Fraser Watts Morphic Fields and Extended Mind An Examination of the Theoretical Concepts of Rupert Sheldrake Abstract: This paper examines the central theoretical concepts in the work of Rupert Sheldrake. The first section examines Sheldrake’s account of morphic fields and questions whether difficulties arise when these concepts are extended upwards from the biological level. The second section reviews Sheldrake’s concept of extended mind and considers the criticism that it is reductionist about mentality. In con- sidering both of these criticisms it is argued that Sheldrake’s theories can be taken in a reductive direction, but need not be. The third and final section draws on the work of Joseph Bracken and David Ray Griffin to suggest a panpsychist metaphysics of field as one possible way that Sheldrake could sidestep these dangers and strengthen his approach. An Examination of the Work of Rupert Sheldrake This essay will examine the striking and controversial theoretical pro- posals of Rupert Sheldrake concerning both the development of biolog- ical form and the question of consciousness.1 Sheldrake is no stranger Correspondence: Fraser Watts, Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge, West Road, Cam- bridge, CB3 9BS Email:
[email protected] [1] This essay is the outcome of a regular series of discussions with Philip Clayton, Russell Re Manning, Leon Turner, and Fraser Watts on Sheldrake’s work which took place in Queens’ College, Cambridge. The essay is greatly indebted to the help and ideas of the above as well as to Rupert Sheldrake, who was present at the final meeting of the group on 17 February 2010 to discuss and defend his theories.