Therapeutic Consequences of the Drug Lag 93 X Recent Developments, 1972 to 1974 ...•

REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT William M. Wardell and Louis Lasagna American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Washington. D. C. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .. ................... 1 PART ONE Science. Government, and the Current State of Affairs I PRE-1962 PRACTICES: THE EVOLUTION OF CON- TROLS OVER THERAPEUTIC DRUGS 5 II POST-1962 GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES 19 III THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE 27 IV WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE 37 V ECONOMICS AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 45 PART TWO Lessons from Other Countries VI APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 51 VII PATTERNS OF INTRODUCTION OF NEW DRUGS IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 55 VIII BRITISH USAGE AND AMERICAN AWARENESS OF SOME NEW DRUGS 79 IX THERAPEUTIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE DRUG LAG 93 X RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, 1972 TO 1974 ...•....... 109 PART THREE The Wider Issues XI THE INTENT OF CONGRESS AND THE NEEDS OF PATIENTS 127 XII THE RUBRICS REEXAMINED 135 XIII SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT. ............. .. 143 XIV CONCLUSIONS.................................... 161 APPENDIX: Definition of "Substantial Evidence" 167 NOTES 171 INTRODUCTION In the late 1950s the Congress of the United States began holding subcommittee hearings on various matters pertaining to the pharma ceutical industry. Two of the most vigorous and sensational were those chaired by Congressman Blatnik and by Senator Kefauver. They were highly critical of the quality of drug advertising, theevi dence for effectiveness of marketed pharmaceuticals, the allegedly monopolistic nature of the drug industry, and the price of medicines. The drug industry, accustomed to respect and gratitude from physicians and the public, was suddenly confronted with hostile, sensational newspaper headlines and stories and a rising wave of angry criticism. Despite the furor, legislation almost certainly would not have ensued were it not for the thalidomide disaster. The epidemic of grossly deformed "seal babies" (practically all of whom were European) almost overnight achieved the unanimous passage of the Drug Industry Act of 1962, the so-called Kefauver-Harris amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938. The fact that thalidomide had not been approved for U.S. marketing was somehow irrelevant, as was the fact that the new requirements in the amendments, had they been in effect, would not have prevented a thalidomide-type tragedy. The specter of drug toxicity sufficed to carry the day. After more than a decade's experience, it now seems appropri ate to examine whether the 1962 amendments did in fact constitute a turning point in the evolution of controls over the American phar maceutical industry, what influence they have had on the develop ment, availability and use of therapeutic drugs in this country, and what lessons can be derived. 1 CHAPTER I PRE-1962 PRACTICES: THE EVOLUTION OF CONTROLS OVER THERAPEUTIC DRUGS The original stimulus for legislation in the United States was concern over food rather than drugs. To this day, realities of medical science and practice have not always been acknowledged in the legislation or in its interpretation. One consequence has been the apparently unintended penetration of legislative and regulatory influence into the practice of medicine. Developments Prior to the Present Century Before the twentieth century, most food and drug controls were directed against impure and adulterated foods. This concern was produced by the social pressures and limited by the technical abilities of the period. Medicines were thought to pose problems similar to foods but were of secondary importance, except to the pharmacy profession. Indeed, much of the development of the science of phar macy in the nineteenth century was concerned with attempts to standardize and improve the quality of prescription drugs. Nevertheless, the seeds of today's issues of safety and efficacy were there from the beginning. Safety considerations arose in rela tion to the therapeutic use of frankly toxic substances-for example, the use of hydrocyanic acid in the treatment of pulmonary tubercu losis. Questions of efficacy arose in two respects: adulteration of Much of the information in this historical account is based on James G. Burrow, American Medical Association: Voice of American Medicine (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), and John B. Blake, ed., Safeguarding the Pablic: Historical Aspects of Medicinal Drug Control (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970). In the latter volume. the chapters by Glenn Sonnedecker, James Burrow, Harry Dowling, James Young and David Gavers were found to be particularly useful. 5 acted against the maker of a headache mixture containing acetanilid, bearing the beguiling name of Cuforhedake-Brane-Fude. The first serious challenge to the law occurred when a Dr. Johnson, a Kansas City proprietor of a patent medicine, maintained that the law's prohibition of false and misleading statements did not apply to therapeutic claims. This view was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1911. In response, Congress hastily passed the Sherley amendment of 1912, banning those therapeutic claims in patent medi cine that were both false and fraudulent. This wording left an exploitable loophole which culminated in the case of a liniment advertised for the cure of tuberculosis. The court decided in 1922 that a maker who believed his product to be effective had no intent to defraud, and hence could not be said to be acting fraudulently. The government's loss of the liniment case undermined the modest degree of control that had been achieved. Prescription drugs also were subject to control under the 1906 law; in fact, there was no fixed legal boundary drawn by the bureau between prescription and nonprescription medications until 1951. However, prescription medications received a lower priority for two reasons: food and patent medicine abuses were the more urgent problems, and therapeutic nihilism (exemplified by Osler and perhaps justifiable at the time] reigned in the highestechelons of American medicine. To be legal under the 1906 law, all prescription drugs had . to meet the standards for composition of the United States Pharma copoeia or the National Formulary. The Bureau of Chemistry assumed the task of examining drugs in this respect. During the Wiley years these activities of the bureau had been concerned with the quality of plant-derived drugs. In 1912, standard ization of tablets and pills and inspection of manufacturing plants were initiated. The year 1923 marked an intensification of drug con trol work. Bioassays were instituted of potent and crude drugs of biological origin-digitalis and ergot, for example. Thirty years of experience with the 1906 law revealed many deficiencies. In 1933, Senator Copeland introduced a bill, prepared by the Department of Agriculture, as part of President Roosevelt's New Deal promises of domestic reform. Although the Copeland bill represented a vast improvement over the original act and for the first time would have applied federal control to the cosmetic industry, it failed to inspire much enthusiasm among the traditional supporters of more effective legislation and at the same time aroused enormous opposition. The bill was modified several times by its sponsor over the next four years in the hope of making its passage feasible. It was only 7 Section 502 that their labelling give adequate directions for use. The chief consequence of this exempting power was the emergence of the prescription drug as an object of special controls. The exempting regulation required that prescription drugs carry only the legend "Caution-to be used only by or on the prescription of a physician." In 1951, the Humphrey-Durham amendment sought to define prescription drugs. That act classed drugs into three categories: (1) those labelled "Warning: May be habit forming," (2) those con sidered unsafe unless Administered by a licensed physician, and (3) those new drugs limited by the terms of a Section 505 new drug application (NDA) to prescription by a licensed physician. During the debate on this act, the question arose of whether the administrator of the Federal Security Agency (FSA), of which the FDA at that time formed a part, should be able to designate drugs for category (2) on certain criteria, one of which should be a finding that.the drug is "ineffective" for use without diagnosis by, or super vision of, a licensed practitioner. The Congress concluded that it would be unwise to give this power solely to the FSA head, and that there should be a judicial hearing available as a check. The FSA head challenged this, saying that it gave the federal courts legislative authority beyond their constitutional power. This foreshadows the judicial flavor that has come to characterize therapeutic decisions in the U.S. over the past decade. The effectiveness issue is also one which increased in importance as time progressed. The reaction at the time of the American Medical Association (AMA) to this issue is described later. Concern with problems of communication grew after passage of the 1938 amendments. A major defect of the generally strong 1938 law was found to be its lack of adequate control over advertising. In 1944, regulations were promulgated as to ways in which informa tion on prescription drugs should be made available. The current regulations require that "labelling on or within the package from which the drug is to be dispensed" bear adequate information for its use. This is the legal explanation of the package insert. The content of an approved package insert represents a baseline from which, since 1962, the FDA has been able to measure and proceed against deviations in advertising. Roleof the Professions of Medicine andPharmacy Legislation and regulation do not spring spontaneously from govern ment, and the field of therapeutic drugs affords no exception. The medical profession, working principally through the American Medi cal Association, was a powerful force in achieving the passage of 9 edition, 1888) from the beginning was prepared principally by phar macists and published under the authority of their national profes sional society.

Load more