DOCSLIB.ORG

Digital Labour and the Use-Value of Human Work. on the Importance of Labouring Capacity for Understanding Digital Capitalism1

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Digital Labour and the Use-Value of Human Work. on the Importance of Labouring Capacity for Understanding Digital Capitalism1 tripleC 12(2): 599–619, 2014 http://www.triple-c.at Digital Labour and the Use-value of Human Work. On the Importance of Labouring Capacity for Understanding Digital Capitalism1 Sabine Pfeiffer University of Hohenheim and ISF Munich, Germany, www.sabine-pfeiffer.de Abstract: On the face of its virtual and immaterial appearance, digital labour often is seen as a phe- nomenon of abstract work. Contrary to that common understanding, in Marx’s theory the abstraction of labour derives from its historical development into a commodity, splitting human work as all commodi- ties into use-value and exchange-value. Thus the process of abstraction is of economical logic, and not to be explained or characterized by the virtual and immaterial quality that is typical for the means and objects of digital labour. In his early work Marx differentiates between living labouring capacity (Arbeitsvermögen) as the use-value of human work and labour power as its objectified form to be ex- changed. In the tradition of Marx’s Grundrisse Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge in Geschichte und Eigensinn pointed to the dialectical relationship between the use-value and exchange-value of labour, revealing how labour on its use-value side ‟contains and reproduces capacities and energies that ex- ceed its realisation in/as commodity”, extending the model of labour power ‟to a whole range of physi- ological, sexual, social, and national relations” (Negt and Kluge 1993a, xxxiii). While these qualitative and material as well as corporeal aspects of human work are still visible in industrial production pro- cesses, they seem to be vanished in virtual work environments. But, digital capitalism not only opens up exploitation to higher levels and new forms (e.g. Fuchs 2012; Scholz 2012), the relevance of hu- man work and its use-value for capitalism becomes more concealed to the same degree as it be- comes more significant. The article develops an analytical conception relying on Marx’s dialectical distinction between the use-value (labouring capacity) and the exchange-value (labour power), and transforming it into an operationalized model that could be and has been successfully used for empiri- cal studies of digital labour. Labouring capacity has three levels of phenomena: subjectifying corporeal working action, material means and objects of work (even in virtual environments), and the socially and physically experienceable face of globalised work organisation. This analytical concept of labour- ing capacity (Arbeitsvermögen; Pfeiffer 2004) is especially helpful to reveal the dialectics in digital work and its sources of value creation (Pfeiffer 2013). The article unfolds the theoretical foundations of the concept, and elaborates its potential to analyse digital labour. Keywords: digital work, labouring capacity, dialectic, subjectifying work action, corporeality, and materiality. Acknowledgement: The conceptual work on this paper is originated in the context of the COST Action ‘Dynam- ics of Virtual Work’ (IS1202) and was continued in the research project ‘RAKOON—Innovation by active collabo- ration in open organisations’ (Ref. no. 01FK13045); jointly funded by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) and supervised by the German Aerospace Center (DLR). Thanks to both anonymous reviewers and their critical thus supportive thoughts that helped to strengthen my argumentation and to improve this paper. 1. Introduction The debate on digital labour/digital work seems to have reached a new all-time high as it is recently discussed broadly in social sciences (cf. Scholz 2012; Fuchs and Sevignani 2013; Huws 2014). Despite minor differences in the lines of argumentation, we see a consensus 1 The term digital capitalism used heuristically here does not refer to one sphere of production, e.g. ICT, nor does it claim that all material resources or forms of labour and production are of no economical importance. For a ty- pology on definitions of digital or informational society see Fuchs (2013) or Schmiede (2006), fostering the con- clusion that we are confronted with a “unity of diversity of capitalism(s)” today. Schiller, who coined the term digital capitalism in adversary to the then popular New Economy emphasis (2000), stresses that capital stays at the “center of the political economy even as the market system was restructured to accept a profitable information– intensive orientation” (Schiller 2011). CC: Creative Commons License, 2014. 600 Sabine Pfeiffer that work and labour are analytical terms of sustaining importance. Human labour remains the actual source of value creation in the Internet economy. The vivid debate though, points to a peculiar movement: while labour at its core is becoming more important as a source of value creation, on the manifestation level it seems to be fading from view (Pfeiffer 2013, 30): “Human labour remains quantitatively and qualitatively relevant for value creation in the In- ternet economy: On the one hand, its commodification takes on expanded forms; whilst on the other, more options open up for labour input beyond employment and exchange relation- ships or to use its results as commons.” Fuchs and Sevignani (2013, 237) stress the importance of Marxian labour theory and ar- gue that the difference between labour and work still matters. For them labour is rendered as the valorisation dimension of digital work. The authors revisit the economically driven pro- cess of abstractification that Marx developed as the most important characteristic for all capi- talistic labour. Fuchs and Sevignani deserve the credit for demonstrating how vital Marx’s concept of work and labour still is: how work as an essential category is necessary labour, producing use-value in a concrete labour process; and, how many layers of abstraction are necessary to transform it into abstract labour as commodity, with a quantifiable exchange- value (2013, 248). Thus far, there seems to be no need for analysing digital work differently than Marx would have done it, and in that respect I totally agree with Fuchs and Sevignani (and many others as well): The double character of work/labour that Marx unfolded is “alive and kicking”, be capitalism digital or not. There is no need for re-inventing well serving ana- lytical categories if we want to understand the economic function and movements that are specific for capitalism; there may are new options for and means of exploitation in a digital and therefore more globally organized capitalism, but the underlying logic seems steadfast. Fuchs and Sevignani also look into digital work, which they understand, mostly as bare of material manifestations, be it body or be it objects. The digital quality in their definition comes out of a special form of organizing experiences, derived from brain, speech, and digital me- dia. Following their further line of argumentation reveals three “dialectically connected” di- mensions: cognitive work, communicative work, and co-operative work (Fuchs and Sevignani 2013, 252). The subjects of these three working dimensions are single humans or groups of humans, their objects of work are experiences, thoughts or meaning; and their instruments of work are described as brain, or brain with mouth and ears; or a brain with mouth, ears and body. Finally, the products of work in their presented table also show relations ordered in an upward manner: cognitive work transforms experiences into thoughts, communicative work produces meaning out of thoughts, and in turn these meanings can be shared in co-operative work (Fuchs and Sevignani 2013, 252). The provided heuristic on digital work helps me to clarify the dimensions I think should be analytically elaborated further, and to specify the questions in due course that have to be asked and should be answered. First of all, and again, I agree with Fuchs and Sevignani upon the feeling that work in digi- tal times needs to be re-considered, although its use-value producing quality has not changed. Besides that consensus, the fact alone that some means, objects and processes of labour and/or work are more virtualized, digitised, or informatised than a couple of years be- fore, does not convincingly justify to reinvent work as an analytical category. A pinch of un- ease creeps in here, that is best expressed by Ursula Huws, who criticised the emerging consensus “that the world as we know it is becoming quite dematerialised (or, as Marx put it, ‘all that is solid melts into air’)”, and it became “taken for granted that ‘knowledge’ is the only source of value, […] and any assertion of the physical claims of the human body in the here- and-now is hopelessly old-fashioned” (Huws 1999, 30). In that sense, I will follow Ursula Huws on her path into what she named the challenge of “re-embody cyberspace”, making “visible the material components of this virtual world” (1999, 30). In its core, this objective is tantamount to a dialectical endeavour. Hence, the second chapter challenges the too often to be seen approach of a dualism that is labelled as dialec- tic. As an example the concept of Scott Lash is critically discussed, which claims that in times of informationalisation, dualism comes to its end. This notion stands for common debates that non-analytically propose all theoretical terms of the past to be obsolete in the face of the shining brand new phenomenon of the Web. No better could the aim of the second chapter CC: Creative Commons License, 2014. tripleC 12(2): 599–619, 2014 601 be characterized than in the words of Lefebvre: “But to define ‘the new’ by sifting out every- thing that distinguishes it from the old is not as easy as the dogmatists with their lack of dia- lectic used to believe. Our era is truly an era of transition; everything about it is transitory, everything, right down to men and their lives. The informed observer will be as struck as much by similarities as by differences, as much by the unity within contradiction as by contra- diction itself.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Critique of Real Abstraction: from the Critical Theory of Society to the Critique of Political Economy and Back Again
    The Critique of Real Abstraction: from the Critical Theory of Society to the Critique of Political Economy and Back Again Chris O’Kane John Jay, CUNY [email protected] There has been a renewed engagement with the idea of real abstraction in recent years. Scholars associated with the New Reading of Marx, such as Moishe Postone, Chris Arthur, Michael Heinrich, Patrick Murray, Riccardo Bellofiore and others,1 have employed the idea in their important reconstructions of Marx’s critique of political economy. Alberto Toscano, Endnotes, Jason W. Moore and others have utilized and extended these theorizations to concieve of race, gender, and nature as real abstractions. Both the New Reading and these new theories of real abstraction have provided invaluable work; the former in systematizing Marx’s inconsistent and unfinished theory of value as a theory of the abstract social domination of capital accumulation and reproduction; the latter in supplementing such a theory. Yet their exclusive focus on real abstraction in relation to the critique of political economy means that the critical marxian theories of real abstraction -- developed by Alfred Sohn- Rethel, Theodor W. Adorno and Henri Lefebvre -- have been mostly bypassed by the latter and have largely served as the object of trenchant criticism for their insufficient grasp of Marx’s theory of value by the former. Consequently these new readings and new theories of real abstraction elide important aspects of Sohn-Rethel, Adorno and Lefebvre’s critiques of real abstraction; which sought to develop Marx’s critique of political economy into objective-subjective critical theories of the reproduction of capitalist society.2 However, two recent works by 1 Moishe Postone’s interpretation of real abstraction will be discussed below.
    [Show full text]
  • Money As 'Universal Equivalent' and Its Origins in Commodity Exchange
    MONEY AS ‘UNIVERSAL EQUIVALENT’ AND ITS ORIGIN IN COMMODITY EXCHANGE COSTAS LAPAVITSAS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF LONDON [email protected] MAY 2003 1 1.Introduction The debate between Zelizer (2000) and Fine and Lapavitsas (2000) in the pages of Economy and Society refers to the conceptualisation of money. Zelizer rejects the theorising of money by neoclassical economics (and some sociology), and claims that the concept of ‘money in general’ is invalid. Fine and Lapavitsas also criticise the neoclassical treatment of money but argue, from a Marxist perspective, that ‘money in general’ remains essential for social science. Intervening, Ingham (2001) finds both sides confused and in need of ‘untangling’. It is worth stressing that, despite appearing to be equally critical of both sides, Ingham (2001: 305) ‘strongly agrees’ with Fine and Lapavitsas on the main issue in contention, and defends the importance of a theory of ‘money in general’. However, he sharply criticises Fine and Lapavitsas for drawing on Marx’s work, which he considers incapable of supporting a theory of ‘money in general’. Complicating things further, Ingham (2001: 305) also declares himself ‘at odds with Fine and Lapavitsas’s interpretation of Marx’s conception of money’. For Ingham, in short, Fine and Lapavitsas are right to stress the importance of ‘money in general’ but wrong to rely on Marx, whom they misinterpret to boot. Responding to these charges is awkward since, on the one hand, Ingham concurs with the main thrust of Fine and Lapavitsas and, on the other, there is little to be gained from contesting what Marx ‘really said’ on the issue of money.
    [Show full text]
  • The Basic Theory of Capitalism: a Critical Review of Itoh and the Uno School
    The Basic Theory of Capitalism: A Critical Review of Itoh and the Uno School Simon Clarke Makoto Itoh: The Basic Theory of Capitalism: The Forms and Substance of the Capitalist Economy, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988. 1 The Uno Approach and the Pure Theory of Cap- italism Makoto Itoh's work is well-known to readers of Capital and Class through his long-standing involvement in the CSE. He has now brought together his contributions to the debates on the theory of value and the theory of crisis within a systematic exposition of Marxist theory which brings out clearly the roots of his perspective in the work of Uno. The Uno School is one of the major schools of post-war Japanese Marxism, which came to prominence in the 1960s.1 The Uno approach is marked by a radical neo-Kantian separation of theory from politics, and a fierce opposition to logical-historical interpretations of Capital in favour of a sharp distinction between theoretical and historical analysis. Itoh's book is important in making the Uno approach more accessible to an English speaking readership by relating its perspective directly to the recent English language debates. Although Itoh revises and develops the Uno approach, particularly in his concern to give the theory a greater political and historical relevance, he retains the essential methodological and theoretical foundations of the Uno approach. While Itoh's contribution is of considerable interest in its own right, in this article I intend to focus on these foundations as the basis of a critique of Itoh's book. The methodological foundations of the Uno school lie in the radical sepa- ration of three levels of analysis.
    [Show full text]
  • Keynes and Marx by Claudio Sardoni University of Rome “La Sapienza”
    Keynes and Marx by Claudio Sardoni University of Rome “La Sapienza” I. Introduction Soon after the publication of The General Theory, Keynes manifested his dissatisfaction with the ‘final product’ of the intellectual process which had started in 1931-32 and he stated an intention to re-cast his ideas in a clearer and more satisfactory way. Joan Robinson thought that starting from Marx, rather than orthodox economics, would have saved Keynes ‘a lot of trouble’ (1964: 96). The object of this chapter is to inquire into the possibility that Keynes could have re-written The General Theory by giving Marx more attention and more credit than he did in the 1936 edition of the book. The interest in this issue does not derive, however, from any evidence that Keynes changed his opinion of Marx after 1936: it remained highly critical. Such interest rather derives from the fact that, in the quest for a clearer formulation of his fundamental ideas, Keynes, in my opinion, could have chosen to go, at least partly, ‘back’ to the approach that he had followed earlier on in the process which led to the publication of The General Theory. In fact, at a relatively early stage (1933) of this process, Keynes’s analysis of a capitalist economy and his critique of the orthodox view had come close to Marx’s approach. Keynes soon abandoned his 1933 approach and, in The General Theory, he formulated the critique of orthodox economics in a different way from Marx. In the chapter, I argue that the reason for the change may be found in the fact that the economic theory criticised by Keynes was significantly different from the Ricardian theory to which Marx referred.
    [Show full text]
  • What's Value Got to Do with the Critique of Political Economy? the Multiple Meanings of Value Theory in Marx
    WHAT’S VALUE GOT TO DO WITH THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY? THE MULTIPLE MEANINGS OF VALUE THEORY IN MARX. Riccardo Bellofiore (University of Bergamo) Marx l Uniqueness of Marx: value theory within monetary analysis l Capital as an Automatic Fetish & Subject l Capital as a [social] relation [of production] l Theory of exploitation l within a universalised commodity exchange economy l which is an essentialy monetary economy l Internal tendency to development & crisis l How to read Marx: reading + interpretation + reconstruction l The challenge: being a Marxian (not a Marxist) means do what Marx did: what is political economy after Marx? what have been fundamental changes in capitalism l constant doubt & revision (& procrastination?) CRITIQUE of Political Economy l Critique versus Criticism l Pointing out errors in Political Economy l Learning from its scientific results l Developing science until the point it can be criticised (Critical P.E.) l Putting that science in question (Critique of P.E.) l What are the conditions of possibility of Political Economy? l This conditions are historical, but a capitalism is a system positing its own presuppositions. l The critique of the science provide a critique of capitalist social relation l Uniqueness of Marx: value theory within monetary analysis Multiple meanings of value theory • What IS Value theory • Labour Theory of Value = Value Theory of Labour • 1) Monetary [Labour] Theory of Value • 2) Theory of [Capitalist] Exploitation • 3) Macro-Monetary Theory of Capitalist Production • 4) Theory of [individual, relative] Prices • 5) ‘Out-of-equilibrium’ Theory • 6) Theory of Crisis(Crises • Each one of this multiple meanings has been misinterpreted ToV as Monetary Theory of Value • Separation of commodity producers.
    [Show full text]
  • LABOUR POWER and the STATE Aboot. Aumeeruddy Bruno Lautier and Ramon G. Tortajada
    LABOUR POWER AND THE STATE AbooT. Aumeeruddy Bruno Lautier and Ramon G . Tortajada The Marxist theory of the state has developed in three main directions : the study of the relation between the bourgeoisie and the state ; the study of the functioning of the state ; and the study of its role in the valorisation of capital . However, it seems to us that the essential question is that of the foundation of the state under capitalism . This foundation must be sought in the wage-relation, whose reproduction is never given a priori. Hence the necessity for a study of the relation between the state and labour-power . INTRODUCTION The debate on the nature and function of the state under capitalism takes two forms . The first type of debate is concerned mainly with the 'intervention' of the state in the field of the production and circulation of commodities. More precisely, it is a debate about the way in which, once the social conditions for the production of value have been achieved, the state intervenes in the way this value is divided up. This activity affects the division between wages and profits as much as the division of profit be- tween fractions of capital . This activity implies, among other things, the regulation of money . The second type of debate is about the very nature of the state, and about the links it maintains with the class structure of society ; in particular, it is concerned with whether or not the state establishes the central social relation of capitalism, the wage-relation . We do not deny the importance of the first type of debate .
    [Show full text]
  • Marx's Theory of Value and Money
    MARX’S THEORY OF VALUE AND MONEY: A CRITIQUE OF REUTEN’S ‘VALUE-FORM’ INTERPRETATION OF PART 1 OF VOLUME 1 OF CAPITAL by Fred Moseley [email protected] How then is the magnitude of value to be measured? By means of the ‘value-forming substance’, the labour, contained in the article. The quantity is measured by its duration, and the labour-time itself is measured on the particular scale of hours, days, etc. (C.I. 129). Socially necessary labour-time is the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the conditions of production normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity of labour prevalent in that society. (C.I. 129) A given quantity of any commodity contains a definite quantity of human labour. Therefore the form of value must not only express value in general, but also quantitatively determined value; i.e. the magnitude of value… The equation 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 years of linen are worth 1 coat, presupposes the presence in 1 coat of exactly as much of the substance of value as there is in 20 yards of linen, implies therefore that the quantities in which the two commodities are present have cost the same amount of labour or the same quantity of labour-time. (C.I. 144) It is not money that renders commodities commensurable. Quite the contrary. Because all commodities, as values, are objectified human labour and therefore themselves commensurable, their values can be communally measured in one and the same commodity.
    [Show full text]
  • Futures of the Lumpenproletariat
    Lumpen: Vagrancies of a Concept from Marx to Fanon (and on) by Bennett Dempsey Carpenter Program in Literature Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Roberto Dainotto, Supervisor ___________________________ Wahneema Lubiano ___________________________ Anne Garréta ___________________________ Nancy Armstrong Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate Program in Literature in the Graduate School of Duke University 2019 i v ABSTRACT Lumpen: Vagrancies of a Concept from Marx to Fanon (and on) by Bennett Dempsey Carpenter Graduate Program in Literature Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Roberto Dainotto, Supervisor ___________________________ Wahneema Lubiano ___________________________ Anne Garréta ___________________________ Nancy Armstrong An abstract of a thesis/dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate Program in Literature in the Graduate School of Duke University 2019 Copyright by Bennett Dempsey Carpenter 2019 Abstract This dissertation, Lumpen: Vagrancies of a Concept from Marx to Fanon (and on), tracks the concept of the lumpenproletariat from its coinage by Karl Marx through its reworking by Franz Fanon, the Black Panthers and others in the context of the colonial liberation and Black Power movements, and onwards into contemporary debates about populism, identity, politics, and the end
    [Show full text]
  • A Critique of Benetti's Critique of Marx's
    A CRITIQUE OF BENETTI’S CRITIQUE OF MARX’S DERIVATION OF THE NECESSITY OF MONEY by Fred Moseley Mount Holyoke College (Massachusetts, USA) Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana - Iztapalapa (Mexico) Carlo Benetti’s critique of Marx’s derivation of the necessity of money (Benetti 1990, pp. 163-69) is well known in Mexico and widely accepted (e.g. Hernandez) (although not universally accepted; e.g. Robles).1 Very succinctly put, Benetti’s critique is that Marx’s derivation of the general form of value by “inverting” the expanded form of value is logically flawed; more precisely, that the “inversion” of the expanded form of value does not yield the general form of value, but instead yields the same expanded form of value. This note argues that Benetti’s critique is itself logically flawed for two main reasons: Benetti misinterprets Marx’s concept of the expanded form of value and Benetti misinterprets the logic of Marx’s derivation of the general form of value. I conclude that Marx’s derivation of the necessity of money as the general form of appearance of the value of commodities is logically sound and that Marx’s theory is in fact the only economic theory that is able to derive the necessity of money from its fundamental value theory. I regard this to be a very significant relative strength of Marx’s theory. I will first briefly review Benetti’s critique and will then present my critique of Benetti’s critique. 1 BENETTI’S CRITIQUE For an economy with n commodities, Benetti defines the “expanded form of value” as the complete set of n expressions of the value of all n commodities - each in terms of all other (n -1) commodities as particular equivalents.
    [Show full text]
  • A Critical Marxist Approach to Capital Theory
    Munich Personal RePEc Archive A Critical Marxist Approach to Capital Theory Cavalieri, Duccio University of Florence 9 October 2013 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50527/ MPRA Paper No. 50527, posted 10 Oct 2013 05:00 UTC Duccio Cavalieri (University of Florence) A Critical-Marxist Approach to Capital Theory 1. Beyond Marx’s treatment of capital theory. The present paper aims at providing a logically consistent reformulation of Marx’s theories of value and capital. The author’s purpose is to draw the main lines of a critical-Marxist reconstructive approach to Marx’s theory of capital. By critical-Marxist we mean an approach internal to the cultural tradition of Western Marxism which takes Marx’s system as main reference point, but does not regard it as something that should be accepted or rejected in toto. Critical Marxists do not interpret Marx’s intellectual heritage dogmatically. They do not consider Marxism a science, but a method of social research, and do not hesitate to call Marx’s views in question and to contrast them on specific points, when this is needed. The line of demarcation between ‘critical’ social theory and ‘scientific’ or fundamentalist Marxism is not easy to trace. ‘Orthodox’ Marxists consider Marxism a science, the science of the laws of motion of society. They practice economic reductionism and determinism and underline the methodological relevance of dialectical materialism.1 A possible line of separation between orthodox and critical Marxism could be identified in their respective acceptance and refusal to stress the importance of the available quantities of physical inputs in production and to downgrade the relevance of money.
    [Show full text]
  • Use-Value, Exchange-Value, and the Demise of Marx's
    USE-VALUE, EXCHANGE-VALUE, AND THE DEMISE OF MARX’S LABOR THEORY OF VALUE¶© BY STEVE KEEN§ Introduction Marx was the greatest champion of the labor theory of value. The logical problems with this theory have, however, split scholars of Marx into two factions: those who regard it as an indivisible component of Marxism, and those who wish to continue the spirit of analysis begun by Marx without the labor theory of value. In the debate between these two camps, the former has attempted to draw support from Marx’s concepts of value, while the latter has ignored them, taking instead as their starting point the truism that production generates a surplus. However a careful examination of the development of Marx’s logic points out a profound irony: that after a chance re-reading of Hegel, Marx made a crucial advance which should have led him to replace the labor theory of value with a theory that commodities in general are the source of surplus. Marx’s value analysis is thus consistent, not with those who would defend the labor theory of value, but with those who would transcend it. However Marx did not properly apply this analysis to non-labor inputs, while the cornerstone of Capital was the correct application of the same analysis to labor. This unjustified asymmetrical treatment of the labor and non-labor inputs to production is therefore the true and unsound foundation of Marx’s labor theory of value, and with it corrected, the labor theory of value collapses. Early Marx The Labor Theory of Value Marx did not spring immediately to the labor theory of value.
    [Show full text]
  • The Spontaneous Generation of Excess and Its Capitalist Capture" (2009)
    Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School 2009 The ps ontaneous generation of excess and its capitalist capture Ryanson Alessandro Ku Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons Recommended Citation Ku, Ryanson Alessandro, "The spontaneous generation of excess and its capitalist capture" (2009). LSU Master's Theses. 2471. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/2471 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE SPONTANEOUS GENERATION OF EXCESS AND ITS CAPITALIST CAPTURE A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in The Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies by Ryanson Alessandro Ku B.S., The George Washington University, 2004 M.A., Louisiana State University, 2008 May 2009 To uncompromising radical thinkers everywhere, like Marx and Deleuze The answer may have emerged in the Manifesto . ii Acknowledgements I would like to thank my dear advisors: Greg Stone, who gave me the opportunity to do graduate work, introduced me to theory, and insists on Marx (making him persist); John Protevi, who introduced me to Deleuze and demands a rigorous and complex thinker; and especially Greg Schufreider, the chair of the committee, who with patience, openness, and generosity guided me all the way, going so far as to let me present parts of this thesis in his course in nineteenth- century philosophy.
    [Show full text]