(Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) An Analysis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Narrative
An Honors Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Elon University Honors Program
By Kelsey L. Glover
April, 2011
Approved by:
Dr. Laura Rose le, Thesis Mentor
Dr. Brooke Barnett, Communications (Reader)
Dr. Tim Wardle, Religious Studies (Reader) AI-Ikhwan al-Muslimin An Analysis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Narrative
Kelsey L. Glover (Dr. Laura Roselle) Department of International Studies-Elon University
This study presents an in-depth qualitative analysis of the strategic narrative of the al Ikhwan al-Muslimin, also known as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is a politically active Islamic organization and has been a formidable player on the political scene as one of the only opposition groups for over eighty years. Given the recent revolution in Egypt, they could have a dramatic impact on the future of the country, and it becomes even more important to understand their strategic narrative, how it has changed over time, and how it could change in the future.
In order to analyze these narratives in a systematic manner, I developed a coding instrument to analyze the organization's narratives from the beginning of2008 to the end of2010. The coding instrument, Atlas.ti, was used to code for themes and descriptions of grievances and remedies. I analyzed these narratives to look for reactionary changes and trends over time. My research suggests that there has been a discemable shift in their narrative from their more radical beginnings to a moderate Islamist, pro-democracy movement today. This research is timely and relevant - as Egypt builds a new political system. Table of Contents:
Chapter 1 1
Introduction 2
Historical Background of 7 Egyptian Politics in ·the Twentieth Century
Literature Review 32
Methodology 42
Chapter2 51
Analysis of the historical 52 strategic narrative of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood
Analysis of Egypt's Muslim So Brotherhood's strategic narrative from 2008-2010
Chapter3 94
Conclusion 95
References Cited 99
Appendices 103 Jo those who always suppo~ted me, both nea~ and fa~. Jo my Jathe~ and family who neve~ doubted f J could, Jo the fiiends who made me smile th~ough it all, And to :JJ~. J!.auM f Chapter 1 ~Introduction ~Historical Background of Egyptian Politics in the Twentieth Century ~Literature Review ~Methodology Introduction The need to fully comprehend the history and motivation of the Muslim Brotherhood grows everyday as Egypt embarks on its transition to democracy. The movement is a major player in the Egyptian political sphere, representing approximately twenty to thirty percent of the popular vote, according to news broadcasts during the January 25th revolution, and will play a prominent role in the political future of Egypt. Even though the Brotherhood is a sub-state actor, it wields substantial influence on both the domestic and international stage, which makes it a prime candidate to expand the growing research in academia about strategic narratives. The academic field of strategic narratives is a fairly new arrival on the academic scene and has traditionally been applied to state actors in the realm of power politics. This study will expand the breadth of research pertinent to strategic narratives while simultaneously seeking to clarify the stated goals and motivations of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, their strategic narrative is the main focus of this study. Examining how their message has responded over time to changes in factors that affect subversive political group‟s narratives, namely the narrator, the social climate, and what type of government is in power, will help to better understand the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a whole and help predict how the movement will respond to future events. Misr or, as it‟s known in the West, Egypt, is a multifaceted country shaped by a multitude of influences throughout its history. What makes Egypt distinct, 2 though, is the amount of social and political change it has undergone within the last century. Politically, Egypt has evolved from a monarchy to a despotic republic lasting three different leaders. Most recently and dramatically its citizens peacefully protested to oust the last president in hopes of creating a fair, open democracy in the future Egypt. Culturally, it has one of the most prolific pre- historical pasts known to the world, best known by those buildings in the sand they call pyramids. Beyond that, it has been a cultural hub for traders and merchants from Europe and the Far East for centuries, all of which left behind bits of their culture, with the clearest imprints left by the Ottoman Empire and, in modern times, the British Empire at the height of its colonial power. What some would argue has remained Egypt‟s strongest asset through all of this change would be the Egyptian citizens themselves who continue to play an active role in the betterment of the country and their daily lives. Religion represents another integral facet of Egypt‟s framework. As a part of the Arab world and geographically connected to the founding land of Islam, it is no surprise that the overwhelming majority of the population of Egypt today is a follower of the Prophet Muhammad. Islam is entrenched in most aspects of daily life for the devout Egyptian and serves as the basis for a large number of social organizations and has branched out into political participation via popular elections. One such organization is known as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin or the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna (Mitchell, 1969). He outlines the aims of the organization when he stated, You are not a benevolent society, nor a political party, nor a local organization having limited purposes. Rather, you are a new soul in the 3 heart of the nation to give it life by means of the Quran…When asked what it is you propagate, reply that it is Islam, the message of Muhammad, the religion that contains within it government…If you are told that you are political, answer that Islam admits no such distinction. (as cited in Hopwood, 1991, p. 21) In other words, Islam is considered an all-encompassing religion and sees no separation of church and state, especially because it dictates a moral law for all believers to follow known as „shari‘a.‟ Therefore, along with many Islamic-based political organizations, the Brotherhood aims to end a secular government and replace it with the rules and laws as decreed by Islam (Harnisch & Mecham, 2009). Since their founding, they have slowly evolved to have an ever-more prevalent position in Egypt‟s political arena with significant gains in the Egyptian Parliament over the last fifteen years (Brown & Hamzawy, 2010). While the organization does provide a number of vital social welfare programs for the Egyptian population, it also represents the single largest political opposition group in Egypt, which has not gone unnoticed by past rulers (Brown & Hamzawy, 2010; Baker, 1990; Harnisch & Mecham, 2009). The Brotherhood‟s amazing success in transforming itself from a small social change organization to a massive revivalist movement “can be ascribed to its ability to… [provide] its followers with a total ideology identifying the ills of society and prescribing measures to remedy them…based on fundamentalist Islam… [advocating] total social, economic, and political reform” (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 19). 4 With every regime from the monarchy to Mubarak, there have been at least one or more periods of political strangulation and suffocation for opposition groups, and the Brotherhood has suffered the brunt of these mass arrests, abuse, and imprisonment. Surely an organization that has lasted through these kinds of harrowing times has had to conduct their business in a very careful and strategically planned manner so as to garner public support but not acquire the complete wrath of the governing leadership. Additionally, any organization in existence for over 80 years has inevitably changed over that time in both structure and intent, thus changing their overall message and relationship with their constituents. This study will combine the theoretical and practical importance of strategic narrative study with the political force and power that a non-state actor can have by examining the strategic narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood, which adds the extra dimension of political Islam. Trying to examine all of the communication messages composing the Brotherhood‟s strategic narrative spanning their eighty-plus year history of the organization is too large of a sample size to thoroughly analyze. Consequently, this study will focus first on a historical analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood‟s strategic narrative throughout its history, as understood by Western scholars, and secondly will conduct original research more narrowly focused on the narrative issued from the Brotherhood directly on Ikhwanweb.com, their English language website, from the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2010. 5 In the following pages, the strategic narrative of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood will be broken up into its past, present, and future components which collectively form the overall strategic narrative of the most influential sub- state actor in Egypt. Chapter one will consist of setting the groundwork to understand the Brotherhood‟s strategic narrative. An important component of a strategic narrative is to understand the context in which it exists and develops. Therefore, a summary of the Egyptian political milieu over the past ninety years will contextualize the Brotherhood‟s narrative as it has evolved to the present day. This contextualization is then supplemented by a discussion of relevant scholarship on the theoretical and practical applications of the burgeoning field of strategic narrative study. It will elucidate why examining the past, present, and intended future of an actor is necessary to codify its strategic narrative and how this conceptual lens is to be applied to this research. An explanation of the methodology and why it was chosen for this study will finish out the first chapter. Chapter two includes an in-depth survey of the Ikhwan’s historical narrative, as understood by western scholars, from the Brotherhood‟s founding up to the time period analyzed in this research. All of this leads into the original analysis of their current strategic narrative over the last three years as presented on their English-language website. The final chapter will conclude with a discussion, informed by this study and other relevant scholarship, of the final component of their narrative: the future direction of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin. 6 Egypt’s Political History: A contextualization of the Brotherhood‟s narrative Egypt has an astounding five-plus millennia-long history. Given the focus of this paper on al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, otherwise known as the Muslim Brotherhood, the last ninety years of Egypt‟s political evolution and correlating social change are the elements that most directly influenced the movement. Thus, this time period will be unpacked to fully contextualize the Brotherhood‟s motivations, challenges, and triumphs it has faced over the course of its existence that have all imparted their influence on the Brotherhood‟s strategic narrative or message disseminated to the public. The actions of the government explained below will inform the shifts and changes evident in the historical narrative of the Brotherhood unpacked in Chapter Two. Egypt‟s relevant political history begins under the rule of their last King. The political and social climate of his rule created the impetus for the Brotherhood‟s founding and original declaration of its intentions and goals, thus beginning its narrative. As time travels forward and the political system of Egypt drastically changes from one President to another, the ideas and actions of the Brotherhood change as well; therefore, it is first important to understand the nation-wide changes before exploring their effects in the Brotherhood‟s narrative. 7 Section 1: King Farouk and the British Protectorate In order to understand the situation that spawned the Ikhwan and their founding motivations and goals the examination of Egypt‟s past must travel back to when the governing system was a monarchy with a descendant of Ottoman ruler Muhammad Ali on the throne. The dynasty ruled from 1805 to 1953 and ended with the reign of King Farouk (Tignor, 2010). The King, though popular when he first took the throne at the young age of 16, soon became caught up in the opulent and grandiose lifestyle afforded to a monarch and was eventually overthrown in a military putsch (Dekmejian, 1971). Economic factors also contributed to the unrest under King Farouk (Dekmejian, 1971). The export economy of the 1850‟s to the 1920‟s was stimulated because, during this time, Egypt was considered a protectorate of the British Empire even though an Ottoman king was officially on the throne (Maghraoui, 2006). The cotton exported from Egypt went to supply Britain‟s textile factories; therefore, the British resisted and repressed the development of industrialization in Egypt while the rest of the world began to advance technologically (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007; Maghraoui, 2006). As Hopwood (1991) said, “Egyptian writers see in this period the origins of the underdevelopment of Egypt, when Britain actively discouraged industrialization and favored a policy of Laissez-faire” (p. 17). Although the country was never an official colony of the ever-expanding British Empire, Egypt‟s government and King followed the will of the crown and was always considered more of a mouthpiece than a legitimate governing body (Osman, 2010). King Farouk “had a flawed character 8 surrounding himself with corrupt advisers and flatterers, and his private life became a scandal,” according to Hopwood (1991), “If the British were the hated occupiers, Farouk became the symbol of the corrupt old regime” (p.21). Even though Egypt‟s status as an official protectorate ended in 1922, the British still maintained a heavy presence in the country‟s governance to protect its economic interests (Dekmejian, 1971; Hopwood, 1991; Perry, 2004). A new constitution, enacted in 1923, was even drafted to explain this new independence (Perry, 2004). No greater example of this mixing of freedom and continued British economic dominance can be found than the signing of the 1936 Anglo- Egyptian treaty, which chiseled away some of Britain‟s power but left them in control of the Suez Canal and the ability to maintain troops in the Sinai peninsula (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007; Tignor, 2010). The Great Depression of the 1920‟s affected the global economy and for the next thirty years Egypt felt its effects as it came to the realization that reliance on one export crop, for which demand dropped dramatically was not sound economic practice and the push for industrialization came to the forefront of Egyptian life. Wealthy landowners and the educated populace began investing in and/or replacing a large portion of the formally imported services in order to promote national enterprise (Hopwood, 1991). This period of transition also witnessed a large shift in the population with it nearly doubling from the start of the twentieth century to the middle of it, including a tripling of Cairo‟s population as many people left the farm and moved to an urban area in pursuit of work 9 (Hopwood, 1991; Perry, 2004). Seeing as Britain still pulled the economic and basic governing strings, all did not welcome this shift. Over time, the unrest and frustration with the ruling dynasty and their cooperation with the British began to reach a boiling point by the mid-1940s. “An overriding goal of Egyptian nationalists during the decades following formal independence was to end the British occupation and interference in the country‟s affairs” (Perry, 2004). The British were leery of the King‟s loyalty and commitment to the crown in the turbulent times of World War II and forced him to establish a new government with Nahhas Pasha as the new British approved Prime Minister (Hopwood, 1991; Tignor, 2010). The amount of pressure and meddling by the British did not go unnoticed by the Egyptian public, and in the end only strengthened their will to gain complete and total independence. The people never gave into the pressure of the British Empire and that fact is still nostalgically remembered. Egyptians proudly state that they were one of the few countries, if not the only, under the influence of the British flag that did not adopt English as their first language. In December 1945, this pride and will for independence exploded into the streets with riots and protests against the British crown and the unwillingness of British forces to depart the country or renegotiate the 1936 Treaty (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). Although the British agreed to leave the majority of Egypt by September 1949, save the Canal region, this didn‟t satisfy the controlling political party of the time and the Egyptian people. Rather, they demanded the complete 10 removal of the British presence and the Nile valley, meaning Egypt and Sudan, were unified, so no agreement could be reached (Hopwood, 1991). All of this unrest exploded several times over the course of the next five years culminating in the assassination of then Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmy Nuqrashi in 1948 after he clamped down on opposition groups (Perry, 2004). This was followed by the unilateral abrogation of the 1936 Treaty by the Egyptian government in 1951 after all negotiations repeatedly failed. Finally, „Black Saturday‟ on January 26, 1952 was a popular revolt that left more than fifty million pounds of damage and thirty foreigners dead. The revolt was a backlash to an attack by British forces on police barracks that killed fifty Egyptian officers (Hopwood, 1991; Tignor, 2010). Black Saturday signaled the end of King Farouk‟s reign and the rise of subversive opposition groups gaining power (Hopwood, 1991). One such group was the Free Officers made up of several high ranking military commanders who all came together under their anti-monarch position for Egyptian independence. Two leading officers of this group were Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat who would come to chart the course of Egypt for decades to come (Osman, 2010). While King Farouk was on the throne, however, they were part of an organization that worked to stir the will of the people against the monarch. When they learned that Farouk was going to have them arrested, they decided to act. As Hopwood (1991, p. 37) described, “it followed the classical lines of an army takeover. Armored cars encircled the military area at Abbasiya in Cairo, tanks took up position at strategic points, Sadat and assistants took over 11 the radio station, and some twelve generals were arrested. The army and city passed into their hands without hardly a shot fired.” With the army taking control in 1952, Egypt was declared a republic, parliament was disbanded, and the monarchy abolished. King Farouk perished in exile (Perry, 2004). “This was very much more than a mere coup d‟état. It was a true revolution that would affect, in varying degrees, all Egypt‟s classes and institutions and change the course of its history” (Mansfield, 1969). The Free Officers‟ first three objectives were to expel all British presence from the Canal Zone, socialize or regulate commerce (namely agrarian law), and most importantly eliminate any opposition (Hopwood, 1991). A multitude of turmoil and inner-party disagreements came to fruition during the first year of Free Officer rule, and it ultimately resulted in the forced resignation of the first Prime Minister General Neguib, making former Deputy Prime Minister Nasser the ruling Prime Minister. As Nasser became Prime Minister, institutionalized military rule became the law of the land and assembly elections were indefinitely postponed (Hopwood, 1991; Osman, 2010; Perry, 2004). Nasser becoming Prime Minister ushered a new era of political, economic, and social change for the former kingdom with its effects to be felt around the world, as it became an important player in the strategic game of global politics during the Cold War. 12 Section II: Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab unity objective Nasser took power as the Cold War was just starting to heat up, but he was not eager to pick sides given Egypt‟s former relationship with the British. Although he opposed their presence and meddling in Egypt, he was still hesitant to cut all ties, and therefore initially established a non-alignment policy so as not to burn or cross any bridges by siding with the West or the Communist Bloc. Once he required more arms, though, he initially went to the Western powers, as Egypt had previously done. The offer he was presented had strings attached in the form of treaties that went against the desires of the Egyptian people. Simultaneously, Russia started courting Nasser offering him needed arms and treating him as an equal. After a British threat enraged Nasser, he entered into an arms agreement with Soviet-sponsored Czechoslovakia, which sent shock waves through the West and ultimately left the West alienated (Hopwood, 1991). While acting on the international stage, Nasser simultaneously focused his efforts on Arab politics, as well. Previously, in the 1920‟s and 1930‟s, Cairo had become the cultural heart of the Arab world and as it developed, so did its position as the center of everything Arab. The Arab League established it headquarters there in 1945 and an ideological conflict with Iraq, along with the problems surrounding the foundation of Israel, brought the concerns of the Arab world to the Nasser‟s doorstep. Out of this involvement in the Arab world, Nasser became the leader of the secular Arab nationalist movement (Mansfield, 1969). His popularity among the Arab world continued to grow and flourish as he made strategic steps against Western/imperialist powers. Nasser decided to 13 nationalize the Suez Canal as a final way to cut off ties with the West, which he believed kept treating him and Egypt as a lesser pawn in a world-sized Cold War chess game which could be manipulated, threatened, or coerced into submission (Calvert, 2010). He slyly took control of the Canal in 1956 through an intricate plan executed while he gave a three hour-long speech (Hopwood, 1991; Osman, 2010). This scene—filled with much more drama than the above description conveys—drew tears from millions of viewers, in Egypt and across the Arab world. At that moment in history Gamal Abdel Nasser was… asserting national pride; standing up against the imperialist powers that had dominated the region for decades; emotionally freeing millions of oppressed Arabs and Egyptians; through his actions—and this in his person—effecting the rebirth of Egyptian (and Arab) dignity (Osman, 2010, p. 49). After Nasser‟s announcement of the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, their was an elaborate build-up of arms and tension which finally resulted in a “Tripartite Collusion” of British, French, and Israeli forces clashing with Egyptian forces. When Egypt emerged victorious in the battle for the Suez Canal and became its autonomous ruler, free from all international interference, Nasser became larger than a mere man and skyrocketed to the status of the unquestioned Arab leader who could unite all Arabs and return their culture back to the glory days in the hearts of the Arab people (Mansfield, 1969). Shortly after the battle for the Canal, Iraq fell to pro-Arab forces and its king was assassinated, leaving no formidable opponent of Nasserism, as the secular Arab nationalist movement had become known, in the Middle East. The man himself was at the 14 height of his popularity. He was the hero of the Arab people who stood proudly looking down at his disabled enemies (Mansfield, 1969; Osman, 2010). In 1958, Nasser and Syria entered into an agreement forming the United Arab Republic based on the hopes of Arab unity, greater power for Nasser and a sort of strength in numbers against the Communists and other foreign powers (Hopwood, 1991). With Nasser the leader of the United Arab Republic and his enemies struggling, he seemed poised to drastically expand his ideals and vision for Arab unity to other Arab countries, but it was not so simple. A rocky rule over Syria and an inability actually successfully unite the Arab population, found Nasser slipping from favor in the Arab world by 1961 (Mansfield, 1969). After Egypt‟s federation with Syria fell apart, Egypt‟s political clout over other Arab states seemed to as well. Nasserism was so fiercely attacked that he withdrew Egypt from the Arab League in 1962 (Mansfield, 1969). With a regime change in Iraq and the Syrian government falling to a coup, a renewed push towards Arab unity resurged and a tripartite state between Egypt, Iraq, and Syria with a federation including Yemen and Algeria seemed completely plausible and came to fruition in 1963 (Mansfield, 1969). Secular Arab nationalism looked as though it could unite multiple, independent nations through an ethnic identity (Perry, 2004). This union came to a quick end, though, as collusion between the Syrian and Iraqi Baathists basically disintegrated the Tripartite State. Wanting to disassociate himself with another failed attempt at a united Arab nation, Nasser focused his attention on the rising concern about the balance of power in the Middle East, specifically between Israel and other Arab 15 states. The feeble military capabilities of most Arab countries worried many Middle Eastern powers as the possibility of war with Israel began escalating in 1964 (Mansfield, 1969). Because Israel borders Egypt, the relationship between the two was always tense. In 1964, however, hostility increased as raiding brigades from both sides would cause havoc on their victims and, by proxy, the entire country, until eventually the Egyptian populace and the Army demanded a stronger retaliation. The growing possibility of war with Israel necessitated the convening of a conference in Cairo with all the heads of Arab States. By the completion of the conference, Egypt had once again re-opened all diplomatic channels with all the Arab states, namely with King Hussein of Jordan in an effort to fortify the Arab cause against Israel (Mansfield, 1969). As tensions also escalated between Syria and Israel through their own growing skirmishes, Egypt simultaneously entered into a payments and trade agreement with their fellow United Arab Republic country and ultimately into an all-inclusive defensive alliance as well. Israel also engaged in skirmishes with Jordan, and King Hussein began to prod Nasser with public criticism for his inactivity. This criticism coupled with building pressure from the entire Arab community and Nasser‟s public and frequent proclamations of military supremacy in the Arab world culminated in a political chess game that set Nasser up for failure (Mansfield, 1969; Phizicky, 2007). John Hadden, the CIA chief in Israel in 1967 when this escalation occurred, said in the documentary Six Days in June, “For me it was just like a little boy who was being held by his father, and 16 the little boy is shouting „let me at him, let me at him,‟ and he doesn‟t want to be let at him at all, but all of a sudden, the father lets go of him. And then they were off and running weren‟t they?” This was very much the case of Nasser‟s situation in the Six Day War of 1967 between Israel and Egypt, which not only changed Egyptian-Israeli relations but also altered the entire power structure of the Middle East for decades to come. As explained in the documentary mentioned above by Phizicky (2007), Nasser received intelligence, via a Soviet diplomat to Egypt, that Israel was planning an imminent attack on Syria. Because of the mutual defense pact Egypt had with Syria, Nasser quickly started exploring the possibilities of war with Israel upon their attack. Egypt‟s actions of obvious hostility towards Israel, like making a huge production of moving large numbers of troops out into the Sinai Peninsula, only inflated the confidence of the Arab masses in a guaranteed victory. In reality, though, the Egyptian army was poorly trained and even more poorly organized while the Israeli army was disciplined and determined. As anti- Israeli messages were broadcast into Israel in Hebrew from Egyptian radio stations, the Israelis‟ resolve to fight till the end only hardened. Additionally, both Israel and Egypt‟s firm ties to the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, kept the countries at bay as tensions continued to build. The Soviets who supplied almost all of Egypt‟s military equipment and support, ordered Nasser to not strike first while the U.S. was unable to pledge any physical support to Israel outside of equipment if there was a conflict. Therefore, after a very obvious escalation of diplomatic and militaristic moves, including the 17 removal of UN Peace Keeping troops in the Sinai and the closing of the Straits of Tehran to Israeli vessels, Israel shattered the silence with a surprise air attack early in the morning on June 5, 1967 (Hopwood, 1991; Perry, 2004; Phizicky, 2007). It was a complete Israeli success, destroying all of Egypt‟s air capabilities and a large amount of their arms supplies. Egypt was forced to scramble and assemble their ground troops, but due to botched communication, they were ill prepared to face Israeli ground forces. They suffered horrific defeat on the battlefield in the Sinai, but instead of reporting this to the Egyptian population, the main radio in Cairo broadcast that the Egyptian Army garnered huge success. As Israel drove into the Sinai, Egyptian forces quickly retreated in disorganization and chaos, which caused a large number of Egyptian causalities either at the hand of Israeli forces or the elements. The Israelis captured the Sinai in just four days and by June 10th a ceasefire agreement was signed between the two nations (Phizicky, 2007). After just six days of war, Israel now controlled three and a half times more land than they had before the war. With an estimated ten to fifteen thousand Egyptian soldiers dead and a humiliating Israeli occupation of the Sinai and Canal among the agreements of the ceasefire, “most people believed this was the end of Nasser. Attitudes toward his downfall ranged from hope to dark despair; but there were few even among his enemies, who did not see him as a tragic figure with qualities of courage and nobility” (Mansfield, 1969, p. 83). 18 Egypt‟s rise to the top in the Arab world crumbled as fast as their army‟s resistance did. The day after the ceasefire was accepted, Nasser publicly placed the blame for the Egyptian defeat upon his own shoulders. He then announced he would relinquish his power and position to the Vice-President. The public outcry against his resignation was resounding and clear, which resulted in him reconsidering his decision and accepting the public‟s wish for him to stay president (Mansfield, 1969; Osman, 2010). Though he stayed in power and remained the leader of the Arab world, Nasser was never the same. “The defeat in 1967 had vast strategic implications. Nasser, unlike almost any other Arab leader, truly represented his people‟s will. A military defeat of such dramatic magnitude was a direct blow to the people‟s—and the nation‟s—determination” (Osman, 2010). Egypt still stood as a leader in the Arab world but its role was also different from what it was previously. Nasser, however, “was still a prisoner of the modern Arab nationalist movement he had helped to create. Even if he wanted to, he could not escape”(Mansfield, 1969, p. 88). In the last few years of his life, the President and former hero of Egypt diligently worked to offset the debt of his past failings and errors (Osman, 2010). Gamal Abdel Nasser died of a heart attack on September 28, 1970 after a lengthy effort to end the sparring between Palestinian guerrillas and the Jordanian army. Given his popularity, his death was mourned amidst outpourings of love and support throughout Egypt and the Arab world (Beattie, 2000). His passing left the first ruling power gap in eighteen years and no other 19 leader seemed big enough to fill it. Because Nasser was technically the President, his Vice President and fellow Free Officer, Anwar Sadat, took office upon his death, although he was an unknown figure to the people of Egypt. Even though he started in the shadows of Nasser‟s enormous footprint on Egyptian history, Sadat would quickly step into the light and start his own path into history books. Section III: Anwar Sadat and Egypt’s liberalization Anwar Sadat rose to political prominence as one of the original Free Officers who overthrew the King. During Nasser‟s rule he had been Secretary of The Islamic Congress and National Union and Speaker of National Assembly. In December 1969, he was finally appointed Vice President by Nasser and, therefore, assumed the presidency upon Nasser‟s passing (Hopwood, 1991). Little was known of what direction Sadat‟s policies and presidency would take, especially with the legacy of his predecessor so unclear. Though it took Sadat some time to get his footing, his divergent views soon came to light as he became more acquainted and comfortable with his position of power. Unlike his virulently secular predecessor, Sadat wanted Egypt to be a nation of “science and faith” and made shari‛a the main source for legislation with a constitutional amendment in 1979—though it was haphazardly adhered to in practice (Ibrahim, 1988). Furthermore, Sadat “found that his position with regard to foreign policy was diametrically opposed to that of Nasser... Sadat‟s avowed aim was to build a society „of dignity, serenity, tranquility and 20 affluence‟—brave words in the face of such formidable problems” (Hopwood, 1991, p. 105). Egypt‟s close relationship with the Soviet Union soon began to chafe, along with the socialist policies of Nasser. He swiftly launched what he deemed „the revolution of rectification‟ to compensate for the errors and distortion of the 1952 revolution and implemented policies that began to liberalize the political and economic sectors, like the nullification of the private property sequestration order (Osman, 2010). The economic liberalization only worsened an already strained relationship with the Soviet Union, but Sadat was stuck in relations with them (Perry, 2004). The USSR provided all weaponry to Egypt, whose constant supply would not be easy to recover or replace if ties were broken between the two countries. From 1971 to 1973, the USSR and Egypt went through several warming and cooling periods of relations. Initially Sadat signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1971. He later forced all 15,000 Soviet military specialists out of Egypt, though relations later warmed again in 1973 resulting in their largest arms deal to date (Hopwood, 1991). However, seeing that relations were deteriorating with the Soviet Union overall, Sadat sought support elsewhere. In view of the fact that Israel was still occupying the Sinai and one of his major objectives was the removal of said forces, Sadat went to the United States for aid and their influence on Israel (Tignor, 2010). Sadat tried to introduce a peace initiative with Israel via the U.S. in 1971, but when this failed, he decided to shake up the region by going to war. With all Soviet military influence expunged from Egypt, he was free to plan to 21 attack Israel as he saw fit (Hopwood, 1991). Though all the world powers thought another Egyptian confrontation with Israel spelled another swift, resounding defeat for Egypt, Sadat ordered troops to cross the Israeli-occupied Canal and fortifications on October 6th, 1973 (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007; Tignor, 2010). The attack surprised Israeli forces, and though they recovered quickly and pushed back across the canal thanks only to emergency American aid, they nearly faced defeat (Beattie, 2000). Sixteen days later, little had changed in battle lines and one Egyptian battalion was facing starvation so both sides agreed to a ceasefire sponsored by the United-Nations (Hopwood, 1991). Though no clear victor existed, the war elevated Sadat enormously in the eyes of Egyptians. They saw themselves as the obvious winner since Israel only avoided defeat with Western help (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). One of the major consequences of the October 6th War and one that Sadat hoped for all along was the involvement of the United States in the Middle East peace process. U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, worked diligently on the ceasefire and then closely with Sadat in the months following, which resulted in a release of the Suez Canal by Israel in 1974. A diplomatic relationship was also rekindled between Egypt and the United States for the first time since 1967. By 1975, further peace was reached between the two nations in the form of Israel returning Sinai land and oilfields in exchange for a promise by Egypt to not employ armed force again (Hopwood, 1991; Beattie, 2000). Domestically, Sadat also diverged from the policies of his socialist predecessor and by the mid-1970‟s had introduced widespread economic 22 liberalization known as al-infitah or “the opening,” with international banks and foreign currency operating in Egypt and guarantees against nationalization and of exemption from some laws applied to public sector business (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007; Beattie, 2000; Tignor, 2010). As Kirk J. Beattie explained, Although infitah was slow to attract foreign direct investment and boost Egyptian manufacturing in general, the rapid growth of revenues from petroleum exports, tourism, the Suez Canal, and Egyptian workers‟ foreign remittances greatly altered the country‟s socioeconomic picture…In contrast to the years of austere socialism, Egypt now seemed awash in money. However, this money was very unevenly distributed, and most of it either went toward increased consumption or was kept abroad; not enough was channeled into productive investment in Egypt. (2000, p. 211) Soon Cairo‟s shops became filled with imported goods and worldwide hotel chains started dotting the landscape, as the liberalization allowed for an influx of foreign merchandise and consumption. Not all citizens benefited from this influx of wealth, however, and the class disparities soon became painfully obvious. Whether disgruntled by the departure from Nasser‟s egalitarian views or unhappy with their quality of living quickly worsening with inflation and reduced government subsidies, the liberalizing President soon had an extremely dissatisfied population with which to contend (Beattie, 2000). This tension erupted on January 18, 1977, when the government ended subsidies on several staple food items as an appeasement to the World Bank from whom Egypt was soliciting loans. The public outrage and unhappiness could be heard in the streets as massive protests strangled the city and Sadat‟s resolve in his policy change. He rescinded the changes immediately and the army was forced to end the riots and restore the peace. 23 Sadat was left shaken and threatened, which resulted in a tightening of the political strings he had been slowly loosening (Tignor, 2010). Sadat saw prosperity for his country and policies only through achieving peace with Israel. In 1977, he even went to Jerusalem to negotiate for a solution for Palestinians and for lasting Arab/Israeli peace with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in person, though his actions were immediately repudiated in the Arab world. Sadat sincerely believed Allah had put it upon him to foster peace in the region. Soon the United States got involved with the peace negotiations and brought them to Camp David near Washington D.C. In a historic first, all three countries struck a deal. Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty, which came to be known as the September 1978 Camp David Peace Accords. These Accords stated that, “normal diplomatic and trade relations were to be established, and Israeli ships would pass unhindered through the Suez Canal. The USA would monitor Sinai and Egypt would be unable to act entirely freely in the area” (Beattie, 2000; Hopwood, 1991, p. 110). As one might imagine, Sadat‟s peace initiative was lauded in the West but ill received in the Arab world. Egypt was promptly excommunicated from the Arab League, which cut all diplomatic ties and moved its headquarters to Tunis. Though peace was won, the cost was far more than Sadat expected. Egypt was left in almost total political isolation and completely dependent on the United States. Sadat‟s unpopularity only increased with little progress in the domestic situation of the nation‟s poor. Feeling further threatened, he again 24 clenched his already tight ruling fist to strangle domestic political opposition and continued to alienate himself from the Egyptian people (Osman, 2010). Ultimately, he not only lost public favor for his dramatic policy shifts, peace with Israel, and alliance with the West; he lost his life. While observing a military parade honoring his victory in the October Sixth War in the heart of Cairo, a group of Islamic extremists opened fire from the parade on the watching president, resulting in his death (Beattie, 2000; Perry, 2004; Hopwood, 1991). Sadat‟s time in power, like his predecessor‟s, altered the path of Egypt politically, socially, and economically, the effects of which are still clearly evident today. He devoted the majority of his presidency to the pursuit of peace and the Camp David Peace Accords still stand as a testament to this. The diplomatic tie rekindled between Egypt and United States brought about by Sadat‟s liberalization efforts represents the other enormously important development of his rule. Sadat shocked to life a long-dead relationship with America, one that has remained strong for the past thirty-five years. Section IV: Hosni Mubarak and the maintenance of the status quo Sadat was not alone while surveying the parade the day of his death. Vice President Hosni Mubarak was among those reviewing the troops with Sadat and managed to survive the incoming machine gun fire and grenade explosions with only minor wounds. Seven others were not as fortunate and lost their lives, while twenty-seven others were injured (Perry, 2004; Hopwood, 1991). With Sadat 25 gone, Mubarak ascended the presidency in October 1981 and this relatively unknown and extremely cautious former air force lieutenant would prove to surpass his predecessors‟ time as the head of the Egyptian state (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007; Phizicky, 2007; Tignor, 2010). Having served loyally under Sadat in the October Sixth War, he was made Vice President in 1975 and consequently the Vice President of the ruling National Democratic Party 1978 (Hopwood, 1991). Therefore, when Mubarak took control under such tumultuous conditions, he was not eager to depart drastically from the policies and direction of Sadat. “By nature cautious, almost his first public words were that he would never make a promise he could not fulfil [sic]—an admirable aim for a politician, but one which could be an excuse for inaction” (Hopwood, 1991, p. 184). Mubarak may have kept to the course laid out by Sadat but he did not have the same style of leadership (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). He was somber and calculating in his decision-making unlike the sometimes shocking, wildcard thought process of Sadat (Osman, 2010). This steadfastness would prove to be one of his keys to staying in power for three decades. One of the main policies Mubarak continued was al-infitah, but with a focus on production instead of the exorbitant amount of consumption experienced under Sadat, in hopes of bringing prosperity to the nation‟s poor(al- Sayyid Marsot, 2007). He sought to right the errors made by the previous administration by seeking a hybrid economic policy between the fluidity and unpredictability of Sadat‟s capitalist economy and the restrictions and inflexibility of Nasser‟s socialist policies (Hopwood, 1991). 26 As is the case in numerous „Third World „countries, the wealth gap between the rich and poor was a gaping wound in society festering with corruption and resentment. To keep the population from revolting, all government subsidies were a necessity, which proved to constitute a habitually sticky issue when seeking financial support from international lending organizations like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. “The debt began to be contracted after the Camp David accords, when loans were given as reward but at a time when interest rates were high” (Hopwood, 1991, p. 193). Over the years, Mubarak continually struggled with the realities of the Egyptian economy needing reforms in areas of the economy, price and trade regulation, and private sector development while also keeping his citizens placated, after the slash in subsidies under Sadat resulted in the so called, „Bread Riots‟ of 1977 (Hopwood, 1991; Tignor, 2010). Despite the economic tight-rope walk just described, the President managed to continue the „open-door policy‟ of his predecessor and the mid 1990‟s even saw an acceleration of liberalization resulting in Egypt‟s admittance to the World Trade Organization in 1995 and its official membership in the globalized liberal economy (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). Overall, though the situation of the poor did not improve much under his rule, he did manage to keep stability throughout the country through the maintenance of his predecessors‟ police state (Osman, 2010) In addition to preserving the economic status quo, Mubarak also continued the dramatic shift in foreign policy Sadat began, namely Egypt‟s 27 alliance with the United States and the observance of the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel. He also began to thaw relations with other Arab states. Because Mubarak was not directly associated with the peace treaty, he was able to make progress with other Arab players by avoiding caustic language and demonstrating Egypt‟s importance in the region (Hopwood, 1991). Egypt has been the center of cultural and intellectual development for thousands of years and whether they liked it or not, other Arab states could not completely ignore it (Beattie, 2000; Tripp, 1989). “Almost all Arab states restored diplomatic relations with Egypt by the late 1980‟s. Egypt‟s membership in various Arab and Islamic organizations gradually resumed, as well” (Perry, 2004, p. 139). Simultaneously, Mubarak‟s relationship with the United States led to Egypt receiving the largest amount of foreign aid to any Third World country totaling two billion dollars each year. This also helped solidify his rule, as the U.S. supported him despite its semi-authoritarian ways. As reflected in the amount of aid given each year, the Mubarak regime was the backbone to American foreign policy in the region and to peace with Israel; yet, when American actions proved displeasing to the Egyptian population, his alliance threatened the very stability of his regime. Therefore, Mubarak utilized his political astuteness to cooperate with the West on important issues while preserving his Arab authority by openly disapproving of some American foreign policies and actions (Tignor, 2010). “Mubarak sometimes criticized U.S. policies on the Palestine question and on such issues as the harsh sanctions that punished the Iraqi people for so long, but this benefitted both him and his American 28 patrons alike by legitimizing him at home and in the Arab world” (Perry, 2004, p. 141). American aid and influence both reinforced Mubarak‟s position while weakening it, but ultimately his semi-authoritarian regime maintained dominance and control. Internally, Egypt‟s political system under Mubarak sought to cleanse Egypt of the religious extremism that took Sadat‟s life, since several factions of Egyptian society thought that their hardships were the result of a secular government and sought to correct these grievances by advocating a political system based on Islam with the implementation of shari‘a law. Outside this crackdown, Mubarak initially seemed to promote steps towards a legitimate democracy by allowing the creation and public discussion of opposition groups, as long as they did not go past certain boundaries in their criticisms (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). He even went as far as to say, “„Egypt is for all society—not a privileged few or the chosen elite or the sectarian dictatorship‟” (Hopwood, 1991, p. 184). To initially gain favor with the Egyptian people, he slowly began to tolerate the existence of a more robust political system, allowing the resurrection of parties disbanded under Sadat, the printing of their newspapers and other forms of discussion, and releasing political prisoners (Baker, 1990). This liberalization seemed promising but as he settled into power, those steps towards democracy began to slow to a mere crawl as he decided that too much liberalization would be just as detrimental to stability as an unflinchingly despotic rule. Over the years, though, the authoritarian nature of Mubarak‟s predecessors‟ became evident in his own presidency, most noticeably in his 29 failure to appoint a Vice President (Perry, 2004). Hopwood (1991, p. 186) explained why Mubarak halted his promising steps towards a legitimate democracy stating, “Once an opposition is legalized and open debate permitted there is virtually no end to the demands.” Mubarak did tolerate more political expression than former presidents; it is true, but it is important to understand that it was a manipulated toleration with very specific limits as to how far that expression could go and what exactly it could address (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). The main radio, television and newspapers were all government controlled and they would censor other media outside their own that pushed the limits. Journalists were routinely detained from alternative newspapers for reporting beyond the limitations set by the regime, while parties‟ papers were simply shut down if their criticisms went to far (Osman, 2010). The elections held were poor impersonations of the democratic principle with widespread corruption, and in recent years, there have been significant rumors encircling the National Democratic Party (NDP) that Mubarak was in fact planning for his son to succeed him as president by promoting him to a lead position within the ruling party in 2002 (Perry, 2004). What made this so scandalous was that it was almost assured that the next president would come from the leading positions of the NDP. Another important component of his semi-authoritarian rule was the liberties afforded to him by the “Emergency Law‟. A central reality of the Mubarak years was the Emergency Law put in force at the beginning of his rule and renewed by the People‟s Assembly every three years with only a few opposition members opposing it. It was a crime 30 for more than five people to meet without a permit. Publications deemed a danger to national security could be banned. The law could deprive people of essentially any civil rights. In accordance with legal authorization to detain people without charges for a month (renewable indefinitely), … The law ultimately suspends democratic rights that are inconvenient for the government (Perry, 2004, pp. 134-135). Though opposition parties do exist within Egypt and multiparty elections do occur, having a political system that is capable of haphazardly canceling civil rights cannot qualify as a democracy. It is easy to see that Hosni Mubarak, while allowing for more plurality than his predecessors, still maintained the semi- authoritarian rule supposedly eradicated by the Free Officers when they overthrew the King. What has shifted dramatically since that time is the position of Egypt on the international stage. This examination of the dominant political events and influences directly affecting the attitudes and beliefs of Egypt‟s people for the last eighty years is critical to completely understanding the social movements that have consequently emerged within this political system. It also plays a key role in determining what factors most shape these organizations‟ story or strategic narrative to connect with disenfranchised parts of the population garnering support and strength. The next section will unpack the scholarly discourse surrounding the strategic narrative and outline why its analysis is important. 31 Literature Review The scholarly study of strategic narratives and their use in international relations is a burgeoning field. Strategic narratives constitute a hybrid area of study based on the long existing base of discourse narrative theory developed along the lines of group identity and most commonly applied to the behaviors and messages of state actors within the international political system. The field of narrative analysis was all but disavowed in the 1930‟s and 1940‟s because it was thought to be unscientific, obscure, individualistic, and too broad to represent reality, but it has since been embraced and revered for those precise qualities, resulting in growth and specialization within the field (Ewick & Silbey, 1995). This growth has resulted in the more recent fusion of narratives and international relations theory thus creating strategic narrative analysis. Strategic narrative analysis is the conceptual lens through which to examine the deliberate, forward looking communication of substantial powers characterizing the actors, actions, and goals that are deemed significant and codified into a coherent narrative disseminated to the world to garner influence in the international system (Antoniades, Miskimmon, & O'Loughlin, 2009; Freedman, 2006; Roselle, 2010). Strategic narratives are often thought to be extremely similar to framing analysis, which examines the words, phrases, and images consistently used to create an ethos around a certain event, issue or actor (Entman, 2004). Framing analysis has a large following in the study of political and media communication because it is often a way to determine bias or spin, but it is limited in looking at a particular event, issue, or actor outside the context in which it occurs, the history 32 that led to it, or where it will go in the future. In other words, strategic narratives combine many instances of framing analysis and makes connections over time that coalesce into a consistent narrative of actors, actions, and goals that promote state identity and the future envisioned by the leadership of said the state. Thus using a state or sub-state actor‟s strategic narrative as the conceptual lens international relations theorists can understand why powers project themselves in the manner they do (Roselle, 2010). To understand the development and importance of strategic narratives, one must first examine how scholars constitute a narrative. They exist in many different forms and places but they all serve a basic purpose: to frame the human experience in a logical, set system of language and order, culminating in the expression of a story that can be interpreted by others (Antoniades, Miskimmon, & O'Loughlin, 2009; Braid, 1996; Ewick & Silbey, 1995). Several scholars posit that narratives are the lynchpin in bridging the chasm between everyday life and over-arching structures of social order (Ewick & Silbey, 1995; Scholes, 1980; White, 1980). Many foreign situations and thought processes are unintelligible to those unfamiliar with them unless embodied in the familiar structure and form of a narrative; therefore, the single most important characteristic of a narrative is its ability to personify experience (Braid, 1996). One of the best examples of this is the use of parables to convey principles of behavior and belief in all three of the world‟s most popular monotheistic religions. These stories present information of an ostensible past experience, interpreted by the author and presented in a relatable format, thus, available to 33 be experienced by the audience. By acquiring an awareness of the story people use in their own lives one can ascertain their understanding of their situation, the future in front of them and the amount of empowerment they possess to affect that future (Baker, 1990). Stories also demonstrate that narratives act as a „metacode,‟ which translates culturally differentiated messages into transmittable messages of common reality (White, 1980). Scholars do agree on the basic components that construct a narrative, namely that it has a temporally organized beginning, middle, and an end with a series of seemingly connected past individuals and events that are codified into a bounded, resonating and influential whole (Braid, 1996; Ewick & Silbey, 1995; Froese; Pentland, 1999; Smith, 1980). Although narratives have a set structure, that does not mean they are simply sequenced logically, akin to an argument. But, scholars suggest they are instead developed through a plot permeated by the contextual ether and contingencies from which they came, leaving its conclusion inundated from predictability (Braid, 1996; Pentland, 1999). Additionally, narratives have an identifiable central actor or group with an obvious voice indicating a particular perspective frequently in a struggle or connected to some larger structure (Ewick & Silbey, 1995; Pentland, 1999). Often times, these stories inform and support prevailing ideologies from the family level all the way to the state and international level with a strategically chosen series of details that create a complete ethos disseminated to a receptive audience (Ewick & Silbey, 1995; Froese). This idea, put forth by many scholars, comes to life in an example given by Peter Ehrenhaus (1993) in his examination of the 34 dominant narrative pervasive throughout American culture about Vietnam‟s dysfunctional nature and the rehabilitative agenda as reasons for American involvement in their war (as cited in Ewick & Silbey, 1995). In addition to furthering the hegemonic ideology, Ewick and Silbey (1995) also posit that narratives can function as a vehicle to further the opposite, subversive story by appealing to a specific cohort of people or individual amongst the general social organization. This establishes a foundation in which to root experiences contrary to the hegemonic tale. Thus, narratives allow both the dominating and opposition‟s voices a relatable way to articulate their story and interests and create a mechanism to analyze shifts in those voices as illustrated by Table 1 found in Froese. As Table 1 indicates, in addition to straightforward statements, narratives most commonly include and utilize a number of different types of evidence from historical facts to philosophical ideas, which help to frame the overall message of the narrative (Froese; Smith, 1980). 35 Scholars unpack this use of evidence in the context of lenses and how the viewpoint or voice of a narrative affects said narrative. Hymes argues that how one experiences the world and then interprets that experience does not include all the facts of the situation and is inherently subjective and dependent on the frameworks of understanding developed through one‟s own lived experience. Furthermore, he conjectures that each individual narrative is a direct product of 36 the narrator‟s own worldview and understanding of the experience, thus narratives differ not because they are about a different experience but because of one‟s own personal influences (as cited in Braid, 1996). This does not render narrative analysis useless when trying to apply it to a larger group, though. Many scholars agree that there is a copious amount of rich data to be gleaned from examining narratives from multiple viewpoints around the same central idea (Boje, 1991; Brown A. D., 1998; Pentland, 1999). Moreover, when studying narratives through a historical lens, they are subject to alternative rules than those of fiction, allowing for the incorporation and analyzing of extra-textual facts to shore up the narrator‟s ideology (Froese; Scholes, 1980; Smith, 1980). These extra-textual facts can include the external forces exerting pressure on an organization, creating the subversive narratives discussed previously, and makes it easy to see how narrative analysis is an excellent way to examine social movements (Ewick & Silbey, 1995). In addition to the individual experience, a narrative can be a main form of expressing the interests, history, and overall culture of an organization, as well as constitute the main vehicle through which the organization transmits all of the components to the rest of the world (Ewick & Silbey, 1995; Pentland, 1999). The importance of organizational narrative analysis lies in the fact that by dissecting the overall narrative material, researchers are able to understand the data and points of reference members enlist to interpret and judge their own actions (Pentland, 1999). Some scholars argue that narratives can actually function as apparatuses of social dominance and warn their audiences about nonconformity‟s 37 cost if the hegemonic instructions are not followed (Ewick & Silbey, 1995). With this in mind, it is logical to observe the traits of power inequality and social unrest within subversive narratives as they attempt to expand the constraints of the hegemonic tale in addition to illuminating the merits of their own cause (Ewick & Silbey, 1995). This line of scholarly inquiry into the narrative of hegemonic and subversive powers has been layered on top of research into the dynamics of nation-state identity and politics on the global stage to create the prospering field of strategic narrative analysis. Most scholars agree on the important role of the narrative in the coalescence of identity, both of the individual and group, especially when applied to the nation-state (Antoniades, Miskimmon, & O'Loughlin, 2009; Braid, 1996; Freedman, 2006). Thus, in accordance with the aims of any narrative, scholarly research of strategic narratives concerns itself with the investigation of the manner in which nations communicate their culture and agendas. Additionally, the consequential interactions and reception of said narratives among other states, especially in matters of legitimacy and power are also analyzed (Antoniades, Miskimmon, & O'Loughlin, 2009). One may question the difference between a strategic narrative and a regular story or state promotion, and rightfully so, as the lines can seem blurry. Scholars, like Douglas, have addressed and debunked this muddled-lines argument though, asserting that strategic narratives are theoretical frameworks to explicate and interpret things in the future instead of explanations buffered by hindsight (ISA 2008 paper as cited in Roselle 2010). This differentiation insinuates that in 38 addition to containing the elements of a story like plot, characters, sequence, and a point of view, strategic narratives also deliberately include over-arching and obvious communiqué concerning future action, goals, and affairs (Freedman, 2006; Roselle, 2010). The clear intention and importance of strategic narratives is best argued by Antoniades, Miskimmon, and O‟Loughin (2009, p. 2) when they said, “It is through the use of strategic narratives that emerging and great powers can project their values and interests in order to extend their influence, manage expectation and change the discursive environment in which they operate.” Furthermore, scholars contend that strategic narratives address the intangible factors in the international system, specifically identity and cultural values, while creating frames through which people cognitively assess and interpret reality including other cultures and nations, their interactions with them, and events and policies concerning them, otherwise known as international relations (Antoniades, Miskimmon, & O'Loughlin, 2009; Freedman, 2006; Roselle, 2010). To further differentiate strategic narratives from the foundational narrative, Roselle (2010, p. 4) breaks them down into the proceeding components: Who takes what actions in pursuit of what goals for what purpose and why does this make sense in time, space, and history All of these factors go into the construction of state communication messages and thus reflect the self-perception of that state. From these narratives, one can 39 discern rich data about identity and direction among various other aspects of the state‟s overall goals and objectives. Nations today do not exist in a communication vacuum, though. Instead, the official communication output of the state is integrated into the exponentially expanding and diversifying media ecology of the technology age and scholars are taking notice. Rousseau (2006) theorizes that a positive correlation exists between the level of collective identity amongst a group and the amount of media concentration. He posits that as the media continue to fracture, providing ever more outlets for various communications, the shared identity may continue to splinter along with it (Roselle, 2010). One of the dominating characteristics of the developing media ecology is the opportunity for active audience participation and influence in media content and even in creating their own content. Scholars argue that this phenomena extends to the realm of public diplomacy in that, in addition to the traditional channels of content transmission to external publics, the new media ecology has created a “new „bottom up‟ public diplomacy by enabling publics to interact and, perhaps, „influence‟ each other independently of government communications… [where] authority is increasingly mobile, provisional, collective and anonymous” (Antoniades, Miskimmon, & O'Loughlin, 2009, pp. 7-8). As one might suppose, it will become increasingly difficult for policymakers and scholars alike to anticipate how strategic state communications will be engulfed, digested and regurgitated by the domestic, international, and transnational media monster that modern technology has created. Thus the range 40 of sources applicable to the field of strategic narratives continues to grow and diversify, creating an ever more relevant demand for its expansion as an academic field of study. This phenomena, coupled with the growing interconnectedness and necessity of understanding of state identities within the international political realm, positions the strategic narrative as a potentially crucial and beneficial theoretical structure to examine international relations in the modern media ecology (Antoniades, Miskimmon, & O'Loughlin, 2009; Roselle, 2010). This study seeks to fill a gap in the literature presented above. While narratives exist from the individual to international level, the primary examination of strategic narratives has been done on the nation-state level in relation to foreign policy and states‟ position on the international stage. This paper, though, will instead apply the ideas surrounding strategic narratives presented above to a sub-state actor and their strategic narrative with the goal of observing changes over time in relation to the same type of events that affect states‟ strategic narrative via a platform afford by the new media ecology: the internet. 41 Methodology The field of strategic narrative analysis is still developing, so there is no one set methodology for analysis. The approach used in this study consists of two parts: 1. Part one is an in-depth analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood‟s history to determine their strategic narrative over the past eighty years as it changed and evolved. 2. Part two is a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the statements and articles constructing their current narrative published on the Brotherhood‟s English-language website, Ikhwanweb, from 2008 to 2010. Because strategic narratives include analysis of a sub-state actor‟s narrative throughout its history to inform its current narrative, an in-depth examination of the Muslim Brotherhood‟s general history is presented below. This history is used to identify their strategic narrative over time and illuminate changes in the narrative today. To standardize this type of historical analysis within strategic narrative study, the methodology consists of analyzing the components important in a strategic narrative within the general history of the sub-state actor. These components are the impact of the narrator on the narrative and the changes in the actors and plot discussed in the strategic narrative as time passes. By examining the same components within the Brotherhood‟s strategic narrative in both the historical analysis and in the original research conducted, 42 explained below, the conclusions of this study are able to address the Muslim Brotherhood as a whole, from its past through its present and into is future, which is what separates strategic narrative analysis from other conceptual analytical lenses. The historical analysis will inform the findings of the original research or Part 2, as described above, done for this study. This research uses a different methodology than that of the historical analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood‟s strategic narrative. A qualitative analysis of the Brotherhood‟s current narrative, from the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2010, seeks to analyze the way that they portray themselves in relation to other actors both internationally and domestically on their English Language website with a systematic yet qualitative approach. Using the justification put forth by scholars to use political leaders‟ speeches due to their influential status (Roselle, 2010), this paper will apply the same reasoning to examine the communication put forth by the Supreme Guide through one of the main arteries of international communication for the Muslim Brotherhood known as Ikhwanweb.com, their English language website. Additionally, because original research was conducted for this part of the strategic narrative analysis, specific and measureable hypotheses were developed and are outlined below. A methodological consideration and limitation that must be addressed is that all of the documents used in this study are from the English-language website of the Muslim Brotherhood known as Ikhwanweb and not their Arabic- language site, Ikhwanonline. The differences between the two websites are 43 evident in just their interfaces alone and one would assume that the phrases and descriptions used to describe events, opinions, and statements would vary according to audience. Given that the English-language website is obviously catering and speaking to a Western audience, it is likely to affect the narrative presented on the website. Taking into account the West‟s skepticism of Islamist movements, the communications, including the words used to describe their overall narrative may be affected by the international audience so that situations or complaints are portrayed in a vernacular that employs more Western-based frames of reference instead of Egyptian-based frames of reference. This study cannot explore the differences in the English-language and Arabic-language websites for the Muslim Brotherhood, but it could be analyzed in future research. Additionally, the English-language website has articles written by Ikhwanweb staff and international academic scholars, but it also has articles with content pulled from Wikipedia and obscure non-credible sources making the identity presented through the website multi-faceted and somewhat confusing. This only added to the difficulty experienced in trying to determine what came directly from the Brotherhood and accurately represented its narrative, but in the end, a system was determined and is explained below. Another methodological concern is that narrative theory partially aligns with several research programs, but specifically helps bring factors usually left in the background as assumptions to the foreground (Froese). As noted previously, the role of the narrator plays a huge role in any narrative and therefore, it is extremely important to always distinguish when a narrative is no longer a 44 product of the original research-focused narrator or is not an intentionally strategic message. Furthermore, as Antoniades, Miskimmon, and O‟Loughlin (2009, 17) posit, It may also be that states also „speak through action‟ without any narrative crafting… in the new media ecology states, journalists and citizens anywhere may be interpreting an emerging or great powers‟ words or deeds as if it was its primary strategic narrative… analysis must account for the manner in which leaders and media can mediate other states‟ strategic narratives on behalf of publics. In the same realm of thought, it is also important to remember that the development of foreign policy and identity variables are mutually constructed and not necessarily defined by a linear relationship (Roselle, 2010). While taking these methodological issues into account and remembering that a set of determinants has been established to qualify a communication message as part of a strategic narrative, the researcher can proceed to address how to systematize a seemingly subjective and varied field into a replicable qualitative analysis. While many procedures may exist, this study utilized the tools of a specific computer program named Atlas.ti, designed to enable systematic content analysis (Roselle, 2010). The major benefit of such a program is the optimization of the researcher‟s time in obtaining the analysis output since the software can automatically search for one‟s coding criterion. Roselle (2010, p. 12) explained some of the capabilities and limitations of the software, stating, Atlas.ti does provide a quantitative word count and co-occurrence identification. It is important to note here that the counting of words is only a first step in the analysis. Frequencies can give an idea about actors, actions, and goals in broad sense, but one must be careful about placing 45 too much weight on simple frequencies. Rather, the systematic analysis of wording and phraseology can direct the researcher to potential component parts of the narrative. Atlas.ti allows much more than frequency counts, however. It allows a more nuanced analysis by allowing the researcher to identify and mark important components that are then attached to words, phrases, sentences, or sections and can be retrieved across multiple files or documents. This secondary coding or analysis is based on an interpretive orientation. In order to maintain consistency in the field of strategic narrative analysis, this study will structure its analytic framework according to the broad categories employed in Roselle‟s (2010) analysis of speeches given by Presidents Bush and Obama, specifically along the components of all narratives: Actors and plot, which is subdivided into actions and goals. These components or „families,‟ as the program calls them, will be identified in the English language primary documents gathered for analysis by a series of words that cohesively illuminate the identity of the Muslim Brotherhood projected to the public. The analysis will take place in two steps. First a quantitative word count will be compiled through all the documents to show what part of their narrative is emphasized most (Actor, action, or goal), and what exactly in that family receives the most attention overall. This analysis will lead to a more in-depth investigation of the emphasis of specific words through examination of the surrounding phrases. While a number of factors impact a state‟s strategic narrative, such as international position on the global stage, cultural context, and the political system dominating the state, these factors do not necessarily affect the strategic narrative of a sub-state actor, which is what the Muslim Brotherhood is. Previous 46 research has endeavored to examine nation-state narratives and the factors that affect them, but this research aims to fill the gap in research related to the narrative of a sub-state actor and the factors that affect it. This study will examine how the actors, goals, and actions of the organization, manifest themselves in the narrative of a sub-state actor. Therefore, the data will be examined two different ways: by frequency of code word as compared to others and further analysis will aim to understand in what context those words were used. The words used to characterize each factor have been chosen from the literature read to describe the organization‟s background, from current events affecting the organization at the time of publication, and from the translated works of founder Hasan al-Banna (al-Banna, What is our message?, 1995; al- Banna, Message for youth, 1993). The documents will be split up according to year and coded for component parts of their strategic narrative (see Appendix A). The parameters of the population of (218) primary documents used are as follows: In accordance with the statement issued by the Brotherhood that all official “views and stances of the group are expressed solely by the group‟s chairman, two deputies and three official media spokesmen (MB statements confined to appointed media officials, 2011),” all the primary documents examined are either direct statements or initiatives published on Ikhwanweb.com by the aforementioned representatives or are Ikhwanweb.com reports of such statements or initiatives. Therefore, only articles with an Ikhwanweb byline are used, if it is not a direct statement. 47 The documents from Ikhwanweb.com have been pulled from the site sections labeled “MB News>Egyptian,” “Statements>MB Statements and News Releases,” and “Interviews>MB Leaders.” The primary documents used for analysis date from the beginning of the year 2008 to the end of 2010. While these guidelines provide reference points and a better understanding of the system employed for this research, in order to preserve the ability to replicate this study, a list of all Muslim Brotherhood primary documents used is provided directly after references (appendix E). In the following research I hypothesize that: H1: Because of the importance the narrator plays in creating the strategic narrative, as suggested in the literature, there will be a noticeable change in the focus of the movement once Brotherhood Chairman leadership changes from 2009 to 2010, and this will be evident through the amount of public communication by the Chairman, himself, and through a change in international actors he focuses on or discusses in the narrative. Similar to how international relations with other nations change with every American president, a new chairman will comment on and engage with different international actors than the previous leader, thus affecting the overall narrative. H2: Because of the platform from which the documents were taken—the English-language website of he Muslim Brotherhood—and the outside 48 pressure of the strict political system within which the sub-state entity exists, the frequency of focus on international actors who are important on the international stage will be higher than that on state actors, such as former President Hosni Mubarak. In a semi-authoritarian state where free press liberties are sequestered without little provocation, the Brotherhood must tread lightly in its discussion and criticisms of domestic, powerful actors like former President Mubarak. Additionally, because the website is an English-language website, the publications will target a more international audience and focus on international issues to relate to the audience. H3: Because the social climate the Brotherhood functions in today is decidedly different from the one in which al-Banna founded the organization, there will be distinct differences in the goals expressed today concerning militancy, openness to work within the existing political system and the change they want to see to the government. All of those goals, today, will be different than those of its founder, Hasan al-Banna, outlined below, who was a part of a very different Egypt. As is evident by Egypt‟s political history explained above, the moral, social, and political situation as changed dramatically. Also, the Brotherhood does not exist in a vacuum nor is it impervious to these changes. Subsequently, the members it recruits today will have a different frame of mind than the members of al-Banna‟s time, which will inherently affect the ideology, actions, and goals of the overall movement today. 49 H4: Because a large sector of the Muslim Brotherhood‟s supporters come from the poorest segments of the population, the Brotherhood will have crafted their narrative in a manner which caters to the economic climate and needs of their constituents while still furthering their own agenda of change. Many of the actions the Chairman will use to characterize how the Brotherhood will achieve change will emphasize service to the people and reform of governmental institutions to better the nation‟s poor economic situation. Similar to formula that popularized the movement in the beginning, the narrative will propagate that the ills of society can be reformed through a return to an Islam centered society (Dekmejian, 1971). This will connect with their supporters because of how unsatisfied they are with their own economic plight, but it will also further the Brotherhood‟s accommodationist methods to instigating change. 50 Chapter 2 ~Analysis of the historical strategic narrative of Egypt‟s Muslim Brotherhood ~Analysis of Egypt‟s Muslim Brotherhood‟s strategic narrative from 2008-2010 51 Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: An analysis of their historical strategic narrative from 1928-2007 Strategic narrative analysis differs from framing analysis in an important way. Framing analyzes a particular rhetorical content through a static lens. Whereas, strategic narrative analysis encompasses the cultural context from which the narrative comes, the commonly agreed upon historical narrative, the present narrative found in current communication, and most importantly, the future goals and objectives of the actor that are evident in the current narrative. The political history of Egypt that has been explained above serves to contextualize the events and changes in al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin of Egypt. The following section is a survey of the Muslim Brotherhood‟s historical narrative, as understood by Western scholars. The bolded and italicized headings serve as a roadmap to the evolution of the Brotherhood‟s narrative over time and the section is structured to highlight significant shifts and changes in the sub-state actor‟s narrative, many of which still have evident implications today. Disillusionment and moral decay drive those disgusted back to their religious base and into the insular protection of an organization: The Muslim Brotherhood is founded and explodes onto the Egyptian scene with its conservative call back to Egypt’s Islamic roots The Muslim Brotherhood is the organization that has become the blueprint for all subsequent contemporary Islamist movements. It was founded in 1928 by a disenchanted schoolteacher named Hasan al-Banna in the town of Ismailia, Egypt, whose initial six members were discontented employees of the 52 Suez Canal Company (Calvert, 2010; Ibrahim, 2002; Kepel, 1985; Mitchell, 1969; Rinehart, 2009; Simms, 2002; Wright, 2008). It sought to convert rational ideas based on Islam into political action (Ibrahim, 1988). Al-Banna‟s strategic narrative emphasized the power and necessity of grassroots development to return the cultural ethos of Egypt back to its Islamic faith and this resonated with lost and disillusioned souls (Calvert, 2010). “Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded to pursue a broad reform agenda, which over time has taken on personal, religious, social, and political aspects … Brotherhood leaders insist … their focus is … on the movement‟s broad vision of a society in accordance with Islamic principles” (Brown & Hamzawy, 2010, p. 11). The immense success of the movement is thanks in part to the support and connection they consistently have with Egypt‟s lower middle class, which represents one of the largest and fastest growing sectors of the population (Baker, 2003). Their strategic narrative emphasizes the broad goal of Islamic regeneration that has, for the most part, stayed the path of moderation, government accommodation, and peaceful change and found a lasting home in the civic and social life of the Egyptian people (Baker, 2003). The organization of the group structured the dissemination of strategic narratives through the leader. To date, it has engendered eighty-six branches or affiliates across the globe (Wright, 2008). It has survived structural decimation and maintained its vision through extremely bleak political times by recognizing and skillfully taking advantage of any open crevice in Egypt‟s tightly controlled political landscape and by its methods of recruitment. Additionally, the structure 53 of the Brotherhood is a component of its success, and has only evolved since its inception (al-Awadi, 2009). Because the organization begins with the General Guide, also known as Supreme Guide of Chairman, the rest of the organization develops in a hierarchical system that clearly establishes the order of significance a person or branch may have within the organization. This is clearly evident in the Brotherhood‟s narrative, even today. The Supreme Guide has always served as the mouthpiece and main ideologue of the movement who determines the priorities, beliefs, and direction of the Brotherhood, thus deciding its narrative. For this reason the historical narrative analysis will highlight changes in Supreme Guide, or narrator of the Muslim Brotherhood‟s strategic narrative, as it dramatically affects the overall narrative. This hierarchical structure is illustrated below which shows the main organization of the Brotherhood is divided into eleven individual units and covers a variety of different services (al-Awadi, 2009, p. 219). The chart below from Rinehart (2009) shows the organizational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood as it functioned in 1935, which has changed little to this day. 54 The organization grew out of the growing disillusionment with the secular ruling power and the British/Western interference in the domestic matters of Egypt in the early 1900‟s. Under the charismatic and devout leadership of al- Banna, the Brotherhood soon expanded throughout Egypt, moving its headquarters to Cairo in 1932, shortly after its founding (Calvert, 2010). But it was led, not by religious scholars but by modern-educated men with al-Banna at the helm as Supreme Guide. These men recognized early on that communication 55 of their narrative would be important to the group and produced its own radio broadcasts, papers, theatrical works for the stage and film, journals, and various other publications (Calvert, 2010; Perry, 2004). “The Muslim Brothers hardly represented a throwback to traditional Islam. In many ways, the Muslim Brothers represented a synthesis of modernity and Islam. They called for rethinking older concepts and played down such prominent ideas as that of restoring the caliphate, but nevertheless fervently demanded the creation of a truly Islamic society” (Perry, 2004, p. 81). Using media was crucial to the group‟s strategic narrative that emphasized a goal of broad social change. Initially, the Brotherhood‟s narrative shunned the idea of becoming a political party because al-Banna claimed that Islam and the State should be one and that parties are inherently divisive in society (al-Banna, 1995). Al-Banna instead explicated the Brotherhood‟s true objectives (al-Banna, 1995, p. 9), O, Nation! We call you while in our right hand is the Qur‟an and in our left hand the Sunnah of the Prophet. Our programme conforms to the deeds of the pios forbears of the pure Mitlat. We beckon you towards Islam, its teachings, its injunctions and its guidance! If you call this work politics then without doubt this is our politics. This fit in with the narrative that concentrated instead on total social reform and emphasized supporting Egypt‟s poor through charities, soup kitchens, community betterment projects, creating jobs and even providing medical care (Perry, 2004). Al-Banna outlined the founding principles of the Muslim Brotherhood in the books Risalatut Ta’aleem meaning Message for Youth and 56 What is Our Message? which began the Muslim Brotherhood‟s strategic narrative. He explained (al-Banna, 1993, p. 6; 17) the basic elements of our covenant re ten; so grasp their meanings and memorize them. They are comprehension, devotion, action, striving, sacrifice, obedience, perseverance, resoluteness, brotherhood, and trust…Dear truthful brothers, your acceptance of this covenant obliges you to fulfil [sic] the following duties so that you may become strong bricks in the structure where he continues to through a list of allowed and advised to do coupled with things one should not do. Given this clear vision as outlined by its leader, it is little surprise that the movement quickly forayed into the realm of politics realizing it as a medium to institute the Islamization of Egyptian society that they desired (Calvert, 2010). Once the Brotherhood did become involved in Egyptian politics, it was careful to never officially align with one particular group or create its own functioning party (Brown & Hamzawy, 2010), maintaining its narrative of being outside the established political system. The efforts of the Brotherhood culminated in an estimated two million members across Egypt by 1948, just twenty years after its founding (Calvert, 2010; Perry, 2004). It was not exactly smooth sailing for the movement, though. Given the popular and Islamic nature of the organization, secular King Farouk, Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi, and their regime, with all its British influence, did not take kindly to the oppositional organization. Throughout the 1930‟s and early 1940‟s there was a persistent escalation of tension between the Palace and the Brotherhood. 57 Throughout this escalation the Brotherhood disseminated their narrative through a number of channels including newspapers, magazines, lectures, and general recruitment, which were all, most importantly, responsible for “collecting, systematizing, and republishing the major works of Banna‟s written works” (Mitchell, 1969, p. 188). Therefore, these channels directly communicated the Brotherhood‟s strategic narrative, which primarily focused on an anti- monarchy/anti-British message as a part of a general nationalism growing in Egypt at the time. After 1948, however, there was no official communication channel for the Brotherhood (Mitchell, 1969). Potent ideology coupled with political tension bring about extreme measures: The radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood’s narrative and tactics By 1948, the struggle between the two exploded into a near-constant state of violence. A comprehensive portrait of the chaotic situation is illustrated in Mitchell (1969) who also shed light on the terrorist activities for which the Brotherhood‟s „Secret Apparatus‟ became known (Calvert, 2010; Zollner, 2009). “Like other political movements of the time, the Brotherhood had its own paramilitary unit… The beginnings of the combat unit go back to the year 1936, [with the Palestinian Uprising]… From then on, the organization ran camps, where volunteers were instructed in guerilla warfare” (Zollner, 2009, p. 12). Some members had become frustrated by their inability to institute change through political channels and thus turned to more radical measures, like the Secret Apparatus (Calvert, 2010). Membership in this unit was so secretive that 58 other Brothers did not know whom it counted as members. With an independent, staunchly hierarchical structure, one cell would not be aware of the activities of another and they only reported to their own commander, who in turn reported to the head of the entire Apparatus. Ultimate power over the unit was supposedly vested in the Supreme Guide Hasan al-Banna. “Without recapitulating details, there is no doubt that the Brotherhood was linked to a number of assassination attempts, to the incitement of terror and to growing anti-Jewish violence…[with that,] the government announced the Brotherhood‟s dissolution in the decree of 8 December 1948” (Zollner, 2009, p. 13). Though these measures were meant to stamp out the movement, they instead fostered an increased drive for terror that ultimately resulted in the assassination of Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi by the Secret Apparatus just three weeks following the Brotherhood‟s official dissolution (Calvert, 2010). In hopes of avoiding the seemingly imminent demise of the Brotherhood brought at the hands of a Palace crackdown, al-Banna sought to put space between himself, and by default his organization, by stating that the rogue actions of a select few members misinterpreted the goals of the Brotherhood and they acted completely independently (Zollner, 2009). His narrative lacked credibility, however. On February 12, 1949, al-Banna was assassinated, allegedly by political police, as retaliation and a way to try to stamp out the organization as a whole (Mitchell, 1969; Zollner, 2009). During this time period the conclusion that the Secret Apparatus of the Brotherhood was responsible for terrorist activities cannot be avoided. It is more 59 obvious though, that by the end of his time, al-Banna may not have had full control of the Apparatus and that dissent and conflict within the organization was becoming more evident up to the time of his death, leaving the organization in a state of semi-disarray (Zollner, 2009). The Brotherhood‟s strategic narrative, like the organization, was also in shambles or at least complete disorganization. Considering actions are a component of plot, which is a key part of any narrative, the Brotherhood‟s radical actions and subsequent assassination of its founder and leader had a profound impact on the strategic narrative. These extreme actions shifted the narrative onto a more militant track than it started on in its founding years and has impacted the image projected of the Brotherhood to this day. Additionally, the assassination left the movement without its mouthpiece and most important ideologue, which stranded the narrative in a state of limbo as the movement fought to survive. The sudden passing of the Brotherhood‟s founder and Supreme Guide, in addition to the ruling regime‟s oppression, left the movement limping along nursing several open, debilitating wounds that would bring the Muslim Brotherhood to within inches of its own life (Kepel, 1985; Mitchell, 1969). “For two years, from December 1948 to mid 1951, the Muslim Brotherhood survived in an environment of tactical retreat and secrecy… Nevertheless, the established network of person relations saved the Brotherhood from disappearing into public oblivion” (Zollner, 2009, p. 16). The Brotherhood was facing inner turmoil from the radicalization and apparent loss of control of the Secret Apparatus to questions of who was to be the next Supreme Guide. What became paramount, 60 though, was the reconstitution of the Brotherhood‟s reputation and belief of its benefit to the Egyptian political sphere. The image so carefully crafted prior to al- Banna‟s assassination was left in tatters on the floors of Brotherhood members who were arrested and imprisoned or who were forced underground. Because of the isolation and disorganization of the time, there was little chance to begin salvaging the Brotherhood‟s narrative. That is to say, there was no opportunity or medium through which to clarify the now tainted narrative and elucidate the movement‟s true goals, actions, and just who would lead them there. In fact, little communication occurred at all. As they set about determining the next Chairman, or Supreme Guide, power struggles became evident within the organizations. Because no one wanted to relinquish the power they worked hard to keep during the years of repression, they decided the perfect candidate would be politically connected but would have had little prominence within the Brotherhood itself. “The nomination of [Hasan] al-Hudaybi was therefore a pragmatic decision. As a formerly high-ranking representative of the judiciary, his influence in state institution as well as his contact with relevant persons was useful… Al-Hudaybi was seen as a temporary solution and compromise” (Zollner, 2009, p. 16). The decision to elect al- Hudaybi to be al-Banna‟s successor, though the election was not in accordance with organization by-laws, was the product of an assortment of compromises between the Palace and the movement on the one hand and amongst the Brothers themselves on the other (Kepel, 1985). 61 Within a couple years of al-Hudaybi assuming the position of Supreme Guide, Egypt underwent a dramatic political upheaval with the Free Officers‟ Revolution, described previously. In the months just before and after the Revolution, there were meetings held between the Officers and the Brotherhood because the Officers knew they would need the Brotherhood backing in order to garner widespread public support (Kepel, 1985; Mitchell, 1969; Zollner, 2009). The Brotherhood remained cautious of the change, at least at the executive level, though many members enthusiastically supported the change. Al-Hudaybi remained passive while the change took place and met with Nasser shortly after the coup where they declared affable cooperation between the Revolutionary Command Council, as the new ruling regime was known, and the Brotherhood (Dekmejian, 1971; Mitchell, 1969; Zollner, 2009). “However, the initial emphasis on goodwill and cooperation should not distract from the fact that the revolutionaries and the Brotherhood under al-Hudaybi held fundamentally different views on what constituted a just state system” (Zollner, 2009, p. 26). The only ideology they had in common was a strong sentiment of nationalism against the British and that they were both unsatisfied with the current state of Egypt (Dekmejian, 1971). The Free Officer‟s movement was fiercely secular and once in power even began a relationship with the God-less Communists of the USSR. In the complete opposite direction of the Free Officers, the Muslim Brotherhood adamantly structured their narrative around the positives and ideals of an Islamic-based state system. 62 Violent oppression and torture can break even the strongest man’s spirit: The Brotherhood languishes in concentration camps and in response, turns to a new ideologue to inform gaps in their original narrative and provide meaning for their suffering This time of harmony quickly came to an end in 1953 when the government dissolved all political parties and took complete control of the political system. Though the Brotherhood was exempt from the dissolution as they were not officially a political party, they were instead asked to become a part of government controlled „freedom organizations‟ to represent the people. The Brotherhood, in spite of this, did not want to be under government control and integrated into a government institution. Therefore, the subsequent tension and clashing was inevitable between the regime and the Brotherhood, which both sought the total support of the people (Zollner, 2009). Though many Brotherhood members initially supported the coup and the Free Officers, there was also an increased zeal within the narrative of the Brotherhood for establishing an Islamic state, as they remained committed to the idea that Islam encompasses and dictates all parts of life, from politics to personal piety. This was evident in the narrative of this time as the Brotherhood became critical of the secular Nasser regime after Nasser refused the Brotherhood‟s demand to have veto authority concerning new legislation (Dekmejian, 1971). Instead the Brothers went outside the new government propagated their narrative characterizing their vision for the new state system. While the start of the Nasser Era seemed promising for the Muslim Brotherhood, as he got his footing and a taste of power, he became less tolerant of dissent and opposition, which would result in some of the worse and most 63 merciless treatment experienced by the Brotherhood (Abdo, 2000). In addition, this would result in the radicalization of some Brotherhood members and an obvious shift as the movement‟s narrative became prison-hardened. Just two years into his reign, six leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were hung in the gallows (Calvert, 2010). Additionally, thousands more were arrested and wasted away after sustained periods of torture, mistreatment, and hard work in deplorable concentration camps and prisons (Kepel, 1985). Also at this time, many of the unofficial publications being printed and distributed by the Brotherhood were also shut down and their narrative was strangled along with the members who were hanged in the gallows (Mitchell, 1969). Tensions finally boiled over by late October 1954 “when a member of the Brotherhood tried to assassinate Nasser while the president was delivering a speech in Alexandria…[Brotherhood] headquarters were burned down, their leaders were arrested and tortured, and government agents inflamed the populace against their members” (Kepel, 1985, p. 26; Perry, 2004). This attempt on his life gave Nasser the pretext to really clamp down on the Brotherhood (Abdo, 2000; Calvert, 2010; Dekmejian, 1971). Preceding this attack was an increase in anti-Nasser rhetoric within the Brotherhood‟s narrative by Supreme Guide al-Hudaybi concerning Nasser‟s relations with the British and the Canal Zone. Chairman al-Hudaybi purposefully positioned the Brotherhood in the opposite corner of Nasser, setting up a fight between the two (Dekmejian, 1971). Though the Brotherhood nearly landed the knock out punch with the assassination attempt, it was Nasser who would come back swinging in the next 64 round and continue to pummel the Brotherhood throughout his presidency. The movement‟s narrative was dramatically affected by the harsh treatment at the hands of Nasser‟s regime. At one point the Brotherhood was so crippled that it even offered to cease all subversive activity in return for the release of all imprisoned Brothers, but Nasser‟s regime would not allow it (Dekmejian, 1971). In fact, much like the effects of the King‟s hard-line approach, Nasser‟s oppression caused a flourishing of radical Islamicist thought within the Brotherhood, epitomized in the work of member Sayyid Qutb, who was a prisoner in one of the concentration camps for many years (Abdo, 2000; Calvert, 2010). Much of this time in the Brotherhood‟s narrative was spent fending off rampant Nasser propaganda against the movement trying to isolate them from public support. Nasser continually accosted the Brotherhood‟s motives, goals, and even the actors with which the movement was associated, often saying the movement was an agent of the British, the former monarchy and even the Zionists. There was little the Brotherhood could do from inside prison walls except write, which is why the writings of Qutb and Supreme Guide al-Hudaybi became so influential in the direction of the Brotherhood‟s narrative at the time. These writings were one of the few things propelling their narrative forward in a time of absolute government repression. As Kepel (1985, pp. 27-28) explains, Islamicist thought was reconstructed after 1954 primarily in [Nasser‟s] concentration camps, which were felt by Qutb and his disciples to symbolize the relationship of the state to society…Most of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were held in Tura prison, in Cairo‟s southern suburbs. Conditions were appalling…[and] Sayyid Qutb was horrified by the barbarism of the camp guards, by the inhumanity with which they had 65 left the wounded [Muslim Brotherhood members] die. Various witnesses report that it was then that he lost his remaining illusions as to the Muslim character of the Nasser regime. As a result of his disillusionment and his way with words, Qutb wrote feverishly while in prison, mainly in his sickbed given his frail health during most of his multiple incarcerations. Al-Banna didn‟t leave many written accounts of his thoughts or ideas especially for the Brotherhood to follow after his passing and Qutb‟s writings filled the ideological void (Abdo, 2000; Kepel, 1985). Qutb‟s most famous work Milestones sought to provide ideological hope for Brothers and other Muslims despairing at the moral deprivation they saw running rampant in the world. He begins Milestones stating (Qutb, p. 7), Mankind today is on the brink of a precipice, no because of the danger of complete annihilation which is hanging over its head—this being just a sympton and not the real disease—but because humanity is devoid of those vital values which are necessary not only for its healthy development but also for real progress. With this complete disenchantment with society, it was not surprising he promoted isolationism and doing whatever is necessary for change. Qutb‟s viewpoint on society was reflective of the larger feeling at the time within the Brotherhood, who also became disillusioned with the world given their treatment in Nasser‟s prisons, and that was evident in their narrative. It continually framed the things wrong in society as a result of the moral depravity of a secular government and the general moral decay occurring in Egypt. Qutb‟s writings, though perhaps not within the limits of being a representation of the official narrative of the Brotherhood, seeing as he was never 66 the Supreme Guide, are indicative of the currents and opinions circulating within the movement in response to the hardships they were experiencing under Nasser‟s regime and should be taken into account when examining the overall strategic narrative from this time. In fact, Supreme Guide al-Hudaybi praised Milestones and Qutb, saying that they were the manifestation of the future of the Islamic mission (Kepel, 1985). In addition to providing an ideological path for the Brotherhood, Qutb‟s writings urging separation and isolation from the moral decay encroaching society quickly spread in popularity across the entire Middle East reenergizing the world-wide Islamist movement and still resonate today. This popularity has made him one of the most influential Islamist thinkers in modern history (Calvert, 2010). More radical interpretations of his most famous work, Milestones, even created the basis for today‟s largest terror organizations like Al Qaeda (Abdo, 2000). Sayyid Qutb was arrested again August 9, 1965, in response to Nasser‟s regime learning of a plot to threaten them being assembled by the Brotherhood (Perry, 2004). Though the plot was of little real threat, it gave Nasser a scapegoat to unite the populace behind him yet again after a rocky patch for his foreign and domestic policies. Qutb was later hanged on August 29, 1966, despite efforts from activists in many Arab countries to save him (Kepel, 1985). The persecution of the Brotherhood in 1954 and the stifling of their narrative and communicative organs, specifically their media outlets and public lectures, was not the only campaign of complete repression by Nasser 67 (Dekmejian, 1971). In 1965, another sweeping wave of arrests, unlawful confinement, and torture was underway. By this time, however, the sacrifice of the Brothers for their religion and beliefs had been galvanized as honorable and necessary to travel the road to the foundation of an Islamic state, as taught by Qutb‟s Milestones (Calvert, 2010; Kepel, 1985). Though the prison experience radicalized some Brothers, many continued the path of moderation and were able to weather the persecution and emerge from the concentration camps after Nasser‟s death with a fortified attitude and belief in their mission. “Long years of repression undoubtedly weakened the organization…however, the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood reappeared in public life to reclaim its past, to express what it has learned from its ordeal, and to stake its claim in Egypt‟s future” (Baker, 1990, p. 252). This feeling of optimism and reaffirmation of the Brotherhood‟s goals was evident in its fortified narrative as it rehabilitated itself under Egypt‟s new president. A softening of political oppression brings a softening of the Brotherhood: Their narrative shift towards moderation begins As explained previously, the presidential transfer from Nasser to Sadat ushered in yet another huge ideological shift in Egypt and mirroring that shift, the Brotherhood‟s narrative underwent a large ideological swing, as well. Within Egypt, “Sadat undertook a „controlled liberalization‟ of Egypt‟s political system…However, political liberalization failed to absorb the political, social, economic, cultural, and religious interests and sensitivities stirred up by Sadat‟s 68 new domestic and foreign policies” (Beattie, 2000, p. 211). Therefore, the political light of the Muslim Brotherhood that was extinguished under Nasser was relit and in fact burned quite brightly for many years into Sadat‟s rule (Ibrahim, 1988) and the Brotherhood‟s narrative was able to cater specifically to those citizens adversely affected by the change in foreign and domestic policies. Because there was a more tolerant environment for the Brotherhood to rebuild itself in, there was a moderation of their narrative under Sadat. Instead of perpetuating subversive and sometimes violent acts as a means to institute change, the Brotherhood‟s narrative became much more accepting of the existing political system and veered away from its radical actions of the past. The opening of the press also boosted spirits and allowed the Brotherhood to reconstruct its strategic narrative in the public sphere after many years in the dark cells of Nasser‟s prisons. “As such, the Brotherhood took on activities in student unions, professional organizations and institutions of civil society…[some scholars claim al-Hudaybi] had a decisive influence on the moderate and conciliatory approach of the re-established organization” which further supports the notion that the narrator of a strategic narrative has a huge impact on the narrative itself (Zollner, 2009, p. 48). Ultimately the Brotherhood‟s narrative made a giant leap of moderation when they renounced the use of violence and terrorism as an agent of change (Ibrahim, 1988). Instead they began to advocate for working to change the political system from within (Baker, 1990). If one examines the time period early in Sadat‟s rule, it was clear that Sadat tried to position himself as a more religiously devout president than 69 Nasser; therefore, he had more tolerance for Islamic organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood (Baker, 1990; Calvert, 2010; Tignor, 2010). That tolerance had strings attached, though. Their strategic narrative had to be acceptable within the framework and limitations established by the state leadership because the Brotherhood is a sub-state actor and subject to the rules of the leadership, as was evident under Nasser. With this in mind, Sadat allowed the Brotherhood to start up some of its former publications to disseminate its strategic narrative including the Islamist publication al-Da’wa (Baker, 1990). It was allowed to be printed and circulated as long as the Brotherhood adhered to the realm of Islamic preaching, stayed away from political commentary, did not bring back the Secret Apparatus or harshly criticize Sadat or his policies (Ibrahim, 1988). These restrictions placed on the Brotherhood by the regime obviously affected the scope and breath of their strategic narrative, but this sort of balanced truce between the movement and the ruling power, not experienced before in the organization‟s history, did allow for the Brotherhood to cultivate and enhance its position and strategic narrative within Egyptian society again. Throughout the 1970‟s the Brotherhood was able to express and clearly explain the movement‟s strategic narrative as a practical method to achieve the their goal of the instillation of an Egyptian Islamic order (Baker, 1990). “However, as soon as President Sadat announced his celebrated visit to Israel in 1977, the MB through al-Da’wa, launched the most vehement of attacks on Sadat‟s „peace initiatives.‟ In the following four years, the MB expanded its attacks to all the regime‟s major policies” (Ibrahim, 2002). Through such 70 publications like al Da’wa the Muslim Brotherhood was able to roundly criticize while simultaneously promoting their alternative policies and position in favor of creating an Islamic system of governance based on shari‛a (Abdo, 2000). “The Muslim Brotherhood leadership called on the followers to make maximum use of the peaceful means the liberalization of the Sadat regime made available to them, to work for an Islamic society” (Baker, 1990, p. 246). The Brotherhood was even bold enough to openly condemn the Camp David Peace Accords and the subsequent Peace Treaty when all other opposition papers kept silent, through the strategic use of the Islamic roots that the Brotherhood only feared God and was speaking for Islam (Baker, 1990; Ibrahim, 2002). The criticisms in al-Da’wa largely pointed to “what it saw as the dangerous humiliations that the Israeli interpretation of the Camp David peace process had inflicted on Egypt” (Baker, 1990, p. 244). The Brotherhood‟s narrative, therefore, strategically aligned itself with the greater Arab plight against the Western-back Zionists to whom the Egyptian President was now subservient in order to win over the anti-Zionist population of Egypt. “The last of the [Nasser] imprisoned Muslim Brethren, however, were not freed until 22 March 1975. On 8 July of that year a general amnesty was declared for all those who had been sentenced to prison terms for their political ideas before 15 May 1971” (Kepel, 1985, p. 105). Though Sadat tried to use this slow release process as a method of control over the Brotherhood, Chairman al- Hudaybi refused to align with the President and as time wore on the more amicable relationship between the Brotherhood and the regime started to fray 71 (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). Despite the fact that the limited liberalization benefited both the regime and the Brotherhood through the mid-1970‟s, the relationship became strained under the vociferous criticisms explained above and the disenchantment with government policies still evident in the Brotherhood‟s narrative, which strategically chose when to voice its critiques. Sadat became further isolated and paranoid of opposition groups by the end of his rule. Adverse domestic reaction to his peace initiative with Israel in addition to other domestic issues made him fearful of growing opposition. Despite the moderation of the Brotherhood‟s narrative, it could not ward of Sadat‟s decision to incite his own wave of mass arrests throughout Egypt‟s political opposition sector, landing many Brotherhood members right back where they where when Sadat became president (Beattie, 2000). Just a few months after his draconian acts he was assassinated and the Brothers once again found themselves and the direction of their strategic narrative in a position of limbo within the political system as the new President, Hosni Mubarak, came to power. Continued political liberalization breeds continued effort towards moderation and accommodation to work within the existing system: The Muslim Brotherhood’s growing presence in the Egyptian Parliament and commitment to democracy Because of the chaotic situation that began Mubarak‟s presidency, he was cautious not to make any hasty decisions or enemies. At the outset of Mubarak‟s rule, as explained by al-Awadi (2009, p. 215), 72 the relationship between the regime and the Brotherhood was generally peaceful due to a lack of causes for tension. At that early stage, it seemed that both sides, somehow, needed one another in the pursuit of legitimacy. Moreover, neither Muhammad Hosni Mubarak, who came to power in October 1981, nor the Brotherhood were in a position to enter into an unjustified or unnecessary potentially costly conflict that might exhaust or drain their energies and resources… Neither was it in the interest of the MB to begin the 1980s with a challenge to the new regime, especially since it has just recently emerged, as a movement, from Abdel-Nasser‟s prisons, and from Sadat‟s famous detention campaign of September 1981. It needed a period of peace and calm to finish rebuilding itself, to recruit members and to expand its influence. Given this seemingly symbiotic relationship with Mubarak, the Brotherhood was able to make exponential progress in the building of its organization and strategic narrative, and entrenched itself even further into the fabric of universities, mosques, professional syndicates and general lower-middle class society (Soage & Franganillo, 2010; Wickham, 2002). “Unlike the earlier generation, influenced more by the ideas of Sayyid Qutb calling for „separation and isolation‟ from the wider society, the new generation has been more than willing to work and interact with society and the regime” (al-Awadi, 2009, p. 216; Tignor, 2010). This willingness to interact with the existing political system is no more prevalent than in their growing involvement in Parliamentary elections, despite their unofficial party status. Brothers have strategically made alliances with different, existing political parties or run as independent candidates to get elected, highlighting their commitment to slow, gradual change from within (Baker, 2003; Soage & Franganillo, 2010). The Brotherhood first worked with the Wafd Party in the 1984 elections to usurp eight seats in the Egyptian Parliament and then worked with opposition parties like Labor and Ahrar in 1987 to wrangle thirty-five seats 73 (Baker, 2003). Considering that these parties are secular and would be defined as rival parties if the Brotherhood had a legal party status, it is clear that the move towards moderation that began in the early 1980‟s had definitely taken hold by the end of the decade as Brothers worked through existing channels to take their strategic narrative to a position of power in the Egyptian Parliament. “Since the mid-1980‟s, the Brotherhood has consistently professed a general commitment to a democratic system of government” which has often been viewed as incompatible with an Islamic state (Harnisch & Mecham, 2009, p. 190). The Brotherhood disagrees with these claims, however, and elucidates through its strategic narrative that its version of an Islamic civil state will successfully operate on democratic values. The goals and objectives of their narrative were explained “in February 1989, [when] the group‟s spokesperson and later General Guide, Muhammed Ma‟mun al-Houdaiby… wrote… „[In Egypt] there is a certain degree of democracy; we [i.e. the Brotherhood] guard and hold on to it. We work to confirm and develop it until rights are complete it is important to confirm the democratic pursuit in practice” (Harnisch & Mecham, 2009, p. 191). This commitment should have worked well within Mubarak‟s “democracy,” but the democratic principles spouted by this Islamist organization were barely visible in Egypt‟s political system. The Brotherhood seemed to be heading down the first smooth political path in its history. This smooth pavement slowly became riddled with potholes and roadblocks by the 1990‟s (Wickham, 2002). The so called „second stage‟ of the relationship between Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood began in the 74 early 1990‟s and lasted to the end of Mubarak‟s presidency and is not nearly as conciliatory (al-Awadi, 2009; Wickham, 2002). Instead, this „second stage‟ became rife with tension when Mubarak‟s semi-authoritarian ruling tendencies and continued legal denial was unable to squelch the legitimacy of the Brotherhood in the eyes of the Egyptian people (al-Awadi, 2009; Tignor, 2010). In addition to changes externally in the political system under Mubarak, internally the Brotherhood was beginning to sift into two sects characterized by their generation and outlook on the movement. The „old guard,‟ characterized by older men who had joined the movement in al-Banna‟s lifetime, had a traditional, set outlook on the movement and their participation in politics was a result of their previous difficult times of oppression. Their strategic narrative emphasized the call for isolation, fortitude and never openly advocated for a Western-style democratic system. The younger generations, or the „new guard‟ who was now challenging them, joined the movement through very different channels and had experienced an even more different political environment (Wickham, 2002; Wright, 2008). Much like a teenager views his parents, the younger generation saw the „old guard‟ as having antique, out of date notions that needed revitalization in pragmatic terms applicable to the ever-evolving social stratums in Egypt (Soage & Franganillo, 2010). “Their influence [had] already been felt somewhat in 1995 when the MB declared its support for the principle of multiparty politics, a significant departure from the teachings of Hassan al- Banna... In short, this younger group was looking for a more inclusive Islamic politics outside the exclusive confines of the Brotherhood” (Mandaville, 2007, p. 75 117). Given the influence of this „new guard‟ the political development and legitimate foray into parliamentary politics did not bring about immense surprise. The narrative and direction the „new guard‟ was pushing was a pro- democratic perspective like the one that has become the official narrative of the entire Muslim Brotherhood of today. The best example of this narrative shift being the official statement made in June of 1991 committing the movement to adhering to democratic ideals (Harnisch & Mecham, 2009). Despite tensions, voting fraud, harassment, and arrests of Brothers before elections, the Muslim Brotherhood had impressive showings in both the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, although “the government found ways to go around the [judicial] monitoring… [and] the regime targeted the Muslim Brotherhood in particular… In the end, however, the NDP still lost its majority… The victory of sixteen Brotherhood candidates… meant that the Muslim Brothers had become the largest opposition bloc” (Baker, 2003, pp. 168-169; Abdo, 2000). As the Brotherhood continued to craft its narrative to support both Islamic and democratic principles it gained more and more support from the Egyptian population, the proof of this was seen in the ballot box. Riding the wave of this success, the Brotherhood experienced more political victory in elections and escalated tension with the ruling regime, which still ruled through the application of „State of Emergency‟ law. Enacted after Sadat‟s assassination, the Law extends the rights of the executive branch and strips many citizens‟ civil rights, and the movement actively crusaded against the 76 law in the 2007 constitutional referendum (Harnisch & Mecham, 2009). The Brotherhood mainly received the brunt of the oppression afforded by this law because the Islamic organization represented the strongest oppositional heartbeat in the Egyptian political system, and the heartbeat the regime most wanted to stop (Baker, 2003; Soage & Franganillo, 2010; Wickham, 2002). After the 2005 elections, in which the Muslim Brotherhood won 88 out of a possible 444 seats, the government tightened its political noose allowing fewer and fewer breaths for opposition movements, especially the Brotherhood, representing the largest oppositional political force in the country (Abdo, 2000; Brown & Hamzawy, 2010). The regime instituted legal changes, sweeping arrests, and a general policy of harassment in alignment with its semi-authoritarian nature against the Brothers. By 2007, the Brotherhood was constitutionally banned from creating a political party because of its religious foundation (Brown & Hamzawy, 2010; Soage & Franganillo, 2010). This did not stop the Brotherhood‟s mission for change, though, with General Guide Akef stating, “Our intentions are known and open. We demand full democracy and peaceful transition of power” (Harnisch & Mecham, 2009). Clearly, the strategic narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood looks more moderate within the last ten years than at any other time in its history. Despite the legal inability to form a party, in recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood was pressured to more clearly outline their political platform because of the increasing demands for a clearer picture of their ultimate goals and vision if they were to become a party. Additionally, their increased 77 Parliament “participation has led it to stress political reform, develop a conception of a „civil state with an Islamic frame of reference,‟ and craft specific policy proposals (while still leaving significant areas of ambiguity and debate)” (Brown & Hamzawy, 2010, p. 14). The overall reactions to this political vision were positive and reflective of the strategic narrative communicated by the Brotherhood over the last ten years. “Since it resumed its political activities in the 1970‟s and 1980‟s, the Brotherhood has consistently pushed for some measure of political liberalization” (Brown & Hamzawy, 2010, p. 19). Furthermore, their recent strategic narrative outlines “that although [the Brotherhood] hopes to see the application of shari‘a in Egypt, it does not want to be Egypt‟s only political party; rather, the group believes that pluralism and a multitude of political parties best serve the interests of the nation” (Harnisch & Mecham, 2009, p. 201). As the Muslim Brotherhood press on into unknown territory and Egypt embarks on its first real attempt at legitimate democracy, it grows ever more important to understand this leading organization, their message, and how they connect with their constituents. The future of the Brotherhood and the role it plays in Egypt remains to be seen and is now even more ambiguous as a result of the recent revolution. But, its fortitude through four different despotic to semi-authoritarian regimes filled with torture and oppression shows that it is an enduring movement (Abdo, 2000). The following analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood and their strategic narrative aims to examine their self-portrayal and framing today in connection with the 78 historical narrative just presented to determine how they have changed today and better understand the organization as a whole. 79 Analysis: Actors, Goals, and Actions in the current strategic narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood Actors A sub-state organization‟s strategic narrative is their main artery of communicating their vision of both themselves and their place in the political system in which they operate. The Brotherhood‟s intentions have come under scrutiny in the last ten years as they foray further into politics, and the past three years embody an excellent time to analyze their narrative as it is being explained in further detail (Brown & Hamzawy, 2008). Therefore, it is imperative to examine the other players with whom they concern themselves. These players are the actors or characters in the overall narrative. In the instance of the Muslim Brotherhood the key characters that they interact with or comment on, align closely with the Egyptian State‟s actors, such as the government itself, the United States, Israel, Palestine and other Middle Eastern states (see appendix B). To begin with, the Chairman, his deputies, and media spokesmen, are the narrators of the Muslim Brotherhood‟s strategic narrative as explicitly explained by the Brotherhood. They are the only people whose remarks, announcements, and statements constitute the official views and opinions of the organization as a whole (MB statements confined to appointed media officials, 2011). Therefore, when the leadership position changes hands, much like in a nation-state, so does the direction, policies, and overall focus of the organization. While collecting Brotherhood documents to analyze, the change in sheer volume of official 80 comments and statements between Badie and Akef was visible almost immediately. In both 2008 and 2009, the Chairman was Mohammed Mahdi Akef, but, once 2010 began, Mohammed Badie dominated the leadership and dictation of the strategic narrative. By having a higher frequency of communications as the result of a change in narrator, the narrative becomes more detailed and intricately crafted. Many of the vague or unanswered questions left from fewer numbers of statements made previously are answered by the influx. Now one might argue that one man in an organization as prolific as the Muslim Brotherhood will not have that much of an effect on the overall narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood, but this analysis suggests otherwise and informs the literature‟s supposition about a narrator‟s importance in a strategic narrative. At the start of 2010, the movement elected a new Supreme Guide or Chairman. The number of official statements doubled from 2008, under Akef, to 2010, under Badie‟s leadership (see chart below). This reflects the push that started in the mid-2000‟s from within the movement and from outside, critics have been demanding for the movement to more clearly communicate their plans and views on different components of their platform. Combine this with the fact that parliamentary elections were held again at the end of 2010, and an increase in the official output of the organization is logical (Brown & Hamzawy, 2008). It also informs the first hypothesis that a discernable difference will arise in the narrative with the change in the leading narrator or Supreme Guide. 81 Number of official comments or statements Badie in 2010 Akef in 2008 Akef in 2009 Akef in 2009 Badie in 2010 Akef in 2008 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 When examining the actors most discussed in their narrative, Hypothesis Two is confirmed, as the dominating actors in the narrative throughout the same years were primarily international with prominent places on the international stage. From 2008-2010, the Muslim Brotherhood most often discussed Palestine in its statements and messages to the public. The creation of Israel and the ensuing battle between the first Jewish state and the native occupants of the time, the Palestinians, have created one of the longest, ongoing conflicts in modern history and is still a huge source of contention in international and religious circles. The Brotherhood believes that the Palestinians have claim to the land called Palestine and are completely against the Zionist cause. Therefore, they are staunch supporters and advocates for the Palestinians and talk about Palestine more each year than they did about their own President Mubarak. During 2008 and 2009, the Brotherhood addressed Palestine twice as much as they did the Egyptian government as a whole. 82 An interesting shift occurred in 2010, though, with the Palestinian cause discussed less than Egypt‟s own government. In addition to the Brotherhood including Palestine as a major actor in its narrative, there was also subsequent, consistent discussion of Israel, which makes sense given that it is the villain of the story in the view of movement. Another villain consistently discussed was not former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak by himself as one might expect, but the entire government and state security police, as a whole, which supports the hypothesis that the type of regime affects the narrative of a sub-state actor. As is evidenced by the headlines of many opposition parties in open political systems, criticism of the nation‟s leader is commonplace in their narratives. In a semi- authoritarian system like Egypt, however, blatant criticism or discussion of the nation‟s President is simply not tolerated. For this reason, when discussing complaints about Mubarak‟s policies or actions, the Chairman instead surreptitiously refers to the “regime” as a whole or general government so as not to warrant the wrath and further closure of an already strictly controlled system. If the political system was more open, pointed, and directed criticism of the president and his policies would likely find its way to the surface of the Brotherhood‟s narrative. Finally, despite the enormous role the United States plays in Egypt‟s domestic politics, thanks to the large amount of aid given, there has been a steady decrease in the amount of discussion or commentary about the Western power in their narrative. Overall, the actors within the strategic narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood, as Hypothesis Two suggested, reflect the global nature of the medium on which they are being discussed. The Brotherhood 83 understands that their audience on their English website will be primarily foreign. Therefore, the majority of the actors they discuss have significant international importance. They also use the different audience to characterize the semi-authoritarian nature of the ruling regime without bringing down harsh punishments by going too far. Actions In addition to the actors within a narrative, the plot is the other central element. For this research, as explained above, the plot has been divided into the separate sections of actions and goals. No organization can achieve their goals through inactivity, which is why examining the actions a sub-state actor attempts to reach its goals is important in understanding the overall nature of the organization. As suggested previously, over the last ten years the Muslim Brotherhood has secured its most steady legitimacy in Egyptian culture since al- Banna‟s time and wielded more political power than ever before; therefore, over the past decade much interest has developed in exactly how the Brotherhood will accomplish its goals and plans for Egypt. Over the course of three years the most frequently referenced modes of change were reform, improve, serve, and work, whereas the actions stereotypically associated with Islamist movements like jihad were hardly referenced at all (see appendix C for all actions coded). 84 Serve Work 2010 Action 2009 Improve 2008 Reform 0 50 100 150 200 Average mentioned per 100 documents Out of all actions examined, the action of reform was consistently and most often stressed. References to reform doubled between 2009 and 2010, which follows the ruling ideology of the Brotherhood today to bring about change and accomplish their goals through existing political channels. To accompany this significantly more noticeable push for reform in the last year, there was also a forty percent increase in the discussion of oppression perpetrated against the Brotherhood in 2010. As the Parliamentary elections were held towards the end of 2010, the increased fervor of government arrests and oppression would warrant the increased discussion and emphasis of oppression. Furthermore, service consistently appeared in their narrative, also aligns with the vital component of the Brotherhood‟s success through providing necessary services that the government is unable or unwilling to provide. Finally the notions of work and improvement are the other two strongest methods of change discussed by the movement. All of these actions relate or address the social needs of their 85 constituents while also attending to their own agenda as Hypothesis Three suggested. The population of Egypt sees that change needs to happen in their political system, and in response to those demands, the Brotherhood has carefully crafted their actions to respond to those needs. Additionally, many of the actions commonly associated with Islamist movements in today‟s Western world, like the act of jihad or killing, were hardly mentioned in all three years or at least not in the context commonly expected. Jihad is hardly mentioned throughout all three years, and the context in which it is referred to most commonly addresses the Palestinian cause or the idea of religious resistance, not advocating broad violence against others like the jihad called for by radical Islamic fundamentalist groups like Al-Qaeda. For example, in one instance of jihad, the Chairman is encouraging Palestinians in their continued religious resistance to Israel. In the case of killing, the action does frequent the messages of the Chairman, but under the description of massacre or slaughtering. Most commonly it is discussing Palestine or other atrocities committed against communities important to the Brotherhood. Consequently, the actions advocated by this Islamist organization reinforce their claims of being a moderate alternative to the radical movements gaining momentum in other parts of the world. 86 Goals Finally, the last component of a narrative is the overall lesson or objective; the reason everything else was said: the goal. An organization‟s goals create their reasons for existing, and dictate the actions and actors that come together in an effort to achieve those goals. Though the movement‟s goals were already well defined by its founder Hasan al-Banna, the Brotherhood has changed significantly since that time. This change is best seen by comparing the goals outlined in the Chairmen‟s statements and announcements in recent times to the Brotherhood‟s goals based on the historical analysis above (see appendix D). Given the extensive research into the history and foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood completed for this study, the goals were fairly simple to define but difficult to code for given that they are rarely summed up into easily recognizable phrases or words. The results, however, seem to tell a very different story from the original narrative put forth by al-Banna. Though he did not harp on the idea of restoring the Caliphate, an Islamic state with no separation between religion and government was one of his original goals. Yet, there was not one mention of it in all three years analyzed. So, the fact that the modern narrative of the Brotherhood does not include this notion reveals just how much the movement has evolved over the last eighty years. Another important component of an Islam- based system of governance is the implementation of shari‛a law. Though the Egyptian constitution already says that all their laws will be in accordance with or based on shari‛a , it has been extremely loosely interpreted and even outright 87 ignored. Surprisingly, though, Islamic law was mentioned less than an average of four times per every one hundred documents each year. Despite the fact that Brothers in the Egyptian Parliament still advocate for the use of shari‛a in legislation drafting, the Chairman has not made it an obvious priority in the strategic narrative put forth in the years analyzed. Furthermore, continuing down the path of evolution, at least in the eyes of a socially and politically Western audience, the goals of democracy, freedom, justice and peace most consistently materialize in the documents. If one were to read just the previous statement, most likely one would assume it was describing an American president‟s speech, but in fact it is describing a movement that many have said is incompatible with the principles discussed. Whether this incompatibility is in fact true or not is outside the scope of this research, but it does raise an interesting point, which could be expounded upon by further research, especially as the political system changes in the upcoming years. The results of this analysis also support the hypothesis that the social environment of the sub-state player affects the goals emphasized in their strategic narrative. The goals set forth by al-Banna that defined the Muslim Brotherhood for the next thirty years reflected an organization facing extreme and violent oppression during a difficult time in Egypt‟s history, and as that situation has changed and altered the movement itself, the goals of the Brotherhood have also altered and shifted. 88 What does this mean and why does it matter? Although the data presented above illuminates many facets of the Muslim Brotherhood, there are several key points that deserve further examination and explanation. Taking into account the Muslim Brotherhood‟s radical, militant past, former position of many of Brotherhood members on the United States‟ terrorist watch list, and the current debate over the nature of the organization today, the frequent use of words like „reform,‟ „justice,‟ „democracy,‟ and „peace‟ in their recent narrative indicate the current thinking within the organization in relation to achieving change they wish to see in Egypt or an attempt to change their image. An in-depth, contextually based analysis of the Brotherhood‟s use of the word „reform‟ indicates that it is their main method of instituting change. Throughout the years examined, the Brotherhood consistently cited political reform as the solution to their grievances and often criticized the government for their hindrance of true reform. By stressing their desire for reform and positioning the ruling regime and the roadblock to bettering the lives of the Egyptian people, the Brotherhood has strategically painted themselves as the proponent for the people and the government as the evil repressive entity not only neglecting the will of the people but the “reform basically taught by Allah.” Unlike many only Islamist groups that call for revolution against secular rule, like Al Qaeda for example, the Brotherhood clearly distances themselves from rhetoric like this when stressing „reform‟ instead of revolution to show both how 89 different they are from radical Islamist groups and to reiterate their „accommodatioinst‟ agenda (Abed-Kotob, 1995). Furthermore, the highest instance of co-occurrence between any two words coded for appeared in 2010 with the action of „reform‟ and the goal of „peace‟ occurring twenty-one times together In this case, peace was most often used to describe the how the Brotherhood would achieve reform i.e. „through their campaign of peaceful political reform.‟ This consistent message refutes the actions of the Brotherhood organization before the mid-1970‟s and indicates a dramatic ideological shift from its roots. As a sub-state actor in an oppressive political system, promotion of peaceful reform creates the most opportunity to actually see results because it indicates little threat to the ruling regime. This shift is the reason the Brotherhood has seen such growth and success within the Egyptian political system over the last fifteen years and will be emphasized more in the years to come, as indicated by the new Chairman promoting the action more than three times as much as the former Chairman Akef did in 2009. With greater pushes towards peaceful reform, the Brotherhood may continue to integrate into the political landscape and slowly saturate it with the change they wish to see. The change they wish to institute, however, is what has most people concerned about the Muslim Brotherhood, both domestically and internationally. Over the years Mubarak has positioned himself as the moderate force keeping the Brotherhood at bay and staving off another Iranian revolution (Brown & Hamzawy, 2010). When their use of justice and democracy are analyzed further, 90 though, the message put forth by the Brotherhood contradicts this portrayal completely. From the beginning of the time period analyzed, the Brotherhood has reiterated its commitment to democracy based on political pluralism and a peaceful transfer of power, that the nation is the source of authorities, that people have the fundamental option to choose their rulers, members of parliament and representatives, the program that truly reflects their ambitions and aspirations, all this through free, transparent and fair elections. ("Brotherhood Chairman: Goverment attacks on freedoms unprecedented", 2008) These are pretty strong words coming from the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and have not proven to be empty promises either, which is key to their influential position as a sub-state actor. These findings have been informed by recent research in academia that support the Brotherhood‟s present narrative describing their future goal of democracy with Islamic principles infused into the existing system of governance and jurisprudence, and a far cry from the actions and philosophies that used to frighten so many Western governments (al-Awadi, 2009; Abed-Kotob, 1995; Brown & Hamzawy, 2010; 2008; Harnisch & Mecham, 2009; Soage & Franganillo, 2010; Stilt, 2010). By claiming that they are the true proponents of democracy, and not Mubarak‟s government, they are making the international community, especially those who promote democracy throughout the world like the United States, take notice. Furthermore, there has already been some analysis conducted within academia of a draft publication released in 2007 by the Brotherhood outlining their political platform over the course of 128 pages (Abed-Kotob, 1995; Brown & 91 Hamzawy, 2008; Soage & Franganillo, 2010; Stilt, 2010). It was excluded from analysis this study as it was written in Arabic and its analysis would require a higher level of Arabic than the researcher processes presently, but has been consulted to inform the current academic research. The scholarly consensus about this draft, which is one of the clearest annunciations of the Muslim Brotherhood‟s strategic narratives to date, is that the agreed upon goals and direction of the Brotherhood today is one of accommodation and moderation, which informs the findings of this analysis (Abed-Kotob, 1995; Brown & Hamzawy, 2008; Soage & Franganillo, 2010; Stilt, 2010; Muslim Brotherhood: Shura Council, 2007). “The Brethren‟s major strategy was labeled „accommodation‟ with the existing political system…The Brotherhood‟s contemporary emphasis on the accountability of rule and the responsibility of the individual forces a reevaluation of the western perception of Muslim societies as submissive to authority” (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 336). Given that democracy, freedom, and reform were some of the most frequently used and widespread ideas throughout the narrative, it looks as though the Brotherhood‟s English language outlet only furthers the idea circling around in analytic and academic circles that they are not the militant, political terrorist group they once were and that their future goals are in fact in line with many other nation-states active on the world stage today. The narrative put forth on the Muslim Brotherhood‟s English-language website utilizes and emphasizes many ideas popular in the West like democracy, justice, reform and peace. These ideas are used in their narrative so that can be 92 received well in the West and were used to criticize the Western-backed regime formerly in power, even highlighting the hypocrisy of Western support of a semi- authoritarian regime. Therefore, this narrative positions the Brotherhood on both sides of the ideological fence that is commonly believed to exist between an Islamic state and democracy, priming it to cater to many sections of the Egyptian and international community if it were to gain significant power within the Egyptian government. 93 Chapter 3 ~Conclusion ~References Cited ~Appendices 94 Conclusion The final and some may argue most important component of strategic narrative analysis is the ability to discern the future direction of the actor being analyzed based on the current narrative. Therefore, grounded in the information found in this analysis of the Brotherhood‟s current narrative and recent scholarly discussions in the academic milieu, it is likely that the Brotherhood will continue down its path of moderation and political integration within the existing Egyptian political system. If given the opportunity to assume power, the Brotherhood may maintain its commitment to political pluralism and encourage a democratic society instead of a theocracy. As an organization they recognize that they do not reflect the views and opinions of the majority of Egypt‟s population and would not attempt to stifle those other views like the regimes that have oppressed the Brotherhood for so long. It does, however, represent a significant portion of views and opinions in Egypt, approximately twenty to thirty percent, according to American news coverage of the Egyptian Revolution, and will seek to have a substantial presence in any governing body. Many in the West fear an Islamic state, especially coming to power in a staunch Western-ally like Egypt, but the Muslim Brotherhood has worked for slow and steady change throughout society over the past eighty years and, today, does not seek to institute radical, sweeping transformation, despite the original objectives of al-Banna. While the Brotherhood is still a politically active Islamist organization, it no longer represents the radical, violent ideology of its past that has found homes with so many other extreme Islamist movements. Instead, the 95 Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt can serve, yet again, as the blueprint for other organizations promoting political Islam on how to peacefully work to achieve their objectives through political integration and patience like the Brotherhood has done throughout the years. Given the recent revolution in Egypt, it may seem odd not to have included the Brotherhood‟s narrative during the revolution in this study. Unfortunately, though, the revolution began after the data collection had begun, which is why it was not also analyzed. The events and actions of the Brotherhood during and after the revolution, however, can be used to inform the findings of this study about the Brotherhood‟s narrative. Their narrative has become the focus of much analysis and attention on the international stage as many world powers look for indications as to the future power players within the Egyptian political ecology and possible direction of the country‟s international relations. Thus far, at the time of publication, the Brotherhood has taken an active, yet reserved stance in the development of a post-Mubarak Egypt. They have not made a play for complete power, nor have the advocated for a theocracy. As suggested by the findings of this study, they have maintained the course as an advocate for democracy and fair, open elections for the next president and parliament of Egypt. The Brotherhood has never existed in an open governing system, so their strategic narrative is sure to have many changes in the near future. As found in this study, the type of governing system that a sub-state actor exists within has a direct effect on their narrative. So, as the political system of Egypt continues to 96 change and move towards democracy, a rise in formerly withheld opinions or goals will occur that would have chafed with the restrictions imposed on speech under Mubarak. Moreover, their previously stated goals and actions examined in this study, like democracy and reform, will for the first time be able to be supported by their actions. Being the largest and best organized political party in Egypt, though their official status as a party is not approved, The Brotherhood now must become the shepherds of the political pluralism and multi-party development they have so long emphasized and to which they previously committed themselves. As the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood treads ahead into the newly liberated political landscape, the world will be carefully watching their every move and analyzing every statement. Therefore, the Brotherhood represents an exciting research opportunity in the field of strategic narrative study. As a sub- state actor, the Brotherhood expands the scope of examination typically seen in research today. While this study focuses in on a very specific section of the Brotherhood‟s narrative, namely the narrative presented on the English website from 2008-2010, which included a Chairman change and a round of Parliamentary elections, much more data is available to be collected from the Arabic website. It could then be compared with other Brotherhood Arabic publications spanning the organization‟s history. This type of study would inform and expound upon the findings of this study. 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The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and ideology. London: Routledge. 102 Appendix A: Coding Key Actors Goals Actions ~Mubarak: ~Peace ~Vote Mubarak|president| ~Democracy ~Protest dictator ~Islamic State ~Jihad ~Government: ~Shari‟a ~Work Government|regime|State ~Freedom: free|freedom ~Protect security police ~Caliphate ~Sacrifice ~Ideologue: al- ~Political party: legal ~Serve Banna|Sayyid Qutb status|political party ~Provide ~Partner ~Truth ~Elect: represent| elect ~Role of Women ~Charity ~Oppress: torture, ~Islam: ~Justice, arrest, control, Quar‟an|Islam|Allah| ~Have a voice suppress Umma, ~Civil rights ~Reform: ~Christian: ~Free Palestine reform|change| Christian|Coptic ~Free Speech renew|condemn| Christians ~Independence criticize ~Society: citizen|society ~Moderation ~Improve: Improve| ~Political Parties: New strengthen|build| Wafd Party|Labour transform|develop| Party|Egyptian Arab pursue Socialist Party|Nasserist ~Kill: kill|massacre| Party|Libaral slaughter| Party|National Democratic murder Party|Democractic Peace ~Negotiate: Negotiate| Party cooperate|share| ~America: United compromise States|America|Obama| West ~Israel: Israel|Zionist|Jews| Jewish|Judaism ~Palestine: Palestine|Gaza|hamas ~Middle East: Sudan|Jordan|Saudi Arabia|Syria|Lebanon| Iraq|Iran|Lybia|Tunis| Tunisia|Algeria|Morocco| Yemen|Qatar|U.A.E.| Kuwait|Afghanistan| Pakistan 103 Appendix B: Actor # of times Average of # of times Average of # of times Average of mentioned times mentioned times mentioned times in 2008 in mentioned in 2009 in mentioned in 2010 in mentioned 51 per 100 60 per 100 107 per 100 documents documents documents documents documents documents America 67 131 44 73 21 19.6 Christian 6 11.7 2 3.3 28 26.1 Government 105 205.9 68 113.3 155 144.9 Ideologues 2 3.9 5 8.3 13 12.1 Islam 36 70.6 118 196.7 197 184.1 Israel 110 215.7 196 326.7 103 96.2 Middle 86 168.6 125 208.3 75 70.1 Eastern States Mubarak 12 23.5 13 21.7 12 11.2 Palestine 221 433.3 296 493.3 133 124.3 Partner 3 5.9 1 1.7 6 5.6 Political 21 41.2 6 10 18 16.8 Parties Role of 8 15.7 45 75 42 39.3 Women Society 46 90.2 21 35 31 29 104 Appendix C: Action # of times Average of # of times Average of # of times Average of mentioned in times mentioned in times mentioned in times 2008 in 51 mentioned 2009 in 60 mentioned 2010 in 107 mentioned documents per 100 documents per 100 documents per 100 documents documents documents Condemn 2 3.9 2 3.3 11 10.2 Improve 23 45 17 28 51 47 Jihad 2 3.9 6 10 3 2.8 Kill 23 45 27 45 21 19.6 Negotiate 6 11.7 0 0 7 6.5 Oppress 23 45 33 55 26 24.3 Protect 18 35.3 8 13.3 24 22.4 Protest 9 17.6 13 21.7 7 6.5 Provide 7 13.7 12 20 32 29.9 Reform 71 139.2 47 78.3 184 171 Represent 8 15.7 5 8.3 10 9.3 Sacrifice 14 27.5 15 25 18 16.8 Serve 42 82.4 67 111.7 108 100.1 Vote 5 9.8 1 1.7 4 3.7 Work 40 78.4 35 58.3 64 59.8 105 Appendix D: Goal # of times Average of # of times Average of # of times Average of mentioned times mentioned times mentioned times in 2008 in mentioned in 2009 in mentioned in 2010 in mentioned 51 per 100 60 per 100 107 per 100 documents documents documents documents documents documents Caliphate 0 0 0 0 0 0 Charity 1 2 1 1.7 5 4.7 Civil Rights 9 17.6 4 6.7 12 11.2 Coalition 18 35.3 4 6.7 10 9.3 Democracy 27 52.9 20 3.3 38 35.5 Free Palestine 0 0 0 0 1 0.9 Free Speech 0 0 0 0 1 0.9 Freedom 64 125.5 71 118.3 87 81.3 Have a Voice 10 19.6 5 8.3 12 11.2 Independence 12 23.5 12 20 17 15.9 Islamic State 1 20 1 17 2 17.8 Justice 32 62.7 24 40 61 57 Moderation 5 9.8 7 11.7 19 17.8 Peace 39 76.5 49 81.7 72 67.3 Political Party 0 0 0 0 0 0 Shari‛a 2 3.9 2 3.3 3 2.8 Truth 13 25.5 9 15 5 4.7 106 Appendix E: The Date: Title of 2008-2010 documents used in analysis 2008 January 1, 2008: Muslim Brotherhood Statement Rejects Bush‟s Egypt Visit January 1, 2008: MB Urges Hamas and Fatah Leaders Meeting in Cairo to Reach Agreement February 2, 2008: MB Chairman: Wisdom, Patience Adopted towards Repressive Detentions February 2, 2008: Why Was the MB Military Trial‚Äôs Verdict Postponed? Dr. Habib Writes March 3, 2008: Brotherhood Chairman: Gov‟t Attacks on Freedoms Unprecedented March 3, 2008: MB Chairman in Press Conference: Egyptian Regime Violated Every Thing Including People‟s Freedom March 3, 2008: MB Demands Swift Investigations Into Suez Shooting, Offers Condolences to Families March 3, 2008: MB on Arab Summit: Absence of Some Arab Leaders is Poor Judgment March 3, 2008: Akef: Applying Sharia Reinforces Status of Minorities in Muslim State March 3, 2008: Reactions of Opposition Voices to MB Stance toward Strike April 4, 2008: Habib: Unfair Military Decision undermining Egypt April 4, 2008: Reconsidering Camp David Treaty and Restoring real sovereignty April 4, 2008: Mahdi Akef: Muslim Brotherhood Rejects Gamal Mubarak as President April 4, 2008: Muslim Brotherhood Statement on Local Election Boycott April 4, 2008: MB Demands Egypt to Reopen Rafah Crossing to Aid Palestinians in Gaza April 4, 2008: MB Statement on the Military Decisions April 4, 2008: Akef Criticizes Arrest of Female Political Activist Israa Abdel Fattah 107 May 5, 2008: Muslim Brotherhood Chairman: Key Principles in the Palestinian Cause May 5, 2008: Akef Calls for Reconciliation among Lebanese Currents May 5, 2008: Muslim Brotherhood Statement on Exporting Gas to Israel May 5, 2008: Muslim Brotherhood Statement on Recent Price Hikes May 5, 2008: Statement: Muslim Brotherhood Calls for Ceasefire in Lebanon May 5, 2008: Statement: The Muslim Brotherhood Condemns Bush‟s Visit May 5, 2008: Muslim Brotherhood Chairman congratulates Michel Suleiman June 6, 2008: Interview with MB Deputy Chairman in Al Ahrar Daily June 6, 2008: The Muslim Brotherhood is Pro-Dialogue, Engagement of Women and Copts: Habib June 6, 2008: Morsi: Neglecting Human Development is the Cause of Egypt‟s Failure June 6, 2008: Habib Clarifies MB Stance towards Hamas, the Palestinian Cause July 7, 2008: Muslim Brotherhood Slams Int‟l Court Charges against Sudan President August 8, 2008: Mahdy Akef: Freedom Requires Sacrifice August 8, 2008: An Interview With Muslim Brotherhood‟s #2, Mohammed Habib August 8, 2008: Akef Praises European Activists For Breaking Gaza Siege August 8, 2008: Akef Congratulates Muslims On Ramadan August 8, 2008: Akef Calls on Palestinian Factions to Stop Mutual Accusations, Detentions September 9, 2008: Habib: Honorable National Forces Agree On a Reform Bundle Against Rising Despotism and Corruption September 9, 2008: MB Chairman: Disagreements Should Be Put Aside For the Sake of National Interests September 9, 2008: Brotherhood Chairman Visits, “Al Wafd‚” Liberal Party, Invites Its Leadership For Coalition September 9, 2008: MB Chairman Calls On Muslim Governments To End Bloody Conflicts With Their People October 10, 2008: Morsi: Interior Minister Is Responsible For 108 November 11, 2008: Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Chairman Mohamed Mahdy Akef November 11, 2008: Muslim Brotherhood Chairman Comments on Obama‟s Victory November 11, 2008: MB Chairman Calls for Ending Gaza Siege November 11, 2008: Morsi Slams Escalation Against Muslim Brotherhood Across Egypt November 11, 2008: The Muslim Brotherhood Condemns Terrorist Attacks in India December 12, 2008: MB Calls For Release of Gaza Relief Detainees December 12, 2008: MB Press Release on the Brutal Israeli Assaults on Gaza December 12, 2008: December 12,2008: Muslim Brotherhood Is Considering National Coalition That Would Bypass Mistakes of the Past: Habib December 12, 2008: MB Chairman Calls On Egyptian People To Continue Protests Against Gaza Holocaust December 12, 2008: Muslim Brotherhood Condemns Terrorist Attacks on Gaza, Blames Arab Regimes 2009 January 1, 2009: Dr. Habib: Disappointment In Regimes And Hopes In People January 1, 2009: Muslim Brotherhood Demands Egyptian Regime Take Positive Measures for Gaza January 1, 2009: Morsy: Nation Interacts With Gaza Summit Decisions, Anticipates Activation January 1, 2009: Egyptian National Forces: We Support Palestinians‟ Right To Armed Struggle January 1, 2009: Muslim Brotherhood Statement on Egyptian Gaza Initiative January 1, 2009: Muslim Brotherhood Calls for Impeaching Israeli Leaders Over Gaza War Crimes January 1, 2009: Muslim Brotherhood Welcomes Qatar‟s Call For Summit, Slams Countries That Rejected It January 1, 2009: Muslim Brotherhood Statement on Sharm El-Sheikh Summit 109 February 2, 2009: Al-Raya Interview With Muslim Brotherhood Deputy Chairman Over Gaza Crisis February 2, 2009: Muslim Brotherhood Chairman Calls for Confronting Possible Zionist Aggression on Gaza February 2, 2009: MB Chair To the Arab-Islamic People February 2, 2009: MB Chair: We Want Youth Who Know the Rights of A Country And Patriotism February 2, 2009: MB Chair Congratulates Sheikh Ahmed on Presidency of Somalia February 2, 2009: Morsi Congratulates Ayman Nur On His Release, Wishes Same For All Oppressed February 2, 2009: A Bomb Blast Hits Egypt‟s Stability March 3, 2009: Egypt will Arise: By Muhammad Mahdy Akef March 3, 2009: MB Chair Calls to ICC Rejection March 3, 2009: MB All Over the World Condemn Decision to Arrest Al-Bashir March 3, 2009: MB Calls On Arab Leaders To Support Palestinians, Unleash Liberties April 4, 2009: Dr. Habib: "Reuters" Misrepresented My Statements on the Inheritance Project April 4, 2009: MB Statement on the, “Day of Rage‚” April 6th, 2009 April 4, 2009: MB Statement on One Year Mark of Military Sentences Against Frontline MB Leaders April 4, 2009: Morsi: We Refuse Any Behavior That Threatens Egypt‟s Security April 4, 2009: Morsy: We Reject Lieberman‟s Zionist Statements Against Hamas May 5, 2009: MB Chair: Netanyahu Not Welcomed In Egypt May 5, 2009: Dr. Morsy warns against Zionist illusions May 5, 2009: MB Expresses Condolences For Death of President‟s Grandson, Mohamed May 5, 2009: Katatni: MB Would Welcome Effective Debate With Obama During His Visit May 5, 2009: MB Chairman Expresses Condolences For Death of el Shater‟s Mother 110 June 6, 2009: Habib: Actions speak louder than words June 6, 2009: Habib: Allocating seats to women in the People‟s Assembly (PA) is unconstitutional June 6, 2009: Statement of MB on the Fierce Security Attack on Leaders and Members of the Group June 6, 2009: The Muslim Brotherhood‟s statement on recent detentions July 7, 2009: The MB Chairman: Our Youth, our future July 7, 2009: Muslim Brotherhood‟s Statement on U.S. combat troops withdrawal from Iraqi cities September 9, 2009: Ikhwanweb interviews Prof. Mohamed Habib, the Deputy Chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood September 9, 2009: Akef calls on authorities to unite and help victims of devastating floods in Turkey September 9, 2009: Muslim Brotherhood‟s Statement on, “State of lawlessness‚” September 9, 2009: Habib: Extremely poor political climate makes presidential nominations pointless September 9, 2009: Muslim Brotherhood Statement on Yemen‟s Saada incidents October 10, 2009: The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood October 10, 2009: Chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood denies fabricated allegations of his resignation October 10, 2009: MB Chairman mourns leftist thinker Dr. Mohamed Al Sayed Said October 10, 2009: A statement from the Muslim Brotherhood, regarding rumours of the Chairman's resignation October 10, 2009: The Muslim Brotherhood and latest incidents:(Clarification from Executive Bureau) October 10, 2009: Habib: IOF and the U.S. administration behind recent wave of arrests October 10, 2009: Muslim Brotherhood's statement on Al-Aqsa Mosque‟s latest incidents October 10, 2009: Akef: The Palestinian cause is on the Brotherhood's high priorities list 111 November 11, 2009: MB Chairman: Freedom has a price and peaceful resistance is our approach November 11, 2009: MB Chairman: We are confident Jihad is the path to liberate Al-Aqsa mosque November 11, 2009: MB chairman calls for the halt of blood spilling between Yemenis and Saudis November 11, 2009: MB Chairman calls on Yemen‟s rival parties to end fighting and to resume dialogue December 12, 2009: MB Chairman in an interview to refute reservations December 12, 2009: The Muslim Brotherhood condemns barbaric bombings in Somalia December 12, 2009: Chairman of MB Mr. Akef issued a statement following the elections of the new Executive Guidance Bureau December 12, 2009: Statement by the MB concerning current events December 12, 2009: Mohammed Mahdi Akef: Have faith for there will be a bright tomorrow for the Islamic nation December 12, 2009: Muslim Brotherhood Movement Chairman Mr Mohamed Mahdi Akef criticizes the shunning of the movement 2010 January 1, 2010: MB‟s statement on the construction of the steel wall between Egypt and Gaza January 1, 2010: Akef; Solidarity with Palestine secure's Egypts safety and well- being January 1, 2010: Letter from the MB New Chairman Mohammed Badie January 1, 2010: The Muslim Brotherhood's statement on the earthquake in Haiti January 1, 2010: MB statement regarding latest Israeli oppression January 1, 2010: In response to the rumours of giving up politics January 1, 2010: Egypt's Brotherhood calls for the end of violence and bloody clashes in Nigeria January 1, 2010: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood condemns violence against innocent civilians in Nigeria 112 January 1, 2010: Akef:MB's elections proved further the strength of the movement and the efficiency of its regulations January 1, 2010: Morsy: Neither the killing of our Egyptian soldier nor the construction of the Steel Wall is acceptable January 1, 2010: Muslim Brotherhood hold world-wide press conference to announce the 8th Chairman January 1, 2010: Badie to Reuters: MB condemns violence in all its forms and calls for a united front to combat intolerance January 1, 2010: Egypt's Brotherhood gets new leader January 1, 2010: MB Chairman thanks press for attending and covering conference February 2, 2010: Muslim Brotherhood condemn the fierce security attack against top Brotherhood members February 2, 2010: Badie meets with Constitution (Dostoury) Party leader February 2, 2010: A Statement by the MB on the fierce attacks against MB members February 2, 2010: Badie: Al-Banna's amazing foresight February 2, 2010: MB Chairman: al-Banna laid the foundations for the nation's development February 2, 2010: Morsy: Egypt 's ruling regime to compensate its legitimacy to rule by using violence against its own citizens February 2, 2010: Egypt's representatives meet with ElBaradei February 2, 2010: Dr.Morsy : The continuous arrests and host of unjust accusations against the MB will not benefit the nation February 2, 2010: MB attend ElBaradei's fruitful meeting with opposition trends March 3, 2010: Muslim Brotherhood's Statement on IOF War Crimes against Holy Sites March 3, 2010: Muslim Brotherhood Statement on the Violations by State Security Officers March 3, 2010: Muslim Brotherhood Statement on the Violations by State Security Officers March 3, 2010: Morsy calls on media to concentrate reports on Regime's corruptions and scandals 113 March 3, 2010: MB Chairman: Sacrifice is the first road to victory March 3, 2010: Egypt's Opposition calls for constitutional reform March 3, 2010: Morsy calls for a national uprising to save Al-Aqsa Mosque March 3, 2010: MB Chairman Dr Badie, congratulates Al-Azhar's newly appointed Cleric March 3, 2010: MB chairman wishes Mubarak safe homecoming and speedy recovery March 3, 2010: Morsy: The MB has Sacrificed much for Reform March 3, 2010: MB will participate in up-coming Shura elections March 3, 2010: Badie calls on Arab and Muslim leaders and royalty during summit March 3, 2010: MB chairman dispatches welcoming telegraph to President Mubarak April 4, 2010: MB Secretary General: MB will attempt to coordinate and collaborate with ElBaradei April 4, 2010: MB Chairman Dr Badie calls on leaders to support Resistance April 4, 2010: MB's opinion, True political reform is the gateway to real change in Egypt April 4, 2010: MB delegation to convene with Constitution Party April 4, 2010: Morsy: The MB will continue their plea for reform and welcome all who wish to support the call April 4, 2010: MB chairman: MB support Dr.Baradei's call for Political Reform April 4, 2010: MB Chairman: The key to Egypt 's progress and welfare is restored freedom May 5, 2010: MB chairman meets with Labor Party leaders May 5, 2010: 14 MB nominated in upcoming Shura elections May 5, 2010: MB Chairman calls for the release of all political prisoners May 5, 2010: Morsy: 8 MB candidates so far in Shura elections May 5, 2010: MB's comprehensive proposal for Shura Council elections May 5, 2010: MB chairman meets with Ghad Party leader to discuss political reform 114 May 5, 2010: MB Morsy demands NDP Shura candidate withdraw questioning validity May 5, 2010: MB Chairman meets with Egyptian Socialists May 5, 2010: MB chairman offers pep talk to Shura Candidates May 5, 2010: MB Chairman: The Islamic world has awakened to liberate Palestine May 5, 2010: Al Erian: MB determined to participate in elections despite regime's oppression May 5, 2010: Dr. Morsy: The regime's violations exposes its intentions May 5, 2010: MB Chairman: Optimism is the first step towards renaissance May 5, 2010: MB coordinates with six, “Shura,” candidates including one Christian May 5, 2010: MB Chairman: Violations in the Shura Council‟s elections is beyond limits May 5, 2010: MB Chairman calls on the world to unite and defend victims of Israeli aggression June 6, 2010: MB calls on Arab rulers to unite and condemn Israel's attacks June 6, 2010: MB Morsy Calls for Solidarity with the freedom flotilla's ship "Rachel Corrie" June 6, 2010: MB leader slams IOF murders calling for worldwide unity and support June 6, 2010: MB and ElBaradei agree on reform June 6, 2010: MB Chairman: With hope and perseverance our nation will defy odds and obstacles June 6, 2010: MB and NAC agree on joined political action June 6, 2010: MB denies deals were made and will continue to follow peaceful, open-minded and tolerant methods June 6, 2010: Morsy: MB analyzing electoral proceedings June 6, 2010: MB chairman calls on Egyptian regime to come to its senses July 7, 2010: MB deputy chairman talks about 7 demands in petition for change July 7, 2010: MB spokesman denies assertions by Reuters and al- Masry al-Youm July 7, 2010: MB Chairman and former ambassador discuss Egypt 's future 115 July 7, 2010: MB chairman's initiated meeting harvests mutual cooperation July 7, 2010: Morsy commends MB chairman's call for dialogue with political parties and opposition leaders July 7, 2010: MB chairman meets with Wafd Party leader, stress reform and peaceful change July 7, 2010: MB Chairman meets with Sudan 's MB Director General August 8, 2010: Morsy: Talks With Israel waste of time and resistance is only effective August 8, 2010: Dr. Morsy denies accusations by Al-Ahram newspaper August 8, 2010: MB chairman congratulates new Syrian MB Secretary General August 8, 2010: MB chairman: We call for a Civil State with Islamic values August 8, 2010: MB chairman congratulates Nour for being elected Ghad Party's president August 8, 2010: MB strongly condemns the killings of relief workers in Afghanistan August 8, 2010: MB chairman criticizes gov't funded TV series smearing MB August 8, 2010: MB annual dinner banned by Mubarak's regime August 8, 2010: MB hosts small Ramadan dinner and discusses Egypt's future August 8, 2010: MB Deputy: Anti-MB, gov't funded TV series 'The Group' mere propaganda August 8, 2010: MB Chairman: MB ready to work with all parties concerned with Egypt's future September 9, 2010: MB: Burning the Quran will increase anti-Americanism in the Muslim world September 9, 2010: MB urges US Government to prevent Quran burning event September 9, 2010: Dr. Morsy: MB remains undecided on Elections September 9, 2010: MB chairman expresses sorrow over death of Moderate Islamist Scholar Dr. Fathi Osman September 9, 2010: MB slams Bishop‟s offensive remarks and calls on Muslims to remain calm October 10, 2010: MB Chairman: Arabs must counter conspiracy of dividing Arab lands into smaller states 116 October 10, 2010: Morsy: Egypt's interests are at the top of MB priorities November 11, 2010: MB deputy chairman: We are optimistic and do not regard elections as battlefield December 12, 2010: MB Chairman Sends Best Wishes to all Copts and Christians Worldwide December 12, 2010: MB chairman: “Our Reformist Work Continues” December 12, 2010: MB Chairman Sends Best Wishes to all Copts and Christians Worldwide 117