1d way," my brother says. Stanley Fish nd small and big farmers ·ountry last year. Six years b. 1938 1 was $8.oo per hundred "This year it is $3.90 per l, I think to myself, after Stanley Eugene Fish was born in Providence, Rhode Island, and grew up in ccount, not planting any- Philadelphia. He was educated at the University of Pennsylvania and earned his Ph.D. in 1962 at Yale. He taught at the University of California at Berkeley and subsequently at Johns Hopkins University and at Duke University, where he was :k yard, stare at Los rosales professor of both English and law, chair of the English Department, and director of me to help her prune the the university press. He left Duke in 1998 to become dean of arts and sciences at the : carpet grass that is chok­ University of Illinois at Chicago. 'e Ramona tambien tenia Fish's earliest scholarly work focused on the Renaissance (with a book based on lexican grows flowers. If his dissertation on John Skelton's poetry in 1965) and on the work of Milton and of dirt, they use car tires, George Herbert. His first major work, Surprised by Sin: The Reader in "Paradise Roses are the Mexican' s :, how symbolic-thorns Lost" ( 1967), applies an early version of reader-response theory, arguing that Milton uses literary strategies to lead his readers to a sense of the sinfulness of pride, only nd Chicana have always to then "surprise" them by showing how they themselves have been prideful in their hings and the land. Again very reading of the poem. This approach shifts the critical focus from the idea that ds getting off the school meaning is in the text itself to the idea that meaning occurs as a result of the opera­ vork clothes, walking into tion of the text upon the reader. Fish's scholarly writing from this time forward is Marni, all six of us bend­ distinguished by his careful attention to literary theories, particularly those based on Iv our feet, under the earth language theories, such as reader-response, speech acts, and, later, deconstruction. ds. We cover them with In Surprised by Sin, Fish maintains that the "surprise" works in Paradise Lost erremotes on top of the because of Milton's goal of bringing the reader to self-consciousness about sin. But ,m being blown away by tes keep the freeze away. soon, in several articles later collected in Is there a Text in this Class?, The Authority e remove the plates, bare of Interpretive Communities (1980) and in a book, Self Consuming Artifacts: The , the elements. They sur- Experience of Seventeenth-Century Literature (1972), Fish generalizes his theory 1it hundreds of times the and shows that it applies to other works, indeed to all works of literature. The "arti­ ater them and hoe them. fact" of the literary work does not, he argues, contain its own meaning. The mean­ 1ines dry, rot, are plowed ing emerges as a result of the act of reading, which therefore ought to be the focus ecay, birth. The soil pre­ of the critic's attention. impregnated, worked on. Fish is himself one of the severest critics of the theory he put forward at this forms, renacimientos de time. In the introduction to Is there a Text in this Class?, he points out the flaw of his method and of much reader-response criticism, namely, that of presuming to know once how reading works in some universal sense (at least for all educated readers) and to be able to describe it. Moreover, he notes, in a book like Surprised by Sin, the critic assumes that the effects achieved are the effects intended by the author, which sim­ be again. ply returns the meaning or the responsibility for the meaning to the text itself. In the essays collected in Is there a Text in this Class?, Fish argues that the reader "cre­ ates" the text by deciding which of its features are relevant or significant. But how does the reader decide? Fish was not content (as were other reader-response critics) to allow mere individual preference to rule. Instead, he puts forward the enormously influential idea of the interpretive community (later to appear as "discourse commu­ nity" in rhetoric scholarship) that maintains the values and conventions that "always

STANLEY FISH 1605 already" constrain its members as they come to the text. In answering the question principles of law e of whether there is a text in the class, Fish answers "no," if by "text" one means an be based on ultim1 object with a fixed and determinate meaning. Rather, the text is a creation of the and not absent. Fis community, for what is there is what a particular community agrees or is con­ we should adopt rar strained to see there. This means that any interpretation that makes sense or is per­ sition is just as unte suasive is so only because it arises within and is directed to a community that sees Interpretive systc or is willing to see the text through the same lens of assumptions about what counts occurs. They do no as literature, or even about what words and phrases may mean. This analysis im­ set of rules or princ plies, in its turn, that the proper business of criticism is to address and argue about but is of sufficient g the way the lens is or ought to be shaped-that is, the interpretive assumptions that ot) all fields of act one does or ought to apply. It also implies that the very definition of "literature" is though it may not t communally bound, and therefore that there is no such thing as a quintessentially way of thinking abo literary text. All texts, indeed, are "always already" under interpretation. by circumstances ar Fish's work during the succeeding decade elaborates these insights, examining Thomas Kuhn to a c the sources and criticizing the implications of "foundationalist" theory-namely, idea or way of seei "theory that promises to put our calculations and determinations on a firmer footing being argued for. Th than can be provided by mere belief or unjustified practice."' He sees the founda­ In his subsequent tionalist assumption operating widely, almost universally, as a belief that interpreta­ al)• Studies and Po tion must seek some underlying truth that is "really" there or at least some objective Speech, and It's a G basis for assessing our beliefs. Fish also takes up the question of what an antifoun­ print and electronic dational view of language and interpretation might be. The essays in Doing What quences of his basic : Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theo,)' in Literal)' and ious areas of public 1 Legal Studies ( 1989) address these issues. Here is what Fish says this title means: erary criticism is a hi I intend it to refer to the unreflective actions that follow from being embedded in a context effect political chang of practice. This kind of action-and in my argument there is no other-is anything but will occur because of natural in the sense of proceeding independently of historical and social formations; but use. This, Fish says, i once those formations are in place (and they always are), what you think to do will not be Fish has won aw calculated in relation to a higher law or an overarching theory but will issue from you as naturally as breathing? judging by the respon Thing as Free Speech Meaning, then, follows from the set of presuppositions that constitute or character­ philosophy should re.: ize the social formation (or the particular moment and its context) rather than from of them transcripts anything inherent in the words or sentences or other symbols that are used for com­ D'Souza) concern pt munication. Most importantly for Fish, there is no place to stand that is outside again, multiculturalis, some context and set of presuppositions. It is not possible, that is, to assess a given of the argument that a interpretation in an absolute way. Nor is it possible to articulate a theory that ac­ vironment of a colleg( counts for all of the features of context and thereby become completely self­ accomplish something conscious about the way one's interpretive acts are bound. This last point leads Fish are "of course" some to assert that theory (as in literary theory or philosophical method) has no con­ course" is determined sequences. ated, there will alway A further consequence of the antifoundationalist position is to recognize that al­ '>peech could really be though the set of interpretive principles in force at any time (Fish is thinking of offered for no reason.

1Fish, p. 14. •Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Nafllrally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Them)' in Liter· •Lief Carter, "There's Nr a,y and Legal St11dies(Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), p.321. (March 1994): p. 33. 2 Fish, p. ix.

1606 MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC 1 answering the question principles of law especially) may be arbitrary in some sense-that is, they cannot · by "text" one means an be based on ultimate reality or transcendent truth-they are nonetheless in force text is a creation of the and not absent. Fish insists that he is not arguing that there aren;t constraints, that 1unity agrees or is con­ we should adopt rampant relativism, or that all interpretations are personal. That po­ tt makes sense or is per­ sition is just as untenable, he argues, as the foundationalist position. o a community that sees Interpretive systems obviously change, and Fish wants to know how that change )tions about what counts occurs. They do not change because of theory, he argues, if by theory we mean "a mean. This analysis im­ set of rules or principles or procedures that is attached to ... no particular activity, address and argue about but is of sufficient generality to be thought of as a constraint on (and an explanation pretive assumptions that of) all fields of activity."3 They change, rather, because of an argument that, al­ finition of "literature" is though it may not be "right" in an absolute sense, is able to change the prevailing ing as a quintessentially way of thinking about the world to another way-another way that is just as bound 1terpretation. by circumstances and contexts but that comes to seem superior. Fish is following 1ese insights, examining Thomas Kuhn to a considerable extent in this analysis. Both recognize that a new rnlist" theory-namely, idea or way of seeing-a new "paradigm" - does not come into being without tions on a firmer footing being argued for. This is the operation, Fish says, of rhetoric. !."' He sees the founda­ In his subsequent work, the essays collected in Professional Correctness: Liter­ s a belief that interpreta­ a,y Studies and Political Change (1994) and There's No Such Thing as Free ,r at least some objective Speech, and It's a Good Thing, Too (1995), and in a remarkable range of essays in ion of what an antifoun­ print and electronic journals, speeches, and interviews, Fish explores the conse­ e essays in Doing What quences of his basic argument in literature, cultural studies, education, law, and var­ Theo,y in litera,y and ious areas of public policy. In Professional Correctness, he argues that because lit­ 1 says this title means: erary criticism is a highly specialized interpretive community, it lacks the power to ~ing embedded in a context effect political change. Therefore, critics are mistaken when they claim that change no other-is anything but will occur because of the kind of texts they study or the forms of interpretation they and social formations; but use. This, Fish says, is the underlying error in the great multiculturalism debates. you think to do will not be Fish has won a wide audience in the law and philosophy of law communities, but will issue from you as judging by the responses to both Doing What Comes Naturally and There's No Such Thing as Free Speech. "Virtually all students of law, the social sciences, and social t constitute or character­ philosophy should read" the latter book, says one review.4 The chapters in it (many ontext) rather than from of them transcripts of Fish's debates with conservative idealogue Dinesh ls that are used for com­ D'Souza) concern public policy issues, basic precepts of liberalism, and, once to stand that is outside again, multiculturalism. The title essay repeats Fish's now basic thesis in the form that is, to assess a given of the argument that all speech is situated and purposeful. Except in the artificial en­ iculate a theory that ac­ vironment of a college seminar, all speech is rhetorical or instrumental, intended to c:come completely self­ accomplish something. Fish shows that all free speech advocates will say that there fhis last point leads Fish are "of course" some limits to what speech can be allowed in public. That "of al method) has no con- course" is determined by the social situation, and since all speech is socially situ­ ated, there will always be some "of course" limits. The only condition in which n is to recognize that al­ speech could really be "free" would be one in which speech meant nothing and was me (Fish is thinking of offered for no reason.

3Fish, p. 14. 1e Practice of Theory in Liter- 4Lief Carter, "There's No Such Thing as Free Speech," The Law and Politics Book Review 4.3 (March 1994): p. 33.

STANLEY FISH The essay "Rhetoric" that is reprinted here comes from Doing What Comes Nat­ urally. Fish reviews the history of rhetoric as a contest between foundational and Rhetoric antifoundational views. He holds rhetoric in high regard for its underlying Sophistic belief in an antifoundational worldview. Protagoras was correct, says Fish, in recog­ nizing that only the situated and contingent reality is meaningful. Therefore, Belia!, in act 1111 rhetoric is necessary for civilized life. Moreover, the revival of rhetoric in the twen­ A fairer person [01 tieth century is a good thing: It both reflects and enhances the "interpretive turn" For dignity compo (what others have called the linguistic turn) in many disciplines. Fish's roll call of But all was false a the heroes of the interpretive turn is a helpful summary of the central theme of Dropt Manna, and twentieth-century rhetorical theory. The better reason Maturest counsel;:

And with persuasiv Selected Bibliography p "Rhetoric" appeared originally as Chapter 20 in Doing What Comes Naturally : Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham and London, I 1989). It is reprinted in The Stanley Fish Reader, ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York, 1999), with a headnote by Steven Mailloux. This collection contains eleven well-chosen essays by For Milton's sever Fish, each with a brief headnote. "Rhetoric" is also reprinted in Rhetoric in an Antifounda­ passage, introducinf tional World: Language, Culture, and Pedagogy, ed. Michael Bemard-Donals and Richard of the fallen angels R. Glezjer (New Haven, 1998). ately recognizable a Fish's major works are Surprised by Sin: The Reader in "Paradise Lost" (Cambridge, on the art and chai Mass., 1967; 2nd ed. 1998); Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth­ deed, in these few I Century Literature (Cambridge, Mass., 1972); Is there a Text in this Class? The Authority of gather and restate v Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, Mass., I 980 ); Professional Correctness: Literary Stud­ paradox of which m1 ies and Political Change (Oxford and New York, 1994); and There's No Such Thing as Free arguments against rt Speech, and It's a Good Thing, Too (Oxford and New York, 1995). Another collection of es­ of rising is to the (m says on law, religion, and politics is The Trouble with Principle (Cambridge, Mass., 1999). eye even before he t A wide-ranging interview with Gary Olson is "Fish Tales: A Conversation with 'The will in book IX wht Contemporary Sophist"' in Joumal of Advanced Composition 12.2 (fall 1992): 253-77, moves so that "each reprinted, with responses by Patricia Bizzell and John Trimbur, in Philosophy, Rhetoric, Lit­ audience ere the tor erary Criticism: (/nter)views, ed. Gary Olson (Carbondale, Ill., 1994). A good overview of draws attention to hi Fish's theories and development is Paul H. Fry's essay on Fish in the Dictionary of Literary and the suggestion o Biography, Volume 67: Modem American Critics Since 1955, ed. Gregory Jay (Milwaukee, understood in its lite 1988), pp. 97- 105. John Schilb analyzes Fish's work on rhetoric in Between the Lines: Relat­ word "act"; that is, ti ing Composition Theory and Literary Theory (Portsmouth, N.H., 1996). The "Introduction" act is said to be "gra to Rhetoric in an Antifoundational World, noted above, relates Fish's ideas (clearly crucial to sion of double meani this collection) to the theories of Derrida, Rorty (a contributor), and others. The essays in the attributes of rhetorica collection-most notably Frank Farmer's "Foundational Thuggery" - frequently address sage. Belia! is precis, Fish's work. simply his outward a for "humane" and "fa on all of his apparen last two words of lim the shadow of "seen line which in isolatio praise. But under the it, the assertion of pra Janus-faced word (tht tate the object of its er

1608 MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC n Doing What Comes Nat­ between foundational and Rhetoric for its underlying Sophistic :orrect, says Fish, in recog­ ... 11prose vasive disjunction between its outer and inner is meaningful. Therefore, Belia!,in act more gracefitl and h11mane; meanings; indicting seeming, it itself repeatedly val of rhetoric in the twen­ A fairer person lost not Heav'n; he seem'd seems): "compos'd" now carries its pejorative ces the "interpretive turn" For dignity compos'd and high exploit: meaning of affected or made-up; "high" at once ciplines. Fish's roll call of But all was false and hollow; though his Tong11e refers to the favored style of bombastic orators Dropt Manna, and could make the worse appear and awaits its ironic and demeaning contrast with ·y of the central theme of The better reason, to perplex and dash Maturest counsels: for his tho11ghtswere low; ... the lowness of his thoughts; "dignity" is an ety­ ... yet he pleas' d the ear mological joke, for Belia! is anything but worthy; And with persuasive accent thus began. in fact, he is just what the next line says he is, ParadiseLost, II, roS- 15, I 17-18 "false and hollow," an accusation that repeats one of the perennial antirhetorical topoi, that t Comes Nat11rally: Change, rhetoric, the art of fine speaking, is all show, t11dies (Durham and London, I grounded in nothing but its own empty preten­ n Veeser (New York, 1999), sions, unsupported by any relation to truth. ~)evenwell-chosen essays by For Milton's seventeenth-century readers this "There is no need," declares Socrates in Plato's n Rhetoric in an Antifo1111da­ passage, introducing one of the more prominent Gorgias, "for rhetoric to know the facts at all for Bemard-D0nals and Richard of the fallen angels, would have been immedi­ ately recognizable as a brief but trenchant essay it has hit upon a means of persuasion that enables it to appear in the eyes of the ignorant to know 'Paradise lost" (Cambridge, on the art and character of the rhetorician. In­ more than those who really know" (459), 1 and in Experience of Seventeenth­ deed, in these few lines Milton has managed to the Phaedrus the title figure admits that the "man I this Class? The Authority of gather and restate with great rhetorical force (a who plans to be an orator" need not "learn what :ii Correctness: Literary St11d- paradox of which more later) all of the traditional is really just and true, but only what seems so to 1ere's No S11chThing as Free arguments against rhetoric. Even Belial's gesture the crowd" (260). 2 95). Another collection of es­ of rising is to the (negative) point: he catches the This reference to the vulgar popular ear indi­ Cambridge,Mass., 1999). eye even before he begins to speak, just as Satan cates that rhetoric's deficiencies are not only : A Conversation with 'The will in book IX when he too raises himself and epistemological (sundered from truth and fact) 11 12.2 (fall 1992): 253-77, moves so that "each part, / Motion, each act won and moral (sundered from true knowledge and in Philosophy, Rhetoric, Lit­ audience ere the tongue" (673-74). That is, he sincerity) but social: it panders to the worst in ,.. • 1994). A good overview of draws attention to his appearance, to his surface, people and moves them to base actions, exactly -

FISH I RHETORIC Socrates makes the same point in the Phaedrus: man is in close touch with the Truth and allows it that exists independc "an orator who knows nothing about good or evil to inspire him. Born, it would seem, in a posture points of view and t undertakes to persuade a city in the same state of of defensiveness, rhetoric has often gravitated to­ and seem perspicuou ignorance ... by recommending evil as though it ward this latter view in an effort to defuse the tive or point of view were good" (260). Behind Belia\ (or descending charge that it is amoral. Quintilian's formulation in force; second, ai from him; the direction of genealogy in Paradise (itself gathered from the writings of Cicero) is knowledge, which is lost is always problematic) is the line of one that will later be echoed in countless trea­ from any and all s sophists- Protagoras, Hippias, Gorgias, shad­ tises: "no man can speak well who is not good knowledge, which be owy figures known to us mostly through the writ­ himself" ( "bene dice re non possit nisi bonus," other system of belie ings of Plato where they appear always as rela­ Institutes, II, xv, 34). As a defense, however, this (in the sense of biase tivist foils for the idealistic Socrates. The declaration has the disadvantage of implying the between a self or cc judgment made on them by a philosophic tradi­ superfluousness of rhetoric, an implication fully outward in an effort tion dominated by Plato is the judgment here realized in Augustine's On Christian Doctrine self to truth and true made on Belia!; their thoughts were low, cen­ where eloquence is so much subordinated to wis­ consciousness that is tered on the suspect skills they taught for hire; dom that it disappears as a distinct and separable tion of its own prejud the danger they represented is the danger Belia] property. Belia!, in contrast, is wholly defined by transcended, continm represents: despite the lowness of their thoughts, that property, by his ability to produce "persua­ and action. Each of tt perhaps because of the lowness of their thoughts, sive accents." "Accent" here is a powerfully res­ in tum to an opposi1 they pleased the ear, at least the ear of the onant word, one of whose relevant meanings is language: on the one promiscuous crowd (there is always just beneath "mode of utterance peculiar to an individual, lo­ fully reflects or repor1 the surface of the antirhetorical stance a powerful cality or nation" (OED). He who speaks "in ac­ ored by any personal and corrosive elitism), and the explanation of cent" speaks from a particular angled perspective sire; and on the oth their unfortunate success is the power Belia! now into which he tries to draw his auditors; he also infected by partisan begins to exercise, the power of "persuasive ac­ speaks in the rhythms of song (etymologically, therefore colors and cent." Encoded in this phrase is a continuing de­ accent means "song added to speech") which as purports to reflect. It i bate about the essence of rhetoric, a debate Milton will soon observe "charms the sense" (II, language that makes c whose two poles are represented by Gorgias' s 556). "Persuasive accent," then, is almost a re­ herence to the first kin praise in the Encomium of Helen of rhetoric as an dundancy: the two words mean the same thing truth and an objective irresistible force and the stoic Cato's characteri­ and what they tell the reader is that he is about to are. It is this distincti zation of the rhetorician as a good man skilled at be exposed to a force whose exercise is uncon­ notes, underwrites the speaking ( "vir bonus, dicendi peritus "). The dif­ strained by any sense of responsibility either to privileged form of di: ference is that for Gorgias the skill is detached the Truth or to the Good. Indeed, so dangerous course to a "neutral from any necessary moral center and represents a does Milton consider this force that he feels it language uninflected b self-sustaining power ("persuasion allied to words necessary to provide a corrective gloss as soon as sitions or preconceptic can mould men's minds"), while for Cato the Belia! stops speaking: "Thus Belia[ with words tinction that inform: skill is a by-product of a focus on goodness and cloth' d in reason's garb / Counsel\' d ignoble ease (Rhetoric, III, 1404, I truth (thus the other of his famous aphorisms, and peaceful sloth" (ll, 226-27). Just in case you language when teach "seize the thing, the words will follow" - "rem hadn't noticed. guage of geometry­ tene, verba sequentur" -which later flowers in I have lingered so long over this passage be­ substantive content­ the Renaissance distinction between res et cause we can extrapolate from it almost all of the to all those languages verba).4 In one position eloquence is the hard­ binary oppositions in relation to which rhetoric "charm the hearer," th won creation of a special and technical facility, a has received its (largely negative) definition: tion, deception, and : facility one acquires by mastering a set of com­ inner/ outer, deep/ surface, essential/ peripheral, strategy. plicated- and morally neutral-rules; in the unmediated/ mediated, clear/ colored, necessary/ It is this understand other eloquence is what naturally issues when a contingent, straightforward/ angled, abiding/ ties and dangers that ge fleeting, reason/ passion, things/ words, realities/ forts to construct a Ian, illusions, fact/ opinion, neutral/ partisan. Under­ 4See A. C. Howell, "Res et Verba: Words and Things," in Seventeenth Century Prose: Modem Essays and Criticism, lying this list, which is by no means exhaustive, 5Thomas Kuhn, The Str ed. S. Fish (Oxford, 1971). [Au.] are three basic oppositions: first, between a truth (Chicago, 1962), p. 125. [Au.

1610 MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC 1ith the Truth and allows it that exists independently of all perspectives and spectival bias (a redundant phrase) has been t would seem, in a posture points of view and the many truths that emerge eliminated, efforts that have sometimes taken as ric has often gravitated to­ and seem perspicuous when a particular perspec­ a model the notations of mathematics, at other in an effort to defuse the tive or point of view has been established and is times the operations of logic, and more recently I. Quintilian's formulation in force; second, an opposition between true the purely formal calculations of a digital com­ ;he writings of Cicero) is knowledge, which is knowledge as it exists apart puter. Whether it issues in the elaborate linguistic echoed in countless trea­ from any and all systems of belief, and the machines of seventeenth-century "projectors" ~ak well who is not good knowledge, which because it flows from some or like Bishop Wilkins (An Essay Towards a Real e non possit nisi bonus, " other system of belief, is incomplete and partial Character and a Philosophical language, 1668), lS a defense, however, this (in the sense of biased); and third, an opposition or in the building (a la Chomsky) of a "compe­ advantage of implying the between a self or consciousness that is turned tence" model of language abstracted from any toric, an implication fully outward in an effort to apprehend and attach it­ particular performance, or in the project of Es­ 's On Christian Doctrine self to truth and true knowledge and a self or peranto or some other artificial language claim­ much subordinated to wis­ consciousness that is turned inward in the direc­ ing universality, 6 or in the fashioning of a Haber­ as a distinct and separable tion of its own prejudices, which, far from being masian "ideal speech situation" in which all 1trast, is wholly defined by transcended, continue to inform its every word assertions express "a 'rational will' in relation to bility to produce "persua­ and action. Each of these oppositions is attached a common interest ascertained without decep­ " here is a powerfully res­ in turn to an opposition between two kinds of tion,"1 the impulse behind the effort is always the hose relevant meanings is language: on the one hand, language that faith­ same: to establish a form of communication that :uliar to an individual, lo­ fully reflects or reports on matters of fact uncol­ escapes partiality and aids us in first determining ). He who speaks "in ac­ ored by any personal or partisan agenda or de­ and then affirming what is absolutely and objec­ rticular angled perspective sire; and on the other hand, language that is tively true, a form of communication that in its draw his auditors; he also infected by partisan agendas and desires, and structure and operations is the very antithesis of of song (etymologically, therefore colors and distorts the facts which it rhetoric, of passionate partisan discourse. lded to speech") which as purports to reflect. It is use of the second kind of That desideratum and the fears behind it have ve "charms the sense" (II, language that makes one a rhetorician, while ad­ received countless articulations, but never have mt," then, is almost a re- herence to the first kind makes one a seeker after they been articulated with more precision than in 1rds mean the same thing truth and an objective observer of the way things these sentences from Bishop Sprat's History of eader is that he is about to are. It is this distinction that, as Thomas Kuhn the Royal Society of London, I 667= whose exercise is uncon ­ notes, underwrites the claims of science to be a When I consider the means of happy living, and the privileged form of discourse because it has re­ of responsibility either to causes of their corruption, I can hardly forbear ... ,od. Indeed, so dangerous course to a "neutral observation language,"s a concluding that eloquence ought to be banish'd out this force that he feels it language uninflected by any mediating presuppo­ of all civil societies, as a thing fatal to Peace and corrective gloss as soon as sitions or preconceptions; and it is the same dis­ good Manners .... They [the ornaments of speak­ "Thus Belia! with words tinction that informs Aristotle's observation ing] are in open defiance against Reason; profess­ , / Counsell'd ignoble ease (Rhetoric, III, 1404, 13) that "Nobody uses fine ing not to hold much correspondence with that; but 226- 27). Just in case you language when teaching geometry." The lan­ with its slaves, the Passions: they give the mind a guage of geometry-of formal rules with no motion too changeable, and bewitching, to consist ong over this passage be­ substantive content-is contrasted by Aristotle with right practice . Who can behold, without indig­ nation, how many mists and uncertainties, these te from it almost all of the to all those languages that are intended only to specious Tropes and Figures have brought on our "charm the hearer," the languages of manipula­ relation to which rhetoric Knowledge? How many rewards, which are due to :ely negative) definition: tion, deception, and self-consciously deployed more profitable, and difficult arts, have been 'ace, essential/ peripheral, strategy. snatch' d away by the easie vanity of fine speaking? clear/ colored, necessary/ It is this understanding of linguistic possibili­ (pp. I Il-13) ,rward / angled, abiding/ ties and dangers that generates a succession of ef­ n, things/words, realities/ forts to construct a language from which all per- 6See Andrew Lange, The Artificial Language Movement . neutral/partisan. Under­ (Oxford, New York, and London, 1985). [Au.] , by no means exhaustive, 5Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scielllific Revo/111io11s 7Jiirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston, 1975), ions: first, between a truth (Chicago, 1962), p. 125. [Au.] p. I08. [Au.]

FISH I RHETORIC 1611 The terms of banishment are exactly those in­ penumbra of irrationality. 8 If tropes and figures ing the nature of 1 voked by Plato against the poets in book X of his "give the mind a motion too changeable," it is upon them their nar Republic: Homer, Socrates says, may be "the because the principle of change, in the form of course of time and most poetic of poets and the first of tragedians, the passions, already Jives in the mind, and it nately "admitted var but we must know the truth [and] we can admit follows then that banishing eloquence and the (p. 19). no poetry into our city save only hymns to the poets from your republic will only do half the In the twentieth c gods and the praises of good men; for if you job. As Milton puts it in the Areopagitica , "they echoed point for pc grant admission to the honeyed Muse ... plea­ are not skillful considerers of human things who scaffolding) by Rud sure and pain will be lords of your city instead of imagine to remove sin by removing the matter of admit into the lexicor law and that which shall ... have approved itself sin"; 9 policing the outer landscape will be of firmly to "protocol" to the general reason as the best" (607a). The little effect if the inner landscape remains host to sentences that satisfy "honeyed muse" is precisely what Belia! be­ the enemy, to sin, to error, to show. are therefore verifiat comes when his tongue drops Manna (1 r3), a It is the view of the anti-rhetoricians that this of the world . The s quintessentially idolatrous act in which he substi­ double task of inner and outer regulation can be Carnap asserts, "take: tutes his own word for the word sent down to us accomplished by linguistic reform, by the institu­ cide what one wishe: by God and therefore deprives us of the direction tion of conditions of communication that at once The freedom of indi, that God's word might have given us. Although protect discourse from the irrelevancies and con­ would be further tak the transition from classical to Christian thought tingencies that would compromise its universal­ verifiable lexicon we is marked by many changes, one thing that does ity and insulate the discoursing mind from those that "corresponded ex not change is the status of rhetoric in relation contingencies and irrelevancies it itself harbors. if that were the case to a foundational vision of truth and meaning. Wilkins proposes to fashion a language that will not arise" (p. 68). Tha Whether the center of that vision is a personal­ admit neither Supe1fiuities- plural signifiers of a either by the words o ized deity or an abstract geometric reason, single signified, more than one word for a partic­ his consciousness in, rhetoric is the force that pulls us away from that ular thing - nor Equivocals-signifiers doing path of truth; the ten center and into its own world of ever-shifting multiple duty, single words that refer to several form in excess of its shapes and shimmering surfaces. things - nor Metaphor - a form of speech that reflect matters of fact Of course, the allure of surfaces and shapes, interposes itself between the observer and the vance, and the mind's of "specious Tropes and Figures," would not be referent and therefore contributes "to the disguis­ of a language uncor felt if there were not something already in us ing of it with false appearances" (pp. 17-18). The moorings would be ne that inclined to it. Rhetoric may be a danger that idea is that such a language, purged of ambiguity, ger posed by rhetoric assaults us from without, but its possible success redundancy, and indirection, will be an appropri­ course and the discou1 is a function of an inner weakness. The entire ate instrument for the registering of an indepen­ have been eliminated . art, as Aristotle explains regretfully, is predi­ dent reality, and that if men will only submit tant differences to be 1 cated on "the defects of our hearers" (Rhetoric, themselves to that language and remain within of Plato, the antientl III, 1404, 8), on the assumption that members of the structure of its stipulated definitions and ex­ bishop, and the logical the audience will be naturally susceptible to the clusions, they will be incapable of formulating the Vienna Circle, but rhetorician's appeal. The anti-rhetorical stance and expressing wayward, subjective thoughts and pany of countless othe can only be coherent if it posits an incoherence will cease to be a danger either to themselves or side of a quarrel that at the heart (literally) of the self that is both to those who hearken to them. In this way, says "old" in the fifth ce1 rhetoric's victim and its source. That self is al­ Wilkins, they will be returned to that original quarrel, the quarrel ways presented as divided, as the site of contest­ state in which the language spoken was the lan­ rhetoric, survives ever· ing forces; in Christian terms the forces are guage God gave Adam, a language in which of Western thought, · named the carnal and the spiritual; in secular every word perfectly expressed its referent (on with the (skewed) cho psychologies the names are passion and reason the model of Adam's simultaneously understand- varnished truth straigt or the willful and the rational; but whatever the the powerful but insic names, the result is a relationship of homology "This is the language of H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of between the inner and outer landscapes, both of Law (Oxford, 1961 ). [Au.] '°Rudolf Carnap. "The I which contain a core element of truth and YJohn Milton, "Areopagitica," in Milton's Prose, ed. logical Positivism, ed. A. J. knowledge that is continually threatened by a J. Max Patrick et al. (New York, 1968), p. 297. [Au.] !Au.]

1612 MODERN AND PO~TMODERN RHEfORIC , • 8 If tropes and figures ing the nature of the animals and conferring guage," language that has transgressed the limits 1 too changeable," it is upon them their names), a language that in the of representation and substituted its own forms change, in the form of course of time and ·'emergencies" has unfortu­ for the forms of reality.' ' es in the mind, and it nately "admitted various and casual alterations" (p. 19). ing eloquence and the II ; will only do half the In the twentieth century Wilkins's program is the Areopagitica, "they echoed point for point (absent the theological To this point my presentation has been as skewed rs of human things who scaffolding) by Rudolf Carnap: Carnap would as this choice, because it has suggested that removing the matter of admit into the lexicon only words that can be tied rhetoric has received only negative characteriza­ · landscape will be of firmly to "protocol" or "observation" sentences, tions. In fact, there have always been friends of 1dscape remains host to sentences that satisfy certain truth conditions and rhetoric, from the sophists to the anti-foundation­ ·, to show. are therefore verifiable by reference to the facts alists of the present day, and in response to the 1ti-rhetoricians that this of the world. The stipulation of this criterion, realist critique they have devised (and repeated) a outer regulation can be Carnap asserts, "takes away one's freedom to de­ number of standard defenses. Two of these de­ c reform, by the institu­ cide what one wishes to 'mean' by [a] word."' 0 fenses are offered by Aristotle in the Rhetoric. munication that at once The freedom of individual speakers and hearers First, he defines rhetoric as a faculty or art whose ! irrelevancies and con­ would be further taken away if the words of a practice will help us to observe "in any given npromise its universal­ verifiable lexicon were embedded in a grammar base the available means of persuasion" (I, 1355, ursing mind from those that "corresponded exactly to logical syntax," for 27) and points out that as a faculty it is not in and ancies it itself harbors. if that were the case "pseudo-statements could of itself inclined away from truth. Of course, bad on a language that will not arise" (p. 68). That is, no one could be misled men may abuse it, but that after all "is a charge ;-plural signifiers of a either by the words of another or by that part of which may be made in common against all good 1 one word for a partic­ his consciousness inclined to wander from the things." "What makes a man a 'sophist,"' he de­ ca/s - signi fiers doing path of truth; the tendency of language to per­ clares, "is not his faculty, but his moral purpose" ds that refer to several form in excess of its proper duty-to report or (I, 1355, 17). To the anticipated objection that -a form of speech that reflect matters of fact-would be curbed in ad­ rhetoric's potential for misuse is a reason for es­ the observer and the vance, and the mind's susceptibility to the power chewing it, Aristotle replies that it is sometimes a tributes "to the disguis­ of a language unconstrained by its empirical necessary adjunct to the cause of truth, first, be­ mces" (pp. 17- 18). The moorings would be neutralized. In short, the dan­ cause if we leave the art to be cultivated by de­ e, purged of ambiguity, ger posed by rhetoric, both to the field of dis­ ceivers, they will lead truth-seekers astray, and, )n, will be an appropri­ course and the discoursing consciousness, would second, because, regrettable though it may be, istering of an indepen­ have been eliminated. Of course, there are impor­ "before some audiences not even the possession men will only submit tant differences to be noted between the idealism of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for 1ge and remain within of Plato, the antienthusiasm of a Restoration what we say to produce conviction" and on those ,ted definitions and ex­ bishop, and the logical positivism of a member of occasions "we must use, as our modes of persua­ ;apable of formulating the Vienna Circle, but together (and in the com­ sion and argument, notions possessed by every­ mbjective thoughts and pany of countless others) they stand on the same body" (I, 1355, 27). That is, because of the de­ either to themselves or side of a quarrel that Plato was already calling fects of our hearers the truth itself must often be hem. In this way, says "old" in the fifth century before Christ. That rhetorically dressed so that it will gain accep­ turned to that original quarrel, the quarrel between philosophy and tance. 12 ~e spoken was the Jan- rhetoric, survives every sea change in the history Aristotle's second defense is more aggres­ a language in which of Western thought, continually presenting us sively positive and responds directly to one of the ressed its referent (on with the (skewed) choice between the plain un­ most damaging characterizations of rhetoric: 1Itaneously understand- varnished truth straightforwardly presented and the powerful but insidious appeal of "fine Ian- 11 Sec on this point George Kennedy, The Art of Pers11a· L. A. Hart's The Collcept of l'ioll ill Greece (Princeton, NJ, 1963), p. 23. [Au.] "'Rudolf Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics," in 12 See John Milton, "Reason of Church Government," in a," in Mi/toil's Prose, ed. Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer (Glencoe, Ill ., 1959), p. 63. The Complete Prose Works of Johll Mi/toll, ed. D. M. Wolfe 1968), p. 297. [Au.] (Au.] et al., vol. I (New Haven, Conn., 1953), pp. 817- 18. [Au.]

FISH I RHETORIC 1613 "We must be able to employ persuasion, just as the things that are not that they are not" (quoted That is, as I have strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite in Plato, Theaetetus, 152a). What this means, as the defenses rhetor sides of a question, not in order that we may in W. K. C. Guthrie has pointed out, is "that the challenges the basic practice employ it in both ways (for we must Sophists recognized only accidental as opposed cal stance, the prem not make people believe what is wrong), but in to essential being, ... the conditional and relative be measured against order that we may see clearly what the facts as opposed to the self-existent." 15 This is not to ality. To the accusat are" (I, 1355, 28-33). In short, properly used, say that the categories of the true and good are with the realms of t rhetoric is a heuristic, helping us not to distort the abandoned, but that in different contexts they and forsakes truth, tt facts, but to discover them; moreover, adds Aris­ will be filled differently and that there exists no sors respond that trut totle, the setting forth of contrary views of a mat­ master context (for that could only be occupied and assumes a diffen ter will have the beneficial effect of showing us by the unavailable gods) from the vantage point fering local urgencie1 which of those views most accords with the truth of which the differences could be assessed and ated with them. "Tru because "the underlying facts do not lend them­ judged. porary, not universal selves equally well to the contrary views." By The result is to move rhetoric from the disrep­ any man was ... wt this argument, as Peter Dixon has pointed out, utable periphery to the necessary center: for if the of." 18 Not only does Aristotle "removes rhetoric from the realm of the highest truth for any man is what he believes it to of analyzing and prei haphazard and the fanciful" 1 J and rejoins it to be (Tlzeaetetus, 152a), the skill which produces form of discourse no that very realm of which it was said to be the belief and therefore establishes what, in a partic­ renders the opposing , great subverter. ular time and particular place, is true, is the skill phy- beside the poi But if this is the strength of Aristotle's de­ essential to the building and maintaining of a civ­ rates' thesis in his Am fense, it is also its weakness, for in making it he ilized society. [n the absence of a revealed truth, geometry and astron< reinforces the very assumptions in relation to rhetoric is that skill, and in teaching it the any "useful applicatio which rhetoric will always be suspect, assump­ sophists were teaching "the one thing that mat­ affairs; ... after they tions of an independent reality whose outlines tered, how to take care of one's own affairs and attend us through !if. can be perceived by a sufficiently clear-eyed ob­ the business of the state." 16 The rhetorician is what we do, but are server who can then represent them in a transpar­ like a physician; it is his job "to diagnose the par­ necessities." 19 Indeed ent verbal medium. The stronger defense, be­ ticular institution and prescribe the best course of to such disciplines the I I cause it hits at the heart of the opposing tradition, action for a man or a state under given condi­ hold that man to be w1 \ is one that embraces the accusations of that tradi­ tions"'7 (see Plato, Theaetetus, I 67b-d, Protago­ ers of conjecture to a I tion and makes of them a claim. The chief accu­ ras, 3 I 8e-19a); and when Socrates asks Protago­ course, and I hold tha sation, as we have seen, is that rhetoricians hold ras if he is "promising to make men good who occupies himse "the probable (or likely-seeming, plausible) in citizens," the reply is firm: "That ... is exactly which he will most qt more honour than the true" (Phaedrus, 267a). what I profess to do" (Protagoras, 3 I 9a). Of sight" (p. 271). Men v The sophist response is to assert that the realm of course, in this context words like "good" and in the world, he concl the probable-of what is likely to be so given "best" do not have the meanings a Plato or from their interests alJ particular conditions within some local perspec­ Socrates would want them to have-good and activities which haven tive-is the only relevant realm of consideration best in any and all circumstances; rather, they What Isocrates doe for human beings. The argument is contained in refer to what would appear to be the better of the shift the balance of p two statements attributed famously to Protagoras. courses that seem available in what are generally and rhetoric by puttin& The first declares the unavailability (not the unre­ understood to be the circumstantial constraints of sive. This same stratei ality) of the gods: "About gods I cannot say ei­ a particular situation; but since, according to the Cicero and Quintilian, ther that they are or that they are not." 14 And the sophist view, particular situations are the only Roman rhetoricians. Ir second follows necessarily from the absence of kind there are, circumstantial determinations of De lnvelltione Cicero godly guidance: "Man is the measure of all what is good are as good as you're going to get. will subsequently be in things, of the things that are that they are, and of

"William K. Guthrie. The Sophists (Cambridge, 197 I), '"Ibid., p. 51. [Au.] 3 9 ' Rhetoric·(London, 1971), p. 14. [Au.) p. 193. [Au.] ' 1socratcs, "Antidosis," i 16 ' 4Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. H. Diels and Ibid., p. 186. [Au.I George Norlin (Cambridge: I W. Kranz (Berlin, 1960), 371: 80, B4. [Au.] I7lbid., p. 187. [Au.J pp. 275, 277- [Au.]

1614 MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC hey are not" (quoted That is, as I have already said, the strongest of humanism and belles lettres. There was a time, What this means, as the defenses rhetoric has received because it he says, when "men wandered at large in the field ted out, is "that the challenges the basic premise of the anti-rhetori­ like animals," and there was "as yet no ordered ·cidental as opposed cal stance, the premise that any discourse must system of religious worship nor of social 1ditional and relative be measured against a stable and independent re­ duties." 20 It was then that a "great and wise" man :nt."1s This is not to ality. To the accusation that rhetoric deals only "assembled and gathered" his uncivilized broth­ ,e true and good are with the realms of the probable and contingent ers and "introduced them to every useful and erent contexts they and forsakes truth, the sophists and their succes­ honorable occupation, though they cried out that there exists no sors respond that truth itself is a contingent affair against it at first because of its novelty." Never­ Id only be occupied and assumes a different shape in the light of dif­ theless, he gained their attention through "reason m the vantage point fering local urgencies and the convictions associ­ and eloquence" ("propter rationem atque ora­ uld be assessed and ated with them. "Truth was individual and tem­ tionem") and by these means he "transformed porary, not universal and lasting, for the truth for them from wild savages into a kind and gentle oric from the disrep­ any man was ... what he could be persuaded folk." Nor would it have been possible, Cicero sary center: for if the of." 18 Not only does this make rhetoric-the art adds, to have "turned men ... from their habits" 1vhathe believes it to of analyzing and presenting local exigencies-a if wisdom had been "mute and voiceless"; only kill which produces form of discourse no one can afford to ignore, it "a speech at the same time powerful and entranc­ 1es what, in a partic­ renders the opposing discourse-formal philoso­ ing could have induced one who had great physi­ e, is true, is the skill phy-beside the point. This is precisely Isoc­ cal strength to submit to justice without vio­ maintaining of a civ­ rates' thesis in his Antidosis. Abstract studies like lence." From that time on, "many cities have : of a revealed truth, geometry and astronomy, he says, do not have been founded, ... the flames of a multitude of in teaching it the any "useful application either to private or public wars have been extinguished, and ... the strongest one thing that mat- affairs; ... after they are learned ... they do not alliances and most sacred friendships have been 1e' s own affairs and attend us through life nor do they lend aid in formed not only by the use of reason, but also '> The rhetorician is what we do, but are wholly divorced from our more easily by the use of eloquence" (1, 1). ·'to diagnose the par­ necessities."'9 Indeed, he goes so far as to deny Whereas in the foundationalist story an original be the best course of to such disciplines the label "philosophy," for "I purity (of vision, purpose, procedure) is corrupted under given condi­ hold that man to be wise who is able by his pow­ when rhetoric's siren song proves too sweet, in is, r67b-d, Protago- ers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best Cicero's story (later to be echoed by countless 1crates asks Protago­ course, and I hold that man to be a philosopher others) 21 all the human virtues, and indeed hu­ J make men good who occupies himself with the studies from manity itself, are wrested by the arts of elo­ "That ... is exactly which he will most quickly gain that kind of in­ quence from a primitive and violent state of na­ )tagoras, 319a). Of sight" (p. 271). Men who want to do some good ture. Significantly (and this is a point to which ds like "good" and in the world, he concludes, "must banish utterly we shall return), both stories are stories of power, eanings a Plato or from their interests all vain speculations and all rhetoric's power; it is just that in one story that to have - good and activities which have no bearing on our lives." power must be resisted Jest civilization fall, while ;tances; rather, they What Isocrates does (at least rhetorically) is in the other that power brings order and a gen­ J be the better of the shift the balance of power between philosophy uine political process where before there was n what are generally and rhetoric by putting philosophy on the defen­ only the rule of "physical strength." tantial constraints of sive. This same strategy is pursued after him by The contrast between the two stories can ice, according to the Cicero and Quintilian, the most influential of the hardly be exaggerated because what is at stake is 1ations are the only Roman rhetoricians. In the opening pages of his not simply a matter of emphasis or priority (as it 11determinations of De lnventione Cicero elaborates the myth that ·ou're going to get. will subsequently be invoked in every defense of 211Cicero, "De Inventione," in Cicero, vol. 2, ed. and trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I 968), I, 2 . [Au.] /1ists (Cambridge, 197 1}, 18 lbid ., p. 51. [Au.] 21 See, for example, John Lawson, lectures Concerning ·~Isocrates, "Antidosis," in /socrates, vol. 2, ed. and trans. Oratory, ed. E. N. Claussen and K. R. Wallace (Carbondale George Norlin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), and Edwardsville : Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), pp. 275,277. [Au.] p. 27. [Au.]

FISH I RHETORIC 1615 ( C-,,n:.lc.,.)

I seems to be in Aristotle's effort to demonstrate manipulates or fabricates himself, simultane­ sistence of essentiali an alliance between rhetoric and truth) but a dif­ ously conceiving of and occupying the roles that rhetorical man will re ference in worldviews. The quarrel between become first possible and then mandatory given serting that serious rr rhetorical and foundational thought is itself foun­ the social structure his rhetoric has put in place. fictional achievement; dational; its content is a disagreement about the By exploring the available means of persuasion style, not the state oft basic constituents of human activity and about in a particular situation, he tries them on, and as the nature of human nature itself. In Richard they begin to suit him, he becomes them. 2 3 "I In a fallen cosmetic Lanham's helpful terms, it is a disagreement as hold," says Isocrates, "that people can become not to be considered . to whether we are members of the species homo better and worthier if they conceive an ambition perhaps to claim att rhetorical as her m seriosus or homo rhetoricus. Homo seriosus or to speak well," for in the setting forth of his posi­ loudly an attitude. T Serious Man tion the orator "will select from all the actions of ment from zero to Io men ... those examples which are the most illus­ possesses a central self, an irreducible identity. deep or equally super These selves combine into a single, homoge­ trious and the most edifying; and habituating neously real society which constitutes a referent re­ himself to contemplate and appraise such ex­ That is to say, for rhe· ality for the men living in it. This referent society is amples, he will feel their influence not only in the (between form and cc in tum contained in a physical nature itself referen­ preparation of a given discourse but in all the ac­ ephemeral and abidin, tial, standing "out there" independent of man. Man tions of his life" (pp. 275, 277). What serious are nothing more than has invented language to communicate with his fel­ man fears-the invasion of the fortress of es­ ater of seriousness, a low man. He communicates facts and concepts sence by the contingent, the protean, and the un­ what they oppose. An about both nature and society. He can also commu­ predictable- is what rhetorical man celebrates ous man were to hea nicate a third category of response, emotions. and incarnates. In the philosopher's vision of the regard it as one more When he is communicating facts or concepts, suc­ world rhetoric (and representation in general) is cess is measured by something we call clarity. nipulation and sleight merely the (disposable) form by which a prior When he is communicating feelings, success is sertion that flies in the measured by something we call sincerity, faithful­ and substantial content is conveyed; but in the equivalent in debate o ness to the self who is doing the feeling." world of homo rhetoricus rhetoric is both form so it would go, with n, and content, the manner of presentation and accord, an endless rou Homo rhetoricus or rhetorical man, on the other what is presented; the "improvising power of the teraccusation in whic hand, rhetor" is at once all-creating and the guarantee guistic responsibility of the impermanence of its creations: "to make a "from serious premise is an actor; his reality public, dramatic. His sense of thing beautiful or unbeautiful, just or unjust, suspect; from a rhetori identity, depends on the reassurance of daily histri­ good or bad is both a human power and a sign of onic reenactment. He is thus centered in time and ent language seems the insubstantiality of these attributes." 2 4 Having 2 concrete local event. The lowest common denomi­ world." s nator of his life is a social situation .... He assumes been made they can be made again. And so it has gon a natural agility in changing orientations .... From Which of these views of human nature is the thought could be wri birth, almost, he has dwelt not in a single value­ correct one? The question can only be answered quarrel. And, indeed, structure but in several. He is thus committed to no from within one or the other, and the evidence of written and with predi single construction of the world; much rather, to one party will be regarded by the other either as In one version writter prevailing in the game at hand .... He accepts the illusory or as grist for its own mill. When pre­ religion, magic, and ve present paradigm and explores its resources. sented with the ever-changing panorama of his­ alently suspect forms , Rhetorical man b trained not to discover reality but tory, serious man will see variation on a few the Enlightenment red to manipulate it. Reality is what is accepted as real­ basic themes; and when confronted with the per- ence; enthusiasm and ~4 ity, what is useful. (p. 4) by the refinement of 1 iA..h-J As rhetorical man manipulates reality, establish­ 2 JSee Thomas Sloane, Donne, Milton, and the End of Hu­ difference (point of vie ,n..t., ing through his words the imperatives and urgen­ manist Rhetoric (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1985), in check by a procedur p. 87: "Rhetoric succeeded in humanism's great desideratum. ~'. cies to which he and his fellows must respond, he (told by a line stretchi the artistic creation of ac.lcptpersonhood." See also Stephen a carnivalesque world Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning (Chicago, 1980). 1u,l.1')w. [Au.] bility is drastically in 24 \~ "The Motives of Eloquence (New Haven, Conn., 1976), Nancy Streuver, The Language of History in the Renais­ p. 1. [Au.] sance (Princeton, NJ, 1970), pp. 15, 12. [Au.] 2 sLanham, Motives, p. 2: tt.l~\I,,.\,

1616 MODERN ANO POSJ'MODERN RHETORIC himself, simultane­ sistence of essentialist questions and answers, dency of a soulless reason, a brutally narrow per­ :cupying the roles that rhetorical man will reply as Lanham does by as­ spective that claims to be objective and proceeds then mandatory given serting that serious man is himself a supremely in a repressive manner to enforce its claim. It is toric has put in place. fictional achievement; seriousness is just another not my intention here to endorse either history or . means of persuasion style, not the state of having escaped style: to offer a third or to argue as some have for a tries them on, and as nonhistory of discontinuous episteme innocent of In a fallen cosmetic world, [plain Jane] is asking ! becomes them. 2 3 "I either a progressive or lapsarian curve; rather, I not to be considered, wants to be overlooked - or 1t people can become perhaps to claim attention by contrast. She is as only wish to point out that the debate continues conceive an ambition rhetorical as her made up sister, proclaims as to this very day and that its terms are exactly :tting forth of his posi­ loudly an attitude. Thus the whole range of orna­ those one finds in the dialogues of Plato and the from all the actions of ment from zero to 100 is equally rhetorical, equally orations of the sophists. 1ich are the most illus­ deep or equally superficial. (p. 30) {ing; and habituating ,, 1d appraise such ex­ That is to say, for rhetorical man the distinctions III fluence not only in the (between form and content, periphery and core, As I write, the fortunes of rhetorical man are on Jurse but in all the ac­ ephemeral and abiding) invoked by serious man the upswing, as in discipline after discipline there ;, 277). What serious are nothing more than the scaffolding of the the­ is evidence of what has been called the interpre­ of the fortress of es­ ater of seriousness, are themselves instances of tive turn, the realization (at least for those it e protean, and the un­ what they oppose. And on the other side, if seri­ seizes) that the givens of any field of activity­ orical man celebrates ous man were to hear that argument, he would including the facts it commands, the procedures ,sopher' s vision of the regard it as one more example of rhetorical ma­ it trusts in, and the values it expresses and ex­ :!ntation in general) is nipulation and sleight of hand, an outrageous as­ tends-are socially and politically constructed, ,rm by which a prior sertion that flies in the face of common sense, the are fashioned by man rather than delivered by conveyed; but in the equivalent in debate of "so's your old man." And God or Nature. The most recent (and unlikely) rhetoric is both form so it would go, with no prospect of ever reaching field to experience this revolution, or at least to of presentation and accord, an endless round of accusation and coun­ hear of its possibility, is economics. The key text irovising power of the teraccusation in which truth, honesty, and lin­ is Donald McCloskey's The Rhetoric of Econom­ ing and the guarantee guistic responsibility are claimed by everyone: ics (Wisconsin, 1985), a title that is itself polemi­ creations: "to make a "from serious premises, all rhetorical language is cal since, as McCloskey points out, mainstream 1tiful, just or unjust, suspect; from a rhetorical point of view, transpar­ economists don't like to think of themselves as m power and a sign of ent language seems dishonest; false to the employing a rhetoric; rather, they regard them­ : attributes." 2 4 Having world." 25 selves as scientists whose methodology insulates le again. And so it has gone; the history of Western them from the appeal of special interests or .f human nature is the thought could be written as the history of this points of view. They think, in other words, that can only be answered quarrel. And, indeed, such histories have been the procedures of their discipline will produce :r, and the evidence of written and with predictably different emphases. "knowledge free from doubt, free from meta­ by the other either as In one version written many times, the mists of physics, morals and personal conviction" (p. 16). own mill. When pre­ religion, magic, and verbal incantation (all equiv­ To this, McCloskey responds by declaring (in ~ing panorama of his­ alently suspect forms of fantasy) are dispelled by good sophistic terms) that no such knowledge is e variation on a few the Enlightenment rediscovery of reason and sci­ available, and that while economic method nfronted with the per- ence; enthusiasm and metaphor alike are curbed promises to deliver it, "what it is able to deliver by the refinement of method, and the effects of [and] renames as scientific methodology [are] the Milton, and the End of Hu­ difference (point of view) are bracketed and held scientist's and especially the economic scien­ ngeles, and London, 1985), in check by a procedural rigor. In another version tist's metaphysics, moral, and personal convic­ 1anism's great desideratum, (told by a line stretching from Vico to Foucault) tions" (p. 16). Impersonal method, then, is both onhood." See also Stephen a carnivalesque world of exuberance and possi­ an illusion and a danger (as a kind of rhetoric it shioning (Chicago, 1980). bility is drastically impoverished by the ascen- masks its rhetorical nature), and as an antidote to !ge of History in the Renais- it McCloskey offers rhetoric, which he says, 5, 12. [Au.] 2 sLanham, Motives, p. 28. [Au.] deals not with abstract truth, but with the truth

FISH I RHETORIC 1617 ~h~hv,.1,\:-l 't ~ IM'V\M\. \1

that emerges in the context of distinctly human quently cited work in the humanities and social was predictable: a t conversations (pp. 28-29). Within those conver­ sciences in the past twenty-five years, and it is that was not captive sations there are always rhetorical through and through. Kuhn begins by provided a neutral SJ rehearsing and challenging the orthodox model particular arguments good or bad. After making adigms could be < of scientific inquiry in which independent facts them there is no point in asking a last, summarizing denying such a cri1 question: "Well, is it True?" It's whatever it is­ are first collected by objective methods and then world of epistemolo persuasive, interesting, useful, and so forth .... built up into a picture of nature, a picture that he words are Israel Sch: There is no reason to search for a general quality himself either confirms or rejects in the context called Truth, which answers only the unanswerable of controlled experiments. In this model, science Independent and pu question, "What is it in the mind of God?" (p. 47) is a "cumulative process" (p. 3) in which each munication has fai new discovery adds "one more item to the popu­ things is a delusion than discovered .. . The answerable questions are always asked lation of the scientist's world" (p. 7). The shape tional men followi 1 within the assumptions of particular situations, of that world-of the scientist's professional ac­ pursuit of truth, we and both question and answer "will always de­ tivities-is determined by the shapes (of fact and within each of whic pend on one's audience and the human purposes structure) already existing in the larger world of atic constraints. 2 6 involved" (p. 150). The real truth, concludes nature, shapes that constrain and guide the scien­ McCloskey, is that "assertions are made for pur­ tist's work. Kuhn and those h< poses of persuading some audience" and that, Kuhn challenges this story by introducing the course, responded to given the unavailability of a God's-eye view, notion of a paradigm, a set of tacit assumptions less to say, the debat, "this is not a shameful fact," but the bottom line and beliefs within which research goes on, as­ of this essay could ea fact in a rhetorical world. sumptions which rather than deriving from the has been particularli At the first conference called to consider Mc­ observation of facts are determinative of the facts area of contest-sci~ Closkey' s arguments, the familiar anti-rhetorical that could possibly be observed. It follows, then, so heavily invested in objections were heard again in the land, and the that when observations made within different apostles of rhetorical land might have been fifth-century Athens as paradigms conflict, there is no principled (i.e., sumably fear to tread. well as Wellesley, Massachusetts, in 1986. One nonrhetorical) way to adjudicate the dispute. One At one point in h participant spoke of "the primrose path to ex­ cannot put the competing accounts to the test of that in the tradition h, treme relativism" which proceeds from "Kuhn's fact, because the specification of fact is precisely search is "reputed to p conception of the incommensurability of para­ what is at issue between them; a fact cited by one "brute experience"; t digms" to the "contention that there are no objec­ party would be seen as a mistake by the other. were truly the mode 1 tive and unambiguous procedures for applying ... What this means is that science does not proceed quire a "neutral obsen rules since the meanings of particular actions by offering its descriptions to the independent language that register: and terms are entirely ... context-dependent." judgment of nature; rather, it proceeds when the tion by paradigm-sr Other voices proclaimed that nothing in Mc­ proponents of one paradigm are able to present problem is that "philc Closkey' s position was new (an observation cer­ their case in a way that the adherents of other not yet provided even tainly true), that everyone already knew it, and paradigms find compelling. In short, the "motor" able to do that would that at any rate it didn't touch the core of the by which science moves is not verification or fal­ specially devised lang economists's practice. Still others invoked a set sification, but persuasion. Indeed, says Kuhn, in expectations about n of related (and familiar) distinctions between the end the force of scientific argument "is only limit in advance what empirical and interpretive activities, between that of persuasion" (p. 94). In the case of dis­ one cannot (in Kuhn' demonstration and persuasion, between verifiable agreement, "each party must try, by persuasion, neutral facts in order 1 procedures and anarchic irrationalism. Of course, to convert the other" (p. 198), and when one cannot have recourse each of these objections had already been formu­ party succeeds there is no higher court to which which to report those lated (or reformulated) in those disciplines that the outcome might be referred: "there is no stan­ the configuration of th had heard rhetoric's siren song long before it dard higher than the assent of the relevant com­ that divides men "is pri, reached the belated ears of economists. The name munity" (p. 94). "What better criterion," asks languages in which it that everyone always refers to (in praise or Kuhn, "could there be?" (p. 170). blame) is Thomas Kuhn. His The Structure of The answer given by those who were horrified 26 Science and Subjecrivi Scientific Revolutions is arguably the most fre- by Kuhn's rhetoricization of scientific procedure [Au.]

1618 MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC humanities and social was predictable : a better criterion would be one (p. 201) . Whatever reports a particular language y-five years, and it is that was not captive to a particular paradigm but (natural or artificial) offers us will be the report iugh. Kuhn begins by provided a neutral space in which competing par­ on the world as it is seen from within some par­ ~ the orthodox model adigms could be disinterestedly assessed. By ticular situation; there is no other aperspectival ich independent facts denying such a criterion, Kuhn leaves us in a way to see and no language other than a situa­ ·ive methods and then world of epistemological and moral anarchy. The tion-dependent language-an interested, rhetori­ 1ture, a picture that he words are Israel Scheffler's: cal language-in which to report. rejects in the context This same point was being made with all the Independent and public controls are no more, com­ In this model, science force of philosophical authority by J. L. Austin in munication has failed, the common universe of (p. 3) in which each things is a delusion, reality itself is made . .. rather a book published, significantly, in the same year 10re item to the popu­ than discovered . ... In place of a community of ra­ (1962) that saw the publication of The Structure rld" (p. 7). The shape tional men following objective procedures in the of Scientific Revolutions. Austin begins How to 1tist's professional ac­ pursuit of truth, we have a set of isolated monads, Do Things with Words by observing that tradi­ the shapes ( of fact and within each of which belief forms without system­ tionally the center of the philosophy of language in the larger world of atic constraints.2 6 has been just the kind of utterance Kuhn declares n and guide the scien- unavailable, the context-independent statement Kuhn and those he has persuaded have, of that offers objective reports on an equally inde­ >ry by introducing the course, responded to these accusations, but, need­ pendent world in sentences of the form "He is t of tacit assumptions less to say, the debate continues in terms readers running" and "Lord Raglan won the battle of research goes on, as- of this essay could easily imagine; and the debate Alma" (pp. 47, 142). Such utterances, which 1an deriving from the has been particularly acrimonious because the Austin calls "constative," are answerable to a re­ erminative of the facts area of contest-science and its procedures-is quirement of truth and verisimilitude ("the truth :rved. It follows, then, so heavily invested in as the one place where the of the constative ... 'he is running ' depends on 1ade within different apostles of rhetorical interpretivism would pre­ his being running"); the words must match the is no principled (i.e., sumably fear to tread. world, and if they do not they can be criticized as licate the dispute. One At one point in his argument Kuhn remarks false and inaccurate. There are, however, innu­ 1ccounts to the test of that in the tradition he is critiquing scientific re­ merable utterances that are not assessible in this ion of fact is precisely search is "reputed to proceed" from "raw data" or way. If, for example, I say to you, "I promise to !m; a fact cited by one "brute experience"; but, he points out, if that pay you five dollars" or "Leave the room," it mistake by the other. were truly the mode of proceeding, it would re­ would be odd were you to respond by saying ence does not proceed quire a "neutral observation language" (p. I 25), a "true" or "false"; rather, you would say to the 1s to the independent language that registers facts without any media­ first "good" or "that's not enough" or "I won't it proceeds when the tion by paradigm-specific assumptions . The hold my breath" and to the second "yes, sir" or m are able to present problem is that "philosophical investigation has "but I'm expecting a phone call" or "who do you he adherents of other not yet provided even a hint of what a language think you are?" These and many other imagin­ . In short, the "motor" able to do that would be like" (p. 127). Even a able responses would not be judgments on the not verification or fal­ specially devised language "embodies a host of truth or accuracy of my utterance but on its ap­ [ndeed, says Kuhn, in expectations about nature," expectations that propriateness given our respective positions in ific argument "is only limit in advance what can be described. Just as some social structure of understanding (domes­ ). In the case of dis- one cannot (in Kuhn's view) have recourse to tic, military, economic, etc.). It is only if the cir­ 1st try, by persuasion, neutral facts in order to settle a dispute, so one cumstances are of a certain kind-that is, if five 198), and when one cannot have recourse to a neutral language in dollars is a reasonable rather than an insulting higher court to which which to report those facts or even to report on amount, if the room I order you to leave is mine Ted: "there is no stan­ the configuration of the dispute. The difference not yours-that the utterances will "take" and t of the relevant com­ that di vi des men "is prior to the application of the achieve the meaning of being a promise or a Jetter criterion," asks languages in which it is nevertheless reflected" command . Thus the very identity, and therefore . 170). the meaning, of this type of utterance-Austin >se who were horrified 26Scie11ce and Subjectivity (Indianapolis, 1967), p. 19. names it "performative" -depends on the con­ :>fscientific procedure [Au.J text in which it is produced and received . There

FISH I RHETORIC 1619 this acknowledgmf is no regular-in the sense of reliable and pre­ ing state of affairs; rather, they are situation-spe­ of infelicity-of tt dictable-relationship between the form of the cific judgments on the relationship between con­ ing origin of utten linguistic marks (the words and their order) and textually produced utterances and states of affairs constructed by intf their significance. Nothing guarantees that "I that are themselves no less contextually pro­ cial, whereas, in D promise to pay you five dollars" will be either in­ duced. At the end of the book constatives are self the originary s tended or heard as a promise; in different circum­ "discovered" to be a subset of performatives, and of meaning must al stances it could be received as a threat or a joke with this discovery the formal core of language pretive constructior (as when I utter it from debtors' prison), and in disappears entirely and is replaced by a world of origin that suppose many circumstances it will be intended as one act utterances vulnerable to the sea change of every of an utterance will and understood as another (as when your opinion circumstance, the world, in short, of rhetorical interpretation; the s of my trustworthiness is much lower than my (situated) man. meaning must be in own). When the criterion of verisimilitude has This is a conclusion Austin himself resists than directly are th been replaced by the criterion of appropriateness, when he attempts to isolate (and thereby contain) guistic transaction. meaning becomes radically contextual, poten­ the rhetorical by invoking another distinction be­ circumstances, mer tially as variable as the situated (and shifting) un­ tween serious and nonserious utterance. Serious circumstances in wl derstandings of countless speakers and hearers. utterances are utterances for which the speaker settings hazard inte It is, of course, precisely this property of per­ takes responsibility; he means what he says, and duced by actors en formatives-their force is contingent and cannot therefore you can infer his meaning by consider­ tions. All the worl be formally constrained-that is responsible for ing his words in context. A nonserious utterance j stage, and on that i their being consigned by philosophers of lan­ is an utterance produced in circumstances that mitted by Austin" i~ guage to the category of the "derived" or "para­ "abrogate" (p. 21) the speaker's responsibility, by sticking close t, sitic," where, safely tucked away, they are pre­ and therefore one cannot with any confidence­ nary circumstances, vented from contaminating the core category of that is, without the hazard of ungrounded conjec­ positive condition" the constative. But it is this act of segregation ture-determine what he means: tion." 28 and quarantining that Austin undoes in the sec­ a performative utterance will, for example, be ... hol­ In the same pub! ond half of his book when he extends the analysis low or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if intro­ translation of Den of performatives to constatives and finds that duced in a poem, or spoken in a soliloquy.. .. Lan­ Searle, a student of . they too mean differently in the light of differing guage in such circumstances is in special ways ... make clear the affili contextual circumstances. Consider the exem­ used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its nor­ to the ancient deb, plary constative, "Lord Raglan won the battle of mal use .. .. All this we are excluding from considera­ have been tracing. Alma." Is it true, accurate, a faithful report? It tion. Our performative utterances ... are to be under­ to repeat Austin's p1 depends, says Austin, on the context in which it stood as issued in ordinary circumstances. (p. 22) has missed them: "J is uttered and received (pp. 142-43). In a high we want to know wl school textbook it might be accepted as true be­ The distinction, then, is between utterances that had better not stt cause of the in-place assumptions as to what, ex­ are, as Austin puts it later, "tethered to their ori­ promises made by a actly, a battle is, what constitutes winning, what gin" (p. 61), anchored by a palpable intention, some fairly obvious the function of a general is, etc., while in a work and utterances whose origin is hidden by the standard cases of pn of "serious" historical research all of these as­ screen of a theatrical or literary stage setting. rida's argument, the sumptions may have been replaced by others, with This distinction and the passage in which it ap­ precisely what is b the result that the very notions "battle" and pears were taken up in 1967 by Jacques Derrida structed." Although "won" would have a different shape. The proper­ in a famous (and admiring) critique of Austin. promises uttered in ties that supposedly distinguish constatives from Derrida finds Austin working against his own rect- less etiolated performatives-fidelity to preexisting facts, ac­ best insights and forgetting what he has just ac­ stage, this (Derrida countability to a criterion of truth- turn out to knowledged, that "infelicity [communication the stage settings wi be as dependent on particular conditions of pro­ going astray, in an unintended direction] is an ill 2 ceeds are so powerf duction and reception as performatives. "True" to which all [speech] acts are heir." 1 Despite in place that they and "false," Austin concludes, are not names for the possible relationships between freestanding 27 Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," Glyph I 28 lbid. [Au.] (constative) utterances and an equally freestand- (1977): 190. [Au.)

1620 MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC this acknowledgment, Austin continues to think therefore the meanings they make possible are they are situation-spe- of infelicity-of those cases in which the tether­ experienced as if they were direct and unmedi­ 1tionship between con­ ing origin of utterances is obscure and must be ated by any screens. The "obvious" cannot be op­ :es and states of affairs constructed by interpretive conjecture-as spe­ posed to the "staged," as Searle assumes, because ess contextually pro- cial, whereas, in Derrida's view, infelicity is it­ it is simply the achievement of a staging that has book constati ves are self the originary state in that any determination been particularly successful. One does not escape t of performatives, and of meaning must always proceed within an inter­ the rhetorical by fleeing to the protected area of rmal core of language pretive construction of a speaker's intention. The basic communication and common sense because ·eplaced by a world of origin that supposedly tethers the interpretation common sense in whatever form it happens to e sea change of every of an utterance will always be the product of that take is always a rhetorical-partial, partisan, in­ in short, of rhetorical interpretation; the special circumstances in which terested-construction. This does not mean, meaning must be inferred through a screen rather Derrida hastens to add, that all rhetorical con­ \ustin himself resists than directly are the circumstances of every lin­ structions are equal, just that they are equally : (and thereby contain) guistic transaction. In short, there are no ordinary rhetorical, equally the effects and extensions of another distinction be­ circumstances, merely those myriad and varied some limited and challengeable point of view. ::ms utterance. Serious circumstances in which actors embedded in stage The "citationality" - the condition of being in ·or which the speaker settings hazard interpretations of utterances pro­ quotes, of being indirect-of an utterance in ans what he says, and duced by actors embedded in other stage situa­ a play is not the same as the citationality of a meaning by consider­ tions. All the world, as Shakespeare says, is a philosophical reference or a deposition before a ~ nonserious utterance stage, and on that stage "the quality of risk ad­ court; it is just that no one of these performatives in circumstances that mitted by Austin" is not something one can avoid is more serious-more direct, less mediated, less ~aker' s responsibility, by sticking close to ordinary language in ordi­ rhetorical-than any other. Whatever opposition 1ith any confidence­ nary circumstances, but is rather "the internal and there is takes place within a "general" citational­ )f ungrounded conjec- positive condition" of any act of communica­ ity which "constitutes a violation of the allegedly 1eans: tion."28 rigorous purity of every event of discourse or I, for example, be ... hol­ In the same publication in which the English every speech act" (p. 192). )f on the stage, or if intro- translation of Derrida's essay appeared, John Searle points out (p. 205) that in order to 1 in a soliloquy .... Lan­ Searle, a student of Austin's, replied in terms that achieve a "general theory of speech acts," one es is in special ways ... make clear the affiliation of this particular debate must perform acts of exclusion or idealization 1ysparasitic upon its nor­ to the ancient debate whose configurations we like Austin's; but it is the possibility of a general ·xcluding from considera­ have been tracing. Searle's strategy is basically theory-of an account that is itself more than an ances ... are to be under­ to repeat Austin's points and declare that Derrida extension of some particular context or perspec­ ircumstances. (p. 22) has missed them: "Austin's idea is simply this: if tive- that Derrida denies. His is the familiar :tween utterances that we want to know what it is to make a promise we world of Rhetorical Man, teeming with roles, sit­ "tethered to their ori­ had better not start our investigations with uations, strategies, interventions, but containing a palpable intention, promises made by actors on stage ... because in no master role, no situation of situations, no strat­ ~in is hidden by the some fairly obvious way such utterances are not egy for outflanking all strategies, no intervention literary stage setting. standard cases of promises" (p. 204). But in Der­ in the arena of dispute that does not expand the .ssage in which it ap­ rida's argument, the category of the "obvious" is arena of dispute, no neutral point of rationality ,7 by Jacques Derrida precisely what is being challenged or "decon­ from the vantage point of which the "merely ~) critique of Austin. structed." Although it is true that we consider rhetorical" can be identified and held in check. jng against his own promises uttered in everyday contexts more di­ That is why deconstructive or post-structuralist what he has just ac­ rect- less etiolated-than promises made on a thought is supremely rhetorical: it systematically ;ity [communication stage, this (Derrida would say) is only because asserts and demonstrates the mediated, con­ led direction] is an ill the stage settings within which everyday life pro­ structed, partial, socially constituted nature of all ceeds are so powerfully-that is, rhetorically­ realities, whether they be phenomenal, linguistic, are heir." 2 1 Despite in place that they are in effect invisible, and or psychological. To deconstruct a text, says Derrida, is to "work through the structured ge­ Event Context," Glyph 1 '"Ibid. [Au.] nealogy of its concepts in the most scrupulous

FISH I RHETORIC 1621 and immanent fashion, but at the same time to legacy of the deconstructive gesture. Since the IV determine from a certain external perspective course of a deconstruction is to uncover a "frag­ that it cannot name or describe what this history mented stage that can be called natural with re­ That, however, is ju may have concealed or excluded, constituting it­ gard to the system that is being undone," there is structive practice fn self as history through this repression in which it always the danger that the "natural" pattern will lectual left, many of has a stake." 2 9 The "external perspective" is the "substitute its relational system for the one it Nietzsche's account perspective from which the analyst knows in ad­ helped to dissolve.":i• The only way to escape ical but find that m vance (by virtue of his commitment to the this danger is to perform the deconstructive act course uses that ac rhetorical or anti-foundational worldview) that again and again, submitting each new emerging into new versions the coherences presented by a text (and an insti­ constellation to the same suspicious scrutiny that Frank Lentricchia, f tution or an economy can in this sense be a text) brought it to light, and resisting the temptation to de Man's texts an in rests on a contradiction it cannot acknowledge, put in place of the truths it rhetoricizes the truth a realm where it c, rests on the suppression of the challengeable that everything is rhetorical. One cannot rest historical life" and f, rhetoricity of its own standpoint, a standpoint even in the insight that there is no place to rest. into "the realm of th that offers itself as if it came from nowhere in "Rhetoric," says de Man, "suspends logic and guistic transcendentc particular and simply delivered things as they re­ opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential undecidable," when ally (i.e., nonperspectivally) are. A deconstruc­ aberration" (p. 10). But the rhetorical vision is chronically and enc tive reading will surface those contradictions foreclosed on and made into a new absolute if its own duplicitous and expose those suppressions and thus "trouble" those "vertiginous possibilities" are celebrated as Eagleton's judgment a unity that is achieved only by covering over all the basis of a new wisdom. The rhetorical beat in the wake of Nif the excluded emphases and interests that might must by definition go on, endlessly repeating the "mocked and berated threaten it. These exclusions are part of the text sequence by which "the lure of solid ground" is rationalism," takes it in that the success of its totalizing effort depends succeeded by "the ensuing demystification." 3 2 by finding itself in on them. Once they are made manifest, the hith­ When de Man approvingly quotes Nietzsche's Eagleton complains t erto manifest meaning of the text is under­ identification of truth with "a moving army of content to stop there mined-indeed, is shown to have always and metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms," function of unmaskin already been undermined - as "the rhetorical a rhetorical construction whose origin has been ization, all knowledg operations that produce the supposed ground of (and must be) forgotten, he does not exempt metaphor.":i4 Operati argument, the key concept or premise," are de­ Nietzsche's text from its own corrosive effects. If tier of all ideology," prived of the claim to be unrhetorical, serious, Nietzsche declares (well in advance of Kuhn and form of thought and disinterested.3° Austin, but well after Gorgias and Protagoras) final ideological ratio Nor is this act performed in the service of that "there is no such thing as an unrhetorical, retreat "from market something beyond rhetoric. Derridean decon­ 'natural' language," for "tropes are not some­ philology, social pra, struction does not uncover the operations of thing that can be added or subtracted from lan­ structive rhetoric tum rhetoric in order to reach the Truth; rather, it con­ guage at will," the insight must be extended lo of Nietzschean thoug tinually uncovers the truth of rhetorical opera­ that very declaration: "A text like On Truth and ideological nerve," all tions, the truth that all operations, including the Lie, although it presents itself legitimately as a the elitist pleasure of, operation of deconstruction itself, are rhetorical. demystification of literary rhetoric, remains en­ commercial and politii If, as Paul de Man asserts, "a deconstruction al­ tirely literary, and deceptive itself" (p. 113). The In both his study of E ways has for its target to reveal the existence of "rhetorical mode," the mode of deconstruction, is litera,y Tlzeo,y: An I, hidden articulations and fragmentations within a mode of "endless reflection," since it is "unable a return to the Cicen assumedly monadic totalities," care must be ever to escape from the rhetorical deceit it an­ which the rhetorical a, taken that a new monadic totality is not left as the nounces" (p. I I 5). practice of a politics, indissociable from tt

29 Jacques Derrida, Positions (Chicago: University of 3 1Al/egories of Reading (New Haven, Conn., 1979), 33After the New Criticis Chicago Press, 1981), p. 6. [Au.] p. 249. [Au. I [Au.] 30 Jonathan Culler, 011Deco11structio11 (Ithaca, NY, 1982), J 2 William Ray, Literary Meaning (Oxford, 1984), p. 195. 34 Walter Be11jami11or T, p. 86. [Au.] [Au.] (London, 1981), p. 108. [Au

1622 MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC : gesture. Since the IV audiences involved," techniques whose employ­ to uncover a "frag­ ment is "closely determined by the pragmatic sit­ That, however, is just what is wrong with decon­ tled natural with re­ uation at hand.'' 35 In short, he calls for a rhetoric structive practice from the viewpoint of the intel­ ng undone," there is that will do real work and cites as an example the lectual left, many of whose members subscribe to natural" pattern will slogan "black is beautiful," which he says is ~ietzsche's account of truth and reality as rhetor­ ;tern for the one it "paradigmatically rhetorical since it employs a ical but find that much of post-structuralist dis­ Jnly way to escape figure of equivalence to produce particular dis­ ~ourse uses that account as a way of escaping e deconstructive act cursive and extra-discursive effects without di­ mto new versions of idealism and formalism. each new emerging rect regard for truth. "36 That is, someone who Frank Lentricchia, for example, sees in some of picious scrutiny that says "black is beautiful" is not so much inter­ de Man's texts an intention to place "discourse in ng the temptation to ested in the accuracy of the assertion (it is not a realm where it can have no responsibility to ·hetoricizes the truth constatively intended) as he is in the responses it historical life" and fears that we are being invited ,I. One cannot rest ma~ provoke-surprise, outrage, urgency, soli­ into "the realm of the thoroughly predictable lin­ : is no place to rest. danty-responses that may in tum set in motion guistic transcendental," the "rarified region of the ·suspends logic and '~practices that ar<:deemed, in the light of a par­ undecidable," where every text "speaks syn­ ,ilities of referential ticular set of falsifiable hypotheses, to be desir­ chronically and endlessly the same tale ... of rhetorical vision is able.''37 its own duplicitous self-consciousness."33 Terry o a new absolute if For Eagleton, the desirable practices are Eagleton's judgment is even harsher. Noting that es" are celebrated as Marxist-socialist and the rhetoric that will help ),n the wake of Nietzschean thought, rhetoric, The rhetorical beat establish them has three tasks: mocked and berated for centuries by an abrasive jlessly repeating the rationalism," takes its "terrible belated revenge" First, to participate in the production of works and · of solid ground" is by finding itself in every rationalist project, events which ... so fictionalize the "real" as to in­ demystification." 32 Eagleton complains that many rhetoricians seem tend those effects conducive to the victory of so­ quotes Nietzsche's content to stop there, satisfied with the "Fool's cialism. Second, as "critic" to expose the rhetorical "a moving army of function of unmasking all power as self-rational­ structures by which non-socialist works produce mthropomorphisms," ization, all knowledge as a mere fumbling with politically undesirable effects .... Third, to inter­ ose origin has been pret such words where possible "against the grain," metaphor.'_'34 Operating as a "vigorous demysti­ e does not exempt so as to appropriate from them whatever may be fier of all ideology," rhetoric functions only as a 8 1corrosive effects. If valuable for socialism.3 form of thought and ends up by providing "the .dvance of Kuhn and final ideological rationale for political inertia." In It is, of course, the second of these tasks that pre­ :ias and Protagoras) retreat "from market place to study, politics to sents conceptual and cognitive problems. If all , as an unrhetorical, philology, social practice to semiotics," decon­ cultural work is, as Eagleton says in the sentence opes are not some­ struc~ive rhetoric turns the emancipatory promise just before this passage, rhetorical, then how mbtracted from lan­ of N1etzschean thought into "a gross failure of does one's own rhetoric escape the inauthenticity nust be extended to ideological nerve," allowing the liberal academic it discovers in the rhetoric of others? Eagleton's ;t like On Truth and the elitist pleasure of repeatedly exposing "vulgar answer is contained in his assumption of the su­ elf legitimately as a commerc(al and political hectorings" (pp. 108--9). periority of the socialist program; any rhetorical hetoric, remains en­ In both his study of Benjamin and his influential work in the service of that program will be justi­ itself" (p. n3). The Literary Theory: An Introduction, Eagleton urges fied in advance, while conversely any rhetorical of deconstruction, is a return to the Ciceronian-Isocratic tradition in w?rk done in opposition to socialist urgencies 1," since it is "unable which the rhetorical arts are inseparable from the will flow from "false consciousness" and will de­ !torical deceit it an- pra~tice .of a politics, "techniques of persuasion serve to be exposed. This confidence in his ob­ md1ssociable from the substantive issues and jectives makes Eagleton impatient with those for

" Haven, Conn., 1979), 33After the New Criticism (Chicago, 1980), pp.310,317. 35 Jbid.,p. 104. [Au.] [Au.] 36lbid., p. I 12. [Au.] zg (Oxford, 1984), p. 195. 34 Walter Benjamin or Towards a Revolwionary Criticism 37lbid., p. I I 3. [Au.] (London, 1981), p. 108. [Au.] 38 lbid. [Au.]

FISH I RHETORIC whom the rhetoricity of all discourse is some­ lying structure of assumptions that confers a spu­ background plan c thing to be savored for itself, something to be rious legitimacy on the powers that currently be. chy" (p. 587). To 1 lovingly and obsessively demonstrated again and The claim, in short, is that the radically rhetorical tent of that emanc. again. It is not, he says, "a matter of starting from insight of Nietzschean/Derridean thought can do rhetorical through . certain theoretical or methodological problems; it radical political work; becoming aware that Gordon's and Ung, is a matter of starting from what we want to do, everything is rhetorical is the first step in coun­ reply that emancip and then seeing which methods and theories will tering the power of rhetoric and liberating us strengthening and best help us to achieve these ends. "39 Theories, from its force. Only if deeply entrenched ways of mind that stands to in short, are themselves rhetorics whose useful­ thinking and acting are made the objects of suspi­ able to resist, the ap ness is a function of contingent circumstances. It cion will we be able "even to imagine that life enslave us. That c, is ends-specific goals in local contexts-that could be different and better." many names, but th rule the invocation of theories, not theories that This last sentence is taken from an essay by "critical self-consc determine goals and the means by which they can Robert Gordon entitled "New Developments in sciousness is the al be reached. Legal Theory."4° Gordon is writing as a member oped in others) to d There are those on the left, however, for of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, a group sociation," includin whom the direction is the other way around, from of legal academics who have discovered the and compelling, the the theoretical realization of rhetoric's pervasive­ rhetorical nature of legal reasoning and are busily view; and the clain ness to a vision and a program for implementing exposing as interested the supposedly disinter­ negative task, critic it. In their view the discovery (or rediscovery) ested operations of legal procedures. Gordon's pates in the positive that all discourse and therefore all knowledge is pages are replete with the vocabulary of enclo­ of associations (stru, rhetorical leads or should lead to the adoption of sure or prison; we are "locked into" a system of ment) that are in th a method by which the dangers of rhetoric can be belief we did not make; we are "demobilized" party but of all man} at least mitigated and perhaps extirpated. This (that is, rendered less mobile); we must "break It need hardly b method has two stages: the first is a stage of de­ out" (p. 291), we must "unfreeze the world as it back in the directior bunking, and it issues from the general suspicion appears to common sense" (p. 289). What will versalism that the er in which all orthodoxies and arrangements of help us to break out, to unfreeze, is the discovery sets out to demystif) power are held once it is realized that their basis "that the belief-structures that rule our lives are jecting the rationaliti is not reason or nature but the success of some not found in nature but are historically contin­ izations and revealir rhetorical / political agenda. Armed with this re­ gent," for that discovery, says Gordon, "is extra­ be rhetorical, that i alization, one proceeds to expose the contingent ordinarily liberating" (p. 289). What it will liber­ around and attempts and therefore chailengeable basis of whatever ate are the mental energies that were before ity to build somethi presents itself as natural and inevitable. So far prevented by the "paralysis-inducing" effects of hostage to the urgenc this is precisely the procedure of deconstruction; received systems of thought from even imagining more responsive to ti but whereas deconstructive practice (at least of that "life could be different and better." In the in general. Insofar a the Yale variety) seems to produce nothing but words of Roberto Unger (another prominent logical conclusion, i1 the occasion for its endless repetition, some cul­ member of the movement), if you start with an conclusion of a rheto tural revolutionaries discern in it a more positive awareness of the insight "that no one scheme of entire array of anti-rt residue, the loosening or weakening of the struc­ human association has conclusive authority" and sions. One sees this c tures of domination and oppression that now hold come to an understanding of the "flawed" nature Habermas, a thinker · us captive. The reasoning is that by repeatedly of the schemes now in place, you can then is testimony to the dt uncovering the historical and ideological basis of "imagine the actualizations [i.e., present-day began (at least) with J established structures (both political and cogni­ arrangements of things] transformed" and in time bring about somethin tive), one becomes sensitized to the effects of "transform them in fact."4• The result will be a situation," a situation ideology and begins to clear a space in which "cultural-revolutionary practice" that will bring ceed not from the pc those effects can be combated; and as that sensi­ about the "progressive emancipation from a sires and strategies, b tivity grows more acute, the area of combat will general rationality u become larger until it encompasses the under- 40 The Politics of Law (New York, 1983), p. 287. [Au.) agreed. In such a sitt ••"The Critical Legal Studies Movement," Harvard LLzw except the claims to 1 39LiteraryTheory (Minneapolis, 1983), p. 21 I. [Au.) Review 96 (1983): 580. [Au.] sertions. "No force ex

MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC tions that confers a spu­ background plan of social division and hierar­ ment is exercised; and, ... as a result, all motives )Wers that currently be. chy" (p. 587). To the question, what is the con­ except that of the cooperative search for truth are t the radically rhetorical tent of that emancipation, given a world that is excluded."42 Of course, in the world we now in­ erridean thought can do rhetorical through and through, those who work habit there is no such purity of motive; neverthe­ becoming aware that Gordon's and Unger's side of the street usually less, says Habermas, even in the most distorted ; the first step in coun­ reply that emancipation will take the form of a of communicative situations there remains some­ toric and liberating us strengthening and enlarging of a capacity of thing of the basic impulse behind all utterance, :ply entrenched ways of mind that stands to the side of, and is therefore "the intention of communicating a true [wahr] :1dethe objects of suspi­ able to resist, the appeal of the agenda that would proposition ... so that the hearer can share the ·en to imagine that life enslave us. That capacity of mind has received knowledge of the speaker."43 If we could only ter." many names, but the one most often proposed is eliminate from our discourse performances those aken from an essay by "critical self-consciousness." Critical self-con­ intentions that reflect baser goals-the intentions 'New Developments in sciousness is the ability (stifled in some, devel­ to deceive, to manipulate, to persuade-the ideal is writing as a member oped in others) to discern in any "scheme of as­ speech situation could be approximated. lies Movement, a group sociation," including those one finds attractive What stands in our way is the fact that many > have discovered the and compelling, the partisan aims it hides from of our speech acts issue from the perspective of ·easoning and are busily view; and the claim is that as it performs this local and historically contingent contexts, and 1e supposedly disinter­ negative task, critical self-consciousness partici­ these by definition cannot contribute to the build­ [ procedures. Gordon's pates in the positive task of formulating schemes ing up of a general rationality. Therefore, it is in­ .e vocabulary of enclo­ of associations (structures of thought and govern­ cumbent upon us to choose and proffer utter­ >cked into" a system of ment) that are in the service not of a particular ances that satisfy (or at least claim and desire to we are "demobilized" party but of all mankind. satisfy) universal conditions of validity. This is )bile); we must "break It need hardly be said that this claim veers the project Habermas names "Universal Pragmat­ mfreeze the world as it back in the direction of the rationalism and uni­ ics" and the name tells its own story. Habermas e" (p. 289). What will versalism that the critical/ deconstructi ve project recognizes, as all modem and postmodern con­ 1freeze, is the discovery sets out to demystify. That project begins by re­ textualists do, that language is a social and not a ; that rule our lives are jecting the rationalities of present life as rational­ purely formal phenomenon, but he thinks that the are historically contin­ izations and revealing the structure of reality to social/pragmatic aspect of language use is itself says Gordon, "is extra- be rhetorical, that is, partial; but then it turns "accessible to formal analysis" (p. 6) and that 289). What it will liber­ around and attempts to use the insight of partial­ therefore it is possible to construct a universal ·gies that were before ity to build something that is less partial, less "communicative competence" (p. 29) parallel to sis-inducing" effects of hostage to the urgencies of a particular vision and Chomsky's linguistic competence. Sentences :ht from even imagining more responsive to the needs of men and women produced according to the rules and norms of this ·ent and better." In the in general. Insofar as this "tum" is taken to its communicative competence would be tied not to er (another prominent logical conclusion, it ends up reinventing at the "particular epistemic presuppositions and chang­ 1t), if you start with an conclusion of a rhetorically informed critique the ing contexts" (p. 29), but to the unchanging con­ "that no one scheme of entire array of anti-rhetorical gestures and exclu­ text (the context of contexts) in which one finds ,nclusive authority" and sions. One sees this clearly in the work of Ji.irgen the presuppositions underlying the general possi­ ; of the "flawed" nature Habermas, a thinker whose widespread influence bility of successful speech. "A general theory of 1 place, you can then is testimony to the durability of the tradition that speech acts would ... describe ... that funda­ ions [i.e., present-day began (at least) with Plato. Habermas's goal is to mental system of rules that adult subjects master ·ansformed" and in time bring about something he calls the "ideal speech to the extent that they can fulfill the conditions of '4' The result will be a situation," a situation in which all assertions pro­ happy employment of sentences in utterances no ractice" that will bring ceed not from the perspective of individual de­ matter to which particular language the sentences emancipation from a sires and strategies, but from the perspective of a may belong and in which accidental contexts the general rationality upon which all parties are agreed. In such a situation nothing would count York, 1983), p. 287. [Au.] 42legitimatio11Crisis (Boston, 1975), pp. rn7-8. [Au.] !s Movement," Harvard Law except the claims to universal validity of all as­ 43Co1111111111icatio11and the Evolution of Society (Boston, sertions. "No force except that of the better argu- 1979), p. 2. [Au.]

FISH I RHETORIC utterances may be embedded" (p. 26). If we can can expect too a host of voices raised in opposi­ munication and argue operate on the level of that fundamental system, tion to what will surely be called the "new posi­ the way writing is taL the distorting potential of "accidental contexts" tivism." Those voices will include some that rnidable, but it couk will be neutralized because we will always have have been mentioned here and some others that support for Scholes' one eye on what is essential, the establishing by certainly merit recording but can only be noted in epistemology has bee rational cooperation of an interpersonal (non­ a list that is itself incomplete. The full story of ford Geertz's announc accidental) truth. Once speakers are oriented to rhetoric's twentieth-century resurgence would tributor to the shift he this goal and away from others, oriented toward boast among its cast of characters: Kenneth happening to the way general understanding, they will be incapable Burke, whose "dramatism" anticipates so much think."45 of deception and manipulation: "Truthfulness of what is considered avant-garde today; Wayne But it would seen guarantees the transparency of a subjectivity Booth, whose The Rhetoric of Fiction was so im­ shaled in this essay, representing itself in language" (p. 57). A com­ portant in legitimizing the rhetorical analysis of happening to the way pany of transparent subjectivities will join to­ the novel; Mikhail Bakhtin, whose contrast of ways the same somet gether in the fashioning of a transparent truth and monologic to dialogic and heteroglossic dis­ two views of human of a world in which the will to power has been course sums up so many strands in the rhetorical one of which can eve eliminated. tradition; Roland Barthes, who in the concept of ascendancy because i1 In his book Textual Power (New Haven, "jouissance" makes a (non) constitutive principle umphanl articulation t r 985), Robert Scholes examines the rationalist of the tendency of rhetoric to resist closure and tion of the other. · epistemology in which a "complete self con­ extend play; the ethnomethodologists (Harold obliged in both The fronts a solid world, perceiving it directly and ac­ Garfinkel and company) who discover in every Rhetoric of Irony to c curately, ... capturing it perfectly in a transpar­ supposedly rule-bound context the operation of a by sharply distinguish ent language" and declares it to be so thoroughly principle (exactly the wrong word) of "ad-hoe­ two extreme-limit ca discredited that it now "is lying in ruins around ing"; Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca tor" and "unstable iro us" (pp. I 32-33). Perhaps so, in some circles, but whose The New Rhetoric: A Treatise 011 Argu­ critics deconstruct th, the fact of Habermas's work and of the audience mentation provides a sophisticated modern ciency of the text, but he commands suggests that even now those ruins source book for would-be rhetoricians weary of leging the autonomo are collecting themselves and rising again into always citing Aristotle; Barbara Herrnstein Smith ject; some feminists the familiar anti-rhetorical structure. It would who, in the course of espousing an unashamed claims of "male reaso seem that any announcement of the death of ei­ relativism, directly confronts and argues down rationality or nonrati ther position will always be premature, slightly the objections of those who fear for their souls essential; Jameson OJ behind the institutional news that in some corner (and more) in a world without objective stan­ history in order to pro of the world supposedly abandoned questions are dards; Fredric Jameson and Hayden White who and unifying one. He receiving what at least appear to be new answers. teach us (among other things) that "history ... is return of the repressed Only recently the public fortunes of rationalist­ unaccessible to us except in textual form, and whose writings and i1 foundationalist thought have taken a favorable that our approach to it and to the Real itself nec­ tum with the publication of books like Allan essarily passes through its prior textualization"; 44 45"8lurrcd Genres: The Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind and reader-oriented critics like Norman Holland, The American Scholar 49 (! E. D. Hirsch's Cultural Literacy, both of which David Bleich, Wolfgang Iser, and H. R. Jauss (Bloom's more directly) challenge the "new Or­ who, by shifting the emphasis from the text to its thodoxy" of "extreme cultural relativism" and re­ reception, open up the act of interpretation to the assert, albeit in different ways, the existence of infinite variability of contextual circumstance; in­ normative standards. In many quarters these numerable feminists who relentlessly unmark books have been welcomed as a return to the male hegemonic structures and expose as rhetori­ common sense that is necessary if civilization is cal the rational posturings of the legal and politi­ to avoid the dark night of anarchy. One can ex­ cal systems; equally innumerable theorists of pect administrators and legislators to propose re­ composition who, under the slogan "process, not forms (and perhaps even purges) based on product," insist on the rhetorical nature of com- Bloom's arguments (the rhetorical force of anti­ rhetoricalism is always being revived), and one 44 The Political U11co11scious(Ithaca, 1981), p. 35. !Au.]

MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC )ices raised in opposi­ munication and argue for far-reaching changes in other chapter in the story I have not even begun called the "new posi­ the way writing is taught. The list is already for­ to tell) were it not that the repressed-whether it ll include some that midable, but it could go on and on, providing be the fact of difference or the desire for its elim­ and some others that support for Scholes's contention that the rival ination - is always so close to the surface that it Jt can only be noted in epistemology has been vanquished and for Clif­ hardly need be unearthed. What we seem to have lete. The full story of ford Geertz's announcement (and he too is a con­ is a tale full of sound and fury, and signifying it­ ry resurgence would tributor to the shift he reports) that "Something is self, signifying a durability rooted in inconclu­ characters: Kenneth happening to the way we think about the way we siveness, in the impossibility of there being a last ·• anticipates so much think."45 word. it-garde today; Wayne But it would seem, from the evidence mar­ In an essay, however, someone must have the · of Fiction was so im- shaled in this essay, that something is always last word and I give it to Richard Rorty. Rorty is rhetorical analysis of happening to the way we think, and that it is al­ himself a champion of the antiessentialism that in, whose contrast of ways the same something, a tug-of-war between underlies rhetorical thinking; his neo-pragmatism 1d heteroglossic dis­ two views of human life and its possibilities, no makes common cause with Kuhn and others who rands in the rhetorical one of which can ever gain complete and lasting would turn us away from the search for transcen­ who in the concept of ascendancy because in the very moment of its tri­ dental absolutes and commend to us (although it 1 constitutive principle umphant articulation each turns back in the direc­ would seem superfluous to do so) the imperatives : to resist closure and tion of the other. Thus Wayne Booth feels and goals already informing our practices. It is, !thodologists (Harold obliged in both The Rhetoric of Fiction and A however, not the polemicist Rorty whom I call 1ho discover in every Rhetoric of Irony to confine the force of rhetoric upon to sum up, but the Rorty who is the brisk text the operation of a by sharply distinguishing its legitimate uses from chronicler of our epistemological condition: ng word) of "ad -hoc­ two extreme-limit cases (the "unreliable narra­ There ... are two ways of thinking about various L. Olbrechts-Tyteca ! tor" and "unstable irony"); some reader-response things .... The first ... thinks of truth as a vertical A Treatise 011 Argu­ critics deconstruct the autonomy and self-suffi­ relationship between representations and what is ophisticated modern ciency of the text, but in the process end up privi­ represented. The second ... thinks of truth hori­ rhetoricians weary of leging the autonomous and self-sufficient sub­ zontally-as the culminating reinterpretation of ·bara Herrnstein Smith ject; some feminists challenge the essentialist our predecessor's reinterpretation of their predeces­ ousing an unashamed claims of "male reason" in the name of a female sors' reinterpretation .... It is the difference be­ nts and argues down rationality or nonrationality apparently no less tween regarding truth, goodness, and beauty as 10 fear for their souls essential; Jameson opens up the narrativity of eternal objects which we try to locate and reveal, ithout objective stan­ history in order to proclaim one narrative the true and regarding them as artifacts whose fundamental design we often have to alter.46 d Hayden White who and unifying one. Here one might speak of the gs) that "history ... is return of the repressed (and thereby invoke Freud It is the difference between serious and rhetorical in textual form, and whose writings and influence would be still an- man. It is the difference that remains. to the Real itself nec­ 6 >rior textualization";44 45"B1urred Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought," • Co11seq11e11cesof Pragmatism (Minneapolis, 1982), 1 The American Sclw/c,r 49 (spring 1980). !Au.] p. 92. !Au.] • Norman Holland, s r, and H. R. Jauss s s from the text to its > i!"}terpretation to the . al circumstance; in- relentlessly unmark d expose as rhetori­ > the legal and politi- 1 erable theorists of ! slogan "process, not rical nature of com- thaca, 1981), p. 35. [Au.J

FISH I RHETORIC