk psychology to checking if descriptions of phenomenal experiences expressed in everyday language are recognized by non-experts as descriptions of conscious states. If yes, then researchers’ expectations would be confirmed. However, the results of such research could not be interpreted unequivocally. Even if inquired respondents selected situations which, from the experiential perspective of researchers, referred to actions of phenomenally conscious creatures, respondents’ choices would not mean that they made them by intuitively grasping the idea of phenomenal experience. They might name the described mental state as conscious because they have in mind their own criteria of being conscious. For example, they might identify the state of being conscious with being attentively directed to something. Since the

27“In the broadest sense, the expression consciousness comprehends (but then indeed less suitably) all mental processes” (Husserl, 1982/1913, §33). Although the expression ‘mental processes’ represents here German Erlebnisse, which was also translated as ‘lived experiences’ or ‘mental experiences’, Erlebnis in Husserl’s phenomenology denotes mental object which is complex and often multilayered. Husserl’s concept of Bewusstsein comprising all Erlebnisse is a counterpart to the anglo-american concept of mind comprising all mental processes (states). (I owe this remark to Andrzej Klawiter.) 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 51 latter is equivalent to intentionality, then in such case consciousness would be identiﬁed with intentionality. While to most experts intentionality and phenomenality are different properties, but it is practically impossible to express this difference in folk psychology language. One can imagine several criteria of being conscious which deviate from the phenomenality criterion, but existing research methods are too coarse-grained to detect this difference by examining choices based on folk psychology assessments. The situation in which research on the consciousness component of folk psychology is reduced to tracking cases that ﬁt paradigmatic examples of phenomenal experience can be named an “experiential trap”. Is there a way to be liberated from this trap? The comprehensive answer to this question demands extensive and careful considerations that go beyond the scope of the present work. There is, however, a provisional solution which I will sketch.

1.4.4.3 Conscious stance as the recognition of conscious behavior

Let us assume that human beings know what does it mean to be conscious. But is is a knowledge that could not be verbalized. It is ineffable in a similar way as is the answer to the question “How a clarinet sounds?” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §78). One might object that this kind of ineffability exactly ﬁts the property of phenomenal experience and therefore illustrates the idea of the experiential nature of consciousness. This objection is groundless. It is easy to notice that there is a marked difference between the subjective state of experiencing an actually heard sound of the clarinet and a situation in which we identify the heard sound as played on a clarinet. Imagine that we are exposed to a sequence of sounds played one after the other, with 2-second break between consecutive sounds. We can listen to each sound separately and have a number of phenomenal experiences that matches the number of presented sounds. This kind of auditory experience can be called phenomenal listening. We can also listen to each sound separately and focus on deciding if the sound presently heard came from the same instrument as sounds played earlier, thus learning their common property, namely the timbre. It is the timbre that allows us to identify a sound as coming from a deﬁnite instrument, e.g., a clarinet. This second form of listening is not of an experiential but of a cognitive kind, even though the property we learned to identify — the timbre of a clarinet — is still ineffable. 52 1.4. The folk view about consciousness

We can apply this mode of proceeding to the problem of consciousness. It might appear that the question will have the form: ‘How a conscious state is experienced (felt)?’. This would turn us back to the experientialists camp because such a form of asking directs attention toward something that is hidden beneath opaque bodily expressions, something that is accessible and graspable only to its bearer. No wonder that in experientialists discourse human and zombie28 behavior is indistinguishable and the difference between representatives of these two species consists in possession of the hidden “experiential mental mechanism” by the former. The functioning of this mechanism is unobservable and, therefore, unidentifiable from an external perspective. External inaccessibility of such a form of consciousness practically excludes it from empirical studies on place and function of consciousness in folk psychology. The reason is simple: in mindreading (as I declared earlier, I use this term as a synonym of folk psychology) approach mental processes are undetachable from bodily manifestations, i.e., from behavior. This approach prevails in empirical research on folk psychology29. I see no reason why this inseparability of cognitive mind and behavior should not be extended to the inseparability of conscious mind and behavior. It is difficult to imagine the consciousness component of folk psychology where conscious state are cut off from behavior. It is clearly visible in cases of conscious state attributions to others. There must be something in other person’s behavior that justifies such attribution and makes it non-arbitrary. The term ‘behavior’ is used here in a broad sense. While in typical, cognitive (intentional) cases of folk psychology, the behavior is commonly understood as a physical bodily movement coupled with mental activity, in consciousness cases behavior comprises a broader spectrum of bodily expressions. Not only movements, but also postures (as in Michelangelo’s Pieta or Rodin’s Thinker), involuntary face (blushing cheeks, tears flowing from the eyes), or body expressions and different forms of vol- untary communication behavior. In folk psychology, purely physical behavior plays only a mediating function. It is impossible to detect someone’s mental states such as beliefs or desires without noticing changes in behavior. This trivial remark should be supplemented with the statement that although these behavioral changes have to be noticed, they function as transparent indices (in

28Philosophical zombie, as defined in Chalmers (1996). 29This idea is illustrated nicely in Figure 10.1 in Stich and Nichols (2003, p. 243). I wrote about this behavior-oriented sense of folk psychology in Section 1.2. 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 53 the same way as transparent are linguistic utterances) which direct observer’s attention to mental states (processes). Let me give an example of biological motion. Although it illustrates a phenomenon of detecting biological organ- isms from tiny pieces of information it is an instance of the general regularity of seeing through the observed behavior. As is well known, Johansson (1973) demonstrated that a specially organized group of moving light dots is seen as a walking human. The effect is so strong that a person who observes this purely physical motion of light dots cannot get rid of an animate component of this motion and sees through these dots living creatures with extremities in motion. The analogous effect occurs in the domain of mental activities. When we see someone who presses different piano or keyboard keys for some time, we perceive this physical sequence of moving fingers not only as biological motion but also as a skilled, intelligent action of playing on a piano or writing on a computer. Similarly, when we observe someone gliding on ice, performing multiple jumps and turns, we see not only a physical sequence of moving extremities but also an artistic, thought-through, figure skating. In a standard situation, this intentional component of behavior will stay in the foreground, while observed motion will serve as a transparent index through which we see an intelligent mental action and, in effect, conclude that a person who skillfully controls fingers in motion is a pianist. The aim of the above argumentation was to show that the attribution of mental states to a person demands noticing her behavior (in the same way as reading a text demands noticing characters) and disregarding its purely physical traits in a process of grasping the mental component revealed by this behavior. My claim is that the transparency of the physical form of behavior and seeing through it as an intentional, intelligent component applies also to forms of conduct which can be called conscious behavior. It means that we are able to see through the physical component of behavior and focus not on its intentional, but on its conscious component. Having this in mind, we can now return to the initial problem of finding an analogue of ‘How a clarinet sounds?’. In the light of the above considerations, our question can take a form: ‘How a conscious being behaves?’. In this question, the word ‘behaves’ does not refer to the purely physical change in behavior, but to its conscious component. According to this interpretation, the question means: ‘Which kinds of perceived behavior are characteristic to a conscious creature?’. To show that this clarinet analogy is close to the original I will transform the initial question. After this, it will 54 1.4. The folk view about consciousness take the following form: ‘Which kinds of perceived sounds are characteristic to clarinet?’. Let me notice that the expression ‘perceived sounds’ does not refer to purely physical properties of acoustic waves, but to their perceptual counterparts. Still, there is a huge difference between identifying clarinet by perceived sound and conscious creature by observed behavior. We know — although we are unable to describe it — how to successfully perform the former identification, but do lay people know how to perform the latter? The answer cannot be found on the purely speculative ground. We need to design experiments that will help to tell if lay people can identify conscious behavior. I will risk the hypothesis that this ability is used quite often. However, it does not consist in recognizing a specified token of a conscious state. It is rather detection of a type of such a state. Let me illustrate it with examples. When we look at Rodin’s Thinker, we do not know what thoughts are present in his mind. Nevertheless, we have no doubt that he is consciously reflecting. We can say that instances of this kind of “mind in motion” belong to reflective consciousness. It does not mean that all cases of reflecting consciousness can be easily decoded from behavior, but there are instances of behavior that majority of us will classify as transparent indices of reflective consciousness. There are specific postures and forms of movement, through which we recognize that a person is engaged in profound thinking. When we notice such behavior, we say that a person is absent-minded. The other form of behavior relates to an attentive kind of consciousness. Providing two examples for the latter: while walking with a full teacup we attentively monitor our steps and motions of the tea in the cup, trying not to spill it. When we trip on a sidewalk and look around monitoring eyesights of everyone on the street, checking if anyone saw our clumsiness. If we would observe any of these two behaviors, we would say that a person was conscious (of the motion of the tea or the eyesight of people around her). Despite the fact that both intentional and conscious mental states are recognized from their behavioral manifestations, the mechanisms of this recognition are different. When we observe someone’s behavior, we can interpret it in 3 ways: (1) a physical form of bodily motion, (2) a form of intentional action, (3) an outward form of conscious state. In the intentional stance ((2) case) we perceive the behavior as bodily motion initiated and controlled by mental processes. It is the behavior that is kept in the window of attention as the 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 55 object needing explanation. This explanation consists of selecting beliefs and desires which anchor the subject’s behavior in the external world and allow us to foresee how it will be continued. There are two characteristic traits of the intentional behavior: it is preceded by a mental process comprising beliefs and desires and it is outward-oriented. The second trait means that behavior — in accordance with its intentional nature — does not point at its mental antecedents (although they can be seen through it) but at happenings or situations which are its consequences in the external world. The third form of interpreting behavior (3) consists of perceiving it as the “corporeal robe” which covers the conscious states. It might be expected that such a corporeal form of clothing effectively hides conscious states making them inaccessible to external persons. This impression is built on the concept of phenomenal consciousness, which is defined as lacking any external manifestations. Even if we accept this view and agree that it fits the experts’ concept of phenomenal consciousness, it does not apply to reflective or attentive forms of consciousness. As I argued above, both forms manifest themselves in behavior. However, their behavioral clothing is not opaque but transparent. While in the intentional stance our basic aim is to explain or predict behavior by recourse to its mental antecedents, in the stance which could be called conscious, our primary interests focus on happenings in the mind. We learn about them by observing specific forms of behavior, but what we get is the information that the observed person is more involved in her mental rather than in her worldly activities. Summing up the above considerations, we can say that in the intentional stance the behavior is interpreted as outward-oriented, while in conscious stance behavior is interpreted as inward-oriented. It is oriented towards a change in the world. This change is “mentally designed” with the help of beliefs and desires, and behavior is the subject’s endeavor to make changes happen in her environment. In a conscious stance, the function of the behavior is different. It is interpreted as inward-oriented. It points to happenings in the mind. Let me stress that this insight into conscious states of others should be sharply distinguished from introspection or any other form of self-reflection. In this third-person process, the behavior is used to judge why a person is focusing on being-in-the-mind rather than being-in-the-world. In other words, 56 1.4. The folk view about consciousness we take the intentional stance when we want to know what a person is doing or what will be her future actions. We take a conscious stance when through observed behavior we “see” that behaving person temporarily suspends her worldly activities and instead engages in her mental ones. Let us now return to the obviousness claim and consider it from the perspective of the above remarks. The claim states that non-experts understand concepts of consciousness and conscious state and use them just like experts do. Researchers postulate that typical conscious states attributions are attributions of ‘experiences’ and ‘feelings’ because that is how consciousness is most often described in the scientific literature (e.g., Sytsma & Ozdemir, 2019a). Even if we agree with it, the fundamental problem remains unsolved: on what grounds a specific phenomenal state (or at least a specific kind of a phenomenal state) is attributed to a given person at a given moment? Since such states are, by definition, inaccessible and undetectable by an external, average observer, how could she decide in what conscious state a person is? On the other hand, in the everyday life, the expressions ‘she is conscious of her feelings’, ‘she did it consciously’, etc., are not uncommon. We still know little to nothing about the rules of their use. To my knowledge, there was no system- atic investigation into how non-experts use ‘conscious’ and ‘consciousness’, i.e., into pragmatics and semantics of such terms. Coming back to the main point, the validity problem is the problem of how well our theoretical construct — expert view of consciousness — is grasped by the chosen measurement tools. The problem arises on two levels, like two sides of a coin. First, one can doubt whether mental states that participants were asked to attribute were selected by them as conscious because of their phenomenal character. Since non-expert respondents probably have not heard about the concept of phenomenal consciousness, they used the criterion of being conscious that was more familiar to them. Second, the conscious state attribution based on behavioral indices was omitted in the XPhi studies because it cannot be adjusted to the idea of the undetectable character of phenomenal consciousness. That is why it is striking that there has been no investigation into how exactly non-experts use the term ‘conscious’ and ‘consciousness’. In other words, the validity problem raises the issue of whether experiments performed were about the obviousness claim or whether they missed the claim altogether. 1.4. The folk view about consciousness 57

1.4.4.4 Methodological limitations of the empirical studies on the folk view about consciousness

The XPhi field as such was investigated in terms of replicability (Cova et al., 2018), statistical inconsistencies (Colombo, Duev, Nuijten, & Sprenger, 2018), and p-hacking (Stuart, Colaço, & Machery, 2019), meeting the same challenges as social sciences in general (Camerer et al., 2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Overall, experimental philosophy studies are becoming more thought-out methodologically. Some smaller issues regarding research on the folk view about consciousness were with time accounted for, e.g., the sample sizes became bigger. Nevertheless, even if the field improves in terms of methodology and statistics used, small methodological issues in studies on a specific subject can still bias the picture of said subject. Such a specific subject is the obviousness claim. I move now to describe three smaller methodological issues, additional to that of the validity problem. As mentioned, sample sizes got better. Around half of the studies on folk intuitions about consciousness, however, suffer from a small number of participants. The first experiments done by Knobe and Prinz had between 28 and 38 participants (Knobe & Prinz, 2006), with the larger group being divided between two conditions. In studies by Sytsma and Machery (2009), sample size ranged between 48 and 75, with each pool of participants divided into two conditions. Arico (2010) tested 61 participants divided into two conditions. Experiments of Jack and Robbins (2012), meant to test the involvement of intuitions about consciousness with the moral cognition, had from 35 (divided into two conditions), 112 (divided into four conditions), and 119 participants (in two studies, each time divided into two conditions). Things got better in the important Sytsma and Machery (2010) paper, where 671 participants were divided into four groups in the main experiment, though only 106 into four and 177 into six groups in the follow-up studies. In their extended replication of their 2010 study, Sytsma, Bluhm, Willemsen, and Reuter (2019), there were 1465 participants, divided into eight conditions. To provide one last example, Buckwalter and Phelan (2014) gathered 158 participants in their first, 147 in the second, 118 in the third, 120 in the fourth, and 194 in the fifth study, latter divided into six conditions and the rest into four. With such group sizes, many of the studies reported in Subsection 1.4.1 and Table 1.1 are underpowered. Even if one intends to use a simple one-tailed t-test for independent two 58 1.4. The folk view about consciousness groups, in order to achieve the statistical power of .8 with a hypothesized effect size of .5, one should try to have sample sizes higher than 50 participants per condition (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The lower the effect size expected, the bigger the sample size should be. A related issue present in the existing studies about the obviousness claim is the sampling bias (Smart, 1966). In the case of many studies, the participants were undergraduate students taking philosophy or psychology classes (e.g., Arico, 2010; Huebner, 2010; Knobe & Burra, 2006; Knobe & Prinz, 2008, as well as the first study of Jack and Robbins, 2012). Given the nature of the obviousness claim, the realm of folk psychology, a sharp line between expert and non-experts is needed. However, in some cases, we only know that participants were students (e.g., Arico et al., 2011) or that they had varied contact with philosophy in general (Phelan et al., 2013). Even when the expert-level was controlled, the criteria for including a participant in the study varied. Sytsma and Machery 2010; 2012b defined experts as those that had some grad- uate training in philosophy or completed/were close to completing a major in philosophy. Similar criteria were probably, as they are not explicitly stated in the paper, in research by Sytsma and Machery (2009). Some researchers did not use student populations: Buckwalter and Phelan (2013) used Ama- zon’s Mechanical Turk platform to find participants (Buhrmester, Talaifar, & Gosling, 2018), but they did not control the education level. In the follow-up experiments, Jack and Robbins (2012) used word of mouth method, Facebook, and in one case Mechanical Turk as well. In the latter study, they controlled the level of education, but it is not mentioned in the paper whether they corrected for being an expert. The third issue relates to the fact that all studies reported in Table 1.1 used Likert-like response formats and parametric methods to analyze the collected data. While strictly speaking data from Likert items is ordinal, it is not uncommon to treat it as continuous and fit for the parametric tests (De Winter & Dodou, 2010; Derrick & White, 2017; Norman, 2010). Recently, however, psychological researchers started to popularize alternatives such as ordinal regression models (Bürkner & Vuorre, 2019; Liddell & Kruschke, 2018). Given these voices, a non-parametric approach to data analysis could shed some additional and more credible light on the results. 1.5. Current project. Hypotheses 59

To sum up, there are problems with the existing research on the obviousness claim, which yield results disputable. In some studies, small samples were used. Additionally, the level of participant’s expertize was controlled only in several studies. These two issues make the following one even more serious. Since, in some cases, there were problems with sample sizes and sampling bias, the non-parametric tests that ideally should be used to analyze Likert-like data might have not given any significant results. Weaknesses mentioned in the previous paragraph concern only some studies reviewed in this section. However, the validity problem concerns them all. None of the studies operationalized the expert account of consciousness in an exhaustive way, i.e., only some kinds of the phenomenal conscious mental states were used in experiments. Furthermore, the research on behavioral clues of being in a conscious state was omitted. Because we have virtually no knowledge about neither how lay people understand ‘consciousness’, nor how they apply this term in the process of attributing conscious states to other persons. At this point, then, it is not sure that we should trust the results of already existing empirical studies that they tested the obviousness claim. However, doubts raised here do not mean that the reviewed literature is wrong. Nev- ertheless, there is now a need to fill in the gaps, to fix at least some issues reported here. An additional bonus is that this way the already existing results will be evaluated whether they support or deny indeed the obviousness claim.

1.5 Current project. Hypotheses

In Section 1.1, I argued that the obviousness claim plays a fundamental role in the field of consciousness studies. In Subsection 1.4.4, I showed that what is doubtful is not the claim per se but its interpretation by experts. When they talk about the obviousness of consciousness, they refer to one variety only, that is to the phenomenal consciousness. In my opinion, which I discussed above, this “phenomenal” interpretation of obviousness is — at best — typical to experts but not to lay persons. We need to have reliable evidence — which is still lacking — that lay persons understand consciousness along the same lines as experts. Since non-experts base their knowledge about consciousness on folk psychology, then they understand it in the intersubjective, not the subjective (experiential) way. If this conjecture is true, then it implies that 60 1.5. Current project. Hypotheses there is a consciousness component in folk psychology which contains rules of attributing conscious states to other persons. Let me add, for the sake of clarity, that these rules are not of an explicit, but of tacit character. The view that part of folk psychology regulates conduct, attitudes, and assessment of conscious states of other persons is expressed in the consciousness attribution claim, which was introduced on page 10. While it may seem that the reservations concerning the phenomenal interpretation of the obviousness claim fit nicely with experimental results that rejected the idea that lay people have the concept of phenomenal consciousness (Huebner, 2010; Peressini, 2014; Sytsma, 2009, 2012; Sytsma & Machery, 2010, 2012a; Sytsma & Ozdemir, 2019a), the limitations of experimental philosophy studies — discussed in 1.4.4 — cast a shadow on the validity of these results as well. Taking that under consideration, I put forward a proposal of how to conceptualize the folk view of consciousness in a way that gives testable hypotheses. In doing so, I refer to Dennett’s framework of stances and return to the concept of the conscious stance, discussed in 1.4.4.3. In Section 1.3 I mentioned that it is debatable whether the intentional stance suffices for every kind of mental state attribution. As evident from Section 1.2, researchers tend to associate a wide range of mental states with attributions utilizing the theory of mind concepts. Only a minimal, oversim- plified system of folk psychology entails treating the intentional stance as an exhaustive account of how lay people view mental states and minds in general. Given the results covered in Subsections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2, there is a multitude of evidence that the intentional stance is not enough to explain the folk mind perception. In 1.4.4.3 I proposed to extend Dennett’s framework with a stance that involves attributing consciousness and conscious states to agents using their behavior as a transparent index pointing at their specific mental states. The specificity of these states consists of their “power” of keeping subjects’ attention within their mental realm, by its temporal withdrawal from the external happenings. I propose to call such a stance the conscious stance. The difference between the intentional and the conscious stances consists of the role of behavior. In the intentional stance, it is the behavior — interpreted as intelligent — that is explained or predicted by recourse to the mental states: behavior is a destination station, while mental states are transfer stations. In the conscious stance, it is the specific mental state(s) we want to discover by recourse 1.5. Current project. Hypotheses 61 to behavior. In this case, it is behavior — interpreted as conscious — that is a transfer station leading to a specific mental destination. There is no doubt that the concept of the conscious stance understood in the way proposed here raises many questions and needs further clarification. It is not my aim to focus on this task. I only wanted to uncover the weaknesses of the phenomenal stance (Robbins & Jack, 2006)30 and sketch an alternative approach that can be — contrary to the phenomenal stance — incorporated into folk psychology. The detailed construction of the conscious stance and the empirical testing of this conception are tasks which must be left for a future occasion. In this work, I will deal with consciousness concepts that were examined and tested in the experimental philosophy and folk psychology studies. If the hitherto research programs occur successful, then seeking for an alternative approach will be superfluous. The lack of evidence about how lay people use ‘consciousness’ and related terms is an issue that simply testing for differences between ‘conscious state X’ and ‘state X’ attributions is not enough to fill in the blanks in our knowledge about the folk psychology. That is why it is also valuable to investigate how the terms that philosophers and scientists associate with consciousness are used in the ordinary language. Such a line of research will help to provide the answer to the obviousness claim: are there patterns in using such terms that would indicate the phenomenal reading of consciousness among non-experts? How does ordinary language talk about consciousness relate to that of science and philosophy? Even if the phenomenal claim is false, the obviousness claim can still be true. But for the obviousness claim to be true, non-experts cannot conflate conscious states with other kinds of mental states, e.g., they cannot view philosophically-conscious states only as emotional states. Because the conclusions of existing studies cast doubt on the thesis that lay people have the concept of phenomenal consciousness31, one might expect that patterns of usage will support neither the phenomenal nor the obviousness claim.

30In a broad sense, i.e., as a stance in which one attributes phenomenal states to others. Robbins and Jack (2006) argue that such stance is involved in moral cognition, as discussed in Subsection 1.4.3. 31I discussed this research in Subsection 1.4.1, and referred to it at the beginning of this Subsection, so here I provide only a direct quote: “the present evidence suggests not just that people generally lack problem intuitions [intuitions about the existence of the hard problem of consciousness] but that they do not have the concept of phenomenal consciousness in the ﬁrst place” (Sytsma & Ozdemir, 2019a, p. 254). 62 1.5. Current project. Hypotheses

Summing up the above, here are hypotheses I tested in linguistic research (LH) and in the questionnaire studies (CH and MH), with additional explanations given below:

LH The non-experts use consciousness-related words in the same way as experts (i.e., philosophers, scientists).

CH Mental states that experts view as uncontroversial examples of conscious states are attributed in the same conditions regardless of them being explicitly identiﬁed as conscious in the experimental vignettes or not.

MH Attributions of conscious states of perceptual or emotional kind inﬂu- ences perception of moral patiency in an analogous way.

The above hypotheses contribute to the discussion surrounding the obviousness claim in varied ways. If the LH (the Linguistic Hypothesis) will be confirmed by data, then there are provisional grounds to accept the obviousness claim. Virtually all experiments reviewed in Section 1.4 involved mental vocabulary, both as a means of instructing the participants and as a response format. If the hypothesis will be rejected then there are no grounds to definitely reject the obviousness claim, but also no grounds to claim that in the existing studies researchers tapped into the non-expert intuitions about consciousness. Both groups, experts and non-experts, will have used crucial vocabulary differently. Only further investigation will allow checking what sort of folk psychology vocabulary is associated with experts’ use of ‘consciousness’ or related words. If such further investigation again occurred unsuccessful it would seriously undermine the validity of the obviousness claim. The Consciousness Hypothesis (CH) refers directly to the most often used method of investigating the folk view about consciousness. As mentioned at the end of Subsection 1.4.1, researchers typically measure patterns of mental state attributions. They look for regularities describing how participants attribute different mental states in the same conditions, or how participants attribute the same mental states in different conditions. If the phenomenal and obviousness claims are correct (see page 42), then mental states conceived by experts as conscious should be recognized by lay people as conscious as well. Let me add that both claims apply to humans and these cases belong to the condition which I propose to call human. In the non-human conditions, 1.5. Current project. Hypotheses 63 involving robots or forms of artificial intelligence, the situation is less straightforward. As of yet, we do not know the extent of the consciousness attribution claim, whether we attribute conscious mental states to non-human agents as well. There is evidence indicating that we attribute mental states to a wide variety of agents (I covered it in Subsection 1.4.2), but this line of research is quite coarse-grained when it comes to the subtleties of how non-experts use vocabulary related to mental states, especially to conscious mental states. Furthermore, results of studies like Sytsma and Machery (2010) indicate that non-experts attribute mental states to robots at least slightly differently than to humans. Taking this information into account, I expect that when it comes to non-human agents like robots, their ability to select and focus on red color will not be called ‘seeing red’ but ‘detecting red’. If someone would insist that robots are able to see red then such a person would use the expression ‘seeing red’ not in its direct sense but in a figurative one. Let me repeat that CH applies to human conditions (other kinds of conditions are introduced in Chapter 3), regardless of who is seeing red, expert or lay person. Although lay persons might not share experts’ view that the conscious means the phenomenal but they also should consider instances of visual perception as conscious mental acts. If this conjecture holds true, then naming seeing red as conscious is redundant because the conscious character of seeing red is its intrinsic property. Therefore, the expression ‘consciously see red’ is a pleonasm and the adverb ‘consciously’ is obsolete. The same should apply to other exemplary cases of conscious mental acts, such as pain or mental acts from other perceptual modalities. It is worth noting that while adding the term ‘conscious’ to expressions ‘seeing red’, ‘feeling pain’, or ‘hearing voice’ is superfluous, adding the term ‘unconscious’ makes such expression inconsistent. The typical way of avoiding inconsistency is to change the sense of expression (‘seeing red’, ‘feeling pain’, or ‘hearing voice’) from literal to figurative. While these remarks may seem trivial, as I showcased in this chapter they were never tested. This is especially worrying since without the corroboration of CH we have no grounds to treat research reviewed in Subsections 1.4.1–1.4.3 as valid, i.e., as about the obviousness claim: a conjecture I covered in Subsection 1.4.4. The Moral Hypothesis (MH) refers to the view often accepted in empirical research that attributions of emotional or perceptual conscious states are related to the moral assessment of the situation of a moral patient and influence these assessments in an analogous (if not identical) way. This hypothesis will 64 1.5. Current project. Hypotheses be corroborated if attributions of emotional conscious states increase moral patiency assessment and attributions of perceptual conscious states increases perceived moral patiency. That is the claim made by Jack and Robbins (2012), who state that the phenomenal stance (represented here by the attribution of emotional or perceptual conscious states) is involved in moral cognition. They say that if we attribute phenomenal states to an agent, then we perceive this agent’s moral patiency as higher than when we do not attribute said states. Since, as was shown throughout this chapter, experts take emotional and perceptual states as exemplary phenomenal states, then — if MH is true, i.e., experts are correct — an attribution of either of these states should increase perceived patiency. If, on the other hand, MH is false, then there is no empirical ground for claiming that there is a phenomenal stance that is involved in the perception of moral patiency. In the following chapters, I test these hypotheses. The first hypothesis, on the usage of the vocabulary related to consciousness among experts and non-experts, is tested in Chapter 2, in a series of studies utilizing tools from computational linguistics. Experiments dedicated to the hypotheses CH and MH are presented in Chapter 3. They utilize modified paradigms from the experimental philosophy studies reviewed in Subsections 1.4.1 and 1.4.3. Discussions dedicated to the results of each study are included in relevant chapters. A more general discussion about findings is presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 2

Linguistic forms of attributing consciousness in everyday English: three studies

Preliminary remarks

The usage of linguistic tools and methods to investigate intuitions about consciousness expressed in the language of folk psychology is a rather uncommon approach. Before I dive into details about studies performed in this project. I will introduce the usage of said methods and assumptions behind them. Linguistics offers a variety of ways in which languages can be studied, but they were all so far rarely used by the XPhi community. Reuter (2011), and Knobe and Prinz (2008) to some extent, used search engines to gather data on the usage of certain phrases. Based on these they inferred conclusions on semantics behind these phrases. In a study by Fischer and Engelhardt (2017), participants had to decide which words will they use in given sentences. The authors used collected data to argue in favor of speciﬁc folk intuitions. However, the most important tools are corpora of texts, i.e., large collections of texts and/or transcribed speech compiled with speciﬁc criteria in mind, e.g., if one would collect academic papers, one would produce a corpus of academic texts. Providing some examples1: Bluhm (2016) argues that corpora can help the process of conceptual analysis, by gathering various cases of real usage, thus minimizing the probability that philosophers’ own

1For more examples see research by Fischer, Engelhardt, and Herbelot (2015); Liao and Meskin (2016); Mejia-Ramos et al. (2019). 66 intuitions would bias the analysis. Andow (2015) uses corpora to investigate how the term ‘intuition’ is used by philosophers. Sytsma et al. (2019) defend the claim that corpus analysis is not only useful, it can also be an independent source of evidence in XPhi. Simiarily, Hansen, Porter, and Francis (2019) argue that data on the frequency distributions of words in corpora is valuable in philosophical investigations. The idea that meaning is use is not new in philosophy (Wittgenstein, 1953, 2000). It is also not new in linguistics: the so-called distributional hypothesis dates back to the work by Firth (1957) and Harris (1954). The hypothesis states that words used in similar contexts tend to have a similar meaning, i.e., we can derive semantic conclusions from the analysis of patterns of words’ usage. From that, it follows that the higher the interchangeability between two words, the higher the semantic similarity between these words: they are used in the same contexts. While researchers are not unanimous about the degree to which the word usage distribution can be identified with meaning (Gries & Otani, 2010; Smadja, 1993), the idea of distributional semantics is widely used in both corpus and computational linguistics (Bojanowski, Grave, Joulin, & Mikolov, 2016; Church, Gale, Hanks, & Hindle, 1991; Grave, Bojanowski, Gupta, Joulin, & Mikolov, 2018; Gries, 2001; Lenci, 2018; Mikolov, Chen, Corrado, & Dean, 2013). As of today, there is no standardized methodology for extracting semantic information from linguistic data mining. The aforementioned examples varied in their usage of corpus data, focusing on comparing frequencies of a given word and drawing random samples of real usages for more in-depth analysis (e.g., Andow, 2015; Fischer et al., 2015; Hansen et al., 2019). Sytsma et al. (2019) and Herbelot, von Redecker, and Müller (2012) used also information about collocations, i.e., the non-random sequences of words. A collocation in corpus linguistics is a such a set of words that co-occur with a given word significantly more often than a random chance would have it. A collocate, then, is a word that co-occurs non-randomly with a key word. Given such plurality of methods, for purposes of testing LH2, I chose three different approaches: WordNet, word embeddings, and corpus studies. Each of them involves heavy usage of computations. The first study utilizes the WordNet data (Miller, 1995), a lexical database of semantic relationships between words. In the second — word embedding — study, a machine learning

2That the non-experts use consciousness-related words in the same way as experts 2.1. Consciousness-related words 67 approach is used to investigate semantic relationships between word vectors, a multidimensional representations of word meanings created by feeding the algorithms large bodies of texts of ordinary language (Bojanowski et al., 2016). WordNet and word embedding studies provide only coarse-grained indications of how words are actually used, that is why the third study involves a more ﬁne-grained, corpus-based frequency and collocation analysis of the consciousness-related words (Davies, 2008). Given that the language of science is English, in each case I use data for the English language. Before moving to the ﬁrst study, in the next section, I elaborate on the selection of the consciousness-related words, which patterns of use are then investigated with these three approaches. A more general discussion with respect to the existing literature is provided after presenting results from all three approaches.

2.1 Consciousness-related words

By ‘consciousness-related words’ (CR-words) I mean words that are used by philosophers and scientists in their descriptions of consciousness. These are not necessarily the kind of words that appear as synonyms of ‘consciousness’ in dictionaries. Choices made by lexicographers are independent of how a relatively small community of academics use speciﬁc words. The Merriam- Webster Dictionary, for example, lists following synonyms for ‘consciousness’: ‘advertence’, ‘advertency’, ‘attention’, ‘awareness’, ‘cognizance’, ‘ear’, ‘eye’, ‘heed’, ‘knowledge’, ‘mindfulness’, ‘note’, ‘notice’, ‘observance’, and ‘observation’ (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2019)3. Juxtaposing these terms with the vocabulary used in Section 1.1, it is clear that the two have little in common. 3Dictionaries provide lists of different synonyms of ‘consciousness’. The Collins Dictionary, for example, lists following: ‘awareness’, ‘apprehension’, ‘knowledge’, ‘realization’, ‘cognition’, ‘sensibility’ (for the American English) (Collins Dictionary, 2020). Providing another example, in the Lexico Dictionary (co-created in Oxford University): ‘awareness’, ‘wakefulness’, ‘alertness’, ‘responsiveness’, ‘sentience’, ‘knowledge of’, ‘sensitivity to’, ‘realization of’, ‘cognizance of’, ‘mindfulness of’, ‘perception of’, ‘apprehension of’, ‘recognition of’ (Lexico Dictionary, 2020). 68 2.1. Consciousness-related words

The ideal way of distinguishing CR-words would be to compile a corpus of academic texts on consciousness and finding out which phrases were used most often. However, as this is — as far as I know — the first investigation of this kind on the usage of CR-words, I propose a simplified approach, in which only five but undoubtedly crucial CR-words are to be studied:

CR-words: ‘awareness’, ‘emotion’, ‘experience’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘feeling’.

A few reasons support choosing such a limited set of CR-words. First, as evident from Subsection 1.4.1, phrases like ‘experience X’ and ‘feeling X’ were most often used in experiments in order to trigger phenomenal intuitions in participants. While they are used in a verb form and there is no verb for ‘consciousness’, each of them is often used in noun forms as well. Furthermore, both ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ are used to describe phenomenal consciousness (e.g., Blackmore, 2017; Block, 1995; Chalmers, 1996) and consciousness in general (e.g., Koch, 2019). Second, as voiced in Subsection 1.4.4.1, there is the validity problem. Espe- cially in the case of the studies dedicated to the function of the folk view about consciousness, discussed in Subsection 1.4.3, I emphasized that — contrary to the experientialists views — what is involved in the moral cognition are intuitions about emotional and not conscious states. Taking that under consideration, the comparison of how words ‘emotion’ and ‘consciousness’ are used in everyday English is crucial. Third, ‘awareness’ is often a sort of a counterpoint to the concept of the phenomenal consciousness, being made by Chalmers (1996). Explicated as a functional or psychological concept of consciousness, with information being aware when it is available for controlling the behavior. A similar concept, of access consciousness, was famously proposed by N. Block (1995). As noted by Knobe and Prinz (2008, p. 68), it is probable that most people never met the phrase ‘phenomenal consciousness’. The same can probably be said about the phrase ‘access consciousness’. However, regardless of the minute differences between two concepts — noted by Chalmers (1996, p. 228-229) — I chose ‘awareness’ simply because Chalmers’ distinction between consciousness and 2.1. Consciousness-related words 69 awareness did not gain widespread recognition and both words still function as synonymous. Let me add that the latter word is often used in the more empirical contexts, as in the neuroscience of consciousness (e.g., Kelly et al., 2014; Webb, Kean, & Graziano, 2016). To sum up, while there always could be more CR-words chosen for the analysis, data on the five that were selected can draw a quite detailed picture of how varied is both the academic and the non-academic talk about consciousness. Such selection allows for a more specific hypotheses than LH to be put forward. There are multiple ways in which LH can be specified, depending on which expert view about consciousness one recognizes as the most common. Here are specifications of LH, which on the linguistic level represent the most widespread experts’ views about consciousness:

LH1 All selected CR-words are used in the same way in the academic and non-academic languages.

LH2 Given the role of the umbrella label of ‘consciousness’ and ‘conscious states’ in the expert view, ‘consciousness’ should be used the same way in the academic and the non-academic languages4.

LH3 Given that for experts the phenomenal consciousness is commonly understood as the most important account of how ‘consciousness’ is understood philosophically and scientiﬁcally, ‘consciousness’ should be understood phenomenally in the ordinary language.

LH4 Given that both ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ are commonly used to describe phenomenal consciousness, both ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ should, in the ordinary language, be used in contexts that are consistent with the concept of phenomenal consciousness.

LH5 Given that the folk intuitions about emotional states can interfere with measurements of intuitions about consciousness, ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ usages should be more similar to ‘consciousness’ usages than to the ‘emotion’. 4The phrase ‘umbrella label’ is simply a common name for all different types of consciousness distinguished by researchers, e.g.: access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, self-consciousness, reﬂexive cnosciousness, and monitoring consciousness (Block, 2002). 70 2.1. Consciousness-related words

LH6 Given that in Chalmers’ view there is a clear distinction between consciousness (understood as phenomenal consciousness) and awareness (understood as psychological consciousness), linguistic analyzes should show that such distinction is preserved in the non-expert usage as well, i.e., ‘consciousness’ is more similar to ‘experience’ or ‘feeling’ than to ‘awareness’.

LH1 hypothesis is, in a way, the boldest one, as it demands that all 5 main CR-words are used by lay persons identically with the way experts use them

(and vice versa). If LH1 occurs false, then the results of the existing research, covered in previous sections, would have to be reinterpreted as inconsistent — at least on a linguistic level — with the obviousness claim. Regardless of how we specify the core of the experts’ view on consciousness: as the phenomenal consciousness, as the distinction between functional (awareness) and ﬁrst- person approaches (consciousness), or mental states which are accompanied with ‘feelings’ or ‘experiences’, the experts’ and lay persons’ utterances of

CR-words should be indistinguishable if LH1 is true. The remaining hypotheses specify more subtle aspects of how the obviousness claim can be visible on the linguistic level. LH2 is a less bold variant of

LH1. It demands that among CR-words only ‘consciousness’ is used similarly in the academic and the non-academic languages. It stems from the fact that while there are different types of consciousness distinguished by scholars, ‘consciousness’ is a word used to name them all. While I do not assume here that there is some single property of consciousness that is — according to experts — shared by all types of consciousness, the ‘consciousness’ is by experts used similarly to the term ‘game’ in the late writings of Wittgenstein. LH3 and LH4 directly state that phenomenal reading of consciousness should be visible in how non-experts use the noun ‘consciousness’ (LH3), and in the use of ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ (LH4). As authors reviewed in Subsection 1.4.1 wanted to test whether the phenomenal interpretation of consciousness was widespread among non-experts, they assumed that such reading can be clearly seen in how people use certain words. They most often used ‘experience’ and

‘feeling’ to describe such states (LH4), but as I argued in throughout Subsec- tion 1.4.4, for an unknown reason researchers omitted phrasing these states as ‘conscious’ states. If these studies were indeed studies on the obviousness claim, this intended phenomenal reading should be visible in usages of ‘experience’, ‘feeling’, and ‘consciousness’: this is what hypotheses LH3 and LH4 2.2. Study 1. WordNet 71

express. Testing LH5 can help to answer whether there is the validity problem, related to some CR-words being understood as expressing emotional states and not conscious states. LH6 is a different twist on the expert view about consciousness, consistent with Chalmers’ view, namely that speaking about experiences and feelings is speaking about (phenomenal) consciousness and not so much about awareness (psychological consciousness). If Chalmers’ distinction is visible in how people use CR-words, then it indicates that people are indeed able to grasp mental states as mental states, i.e., they acknowledge specific properties of mental states as properties of mental — and not for example brain — states. In other words, they accept the phenomenal claim. As this is the first investigation of this kind into the folk usage of CR- words, I am interested in all specifications of the LH hypothesis. In the following three studies I collect evidence on all six of them. While describing each study more in-depth, I will refer to the specific LH versions. Some additional results from studies reported in this chapter are available in Appendix A. Code snippets and full analyzes are available in the data repository at the Open Science Framework5.

2.2 Study 1. WordNet

For gaining some initial knowledge about different meanings of selected CR-words in the English language, the ﬁrst study was designed to utilize lexicographic ﬁndings on the English language. For this purpose, I used the WordNet data (Miller, 1995). Wordnet is a lexical database of semantic relations between words in the English language. Words are grouped into synonym sets (synsets) that are thought to be interchangeable, i.e., each synset represents a singular sense of a given word. Princeton’s Wordnet is not the only one available. Initiatives like Open Multilingual Wordnet project merge Wordnets of more than 30 different languages (Bond & Paik, 2012). As Wordnet is a semantic lexicon of the natural language, it represents not the semantics of languages of philosophy or science but rather that of the common being-in- the-world. 5https://osf.io/htk7g/?view_only=48bf247feca84430b201bc998cb1aaef [Accessed: 18 May, 2020]. 72 2.2. Study 1. WordNet

LH hypothesis itself is formulated in pragmatic terms, i.e., that non- experts use CR-words as experts do. The WordNet data is not actually data on how words are used. Description of the early stages of WordNet development can be found in Fellbaum (1998, p. XVIII-XIX). In short, synsets are produced by lexicographers, and relations between synsets are established with the help of computational techniques. WordNet depends more on the polysemy, loosely speaking the number of meanings a word has than pure frequency patterns (Beckwith & Miller, 1990, p. 305-306). Nevertheless, as explained throughout Chapter 1, while the obviousness claim was studied by investigating how lay people use consciousness-related vocabulary (indirectly: how they attribute conscious mental states), the claim itself is concerned with the semantics, with how consciousness is understood by non-experts. WordNet is a source of information on meanings in the ordinary English language. As noticed, WordNet data does not distinguish between academic and non-academic, expert and non-expert synsets, instead it models the natural language as such. It would be difﬁcult, then, to directly test hypotheses LH1−2 with this data6. A way to overcome this obstacle is described in the following subsection.

2 . 2 . 1 M ETHODS

The first study consisted of two parts. First, relevant synsets of the selected CR-words were extracted. Second, CR-words were compared in terms of their semantic relatedness to one another. The first phase was indented to help figure out how many senses consistent with the expert view are there for the selected CR-words. Given that researchers studying the folk intuitions about consciousness often look for the everyday expressions which — in their opinion — are consistent with the concept of phenomenal consciousness, the results of their research are biased by their focus on phenomenal consciousness. To mimic their choices and select relevant synsets, two independent raters, with major degrees in philosophy and cognitive science, judged all synsets on their appropriateness to describing the phenomenal consciousness. More

6 I will use this subscript notation to refer to all hypotheses in a given range. E.g., ‘LH1−2’ means ‘LH1 and LH2’, ‘LH3−6’ means ‘LH3, LH4, and LH5, and LH6’. 2.2. Study 1. WordNet 73 precisely, they were given a list of synsets and the following instruction: ‘From the following list, select items that you could use when describing, even if only partly, the concept of the phenomenal consciousness’. Only synsets that both raters selected were then used in the second part of the study. To understand how CR-words were semantically compared with each other, i.e., how the second part of the study was performed, a little more has to be said about the WordNet structure. WordNet can be thought of as a network, with synsets as nodes and connections between them as semantic relations. The path’s length on the network, from one node to the other, is a measure of similarity between word senses. The shorter the path between the two synsets, the more similar they are. This symmetrical measure, ranging from 0 to 1 (meaning identity, complete interchangeability), was used to compare synsets selected in the ﬁrst part of the study. For purposes of having a reference point, this measure was calculated also for three pairs of antonyms ((1) ‘war’ and ‘peace’, (2) ‘arrival’ and ‘departure’, (3) ‘text’ and ‘speech’), three pairs of semantically unrelated words ((1) ‘pizza’ and ‘luna’, (2) ‘book’ and ‘earth’, (3) ‘coffee’ and ‘citizen’), and three pairs of near-synonyms ((1) ‘speech’ and ‘talk’, (2) ‘cab’ and ‘taxi’, (3) ‘church’ and ‘chapel’). Providing an example of how the WordNet data works, let us take words: ‘gouda’, ‘cheddar’, and ‘tomato’. We expect the last word to be less similar to the ﬁrst word than ‘cheddar’ is. For the sake of simplicity we will pick only one synset for each word from WordNet. In the case of ‘gouda’, that sense is: “mild cream-colored Dutch cheese shaped in balls”. For ‘cheddar’ it is “hard smooth-textured cheese; originally made in Cheddar in southwestern England”. Finally, for ‘tomato’: “mildly acid red or yellow pulpy fruit eaten as a vegetable”. As it turns out, the path similarity between ‘gouda’ and ‘cheddar’ synsets is 0.33, while only 0.14 between ‘gouda’ and ‘tomato’ synsets. Our trivial conclusion is as follows: ‘gouda’ is semantically more similar to ‘cheddar’ than to ‘tomato’7. The analysis was performed using 3.4 version of NLTK package (Bird, Loper, & Klein, 2009) and Python 3.7.1.

7If there would be more than one synset of interest for each word, as in this study, we could for example average the similarities. 74 2.2. Study 1. WordNet

In terms of the hypotheses, the ﬁrst part of this study was designed to provide a preliminary insight on LH1−4, assuming that experts identify consciousness with its phenomenal variety. The remaining speciﬁcations of LH

(LH5 and LH6) were tested in the second part, as direct measurements of similarity were calculated between CR-words, i.e., their selected synsets. Due to the nature of data available in the WordNet, for LH to be rejected, the ﬁrst part should show that only few CR-words’ synsets are useful for describing the phenomenal consciousness and — more importantly — that CR- words are less similar to each other than the control pairs are, i.e., the antonyms and the semantically unrelated pairs. Given the phenomenal reading of the expert view in this case, especially ‘consciousness’, ‘feeling’, and ‘experience’ should have higher similar scores with each other than to the remaining CR- words.

2 . 2 . 2 R ESULTSANDDISCUSSION

2.2.2.1 Part 1. Synsets that can be used to describe phenomenal consciousness

Synsets for the selected CR-words are presented in Table 2.1. The ones that both experts rated as usable to describe phenomenal consciousness are underlined (inter-rater reliability statistic, κ, was .798). Not a single synset of neither ‘awareness’ nor ‘consciousness’ was selected. Looking at a sheer number of synsets per given CR-word, WordNet data suggests that ‘feeling’ is the word that has the most varied semantics. Most of these senses, as well as in the case of ‘experience’, are related to the verb form of this word. However, among those selected by raters are both noun and verb forms of these CR-words. As senses in WordNet are ordered starting from the most common ones, the ﬁrst synset corresponds to the prevailing meaning of the word8. However, only in the case of ‘emotion’ and ‘feeling’ does the ﬁrst synset represent a sense relatable to the phenomenal consciousness.

Word Sense awareness awareness.n.01 having knowledge of awareness.n.02 state of elementary or undifferentiated consciousness

8Detailed documentation available at WordNet’s (2010) website: https://wordnet .princeton.edu [Accessed: 18 May, 2020]. 2.2. Study 1. WordNet 75

Word Sense consciousness consciousness.n.01 an alert cognitive state in which you are aware of yourself and your situation awareness.n.01 having knowledge of emotion emotion.n.01 any strong feeling experience experience.n.01 the accumulation of knowledge or skill that results from direct participation in events or activities experience.n.02 the content of direct observation or participation in an event experience.n.03 an event as apprehended experience.v.01 go or live through know.v.05 have firsthand knowledge of states, situations, emotions, or sensations experience.v.03 go through (mental or physical states or experiences) feel.v.01 undergo an emotional sensation or be in a particular state of mind have.v.11 undergo feeling feeling.n.01 the experiencing of affective and emotional states impression.n.01 a vague idea in which some confidence is placed spirit.n.02 the general atmosphere of a place or situation and the effect that it has on people feeling.n.04 a physical sensation that you experience touch.n.10 the sensation produced by pressure receptors in the skin feeling.n.06 an intuitive understanding of something feel.v.01 undergo an emotional sensation or be in a particular state of mind find.v.05 come to believe on the basis of emotion, intuitions, or indefinite grounds feel.v.03 perceive by a physical sensation, e.g., coming from the skin or muscles feel.v.04 be conscious of a physical, mental, or emotional state feel.v.05 have a feeling or perception about oneself in reaction to someone’s behavior or attitude feel.v.06 undergo passive experience of: ‘We felt the effects of infla- tion’ feel.v.07 be felt or perceived in a certain way feel.v.08 grope or feel in search of something feel.v.09 examine by touch palpate.v.01 examine (a body part) by palpation feel.v.11 find by testing or cautious exploration feel.v.12 produce a certain impression 76 2.2. Study 1. WordNet

Word Sense feel.v.13 pass one’s hands over the sexual organs of

Table 2.1: Synsets of CR-words along with their labels, ordered by their popularity. Underlined are the ones chosen by raters as consistent with at least partly descriptions of the phenomenal consciousness.

Among nineteen synsets of ‘feeling’ we ﬁnd: “a physical sensation that you experience” (4th most common), “the sensation produced by pressure receptors in the skin” (5th), “undergo an emotional sensation or be in a particular state of mind” (7th), “perceive by a physical sensation, e.g., coming from the skin or muscles” (9th), “be conscious of a physical, mental, or emotional state” (10th), “have a feeling or perception about oneself in reaction to someone’s behavior or attitude” (11th), “be felt or perceived in a certain way” (13th). There is synset that was selected as relatable to the concept of phenomenal consciousness, that is shared between ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’: “undergo an emotional sensation or be in a particular state of mind” (7th for both the former and the latter). ‘Feeling’ has the biggest number of synsets relatable to the phenomenal consciousness, albeit they all relate to the perceptual, bodily, and emotional states. Given these are the typical examples of phenomenal states in the philosophical literature, among chosen CR-words, results indicate that ‘feeling’ is semantically closest to the concept of phenomenal consciousness.

2.2.2.2 Part 2. Computing path similarities between CR-words

To ﬁnd out more details about the semantic similarity between CR-words, the shortest path distances for the selected synsets were calculated. These are presented in Figure 2.1. Only one synset, feel.v.01, was shared between two words, i.e., ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’. Low similarity scores in Figure 2.1 seem to suggest that nearly all synsets are semantically far away from one another. However, in order to gain perspective on the WordNet data, similar scores were computed for synsets of antonyms, unrelated, and related word pairs9.

9They are presented in Appendix A 2.2. Study 1. WordNet 77 Level similarityof

Figure 2.1: Similarity matrix for the synsets of CR-words. 78 2.2. Study 1. WordNet

Table 2.2 presents the mean similarities between synsets for chosen words. While for CR-words, only synsets selected in the previous part of the study were used to calculate the mean similarities, in the case of remaining words all their synsets were used. The popularity of any given synset for any given word was ignored. Path similarity values between CR-words are the closest to those of the antonyms. However, the near-synonymous pairs, when averaged across all synsets, have a quite wide range of similarity scores. What this indicates is that it is rather speciﬁc synsets or subsets of all synsets of given words that are synonymous with each other rather than all of the synsets of the given words10.

Word1 Word2 Mean similarity (0-1) CR-words experience feeling .16 emotion feeling .15 emotion experience .11 antonyms war peace .1 arrival departure .13 text speech .11 unrelated pizza luna .06 book earth .08 coffee citizen .09 near-synonyms speech talk .09 cab taxi .24 church chapel .12

Table 2.2: Mean similarities between words based on chosen synsets.

10This evidence of polysemy is more directly seeable when looking at the similarity scores between individual synset pairs of chosen antonyms, unrelated, and near-synonyms. As stated few paragraphs earlier and in Appendix A this data is available in the dissertation repository at Open Science Framework. 2.2. Study 1. WordNet 79

While raters did not choose any synsets of ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ in the first stage of this study, one of LH specifications, LH6, postulated that ‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’ should be less similar to one another than ‘consciousness’ to ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’. In order to cover that LH specification as well, additional similarity scores were calculated: between synsets of ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’, and synsets of CR-words, selected in the previous stage. Mean scores are presented in Table 2.3.

Word1 Word2 Mean similarity (0-1) awareness consciousness .41 awareness emotion .11 awareness experience .09 awareness feeling .09 consciousness emotion .12 consciousness experience .09 consciousness feeling .1

Table 2.3: Mean similarities between ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ and other CR-words.

2.2.2.3 Discussion of Study 1

The results of the first stage of this study do not support LH1−3. Raters found no synset for ‘consciousness’ that could be used to describe phenomenal consciousness. According to the expert view in its phenomenal reading, ‘consciousness’ is often used to describe phenomenal consciousness, as for this view the phenomenal understanding is the most important way of understanding ‘consciousness’. However, as such synsets were found for both ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’, the results of the first stage support LH4. There are synsets of these words in the English language that are consistent with the concept of phenomenal consciousness. Mean similarity scores from the second stage of this study indicate that ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ are as semantically similar to one another as they are to ‘emotion’, with ‘feeling’ being more similar to the latter than is ‘experience’. While, overall, the mean similarity scores were low, there was one pair of synsets that yielded relatively high value: one synset of ‘feeling’ had .5 similarity score with the only synset of ‘emotion’. Since it was not the case 80 2.2. Study 1. WordNet for any of the synsets of ‘experience’, this result suggests that ‘feeling’ usage may elicit intuitions consistent with emotions more often than ‘experience’ does. The synset in question is: ‘experiencing of affective and emotional states’ (Table 2.1). Nevertheless, low mean scores indicate that ‘feeling’, just like ‘experiencing’, is used in a variety of different semantic contexts. Comparing these mean scores with control conditions (Table 2.2), while CR-words are generally more similar to each other than words semantically unrelated, this similarity is as high as in the case of antonyms. Nevertheless, while for the near-synonyms there was a higher score, which could mean that ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ are not as closely related as the expert view might suggest, near-synonyms scores constitute the most varied group. ‘Speech’ and ‘talk’, belonging to the near-synonymous group, yielded as low score as unrelated pairs. Calculating similarity scores directly between ‘awareness’, ‘consciousness’, and the remaining CR-words indicate that the former two words are more similar to each other than to any other CR-word (Table 2.3). Such an outcome is an indication that Chalmers’ distinction represented in LH6 is false for everyday language. Moreover, scores between ‘consciousness’ and ‘experience’, and ‘feeling’ are slightly lower than those for ‘emotion’ and ‘experience’, and ‘feeling’ (also when looking at results of synset pairs comparisons), which fails to support LH5. Overall, the first study provided only limited evidence against LH, i.e., while outcomes of the first part of the study are supportive of LH4, they do not support the first three specifications of LH. Results from the second part, while indicating general low similarity between CR-words, are not as unam- biguous as the first part. Mean similarity scores for antonym and semantically unrelated pairs were quite close to those of near-synonyms which indicate that the mean similarity alone is a rather blunt indicator of semantic similarity. However, it was enough to detect a rather high similarity between ‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’, which is consistent with the results of the first part of the study and fails to support LH6. In the analysis of similarity scores for each synset pair one outcome of the second part of the study stood out: one of ‘feeling’ synsets has a high similarity score with the synset of ‘emotion’, thus the former is sometimes used to describe emotional states. Since ‘feeling’ has no synset that would be as similar to any ‘consciousness’ synsets, results cast doubt on LH5 as well. 2.3. Study 2. Word embeddings 81

Since semantic relationships between words in WordNet are ultimately judged by lexicographers, it is possible that results were biased by the fact that WordNet’s authors themselves did not share particular intuitions regarding chosen words. To account for this, the second study was designed and performed.

2.3 Study 2. Word embeddings

The second study adopted a machine learning approach. Word embedding is a set of increasingly popular techniques that map words into multidimensional vector models. Trained on extensive bodies of texts, such algorithms look for patterns of word usages. Word vectors contain both syntactic and semantic regularities (Mikolov, Chen, et al., 2013). Word embedding approaches, then, make extensive use of the distributional hypothesis, as described in Section 2. Word’s vector representations vary in the number of dimensions, i.e., the number of numerical values used to describe each word. The higher the number, the bigger are the computational costs of generating embeddings. The typical choices are between 50 and 300 dimensions (Goldberg, 2017, p. 121). Free to use pre-trained language models of the more popular algorithms: word2vec11. and fastText12, are 300-dimensional (Grave et al., 2018; Mikolov, Sutskever, Chen, Corrado, & Dean, 2013). Furthermore, such vectors can be used in an arithmetic way. A famous example is that when from vector of ‘king’ we subtract vector of ‘man’ and add vector of ‘woman’, we get a result close to the ‘queen’ vector (Mikolov, Yih, & Zweig, 2013). A point to remember is that word embeddings do not differentiate between different senses of the word, like synsets in WordNet did. Each word has a single vector. Moreover, the semantic similarity is understood strictly operationally: words are semantically similar if they are used in the same contexts, i.e., places in the texts.

11Available at https://code.google.com/archive/p/word2vec/ [Accessed: 18 May, 2020]. 12Available at https://fasttext.cc/docs/en/crawl-vectors.html [Accessed: 18 May, 2020]. 82 2.3. Study 2. Word embeddings

In the WordNet study, the types of contexts were ultimately judged by the lexicographers in the form of synsets. That is not the case for the word embedding approaches. Neural networks that are at play are simply provided with the corpora and they generate word vectors themselves13. Word embeddings are purely distributional, there is no referring to the experts involved.

2 . 3 . 1 M ETHODS

The following study used fastText, an algorithm thought as a successor of the word2vec method (Bojanowski et al., 2016). A pre-trained vector model of the English language was used (Mikolov, Grave, Bojanowski, Puhrsch, & Joulin, 2018). As the model was trained on the Common Crawl and Wikipedia website14, with the latter source supplying only few percentages of total data, its vectors stem from real-world, ordinary usage of the English language. This time the similarity measure was the cosine similarity, with the value ranging from 0 to 1, the latter being complete interchangeability, but calculated differently than the path similarity used in the WordNet study (Yates & Neto, 1999). As word embeddings are insensitive to the polysemy, only some speci- ﬁcations of LH could be investigated. Direct similarity comparisons between

CR-words were performed, thus testing LH5−6. The same comparisons were performed for the reference pairs from Study 1. To include additional insight on LH3−4, words that are most similar to CR-words were generated. Study 2 was performed using 3.8 version of Gensim package (Rehôˇrekˇ & Sojka, 2010) and 3.7.4 version of Python. The pre-trained model is case- sensitive and is not performing lemmatization — grouping together different forms of a given word — so multiple appearances of the same words were omitted in the results.

2 . 3 . 2 R ESULTSANDDISCUSSION

Cosine similarities between CR-words and for the reference pairs are presented in Table 2.4. The most similar pair for this pre-trained model is ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’, with ‘emotion’ and ‘feeling’ being behind. As noted before, word embeddings are not enough to differentiate between antonyms

13More on the limitations of distributional methods in the computational linguistics can be found in Goldberg 2017, ch. 10.7 14Common Crawl: https://commoncrawl.org, Wikipedia: https://www.wikipedia.org [Accessed: 18 May, 2020]. 2.3. Study 2. Word embeddings 83 and synonyms. Similarity scores for CR-words were around the values of both antonym and near-synonymous pairs. The latter had, overall, the highest similarity. CR-words turned out to be more similar in the pre-trained model than word pairs from the unrelated group.

Word1 Word2 cos(θ) CR-words awareness consciousness .67 awareness emotion .48 awareness experience .5 awareness feeling .45 consciousness emotion .51 consciousness experience .44 consciousness feeling .42 emotion experience .44 emotion feeling .59 experience feeling .53 antonyms war peace .57 arrival departure .77 text speech .49 unrelated pizza luna .33 book earth .25 coffee citizen .31 near-synonyms speech talk .47 cab taxi .81 church chapel .71

Table 2.4: Cosine similarities (cos(θ)) between CR-words and reference pairs calculated on the fastText pre-trained model of the English language.

The differences between similarity scores for CR-words are rather small, however, they provide a small indication that LH5 is false: in the case of ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’, the similarity with ‘emotion’ is slightly higher than that with ‘consciousness’. Moreover, results are inconsistent with LH6 as well: ‘consciousness’ is more similar to ‘awareness’ than to the ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’. 84 2.3. Study 2. Word embeddings

Cosine similarity does not inform about contexts in which given words are used, so it might be that people have intuitions consistent with LH5−6, but use different words. To account for that, I generated lists of the ﬁfteen most similar words to each CR-word. The results are shown in Table 2.5.

Word Most similar words awareness perception, consciousness, understanding, knowledge, alertness, recognition, visibility, appreciation, sensitivity, perceptivity,heightened, comprehension, mindfulness, apperceptive, awakeness consciousness life-stream, awakeness, mind-ﬁeld, awareness, selfhood, apperceptive, brain-mind, recognition, perception, tran- scendence, mineness, innerness, wakefulness, mind-state, self-contraction emotion sadness, emotiveness, feelings, anger, pathos, visceral- ity, sentimentality, angst, excitement, elation, passion, an- guish, grief, hatred, pensiveness experience knowledge, ﬁrst-hand, expertise, understanding, insight, familiarity, learning, perspective, enjoyment, real-work, interaction, life, lifetime, perception, experiental feeling sensation, thinking, uneasiness, knowing, sense, aching, craving, longing, unease, dread, heartsickness, fear, mood, panging, pukish

Table 2.5: Lists of ﬁfteen most similar words from the pre-trained model to the CR-words, case-, inﬂection-, and negation- insensitive.

Results indicate that words such as ‘experience’ and ‘consciousness’ are used in very different contexts than other CR-words. The former is ﬁrst: ‘to be experienced at’, associated with being an expert within a given practical or theoretical domain, e.g., being a skillful archer or being versed in ancient history (let me emphasize that this expression does not relate in any sense to the meaning of ‘experience’ discussed by experts in consciousness studies), second: the perception. ‘Consciousness’ is the most varied of the group, with some similar words indicating the level of consciousness — being awake — while others with the mind and perceptual capacities. As from the most similar words only ‘mineness’ and maybe ‘mind-state’ could be used to describe phenomenal 2.3. Study 2. Word embeddings 85

15 consciousness, ﬁndings are inconsistent with LH3 . Given that there is a small overlap in terms of the most similar words to ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’, which might explain the relatively high cosine similarity between these words,

ﬁndings are also inconsistent with LH6. On the other hand, LH4, postulating that ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ are used in the phenomenal contexts, is partly consistent: ‘feeling’ is used in contexts of sensations and emotional states. The relatively close relationship between ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ visible in Table 2.4 is supported by the fact that ‘awareness’ is one of the most similar words with the ‘consciousness’ and vice versa. Taking the aforementioned comments into account, it could be said that

LH as such — with the exclusion of partly consistent LH4 — is not supported by the results of Study 2. Furthermore, ﬁndings from Study 2 generally agree with those from Study 1: ‘consciousness’ is more similar to ‘awareness’ than to any other CR-word, and both ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ are less similar to ‘consciousness’ than to ‘emotion’. Surprisingly, ‘feeling’ is more similar to ‘emotion’ than to any other CR word, which signals that it may be more associated with emotional states than with mental states of any other kind. The results of the preliminary Studies 1 and 2 cast doubt on the validity of LH. CR-words are semantically related, but there are indications that ‘consciousness’ is the closest to the ‘awareness’, while ‘feeling’ is closer ‘emotion’, than to ‘experience’. Although it was possible to juxtapose different LH speciﬁcations with each CR-word’s list of synsets (Study 1) and of the most similar words (Study 2), both measures of similarity between CR-words (path similarity in Study 1 and cosine similarity in Study 2) yielded results not far from corresponding scores for control pairs. E.g., in Study 2, while for all CR-word pairs scores were higher than for any of the semantically unrelated pairs, they were in the same range as for both antonym and near-synonym pairs. Also, the corpus that was used to train the model (Common Crawl data) was not representative of the English language. To ensure that conclusions are based on a more realistic representation of English, Study 3 was designed and performed.

15Given the rich variety found in the results and the realization that there are many scientiﬁc and philosophic accounts of consciousness, ﬁndings from Study 2 are not inconsistent with LH2 (which claims that ‘consciousness’ is used in the same way in the academic and in the non-academic language). 86 2.4. Study 3. Corpus

2.4 Study 3. Corpus

Corpus linguistics tries to create corpora, a set of texts, that is both representative and balanced. Corpora should not only be representative, i.e., cover those linguistics domains a researcher is interested in, they should also be balanced, i.e., sampled proportionally to the way these varieties exist in real- world usage (Gries, 2009). To some extent, these criteria are arbitrary, as we do not possess complete knowledge about every linguistic phenomenon of the inquired natural language. Because perfect representativeness is out of reach, efforts are taken to make corpora as balanced as possible. As a corpus of choice for Study 3, the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) was used (Davies, 2008). It consists of more than 560 million words and is one of the biggest and balanced corpora of the English language. Because of the richness of data from COCA, details about how the data was collected and how it relates to hypotheses are given in a separate subsection. After that, information about the speciﬁc methods used is provided.

2 . 4 . 1 D ATAACQUISITIONANDHYPOTHESES

For each CR-word, concordance and collocation data were extracted from COCA in October 2018. The ﬁrst type of data provides details on how often a given word is used, while the second tells us which and how frequently other words non-randomly co-occur with a given word. As COCA does lemmatization, data on lemma forms of CR-words were extracted. A lemma is a dictionary form of the word, such that, for example, ignores the differences between inﬂected forms. In the case of ‘feeling’ then, cumulative data for forms like ‘feeling’ and ‘feelings’ were collected. Furthermore, data was collected separately for the academic (>111 million words) and the non-academic (>464 million words) subcorpora of COCA16. To ensure comparability, for each word only adjective collocates were searched for.

16Collecting data only from the philosophical texts is possible, but there are two reasons for not doing so in this case. First, philosophy texts in COCA are grouped with texts on the subject of religion. Second, while the concept of phenomenal consciousness grew out of the philosophy of mind, it is widely used in all sciences related to human cognition. 2.4. Study 3. Corpus 87

In effect, a set of data was collected. Concordance data were frequencies of how many times a given word appeared in a given corpus. Collocation data consisted of three elements: 1) collocation proﬁle, a list of co-occurring words (collocates) for each CR-word, 2) strength of the non-random association for each collocate with given CR-word, and 3) counts of how many times collocate appeared nearby given CR word in a given corpus. In the case of Study 3, all speciﬁcations of LH listed in Section 2.1 could be tested. Below I discuss conditions that should be met to allow hypotheses from LH1 to LH6 to be tested.

If LH1 is true, given COCA data, CR-words should meet two criteria: 1) they occur with similar frequency in both the academic and the non-academic corpora (concordance data), 2) they have similar collocation profiles between corpora. By a ‘similar collocation profile’, I mean two properties of CR-words. First, the percentage of collocates that are shared between profiles. However, that is not enough, as a small percentage in the case of words semantically related can be explained by the polysemic nature of words in natural languages. That is, there still could be a relevant meaning that is shared, but are obscured by the number of meanings that are not shared. That is why the similarity between collocation profiles means also that there is a similarity within frequencies, i.e., that the shared collocates are used as often alongside both words. For LH2 to be corroborated, these considerations should apply at least to ‘consciousness’.

As LH3 and LH4 deal with a special case of consciousness, its phenomenal variety, among the collocates of ‘consciousness’, ‘experience’, and ‘feeling’ there should be many words suitable to describe phenomenal consciousness.

To test LH5 and LH6, a comparison of collocation proﬁles of relevant CR- words needs to be made. For example, if LH6 is to be corroborated by data, ‘consciousness’ should have less similar collocation proﬁle to ‘awareness’ than to ‘feeling’ or ‘experience’. Given that the obviousness claim refers both to expert and non-expert view about consciousness, but also about the expert view, mentioned similarities should be observable in both corpora. 88 2.4. Study 3. Corpus

Above mentioned specifications of LH focus on the differences between specific CR-words. In contrast, the two remaining LH specifications, LH3 and LH4, are claims about a specific meaning, i.e., the phenomenal claim. To address these directly, collocation profiles of relevant CR-words should be evaluated in greater detail, with the help of quantitative analysis of whether given collocates are consistent with descriptions of the concept of the phenomenal consciousness.

2 . 4 . 2 M ETHODS

Association measure used for generating collocation data was mutual information (MI), one of the measures often used in the corpus linguistics (Church & Hanks, 1990). Collocations were extracted with a span setting of 2 words both left and right from the target word. As mentioned earlier, only adjective collocations were collected. To adjust for the tendency of MI score to favor rare words, collocates were further sorted by their frequencies (Kilgarriff, 2001). To assess whether consciousness-related words are used as often in the non-academic as in the academic language (the first criterion for LH1), frequency of their appearances in the academic and non-academic corpora was compared with G-test (Woolf, 1957), because frequencies are count data (Fisher, 1922; Pearson, 1900). To assess the second criterion, i.e., the similarity of collocation profiles, for each CR-word, percentages of collocates shared between corpora were calculated. The idea here is simple: the percentage of overlap in collocation profiles between corpora gives us a measure of how much of word’s semantic diversity is kept between academic and non-academic languages. Frequency distributions of these collocates between corpora were then compared with G-test, to test for differences in how often were they used.

To test LH3 and LH4, among ﬁfty most frequent collocates of ‘consciousness’, ‘experience’, and ‘feeling’ within the non-academic corpus, words that could be used to describe phenomenal consciousness were looked for by two independent raters, one with a degree in philosophy and the other with a degree in cognitive science. Raters were given a list of collocations (collocate + target word) with the following instruction: ‘From the following list, select items that you could use when describing, even if only partly, the concept of the phenomenal consciousness. If possible, after making a selection, note what kind of phenomenal state could you describe with the given item (you 2.4. Study 3. Corpus 89 can select more than one): emotional, perceptual, bodily, imaginative, or other (select also when it is difﬁcult to decide on any of the remaining types)’. The second sentence was added to check how exhaustive the description of the phenomenal consciousness can be provided by these three CR-words. For

LH3 and LH4 to be corroborated, such analysis should show that there are collocates suitable to describe varied phenomenal states among most frequent collocates of ‘consciousness’, ‘experience’, and ‘feeling’.

For LH5 to be corroborated there should be more collocates in collocation proﬁles of ‘experience’ and‘feeling’ that are also collocates of ‘consciousness’ than those that are also collocates of ‘emotion’. For LH6 to be corroborated there should be more collocates in the collocation proﬁle of ‘consciousness’ that are also collocates of ‘experience’ or ‘feeling’ than those that are also collocates of ‘awareness’. Frequencies among shared collocates within each corpus were compared with G-test for following pairs: 1)‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’; 2) ‘consciousness’ and ‘experience’; 3) ‘consciousness’ and ‘feeling’; 4)

‘experience’ and ‘emotion’; 5) ‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’. If, for example, LH5 was to be confirmed, then beside bigger overlaps in collocation profiles for ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ with ‘consciousness’ than with ‘emotion’, the frequency of usage of these overlapped collocates should be similar for ‘experience’, ‘feeling’, and ‘consciousness’, but not for ‘emotion’ and ‘consciousness’. If for any of the above word pairs, shared collocates would have similar frequency patterns, an additional checkup of these collocates was planned. What would be looked for in such data were phrases consistent with concepts of consciousness (such as phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, or self-consciousness), popular in the academic discourse among cognitive scientists. Such a checkup was designed to filter out situations in which some collocates are shared between CR-words, but they do not carry consciousness- related meaning. The interpretation here goes like this: if such shared collocates were to be found, then what was common to words in such a pair was meaning non-related to consciousness and thus irrelevant to my analysis. Pro- viding an example: let us assume that the shared collocates of ‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’ have similar frequency distributions, but among these shared collocates are mainly collocates like ‘cinematic’, ‘musical’, ‘cultural’. Since such collocates are not consistent with speaking about any popular concept of consciousness in cognitive science, the similarity of frequency patterns would be irrelevant to my analysis. 90 2.4. Study 3. Corpus

Bonferroni correction was applied for simultaneous multiple testing. When comparisons were made between corpora, normalized frequencies instead of raw data were used, to control for differences in corpus size (Evison, 2010). Statistical analysis was performed using the R programming language (Ihaka & Gentleman, 1996) with the help of the DescTools package (Signorell, 2015).

2 . 4 . 3 R ESULTSANDDISCUSSION

2.4.3.1 How often are CR-words used in the academic and the non- academic languages?

As is visible in Table 2.6, with the exception for ‘emotion’, chosen words are predominantly scientiﬁc: it is far more likely to ﬁnd them in the academic language than in the non-academic (G = 135.92; df = 4; p < .0001; effect size of V = .37). Because the academic corpus is smaller than the non-academic, normalized frequencies (frequency of a given word per 1 mln words) were used in each comparison.

Academic Non-academic G-test rawa per 1mlnb rawa per 1mlnb awareness 10752 97 8128 18 G = 59.64, df = 1, p < .0001, V = .005 consciousness 6188 56 6516 14 G = 26.985, df = 1, p < .0001, V = .004 emotion 2147 19 7775 17 G = .11117, df = 1, p > .05, V = .0002 experience 50685 455 73635 160 G = 147.545, df = 1, p < .0001 , V = .008 feeling 7486 67 62517 136 G = 23.929, df = 1, p < .0001, V = .003

a — raw frequencies, as collected from a given corpus b — rounded normalized frequencies, per 1 million words in a given corpus.

Table 2.6: Total and normalized frequencies of CR-words. Results in the last column inform how word frequencies differed between corpora. G-test was Bonferroni corrected at adjusted alpha level of .05/5.

The difference in concordances cannot be explained away by alluding to the differences in corpora’s size, i.e., that there are simply fewer words in the academic corpus, and so those that are used, are used relatively often. Though the non-academic corpus is bigger than the academic one, the difference in their size is accounted for by using normalized frequencies in calculations. For the size of the corpus to inﬂuence a frequency of a given word, the factor by which chosen words differ between corpora would be expected to be around 2.4. Study 3. Corpus 91

4 (the academic corpus comprises roughly 115 mln and the non-academic corpus 464 mln words). This is not what happens in data. Frequencies of usage of consciousness-related words differ between the academic and the non-academic language in varying degrees.

The ﬁrst criterion for LH1, that the CR-words are used as often in both corpora, is not met in COCA data.

2.4.3.2 How many collocates are shared between CR-words within and between corpora?

None of the words has the same collocation profile in both academic and non-academic languages. As shown in Table 2.7, the percentages of collocation profiles’ overlap between corpora do not exceed 39%. The word with the largest share of its academic collocates in its non-academic collocation profile is ‘feeling’ (38.33%), with ‘consciousness’ being at the opposite end of the spectrum (14.58%). The shared part of profiles between corpora, then, presents a very limited account of how CR-words are being used in science and philosophy. However, given the polysemic nature of words in ordinary language, the percentages are probably sufficient to potentially transfer the meaning related to the concept of the phenomenal consciousness. Percentages of overlaps alone, then, are not inconsistent with LH1 and LH2.

Word CPa CPna CPa∗na %a %na awareness 319 398 62 19.44 15.58 consciousness 337 317 49 14.54 15.46 emotion 153 359 35 22.88 9.75 experience 927 1440 163 17.58 11.32 feeling 457 1170 174 38.07 14.87

Table 2.7: Percentage of overlap for collocation profiles of CR-words between corpora. CPa and CPna — number of collocates, respectively, in the academic or the non-academic collocation profile; CPa∗na — number of shared collocates between corpora; %a and %na — the percentage of, respectively, the academic or the non-academic profile shared between corpora. 92 2.4. Study 3. Corpus

Percentages are even smaller when it comes to the shared parts of collocation proﬁles between words within a given corpus. Table 2.8 presents such results. Inconsistently with LH5, the overlaps for ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ with ‘consciousness’ are smaller than those with ‘emotion’ in both corpora.

The prediction of LH6 that ‘consciousness’ is more similar to ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ than to ‘awareness’ occurred also false with respect to the size of the overlap between these words in each corpus.

Word pair CPa1∗2 %a1 %a2 CPna1∗2 %na1 %na2 awareness-consciousness 20 6.27 5.93 51 12.81 16.1 awareness-emotion 7 2.19 4.58 26 6.53 7.24 awareness-experience 25 7.84 2.7 49 12.31 3.4 awareness-feeling 22 6.9 4.81 39 9.8 3.33 consciousness-emotion 12 3.56 7.84 25 7.89 6.96 consciousness-experience 18 5.34 1.94 20 6.31 1.39 consciousness-feeling 18 5.34 3.94 16 5.05 1.37 emotion-experience 11 7.19 1.19 34 9.47 2.36 emotion-feeling 18 11.76 3.94 56 15.6 4.79 experience-feeling 24 2.59 5.26 59 4.1 5.04

Table 2.8: Percentage of overlap for collocation profiles of CR-words within corpora. CPa1∗2 and CPna1∗2 — number of shared collocates between, respectively, the academic or the non- academic collocation profiles; %a1 and %na1 — the percentage of collocates from, respectively, the academic or the non-academic profile of the first word of the pair shared with the profile of the second word; %na1 and %na2 — the percentage of collocates from, respectively, the academic or the non-academic profile of the first word of the pair shared with the profile of the second word.

2.4.3.3 Can CR-words be used to describe the concept of phenomenal consciousness?

As was planned for the purpose of testing LH3 and LH4, most frequent collocates for related CR-words, i.e., ‘consciousness, ‘experience’, and ‘feeling’, were extracted and, collocate + target word pairs, evaluated by independent raters (κ = .839). The results are presented in Table 2.9. In terms of the kinds of phenomenal states that selected collocations could help describe, the two ‘consciousness’ collocates that were selected were judged to be useful in describing perceptual and imaginative states. In the case of ‘experience’, after adding up ratings from both judges, choices were as follows: perceptual states – 2 (e.g., ‘visual’), bodily – 9 (e.g., ‘painful’), emotional – 18 (e.g., ‘traumatic’), imaginative – 4 (e.g., ‘memorable’), and other 2.4. Study 3. Corpus 93 or difﬁcult to say – 7 (e.g., ‘authentic’). For ‘feeling’: perceptual – 0, bodily – 20 (e.g., ‘relaxed’), emotional – 28 (e.g., ‘embarrassed’), other or difﬁcult to say – 2 (e.g., ‘dizzy’). Summing these ratings, most collocations that were judged to be usable in describing the phenomenal consciousness would be used to describe bodily or emotional states in the case of both ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’.

No consciousness experience feeling 1 public personal sorry 2 national previous guilty 3 human religious strong 4 social similar sick 5 collective wonderful strange 6 political extensive warm 7 environmental positive uneasy 8 lost sexual tired 9 popular near-death comfortable 10 global unique uncomfortable 11 cultural hands-on conﬁdent 12 false ﬁrst-hand wonderful 13 cosmic shared funny 14 historical amazing sad 15 feminist painful lonely 16 altered educational odd 17 inner spiritual terrible 18 ecological emotional mutual 19 heightened traumatic helpless 20 racial overall foolish 21 spiritual prior depressed 22 ordinary pleasant weird 23 mainstream limited eerie 24 expanded actual awful 25 impaired incredible queasy 26 raised out-of-body anxious 27 shared practical horrible 28 civic valuable vulnerable 29 sporting intense overwhelming 30 emerging humbling optimistic 31 widespread extraordinary overwhelmed 32 visual life-changing awkward 33 advanced bitter ashamed 34 dawning african-american distinct 35 enlightened clinical vague 36 unhappy immersive nagging 37 changing rewarding dizzy 38 everyday memorable insecure 94 2.4. Study 3. Corpus

No consciousness experience feeling 39 stream-of- driving embarrassed 40 pop-culture visual creepy 41 emergent civic widespread 42 evolving horrible genuine 43 self- ultimate sickening 44 enhanced everyday self-conscious 45 communal terrifying generous 46 dual frightening exhausted 47 feminine intimate relaxed 48 acute once-in-a-lifetime giddy 49 culinary authentic frustrated 50 rising considerable betrayed

Table 2.9: Most frequent collocates in the non-academic corpus. Collocates that were selected by both raters are bolded.

The drastic difference in the number of collocates selected for ‘consciousness’ and the remaining two words is visible to a naked eye. However, there are also signiﬁcantly fewer collocations selected for ‘experience’ than ‘feeling’: G = 5.1396, df = 1, p < .05.

Findings do not support LH3, i.e., ‘consciousness’ is not typically used in contexts consistent with the concept of the phenomenal consciousness.

Moreover, LH4 is not supported as well. There are words useful to describe phenomenal states among the most frequently used collocates in the non- academic language of both ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’. In the case of the latter such collocates even constitute 50% of ﬁfty most frequent collocates. Never- theless, they were found to be predominantly useful in describing emotional and bodily states. Since these two types of states function independently of phenomenal states, LH4 should be rejected as well.

2.4.3.4 How similar are the shared parts of collocation proﬁles?

Given the differences in the size of the academic and the non-academic corpora, for each CR-word the normalized frequencies were calculated for the collocates shared between corpora. Since we have to do with small frequencies, they were normalized to a rather large value of 100 millions17. Only

17It is more often to normalize frequencies to per 1 million. That is the case in COCA online interface itself: one can display frequencies of words per 1 million in a given corpus. However given that both the academic and the non-academic subcorpora are large (> 100 mln), a larger denominator was chosen. 2.4. Study 3. Corpus 95 collocates for which normalized frequencies could be rounded at least to a single positive integer (1) were used in the analysis. The results are presented in Table 2.10. Results indicate that even though for CR-words some collocates appear in both the academic and the non-academic languages, they are used with varying frequencies. The exception here is ‘consciousness’, for which there were no differences in frequencies of usage of the collocates shared between corpora. While LH1 should be rejected, then, ﬁndings support LH2 in the sense that there is a portion of the collocation proﬁle of ‘consciousness’ that is used as frequent in both corpora.

Word G df p V awareness 370.38 36 < .0001 .33 consciousness 27.787 22 .914 .18 emotion 50.846 19 < .001 .52 experience 736.84 111 < .0001 .38 feeling 358.4 150 < .0001 .39

Table 2.10: Results for testing for differences in frequencies of collocates shared between corpora for each CR-word.

However, after investigating which collocates of ‘consciousness’ are used with the same distribution of frequency in both the academic and the non- academic corpus, the aforementioned support for LH2 is only apparent. The collocates are as follows: ‘altered’, ‘civic’, ‘collective’, ‘cosmic’, ‘culinary’, ‘dawning’, ‘ecological’, ‘emergent’, ‘emerging’, ‘everyday’, ‘evolving’, ‘false’, ‘feminist’, ‘heightened’, ‘historical’, ‘human’, ‘national’, ‘ordinary’, ‘racial’, ‘rev- olutionary’, ‘rising’, ‘self-’. These collocates do not ﬁt any scientiﬁc meaning of the word ‘consciousness’ discussed in experts’ circles. More than that, they cannot be grouped into categories, even if these categories were based only on family resemblance. Thus, while LH2 is partially supported by a set of 23 collocates that have a similar distribution of frequencies in both the academic and the non-academic corpus for ‘consciousness’, that set is both extremely small and it does not represent any typical meaningful contexts of academic discourse about consciousness. 96 2.4. Study 3. Corpus

Analogous results for comparisons between CR-words, but within each corpus, are presented in Table 2.11. Findings do not give a clear picture about the validity of LH5 and LH6. For ‘consciousness’ there are differences in overlaps with ‘awareness’ in both corpora, but with ‘experience’ only in the non-academic, and only in the academic with ‘feeling’. Similarly, for ‘emotion’ there are differences with ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ only in the non-academic corpus.

Pair G df p V awareness-consciousness academic 74.45 19 < .0001 .58 non-academic 256.91 50 < .0001 .37 consciousness-experience academic 35.59 17 .05 .35 non-academic 255.09 19 < .0001 .59 consciousness-feeling academic 58.45 17 < .0001 .61 non-academic 11.52 15 1 .28 emotion-experience academic 17.39 10 .66 .22 non-academic 117.54 33 < .0001 .37 emotion-feeling academic 14.49 50 1 .31 non-academic 167.3 55 < .0001 .37

Table 2.11: Tests for differences in frequencies of collocates shared within corpora for selected CR-word pairs.

One has to remember about differences in the size of the overlaps in collocation profiles of CR-words. Shown in Table 2.8, the overlap between ‘consciousness’ and ‘feeling’ in the non-academic corpus consists of 16 collocates, which is 5% of total ‘consciousness’ collocation profile and only 1.4% in the case of ‘feeling’. Little bigger, but still small, are the percentages of overlaps between ‘emotion’, ‘experience’, and ‘feeling’. These are quite small overlaps for LH5−6 to be supported. To investigate this matter further, I performed a follow-up inquiry into these overlapping collocates that yielded similar frequency distributions. The results are presented in Table 2.12. As from the perspective of the folk view about consciousness I am more interested in data from the non-academic corpus, I will focus on it first. There was one pair in the non-academic corpus that had similarly distributed shared collocates: ‘consciousness’ and ‘feeling’. 2.4. Study 3. Corpus 97

However, these collocates do not depict a single popular scientific account of ‘consciousness’. A couple, e.g., ‘powerless’, ‘gnawing’, ‘unattractive’, refer to some negative feelings and conscious states, but others seem to be rather random and nonspecific, e.g., ‘cottony’. So while technically result of the comparison of the frequency distribution of the overlap of ‘consciousness’ and ‘feeling’ collocation profiles in the non-academic corpus does support

LH5−6, its support is inconsequential. These shared collocates do not allow to differentiate emotional states from conscious states, as LH5 states, nor do they allow to differentiate conscious states from functionally understood

‘awareness’, as LH6 states.

Word pair Overlapping collocates consciousness-experience academic bodily, cinematic, contemplative, culinary, diminished, disengaged, esthetic (fco = 1, MIco = 4.54; fex = 20, MIex = 5.82), everyday, inauthentic, intersectional, irish-american, nondualistic, perceptual (fco = 6, MIco = 3.92; fex = 72, MIex = 4.47), phenomenal, spectatorial, transcendent, transcen- dental, transpersonal (fco = 8, MIco = 6.85; fex = 11, MIex = 4.28) consciousness-feeling non-academic constricted, cottony, devoid, disjointed, drowsy, elated, gnawing (f f e = 14, MI f e = 6.86; fco = 2, MIco = 7.32), jittery, mingled, mutinous, powerless (f f e = 30, MI f e = 5.14; fco = 1, MIco = 3.49), repressed, residual, transformed, unattractive, widespread emotion-experience academic aesthetic (fem = 4, MIem = 3.08, fex = 245, MIex = 4.45), de- grading, ecstatic, joyful, liberating, mediated, painful, subjective (fem = 4, MIem = 3.68, fex = 136, MIex = 4.20), unpleasant, vicarious, visceral emotion-feeling academic afraid, confused, drained, ecstatic, expressed, ﬂeeting, genuine, heartfelt, intense (fem = 7, MIem = 4.52, f f e = 11, MI f e = 3.37), jealous, liberating, painful, spontaneous, subjective (fem = 4, MIem = 3.68, f f e = 18, MI f e = 4.05), uncontrollable, unpleasant, vague, visceral

Table 2.12: Overlapping collocates for selected CR-word pairs within each corpus. Collocates which were both frequent and had high Mutual Information score — relative to given collocation proﬁle — have statistical details provided in parentheses (f = frequency with which given word appeared as a collocate in a given corpus, MI = Mutual Information score, CR-word for which values are presented is in subscript, for example f f e is the frequency of a collocate of ‘feeling’ in a given corpus, and MIco is Mutual Information score between a collocate and ‘consciousness’ in a given corpus). 98 2.5. Summary discussion

There are evident similarities among comparisons in the academic corpus. For example, ‘phenomenal’ is a collocate shared between ‘consciousness’ and ’experience’. Among overlaps for ‘emotion’ with both ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ in the academic corpus, there are collocates consistent with speaking about the phenomenal consciousness (e.g., ‘subjective’). However, what these shared collocates suggest is by no means a piece of conclusive evidence for accepting

LH5−6. The assumption that experts identify emotional states with conscious ones is, after all, one of the doubts about the validity of the existing research, as described in Subsection 1.4.4. There are vast differences in collocation profiles between all relevant CR- words, i.e., ‘awareness’, ‘consciousness’, ‘experience’, and ‘feeling’. Among the overlaps, there are mainly differences in frequency distributions. Where there are similarities, they either do not carry academically recognizable meaning — they do not refer to the concept of phenomenal consciousness — or they simply affirm the academic conflating of emotional and conscious states.

2.5 Summary discussion

In this subsection, I recapitulate the main conclusions of the performed linguistic studies, consider some arguments against them, and discuss how these results relate to the obviousness claim and why do they support the consciousness attribution claim. Testing folk intuitions about consciousness is testing a significant — although rarely studied — component of folk psychology. As folk psychology research tradition goes, as argued in Section 1.2, testing folk psychology involves making claims about how people utilize vocabulary related to mental capacities. In this chapter, I presented results of three independent research studies of how some of the consciousness-related words, i.e., words used to describe consciousness, function in the academic and in non-academic languages. In the majority of experiments investigating problems related to the obviousness or the phenomenal claims, researchers asked participants about attributions of few chosen types of mental states, those that they associate with being conscious. Predominantly these were emotional or perceptual states (e.g., Buckwalter & Phelan, 2013; Huebner, 2010; Jack & Robbins, 2012; Sytsma & Machery, 2012b). In practice, participants never had been explicitly asked about the conscious states of other persons. In 2.5. Summary discussion 99 consequence, the questionnaires that researchers designed did not mention these consciousness-related words which are needed to go beyond the enchanted circle of perceptual and emotional mental states. It means that such questionnaire studies were, at best, confined to a tiny segment of conscious mental states. Since there was no previous exploration of how lay persons understand phrases that experts associate with phenomenal conscious states, there is a danger that with their experiments researchers did not tap into folk intuitions about consciousness at all. The linguistic part of my study shows that in the non-academic language there are no phrases which can be easily related to meanings of consciousness so familiar to academic researchers in this domain. This finding supports the validity objection, characterized in the Subsection 1.4.4, and rejects — at least at the linguistic level — the obviousness claim. Let me explain it in a more detailed way. Taken all together, results reported in this chapter are unfavorable for the Linguistic Hypothesis. Only a few, less significant aspects of presented analyzes were promising from LH’s perspective. According to the WordNet data, ‘experience’ and especially ‘feeling’ had some senses relatable to the concept of the phenomenal consciousness, though mainly to the emotional, bodily, and perceptual states. In Study 2, the involvement of contexts relatable to emotions in usages of ‘feeling’ was further indicated. In Study 3, among the most frequent collocates of both ‘experience’ and especially ‘feeling’ were many that were consistent with speaking about the phenomenal consciousness. However, among them were mostly those that described emotional and bodily states, which belong to a small subset of conscious states. The relation of ‘feeling’ and ‘experience’ with emotional states manifested also when their collocation profiles were compared with that of ‘emotion’ in the academic corpus. The similarities between emotional states and selected CR-words is not enough to support LH. On the contrary, one of its specifications, LH5, states explicitly that ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ should be used more like ‘consciousness’ than like ‘emotion’, because if they are not then they refer to predominantly emotional states, not necessarily conscious ones. Since the aforementioned collocates of ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ described mostly emotional and bodily states, the claim that these words can be safely used to elicit intuitions consistent with the concept of the phenomenal consciousness (and not only emotional and/or bodily states) needs to be rejected. 100 2.5. Summary discussion

More than once, ‘consciousness’ proved to be more similar to ‘awareness’ than to other CR-words. In Study 1 these two words shared one of two of their synsets, in Study 2 they had the highest similarity score and appeared among each other’s most similar words. Results of Study 3 presented in Ta- ble 2.11 indicate that ‘consciousness’ does not share with ‘awareness’ any collocates that would be used as often in terms of its frequency, which tells us that there is a limit to the observed similarity between these two words, but it is worth pointing out that the overlap in collocation profiles between these two words in the non-academic corpus was the largest one detected (Table 2.8). The combined results of Table 2.11 and Table 2.12 indicate minute similarities between collocation profiles of ‘consciousness’ and ‘feeling’ in the non-academic corpus, but these similarities are not relatable to any scientific concept of consciousness. Furthermore, among the most important non-academic collocates of ‘consciousness’, there were none that could be used to describe the phenomenal consciousness. Thus, not only LH5 but also

LH6 should be rejected. There is something to be stated about the overwhelming character of the analyzed data. The vast parts of collocation profiles in Study 3 in both between- and within- corpora were not shared between CR-words. All parts of results supportive for LH were found among small percentages of overlapping collocates. While it is certainly true that words in natural language are polysemous, and among these small percentages could hide collocates relatable to some concept of consciousness, but that is not what data shows. Such overlapped collocates did not contribute to the meaning which is typically assigned to consciousness. While, then, some CR-words are used partly in the same contexts, these contexts do not refer to conscious states. Thus, they are irrelevant from the perspective of the folk view about consciousness and the obviousness claim. Turning now to the counterarguments, as admitted in Section 2, there is no widely accepted way of performing such investigations as the ones I am interested in. Given the variety of available methods and the richness of data it might be argued that: 1) chosen LH specifications are not representative of LH as such, 2) chosen methods are not fit to answer selected LH specifications, 3) formulated conclusions are insufficiently supported by obtained data. 2.5. Summary discussion 101

Arguing against 1), there are many ways one can understand the LH hypothesis. In Section 2.1 I shortly provided reasons hidden behind each of LH specifications. One can argue that there are other specifications of LH but I have chosen those which seem to me basic to search for folk psychology analoga of phenomenal states. Given the importance of phenomenal consciousness in philosophy and science of consciousness, searching after linguistic traces of speaking about this form of consciousness is, I think, valuable by itself. These LH specifications can be also viewed as a starting point to a more robust investigation into the language of consciousness. Turning the eyes to the second argument, it is a fair point that the methods I chose predominantly utilize the distributional hypothesis, i.e., that patterns of usage define meanings. In Section 2 I referred to both researchers that argue in favor of using linguistics methods in XPhi as to the linguists themselves. However, there is an added value in taking such approaches as the ones I used, a one that I haven’t yet written about. Each study reported in this chapter used computational methods. This project is focused on the folk view about consciousness, on folk intuitions. Quantitative methods of computational and corpus linguistics, such as similarity scores, generating collocation lists, and comparing frequencies, are more resistant to bias than any comparisons made solely by human subjects. Recognizing — as stated in Section 2 — that chosen methods possibly have only limited access to the information about words’ semantics, I also used more qualitative approaches such as making use of raters in Studies 1 and 3. Summing my counterargument against 2): chosen methods are most likely not the most optimal methods to answer selected LH specifications, and this is precisely why so many varied methods and data sources were used. If only some of the said methods produced negative outcomes for LH, it would be more doubtful to reject LH, than when most of them produced such outcomes. The third argument is closely related to the second, however, it focuses on the interpretation of results rather than the selection of methods. As in the case of previous arguments, given the lack of standards of performing this kind of investigation, I used the obtained data to validate the obviousness claim from the linguistic perspective. I do not doubt that linguistics provides tools that allow us to use more refined methods and get more accurate results. To excuse this preliminary character of my studies let me say that the research on CR-words proposed here could not be modeled on previous research because 102 2.5. Summary discussion studies on linguistic attribution of conscious states to other persons escaped the attention of consciousness scholars. If drawing semantic conclusions from the comparisons of shared parts of collocation profiles are not convincing, I urge to look at the step before the comparisons: into the colossal differences between CR-words in their collocation profiles. If, on the other hand, one is convinced that among small overlaps in these profiles a transfer of meanings consistent with the concept of the phenomenal consciousness can occur, I urge to look into these overlaps more in-depth, one collocation at a time. In short, if the conclusions made with statistical inference are deemed mistaken, the more descriptive statistics, e.g., specific collocations, most similar words in Study 2, percentages of overlap in Study 3, are also indicative of rejecting LH. Having defended the overall outcome of reported linguistic studies, the rejection of LH, I now turn to what does it mean for the received view among consciousness scholars. First and foremost, conclusions about the phenomenal claim cannot be drawn from the results of experiments that utilized only ‘experience’ or ‘feeling’ phrasing. Results of analyzes in this chapter indicate that while both of these words are used to describe states that are considered as conscious, e.g., emotional, it does not mean that traits which make this specific emotional mental state conscious can be also found in the linguistic data of speaking about other forms of consciousness. The evidence obtained here is supportive of the validity problem, presented in Subsection 1.4.4. Behind different specifications of LH stood different variations of the expert view about consciousness, i.e., distinct explications of the obviousness claim. Because none of their views was corroborated in this chapter, the studies reviewed in Subsection 1.4.1 should not be treated as studies on such obviousness claims. In short, the issues with the research on the obviousness claim, marked in the previous chapter, are still real. There is a need for new experiments, ones that would fill in the blanks about how lay people understand consciousness and would shed some light on the validity problem. Three such experiments are reported in the next chapter. Let me add one final remark. The plausibility of linguistic studies on CR-words consists also in that the phenomenon of consciousness reveals its non-subjective face. There is no doubt that when we want to study how people understand consciousness and how they attribute it to other persons, we have to focus our attention on their linguistic practices. In effect, we start studying conscious states not from the subjective but the intersubjective perspective. 2.5. Summary discussion 103

Results of linguistic studies presented in this chapter, at least partly, conﬁrm the consciousness attribution claim — CR-words are used to speak about mental states, including conscious ones — and contribute to much needed intersubjective shift in consciousness studies.

Chapter 3

Questionnaire studies on attributions of conscious states

In Chapter 2, I presented three investigations into the Linguistic Hypothesis. Now I move on to presenting studies dedicated to the two remaining hypotheses stated in Section 1.5: the Consciousness Hypothesis (CH) and the Moral Hypothesis (MH). The former states that patterns of attribution of conscious states are preserved regardless of whether the form of recognition of their conscious character is explicit or implicit1. The latter states that attribution of the conscious state of an emotional or perceptual character inﬂuences the perception of moral patiency in the same way2. As was argued throughout the second part of Chapter 1, both these hypotheses stem out from the results of the existing research, which rests on the assumption that the obviousness claim is valid. My objections, which I presented in Subsection 1.4.4, exposed weaknesses of the obviousness claim and led me to the conclusion that experts’ projec- tion of their concept of (phenomenal) consciousness onto lay persons’ views about mental life resulted in distorting the actual folk understanding of consciousness. Results of the language analyses presented in Chapter 2 afford preliminary justiﬁcation to my objections. I decided to complement these linguistic inquiries with empirical research on patterns of attribution of conscious states to others. I could design my experiments from scratch but I

1For convenience here is the full version of CH: Mental states that experts view as uncontroversial examples of conscious states are attributed in the same conditions regardless of them being explicitly identiﬁed as conscious in the experimental vignettes or not. 2Full version: Attributions of emotional or perceptual conscious mental states modulate perceived moral patiency in the same way. 106 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness

finally concluded that one should start with slightly modified designs of already performed experiments. Choosing this way of proceeding, I followed other researchers, e.g., Sytsma and Machery’s (2010) study was replicated by Cova et al. (2018) and its design was modified in Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019a). I modified the design of experiments presented in these three papers to test the Consciousness Hypothesis and the design of Jack and Robbins’ (2012) study to test the Moral Hypothesis. This moderately conservative research strategy was chosen to confront the results of my experiments with the previous ones. While my research was directly devoted to studies on the consciousness component of folk psychology, the earlier ones tried to approach it indirectly, as I showcased throughout Section 1.4. This chapter is structured similarly to the previous one. For each study, methods, results, and short discussions are presented separately. Before each experiment, a short description of the design of the original experiment and its results are presented. At the end of this chapter, a more general discussion is presented. More details are available in Appendix B and the code used to analyze each study is available at the repository on the Open Science Framework3.

3.1 Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness

To test the Consciousness Hypothesis, I selected the design used by Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019a), which is an already modiﬁed design of Sytsma and Machery (2010), one of the more often cited studies on conscious states attributions by philosophers and non-philosophers. As described in Subsection 1.4.1, the 2010 study was supposed to test the differences in conscious state attributions between philosophers and non-philosophers. The later study by Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019a) was an investigation into the potential effect that phrases about experiencing mental states can have on patterns of attributions. It used 2×2×2 between-participant design. Participants were divided into eight groups, one per condition. Conditions varied the agent (human or a robot), the state (perceptual or pain), and the term used to describe the mental state (‘see’ for perceptual and ‘feel’ for pain state or ‘experience’ for both). , Sytsma and Ozdemir’s (2019a) results indicate that attributions of perceptual

3https://osf.io/htk7g/?view_only=48bf247feca84430b201bc998cb1aaef [Accessed: 18 May, 2020]. 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness 107 and pain states were the same after phrasing said states as ‘seeing red’ and ‘experience red’. Patterns of attributions were the same for ‘feel pain’ and ‘experience pain’. More precisely, people tend to attribute seeing, feeling, and experiencing to a human with only slight differences between perceptual and pain states. However, such differences were larger in robot conditions. Participants were also less likely to attribute pain to a robot, than perceptual state (with intuitions being elicited with both terms). Apart from being one of the most cited works on the non-expert view about consciousness, it is the one that had been already, in a loose sense, replicated two times. In the earlier paragraph, I wrote about Sytsma and Ozdemir’s study from 2019, but the paradigm used by Sytsma and Machery in 2010 was a part of the sample used in the XPhi Replicability Project (Cova et al., 2018). Over 40 experimental philosophy studies were selected for replication, which was conducted by 20 teams across different countries. As a part of this project, Markus Kneer ran two scenarios from Sytsma and Machery’s (2010) study in two groups: philosophers and non-philosophers. The two conditions were: seeing red by a human and seeing red by a robot. As in the original 2010 experiment, non-experts were more likely to attribute perceptual state to a robot than philosophers (Cova & Réhault, 2018).

A) Sytsma and Machery, 2010 B) Cova et al., 2018 C) Sytsma and Ozdemir, 2019 D) Sytsma and Ozdemir, 2019 Folk conditions Replication study See and Feel conditions Experience conditions

7 *** *** *** *** 6 *** *** *** *** *** 5 *** *** 4

3 Mean response Mean *** 2

See Red Feel Pain See Red Feel Pain See Red See Red See Red Feel Pain See Red Feel Pain Exp. Red Exp. Pain Exp. Red Exp. Pain Human Human Robot Robot Human Robot Human Human Robot Robot Human Human Robot Robot M=5.98 M=6.15 M=5.15 M=2.54 M=6.35 M=5.85 M=5.69 M=5.97 M=5.26 M=3.89 M=4.98 M=5.60 M=4.73 M=3.88

Figure 3.1: Results from Sytsma and Machery’s (2010) study (A) and the two later replications. Cova et al. 2018 results (B) are limited to folk conditions. Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019a) results are divided into two plots, C and D, to make them more readable. Different colors of the bars represent different conditions. Signiﬁcant comparisons versus neutral response at: ‘***’ < .005. 108 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness

Figure 3.1 presents results from all three studies. Visible is the main attribution pattern: non-experts tend to attribute perceptual state of seeing (as well as experiencing) red to a human and to a robot while feeling (experiencing) pain only to a human. If CH is true, then the same pattern should occur in cases of explicit attribution of consciously seeing or feeling pain to humans and robots. To test CH, I modiﬁed the term variable. That is, each mental state that participants read about could be ‘conscious’ or ‘unconscious’, i.e., participants were asked if the agent (human or non-human) in their story could ‘consciously see red’, ‘unconsciously see red’, ‘consciously feel pain’, or ‘unconsciously feel pain’. While details are provided in the following subsections, the overarching idea was that if CH is true, ‘conscious’ conditions would mimic patterns of attributions observed in Sytsma and Machery (2010) and Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019a). Moreover, for mental states which participants were likely to attribute in ‘conscious’ condition, they should be unlikely to do so in ‘unconscious’ condition4. In agreement with my commentary to Consciousness Hypothesis presented in Section 1.5, adding ‘consciously’ to ‘seeing red’ or ‘feeling pain’ is redundant, but adding the term ‘unconsciously’ to each of these expressions creates confusion and a need to remove the inconsistency between the intrinsic sense of the conscious character of visual or pain sensation, and sense of a term that explicitly denies it. I decided to take participants’ attributions of unconscious visual or pain sensations as indicating how did they cope with this inconsistency. If non-experts attributed ‘conscious’ or ‘unconscious’ to the same mental state in a similar way, then their understanding of ‘consciousness’ is radically different from that of experts. Such a result would violate the expert view, as stated in Section 1.5, so the obviousness claim should be rejected as well.

4I chose ‘unconscious’ and not ‘nonconscious’ (‘non-conscious’) because according to the Corpus of Contemporary American English data the latter is used scarcely in everyday English language. Furthermore, the Merriam-Webster dictionary deﬁnes ‘nonconscious’ as ‘unconscious’. 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness 109

3 . 1 . 1 M ETHODS

A total of 954 participants, native English users5, were recruited among Ama- zon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers with an approval rate of at least 90% for a small fee of $.11. There was one screening question regarding participants’ education level. People with expert knowledge in philosophy, cognitive science, and/or psychology were disqualified from the study (129 subjects). The screening question was: ‘Do you currently study or have a degree in philosophy, psychology, and/or cognitive science?’, in a yes/no format. Par- ticipants’ age ranged from 18 to 75, with a mean of 38.57. There were 325 men (40%) and 497 women (60%) included in the analysis. Data was acquired from 13/06/2019 to 17/06/2019. The study used pictures and slightly modified vignettes from the first Sytsma and Machery (2010) study, varying agent (robot vs human) and state (seeing red vs feeling pain). As the focus of this study was CH, a third independent variable was added, term (conscious vs unconscious). The study, then, used a 2×2×2 between-participant design, with each participant being randomly assigned to one of eight conditions. The two human scenarios were as follows6:

Timmy is a normal undergraduate at a state university. To make some extra money, he volunteered for a psychological experiment. He was put in a room that was empty except for one blue box, one red box, and one green box (the boxes were identical in all respects except color). An instruction was then transmitted to Timmy. It read: ‘Put the red box in front of the door’. What do you think happened next? Timmy is a normal undergraduate at a state university. To make some extra money, he volunteered for a psychological experiment. He was put in a room that was empty except for one blue box, one red box, and one green box (the boxes were identical in all respects except color). An instruction was then transmitted to

5Participants in each study were from the USA. 6Full scenarios are available in Appendix B. 110 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness

Timmy. It read: ‘Put the red box in front of the door’. When Timmy grasped the red box, however, it gave him a strong electric shock. He let go of the box and moved away from it. What do you think happened next?

The original question from Sytsma and Machery was then changed to: ‘Did [agent] [term] [state]?’ (i.e., ‘Did Timmy consciously see red while performing the task?’). Participants answered using a 5-point Likert-like scale. The far-left option was labeled ’Clearly No, the middle one labeled Not sure, and the far-right Clearly Yes. Before answering the above question, participants in all conditions were asked a yes/no question, whether the action taken by the agent in the story was successful (i.e., ‘Did Timmy put the red box in front of the door?’). The purpose of this was to check whether mental state attribution was inﬂuenced by predictions people made about the behavior of others. Stories presented in the original Sytsma and Machery study assumed that in seeing conditions box was put in front of the door successfully, and in pain condition it was not. While possibly a minor detail, such a difference between conditions could bias the results. For this study, the prediction was that participants will respond consistently with Sytsma and Machery’s (2010) original story: that in seeing conditions the action was successful and the opposite in pain conditions. Furthermore, if some participants were to respond differently to this question, they were not expected to respond differently than other participants in the attribution task. Because of the relationship between mental state (see red or feel pain) and the behavior (putting the red box in front of the door) I will call this the causal question.As stated earlier, if CH is true, then in my experiment attributions in ‘conscious’ conditions should resemble patterns of attributions observed in Sytsma and Machery (2010) and Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019a). If participants, in ‘conscious’ conditions, attributed a given mental state, they should be reluctant to do so in corresponding ‘unconscious’ conditions. Mental state attribution was measured by participants answers on a Likert- item question. The dependent variable is ordinal. To examine the effects of independent variables a 2×2×2 ordinal logistic regression with pairwise Dunn’s test of multiple comparisons as a post hoc procedure was imple- mented (Ananth & Kleinbaum, 1997; Dunn, 1964; Fullerton, 2009; Harrell, 2015; Kruskal & Wallis, 1952; Williams, 2006, 2016). The planned analysis consisted also of one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test for comparing partici- 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness 111 pants’ responses in each condition with the neutral response (‘Not sure’) with Bonferroni correction. Pairwise Dunn’s test was planned to ensure the similarity of patterns with those observed in Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019a, 2019b). Because the causal question was not expected to differentiate responses in any meaningful way, only basic descriptive statistics and Wilcoxon signed rank tests for comparing differences between participants with different causal answers vs neutral responses were planned. All analyzes were performed with the R language.

3 . 1 . 2 R ESULTS

The ordered regression model (Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.295; p < .001) showed main effects for all three variables (term: df = 1; χ2 = 45.91; p <.001; agent: df = 1; χ2 = 115.3; p <.001; state: df = 1; χ2 = 9.98; p = .0016) and for second-level interactions Term×Agent (df = 1; χ2 = 23.82; p <.001) and Agent×State (df = 1; χ2 = 9.34; p < .005). While the proportional odds assumption was slightly violated for the state factor (likelihood ratio test p = .035) (Fullerton, 2009; Fullerton & Xu, 2011), after its removal and construction of the partial proportional odds model (Williams, 2016), main effects for agent, term, and Agent×State were still signiﬁcant (Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.273; p < .001). Because pairwise comparisons were planned beforehand, they were still performed.

c-h-p c-h-s c-r-p c-r-s u-h-p u-h-s u-r-p c-h-s 2.04 c-r-p 10.23*** 8.24*** c-r-s 9.59*** 7.6*** -0.63 u-h-p 5.87*** 3.85** -4.38*** -3.74** u-h-s 8.81*** 6.82*** -1.39 -0.76 2.98 u-r-p 10.7*** 8.7*** 0.44 1.08 4.83*** 1.83 u-r-s 9.64*** 7.64*** -0.61 0.02 3.77** 0.78 -1.06

Table 3.1: Kruskal-Wallis rank sum post-hoc results, with Z scores. Conditions: c – conscious, u – unconscious, h – human, r – robot, s – seeing, p – pain. Signiﬁcant comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) at: ‘***’ < .001, ‘**’ < .01, ‘*’ < .05. 112 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness

Planned full pairwise comparisons are shown in Table 3.1. The post-hoc tests showed that the agent variable differentiated participants’ responses almost every time, with one exception. The results in unconscious human seeing condition were different only when compared with the results in conscious human pain and conscious human seeing conditions. Both term and mental state differentiated participants’ answers in human (Timmy) conditions except for mental state in the conscious human condition. Interestingly, in robot (Jimmy) conditions, the difference in responses was not observed. Results for responses vs neutral values comparisons are illustrated in Figure 3.2 and, in more detail, reported in Table 3.2. Responses for both mental states in conscious human conditions are above the neutral point. While there were no differences between responses in these conscious conditions, after a closer look at the distribution of responses per kind of mental state in Figure 3.3, there is a slight difference between patterns of attributions in both kinds of conscious mental states, not strong enough to remain significant after Bonferroni correction (for a one-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum test: Z = -3.47; W = 4.239.5; p < .001; r = -.34). Interestingly, participants attributed unconscious pain to a human person. My explanation of this baffling result is as follows. The two kinds of mental processes: visual perception (seeing red) and feeling pain significantly differ from the perspective of folk psychology. The former is deliberate and initiated voluntarily, while the latter is unexpected and involuntary. Of course, there are exceptions, but the rule of thumb is that we freely choose the object we want to see and are surprised by a sudden pain. So, in the human unconscious pain scenario, pain is an unexpected result of a sequence: conscious visual perception and the attempt to pick up the red box. Respondents who tried to visualize this situation might stop at the very moment when Timmy let go of the box. There was no doubt that he released the box because of pain elicited by a strong electric shock7. But instant pain that respondents attributed to Timmy was a trigger of his action and therefore was closer to unconditioned reflex than to a conscious feeling.

7Let me add that situation depicted in the human pain scenario is unrealistic. The strong electric shock causes involuntary muscle contraction and in such situation Timmy would not be able to quickly loosen his box grip. 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness 113

This explanation of respondents’ answer assumes that what they had in mind was not the conscious feeling of pain that occurs with a delay as a result of a strong electric shock, but a moment of automatic, unconscious organism’s reaction to a physical stimulus. At this moment the sensation of pain is initiated but not felt, therefore mental state that precedes conscious pain is not conscious.

5 *** *** ***

4 agent * Human 3 Robot Mean response 2

See, See, Pain, Pain, See, See, Pain, Pain, Conscious, Unconscious, Conscious, Unconscious, Conscious, Unconscious, Conscious, Unconscious, N=105, N=101, N=103, N=103, N=102, N=103, N=102, N=103, Mdn=5 Mdn=3 Mdn=5 Mdn=4 Mdn=3 Mdn=3 Mdn=3 Mdn=2

Figure 3.2: Results of Study 4 with 95% CIs. Signiﬁcant comparisons versus neutral at: ‘***’ < .001. ‘**’ < .01, ‘*’ < .05.

Condition Mdn IQR Z W p r c-h-s 5 5-4 -8.14 3745.5 < .001 -.79 u-h-s 3 4-2 -0.02 1109.5 1 -.002 c-h-p 5 5-5 -9.19 4648 < .001 -.91 u-h-p 4 5-3 -3.36 2574 .002 -.36 c-r-s 3 4-2 -1.39 1305.5 1 -.17 u-r-s 3 4-1 -1.64 1031 .81 -.16 c-r-p 3 4-1 -2.29 1037.5 .17 -.2 u-r-p 2 4-1 -3.06 1183 .02 -.3

Table 3.2: One-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test results for participant responses vs neutral answer. Conditions: c – conscious, u – unconscious, h – human, r – robot, s – seeing, p – pain.

In contrast with the prediction consistent with the Consciousness Hypoth- esis, attributions of explicitly conscious states did not give a similar pattern of results as in Sytsma and Machery (2010) (and Sytsma and Ozdemir 2019a), responses for Jimmy (robot) conditions were signiﬁcantly different from the neutral answer only in the unconscious pain condition. 114 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness

c−h−p c−h−s c−r−p c−r−s 80

0 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

u−h−p u−h−s u−r−p u−r−s 80

Number of responses 40

0 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Figure 3.3: Distribution of participants’ responses in each condition of Study 4. Conditions: c – conscious, u – unconscious, h – human, r – robot, s – seeing, p – pain.

In terms of the causal question, most participants gave a positive answer in human seeing conditions (conscious: 98%, unconscious: 94%). For human pain conditions results were opposite (9% for both conscious and unconscious conditions). Responses were less unanimous in Jimmy’s (robot) case: 79% of participants in the conscious and 83% in the unconscious seeing condition responded positively, while in the pain conditions percentages were 25% and 24%, respectively. The ambiguous responses for Jimmy, i.e., participants with negative causal answer in seeing condition and those with positive causal answer in pain condition, were analyzed further. Wilcoxon signed rank with Pratt (1959) correction for ties showed that participants that gave negative causal answer did not think that Jimmy had a conscious state of seeing red (Mdn= 2; Z = -3.32; p < .001). Similar result was observed for those who gave positive causal answer in Jimmy conscious pain condition (Mdn= 1; Z = -3.12; p < .005). Moreover, participants who gave a positive causal answer in the unconscious Jimmy pain condition also did not attribute said state to the robot (Mdn= 2; Z = -2.53; p = .01).

3.1.2.1 A 7-item response format follow-up

In the Sytsma and Machery (2010) and Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019a) studies a 7-item respone format was used. After seeing that there was, unexpected from the hypothesis’ perspective, lack of significance in the conscious robot seeing condition, a possibility that the response format used here was too 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness 115 coarse came into light. To test for whether that is the case, an alternative version of robot conscious seeing condition was run, with a 7-item response format (1 anchored as Clearly No, 4 as Not Sure, and 7 as Clearly Yes). From 121 participants that filled out this new questionnaire, 19 had to be removed from further analysis on the basis of not answering all questions or being experts. Age ranged from 20 to 81 (M = 36.8). Opposite with the worry, participants’ responses were not significantly different from the neutral value (p = .1335).

3 . 1 . 3 D ISCUSSION

Results indicate that non-experts attribute (explicit) conscious states differently than unconscious states. If conforms to the explanation proposed above. When they are ascribing to humans, patterns of attributions are similar to those in Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019a) study. However, in contrast with the prediction, non-experts did attribute unconscious pain in the human condition. Furthermore, results for Jimmy (robot) conditions indicate that non-experts are unlikely to neither attribute nor deny attribution of both conscious and unconscious states. With one, surprising, exception: people tend to deny unconscious pain in the robot condition. Overall, the Consciousness Hypothesis is not supported by these ﬁndings. Such striking differences between results in human and robot conditions are probably not due to non-experts’ inclination to deny possession of mental states by robots (Fiala et al., 2014; Sytsma, 2014b). After all, the human tendency to attribute mental states to robots was demonstrated multiple times in research, with some examples being provided in Subsection 1.4.2. A rather uncontroversial idea discussed by Arico et al. (2011) is that conscious state attributions may depend on assessment whether an entity is alive or not. However, that is not supported by data in Study 4, as one should expect non- experts to be more decisive in denying robot conscious states. Such denying was observed only for the unconscious pain state. An explanation consistent with the results obtained in this study is that when asked to attribute explicitly (un)conscious states to a robot the non- experts are confused. The confusion can be a result of the fact that we as human beings incline to attribute mental states to non-human animals and even to unanimated artifacts. However, in all these cases the mental states which are attributed to pets, apes, or highly intelligent birds such as New 116 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness

Caledonian crows or scrub-jays are not regarded as identical to human mental states. It is visible in the robot case. If we say that a robot sees a red box, we are not assuming that it processes visual information like humans do. We only attribute to the robot the ability to identify red box from among other boxes and we assess this ability by observing his behavior8. We can even say that its search for a red box demanded intelligence, but it does not mean that we are ready to acknowledge that visual processes in robot closely resemble human visual processes. The situation complicates when we have to decide if a mental state of non-human animal or robot is conscious or not. As I propose in Chapter 1, we attribute conscious states to human beings on the basis of their behavior but it is often practically impossible to ﬁnd analogous behavior among other animals or robots. On what basis can we attribute to them conscious states such as meditation, guilt, moral disgust, etc.? What’s more, we cannot say that these creatures can live through such mental states. If I am right, then there is no sense in attributing to non-human mental states the trait of being conscious. In effect, when we observe the behavior of a scrub joy or a robot which we have to take as intelligent, we can attribute to these creatures the ability of mental processing, but there are no clues which allow us to classify these mental states (processes) as conscious or unconscious. There is some evidence supporting the confusion claim. Nahmias et al. (2019) investigated an issue of the folk understanding of the free will and how it relates to what lay persons think about consciousness. Their result indicates that even when people are cued that robots are conscious, their mean response in conscious state attribution task is close to the neutral answer, i.e., to the midpoint between Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree9. Furthermore, as mentioned in the description of the Consciousness Hypothesis in Section 1.5, while the results of studies on mind perception suggest that people, among other mental capacities, attribute something that they call ‘consciousness’ to a wide variety of agents, these studies were quite coarse-grained. Researchers

8This statement may resemble the ambiguity objection and the proposed two different readings of ‘seeing red’, i.e., informational and phenomenal, which I described in Section 1.4.4. I come back to this issue in a few paragraphs. 9In their second experiment, Nahmias et al. (2019) report minor differences between conscious and unconscious robot conditions, but if we look at mean responses they never diverge far from the neutral answer. 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness 117 did not control whether participants associated single meanings with each of the mental capacity they were supposed to attribute. Since that is the case, studies on mind perception described in 1.4.2 do not weaken the likelihood of the confusion claim. There is one additional reason for the confusion claim. As became evident after looking at results for the causal question, people tend to give more varied predictions when it comes to the behavior of robots. Those that predicted robot behavior in a human-like way, i.e., success in seeing and failure in pain condition, were more likely to select neutral response in the main task. In contrast, when they view robots as behaving differently than humans, they are more likely to deny conscious states to a robot. When it comes to making attributions to other people, the non-experts are less confused: they tend to attribute both conscious pain and conscious seeing states. To a lesser extent, they tend to attribute unconscious pain as well. The difference between attributing unconscious seeing and unconscious pain conditions can be due to different understanding by the folk the nature of the spatial and temporal extensions of these mental states. Pains are bodily states with an interoceptive component, while visual color perception is exteroceptive and represents properties of external objects (Sytsma, 2010a, 2012). Because of the latter, as the non-experts predicted that Timmy will successfully perform the action — so he had to select appropriate box — it was confusing to be asked to attribute unconsciously seeing red. The visually accessible red surface of the object cannot be unconsciously noticed (at least from a folk psychology perspective). The agent needs some time to process visual information and realize that what he sees is a red box. The pain situation is different. Probably everyone had an experience of being wounded and observed that the feeling of pain occurred after the wound was seen or felt. There are two interpretations. According to the first, the feeling of (nociceptive) pain, which is a conscious experience, occurs with a delay after the skin laceration has been noticed. According to the second interpretation (I wrote about it earlier), there are at least two stages of pain. The first, initial stage is unconscious and starts at the moment the skin is damaged. Only when skin damage is noticed starts the second stage and the pain increases above the threshold of conscious feeling. I favor the second interpretation and consider unconscious pain attribution as referring to the first stage, and conscious pain attribution as referring to the second stage of this mental process. The obtained results 118 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness indicate that lay people understood human pain scenario as matching the second interpretation and attributed unconscious pain to Timmy because the scenario depicted the first, unconscious stage of pain. This result is consistent with the findings of Reuter and Sytsma (2018), but the authors did not explain their findings. Furthermore, this account also helps to explain why participants denied Jimmy feeling unconscious pain. Jimmy’s picture suggested he has a plastic or a metal body, which is less likely to suffer from damage due to the electric shock than the human body. Participants were already pointed toward the first stage of pain and that is why they did not respond in a confused manner (contrarily to when they were to attribute conscious pain to Jimmy). During this first stage of pain in humans, the amount of pain due to the body damage (in electric shock scenario) can build-up high enough to eventually become conscious. In the case of Jimmy, his different body structure made it easy for participants, primed them, to deem the possibility of damaging him unlikely, hence they denied Jimmy the unconscious pain. The proposed interpretation of detecting red in robot condition resembles the ambiguity objection, described in Section 1.4.1. According to the objection when lay people are asked to attribute mental states like seeing red to a robot, they do not use a phenomenal reading of ‘seeing red’ phrase but an informational one, i.e., if one sees red then one can detect red from non-red objects and is able to act on the basis of this detection. According to the proponents of the ambiguity objection (e.g., Huebner, 2010), such difficulty does not arise when it comes to attributing a state of feeling pain, which has only phenomenal reading. As I described in Chapter 1, this objection was rejected by Sytsma (2009, 2010a, 2012) because he deemed it could only apply if lay people viewed colors and pains as mind-dependent properties. In a series of experiments, he showcased, also with Reuter (2018), that it is not the case. This mind-independent view of colors and pains is called as a naïve view. Let me stress that the results of my experiment do not contradict these later findings of Sytsma and his collaborators. What I propose is, however, distinct from the ambiguity objection, as I focus on how the ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ phrasing (absent in the original Sytsma and Machery’s (2010) study) differentiated participants responses. From this point of view, the rejection of the informational reading of the mental state of seeing red is too hasty. 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness 119

First, despite what Sytsma and Machery (2010, p. 310) claim, there is a simpler explanation of why robot visual perception would rather be more likely read informationally than phenomenally. I presented it in the earlier paragraphs in this Section. Second, also against Sytsma and Machery (2010, p. 310), there is no reason to assume that the adequate reconstruction of naïve view demands to choose one of two readings of ‘seeing red’. It is highly probable that neither the informational (in fact, a special case of functional) nor the phenomenal interpretations of consciousness and conscious states can be found in folk psychology. Both interpretations have been proposed by experts and it was they who projected their own views on lay people beliefs. In my opinion, instead of guessing which of two interpretations is correct, one should observe how lay persons use phrases ‘conscious’ or ‘unconscious’ in different, well-defined conditions. Only after gathering data, one can risk hypothesis about the naïve concept of consciousness. It might be close to one of those mentioned above but it might also significantly vary from both of them. This second approach seems to be supported by the contents of scenarios used in the experiment. Let me remind that both agents — human Timmy or robot Jimmy — are distinct both in terms of external and internal body structure, and while they can perform the same type of behavior in experimental scenarios, they are not said to prepare it the same, they also do not execute the same movements (for one, Timmy has legs and Jimmy does not). The decision, how expressions ‘consciously see red’ or ‘unconsciously see red’ are understood in human, and how in robot conditions might be quite straightforward due to differences between these two kinds of agents. Third, the very fact that colors and pains are conceived by lay people as mind-independent properties does not decide if these properties are accessed consciously or unconsciously. Therefore the decision whom to attribute conscious seeing (pain) and whom unconscious does mean that this attribution has to be understood in two ways only: phenomenal or informational. As argued above, attribution of unconscious seeing red to Timmy left participants in confusion, as in folk psychology successful color perception cannot be unconscious. I find this interpretation of seeing highly convincing. I will illustrate my point by referring to the didactic experience that those teaching philosophy of mind or cognitive science classes might have. Visual form agnosia is an example of a somewhat successful process of seeing (patients can avoid obstacles, catch objects, and so on) without the conscious recognition of ‘seen’ objects. Students are often 120 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness surprised that such a visual deficit exists at all. At first, they suspect that they misunderstood the description of this rare disability. Their consternation is a consequence of the stark difference between the folk and the scientific account of vision. For the former vision is always conscious but for the latter the process of unconscious seeing (but different from visual perception) has been empirically confirmed and thus it is reasonable to accept this form vision. Since the unconscious seeing is not viewed as informational, as that would require participants to attribute it to Timmy but they do not, the question arises is the conscious seeing interpreted phenomenally or informationally? Of the two readings, the informational one is more compatible with the fact that (as argued throughout Section 1.4.4.3) we infer conscious states by looking at the behavior of others. Results of linguistic studies in the previous chapter indicate that spontaneous, everyday usage of ‘consciousness’ is not very relatable to the concept of phenomenal consciousness. But perhaps a forced task, in which people are asked to describe what consciousness is, would elicit in participants answer which of the two interpretations is closer to their views. To test this, the design of the fifth study was modified to include measurement on how non-experts tend to define ‘consciousness’. For the consistency in reporting results on CH, results are given below. For the informational reading to be a potential explanation of Study 4 results, I expected that people would describe ‘consciousness’ as primarily about detecting things. Moreover, bigger differences in responses were observed in two seeing conditions than in two pain conditions. As mentioned, vision is exteroceptive, so given the accentuated differences in responses in seeing conditions I expected descriptions of consciousness to be mostly about functioning in the environment, detecting and processing information about the external world. Needless to say, such results would be incompatible with the phenomenal claim, which would demand the opposite results: that participants would describe consciousness as having to do with properties of their mental states.

3.1.3.1 Folk deﬁnitions of consciousness follow-up

A total of 298 non-empty definitions were collected from participants of Study 5. At the end of Study 5, all subjects were asked to give a short definition of consciousness and were left with an open text field. More details on the demographics are available in the Methods section for the Study 5. 3.1. Study 4. Explicit attributions of consciousness 121

The most frequent, excluding English stop-words, words were ‘aware’ (131), ‘awareness’ (60), ‘surroundings’ (60), ‘ability’ (54), ‘one’s’ (39), ‘awake’ (34), ‘consciousness’ (20), ‘environment’ (20), ‘feel’ (16), ‘world’ (16). Among the most often 4- to 6-word phrases were as follows: ‘being aware of’ (20), ‘aware of your surroundings’ (19), ‘the state of being awake’ (7), ‘what is going on around’ (8), ‘being awake and aware of’ (6), ‘state of being awake and aware’ (4). Results support the informational reading of ‘consciousness’. Non-experts tend to think about consciousness firstly as being aware of their surroundings/environment, of something that is an ability and relates to being awake. All three are functional depictions of consciousness. Being awake is a state in which the body functions differently than while asleep. Abilities are actions that need to be performed in a specific way to fulfill certain goals. Being aware of one’s environment, at least, is possessing information about it. Perceptions are mental representations of the surroundings. The main results from Study 4 as well as additional details from explicit definitions add to the complexity of the obviousness claim. Existing research indicated that lay persons do not treat mental states evenly, i.e., some mental processes are regarded as referring to mind-dependent properties, while others — to mind-independent. Results of Study 4 are consistent with these findings, but also show that conscious and unconscious mental states are treated differently, relative to particular kinds of states attributed to a specific type of agent. Perceptual states like seeing seem to be understood as informationally conscious (aware), while pain states can be both conscious as well as unconscious. While this informational reading of seeing is akin to that of the concept of awareness, it should not be read as folk having the full concept of awareness or access consciousness. That would require from participants having expert knowledge about naturalization tendencies present in contemporary philosophy of mind. However, this informational reading is akin to folk view that conscious seeing is oriented at acquiring information about environments. Additionally, both concepts: conscious and unconscious apply predominantly to humans for most of the non-experts. Overall, these findings do not support the Consciousness Hypothesis. The explicit conscious character of mental states influences the attribution patterns found in Sytsma and Machery (2010). 122 3.2. Study 5. Consciousness and moral concern

3.2 Study 5. Consciousness and moral concern

The Moral Hypothesis, presented in Section 1.5, states that attribution of conscious states of perceptual and emotional kind influences perception of moral patiency in an analogous way. To test MH, I modified the design of the first study from the paper by Jack and Robbins (2012). As described in Subsec- tion 1.4.3, authors claimed that attributing phenomenal states, i.e., taking the phenomenal stance, influences how lay persons perceive moral patients (Rob- bins & Jack, 2006), i.e., those who are the objects of morally relevant actions. In their 2012 paper, Jack and Robbins complement their idea with Gray et al.’s (2007a) proposal of the two dimensions of mind perception: agency and experience. Being consistent with these findings, and with the moral typecasting claim as such (Gray & Wegner, 2009), Jack and Robbins presented experimental results that, in their view, support the plausibility of phenomenal stance. However, given the limitations of reported studies (Subsection 1.4.4), it is uncertain whether these results are in fact about the function of the folk understanding of consciousness, i.e., whether it is so that the folk view about consciousness is involved in making moral judgments. What I already emphasized, the authors designed their experiments to test if lay persons clearly distinguish the intentional from the phenomenal stance. In their approach taking the former stance means to attribute intelligence, understood as an ability to set a target, select means to achieve it, and prepare for action10. To take the phenomenal stance is to attribute to others the phenomenal experiences. While in experts’ eyes exemplary cases of experiences are these of exteroceptive origin, Jack and Robbins chose experiences originating from interoception11. It is the latter stance which, in the authors’ opinion, is identical with the attribution of conscious stance. In Subsection 1.4.4, I argued that such identification is highly dubious. First, because it projects experts’ views

10This is visible in vignettes in their experiments, e.g., this vignette from the first experiment: “Lobsters are highly intelligent. They form elaborate search strategies to forage for food. The neural system responsible for lobster memory and reasoning are similar in important aspects to the systems in the human brain” (Jack & Robbins, 2012, p. 387). 11“Lobsters have rich and complex emotional lives. They are capable of suffering from depression and anxiety. The neural systems responsible for lobster emotion are similar in important respects to the systems in the human brain” (Jack & Robbins, 2012, p. 387). 3.2. Study 5. Consciousness and moral concern 123 about consciousness on folk minds; Second, because it starts with exemplary cases of experiences (seeing red, experiencing emotions, feeling pain) and unjustifiably presents this particular, experiential trait as a general property of all conscious mental states. The original design of the first study was as follows. Participants (n = 35), undergraduates taking introductory psychology class, were divided into two conditions. In each condition, participants read a story about lobsters and fishermen. There was a moral context to the story. Lobsters were caught in traps in which, due to the lack of fishermen’s diligence, they sometimes died out of starvation. Participants were also informed that some groups of people want to change the law so that lobsters would have to be treated more humanely. After reading the story, each participant was asked how concerned they feel about the welfare of the lobsters, how guilty would they feel if — as a fisherman or a fisherwoman — after not checking their traps for several weeks they would find dead lobsters, and how strong a penalty should there be applied for not checking traps regularly. For each question there was 0-10 response format, with only extreme values labeled, e.g., in the second question participants were asked to indicate how guilty they would feel, with “0 = it would not affect me at all, 10 = I would feel absolutely terrible”. After answering the above questions, participants in each condition read different follow-up story. One of them (agency condition) depicted lobsters as highly intelligent creatures, making strategies, with neural systems responsible for memory and reasoning similar to that of humans, but lacking emotion, they could not sense pain or pleasure. In the second condition (experience condition), lobsters were depicted as highly emotional, capable of suffering from depression, with neural systems responsible for emotion similar to that of humans, but unintelligent. In this version, lobsters had weak memory and virtually no reasoning skills. After reading follow-up stories, participants in both conditions were asked to answer the same three questions as before once again. Responses for each question were significantly higher than baseline in experience condition and lower in the agency condition. Results from this experiment are presented in Figure 3.4. In researchers’ own words: mind perception differentially affects moral consideration depending on the dimension of mindedness at issue. [. . .] what matters most for moral consideration is the capacity to feel, not the capacity to think — or so common-sense would have it (Jack & Robbins, 2012, p. 388). 124 3.2. Study 5. Consciousness and moral concern

Figure 3.4: Mean change in patiency-related judgments from Jack and Robbins’ (2012) study. Reprinted by permission from Springer Nature: Springer Review of Philosophy and Psychology, paper “The Phenomenal Stance Revisited” by Anthony I. Jack and Philip Robbins (2012).

I already noticed that Jack and Robbins (2012) in their ﬁrst experiment identiﬁed experiential consciousness with its interoceptive (emotional) variety. One might ask what about exteroceptive experiencing such as seeing red? Does this variety of experiential consciousness couple with moral patiency as well? In the further part of their paper, where a second experiment is reported, the authors explicitly state that for them all varieties of experiences have the same status as conscious states and therefore all of them are coupled with moral patiency12 Similarly, when they introduce the idea of phenomenal stance, in their 2006 paper, they also state that all varieties of experiences are coupled with moral patiency in an analogous way: “[. . .] to regard something as a locus of experience is ascribing phenomenal states (emotions, moods, pains, visual sensations, etc.) to it [. . .] part of what it is to regard something

12It is clearly visible when reading their 2012 paper: “The folk conception of the mind is inextricably linked to moral cognition. Speciﬁcally, there is a tight coupling, in both directions, between regarding something as a bearer of experiential states and feeling moral concern for that thing [. . .] we will present evidence of a bidirectional coupling between moral concern and the attribution of properties and states that are associated with experience (e.g., conscious awareness, feelings)” (Jack & Robbins, 2012, p. 384–385). This fragment coupled with, for example, the authors’ description of experiences of lobsters: “[. . .] lobsters experience pains, pleasures, emotional feelings, and other sensations” (Jack & Robbins, 2012, p. 390), shows that for Jack and Robbins all kinds of experiences have the same status as conscious states. “Other sensations” in this case are exteroceptive experiences. 3.2. Study 5. Consciousness and moral concern 125 as a locus of experience is to treat it as something that one ought to shield from harm” (Robbins & Jack, 2006, p. 69–70). It means that the authors’ position agrees with Moral Hypothesis. To test if Jack and Robbins are right and MH is true, I decided to add the third condition in which exteroceptive experience (I called perception condition) is considered as a separate form of mindedness. I also modiﬁed the story by replacing lobsters that are too distant from humans with an exotic species of mammals. Because the experience condition used by Jack and Robbins was in probing intuitions only about emotional states, it did not represent even one kind of conscious states, at best it represented only one variety of experiential kind of consciousness. In the third, perceptual condition, creatures in the story were described as equipped with brains capable of processing physical stimuli from the environment to form complex, multimodal perceptual representations of it. If MH was to be supported, the outcome observed by Jack and Robbins: above baseline in the emotional condition (originally: experience condition, in fact, interoceptive variety of conscious experience) should apply also for the perceptual condition (exteroceptive variety of experience), while in the agency condition, responses should be below baseline.

3 . 2 . 1 M ETHODS

A total of 356 native English users were recruited among MTurk workers with an approval rate of at least 95% for a small fee of $.20. There was one screening question regarding the participants’ education level: ‘Do you currently study or have a degree in philosophy, psychology, and/or cognitive science?’, in a yes/no format. 53 participants were removed from the analysis, because of their expertise, failing the attention check or not answering all questions. Participants’ age ranged from 19 to 75, with a mean of 40.52. There were 171 (56%) women and 132 (44%) men. Data were acquired on 08/07/2019. There were three conditions: intelligence (agency in Jack and Robbins’ (2012) paper), emotion (experience in Jack and Robbins’ (2012) paper), and perception. In the beginning, participants in each condition read the following story: 126 3.2. Study 5. Consciousness and moral concern

While on a scientiﬁc expedition, a researcher discovered a new species that lives in the nearby forest. These newly recognized creatures have fur with various colors and weigh about 50 pounds. Their diet consists mostly of small plants. Because the river could ﬂood the city, the local government ordered to change its course. This means part of the forest has to be logged. This part is the only region where the new species lives. Woodcutters already started their work. Some woodcutters, before cutting trees down, make sure that no creatures are present nearby. If they are, woodcutters scare them away, so that the creatures do not get injured. Not every woodcutter does this. When that happens, some creatures die due to heavy machinery and falling trees. Some citizens are concerned about this. They do not want woodcutters to hurt creatures. They want to enforce a law so that before they start to cut trees, woodcutters would have to make sure that no creatures are nearby so that none of the creatures would have to die or be injured anymore.

Similarly to the original Jack and Robbins (2012) study, participants were then asked three questions, where (1) dealt with moral concern, (2) with guilt, and (3) with penalty:

1 Please indicate how concerned you feel about the welfare of the newly discovered creatures (0 = not at all concerned, 10 = very concerned)

2 Imagine you are a woodcutter. Due to some unusual circumstances you forgot to check whether there were any creatures nearby when you cut down trees. Please rate how bad you would feel if you found that creatures were in effect injured or died. (0 = it would not affect me at all; 10 = I would feel absolutely terrible)

3 If the laws were changed to encourage woodcutters to check the presence of creatures more often, please rate how strong a penalty should be applied to woodcutters who do not comply. (0 = no penalty at all; 10 = bad offenders should serve jail time) 3.2. Study 5. Consciousness and moral concern 127

An attention check was included next: ‘Please select second option’, with three options possible (ﬁrst, second, and third). After that participants read some new information about discovered creatures. In each condition this continuation was different. As an example, here is the story in the intelligence condition13:

Now suppose that scientists made the following important discoveries about the new species: Creatures are highly intelligent. They form elaborate search strategies to forage for food. The neural systems responsible for their memory and reasoning are similar in important aspects to the systems in the human brain. However, creatures feel little or no emotion and have very poor vision, hearing, and other senses. If stuck, they do not hesitate to hurt themselves in order to be able to move freely. They have no recognizable neural system for sensing pain or pleasure. They see, hear, and smell little: they do not perceive a lot. The neural systems responsible for their senses are primitive and they have no recognizable system for creating complex, multimodal representations of the environment. In short, creatures are very smart, but they are devoid of feeling and they have extremely bad senses.

After reading follow-up stories, participants were again asked to answer the same questions as before. Answer format for each question was also the same: a 11-point horizontal scale ranging 0 from left to 10 on the right side. Each point on the scale was labeled with the corresponding digit. The ﬁrst set of questions was used as a baseline measure. Analyzes consisted of a one-way ordinal regression and Wilcoxon signed rank tests with Bonferroni and Pratt corrections, respectively for multiple comparisons and ties. The former was planned to investigate whether there was an effect of manipulation on participants’ responses across all questions. The latter, Wilcoxon tests, were planned to investigate the effect of manipulation for each question, more in-depth. All analyzes were once again performed with the R language.

13All scenarios are available in Appendix B. 128 3.2. Study 5. Consciousness and moral concern

3 . 2 . 2 R ESULTSANDDISCUSSION

Baseline medians were relatively high, 9 for concern, 10 for guilt, and 7 for penalty questions. The planned ordinal regression showed that the manipulation, second part of the story that participants read, differentiated responses relative to the baseline (df = 1; χ2 = 337.92; p <.001). The results of the Wilcoxon tests are presented in Table 3.314. The manipulation effect on the patiency-related judgment was visible only in four cases. After reading the second part of the story in the intelligence condition, participants felt less guilt than at baseline. Their response to the penalty question was also lower. The effect was also observed in the perception condition, both for guilt and penalty questions.

Condition & question Mdnb Mdnp IQRb IQRp Z p Intelligence Concern 9 8 2 3 -2.4 .15 Guilt 10 9 2 3 -4.85 < .0001 Penalty 7 7 3 3 -3.22 < .01 Emotion Concern 9 9 3 3 1.16 1 Guilt 10 10 1 2 -1.33 1 Penalty 7 7 3 3 -0.62 1 Perception Concern 8 8 2.5 2 -2.13 .3 Guilt 10 9 2 4 -6.44 < .0001 Penalty 7 6 2 3 -4.72 < .0001

Table 3.3: Wilcoxon signed rank test results for participant responses vs baseline in Study 5, including descriptive statistics. Mdnb – baseline median, Mdnp – posttest median, IQRb – baseline interquartile range, IQRp – posttest interquartile range.

14Results are not presented in the same way as in Jack and Robbins (2012). As I pointed out back in Subsection 1.4.4.4, I ﬁnd analyzing Likert-like data using non-parametric methods more suitable than parametric methods, which were used by earlier authors, including Jack and Robbins. The non-parametric alternative to the paired t-test (used by Jack and Robbins), i.e., the Wilcoxon signed rank test, is rank based. Customarily, when calculating t-test one reports means and with non-parametric alternatives one reports medians. Differences in means between baseline and posttest are showed in Figure 3.4 (the one presenting results from Jack and Robbins’ (2012) study). In the case of Study 5, differences in medians between baseline and posttest are not always present, as visible from Table 3.3, which is why an analogous ﬁgure to that from Jack and Robbins (2012) would not be readable, and why only the table is presented. 3.2. Study 5. Consciousness and moral concern 129

Results for two conditions — intelligence and perception — did not replicate Jack and Robbins (2012) findings, i.e., emotional and perceptual mental states, associated with being conscious, did not modulate perception of moral patiency in an analogous way. There was no manipulation effect in emotion condition and there was a negative effect in perception condition, i.e., respondents felt less guilt and they opted for a smaller penalty than at baseline. These results indicate that the authors’ claim that conscious states are all coupled with moral patiency in an analogous way is false. What Jack and Robbins are making in their 2012 and 2006 articles is a form of unjustified generalization. They hold — as evident from quotes in the introduction to this section — that simply recognizing an agent as a locus of phenomenal experience is enough to want to shield that agent from harm, i.e., they hold that lay persons take the phenomenal stance (as Jack and Robbins understand it). Results of Study 5 show that this is not the case. Thus, not only the Moral Hypothesis is rejected, the idea of phenomenal stance is rejected as well. While it could be that additional details about perceptual capacities included in the story — either denying such capacities or attributing them to the creatures in the story — somehow confused non-experts, such claim is not supported by data. Finding out about high intelligence and low interoceptive and exteroceptive capacities (intelligence condition) consistently made answers lower, significantly lower for guilt and penalty questions. High exteroceptive capacities (perception condition) also resulted in a drop in feeling guilt and the desirable amount of penalty. Overall, then, results do not support the Moral Hypothesis. Given the discrepancy between Jack and Robbins (2012) results in experience condition and results in emotion condition in my experiment, a concern arose that forest creatures described in the study yielded too high baseline responses for emotional manipulation to significantly influence responses. Lobsters used in the original Jack and Robbins (2012) study are living in a less, than forest, familiar environment to most people: an oceanic one. More specifically, the discrepancy might be due to the familiarity of the environment itself or the familiarity of agents typically living in any given environment. Forests are, arguably, more familiar and better known in the majority of Western countries than oceans and well-being of creatures living in them, e.g., hunting laws, are often an on-going issue in public debates. To account for the effect of the environment, Study 6 was run with lobsters as the main heroes of the 130 3.3. Study 6. Consciousness and moral concern vignettes. The prediction was, consistently with Jack and Robbins (2012) and MH, that less familiar creatures will generate lower baseline responses and, in consequence, the pattern observed in the experience condition in the Jack and Robbins study will emerge for both the emotion and perception conditions.

3.3 Study 6. Consciousness and moral concern

3 . 3 . 1 M ETHODS

This study involved 354 native English users, recruited through MTurk for a small fee of $.20. After checking answers on the screening question and the attention check, 41 were removed from the analysis. Participants’ age ranged from 19 to 81, with a mean of 38.81. Data from 193 (62%) women and 120 (38%) men were analyzed. Data were acquired on 10/07/2019. The design was similar to that of Study 5, with three conditions: intelligence, emotion, and perception, each participant being assigned to only one of them. This time, however, the story resolved around lobsters. At the beginning all participants read the following story:

In the Indonesian islands, lobsters are considered a great delicacy. They are caught by putting traps down on the ocean floor. The traps contain a small amount of food. The lobsters enter to eat the food and cannot get back out. Periodically, fishermen come and pull up their pots to check to see if there are any lobsters inside. They put any lobsters they find into a large cage and bring them back to port. Back at port, the lobsters are quickly bought by local restaurants. They are killed quickly by boiling and they are almost always eaten the same night. Some fishermen do not check their lobster pots very regularly. When this happens, some lobsters may be stuck in the pot for as long as 2 weeks. Because the small amount of food runs out quickly, some lobsters starve to death in the pots. Some Indonesians are concerned about this. They don’t want to stop people from eating lobsters, but they do want the lobsters to be treated humanely. They want to change the law so that fishermen have to check their pots more regularly, so that lobsters don’t starve to death in the traps. 3.3. Study 6. Consciousness and moral concern 131

Participants were then asked the same set of questions as in Study 5, including the attention check. The continuation of the story was different in each condition. As an example, in the perception condition it was as follows15:

Now suppose that scientists made the following important discoveries about lobsters: Lobsters have rich and complex perceptions. They see, hear, and smell a lot, and their brain creates complex, multimodal, representations of their environment. The neural systems responsible for their senses are similar in important aspects to the systems in the human brain. However, lobsters feel little or no emotion and are not especially intelligent. If stuck, they do not hesitate to hurt themselves in order to be able to move freely. They have no recognizable neural system for sensing pain or pleasure. Lobsters remember little about their environment. They forage for food simply by moving forward. The neural systems responsible for lobster memory are primitive and they have no recognizable system for reasoning. In short, lobsters have highly developed senses, but they are devoid of feeling and they are not very smart.

After reading the story, participants were asked to answer the same questions as before. The response format for each question was the same each time: a 11-point horizontal scale ranging 0 from left to 10 on the right side. Each point on the scale was labeled with a corresponding digit. The ﬁrst set of questions was used as a baseline measure. The analysis plan was identical to that of Study 5.

3 . 3 . 2 R ESULTSANDDISCUSSION

Baseline medians were lower than in Study 5, with 7 for concern, 8 for guilt, and 5 for penalty questions (in Study 5, accordingly: 9, 10, and 7). Ordinal regression results showed that the manipulation differentiated responses relative to the baseline (df = 1; χ2 = 526.97; p < .0001). Results for the paired Wilcoxon signed rank tests are presented in Table 3.4.

15As before, all scenarios are available in Appendix B. 132 3.3. Study 6. Consciousness and moral concern

Condition & question Mdnb Mdnp IQRb IQRp Z p Intelligence Concern 7 6 3.5 3.5 -3.68 < .01 Guilt 9 8 4 5 -4.73 < .0001 Penalty 5 5 3.5 4 -2.25 .21 Emotion Concern 7 7 3 2.75 4.15 < .0001 Guilt 8 8 3.75 3 2.04 .38 Penalty 5 6 3 2 3.43 < .01 Perception Concern 7 7 3 4 -4.19 < .0001 Guilt 9 7.5 3 4 -5.86 < .0001 Penalty 6 5 3 3.25 -5.21 < .0001

Table 3.4: Wilcoxon signed rank test results for participant responses vs baseline in Study 5, including descriptive statistics. Mdnb – baseline median, Mdnp – posttest median, IQRb – baseline interquartile range, IQRp – posttest interquartile range.

The manipulation effect on the patiency-related judgment was visible in all cases except for guilt question in the emotion condition and the penalty question in the intelligence condition. Distinctively, in the emotion condition, participants felt more concerned after the second part of the story. They also wanted more strict law than in the baseline. Worryingly for the Moral Hypothesis, being informed about the high perceptual capacities of lobsters inﬂuenced responses negatively, i.e., participants were less concerned, felt less guilt, and wanted the penalty to be less harsh, relative to baseline. The expert view about phenomenal consciousness is not consistent with folk psychology. According to the former both emotional (interoceptive) and perceptual (exteroceptive) experiences are considered phenomenal, while according to the latter these two types of mental states are distinct and not of the same kind. There are, at least, two possibilities: either the status of phenomenal consciousness in folk psychology is different than experts think, i.e., lay people reject the claim that phenomenal consciousness is uniform and consider varieties of phenomenal states differently, or the expert account of phenomenal consciousness does not have its equivalent in folk psychology. Either way, the relation between moral patiency and attribution of emotions is opposite to the one between moral patiency and attribution of perceptual mental states. 3.3. Study 6. Consciousness and moral concern 133

Results obtained in Studies 5 and 6 are similar (although obtained independently) to Nahmias et al. (2019) findings about the relationship between attributions of free will, consciousness, and moral responsibility. As authors put it: “the ability to feel emotions and have things actually matter to the individual is important in Free Will attributions, yet the ability to have conscious sensations (e.g., the ability to experience sounds or smells) specifically plays no significant role” (Nahmias et al., 2019, p. 76). Results from Studies 5 and 6 are consistent with this quote, as they show that for lay people emotion and perception are of mental states of a separate kind. Emotional mental state attributions increases perceived moral patiency. Furthermore, as stated a moment ago, results also indicate that attributions of other mental states — perceptions or deliberations — modulate moral patiency negatively. Had at least perceptual capacities modulated moral patiency in the same direction as emotional ones, it could be argued that it is conscious experience attribution that modulates the moral patiency. Switching to an animal from a distant species living in an alien environment produced a different pattern of results than the one used in Study 5. Differences relative to baseline responses yielded significant in the emotion condition (for concern and penalty questions). An intriguing idea arises that perception of moral patiency depends on a higher degree on the distance between different species and closeness between other species’ habitat and human natural habitat than on human emotional capacities. As mentioned in Subsection 3.2.2, the effect of the environment might be more about the level of our familiarity with creatures that live in it. Forest creatures are culturally well-known and their well-being, e.g., humane treating and hunting laws, is often an issue in public debates. However, regardless of whether the familiarity concerns the kind of creature and/or its environment, it is tempting to hypothesize that it has a greater impact on the perceived moral patiency than the explicit information about mental (with the special emphasis on emotions) capacities. 134 3.4. Summary discussion

3.4 Summary discussion

In this subsection, I recapitulate the main outcomes of three studies presented in this chapter and how they relate to the earlier studies and experiments that inspired them. I also discuss the combined impact of my studies on the idea of the conscious stance, i.e., folk attributions of conscious states and its function, described in Section 1.5. Study 4 was designed to inquire how do lay people tell the difference between conscious and unconscious mental states. While in original experiments (Sytsma & Machery, 2010; Sytsma & Ozdemir, 2019a) the researchers studied how non-experts attribute experiential states, identified by experts with conscious states, I suspended the experts’ concept of experiential (phenomenal) nature of consciousness and asked lay persons to directly attribute property of being conscious to mental states. This approach did not prejudge if in folk psychology conscious states are understood in an experiential or non-experiential way. The second advantage of such an approach is that is is much more flexible. It allows us to determine if the given mental state is conscious or unconscious. The same procedure cannot be repeated with experience. If we substitute ‘conscious’ with ‘experience’, we get experiential and non-experiential mental states. Are we ready to maintain that every non-experiential mental state is by definition unconscious? That was the reason why I decided to replace ‘experience’ with ‘[being] conscious’. In my experiment, attributions of explicitly conscious states did not give a similar pattern of results as attributions of experiencing in Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019a). Summing up, the results of my study do not support the Consciousness Hypothesis. Non-experts seem to be confused about whether the conscious- unconscious distinction can be used when making attributions to a robot. Such confusion does not arise when it comes to making attributions to a human agent. Findings, then, indicate that explicitly unconscious states are attributed differently than conscious ones: they are attributed differently between different agents, but also between different states. Differences between attributing unconscious perceptual and unconscious pain states are consistent with the explanation provided by studies on color and pain intuitions (Reuter et al., 2019; Reuter & Sytsma, 2018; Sytsma, 2012). The tendency to attribute conscious perceptual state to a human but reluctance to attribute unconscious perceptual state to the same agent is consistent with the 3.4. Summary discussion 135 meaning of perceptual processes in folk psychology. As I mentioned earlier, perceptual processes are regarded as intrinsically conscious, therefore the expression ‘consciously see red’ is redundant. If this interpretation is right, then the expression ‘unconsciously see red’ is inconsistent and it accounts for the confusion of respondents. Studies 5 and 6 were designed to test the claim made first by Robbins and Jack (2006), according to which when we attribute experiential states to agents, we treat them as subjects of our moral concern, i.e., the perceived moral patiency is heightened when we take the phenomenal stance. Jack and Robbins (2012) tested this claim in a way that utilized attributions of only emotional states, which did not exhaust the list of types of mental states that are considered as having an experiential aspect. Other typical examples of phenomenal states, besides mental states of the emotional variety, comprises of perceptual mental states. Thus, if indeed Jack and Robbins were correct in their claim, not only attributions of emotional but also perceptual mental states should influence perceived moral patiency in an analogous way (Moral Hypothesis). Following this prediction I modified Jack and Robbins’ (2012) experimental design to include a condition in which participants had to attribute high perceptual capacities to agents, heroes of the story. The results of Studies 5 and 6 undermine Moral Hypothesis and provide evidence that emotional and perceptual states do not modulate perceived moral patiency in the same way. Emotional capacities either did not change perceived patiency, as the results of Study 5 demonstrate, or they changed it differently than perceptual capacities, which was shown in Study 6. Per- ceptual capacities — in Study 6 — modulated perceived patiency similarly to capacities to perform intelligent actions. Smaller baselines in Study 6, relative to Study 5, seem to be an effect of differences in the location in the phyloge- netic tree and the affinities between habitats depicted in stories in these two experiments. What the outcomes of Study 6 indicate is that even if we accept experts’ view that consciousness is experiential (phenomenal), then among phenomenal consciousness there are different types of phenomenal states and each of them can influence perceived moral patiency differently. In my Studies, this was shown for two types of phenomenal states, but other types of phenomenal states may differ in terms of how they influence perceived moral patiency. Results of Studies 5 and 6 are also consistent with a more 136 3.4. Summary discussion straightforward interpretation, according to which in tasks like those in Jack and Robbins (2012) and my Studies 5 and 6 lay persons do not differentiate between different varieties of phenomenal consciousness but they utilize a view about consciousness that is different from that of the experts’. Looking at the results of the three studies reported in this chapter combined, experiments designed similarly as Jack and Robbins’ (2012) experiment, e.g., Studies 5 and 6, are likely to not inform us on the mechanism of folk attributions of consciousness. I found no evidence suggesting that attributions of unconscious mental states evoke the same intuitions as attributions of explicitly conscious states do, with the exception of perceptual states being understood as conscious by default when attributed to a human agent. That outcome alone hinders drawing conclusions such as those in 2012 paper by Jack and Robbins, i.e., about the phenomenal stance. However, the outcomes of Studies 5 and 6 give a similar conclusion independently. As even if attributions of (implicitly) conscious emotional and perceptual states would be a good way to test the folk intuitions about consciousness, the responses should be similar in both conditions. They were not, which indicates that emotional and perceptual capacities do not belong to the same kind of experiential (i.e., conscious) mental state. Thus, it is not a good strategy to infer conclusions about the involvement of the folk view about consciousness in moral reasoning. After the rejection of the Consciousness and the Moral Hypotheses the idea of the conscious stance, as it was first introduced in Section 1.4.3 seems to be indefensible. First and foremost, non-experts do associate certain meanings with ‘consciousness’, ‘conscious’, and ‘unconscious’, as they are capable to use these terms distinctively in specific contexts. In other words, ‘consciousness’ is not an umbrella term that covers a wide range of mental states, independently of their function, their links with the physical world, and their place in the structure of the mental system as a whole. Experts do agree that emotional, perceptual, and some other mental states belong to conscious mental states but they demand — and expect that this demand will be shared by lay persons as well — that each member of this class if of phenomenal (experiential) character. Conscious character understood in experts’ way is what links these different states together. 3.4. Summary discussion 137

Overall, the gathered evidence suggests that the idea of the phenomenal stance should be rejected or radically modified from the ground up. It still may be that what non-experts think about ‘consciousness’ plays a role in everyday life, i.e., that it is a non-trivial part of folk psychology. After all, results from Studies 5 and 6 indicate that perceptual capacities modulate perceived moral patiency negatively, and findings from Study 4 indicate that perceptual states might be understood as conscious by default. Either way, however, the folk view about consciousness is not compatible with the phenomenal claim. Non-experts do not think about consciousness like experts. The additional investigations are needed now to find out what is a mechanism behind attributing conscious states in everyday life. As they exceed the goal of this project, it is a quest yet to be taken.

Chapter 4

General discussion

In this chapter, I provide a recapitulation of my theoretical considerations (Chapter 1) and empirical results from linguistic (Chapter 2) and questionnaire (Chapter 3) studies. The chapter is structured as follows. First, I recall my basic theoretical views which led me to formulate the Linguistic, Consciousness, and Moral Hypotheses. Then I shortly recapitulate empirical findings related to relationships postulated in them. Then, I argue that findings are consistent with each other. Results from all analyzes and experiments presented in this manuscript point toward the same verdict about the phenomenal reading of the obviousness claim: there is no evidence to support it, so it should be rejected. Later in this chapter, I discuss the limitations of my analyzes and experiments. Final conclusions, i.e., how results of my studies allow meeting the goals stated in the Introduction, are presented not in this but the next, final, chapter.

W HYDOWENEEDTOSTUDYACOMMONSENSEAP - PROACHTOCONSCIOUSNESS , ANDHOWTODESIGN ANDPERFORMRESEARCHRELEVANTTOTHISTOPIC

Let me start with a rough sketch of a situation in consciousness studies which I discussed in detail in Chapter 1. There is no doubt that the questions ‘What does it mean to be conscious?’ and ‘How should we study conscious processes?’ are fundamental both for philosophers and researchers in many scientific disciplines. They belong to the most obscure — but at the same time the most fascinating — scientific challenges which so far have not been successfully met. It does not mean that the consciousness problem is hopelessly 140 difficult and nothing important has been achieved in this domain of inquiry1. There are significant, although dispersed contributions which help to dispel the fog of obscurity (Boly et al., 2017; Dehaene, Charles, King, & Marti, 2014; Overgaard, 2017; Seth, 2018) but the main problem remains unsolved: there is no commonly accepted approach capable of offering a unified view of consciousness and providing reliable, intersubjective methods of studying conscious mental states. It seems to me that this embarrassing situation has its origin in the widespread idea that every serious, scientifically oriented study of consciousness has to cope with experiences which are the most characteristic form of our mental life. This form is called phenomenal consciousness and advocates of experiential view maintain that since every healthy human being has experiences, then every experiencing person is conscious. The idea of this commonly shared form of consciousness seems to agree both with intuitions evoked by neatly selected examples such as seeing red, feeling pain, or be scared and with an overwhelming sense of obviousness of conscious nature of these and supposedly similar mental states. No wonder that consciousness scholars from various disciplines strive to introduce into their research programs the exemplary cases of conscious experiences. However, the idea of experiential nature of consciousness has one serious disadvantage, namely conscious experiences are accessible only from inside. It means that every person is the sole judge of its consciousness and no one can responsibly attribute consciousness to someone else. The subjectivity, that is the first-person accessibility of experiences cannot be reconciled with the intersubjectivity conceived as a fundamental trait of every scientific inquiry, including research procedures and obtained results. Needles to say, even in the advanced sciences there are no instruments allowing to study subjective conscious experiences with intersubjective methods2. What we get is a paradox: conscious experiences, which are undeniably obvious because of their subjective character (at least in experientialists’ eyes), at the same time are completely obscure

1As a well-known quote from Stuart Sutherland goes: “Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon. It is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written on it” (Sutherland, 1989, p. 90). Scholars of consciousness still come back to this quote, a recent example is Seth (2018). 2The perspective of heterophenomenology, Dennett’s proposal of how to study consciousness, is not a concrete research program, furthermore, it does not assume that something like first-person experiences exists: what is only necessary for a heterophenomenologist are beliefs that people have that they do have first-person experiences. Similarly, in the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (e.g., Koch, 2019; Tononi, Boly, Massimini, & Koch, 2016) ‘experiences’ are understood non-traditionally. 141 because of their impenetrability to scientific inquiry. The most common way to overcome this paradox is by upholding the view of experiential nature of consciousness and attempting to modify existing or design new method which will allow intersubjective access to subjective contents. The aim of my dissertation is much more modest. Instead of searching for tools which could make experiences transparent to scientific observations I decided to transfer interest from subjective forms of living through mental states to situations in which conscious states are not accessed in a privileged way by their owners, but are attributed to other human beings and possibly to specified representatives of other species, and other agents. The idea of attributing conscious states to others might prima facie seem weird. However, a cursory look at everyday situations assures us that in attributing mental states to other people sometimes take these states as conscious and sometimes deny accepting them as conscious. The question I wanted to answer was: does folk psychology, representing lay persons beliefs about other minds, contain a conscious component, that is rules and judgments which allow to identify mental states as conscious and attribute them to certain agents functioning in specific conditions? It can be argued that since conscious states are a special kind of mental states, then the best way to study conscious states’ attribution is to search for a special kind of intentional stance that relates to mental states equipped with an additional property of being conscious. After a discussion of Dennett’s conception of intentional stance (Dennett, 1987, Section 1.3), I presented objections against the solution assuming that the intentional stance approach would suffice to account for conscious state attribution. The basic objection runs as follows. The idea of intentional stance was proposed to show that in everyday life we make use of folk psychology to be able to account for actions that could not be reduced to pure motion and are incomprehensible without attribution of intelligence to its agent. Therefore, this kind of action is called intelligent and mental capacities necessary to plan and execute it encompass beliefs and desires. As is well known, in the theory of intentional stance, attribution of mental states is only a means allowing to explain or predict someone’s behavior. Although a person who takes this stance ascribes to someone else definite intention, beliefs, plans of actions, and their anticipated results, all these efforts to uncover mental processes of other person serve as an instrument of making sense of her past, present or future behavior. In other words, the idea of intentional stance was designed to show how the 142 attribution of mental machinery helps in understanding the behavior of other persons. It can be asked if the functioning of this machinery depends on the conscious character of its components? Let me discuss it in more detail. Imag- ine that we see a person and want to understand her actions. Observation assures us that it is a sequence of actions that do not appear in random but in a certain order. We take the intentional stance and using the best of our knowledge we attribute to this person such beliefs and desires that jointly explain these actions as aiming at reaching a definite goal. One might object that when complex actions are performed such an explanation is too coarse and it would be worth getting a more accurate one. To get a finer picture of the working of mental machinery a class of attributed mental states could be extended with recollections of imaginations, anticipations, emotions, and so forth3. Consideration of interrelated mental states of various kinds could lead to a more detailed and reliable explanation of behavior. Let us return to a rough approximation and limit mental states to beliefs and desires but enrich them with the property of being conscious. I doubt that this introduction of consciousness into mental machinery will result in a more accurate explanation of observed actions. We should remember that the intentional stance was proposed as a relatively simple, but an effective instrument of folk psychology that helps to make actions of other agents comprehensible. It is difficult to imagine that there is a more complicated version of the intentional stance supplemented with the assumption about the conscious character of agents’ mental states. First, I have not met such a proposal in the literature; second, I wonder how this conscious nature of beliefs and desires could be recognized by observers and in effect help them to formulate more reliable and more detailed explanations or predictions of behavior. In my opinion, the intentional stance does not involve assumptions about the conscious or unconscious character of mental states. Therefore, I assumed that instead of trying to refine the intentional stance, one should consider introducing a new stance – the conscious stance. In Chapter 1, I reported proposals which dealt with the problem of attribution of conscious states. Although their authors did not use the expression ‘the conscious stance’, they considered situations in which people were ascribing conscious states to others. Since these re-

3This is a road taken, for example, by Gray et al. (2007a) and Weisman et al. (2017a) in their research on mind perception, which were reviewed in Subsection 1.4.2, albeit their experiments did not involve explaining the behavior of other agents. 143 searchers belong to the experientialists camp4, they designed experiments in which test subjects were expected to attribute experiential mental states such as seeing red, feeling pain, and so forth. Jack and Robbins (2012) called this kind of approach to other persons’ conscious states the phenomenal stance (Section 1.4.3). In Chapter 1, I discussed the relationship between the phenomenal and the conscious stances. The former exhibits experts’ concept of consciousness understood as having experiences, that is living through mental states. A person who takes the phenomenal stance attributes conscious states to other persons. The problem of deciding how to tell which conscious states can be attributed in a given circumstance is left unsolved. The conscious stance approach empha- sizes the importance of uncovering how people detect (‘perceive’) conscious states of other persons and assumes that no form of conscious states is favored over others. While the conscious stance deﬁned in this way is only a postulate (I discussed this proposal in Section 1.4.4) that needs further elaboration, the phenomenal stance represents the views of the majority of scholars performing empirical research in the area of consciousness studies. They are convinced that the fundamental task of solving the great riddle of consciousness is to un- ravel the nature of experience and uncover how this basic, experiential form of consciousness relates to other forms. The advocates of the phenomenal stance belong to experientialists’ camp and share, although sometimes tacitly, several beliefs regarding this form of consciousness. I extracted from the existing literature the most relevant beliefs and formulated three claims in which they are expressed (Section 1.1). First of them — the phenomenal claim — states that during conscious experience human beings (and probably some other creatures) grasp qualia, which are properties of their mental states and not the properties of physical objects from the external world. It means that the quale of (phenomenal) redness should be discerned from (physical) redness deﬁned in parameters of a light wave (Chalmers, 2003a, p. 135)5. Second of them — the obviousness claim — states that experience is self-justifying and its

4Being adherent to the concept of phenomenal consciousness, as first described on page 6 and in regard to Jack and Robbins’ proposal of the phenomenal stance on page 37. 5“I look at a red apple, and visually experience its color. This experience instantiates a phenomenal quality R, which we might call phenomenal redness. It is natural to say that I am having a red experience, even though of course experiences are not red in the sense in which apples are red. Phenomenal redness (a property of experiences, or of subjects of experience) is a different property from external redness (a property of external objects), but both are respectable properties in their own right” (Chalmers, 2003a, p. 135). 144 possession could not be doubted. Both these claims constitute the fundament of the experiential concept of consciousness. I argued that to be able to study the attribution of conscious states to other persons, one has to accept the third claim: the consciousness attribution claim. It says that apart from being certain of our conscious states we can recognize conscious states of others. It seems to me that this claim is accepted tacitly, although its acceptance is necessary because empirical tests with which attributions of conscious states to others are studied (I discussed them in Section 1.4) would be completely arbitrary if their design would not reflect the consciousness attribution claim. Throughout Sections 1.4.4.1, 1.4.4.2, and 1.4.4.3, I presented several arguments against the narrow perspective of empirical researchers who study attribution of conscious states. In practice, they limit their experiments to situations in which human, other animals, or robot is not only capable of computing sensory and perceptual information about environmental objects but is also able to have experiences. Researchers take for granted the experientialists’ arguments that the unique nature of experience does not allow us to describe it in computational terms. Therefore to visualize the very “essence” of experience they borrow from theoretical investigations several examples of typical conscious experiences and present them to participants in their experiments. Empirical researchers seem to have forgotten that these examples play a different role in theoretical disputes and common conversations about mental life. The expressions ‘seeing red’ or ‘feeling pain’ could have completely different meanings for experts and lay persons. Only if we assume — as empirical researchers of consciousness attribution do — that lay person understands the expression ‘seeing red’ (and other exemplary expressions relating to conscious experiences) exactly as consciousness scholar can we maintain that the concept of conscious experience is obvious and commonly accepted. This assumption is a consequence of the obviousness claim. In my opinion, the majority (if not all) of research on consciousness attribution is based on this claim. Although it says that someone immersed in experiences such as seeing red, feeling pain, etc., knows without a doubt that she is in a conscious (mental) state, its content depends on meanings attached to expressions ‘seeing red’, ‘feeling pain’, and ‘being conscious’. It is well known (I recalled it in Chapter 1) that ‘seeing red’ could be understood purely functionally (e.g., neurocomputationally) or phenomenally. None of these two meanings have to belong to folk psychology. If I am right, then scenes describing creatures who see red or feel pain would 145 be interpreted by lay persons as referring to mental states of these creatures, but it is hardly imaginable that lay persons would understand these states in a functional (neurocomputational) or phenomenal (experiential) way. In my opinion, the task of the researchers is not to project their experiential views on the studied subjects but to: (1) suspend own beliefs about consciousness, (2) carefully register the usage of consciousness related words in everyday language, (3) try to decipher what concept of consciousness is assumed by lay persons when they attribute mental states which for experts are evidently phenomenal. As can be seen, such a research program postulates that to study folk psychology approaches to consciousness attribution one should investigate how the language of experts fits into everyday language and to check how lay persons interpret scenes designed by experts as involving conscious experience. Both these tasks depend on the validity of the obviousness claim. If this claim is true, then experts and lay persons should share at the linguistic level the meanings of the basic, non-technical phrases referring to conscious states and use these phrases in an analogous way. I expressed this conjecture in the form of the linguistic hypothesis (LH: non-experts use consciousness-related words in the same way as experts) and reported, in Chapter 2, the results of my studies on the use of consciousness related words. The substantial part of my empirical research was devoted to studies on attitudes of lay persons to conscious states of others. I performed three questionnaire studies to find out if in attributing conscious states others lay persons follow the expectations of experts and if their choices of attributed conscious states influence their perception of moral patiency. The first of the mentioned problems corresponds to Consciousness Hypothesis (CH: mental states that experts view as examples of conscious states are attributed in the same conditions regardless of them being explicitly identified as conscious in the experiment or not), the second corresponds to Moral Hypothesis (MH: attributions of perceptual and emotional conscious states influence perception of moral patiency in an analogous way). Below I discuss the main results of my empirical studies from the perspective of formulated hypotheses. 146

T HE L INGUISTIC H YPOTHESIS

We test non-experts’ intuitions regarding conscious mental capacities by looking at their linguistic behavior (verbal responses to situations described in questionnaire studies) or their reactions to such linguistic behavior (responding to the experimentator’s instructions). Thus, we should ensure that our participants associate consciousness-related words and phrases with the same phenomena as we, researchers. How we deﬁne experimental conditions and how we describe them to participants matters. In experiments investigating conscious states attributions, as evident from Section 1.4.1, this issue is clear: most often researchers ask participants whether they would attribute ‘state XYZ’ to certain agents (e.g., Buckwalter & Phelan, 2014; Knobe & Prinz, 2008; Shepherd, 2015). It is assumed that what these prepared phrases elicit in non- experts are their intuitions about consciousness. Without this assumption, not only the research on the folk view on consciousness but also any scientiﬁc investigation into folk psychology has a problem. If we are interested in how people understand consciousness and other mental capacities, we have to include linguistic behavior in our experiments. At the very least, this linguistic behavior is present because of what experimentators do. Even if participants are not responding verbally, e.g., are given a body map and are asked to color where in their bodies they feel certain states (as in: Nummenmaa et al., 2018a; Volynets et al., 2019), these states are still named by experimentators in instructions to participants. The Linguistic Hypothesis touches this issue directly. If the obviousness claim is true, then at the very least consciousness-related words are present in and used similarly in both the expert and the non-expert languages. This is precisely what LH states. If language is the problem, if words and phrases that experts associate with their favorite concept of consciousness are associated by non-experts with a different meaning, then the possibilities to test the obviousness claim shrink drastically. Furthermore, most of the existing research, reportedly on the subject of conscious state attribution, would have been not on this subject but on a subject of attributing any mental state. 147

The important component of the expert conception of consciousness is a set of statements deﬁning the property (or properties) of mental states which decides of their conscious character. By investigating how non-experts use consciousness-related words we can test the truthfulness of the obviousness claim. This claim implies that non-experts use such words to denote these mental states that experts regard as conscious. The role that language plays in the folk view about consciousness is rarely raised in the literature. Among very few examples is the following opinion of Knobe and Prinz from classic 2008 paper regarding the obviousness claim with reference to the concept of phenomenal consciousness:

[. . .] it is clear that most people would not understand the words ‘phenomenal consciousness’ [. . .] It would certainly be foolish, then, for us to suggest that people ordinarily have explicit beliefs about whether particular mental state types do or do not require phenomenal consciousness [. . .] the suggestion is that people are actually applying the concept all the time; it’s just that they normally have no awareness of doing so [. . .] Linguists quite often suggest that people categorize words or phrases using a particular concept even when they have no awareness at all of doing so. [. . .] Our hypothesis is that people have a concept of phenomenal consciousness and that they use this concept to distinguish between different types of mental states ascriptions. (p. 68–69)

The authors aptly point out that the expression ‘phenomenal consciousness’ does not belong to the language of folk psychology but at the same time, they maintain that lay persons have the concept of phenomenal consciousness and utilize it to make different mental states ascriptions. One might ask what are the grounds of such a firm thesis? It surely is not the conclusion of an empirical inquiry, nor the consequence of a comprehensive investigation of fundamental beliefs and assumptions of folk psychology. It seems that its origins are judgements expressed in the phenomenal and obviousness claims. Both claims belong to experts’ views about consciousness and because their contents are so evident to them that they tacitly assume universal validity of these claims. Let me notice that if the experts’ views were true and lay persons 148 had the concept of phenomenal consciousness, then the everyday language should include expressions which could be used — if not directly, then figura- tively — to refer to phenomenal mental states. According to my knowledge, linguistic studies searching for such phrases have not been undertaken. Because of the rareness of such investigations in the literature surrounding the folk view about consciousness, lack of a beaten path, results on LH presented in Chapter 2 are a new kind of evidence. At the end of the aforementioned chapter, I included responses to some of the possible reservations one may have about such analyzes. As of the moment of writing this manuscript, outcomes from these investigations are the only actual evidence there is on LH, which is why I find them even more important. The results of my three linguistic studies allow us to formulate the general conclusion that the Linguistic Hypothesis is false. The amount of evidence supportive of different specifications of LH is extremely small. The overall picture from three independent linguistic studies is that selected consciousness- related words are semantically similar in a very limited way. Furthermore, I found no evidence for neither of the words that would indicate that one can use them to describe phenomenal consciousness exhaustively, which speaks against the phenomenal reading of the obviousness claim. Especially the latter result is detrimental to the validity of the existing research. Analyzes performed on three different sources of data: the semantic database of WordNet, word embeddings from a large model of English, and Corpus of Contemporary American English, show how unsatisfactory words used in the research on the folk view about consciousness are to describe consciousness. With words such as ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ non-experts associate emotional and bodily states at best. While, naturally, not every academic concept of consciousness is consistent with the concept of phenomenal consciousness, most — if not all — of them have the following feature: they map out certain types of mental states as conscious states. Because there are more of such types than just emotions and bodily sensations, simply acknowledging the association of certain words and phrases with these two types of states is not enough to associate them with words and phrases eliciting intuitions about consciousness. 149

The overall outcome of testing LH is negative for the idea of phenomenal claim and the idea of easy testability of the obviousness claim. There is no linguistic evidence indicating the existence of commonly accepted ways of addressing mental states of others as conscious states that would be consistent with the concept of phenomenal consciousness.

T HE C ONSCIOUSNESS H YPOTHESIS

Researchers typically look for patterns of mental state attributions. If we take attributions of states like ‘seeing red’ or ‘feeling pain’ as attributions of conscious states, which scholars of consciousness and scholars interested in folk view about consciousness often do, we assume that conscious character of these states is their intrinsic property that does not need to be named explicitly. In other words, asking about ‘seeing red’ is the same as asking about ‘consciously seeing red’. Furthermore, as reviewed in Section 1.4, researchers most often assume that non-experts share — although tacitly — their concept of consciousness. However, researchers did not present any compelling evidence supporting this assumption. In other words, the ‘Do non-experts have and use a well-deﬁned concept of consciousness?’ question was often omitted in favor of ‘Is non-expert concept of consciousness consistent with the experts’ concept of phenomenal consciousness?’. The Consciousness Hypothesis was tested to provide evidence on the aforementioned claims. If the existing literature is right, then, when asked to attribute a deﬁnite mental state, say ‘feel pain’ to a certain agent non- experts should respond similarly as to a situation when they would be asked to attribute ‘consciously feel pain’. So the expected pattern of attributions for explicitly conscious states should stay the same as when this conscious character is only implicit (as in, e.g., Sytsma & Machery, 2010; Sytsma & Ozdemir, 2019a). Furthermore, the attributions of explicitly unconscious states follow a different pattern. If non-experts are in certain situation inclined to acknowledge given mental state as conscious, then they would refrain from considering this state as unconscious. The property of being conscious is an internal property and cannot be freely detached from the mental state. 150

However, this is not what was found and reported in Section 3.1. Non- experts tend to utilize ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ distinction differently than predicted by CH. The attributions of explicitly conscious states are not consistent with the patterns observed by other researchers in previous experiments, originally by Sytsma and Machery (2010). Findings indicate that the distinction — ‘conscious’ vs. ‘unconscious’ — when used towards robots confuses lay people. Furthermore, the pain states are not understood as necessarily (intrinsically) conscious states, which is consistent with unfelt pains attributions discovered by Reuter and Sytsma (2018), but inconsistent with the prediction behind CH. On the other hand, when perceptual mental states are attributed to a human, they are implied to be conscious. This linkage between consciousness and perceiving the objects in an environment was further supported by non-experts descriptions of consciousness. Results indicate that the folk view identiﬁes consciousness with its informational (functional) reading: perceptual states oriented at acquiring information about the environment. Overall, outcomes from Study 4 are not consistent with the phenomenal claim.

T HE M ORAL H YPOTHESIS

As described in Section 1.2, more than a half-century-old tradition of scientiﬁc and philosophical investigation into the folk psychology sees its function in explaining and predicting the behavior of other agents (e.g., Dennett, 1971; Frith et al., 1991; Nichols & Stich, 2003). In Subsection 1.4.4.3, I sketched a proposal of the purpose of conscious mental state attribution, i.e., I introduced the conscious stance. I argued that while the intentional stance is oriented at predicting behavior, the conscious stance is oriented at predicting mental activities. As stated in Section 1.5, the idea of the conscious stance is an alternative to the idea of the phenomenal stance, which was put forward by Robbins and Jack (2006) and tested in Jack and Robbins (2012). According to the proponents of the phenomenal stance, attributing phenomenal states to others is involved in reasoning about moral patiency. This link between attribution of conscious mental states and morality is not limited to the idea of the phenomenal stance, as evident from Section 1.4.3. 151

Testing the Moral Hypothesis is testing the scope of this link. The attribution of states typically identified as conscious by experts, such as emotions (interoceptive experiences) or perceptions (exteroceptive experiences), should modulate perceived moral patiency in an analogous way. If it is indeed the conscious character of these states that guides moral patiency, then there should be no difference in perceived moral patiency regardless if we attribute an emotional or a perceptual mental state. Outcomes of both Study 4 and Study 5 indicate that attributing exteroceptive capacities has an opposite effect on the perceived moral patiency than attributing interoceptive capacities. Only being informed about high emotional capacities, in Study 6, resulted in higher moral concern than at baseline. Such falsification of MH implies that studies such as those of Jack and Robbins are not about the folk view about consciousness, they are about the involvement of attributions of emotional experiences in the perception of moral patiency. Thus, their experiments do not actually test the idea of phenomenal stance in its complete scope. This may seem a trivial conclusion, however, I again stress the danger of committing a fallacy of making claims about intuitions based on intuitions. If indeed such a conclusion is obvious on its own, now we have data to corroborate this triviality. Furthermore, rejecting MH means that the role that folk intuitions about consciousness serve in everyday life remains largely unknown. This outcome justifies taking the idea of conscious stance seriously.

C ONSISTENCYOFFINDINGS

On the most general level, the obviousness claim is about how we ordinary bread eaters, experts and non-experts alike, view the lived through the experience of being conscious. What results of my experiments indicate is that studying the obviousness claim requires a set of carefully designed experiments. The difficulty is even higher, given the validity problem that researchers ne- glected: assuming that the folk view about consciousness manifests itself in how non-experts attribute mental states that experts deem as phenomenal (conscious). The overall consistency of outcomes of my studies is visible in that 152 they all provide evidence against the phenomenal reading of the obviousness claim while at the same time they all provide evidence supporting that indeed there is the validity problem present in the research on the folk view about consciousness. I will dismantle this consistency into two layers: linguistic and socio-cognitive. The former, linguistic layer, takes into consideration how researchers and lay people actually use consciousness-related vocabulary. In this regard, I found no compelling evidence that the obviousness claim can be tested in any linguistically straightforward way. Furthermore, the results of linguistic studies convince that the phenomenal claim should be rejected. Second is the socio-cognitive layer with a specific problem of attribution conscious states to other persons. I was interested in what sort of mental states, especially the conscious ones, are attributed by non-experts. Likewise, I found no evidence to accept the phenomenal claim here. Non-experts do not attribute the explicitly conscious states in a way that would support the phenomenal reading of the obviousness claim. On the contrary, some conscious mental states, such as visual perceptions, are understood by lay people informationally. Other kinds of conscious mental states, such as feeling pain, seem to have, for non-experts, both conscious and unconscious stages. Finally, I found, contrary to the previous research that suggested the involvement of phenomenal stance with the moral cognition, no evidence to justify the claim that lay people attributions of conscious mental states heightens the perceived moral patiency. Overall, then, results are against the phenomenal claim. They are also against the experts’ perspective of existing studies on the subject of folk view about consciousness. Testing attributions of some of the states that experts identify as conscious does not equal testing intuitions about consciousness. Remaining aware of the danger of a post hoc fallacy, I want to expose a few more specific interrelationships between the results of my studies. The informational reading of conscious exteroceptive mental states, which I mentioned in the previous paragraph, finds support in two out of three linguistic analyzes (WordNet and word embeddings studies). In WordNet data, for example, one of ‘consciousness’ synsets was: “an alert cognitive state in which you are aware of yourself and your situation”. These findings are consistent with the informational reading of the explicitly conscious perceptual states in Study 4 and its follow-up. On the other hand, the semantic affinity between 153

‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ based on the fact that in the everyday language both phrases are mainly used to refer to emotions or bodily states does not suffice to maintain that they are taken by lay persons as typical representatives of consciousness-words. This outcome was striking both in linguistic experiments and questionnaire studies. The independent contribution that each of my studies gives towards un- dermining the validity of the phenomenal claim makes its rejection more legitimate. However, I remain cautious about more general conclusions. Draw- ing inferences based on connections between only some of the outcomes can lead to a distorted, biased view about the folk intuitions about consciousness. Not everywhere the same kind of connections can be made, e.g., there is none between the outcomes of the most frequent collocates of ‘consciousness’ and the definitions of ‘consciousness’ gathered from non-experts: The former was not indicative of informational reading of consciousness but the latter one was. This does not mean that these outcomes are contradictory to one another. However, if one would expect findings from different studies in this project to complete one another to result in a firm general conclusion, then such expectation was not fulfilled.

L IMITATIONSOFPERFORMEDSTUDIES

It could be imagined that some future expanded empirical studies would present firm evidence that non-experts do not possess the concept of phenomenal experience. If it were true, then their use of the word ‘consciousness’, even when they refer to mental states such as seeing red or feeling pain would radically deviate from that of experts. This issue was discussed above (cf. the informational reading of consciousness by lay persons) and earlier when I introduced the validity problem back in Subsection 1.4.4. I argued that while it is possible, testing the attributions of explicitly conscious states is a missing piece of evidence on the subject of how non-experts attribute conscious mental states. What for experts is a common property of mental states such as certain sensations, perceptions, feelings, emotions, etc., is that they are subjectively experienced or lived through. Experts call these states ‘conscious’ and say we ‘experience’ and ‘feel’ them. Attributions of states introduced with the latter two phrases were already tested (e.g., Arico, 2010; Arico et al., 2011; Fiala et al., 2014; Huebner, 2010; Huebner et al., 2010; Jack & Robbins, 2012; Kim 154 et al., 2016; Knobe & Prinz, 2008; Sytsma & Machery, 2009, 2010; Sytsma & Ozdemir, 2019a). Testing the attributions of explicitly conscious states was a missing piece. The burden of proof, that non-experts possess the concept of phenomenal experience but cannot put it into words experts use, I argue, on the side of those that make such claim6. The success of such a demonstration is crucial for the validity of the obviousness claim. As I stated in Section 1.5, the aim of the empirical part of my project was to examine consciousness concepts that were already present in studies on the folk view about consciousness. Because of that, the findings presented in this dissertation do not provide a complete positive picture of how non- experts view consciousness. It might be seen as a serious limitation to my studies. In my opinion, such expectation goes too far. Before we start to search for a positive, folk psychological view of consciousness we should examine the reliability of theoretical assumptions of the hitherto empirical research. I performed such an examination in Chapter 1. In effect, it occurred that the prevailing majority of both theoretical and empirical studies are based on the experiential conception of consciousness. I argued that this conception is biased because of two assumptions: phenomenal and obviousness claims. What’s more, these claims are also assumed by empirical researchers. There- fore, the first task in a search for a positive conception of consciousness should be to test the validity of these claims. The results of my studies strongly support the conclusion that the phenomenal claim is false. What is not evident is the falsity of the obviousness claim. Its rejection demands more experiments and more data. At present not much can be said about this folk concept of consciousness. This limitation of my empirical research, however, was known from the very start, I made it clear in Section 1.5 when I declared that my experiments will be dedicated to solving issues and unknowns about studies made by other researchers. Limitations of the experiments reported in Chapter 2 are due to the specific hypotheses they were designed to test. In a way, while helpful in rejecting the Consciousness Hypothesis, Study 4 results give a preliminary picture of how non-experts utilize conscious-unconscious distinction in their everyday conscious states attributions. Furthermore, the rejection of the Moral Hypoth- esis following the results of Studies 5 and 6 does not resolve the issue of the

6A further piece of evidence that lay persons do not have some other names for phenomenal experience is provided by results of Studies 5 and 6. 155 role that the folk view about consciousness play in everyday human moral judgments. Nevertheless, rejecting the idea of phenomenal stance opens a possibility for further exploration of the idea of conscious stance (Section 1.4.4.3), according to which the function of conscious mental states attribution is in- forming us about the mental life of other persons. As stated in Section 1.5, this idea could not be entertained before performing a careful, empirical examination of the claims made by authors of previous studies on the subject of folk view about consciousness. Summing up this chapter, what follows from my research is that the idea of conscious stance can be now explored empirically, the phenomenal claim occurred false and should be rejected, while the validity of the obviousness claim has not been convincingly demonstrated and demands further research. Additional studies can investigate the positive accounts of folk understanding of consciousness and its function. They can do so by building on the outcomes of the existing studies. Having rejected the inferences made by researchers before, their research is a large body of evidence about attributions of perceptual, emotional, bodily states, and some — though not much — about attributions of consciousness.

Conclusions

I decided to skip meticulous summarizing of the most important result of my dissertation and devote final comments to: (1) reflection about the consciousness as the object of empirical study, (2) general conclusions of my linguistic and socio-cognitive experiments. (1) When we reflect on the consciousness problem, we start with several prejudgments that are tacitly accepted without justification because they appear as self-evident. First of them states that consciousness is an extremely important, inalienable component of human nature. Loss of consciousness results in a breakdown of human nature. The second prejudgment says that basic form of consciousness accompanies relatively simple mental states. This basic form of consciousness manifests itself in sensations, perceptions, emotional processes, and other mental operations directed towards situations or objects in an environment. It consists of grasping qualia (no their physical causes!) or — in other words — of experiencing the phenomena. Since qualia are accessible only to their bearers, then this experiencing (called phenomenal consciousness) is entirely subjective and its content cannot be observed or checked from an external point of view. However, and it is the third prejudgment, these phenomenal experiences are so elementary and undeniable that every human being has to be phenomenally conscious. This conception of consciousness has fundamental deficiency: it cannot be tested with the legitimate, intersubjective methods of science. Many scholars struggle to find a way out of this maze and reinterpret the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995) by trying to express it in the language of the present-day science. I propose a more modest approach. (2) If consciousness is a universal property of human beings, then in certain, qualified situations, we should be able to acknowledge or deny its possession by a given person. This shifting focus from the first-person experience to the third-person attribution of conscious mental states demands to postpone (or suspend for a time being) the hard problem and turning to a feasible task. In effect, we get two independent problems: the hard problem of 158 conscious experience and modes of attribution of conscious states. While the former is still unsolvable, the latter is suitable for empirical research. I decided to join this kind of research. However, in my opinion, the existing studies on the attribution of conscious states are biased by experts’ views on phenomenal consciousness which they regard as obvious and commonly accepted. I proposed to condense these views into phenomenal and obviousness claims. The basic aim of my empirical studies was to test the validity of both claims. Given the outcomes of my studies, the phenomenal claim should be rejected. Thus, non-experts do not think about consciousness in the way that experts do. Especially, their understanding of consciousness does not comprise the intuitions present in the concept of phenomenal consciousness. Never- theless, lay people seemingly do have an understanding of consciousness. Its applicability is limited to only some agents and affects the attributions of perceptual states differently than attributions of bodily sensations. Proponents of the obviousness claim need a new kind of empirical program. The claimed obviousness is not confirmed by the data. Since experts and non-experts lack a common language necessary to speak about consciousness using the same words (perhaps with different proficiency), any investigation into folk view about consciousness relying solely on verbal responses will, at best, provide only coarse-grained insight. Such granularity is sufficient to reject the phenomenal claim and, thus, to reject the widespread of the experiential concept of consciousness among non-experts. However, it is not enough to comprehensively test the obviousness claim when the claim is considered separate from the phenomenal claim. To test whether the conscious experience is taken to be unquestionable we need to establish in greater detail what is the positive folk view of consciousness. Results obtained and presented in this thesis showcase the complex picture of folk psychology. The role of folk psychology cannot be reduced — as it traditionally was — to predicting behavior. Attributing conscious and unconscious states made little difference for behavioral predictions of non-experts. Furthermore, attributing different varieties of experiences differently influences perceived moral patiency. In other words, there is more to folk psychology than the intentional stance allows for. The idea of the conscious stance, allowing us to recognize and predict mental states in other persons is now, given the rejection fo the idea of phenomenal stance, a viable alternative to be both elaborated on theoretically and pursued empirically. Appendix A

Additional data from the language studies

Complete code snippets and datasets used to perform all analyses are available for download as a project at the Open Science Framework1.

Study 1

The similarity scores for ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ synsets versus the selected synsets of the remaining CR-words:

Synset1 Synset2 Similarity (0-1) awareness.n.01ac awareness.n.02a .07 consciousness.n.01c .08 emotion.n.01e .09 experience.n.02x .14 know.v.01x .08 experience.v.03x .08 feel.v.01x f .10 feeling.n.01 f .10 feeling.n.04 f .12 touch.n.10 f .14 feel.v.01 f .14 feel.v.03 f .10 feel.v.04 f .09 feel.v.05 f .08

1https://osf.io/htk7g/?view_only=48bf247feca84430b201bc998cb1aaef [Accessed: 18 May, 2020]. 160

Synset1 Synset2 Similarity (0-1) feel.v.07 f .08 awareness.n.02ac consciousness.n.01c .50 emotion.n.01e .12 experience.n.02x .08 know.v.01x .07 experience.v.03x .08 feel.v.01x f .09 feeling.n.01 f .14 feeling.n.04 f .07 touch.n.10 f .07 feel.v.01 f .09 feel.v.03 f .08 feel.v.04 f .08 feel.v.05 f .07 feel.v.07 f .08 consciousness.n.01c emotion.n.01e .14 experience.n.02x .09 know.v.01x .08 experience.v.03x .08 feel.v.01x f .10 feeling.n.01 f .17 feeling.n.04 f .07 touch.n.10 f .08 feel.v.01 f .10 feel.v.03 f .09 feel.v.04 f .09 feel.v.05 f .08 feel.v.07 f .08

a – synset of ‘awareness’ c – synset of ‘consciousness’ e – synset of ‘emotion’ f – synset of ‘feeling’ x – synset of ‘experience’

Table A.1: Study 1 additional data. Similarity scores between ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ synsets and the selected synsets of the remaining chosen words.

The similarity scores for synsets of the reference pairs: Due to size, matrixes with similarity scores for antonym, semantically related, and semantically unrelated pairs would be unreadable in A4 format. They are available in the online repository, in WordNet analysis’ folder. Appendix B

Additional data from the questionnaire studies

All questionnaire studies were performed on the Amazon Mechanical Turk with the assistance of TurkPrime, now (2020) CloudResearch powered by TurkPrime1. Caring for the anonymity of participants and the quality of data, MTurk workers’ IDs were anonymized, duplicate IP addresses were blocked but data about them was not recorded nor was accessible at any point to the experimentators. For Study 4, participants had to have a record of completion of at least 100 tasks (Human Intelligence Tasks, HITs) with at least 90% approval rate, and at least 50 tasks with at least 95% approval rate for Studies 5 and 6. Questionnaire themselves were hosted on the SurveyMonkey web- site2. Complete analyses and data is accessible on the repository at the Open Science Framework3.

1https://www.cloudresearch.com. 2https://www.surveymonkey.com. 3https://osf.io/htk7g/?view_only=48bf247feca84430b201bc998cb1aaef [Accessed: 18 May, 2020]. 162

Study 4

S CENARIOS

Conditions 1 and 2 (Human – Seeing):

Conditions 3 and 4 (Human – Pain):

Timmy is a normal undergraduate at a state university. To make some extra money, he volunteered for a psychological experiment. He was put in a room that was empty except for one blue box, one red box, and one green box (the boxes were identical in all respects except color). An instruction was then transmitted to Timmy. It read: ‘Put the red box in front of the door’. When Timmy grasped the red box, however, it gave him a strong electric shock. He let go of the box and moved away from it. What do you think happened next?

Conditions 5 and 6 (Robot – Seeing):

Jimmy is a relatively simple robot built at a state university. He has a video camera for eyes, wheels for moving about, and two grasping arms with touch sensors that he can move objects with. As part of a psychological experiment, he was put in a room that was empty except for one blue box, one red box, and one green box (the boxes were identical in all respects except color). An instruction was then transmitted to Jimmy. It read: ‘Put the red box in front of the door’. What do you think happened next? 163

Conditions 7 and 8 (Robot – Pain):

Q UESTIONS

Causal question:

Did Timmy/Jimmy put the red box in front of the door? [Yes/No]

Main questions were constructed, depending on the condition, as follows:

Did [Timmy/Jimmy] [consciously/unconsciously] [see red/feel pain] while performing the task?

The response format for the main question was ﬁve point Likert-style item, with far left option labeled as Clearly No, middle one Not sure, and far right option as Clearly Yes. 164

I LLUSTRATIONS

Vignettes about Timmy were accompanied by an illustration, used originally by Sytsma and Machery (2010)4.

Figure B.1: Picture of Timmy.

Figure B.2: Picture of Jimmy.

Study 5

S CENARIOS

Initial part of the story, read by all participants:

While on a scientiﬁc expedition, a researcher discovered a new species that lives in the nearby forest. These newly recognized creatures have fur with various colors and weigh about 50 pounds. Their diet consists mostly of small plants. Because the river could ﬂood the city, local government ordered to change its course. This means part of the forest has to be logged. This part is the only region where the new species lives. Woodcut- ters already started their work. Some woodcutters, before cutting trees down, make sure that no creatures are present nearby. If they are, woodcutters scare them away, so that the creatures do not get injured. Not every woodcutter does this. When that happens, some creatures die due to the heavy machinery and falling trees.

4Permission to use them in Study 4 was granted by the corresponding author. 165

Some citizens are concerned about this. They do not want woodcutters to hurt creatures. They want to enforce a law so that before they start to cut trees, woodcutters would have to make sure that no creatures are nearby, so that none of the creatures would have to die or be injured anymore.

Intelligence condition:

Now suppose that scientists made the following important discoveries about the new species: Creatures are highly intelligent. They form elaborate search strategies to forage for food. The neural systems responsible for their memory and reasoning are similar in important aspects to the systems in the human brain. However, creatures feel little or no emotion and have very poor vision, hearing and other senses. If stuck, they do not hesitate to hurt themselves in order to be able to move freely. They have no recognizable neural system for sensing pain or pleasure. They see, hear, and smell little: they do not perceive a lot. The neural systems responsible for their senses are primitive and they have no recognizable system for creating complex, multimodal representations of the environment. In short, creatures are very smart, but they are devoid of feeling and they have extremely bad senses.

Emotion condition:

Now suppose that scientists made the following important discoveries about the new species: Creatures have rich and complex emotional lives. They are capable of suffering from depression and anxiety. The neural systems responsible for their emotion are similar in important aspects to the systems in the human brain. However, creatures are not especially intelligent and have very poor vision, hearing and other senses. They remember little about their environment. They forage for food simply by moving forward. The neural systems responsible for their memory are primitive and 166

they have no recognizable system for reasoning. They see, hear, and smell little: they do not perceive a lot. The neural systems responsible for their senses are primitive and they have no recognizable system for creating complex, multimodal representations of the environment. In short, creatures feel a great deal, but they are not very smart and they have extremely bad senses.

Perception condition:

Now suppose that scientists made the following important discoveries about the new species: Creatures have rich and complex perceptions. They see, hear, and smell a lot, and their brain creates complex, multimodal, representations of their environment. The neural systems responsible for their senses are similar in important aspects to the systems in the human brain. However, creatures feel little or no emotion and are not especially intelligent. If stuck, they do not hesitate to hurt themselves in order to be able to move freely. They have no recognizable neural system for sensing pain or pleasure. They remember little about their environment. They forage for food simply by moving forward. The neural systems responsible for their memory are primitive and they have no recognizable system for reasoning. In short, creatures have highly developed senses, but they are devoid of feeling and they are not very smart. 167

Q UESTIONS

The response format for the all questions was eleven point Likert-style item, with each option labeled with numbers from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right). Concern question:

Please indicate how concerned you feel about the welfare of the newly discovered creatures (0 = not at all concerned, 10 = very concerned)

Guilt question:

Imagine you are a woodcutter. Due to some unusual circumstances you forgot to check whether there were any creatures nearby when you cut down trees. Please rate how bad you would feel if you found that creatures were in effect injured or died. (0 = it would not affect me at all; 10 = I would feel absolutely terrible)

Penalty question:

If the laws were changed to encourage woodcutters to check the presence of creatures more often, please rate how strong a penalty should be applied to woodcutters who do not comply. (0 = no penalty at all; 10 = bad offenders should serve jail time)

Study 6

S CENARIOS

Initial part of the story, read by all participants:

Some ﬁshermen do not check their lobster pots very regularly. When this happens, some lobsters may be stuck in the pot for as long as 2 weeks. Because the small amount of food runs out quickly, some lobsters starve to death in the pots. Some Indonesians are concerned about this. They don’t want to stop people from eating lobsters, but they do want the lobsters to be treated humanely. They want to change the law so that ﬁshermen have to check their pots more regularly, so that lobsters don’t starve to death in the traps.

Intelligence condition:

Now suppose that scientists made the following important discoveries about lobsters: Lobsters are highly intelligent. They form elaborate search strategies to forage for food. The neural systems responsible for their memory and reasoning are similar in important aspects to the systems in the human brain. However, lobsters feel little or no emotion and have very poor vision, hearing and other senses. If stuck, they do not hesitate to hurt themselves in order to be able to move freely. They have no recognizable neural system for sensing pain or pleasure. Lobsters see, hear, and smell little: they do not perceive a lot. The neural systems responsible for lobster senses are primitive and they have no recognizable system for creating complex, multimodal representations of the environment. In short, lobsters are very smart, but they are devoid of feeling and they have extremely bad senses.

Emotion condition:

Now suppose that scientists made the following important discoveries about lobsters: Lobsters have rich and complex emotional lives. They are capable of suffering from depression and anxiety. The neural systems responsible for lobster emotion are similar in important respects to the systems in the human brain. 169

However, lobsters are not especially intelligent and have very poor vision, hearing and other senses. They remember little about their environment. They forage for food simply by moving against ocean current. The neural systems responsible for lobster memory are primitive and they have no recognizable system for reasoning. Lobsters see, hear, and smell little: they do not perceive a lot. The neural systems responsible for their senses are primitive and they have no recognizable system for creating complex, multimodal representations of the environment. In short, lobsters feel a great deal, but they are not very smart and they have extremely bad senses.

Perception condition:

Now suppose that scientists made the following important discoveries about lobsters: Lobsters have rich and complex perceptions. They see, hear, and smell a lot, and their brain creates complex, multimodal, representations of their environment. The neural systems responsible for their senses are similar in important aspects to the systems in the human brain. However, lobsters feel little or no emotion and are not especially intelligent. If stuck, they do not hesitate to hurt themselves in order to be able to move freely. They have no recognizable neural system for sensing pain or pleasure. Lobsters remember little about their environment. They forage for food simply by moving forward. The neural systems responsible for lobster memory are primitive and they have no recognizable system for reasoning. In short, lobsters have highly developed senses, but they are devoid of feeling and they are not very smart. 170

Q UESTIONS

The response format for the all questions was eleven point Likert-style item, with each option labeled with numbers from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right). They were identical to those from Jack and Robbins (2012) Study 1. Concern question:

Please indicate how concerned you feel about the welfare of the lobsters. (0 =not at all concerned, 10 = very concerned)

Guilt question:

Imagine you are a lobster ﬁsherman or ﬁsherwoman. Due to some unusual circumstances, you are unable to check your pots for 2 weeks. Please rate how bad you would feel if you found that lobsters had starved to death in your traps. (0 = it would not affect me at all; 10 = I would feel absolutely terrible)

Penalty question:

If the law were changed to encourage ﬁshermen to check their pots more frequently, please rate how strong a penalty should be applied to ﬁshermen who do not comply. (0 = no penalty at all; 10 = bad offenders should serve jail time) References

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