DOCSLIB.ORG

Policies to Enforce the Bank Secrecy Act and Prevent Money Laundering in Money Services Businesses and the Gaming Industry

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Policies to Enforce the Bank Secrecy Act and Prevent Money Laundering in Money Services Businesses and the Gaming Industry S. HRG. 108–902 POLICIES TO ENFORCE THE BANK SECRECY ACT AND PREVENT MONEY LAUNDERING IN MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES AND THE GAMING INDUSTRY HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. POLICIES TO ENFORCE THE BANK SECRECY ACT AND TO PREVENT MONEY LAUNDERING IN MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES AND THE GAMING INDUSTRY SEPTEMBER 28, 2004 Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs ( Available at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate05sh.html U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 27–328 PDF WASHINGTON : 2006 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:52 May 11, 2006 Jkt 025856 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 27328.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Chairman ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York JIM BUNNING, Kentucky EVAN BAYH, Indiana MIKE CRAPO, Idaho ZELL MILLER, Georgia JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey KATHLEEN L. CASEY, Staff Director and Counsel STEVEN B. HARRIS, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel SKIP FISCHER, Senior Professional Staff JOHN O’HARA, Senior Investigative Counsel STEPHEN R. KROLL, Democratic Special Counsel JOSEPH R. KOLINSKI, Chief Clerk and Computer Systems Administrator GEORGE E. WHITTLE, Editor (II) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:52 May 11, 2006 Jkt 025856 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 27328.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 CONTENTS TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2004 Page Opening statement of Chairman Shelby ................................................................ 1 Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of: Senator Dole ...................................................................................................... 2 Senator Sarbanes .............................................................................................. 3 Senator Bunning ............................................................................................... 5 Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 18 Senator Allard ................................................................................................... 22 WITNESSES William J. Fox, Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. De- partment of the Treasury .................................................................................... 5 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40 Response to written questions of Senator Shelby .......................................... 61 Kevin Brown, Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, Internal Revenue Service ................................................................................................... 8 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46 Response to written questions of: Senator Sarbanes ...................................................................................... 68 Senator Carper .......................................................................................... 68 Diana L. Taylor, Superintendent of Banks, State of New York .......................... 10 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., President and CEO, American Gaming Association . 25 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 54 Joseph Cachey, III, Deputy Chief Compliance Officer and Counsel, AML Global Compliance, Western Union Financial Services, Inc. ........................... 28 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55 Ezra C. Levine, Counsel, the Non-Bank Funds Transmitters Group and Part- ner, Howery, Simon, Arnold & White, LLP ....................................................... 30 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 58 Response to written questions of Senator Shelby .......................................... 69 ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUPPLIED FOR THE RECORD Letter to Senator Richard C. Shelby from Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., President and CEO, American Gaming Association, dated October 20, 2004 ................. 72 (III) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:52 May 11, 2006 Jkt 025856 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 27328.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:52 May 11, 2006 Jkt 025856 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 27328.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 POLICIES TO ENFORCE THE BANK SECRECY ACT AND PREVENT MONEY LAUNDERING IN MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES AND THE GAMING INDUSTRY TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2004 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. The Committee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD–538, Dirksen Sen- ate Office Building, Senator Richard C. Shelby (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RICHARD C. SHELBY Chairman SHELBY. This hearing will come to order. This morning, the Senate Banking Committee continues its ex- amination of the use of banks and other financial institutions for the laundering of money derived from criminal activity and for the possible financing of terrorist operations. In fact, the subject of this hearing is not banks at all, except to the degree that they transi- tion into the financial services sector, previously the domain of other institutions. Previous hearings in the Committee’s series on terrorist financ- ing have logically focused on the banking industry. With primary jurisdiction over the banks and the Bank Secrecy Act, one of the principal legal mechanisms for combating money laundering, the Banking Committee has sought to draw as complete an under- standing as possible of those institutions’ continuing vulnerability to abuse by those who seek to harm this Nation. The easy work, however, has been done. Today, comes the hard part. Relatively speaking, banks are easy. We can, to a large de- gree, get our arms around the problems they pose for preventing money laundering. Today’s hearing, however, begins our examina- tion into an entire other realm of financial institutions. If banks represent a fairly well-defined institution into which we can peer for insights and over which we can ensure some reasonable degree of oversight, money services businesses and casinos present prob- lems on a scale that dwarf anything else. There are an estimated 15,000 licensed money services businesses and another 160,000 un- licensed ones. That excludes 40,000 post offices, each of which func- tion as a money services business by issuing money orders. If our regulatory agencies are overextended trying to maintain adequate oversight of banks—and history indicates there is vast room for im- (1) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:52 May 11, 2006 Jkt 025856 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 27328.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 2 provement—then the challenge of preventing abuse of nonbank money services businesses is of several magnitudes greater. Similarly, casinos exist for the sole purpose of transferring cash, generally from your pockets to the casinos’ vaults. The amount of money that filters through the hands of casinos has always been immense, and that was when Las Vegas and Atlantic City rep- resented the sum total of legalized gambling in the United States. Today, we have legalized gambling in 800 casinos in 30 States and territories. Riverboats ply the Mississippi with the same goal as those of Las Vegas casinos. Internet gambling presents literally a virtual challenge heretofore unimaginable to those with responsi- bility for regulating gambling. How we ensure that the explosion in legalized gambling is not abused by those seeking to launder the proceeds of crime or to finance criminal of terrorist activity is the challenge before us. Helping us to understand the challenge are two panels of ex- perts. Our first witnesses are responsible for monitoring money services businesses and casinos and helping ensure their integrity against criminal activity is maintained. First up, is a regular here: William Fox, Director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Net- work, or FinCEN. Following Mr. Fox will be Kevin Brown, Com- missioner of the Small Business/Self-Employed Division of the Internal Revenue Service; and last, but not least, we hear from Diana Taylor, Superintendent of Banks for the State of New York. Ms. Taylor will provide valuable insights into the difficulties of reg- ulating money services businesses, drawing in part from her State’s experience with both major and small businesses. Our second panel will be comprised of Mr. Frank Fahrenkopf, President and CEO of the American Gaming Association; Mr. Jo- seph Cachey, Vice President of Global Compliance for Western Union; and Mr. Ezra Levine, Counsel to the Non-Bank
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Crackdown on Money Laundering: a Comparative Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and Multilateral Policy Reforms Kathleen A
    Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business Volume 23 Issue 2 Winter Winter 2003 Crackdown on Money Laundering: A Comparative Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and Multilateral Policy Reforms Kathleen A. Lacey Barbara Crutchfield George Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb Part of the Banking and Finance Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Kathleen A. Lacey, Barbara Crutchfield George, Crackdown on Money Laundering: A Comparative Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and Multilateral Policy Reforms, 23 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 263 (2002-2003) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. ARTICLES Crackdown on Money Laundering: A Comparative Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and Multilateral Policy Reforms Kathleen A. Lacey* Barbara Crutchfield George** TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRO DUCTIO N ................................................................................... 265 II. B ACKG RO UN D .................................................................................... 267 A. Definition of Money Laundering ................................................. 267 B. Negative Consequences of Money Laundering
    [Show full text]
  • Second Circuit Affirms SEC's Bank Secrecy Act Powers
    Latham & Watkins Securities Litigation & Professional Liability January 11, 2021 | Number 2847 and White Collar Defense & Investigations Practices Second Circuit Affirms SEC’s Bank Secrecy Act Powers The Second Circuit’s recent decision gives the SEC the green light to continue enforcing broker-dealer compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act. Key Points: In US Securities and Exchange Commission v. Alpine Securities Corp., the Second Circuit affirmed the SEC’s authority to require SEC-registered broker-dealers to comply with the BSA’s reporting and recordkeeping requirements, under Section 17(a) and Rule 17a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). The Alpine decision validates the SEC’s focus on broker-dealer AML programs. In anticipation of such scrutiny, broker-dealers and Chief Compliance Officers should evaluate whether their compliance programs satisfy existing anti-money laundering obligations, and particularly BSA reporting obligations. On December 4, 2020, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the US District Court for the Southern District of New York in US Securities and Exchange Commission v. Alpine Securities Corp.1 The case primarily dealt with the issue of whether the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) possesses the authority to enforce broker-dealer compliance with Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) reporting as required by the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), but under Section 17(a) and Rule 17a-8 of the Exchange Act.2 Alpine, the defendant, was an SEC-registered broker-dealer specializing in clearing and settlement services for penny stocks and micro-cap securities. Alpine had previously been the subject of an examination conducted by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.
    [Show full text]
  • Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution
    Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution Peter Van Valkenburgh March 2019 coincenter.org Peter Van Valkenburgh, Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution, ​ ​ Coin Center Report, Mar. 2019, available at https://coincenter.org/entry/e-cash-dex-constitution Abstract Regulators, law enforcement, and the general public have come to expect that cryptocurrency transactions will leave a public record on a blockchain, and that most cryptocurrency exchanges will take place using centralized businesses that are regulated and surveilled through the Bank Secrecy Act. The emergence of electronic cash and decentralized exchange software challenges these expectations. Transactions need not leave any public record and exchanges can be accomplished peer to peer without using a regulated third party in between. Faced with diminished visibility into cryptocurrency transactions, policymakers may propose new approaches to financial surveillance. Regulating cryptocurrency software developers and individual users of that software under the Bank Secrecy Act would be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because it would be a warrantless search and seizure of information private to cryptocurrency users. Furthermore, any law or regulation attempting to ban, require licensing for, or compel the altered publication (e.g. backdoors) of cryptocurrency software ​ ​ would be unconstitutional under First Amendment protections for speech. Author Peter Van Valkenburgh Coin Center [email protected] About Coin Center Coin Center is a non-profit research and advocacy center focused on the public policy issues facing open blockchain technologies such as Bitcoin. Our mission is to build a better understanding of these technologies and to promote a regulatory climate that preserves the freedom to innovate using blockchain technologies.
    [Show full text]
  • Bank Secrecy Act for Operations Staff
    Bank Secrecy Act for Operations Staff Presented by Jan Vogel, Center for Professional Development WilliamsTown Communications, Contributing Writer #TR1118 l Introduction Welcome to CUNA’s Bank Secrecy Act for Operations Staff Training on Demand course! Compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act, otherwise known as the BSA, is a critical task for each and every credit union in the United States, so all credit union employees must be familiar with BSA requirements. To that end, this course provides an overview of the Bank Secrecy Act, including specific actions that you, as a member of your credit union’s operations staff, must take to be BSA compliant. Of course, you also need to be sure that you know What Is the the BSA policy and procedures at your credit union. Bank Secrecy Act? This is key to being in compliance with the require- Not surprisingly, the first step to BSA compliance ments of the Bank Secrecy Act. is understanding just what the Bank Secrecy Act in- Let’s get started! volves and why it was enacted in the first place. In its current form, the BSA is more than just a single act of Objectives Congress; rather, it is a combination of multiple laws The Bank Secrecy Act applies to all credit unions, that have been passed during the last four decades. and it requires that employees in these institutions These laws were enacted to assist law enforcement carry out certain tasks. But what exactly does the officials in the investigation of activities and crimes BSA entail, and how does it affect operations staff such as money laundering, tax evasion, and financing in particular? By the end of this Training on Demand of terrorist groups.
    [Show full text]
  • Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act
    [Billing Code: 4810-02] DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 31 CFR Part 103 RIN 1506-AA31 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Customer Identification Programs for Certain Banks (Credit Unions, Private Banks and Trust Companies) That do not Have a Federal Functional Regulator AGENCIES: The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Treasury. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. SUMMARY: FinCEN is issuing a proposed regulation to implement section 326 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001(the Act) for credit unions and trust companies that do not have a federal functional regulator. The proposed rule provides the same rules for these financial institutions as are provided in a companion notice of proposed rulemaking being issued jointly by FinCEN and the Federal bank regulators published elsewhere in this separate part of this issue of the Federal Register. DATES: Written comments on the proposed rule may be submitted on or before [INSERT DATE 45 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER]. ADDRESSES: Because paper mail in the Washington area may be subject to delay, commenters are encouraged to e-mail comments. Comments should be sent by one method only. Comments may be mailed to FinCEN, Section 326 Certain Credit Union and Trust Company Rule Comments, P.O. Box 39, Vienna, VA 22183 or sent by e-mail to [email protected] with the caption “Attention: Section 326 Certain Credit Union and Trust Company Rule Comments” in the body of the text. Comments may be inspected at FinCEN between 10 a.m.
    [Show full text]
  • Supreme Court of the United States
    No. 13-1175 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, Petitioner, v. NARANJIBHAI PATEL, et al., Respondents. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS AND AFFIRMANCE LEE TIEN Counsel of Record HANNI FAKHOURY JENNIFER LYNCH ANDREW CROCKER JAMIE WILLIAMS ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION 815 Eddy Street San Francisco, CA 94109 (415) 436-9333 [email protected] Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation January 30, 2015 257199 A (800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859 i QUESTION PRESENTED Amicus curiae will address the following question: Are facial challenges to ordinances and statutes permitted under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution? ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTION PRESENTED . i TABLE OF CONTENTS. ii TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . iv INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE . .1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . .1 ARGUMENT. .4 I. This Court Has Permitted and Should Continue to Permit Fourth Amendment Facial Challenges to Statutes That Authorize Warrantless Searches. .4 A. The Court Has Consistently Allowed Fourth Amendment Facial Challenges.. .4 B. The Court Should Reject the Categorical Rule Espoused by Sibron. .9 1. Sibron’s binary distinction between permissible and impermissible Fourth Amendment facial challenges does not hold up to scrutiny. .9 iii Table of Contents Page 2. Sibron’s concern with ripeness does not mean facial challenges should be impossible under the Fourth Amendment. .12 C. Allowing Facial Challenges Is Consistent with the Court’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence and the Purposes of the Amendment.
    [Show full text]
  • Nac 2015045254501 White
    BEFORE THE NATIONAL ADJUDICATORY COUNCIL FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY In the Matter of DECISION Department of Enforcement, Complaint No. 2015045254501 Complainant, vs. Dated: July 26, 2019 Richard O. White Charlotte, North Carolina, Respondent. Respondent structured cash deposits to avoid federal reporting requirements. Held, findings affirmed and sanction modified. Appearances For the Complainant: Leo F. Orenstein, Esq., Joseph E. Strauss, Esq., Savvas A. Foukas, Esq., Tiffany A. Buxton, Esq., Department of Enforcement, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority For the Respondent: Nathan Zezula, Esq., Lueker Mott Zezula LLC Decision Richard O. White appeals a February 27, 2018 Hearing Panel decision. The Hearing Panel found that White knowingly structured cash deposits to evade the federal currency reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, in violation of the high standards of ethical conduct imposed by FINRA Rule 2010. For his misconduct, the Hearing Panel barred White from associating with any FINRA member in any capacity. The primary issue on appeal is whether White, through his training at his member firm, knew about the relevant currency reporting requirements and then intentionally structured the cash deposits to evade reporting. A second issue is the appropriateness of the sanction imposed by the Hearing Panel. The Hearing Panel concluded that White acted knowingly and intentionally. After an independent review of the record, we agree with the liability findings of the Hearing Panel but modify the sanction it imposed. - 2 - I. Introduction The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 (a statute commonly referred to as the “Bank Secrecy Act” or “BSA”) requires U.S. financial institutions to assist U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Gao-18-642T, Bank Secrecy
    United States Government Accountability Office Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Financial Ins titutions and Consumer Credit, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. ET Tuesday, June 26, 2018 BANK SECRECY ACT Further Actions Needed to Address Domestic and International Derisking Concerns Statement of Michael E. Clements, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment GAO-18-642T June 26, 2018 BANK SECRECY ACT Further Actions Needed to Address Domestic and International Derisking Concerns Highlights of GAO-18-642T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found In recent years, some Southwest “Derisking” is the practice of depository institutions limiting certain services or border residents and businesses ending their relationships with customers to, among other things, avoid perceived reported difficulty accessing banking regulatory concerns about facilitating money laundering or other criminal activity services, including experiencing bank such as financing to terrorist groups. In its February 2018 report, GAO found that account terminations and bank branch money laundering risk is high in the Southwest border region because of the high closings in the region. In addition, the volume of cash transactions, the number of cross-border transactions, and World Bank and others have reported foreign account holders. According to GAO’s nationally representative survey of that some money transmitters have banks, an estimated 80 percent (+/- 11) of Southwest border banks limited or did been losing access to banking services not offer accounts to customers that are considered high risk for money with depository institutions.
    [Show full text]
  • Horizon Scanner Financial Crime – US RISK RATING
    Horizon scanner RISK RATING Financial Crime – US Potential impact Legal issue/risk When? What’s next Supporting information The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 Current The AML Act’s expansion of the National Defense strengthened the US government’s ability to seek subpoena power strengthens Authorization Act foreign bank records. the US government’s ability to for Fiscal Year conduct investigations 2021; H.R. 6395 On 1 January 2021, the US Congress overrode former involving foreign banks and to (116th) President Trump’s veto of the Anti-Money Laundering Act pursue enforcement actions, as of 2020 (AML Act) contained in the National Defense it will now have an easier path Congress passes Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. The AML Act to access and use documents the Anti-Money permits the US Department of Treasury and US that previously were difficult to Laundering Act of Department of Justice to issue a subpoena for records to obtain. 2020, amending any foreign bank that maintains a correspondent account and modernizing in the United States. This new subpoena power is not the Bank Secrecy limited to records related to the correspondent account, Act which is the limitation that existed previously. Rather, it permits the US government to request records related to any account at the foreign bank, including records maintained outside of the United States. The AML Act prohibits US courts from quashing or modifying a subpoena on the sole ground that a financial institution’s compliance with the subpoena would conflict with foreign bank secrecy or confidentiality laws. The US Congress enacted the Corporate Current While financial institutions National Defense Transparency Act, which created an ultimate mostly are exempt from the Authorization Act beneficial ownership register.
    [Show full text]
  • An Update on Money Services Businesses Under Bank Secrecy and Usa Patriot Regulation
    S. HRG. 109–517 AN UPDATE ON MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES UNDER BANK SECRECY AND USA PATRIOT REGULATION HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES UNDER BANK SECRECY ACT AND USA PATRIOT ACT REGULATIONS, FOCUSING ON FEDERAL AND STATE EF- FORTS IN THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AREA APRIL 26, 2005 Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs ( Available at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate05sh.html U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 29–429 PDF WASHINGTON : 2006 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:53 Aug 23, 2006 Jkt 025856 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 29429.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Chairman ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York JIM BUNNING, Kentucky EVAN BAYH, Indiana MIKE CRAPO, Idaho THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey MEL MARTINEZ, Florida KATHLEEN L. CASEY, Staff Director and Counsel STEVEN B. HARRIS, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel SKIP FISCHER, Senior Staff Professional JOHN O’HARA, Counsel STEPHEN R.
    [Show full text]
  • FRB: Supervisory Letter SR 21-10 on Interagency Statement on The
    BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM WASHINGTON, D.C. 20551 DIVISION OF SUPERVISION AND REGULATION SR 21-10 June 30, 2021 TO THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF SUPERVISION AT EACH FEDERAL RESERVE BANK SUBJECT: Interagency Statement on the Issuance of the Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism National Priorities Applicability: This guidance applies to all financial institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve that are subject to the Bank Secrecy Act. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (collectively, the federal banking agencies), the State bank and credit union regulators,1 and the U.S Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) are issuing the attached Interagency Statement on the Issuance of the Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism National Priorities (AML/CFT Priorities). The intent of the Interagency Statement is to provide clarity for banks2 on the AML/CFT Priorities. The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (the “AML Act”),3 requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General, Federal functional regulators, relevant State financial regulators, and relevant national security agencies, to establish and make public, priorities for AML/CFT policy. Accordingly, FinCEN published these first national AML/CFT Priorities today. Today’s publication of the AML/CFT Priorities does not create an immediate change to Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) requirements or supervisory expectations for banks. The AML Act requires that, within 180 days of the establishment of the AML/CFT Priorities, FinCEN (in 1 As represented by the Federal Fina ncial Institutions Examination Council Sta te Lia ison Committee.
    [Show full text]
  • Why So Few Prosecutions Connected to the Financial Crisis?
    G THE B IN EN V C R H E S A N 8 8 D 8 B 1 AR SINCE WWW. NYLJ.COM VOLUME 250—NO. 46 WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 2013 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME Expert Analysis Why So Few Prosecutions Connected to the Financial Crisis? n a recent interview, Attorney General investigations and prosecutions of account- Eric Holder told The Wall Street Journal ing fraud and misstatements in financial that he expects to announce in the com- statements. These investigations and pros- ing months significant cases arising from ecutions led to high-profile convictions of the financial crisis of 2008.1 The Attor- officials at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia and Iney General’s remarks follow criticism that many other companies. the administration has not done enough to By And The contrast between these two periods prosecute individuals and institutions said Elkan Jonathan is reflected in the work of the financial fraud to be responsible for the crisis. One com- Abramowitz Sack taskforces created by the administrations mentator, noting that the Attorney General of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. In did not say whether the new cases would ed, broadly speaking, to the financial this article, we compare the work of the be civil or criminal, dismissed the prospect crisis, but ultimately skirted its edges. In two taskforces and then consider some of new cases with the quip, “I’ll believe it one case, against hedge fund managers possible reasons for the relative dearth of when I see it.”2 of Bear Stearns, the charges stemmed high-profile criminal cases arising from the In fact, the Department of Justice has from statements to investors about their financial crisis.
    [Show full text]