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Modelling the Brumadinho Tailings Dam Failure, the Subsequent Loss Of https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-2020-159 Preprint. Discussion started: 4 June 2020 c Author(s) 2020. CC BY 4.0 License. Modelling the Brumadinho tailings dam failure, the subsequent loss of life and how it could have been reduced Darren Lumbroso1, Mark Davison1, Richard Body1, Gregor Petkovšek1 1HR Wallingford, Howbery Park, Wallingford, Oxfordshire OX10 8BA, UK 5 Correspondence to: Darren Lumbroso ([email protected]) Abstract. In recent years the number of tailings dams failures has increased. On 25 January 2019, the Brumadinho tailings dam in Brazil suddenly failed releasing a mudflow over 10 m deep comprising some 10 million m3 of mining waste which killed between 270 and 320 people. This paper details the use of an agent-based model, known as the Life Safety Model (LSM), to estimate the risk to people downstream of the Brumadinho tailings dam and to assess if the number of fatalities 10 could have been reduced if a warning had been received prior to or at time the dam failed. The LSM modelling indicates that even if a warning had been issued as the dam failed the number of fatalities could have been reduced. Agent-based modelling tools such as the LSM can help to inform and improve emergency plans for tailings dams, which will help to reduce the risk posed by them in the future. 1 Introduction 15 Tailings dams are earth embankments used to store waste materials, known as tailings, from mining operations. They can be more than 100 m high and in some cases several kilometres long (Kossoff et al., 2014). Tailings dams are often constructed from readily available materials and over their operating life they are frequently raised as the quantity of stored tailings increases (Lumbroso et al., 2019). Tailings dams are long-lived infrastructure which are often required to be in place in perpetuity (Lumbroso et al., 2019). In 20 the context of long-lived infrastructure the rate of failure of tailings dams is high, owing to inadequate design regulations, as well as less rigorous construction and supervision methods than for normal water-retaining dams, especially in low-income countries (Bowker & Chambers, 2017). There are three principal methods via which tailings dams are constructed: upstream, downstream and centreline. These are shown in figure 1. The upstream method, has the lowest initial cost, owing to the minimal amount of fill material required for the initial construction and subsequent raising which normally consists entirely 25 of the coarse fraction of the tailings (Martin & McRoberts, 1999). Martin and McRoberts describe upstream tailings dams as “unforgiving structures” with any one or combinations of improper design, construction and operation resulting in a catastrophic failure (Martin & McRoberts, 1999). In recent years the number of tailings dam failures has increased. Around half of the significant tailings dam failures in the last 70 years occurred between 1990 and 2010 (Azam & Li, 2010). In South America there are around 1,200 mines currently in 1 https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-2020-159 Preprint. Discussion started: 4 June 2020 c Author(s) 2020. CC BY 4.0 License. 30 operation which have tailings dams and many thousands of tailings dams which have been abandoned and/or which are no longer operational (Azam & Li, 2010). In 2001 the International Commission On Large Dams (ICOLD) stated that “the mining industry has a less than perfect record when tailings dam failures are reviewed" (ICOLD, 2001). Although this statement was made almost 20 years ago the probability of a tailings dam failing is still high in the context of long-lived infrastructure (Bowker & Chambers, 2017; Lyu et al., 2019). In Brazil there have been 12 major tailings dam failures since 1986, which 35 have resulted in over 1,000 deaths and adversely affected the livelihoods of millions of people, as well as causing environmental damage to thousands of kilometres of rivers (Palú & Julien, 2019). Third raise Second raise First raise Impounded tailings Upstream construction method Initial embankment First raise Second raise Impounded tailings Third raise Initial embankment Downstream construction method First raise Second raise Impounded tailings Third raise Centreline construction method Initial embankment (Source: Adapted from Vick, 1990) Figure 1: Different methods of construction for tailings dams 40 Dam “B1” of the Córrego do Feijão mine, referred to in this paper as the Brumadinho tailings dam, was a tailings dam 86 m high with a crest length of 700 m and storage volume of approximately 12 million m3, located 9 km north-east of the town of Brumadinho in the state of Minas Gerais in Brazil (Palú & Julien, 2019; Robertson et al., 2019). The dam was built using the upstream construction method over a period of 37 years in 10 raises (Robertson et al., 2019). A cross-section through Brumadinho tailings dam is shown in Figure 2. The last time the dam was raised was in 2013, and tailings disposal ceased in 45 July 2016 (Robertson et al., 2019). The Brazilian Institute of Water Management of Mines and the National Mining Agency had evaluated and classified the dams probability of failure as being “low” (Porsani et al., 2019). 2 https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-2020-159 Preprint. Discussion started: 4 June 2020 c Author(s) 2020. CC BY 4.0 License. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 Impounded tailings 2 1 Height above (m)sea mean level above Height Subsoil 840 860 880 900 920 940 920 900 880 860 840 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Chainage (m) (Source: Adapted from Adapted from Robertson et al., 2019) Figure 2: Cross-section of the Brumadinho tailings dam and the stages in which it was raised 50 At 12:28 pm local time on 25 January 2019, the Brumadinho tailings dam suffered a sudden failure, releasing a mudflow over 10 m deep which moved rapidly downstream (Robertson et al., 2019). The failure extended across much of the face of the dam and its collapse was complete in less than 10 seconds. Around 9.7 million m3 of material were released, approximately 75% of the stored tailings (Robertson et al., 2019). The ~10 million m3 of tailings material flowed out of Brumadinho tailings dam within about five minutes (Robertson et al., 2019). Information derived from a YouTube video of the event indicates that 55 the maximum velocity of the mudflow may have been as high as 33 m/s (Petley, 2019). Three stills from the YouTube video of the dam failure, together with the local time at which they were taken, are shown in Figure 3. The official report on the Brumadinho tailings dam failure found that it occurred as a result of static liquefaction (Robertson et al., 2019). The investigation deduced that the failure initiated close to the crest of the dam but very rapidly progressed through the entire structure, allowing a comparatively shallow failure to develop (Robertson et al., 2019). This was then 60 followed by a series of retrogressive failures that released the large volume of mine waste (Robertson et al., 2019). The failure of Brumadinho tailings dam led to hundreds of people losing their lives and immense damage to the environment, as well as people’s livelihoods. There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that it took the mudflow between 1.5 and 2 hours to reach the Paraopeba River some 10 km downstream of the tailings dam (Xinhua, 2019). The location of Brumadinho tailings dam, the extent of the mud flow, as well as other key locations related to the event are shown in Figure 4. 65 3 https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-2020-159 Preprint. Discussion started: 4 June 2020 c Author(s) 2020. CC BY 4.0 License. Time: 12:28:25 Time: 12:28:33 Time: 12:28:49 (Source: YouTube, 2019) Figure 3: Stills from the YouTube video of the Brumadinho dam failure Mining developments, including tailings dams, often grow gradually over long periods of time and as a result the responsibility 70 for the direct and indirect risks posed by these operations to downstream communities and the environment is avoided (Downing, 2014; Owen et al., 2020). Following recent tailings dam failures there has been a renewed sense of urgency from industry, civil society, and the investor community to understand the types of risks posed by tailings dams (Owen et al., 2020). 4 https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-2020-159 Preprint. Discussion started: 4 June 2020 c Author(s) 2020. CC BY 4.0 License. Legend Extent of the mudflow caused by the failure Locations A is the tailings dam which failed B is Dam VI, a process water reservoir, destabilized as a result of the event C is the mine office buildings and canteen D is a railway bridge which was destroyed E where the mud flowed into into the Paraopeba River 0 1 2 km (Source: European Space Agency Copernicus Sentinel-2A-L1C Satellite image and OpenStreetMap.org contributors, the image contains 75 modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2019) Figure 4: Location of the Brumadinho tailings dams and the extent of the mudflow The main objectives of this work were to: • Highlight the use of an agent-based model and other modelling tools to estimate the risk to people downstream of the Brumadinho tailings dam 80 • Assess if the number of fatalities could have been reduced if a warning had been received prior to or at time the dam failed, albeit one with a short lead time1 • Demonstrate how these modelling tools can help to inform emergency plans for tailings dams Three separate models were used in this research as follows: • A dam breach model known as EMBREA-MUD specially developed to model tailings dam breaches which was used to 85 help to generate an outflow hydrograph of the tailings.
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