The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth

For the exclusive use of A. Awad, 2017.

9-512-009 REV: APRIL 3, 2012

E L I E O F E K

LAUREN BARLEY The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth

We make everyday life better, every day. — The Clorox Company Mission Statement from its 2007 Centennial Strategy1

In late January 2011, Beth Springer headed into the executive committee strategy meeting at The Clorox Company (Clorox) in Oakland, California. Clorox manufactured and marketed premium, branded consumer products primarily in the U.S. through grocery stores and mass merchandisers. Springer, executive vice president international and natural personal care, and the other executive committee members would discuss Clorox’s annual and long-range plans. (See Exhibit 1 for executive committee members.) She knew tensions could run high as they debated whether to recommit to the existing strategy and tactics, offshoots of Clorox’s 2007 Centennial Strategy.

Shortly after the arrival of Clorox chairman and CEO Don Knauss in 2006, the company crafted a strategic plan honoring the company’s 100th anniversary in 2013. The Centennial Strategy, as it was called, provided a roadmap for long-term, accelerated growth and defined the metrics to evaluate success. A key aspect was the company’s increased emphasis on major, global consumer trends (“megatrends”). Over the next few years, Clorox focused on two of the megatrends—health and wellness, and environmental sustainability—which led to products and go-to-market strategies that addressed consumers’ growing interest in what Clorox broadly termed “sustainability.” This, in turn, drove the successful repositioning of Brita (a water filtration system), the acquisition of Burt’s Bees (a natural personal care line), and the launch of Green Works (a natural cleaning product line).

In August 2010, Clorox reported fiscal year 2010 sales of $5.5 billion and progress against its Centennial Strategy annual targets that mostly met or exceeded expectations despite the challenging business environment. (See Exhibits 2 and 3 for five-year financial summary and progress on the Centennial Strategy annual targets, respectively.) However, the financial outlook for 2011 was less favorable, and Clorox projected flat sales for its fiscal year ending June 30, 2011. Sales of Clorox’s brands—most with leading market shares—were soft amidst the prolonged economic downturn.

As Springer settled into her chair, she wondered if Clorox should continue its strategy of investing heavily in sustainability. Although Brita, Burt’s Bees, and Green Works comprised only about 10% of Clorox revenues, they accounted for much of the company’s sales growth over the past several years. But the growth rates of Burt’s Bees and Green Works, in particular, had slowed considerably in the past year. Possible explanations included the weak economy and that the trends fueling their growth ______

Professor Elie Ofek and Research Associate Lauren Barley prepared this case. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.

Copyright © 2011, 2012 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545- 7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www.hbsp.harvard.edu/educators. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School.

This document is authorized for use only by Ayah Awad in 563: Sustainability & CSR taught by MJ Kay, Montclair State University from June 2017 to December 2017. For the exclusive use of A. Awad, 2017.

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were simply fads that had run their course. It was also possible that the brands’ marketing mix was suboptimal and needed to be refined.

Springer knew the company had to allocate resources over its entire brand portfolio, not just the three “sustainable” brands. Over the past year, Clorox had increased its consumer and trade spending to shore up sales of its primary brands, such as Clorox Bleach, Pine-Sol, and Formula 409, which were in mature categories. Most market shares in these categories were up, but it was unclear how long Clorox should continue its defensive spending and at what level. Growth rates in the sustainable brands had also picked up somewhat recently, and Springer wondered if Clorox should invest heavily in these brands going forward. If so, where would this funding come from? Springer was eager to participate in the upcoming discussion as the executive committee debated how best to position Clorox to achieve its centennial targets as the 100th anniversary grew ever nearer.

Company Background

Clorox was founded in 1913 as the Electro-Alkaline Co. It was reincorporated in 1922 as the Clorox Chemical Corp. and was acquired by Procter & Gamble Co. (P&G) in 1957. By 1969, P&G divested Clorox, and in the intervening years until 2011, Clorox grew to be a mid-size company in the household and personal care industry through acquisitions and strong capabilities in research and development (R&D), and marketing. Its portfolio of leading brands included its namesake Clorox Bleach; household cleaning products such as Pine-Sol, Formula 409, Soft Scrub, Tilex, and Green Works; Glad wraps, bags, and containers; Brita water filtrations systems; Kingsford charcoal; Hidden Valley and KC Masterpiece dressings and sauces; and Burt’s Bees natural personal care products. (See Exhibit 4 for brand portfolio.) Clorox’s competitors included industry behemoths P&G and Unilever with $78.9 billion and $58.7 billion in FY10 revenues, respectively.

Don Knauss and the Centennial Strategy

Knauss joined Clorox in September 2006 after a 12-year career with Coca-Cola, Co., most recently as its president of Coca-Cola North America. By May 2007, the company defined the Centennial Strategy, which focused on achieving double-digit annual growth in economic profit through its milestone anniversary in 2013.2 Under the strategy, Clorox would continue building the number one or number two share brands in mid-sized categories. It would also push for accelerated sales growth using various means, including: 1) extending existing brands to adjacent categories; 2) entering new sales channels with its existing brands; and 3) increasing penetration in countries where Clorox already did business.3 Driving “demand creation” and building “consumer loyalty” would fuel this “organic” growth. Clorox articulated a “3Ds” framework to achieve this: desire (pre-purchase communications to educate consumers how and why the Clorox brands met their needs); decide (in- store and at-the-shelf strategies to ensure consumers chose Clorox brands where most purchase decisions were made); and delight (continual innovation to secure customers’ loyalty and repeat purchases).4 In addition, Clorox would be more deliberate in identifying and acting upon existing, latent, and emerging consumer trends that could be important growth drivers for its business.

Clorox identified four global consumer trends that could be incorporated into its product lines and go-to-market strategies: health and wellness, sustainability, convenience (changed to “affordability” in 2009), and a multicultural marketplace. Springer summarized:

These global trends were not new. They were in the media; consultants like McKinsey were incorporating them into their presentations. As we renewed our corporate strategy to grow faster, we decided to be more externally focused and use these trends to anticipate changes

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that were relevant to our consumers. Before, we tended to be more narrowly focused on filling gaps within our existing portfolio, and we thought our existing portfolio was sufficient.

Riding the Tailwinds of Sustainability

In late 2007, Springer’s group at the time—the strategy and growth office—fielded research with The Cambridge Group to understand the size and nature of the “sustainability” opportunity for Clorox. Springer explained, “We did the Cambridge research to get at emerging and latent demand around sustainability. Would more and more consumers change their habits and buy different products around sustainability? Our conclusion was yes.”

According to the Cambridge research, consumers seeking sustainable product solutions were no longer a small niche; 15% of the population exhibited very strong demand for these products and another 33% had strong demand. Clorox’s syndicated research confirmed the Cambridge findings. One study found 15% to 30% of the population was comprised of consumers Clorox called “deep greens”—those who were interested in sustainability and acted on their interest. Another study, an online consumer survey of claimed purchased behavior, found that over one-third of consumers claimed to regularly buy green products in December 2007 versus only 12% in August 2006.

The Cambridge research segmented consumers into six groups and ranked the most compelling benefits for each segment. Clorox chose the “emerging eco guardians” segment as its primary target for the company’s sustainability efforts with the “eco committed” and “personal purists” as its secondary targets. (See Exhibits 5a and 5b.) Historical research was used to help predict potential events that could propel or disrupt consumer demand for sustainable products. (See Exhibit 6.)

The research conducted also gave Clorox insight into what drove consumers’ interest and involvement in sustainability. Springer elaborated:

Another important piece of learning was that sustainability was not always about saving the world for our consumer—usually a female head of household. Health and wellness, and environmental issues were often about her and her world—rather than the world. It was about making her world better, and in doing so, she was doing a good thing for the world. These were driven by desires and concerns for the well-being of herself and her family.

Out of this insight, we defined the market as the full spectrum encompassing “my environment” and “the environment,” depending on the consumer’s level of involvement and control. They also weren’t mutually exclusive; there were consumers who cared about both in varying degrees. In general, we were targeting consumers who expressed concerns about the products that were “in me, on me, and around me.” (See Exhibit 7.)

The research also looked at what drove first and repeat purchases of sustainable products for the home and family. Among other things it found that consumers who bought environmentally friendly products often relied on the channel to filter claims, with specialty retailers, such as Trader Joe’s and Whole Foods Market, considered reliable authorities. Over the next couple of years, Clorox made a series of moves to grow by capitalizing on sustainability.

The Repositioning of Brita-“In Me”

In 1988, Clorox acquired the rights to market Brita in the U.S. from a small German company, Brita GmBH. Brita was a pour-through water filtration system with a two-compartment pitcher and a replaceable filter. Brita did not have the Clorox name or logo on its packaging and was marketed as

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a standalone brand. Under Clorox management, Brita’s positioning and advertising focused on the taste benefit of tap water filtered by Brita. By 2002, Brita grew to a 70% share of the high margin category of pitcher filtration systems. But, over the next five years, the category declined and Brita sales sagged.5 Shortly after Knauss’ arrival at Clorox, he gave slow growth businesses such as Brita a year or two to improve sales.

As the company sought to revitalize Brita, there was a realization that water filtered by Brita could replace the water in millions of plastic bottles Americans threw away each year. Al Gore’s 2006 film “An Inconvenient Truth” had increased consumers’ sensitivity about bottled water’s environmental impact, and backlash against bottled water grew.6 It took some convincing before the Brita brand group agreed to position Brita as the sustainable alternative to bottled water. Springer recalled:

Initially, sustainability was seen a bit as left-wing political correctness. The Cambridge Group research helped convince some of the skeptics that “sustainable” brands represented significant profitable growth upside. We also were fortunate to have a CEO who came from Coca Cola and had lived through difficult issues on sustainability around health, water use, and bottle waste. He came to Clorox knowing about the megatrend and that at a minimum you needed a defensive stance if not an offensive one.

In August 2007, Brita partnered with Nalgene, a manufacturer of reusable beverage containers, to launch the FilterForGood public relations (PR) campaign. The campaign prompted consumers to use Nalgene’s reusable bottles and Brita-filtered water by invoking three primary messages: 1) the energy used to make disposable water bottles in the U.S. could power 190,000 homes a year; 2) the water from one Brita filter could replace as many as 300 16.9-ounce plastic bottles, giving users great taste without the waste; and 3) drinking Brita-filtered water cost a user only $0.19 a day for annual savings of $1,748 (based on 240 gallons per year at an average price of $1 per bottle).7 The campaign was so successful that Brita incorporated the messaging into its advertising.8 (See ad in Exhibit 8.)

Initially, Brita’s growth rate increased substantially, but slowed a bit through the recession. By FY10, Brita had $250 million in revenues (up from $170 million in 2007), and was still highly profitable and one of Clorox’s fastest growing brands.

The Burt’s Bees Acquisition-“On Me”

In November 2007 Clorox acquired Burt’s Bees, a leading premium brand in the growing U.S. $6.4 billion high margin natural personal care (NPC) segment, for slightly under $1 billion.9 At the time of the acquisition, the NPC segment was small compared to the overall U.S. personal care market ($62 billion), but was one of the fastest growing subcategories with a projected annual growth rate of almost 8% through 2010. The NPC subcategory was fragmented with the top 10 brands accounting for 54% of the total U.S. NPC market size. (See Exhibit 9 for the shares of leading brands.) Health and natural food stores were responsible for 40% of NPC market sales, followed by specialty stores (27%), direct sales (9%), drug stores (6%), and mass merchandisers (6%).

Burt’s Bees was founded in the 1980s by Burt Shavitz, a beekeeper from Maine, and Roxanne Quimby, a graphic designer he met in 1984. The company grew rapidly mostly by word of mouth after the 1991 launch of its signature lip balm, made from bees wax and almond oil. Later, the pair had a falling out, and Quimby acquired Shavitz’s share of Burt’s Bees in 1999. Over the next few years, Quimby expanded distribution, launched an eCommerce website, and introduced new lines including a toothpaste and a shampoo as well as the Baby Bee product line. Quimby put the company up for sale in 2003, when it sold to AEA Investors, a New York private equity firm. AEA paid Quimby $141.6 million for an 80% stake and hired John Replogle from Unilever as CEO in 2005.

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Based on the founders’ ideals, The Burt’s Bees team built the business around an idea called “The Greater Good” that argued if companies were socially responsible, profit would follow.10 (See Exhibit 10.) The team grew distribution beyond health food stores and grocers to major retailers such as CVS and Walgreens drugstores, and Target.11 By 2007, Burt’s Bees was in 15,000 retail outlets. Burt’s Bees products were often set up in a dedicated area with unique merchandising that the company referred to as “hives.” In the more health and natural oriented food chains, such as Whole Foods, Burt’s Bees was able to train retailer employees on selling its products. By 2007, Burt’s Bees revenues had grown to $164 million (90% in the U.S.), up from $23 million in 2000.12

When Clorox acquired Burt’s Bees, Knauss commented, “The Burt’s Bees brand is well-anchored in sustainability and health and wellness, and we believe it will benefit from natural and green tailwinds.”13 Furthermore, Knauss said the acquisition signaled that Clorox was entering into a strategic phase that would allow the company to expand into a natural product business platform.14 The acquisition seemed a perfect fit with the Centennial Strategy. Springer explained:

We wanted a business that could be big in the U.S. market, but also had some international potential. Based on our centennial criteria and looking through the vector of sustainability, we screened many categories for internal growth and acquisition. We decided to look hard at health and personal care because they had been important growth drivers for most of the big household companies over the past decade. Burt’s Bees came on the market, and it had much of what we were looking for in a small company that needed big company capabilities.

Some loyal Burt’s Bees customers were less enthusiastic about the acquisition and accused the company of “selling out.” Springer summarized, “We reassured them that Clorox would not change Burt’s products for the worse and that we intended to learn from Burt’s how to make the entire corporation greener. We’ve delivered on both.”

Under Clorox ownership, Burt’s Bees remained somewhat independent and was marketed as a stand alone brand with no reference to the Clorox name or logo on its packaging. In February 2008, Burt’s Bees launched a “Natural Vs” campaign to educate consumers and address confusion about what comprised a “natural” product in the health and personal care categories. (See Exhibit 11 for an ad.) Burt’s Bees also added a “natural bar” on each of its product’s labels to show the percentage of natural ingredients.15 Jim Geikie, vice president global marketing, Burt’s Bees, explained: “A significant portion of the population is focused on their health and that of their families. With the use of nicotine and birth control patches, there is a raised consciousness that what is applied to the skin could be absorbed into the body. In fact, 60% of what is applied gets absorbed.”He added:

We have a five-segment consumer market. The far left is what we call the “committed naturalists,” and they make up 1% to 2% of the female population. They are highly educated, read the back labels, and research products. The next group over we call the “health and beauty sleuths.” They are less environmentally focused, and more wellness focused. They are on the lookout for harmful chemicals, which they avoid, and tend to be about 6% to 8% of the population. We focus our marketing efforts on these two segments today. As we expanded our distribution into more mainstream retailers like CVS and Target, we knew we had to expand our target beyond the committed naturalists.

In September 2008, Burt’s Bees released its first corporate social responsibility (CSR) report. The company articulated ambitious, quantitative goals to measure progress on its “Greater Good” business model.16 The goals for 2020 included: being a zero-waste, zero-carbon company; operating on renewable energy in LEED certified buildings; and 100% employee engagement in sustainability activities.17 Incentives were put in place to encourage top down and bottom up participation.18

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Under Clorox, Burt’s Bees followed the Centennial Strategy playbook closely. The brand was extended to adjacent categories, including the launch of Burt’s Bees natural acne solutions. Burt’s Bees also gained distribution at Wal-Mart. In 2009, it began expanding overseas under the Burt’s Bees name, entering new markets in Asia (Japan, Korea, Thailand), then Europe (France, Italy, Germany, and Scandinavia), and lastly Latin America in late 2010 (Chile, Colombia, Panama and Puerto Rico).19 Burt’s Bees also had a loyal Facebook following. Geikie stated, “We were rated the number two Facebook page by one rating agency. Facebook is a great way to engage our users with new product concepts or to distribute samples prior to launch.” In June 2010, Burt’s Bees was named the leading green brand by the ImagePower Green Brands Survey.20

But by 2010 Burt’s Bees growth rate had slowed considerably, and it accounted for 4% of Clorox FY10 revenues. Springer stated:

Burt’s Bees was up 25% the year before the recession, but then growth slowed to single digits the year the recession hit. Price was a factor. Burt’s Bees is a premium personal care brand. We also sell a good portion of the business in gift and trial packs that are priced between $9 and $20, which were way off in the recession. We sell a lot through the U.S. drug retailers whose business was also down.

Geikie added, “In the recession, we weren’t losing customers, but we weren’t gaining new consumers as much as we had been over the past couple of years.”

The Green Works Launch-“Around Me”

Quickly after the Burt’s Bees acquisition, Clorox added a second brand to its natural product business platform by launching Green Works in January 2008. It was the first brand that Clorox had developed internally in over 20 years. Springer recalled:

Research over the years showed that some consumers wanted clean and healthy homes, but had some aversion to traditional cleaning ingredients or “chemicals” as they tended to call them. We determined that a lot of the competing “natural” or “sustainable” cleaners suffered from a number of challenges, including the perception that they didn’t work; they weren’t very natural; they were very expensive; and they weren’t widely available. We had tremendous knowledge of surface chemistry at Clorox that could help us make a natural product that worked effectively and was not too expensive. We also had broad customer relationships and distribution. We had the ability to bring green cleaning into the mainstream.

A Clorox study found that 43.8% of consumers said they wanted to use more natural household cleaning products, but the products needed to get the job done.21 Clorox research also found that 53% of consumers planned to buy more eco-friendly products over the next year, and 47% were willing to pay up to a 25% premium for them.22 Seventh Generation and Method were the leading brands in the natural cleaning category with 2007 retail sales of $100 and $46 million, respectively.

At the time of the launch, natural products represented less than one percent of total cleaning category sales and were typically priced almost twice that of traditional cleaning products.23 There was no government standard that products had to meet to call themselves “natural,” and some companies used green-looking labels on traditional cleaners to make them look natural. Research showed that many consumers were confused by environmental labeling, and some claims were unclear and potentially misleading. Nick Vlahos, vice president and general manager, Burt’s Bees and former leader of Clorox’s Laundry, Brita, and Green Works businesses, elaborated:

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The insight was that consumers were disenchanted with those $5.99 natural cleaners because they didn’t work. Although there was a lot of debate, we decided to put the Clorox name and logo on the Green Works packaging because “Clorox” means power and efficacy to the consumer. That comes from our bleach heritage. Some thought that adding the “Clorox” name would make Green Works seem less “natural” because some consumers equate “Clorox” with chemicals. We thought the trade-off was worth it, because the Green Works target is not the green purist. We are targeting the consumer who buys Formula 409 but is a bit chemically concerned and might try Green Works for a reasonable premium. She is not willing to sacrifice on efficacy, price, availability, or brand, but is willing to make small steps to live greener.

At launch, the Green Works line included an all-purpose cleaner, a glass and surface cleaner, a toilet bowl cleaner, a dilutable cleaner, and a bathroom cleaner. All Green Works products were at least 95% natural, and made with cleaning ingredients derived from coconut and lemon oil. The products were biodegradable, packaged in recyclable bottles, and their formulas were not tested on animals. Clorox asked retailers to shelve Green Works next to the traditional home cleaning products so that shoppers were more likely to make the switch to Green Works. Retailers would benefit if consumers traded up because they would earn a larger penny profit on the sale. Clorox hoped that Green Works would grow into a $200 million brand at retail over time.

Clorox supported the launch with $30 million in traditional advertising, mainly TV and print (see Exhibit 12 for an example), and got retailers, particularly Target and Wal-Mart, on board early with $20 million in trade spending. Chris Hyder, director of marketing, said, “It was a nice launch—a big effort. The company got a lot of great coverage on Wall Street, and the retailers were really excited. Retail sales in its first year topped $100 million. There was the feeling that it was the next big thing.”

Clorox also partnered with the Sierra Club, an influential U.S. environmental organization, which agreed to promote Green Works by allowing the Sierra Club name and logo to be on the packaging in exchange for an undisclosed cut of the sales. Knauss said at the time, “Our partnership with the Sierra Club is significant for Green Works but also for The Clorox Company as we continue the focus on our sustainability efforts. Industry plays an important role in environmental conservation.”24

The arrangement was the first of its kind in the Sierra Club’s 116-year history, but it was not without controversy. Several state Sierra Club chapters expressed disapproval with its parent organization.25 Some also questioned Clorox’s commitment. One activist stated, “We’d like to see them [Clorox] incorporate these practices into all their products. Why sell one set of products that have hazardous ingredients and others that don’t?”26

At the one-year anniversary of the Green Works launch, Clorox announced the natural cleaning category had grown more than 100%. Green Works was the number one natural cleaning brand in the U.S. with a 42% share, ahead of the more established players.27 In 2009, Clorox also began listing the ingredients in its conventional cleaning, laundry and disinfecting products sold in the U.S. and Canada.28 Knauss stated at the time, “More than ever, consumers want to know what’s in the products they use in and around their homes.”29

By early 2010, Green Works added more products to its line: a liquid laundry detergent, a laundry stain-remover, natural biodegradable cleaning wipes, a glass cleaner, and a dishwashing liquid. Despite its broad product line, by 2010 Green Works accounted for less than 2% of Clorox revenues. Its growth rate had slowed considerably; and it had yet to reach profitability. Springer explained: “We got a lot of trial through heavy discounting and by a heavy push at Wal-Mart. Some of these triers were never destined to be repeaters. There are a lot of people who want the power of traditional cleaners. There are also a lot of people where it’s all about price. That group has gotten

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bigger over the last two years with the recession. I think Green Works got a little ahead of itself and tried to convert everyone to green.”

Hyder added his perspective:

Many of the green brands have struggled in the last couple of years as economic conditions deteriorated. They usually cost more to produce and are higher priced. In the case of Green Works, some consumers have traded down to less expensive solutions: traditional cleaners or vinegar and water. Others are less willing to try a new green cleaner that costs more.

In hindsight, we probably invested too much and were a bit too far ahead of the trend. While we drove Green Works to $100 million in retail sales, we lost a lot of money in the process. The good news is that we are the number one natural brand in almost every segment except where another brand had an enormous head start like Seventh Generation in laundry detergent. We believe we will benefit from any future category growth. I think competitors will now have a hard time figuring out how to enter the category without buying an existing brand. Green Works is also a wonderful recruiting tool for Clorox, and most everybody who comes here wants to work on Green Works, until they realize how small the business is.

As Green Works’ sales declined, Clorox reduced Green Work’s marketing budget, going to a more targeted marketing approach for the brand. It refined the Green Works message from an appeal to a more explicitly green target to consumers (mostly mothers with children) who were concerned about having harsh chemical fumes in the home. Distribution was also re-examined. Springer stated:

Mass merchandisers are still Green Works largest customers, but certain customers and certain areas are more developed. Target tends to skew to shoppers with higher education and income levels who can afford products they think are good for their sensitive skin and allergies. There are some rural Wal-Mart stores that have a full Green Works line, but where the average low income shopper can’t afford to trade up to an all natural product. It’s okay to let some of the Green Works products fall off the shelf there and to work to replace them with some of our core products that will sell.

In addition, the brand group cut the number of Green Works SKUs (stock-keeping units), eliminating some size and scent variants. Hyder explained, “The original intent was to have a Green Works offering in every segment related to cleaning. It was seen as a door into some massive segments in which we didn’t compete like liquid dishwashers and laundry detergents.”

In early 2010, the brand group lowered the everyday price point on many Green Works products to improve their velocity and maintain distribution support. Vlahos explained, “We wanted to get within a 10% premium to the mainstream cleaning products. Initially we played a high-low price strategy at the shelf. A Green Works product would be $2.99, but on deal, it would be $1.99. We pulled some of the trade dollars out and lowered the cost of the product to get the price point right, which gave retailers a bit more margin on a daily basis.” Springer added, “Green Works is now almost a $50 million brand at retail, but it’s back to growth.” Competitive brands Seventh Generation and Method reported double-digit sales growth for most products in 2010 after flat sales in 2009.30

Clorox continued to receive positive coverage for the line. In 2010, Green Works received the Natural Product Association certification, which required products be primarily made of plant-based ingredients, use no harsh chemical processing, and not be linked to any health risks or tested on animals.31 Also in 2010, the Foreign Policy Association for Corporate Responsibility recognized Clorox for its CSR, particularly in making natural cleaning products accessible with Green Works.

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The Truth About Bleach

As Springer’s strategy and growth office helped Clorox identify ways to leverage “sustainability” for growth, it was pushing the company to address some of the misperceptions about its flagship brand: Clorox sodium hypochlorite bleach. Springer recalled:

We were having a pretty big debate internally about whether it was wise to address the naysayers on bleach. Historically we had been silent: we believed that any discussion about sodium hypochlorite bleach might lead to an association with free chlorine, which our end product doesn’t have, but the discussion just goes downhill from there. Unfortunately, the online world allows misinformation to be spread in ways it never has before so we advised the business unit that marketed bleach to stop being silent. We did some simple research that showed them that the vast majority of mentions on the web about bleach or Clorox were negative. This led to a series of work called “The Truth About Bleach” that corrected the misinformation out there, and also went public about all that is good about bleach.

Corporate Responsibility Strategy

As Clorox put more resources behind the sustainable brands, it also began formulating a broader corporate responsibility (CR) strategy. Springer explained, “We wanted to let the consumer know she was buying from a company that does the right thing in terms of donating products and money, reducing its footprint, and caring about society.” In early 2008, Clorox established the Eco office. Bill Morrissey, vice president environmental sustainability, explained its role:

All of a sudden we had Brita, Burt’s Bees, and Green Works. We looked like the sustainable company. We had put the spotlight on ourselves, but I don’t think as a company we really were a sustainability leader. We were responsible; one of our core values is doing the right thing. But, two of our competitors, Unilever and SC Johnson, had been publishing CSR reports for a decade. Clorox needed to be more integrated so we didn’t have the three sustainable businesses over here and the rest of the company that made up 90% of our revenues over there.

Morrissey spent the first year in his new role meeting with different internal functional groups and business units to explain what his office was and was not. He summarized, “We were responsible for our companywide eco strategy, coordinating efforts across businesses, and agitating for change. But the real work would have to be done by the functional groups and the business units, and we would have to compete with other business priorities to get the work done.”

In addition to embedding environmental sustainability into the company’s strategy, Clorox added eco criteria into its executive performance scorecard and into the goals and business plans of the individual business units. Springer explained: “Each business unit had to contribute to reducing our solid waste, use of water, and greenhouse gas emissions, as well as to making product improvements such as reducing the amount of material in the product or packaging but delivering the same consumer benefit. Or replacing an ingredient that today was considered safe but might be somewhat suspect. Or it could be by targeting their consumer with a more natural solution.”

In February 2009, Greenpeace had asked to meet with Knauss to discuss ways to eliminate the risk associated with the transport and use of chlorine gas in production facilities.32 On November 2, 2009, Clorox announced it would convert its factories that used chlorine gas to high-strength bleach over several years. Vlahos summarized, “We are removing the transportation and handling of chlorine gas from our supply chain and incurring a lot of costs to make the switch. Ultimately, all our plants will receive high-strength bleach that is shipped in trucks and then diluted to make bleach.”

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On September 20, 2010, Clorox announced that its Oakland headquarters achieved Leed Platinum Certification in Energy and Environmental Design-Existing Building/Operating and Maintenance, making it one of only 38 buildings in the U.S. to achieve this recognition. It took more than nine months, and changes included replacing every toilet and plumbing fixture to reduce annual water consumption by 40%, which translated into 1.5 million gallons annually.33

Clorox issued its first corporate responsibility report in October 2010. Springer remarked:

We had never formalized our company’s corporate responsibility point-of-view. I didn’t think we could grow brands such as Brita, Green Works, and Burt’s if we weren’t capable of saying what we stood for. Consumers and NGOs [non-governmental organizations] can be very demanding about knowing the company behind a brand. It made sense to start with our eco goals because we were not measuring and reporting our efforts. It was also important to let consumers know what ingredients were in our cleaning products. We had to engage in this dialog or the misinformed voices would take over.

We are adding new elements to our responsibility strategy. We have a long history of U.S.- based support for youth and cultural programs and worldwide support during disasters. For years, Clorox has partnered with the Red Cross to make bleach available as quickly as possible to help purify contaminated water and property, which can cause an immediate public health threat after a disaster occurs. We are expanding our social programs, especially in areas where Clorox products can make a positive difference in the world and in a way that fits with our desire to build our brands. For example, we are about to kick off the “hygiene project”. In many parts of the world, folks don’t understand the relationship between clean surfaces, clean hands, healthy food, sleep, and staying well. This program reaches out to mothers who have just had their first child to educate them in how to keep a clean and healthy home and family.

Our eco strategy has also built a lot of employee pride. People who work for consumer products companies are generally excited that their products are in millions of homes. We might not be inventing the next rocket, but we are doing things that make people’s daily lives better every day. It’s important to connect those dots with some consumers and with employees, especially the younger ones. They have different expectations for their employers; they don’t come to work simply to put points on the board for the external shareholders.

By 2011, Clorox had made good progress on its eco goals. Morrissey noted:

To date, it has mostly been low-hanging fruit, with footprint reduction projects being “win- win”—good for the environment and a cost savings for the company. Some have been “win- win-win”—also good for the consumer, like Kingsford Surefire charcoal, which offers the consumer a better product at the same price. But at some point in the near future, some of the projects won’t pay out in terms of corporate profitability, but they might pay out in carbon currency—that is, helping us meet external goals for footprint reduction. All this might not affect most consumers’ purchase decisions, but it is important for customers like Wal-Mart, which has embraced sustainability and expects its supply chain to be more sustainable. Footprint reduction is also important to the NGOs, the media, and the investment community.

Wal-Mart, one of Clorox’s largest customers, unveiled its “Sustainability 360” program in early 2007—an initiative that went beyond Wal-Mart’s footprint reduction efforts to engage its employees, suppliers, communities, and customers in its sustainability efforts.34 Alongside these initiatives, Wal- Mart attempted to appeal to a wider variety of shoppers by renovating its stores, reducing the number of SKUs it sold, and moving away from its everyday low pricing strategy. But in early 2011,

The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth 512-009

after seven straight quarters of declining same-store sales, the company announced it was returning to its strategy of offering a wide assortment at everyday low prices to win back some of its core customers—households earning $30,000 to $70,000 a year. Wal-Mart’s CEO stated, “Sustainability and some of these other initiatives can be distracting if they don’t add to every day low cost.”35

Clorox in January 2011

On January 3, 2011, Clorox announced preliminary business results for the second quarter of fiscal 2011. The company expected a decline in sales of 3% to 4% relative to the same quarter in fiscal 2010. Clorox also wrote down the value of its Burt’s Bee’s acquisition by $258 million and Knauss conceded that Clorox “paid too much for it.”36 However, Clorox believed its businesses overall had stabilized and were well positioned for a stronger second half of 2011 behind innovation plans across brands. (See Exhibit 13.) The sustainable brand teams were also discussing strategies to accelerate growth.

Brita

Vlahos summarized some of the options facing Brita:

In Brita, we have had significant tailwinds behind the filtered water category as consumers turned away from bottled water because of cost and environmental concerns. Do we keep riding the trends or do we double down and invest? The entire water filtration pie is a $2 billion pie. There are a lot of different segments, including: whole house filtration, “on the go” water filtration, and faucet mount filtration. We only play in about 12% of all water filtration. We have a great brand, and we are the leaders in the “Pour Through” filtration segment. Where do we want to go? Can we accelerate Brita’s growth and maybe double the size of the business over the next few years? What are our manufacturing capabilities and what new distribution channels would we have to enter? We’re about better tasting water—that is our core message—and more recently we are also about being a cost-effective alternative that is better for the environment. How relevant will all these messages be as the economy recovers from the recession? Which ones should we emphasize going forward?

Our options range from close-in to far-out. There are a number of innovations we could make around the pitcher. Is there an opportunity to make the pitcher design look better? Should we put more effort behind accelerating pour-through so the water filters faster? We could also look at targeting and point-of-entry marketing. There are college campuses that want to go bottle-free. There is a new generation around sustainability that would welcome an alternative to bottled water. Hispanics might also be receptive to Brita. Hispanics from Mexico are used to consuming filtered water from living in Mexico. We could also expand our faucet mount business and develop an “on the go” Brita unit so consumers could filter water anywhere there was a tap. There is also a lot of innovation going on in the beverage industry. Imagine one unit that could do coffee, tea, vitamin-infused water, soft drinks with filtered water….That would be the ultimate in sustainability—no big trucks driving around anymore.

Burt’s Bees

Geikie discussed some future growth options for Burt’s Bees:

When you look at our target—the “committed naturalists” and “health and beauty sleuths,” they make up only 8% to 10% of American women. The next two segments—the “beauty enthusiasts” and “demanding conventionalists”—are an additional 39% of American women

512-009 The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth

(See Exhibits 14a and 14b.) They are open-minded to natural, but they don’t do a lot of product research and need some convincing. They are more likely to buy pseudo-natural brands—that are marketed as natural but aren’t necessarily natural formulations. If you add up those four segments, you have almost half the population, but almost 90% of the total natural business. Should we create a strategy to reach this 39% and what should that strategy look like? Do you use the Burt’s Bees name or do we take a brand portfolio approach?

The “beauty enthusiasts” and “demanding conventionalists” are much more driven by product aesthetics—the fragrance, the product feel, and end-use experience. These segments are also more price-sensitive and less rigid about the definition of natural. We would likely have to reformulate many of our products to appeal to them. There has been massive R&D investment in making truly natural products, but there are still some trade-offs that consumers have to make if they don’t want the synthetic ingredients used to improve a product’s aesthetics. For example, are consumers willing to use a sunscreen lotion that leaves a visible white film on their skin if they are guaranteed it is made of all natural ingredients?

Another option is to keep focusing on our first two target segments. Ten years ago, the “committed naturalists” and “beauty sleuths” accounted for less than 5% of the population. If you look at the younger generation and the habits they will establish in high school and college, I believe they are going to disproportionately be “committed naturalists” and “beauty sleuths.” It is conceivable that these segments will double in the next ten years.

Another question we face is whether to go organic. We are a natural ingredients brand, but not necessarily organic. Going organic would drive product costs up because there are fewer organic ingredient suppliers. In personal care, you can claim “organic” yet be 70% organic material and 30% chemicals. There is a lot of confusion and misinformation out there.

We could also expand more quickly internationally. We are mostly a U.S. brand, but the trends of health and wellness, and environmental sustainability are global. We have a small position in Taiwan, Australia, and the U.K. But, how should we choose the other countries to enter? The natural personal care category is best developed in Europe, and some of the best natural brands are from there. In Germany, even drug store private-label products are 100% natural and some are also organic. The European consumer is much more sophisticated about environmental sustainability and about natural products. But Europe is also the most competitive market with low prices and lots of barriers to entry.

Asia is a possibility. Consumers there are less sophisticated about natural personal care products, but American brands have a lot of appeal. And there is more concern about safety overall in Asia, as opposed to just the environment. Asian consumers also have a real belief in herbal remedies and Eastern medicine so there’s a faith in the power of natural ingredients. A third option is Latin America, which is Clorox’s best developed region outside the U.S. so Clorox has lots of infrastructure there. The natural category is just emerging in Latin America.

Green Works

Vlahos summarized some of the issues and options facing Green Works in early 2011:

Awareness is high and repeat with consumers who value green products is high, but trial rate among more mainstream consumers is not high enough yet. The brand has stabilized since the price rollback and we have great distribution in the places we want. What’s the inhibitor for potential consumers? Is it still price? Do consumers doubt the product will work?

The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth 512-009

One option is to play to our strengths and further invest to develop the brand. This business is all about household penetration and getting it into more people’s hands so they can experience how well the product line works. Our advertising budget is closer to $15 million now, and we are doing some print and mostly digital advertising—Facebook ads—right now. Should we double our ad spend and invest in TV again? We could also inject more money into R&D to innovate and get more scale with the brand. We could develop products in adjacent categories to fill our distribution pipelines at Target and Wal-Mart, etc., especially for their stores that skew to our target consumer. We could also expand our efforts with retailers that are like-minded about sustainability that already carry Clorox products. Wegmans, a grocery chain, is one example and Costco is another. These retailers already have the pull—that is consumers who are looking for natural or sustainable products.

Hyder continued:

One dilemma for Green Works is that it is a small business within our cleaning division that is almost $2 billion in revenues. The cleaning division as a whole can afford $250 million in marketing and needs to parse that across Clorox Bleach, Formula 409, Clorox Disinfectant Wipes et cetera—businesses that are all several times Green Works’ size. But, except for Clorox Disinfectant Wipes, they are all in declining segments. I would like to invest in a business that could be on trend and grow. But in the short-term, a dollar I invest in Clorox Bleach, which is used by 60% of U.S. households, will return ten times as much as a dollar I invest in Green Works. To invest in Green Works, I have to take a much longer-term view.

One option is to ratchet the marketing spending down on Green Works even more—to $2 or $3 million, which would be more in line with its revenues. I don’t see a lot of competitive Seventh Generation or Method ads out in the marketplace. Perhaps we could focus on one or two specific categories. Alternatively, we could turn the marketing spigot back on, and try to make the Green Works messaging more effective. Recent research shows that we were not hitting hard enough on efficacy. The two benefits that seem to matter most to our target are: 1) that it works, and 2) that it’s safe. Green and convenience are further down the list of desired attributes for these consumers. Most of Green Works volume has been stolen from its natural competitors. We’ve been much less effective at bringing new users into the natural segment.

“Green” Light Going Forward?

Springer listened attentively as her colleagues at the executive committee meeting debated Clorox’s existing strategy and its implications for each product line going forward. Knauss pointed out that Clorox had not been able to accelerate growth sufficiently over the past several years to meet centennial targets, and that the company’s cumulative total shareholder return was underperforming relative to its peer group, although it was outperforming the S&P index. (See Exhibit 15.)

In light of the discussion, Springer wondered whether accelerated top-line growth was important in this environment or whether Clorox should instead focus on costs and profitability. If growth was important, was sustainability an enduring mainstream trend that deserved solid investment? Should Clorox lean into its existing sustainable brands or look for other opportunities that were on trend? Should Clorox look to emerging markets or its core businesses for growth? Springer thought back to a presentation she gave in late 2009 called Going Green at Clorox. (See Exhibit 16.) How far along was Clorox on its sustainability journey and was there still significant opportunity to leverage green for growth? It was now her turn to address the group and weigh in on these questions.

512-009 The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth

Exhibit 1 Executive Committee Members

Name Member As Of Title

Donald R. Knauss 2006 Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer Lawrence S. Peiros 1999 EVP and Chief Operating Officer – North America Daniel J. Heinrich 2003 EVP and Chief Financial Officer Frank A. Tataseo 2004 EVP– Strategy & Growth, Bags & Wraps and Away from Home M. Beth Springer 2005 EVP– International & Natural Personal Care Jacqueline P. Kane 2004 SVP– Human Resources & Corporate Affairs Laura Stein 2005 SVP– General Counsel Thomas P. Britanik 2009 SVP– Chief Marketing Officer Wayne L. Delker 2009 SVP– Chief Innovation Officer Benno Dorer 2009 SVP– General Manager, Cleaning Division James Foster 2009 SVP– Chief Product Supply Officer Grant LaMontagne 2009 SVP– Chief Customer Officer George Roeth 2009 SVP– General Manager, Specialty Division

Source: Company 10k report.

Exhibit 2 Clorox Five-Year Financial Summary (fiscal years ending June 30)

Dollars in millions, except share data 2010a 2009a 2008a b 2007a c 2006a

OPERATIONS Net sales 5,534 5,450 5,273 4,847 4,644 Gross profit 2,477 2,346 2,175 2,091 1,959 Selling and administrative expenses 747 715 690 642 631 Advertising costs 518 499 486 474 450 Research and development costs 119 114 111 108 99 Earnings from continuing operations 603 537 461 496 443 Earnings from discontinued operations - - - 5 1 Net earnings 603 537 461 501 444 COMMON STOCK Earnings per share Continuing operations Basic 4.28 3.82 3.27 3.25 2.93 Diluted 4.24 3.79 3.23 3.21 2.89 Dividends declared per share 2.05 1.88 1.66 1.31 1.15 OTHER DATA Total assets 4,555 4,576 4,712 3,621 3,563 Long-term debt 2,124 2,151 2,720 1,462 1,966

Source: Company 10k report. a In fiscal year 2010, the Company adopted a new accounting standard regarding calculation of earnings per share. Prior year earnings per share have been adjusted to reflect the new accounting standard. b In fiscal year 2008, the Company acquired Burt’s Bees Inc. for an aggregate price of $913 million excluding $25 million paid for tax benefits associated with the acquisition. In addition, the Company entered into an accelerated share repurchase agreement under which it repurchased 12 million of its shares for an aggregate price of $750 million. c In fiscal year 2003, the Company announced its intent to sell its business in Brazil, closed its offices in Brazil, and sold nearly all of the remaining assets of this business; in fiscal year 2007, the Company sold certain assets remaining from its discontinued operation in Brazil.

The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth 512-009

Exhibit 3 Centennial Strategy Annual Targets and Progress (years ending June 30)

Target FY10 FY09 FY08 FY07

Sales Growth +3% to 5% +1.5% +3.3% +8.8% +4.4% EBIT Margin Growth +75 to 100 bps +140bps +170bps -140bps +90bps Economic Profit Growth Double-digit +15.2% +3.9% -4.5% +8.9% Free Cash Flow 10% to 12% of sales 11% 10% 11% 12%

Source: Casewriter from 2009 and 2011 Company Investor Relations Presentation.

Notes: In June 2009, Clorox updated its Centennial Strategy targets: 1) EBIT Margin Growth Target increased from +50 to 75 bps to +75 to 100 bps (100 basis points reflects a 1% change), and 2) Free Cash Flow Target was added. Clorox defined economic profit as the earnings from continuing operations before income taxes, non-cash restructuring and asset impairment costs and interest expense; tax effected, and less a capital charge.

Exhibit 4 Clorox Brand Portfolio and Percentage of FY10 Sales

Source: Company website; accessed 3/11/11.

This document is authorized for use only by Ayah Awad in 563: Sustainability & CSR taught by MJ Kay, Montclair State University from June 2017 to December 2017. 512-009 -16- This document is authorized forThis document is authorized use only by Ayah Awad in 563: Sustainability & CSR taught by MJ Kay, Montclair State University from June 2017 to December 2017. Exhibit 5a The Cambridge Group 2007 Eco Demand Landscape-Segments and Targets 6-Segment Solution Demand Overview 6-Segment Solution Demand Overview

Eco Emerging Personal Eco Eco Eco Committed Eco Guardians Purists Confused Uninvolved Skeptics % of Sample: Eco 15% Emerging20% Personal12% Eco 19% Eco 16% Eco 18% Committed Eco Guardians Purists Confused Uninvolved Skeptics % of “My” Eco Spend: 22% 22% 11% 17% 11% 16% % of Sample: 15% 20% 12% 19% 16% 18%

Sound Bite: “The broader “I am becoming more “My own “Environmental “Environmental “I think % of “My” Eco Spend: 22% 22% 11% 17% 11% 16% environment and my concerned about environment is my issues are important issues and care of environmental own environment are environmental top priority – but very confusing, my family and home threats are Sound Bite: “Theequally broader high “Iissues, am becoming especially more in especially“My own anything so“Environmental I focus on what I “Environmentaljust aren’t that exaggerated,“I think and I environmentpriorities and” my concernedmy own about thatenvironment goes on or is in my my issuesknow inare my important care of issuesimportant and tocare me” of prioritizeenvironmental more own environment are environmentalenvironment” top body”priority – butfamily very and confusing, home” my family and home immediatethreats matters” are equally high issues, especially in especially anything so I focus on what I just aren’t that exaggerated, and I priorities” my own that goes on or in my know in my care of important to me” prioritize more Current Demand for Eco Strongest environment”Strong Strongbody” familyAverage and home” Weak immediateWeak matters” Products:

Current Demand for Eco Strongest Strong Strong Average Weak Weak Avg.Products Percent: of TCFH 36% 31% 29% 21% 17% 11% Spending on “My” and “Avg.The PercentBroader” of TCFH 36% 31% 29% 21% 17% 11% EnvironmentSpending on :“ My” and Latent“The Broader” and Emerging Strongest Strong Average Average Weak Weakest EcoEnvironment Demand:: For the exclusive use of A. Awad, 2017. Latent and Emerging Strongest Strong Average Average Weak Weakest %Eco Consumers Demand: Expect to 78% 67% 47% 43% 37% 18% Buy More Eco Products o%ver Consumers Next Year Expect: to 78% 67% 47% 43% 37% 18% Buy More Eco Products Keyover Challenges Next Year: to Their commitment to Reduction of Their involvement in They are so involved They are uninvolved They regard Eco Overcome: “The Broader” confusion over their Eco concerns is in Care of Family in Care of Family information and Key Challenges to TheirEnvironment commitment can to environmentalReduction issueof s Theirlimited involvement to their in Theyand Homeare so and involved wed andThey Home are u andninvolved Price- concernsThey regard with Ecodeep Overcome: cause“The aversionBroader” to confusionwill unlock over growth their Ecoimmediate concerns is in Careto traditional of Family Sensin Careitive, of makingFamily informationskepticism and brandEnvironment association can environmental issues limitedsurroundings to their productsand Home that and a clearwed andthe Home conversion and Price to - concerns with deep causewith aversion Clorox to will unlock growth immediate argumentto traditional must be SensEcoitive, purchase making skepticism brand association surroundings productsmade thatwithout a clear thebehavior conversion difficult to with Clorox argumentefficacy trade must-offs be Eco purchase made without behavior difficult Secondary Primary Secondary efficacy trade-offs TargetSecondary TargetPrimary TargetSecondary Target Target Target Source: Excerpted from Clorox Eco Demand Landscape (2007).

Notes: Sample drawn from respondents who were the head of household responsible for buying and using the household’s cleaning products. The “My” Eco Spend represented the dollar amount spent on products to address concerns regarding “My” Environment defined as home, family, and self (the % of “My” Eco Spend captured the share each segment spent of the total across all segments). TCFH represents the Total dollar amount each segment in the sample spent in seventeen categories in the Care of the Family and Home Space. Percentages therefore capture the dollar share each segment spent relative to its own total spending on products in these categories.

This document is authorized forThis document is authorized use only by Ayah Awad in 563: Sustainability & CSR taught by MJ Kay, Montclair State University from June 2017 to December 2017. 512-009 -17-

Exhibit 5b The Cambridge Group 2007 Eco DemandTop Landscape Benefits – Sought Top Benefits by Segment Sought by Segment

(% in Top 3 Benefits Sought) Top Benefits Sought by Segment (% in Top 3 Benefits Sought)

Emerging Eco Eco Personal Eco Eco Eco Total Committed Guardians Purists Confused Uninvolved Skeptics Emerging % of Sample 100% 15% 20% 12% 19% 16% 18% Eco Eco Personal Eco Eco Eco Efficacy Total Committed Guardians Purists Confused Uninvolved Skeptics Is highly effective 28 21 23 20 27 38 38 Safety% of Sample 100% 15% 20% 12% 19% 16% 18% IsEfficacy safer for myself and my family 27 26 37 20 37 17 18 HasIs ingredientshighly effective that are non-toxic 2817 2127 23 23 20 7 27 18 38 16 38 11 IsSafety safe to put on my skin 16 14 17 15 19 14 17 KillsIs germs/disinfectssafer for myself and my family 2711 26 5 37 13 20 13 37 15 17 7 18 12 DoesHas not ingredients harm the that quality are non-toxic of my home's air/water 1711 2714 23 14 7 6 18 10 16 10 11 8 DoesIs safe not topose put aon threat my skin if mishandled or ingested 168 14 8 17 10 15 5 19 10 14 6 17 5 HasKills 100% germs/disinfects all-natural ingredients 115 5 12 13 8 13 7 15 3 7 2 12 1 NeutralizesDoes not harmor removes the quality harmful of my chemicals home's air/water or 115 14 6 14 6 6 4 10 6 10 5 8 4 contaminantsDoes not pose that a threatcan enter if mishandled my home or ingested 8 8 10 5 10 6 5

DoesHas not 100% harm all-natural my home's ingredients surfaces, such as floors 5 5 12 4 8 3 7 4 3 5 2 5 1 6 For the exclusive use of A. Awad, 2017. or countertopsNeutralizes or removes harmful chemicals or 5 6 6 4 6 5 4 Hascontaminants no petroleum-based that can enter ingredients my home 3 5 3 2 2 3 1 HasDoes organic not harm ingredients my home's surfaces, such as floors 5 2 4 5 3 3 4 2 5 1 5 1 6 0 Cost-Effectivenessor countertops Is lessHas noexpensive petroleum-based ingredients 324 5 6 3 16 2 22 2 29 3 32 1 36 HelpsHas me organic reduce ingredients my home's energy costs 2 4 5 4 3 4 2 4 1 5 1 4 0 4 AllowsCost-Effectiveness me to reduce or reuse the products I am 3 5 4 5 2 4 2 buyingIs less to expensivecare for my family and home 24 6 16 22 29 32 36 ConvenienceHelps me reduce my home's energy costs 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 Is availableAllows me where to reduce I shop or reuse the products I am 319 5 13 4 13 5 15 2 20 4 25 2 29 Is easybuying to to use care and for fitsmy intofamily my and routine home 10 5 6 7 10 14 17 Convenience Is available where I shop 19 13 13 15 20 25 29 Is easy to use and fits into my routine 10 5 6 7 10 14 17

Non-toxic, safe, Safe for myself Safe for myself Effective, Effective, Note: Average across categories; For some categories used in effective, not and family, and family, inexpensive, inexpensive, overall average, segment sample sizes overall small (n<50) harm air/water, non-toxic, effective, kills/ convenient convenient Source: ExcerptedSource: fromClorox Clorox Eco DemandEco Demand Landscape Landscape (2007); Q6,(2007) Q36. 100% natural effective disinfects Notes: Each number in the table reflects the percent of respondents in that segment that ranked the specific benefit to be among the top three sought. “rectangle” = index of 120 or greater vs. total; “circle” = index of 80 or less vs. total.

512-009 -18- This document is authorized forThis document is authorized use only by Ayah Awad in 563: Sustainability & CSR taught by MJ Kay, Montclair State University from June 2017 to December 2017. Exhibit 6 Potential Demand Disruptors

Beliefs about How Much Money We Are Spending to Improve and Protect the Environment (1973-2006) Demand Disruptors

Clean Air Act Amendments; National Exxon ValdezEnvironmental Education Act 80% Oil Spill Recession Recession Bhopal, India Bush Disaster Defeats 70% Gore Invasion of Iraq Too Little Love Three Collapse Canal 60% Mile of the Island USSR Chernobyl 9/11 Gulf Terrorist 50% Times Beach, MO War Attack Dioxin Scare For the exclusive use of A. Awad, 2017. 40%

30% About Right

20% Percentage Total of Percentage

10% Too Much 0% 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Year

Source: Company.

For the exclusive use of A. Awad, 2017.

The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth 512-009

Exhibit 7 Clorox “Her” World vs. “The” World

Source: Company.

Exhibit 8 Brita Advertising

Source: Company.

512-009 The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth

Exhibit 9 Leading NPC Brands in 2007

Source: Company document.

Exhibit 10 Burt’s Bees “Greater Good” Business Model

Source: Company.

The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth 512-009

Exhibit 11 Burt’s Bees Print Advertising

Source: Company.

512-009 The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth

Exhibit 12 Green Works Print Advertising

Source: Company.

The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth 512-009

Exhibit 13 Sample of Clorox 2nd Half FY11 Planned Innovation

Source: Company.

512-009 The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth

Our 2 core consumer segments represent 8% of population and 35% of natural category sales. Exhibit 14a Burt's Bees Consumer Segmentation Study

Segment Name Committed Health & Beauty Beauty Demanding Value Pragmatists Naturalists Sleuths Enthusiasts Conventionalists

% of Females 1% 7% 12% 27% 39%

% of NPC of total PC 71% 27% 16% 10% 3% % of NPC Sales 9% 26% 25% 29% 11%

% of Total PC Sales 1% 9% 16% 28% 36% NPC Purchase Drivers Ingredients. Heavy researchers. Follower of beauty Responsive to Driven by brand to Committed to Learning more and green trends environmental determine quality environment and about living healthier driven by concerns and driven and loyal to those health lifestyle ingredients, by ingredients, that work at the right fragrances and fragrances and price promotions promotions NPC Purchase Barriers Availability, Lack Availability and lack Availability, Lack of Cost and Cost and of sampling & of sampling sampling & Cost understanding value understanding value cost and benefits and benefits

Educated about Natural? Yes Inconsistent Inconsistent No No

Importance of Natural High More pronounced Embedded with Dabbles but needs Little engagement other needs convincing with Natural Approach to Beauty Inward Inward Outward Outward Outward

Approach to Health Educated and Proactive Concerned but Average Less involved than committed laissez-faire in involvement average action

NPC shoppersSource: Hartman Group tend & Burt’s Beesto Consumerspend Segmentation more Study on *Confidential Personal Care compared to | 6 the averageExhibit 14b shopperBurt's Bees Consumer Segmentation Study

On average, spend 27% more on PC and 5x more on NPC

All Females Committed Health & Beauty Demanding Value Naturalists Beauty Sleuths Enthusiasts Conventionalists Pragmatists

Source: Company. Source: Hartman Group & Burt’s Bees Consumer Segmentation Study *Confidential | 7

The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth 512-009

Exhibit 15 Cumulative Total Shareholder Return

Source: Company website; accessed 3/11/11. Notes: June 30, 2005, through June 30, 2010 (assumes reinvestment of quarterly dividends). Peer companies - An average of 18 consumer packaged goods companies used for benchmarking purposes.

Exhibit 16 Springer’s Presentation on Clorox’s Sustainability Journey

Source: Company.

512-009 The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth

Endnotes

1 2008 Financial Report. 2 “Clorox Introduces Centennial Strategy to Drive Long-term Growth,” Business Wire, May 24, 2007, accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011. 3 Tom Branna, “The Top 50: New Faces, New Places,” Household & Personal Products Industry, Volume 44; Issue 7, 2007 Gale Group Inc., accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011. 4 Ibid.

5 Gregory Unruh and Richard Ettenson, “Growing Green,” Harvard Business Review, vol. 88, no. 6, June 2010.

6 IPRA (International Public Relations Association), “Brita Great Taste with Less Waste,” http://www.ipra.org/print.asp?articleid=823, 2008, accessed 3/31/11.

7 Ibid. 8 Jack Neff, “Brita’s Marketing Flows From Grass-Roots Effort,” Advertising Age, November 16, 2009, accessed by Factiva 3/8/2011. 9 Louise Story, “Can Burt’s Bees Turn Clorox Green?”, The New York Times, January 6, 2008, accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Louise Story, “Clorox Faces Scrutiny Over Burt’s Bees Takeover,” New York Times News Service, Corpus Christi Caller Times, January 10, 2008, accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011. 13 Tom Branna, “The Top 50: greener than ever!,” Household & Personal Products Industry, Volume 45; Issue 7, 2008 Gale Group Inc., accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011. 14 Ibid. 15 Christopher Marquis and Bobbi Thomason, “Leadership and the First and Last Mile of Sustainability,” Ivey Business Journal, October 28, 2010, accessed by Factiva 3/8/11. 16 “Burt’s Bees Social and Environmental Dedication to Be Recognized,” Business Wire, September 9, 2008, accessed by Factiva 3/8/11. 17 Christopher Marquis and Bobbi Thomason, “Leadership and the First and Last Mile of Sustainability,” Ivey Business Journal, October 28, 2010, accessed by Factiva 3/8/11. 18 Ibid. 19 Alan M. Wolf, “Burt’s Goes to Latin America; It’s Part of an Aggressive International Expansion,” The News & Observatory, August 7, 2010, accessed by Factiva 3/8/11. 20 Burt’s Bees Press Release, http://www.burtsbees.com/wcsstore/Bee2C/upload/pdf/Green%20Brands%20Survey%20 Announcement %20FINAL.pdf, accessed 3/8/11. 21 “Green Works: Powerful, Naturally; The Clorox Company Introduces New Brand of Natural Cleaning Products; Establishes Alliance with Sierra Club,” Business Wire, January 14, 2008, accessed by Factival 3/1/2011/. 22 Louise Story, “Can Burt’s Bees Turn Clorox Green?”, The New York Times, January 6, 2008, accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011.

The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth 512-009

23 “Green Works: Powerful, Naturally; The Clorox Company Introduces New Brand of Natural Cleaning Products; Establishes Alliance with Sierra Club,” Business Wire, January 14, 2008, accessed by Factival 3/1/2011/. 24 Ibid. 25 John Flesher, “Deal with Clorox Sparks Sierra Club Feud,” Associated Press, Deseret Morning News, August 3, 2008, accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011. 26 Ilana DeBare, “Clorox Expects Greenbacks from Green Cleaners,” San Francisco Chronicle, January 14, 2008, accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011. 27 Ilana DeBare, “Clorox Takes Big Chunk of Green Market,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 12, 2008, accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011. 28 “The Clorox Company Expands Communication of Product Ingredients,” Business Wire, January 12, 2009, accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011. 29 Ibid.

30 Stephanie Clifford and Andrew Martin, “As Consumers Cut Spending, ‘Green’ Products Lose Allure,” NYTimes, April 21, 2011. 31 Carolyn Said, “Not Easy Being Green? Clorox Shows That It Is,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 10, 2010, accessed by Factiva 3/8/11. 32 “Clorox to Eliminate Chlorine Disaster Risks to 13 Million Americans,” State News Service, November 2, 2009, accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011. 33 “Clorox Co-Headquarters Achieves Leed Platinum Certification, Market News Publishing, September 20, 2010, accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011.

34 Wal-Mart Press Release, “Wal-Mart CEO Lee Scott Unveils ‘Sustainabilty 360,’” February 1, 2007, accessed 3/1/11.

35 Miguel Bustillo, “With Sales Flabby, Wal-Mart Turns to Its Core, “ Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2011. 36 “Clorox Moves on After sting of Burt’s Bees Charge,” Reuters, February 4, 2011, accessed by Factiva 3/1/2011.

This document is authorized for use only by Ayah Awad in 563: Sustainability & CSR taught by MJ Kay, Montclair State University from June 2017 to December 2017.