Congress on Privacy & Surveillance

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Congress on Privacy & Surveillance Ecole polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne School of Computer and Communication Sciences Congress on Privacy & Surveillance September 30th, 2013 • 8:45am - 6:30pm • EPFL Rolex Learning Center Forum A one-day event triggered by recent announcements about secret Internet mass surveillance A number of prominent international speakers will discuss your right to information self- determination, the politics of privacy, how to deal with the secret cosmopolitan state within a state, and how to go forward. It is a congress of individuals to represent what is not (yet?) represented by institutions. We are looking forward to welcoming you at this unique event! It is free and open to those who have registered (registration had to be closed on Thursday Sept 19). Guest Speakers Jacob Appelbaum Nikolaus Forgó Axel Arnbak Richard Hill Bill Binney Bruce Schneier Caspar Bowden Organized and chaired by Prof. Arjen K. Lenstra From ic.epfl.ch/privacy-surveillance 1 14 October 2013 Slides Axel_Arnbak - slides Bill_Binney - slides Caspar_Bowden - slides Nikolaus_Forgo - slides Richard_Hill_- slides Richard_Hill - summaries From ic.epfl.ch/privacy-surveillance 2 14 October 2013 Speaker Biographies Editor’s note: to provide background of the speakers, the following is excerpts from the links provided in the conference program. Jacob Appelbaum From Wikipedia Jacob Appelbaum is an independent computer security researcher and hacker. He was employed by the University of Washington,[1] and is a core member of the Tor project. Appelbaum is known for representing Wikileaks at the 2010 HOPE conference.[5] He has subsequently been repeatedly targeted by US law enforcement agencies, who obtained a court order for his Twitter account data, detained him 12[6] times at the US border after trips abroad, and seized a laptop and several mobile phones. According to Karen Reilly, Development Director, the Tor Project receives funding from the U.S. Department of State. Axel M. Arnbak From the Institute for Information Law, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam Axel Arnbak is a cybersecurity and information law researcher at the Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam. He also conducts a Ph.D. project on communications security governance. In the academic year of 2013-2014, Axel will visit the U.S. on fellowships at the Berkman Center at Harvard University and CITP at Princeton University. William Binney (U.S. intelligence official) From Wikipedia William Edward Binney[2] is a former highly placed intelligence official with the United States National Security Agency (NSA)[3] turned whistleblower who resigned on October 31, 2001, after more than 30 years with the agency. He was a high-profile critic of his former employers during the George W. Bush administration, and was the subject of FBI investigations, including a raid on his home in 2007. Caspar Bowden From The Independent Caspar Bowden was Chief Privacy Adviser to Microsoft until 2011, and is now an independent advocate for privacy rights. Nikolaus Forgo From the Center for Data Protection Nikolaus Forgó, born 1968 in Vienna (Austria) studied law and philosophy in Vienna and Paris. 1997 he received a Doctor iuris for a dissertation on legal theory. From 1990-2000 he worked as From ic.epfl.ch/privacy-surveillance 3 14 October 2013 an asssistant at the law school of the University of Vienna and was inter alia responsible for the ICT-infrastructure there. In 1998 he founded a postgraduate-program (www.informationsrecht.at) on ICT-law in Vienna and has been the head of this program since then. In 2000 he became Professor of Law at the Leibniz Univerity of Hannover (www.jura.uni-hannover.de), since 2007 he has been acting as the director of the Institute for Legal Informatics there (www.iri.uni-hannover.de). Richard Hill From Hill & Associates, Geneva Switzerland Richard is the principal of Hill & Associates in Geneva, Switzerland. He has an extensive background in information systems, telecommunications, negotiation, mediation, and conflict management. Richard was the Secretary for the ITU-T Study Groups dealing with numbering and tariffing issues, network operations, and economic and policy issues; he was the Secretary for the preparatory process for the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications and headed the secretariat team dealing with substantive issues at the Conference. He has facilitated numerous complex international negotiations regarding sensitive policy matters. He was Department Head, IT Infrastructure Delivery and Support, at Orange Communications (a GSM operator), responsible for delivering and maintaining the real-time, fail-safe computing infrastructure for the company to support over 300 online agents and related applications such as billing. He previously was the IT Manager at the University of Geneva. Richard holds a Ph.D. in Statistics from Harvard University and a B.S. in Mathematics from M.I.T. Prior to his studies in the U.S.A., he obtained the Maturita' from the Liceo Scientifico A. Righi in Rome, Italy. Arjen Lenstra From Wikipedia Arjen Klaas Lenstra (born March 2, 1956, Groningen) is a Dutch mathematician. He studied mathematics at the University of Amsterdam. He is currently a professor at the EPFL (Lausanne), in the Laboratory for Cryptologic Algorithms, and previously worked for Citibank and Bell Labs. Lenstra is active in cryptography and computational number theory, especially in areas such as integer factorization. Bruce Schneier From Wikipedia Bruce Schneier s an American cryptographer, computer security and privacy specialist, and writer. He is the author of several books on general security topics, computer security and cryptography. From ic.epfl.ch/privacy-surveillance 4 14 October 2013 Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School and a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute. He is also a contributing writer for The Guardian news organization.[2] After receiving a physics bachelor's degree from the University of Rochester in 1984,[4] he went to American University in Washington, D.C. and got his master's degree in computer science in 1988.[5] He was awarded an honorary Ph.D from the University of Westminster in London, England in November 2011. From ic.epfl.ch/privacy-surveillance 5 14 October 2013 THE QUESTION LAWYERS DON ’T ASK : CAN LAW ADDRESS TOTAL TRANSNATIONAL SURVEILLANCE ? @axelarnbak 30 September 2013, Lausanne, Switzerland 1 CLOUD CONCERNS AFTER 1ST PAPER AMAZON SEP ‘12: FEARMONGERING ! 2 THIRD PAPER (MAY ’13) ‘OBSCURED BY CLOUDS ’ With Joris van Hoboken and Nico van Eijk http://ssrn.com/abstract=2276103 OUTLINE The Law & Policy of Total Surveillance National Security Incentives: Why Everything? Can Law & Policy Stop Total Surveillance? 4 OUTLINE The Law & Policy of Total Surveillance National Security Incentives: Why Everything? Can Law & Policy Stop Total Surveillance? 5 47 COECOUNTRIES : E UROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 6 HAYDEN : “US CONSTITUTION IS NOT AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY ” 7 ALSO ACCORDING TO US DEPTARTMENT OF JUSTICE • “non-U.S. persons located outside the United States […] lack Fourth Amendment rights altogether.” • “Because the Fourth Amendment does not protect such persons in the first instance, it does not prevent the Government from subjecting them to surveillance without a warrant.” • “Since its enactment in 2008, section 702 has significantly increased the Government's ability to act quickly.” • “It lets us collect information about the intentions and capabilities of […] foreign adversaries who 8 threaten the United States.” POST -PRISM: S URVEILLANCE FRAMED ‘LAWFUL & AUTHORIZED ’ 9 THE NOTORIOUS “SECTION 702” FISA AMENDMENTS ACT (FAA) 10 THE NOTORIOUS “SECTION 702” FISA AMENDMENTS ACT (FAA) • Explicitly adopted to facilitate total surveillance • “Foreign Intelligence Information” • ‘US National Security & Foreign Affairs’ • Data subjects: persons, organizations, regions • xKeyscore: All VPN connections in Switzerland • Threshold: from ‘primary’ to ‘a’ purpose • Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717: re-use in criminal proceedings • 5 year extension on 31 Dec. 2012 • No legal safeguards for non-US persons 11 EXTRA -TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION : ALL (?) S UISSE BANKS The United States [...] takes the position that it can use its own legal mechanisms to request data from any Cloud server located anywhere around the world so long as the Cloud service provider is subject U.S. jurisdiction: that is, when the entity is based in the United States, has a subsidiary or office in the United States, or otherwise conducts continuous and systematic business in the United States . Even Acknowledged in U.S. Lobby paper: Hogan Lovells 2012, p. 5. 12 US S UPREME COURT : FISA IS NOT OUR BUSINESS Clapper v. Amnesty, Feb. ’13; 5 – 4 Conservative Majority on Section 702 FISA: 1. it eliminated the requirement that the Government describe to the court each specific target and identify each facility at which its surveillance would be directed, thus permitting surveillance on a programmatic, not necessarily individualized basis . 2. it eliminated the requirement that a target be a “foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” 3. it diminished the court’s authority to insist upon, and eliminated its authority to supervise, instance- specific privacy-intrusion minimization procedures ; 13 ORWELLIAN TWIST : ‘N O PROOF OF SURVEILLANCE , N O HARM’ No Standing for Amnesty, ACLU and others in Clapper v. Amnesty. Supreme Court interprets of Section 702 FISA: ‘because para. 1881a
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