U2F & UAF Tutorial

U2F & UAF Tutorial How Secure is Authentication? 2014 1.2bn? 2013 397m

Dec. 2013 145m

Oct. 2013 130m

May 2013 22m

April 2013 50m

March 2013 50m Cloud Authentication Password Issues 1 2 Password might be Password could be stolen entered into untrusted from the server App / Web-site (“phishing”)

4 Inconvenient to type password on phone

3 Too many passwords to remember à re-use / cart abandonment OTP Issues 1 OTP vulnerable to real- time MITM and MITB attacks

4 Inconvenient to type OTP on phone

3 OTP HW tokens are expensive and people 2 don’t want another device SMS security questionable, especially when Device is the phone Implementation Challenge A Plumbing Problem

User Verification Methods Applications Organizations

Silo 1

Silo 2 App 1

Silo 3 App 2

Silo N ? ? New App Authentication Needs

Do you want to login?

Do you want to transfer $100 to Frank?

Do you want to ship to a new address?

Do you want to delete all of your emails?

Do you want to share your dental record?

Authentication today: Ask user for a password (and perhaps a one time code) Authentication & Risk Engines

Purpose Geolocation … (from IP addr.)

Explicit Authentication

Authentication Risk Engine Server Summary

1. Passwords are insecure and inconvenient especially on mobile devices 2. Alternative authentication methods are silos and hence don‘t scale to large scale user populations 3. The required security level of the authentication depends on the use 4. Risk engines need information about the explicit authentication security for good decision How does FIDO work?

Device FIDO Experiences

ONLINE AUTH REQUEST Local USER Verification SUCCESS PASSWORDLESS EXPERIENCE (UAF standards)

Transaction Detail Show a biometric or PIN Done SECOND FACTOR EXPERIENCE (U2F standards)

Verify user … presence How does FIDO U2F work?

Is a user Same Authenticator present? as registered before?

Can verify user presence How does FIDO UAF work? Identity binding to be done outside FIDO: This this “John Doe with customer ID X”.

Same Authenticator Same User as as registered before? enrolled before?

Can recognize the user (i.e. user verification), but doesn’t have an identity proof of the user. How does FIDO U2F work?

How is the key protected?

Verify user … presence U2F Protocol

• Core idea: Standard public key cryptography: o User's device mints new key pair, gives public key to server o Server asks user's device to sign data to verify the user. o One device, many services, "bring your own device" enabled • Lots of refinement for this to be consumer facing: o Privacy: Site specific keys, No unique ID per device o Security: No phishing, man-in-the-middles o Trust: Verify who made the device o Pragmatics: Affordable today, ride hardware cost curve down o Speed for user: Fast crypto in device (Elliptic Curve)

Think "Smartcard re-designed for modern consumer web" U2F Registration FIDO Client / Relying U2F Authenticator Browser Party

AppID, challenge

check AppID a

a; challenge, origin, channel id, etc. generate: key k pub fc key kpriv handle h

kpub, h, attestation cert, signature(a,fc,kpub,h)

s fc, kpub, h, attestation cert, s cookie store:

key kpub handle h U2F Authentication FIDO Client / Relying U2F Authenticator Browser Party handle, AppID, challenge

check AppID h a

h, a; challenge, origin, channel id, etc. retrieve retrieve: key kpub key kpriv fc from from handle h handle h; cntr++ cntr, signature(a,fc,cntr)

s cntr, fc, s

check signature using

key kpub set cookie User Presence API: Registration

{"typ":"register", "challenge":"KSDJsdASAS-AIS_AsS", "cid_pubkey": { "kty":"EC", "crv":"P-256", "x":"HzQwlfXX7Q4S5MtCRMzPO9tOyWjBqRl4tJ8", "y":"XVguGFLIZx1fXg375hi4-7-BxhMljw42Ht4" navigator.handleRegistrationRequest }, ({ "origin":"https://accounts.google.com" } ‘challenge’: ‘KSDJsdASAS-AIS_AsS’, ‘app_id’: ‘https://www.google.com/facets.json’}, callback); callback = function(response) { sendToServer( response[‘clientData’], response[‘tokenData’]); }; User Presence API: Auth.

{ "typ":"authenticate", "challenge":"KSDJsdASAS-AIS_AsS", "cid_pubkey": { "kty":"EC", "crv":"P-256", navigator.handleAuthenticationRequest "x":"HzQwlfXX7Q4S5MtCRMzPO9tOyWjBqRl4tJ8", ({ "y":"XVguGFLIZx1fXg375hi4-7-BxhMljw42Ht4" ‘challenge’: ‘KSDJsdASAS-AIS_AsS’, }, " origin‘app_id":"https://accounts.google.com" ’: ‘https://www.google.com/facets.json’, } ‘key_handle’: ‘JkjhdsfkjSDFKJ_ld-sadsAJDKLSAD’}, callback); callback = function(response) { sendToServer( response[‘clientData’], response[‘tokenData’]); }; Authentication Example Authentication Example Authentication Example Authentication Example FIDO Universal Authentication Framework (UAF) FIDO Experiences

ONLINE AUTH REQUEST Local USER Verification SUCCESS PASSWORDLESS EXPERIENCE (UAF standards)

Transaction Detail Show a biometric or PIN Done SECOND FACTOR EXPERIENCE (U2F standards)

… … SE How does FIDO UAF work?

Same Authenticator Same User as as registered before? enrolled before?

Can recognize the user (i.e. user verification), but doesn’t have an identity proof of the user. How does FIDO UAF work? Identity binding to be done outside FIDO: This this “John Doe with customer ID X”.

Same Authenticator Same User as as registered before? enrolled before?

Can recognize the user (i.e. user verification), but doesn’t have an identity proof of the user. How does FIDO UAF work?

How is the key protected (TPM, SE, TEE, …)? What user verification method is used?

… … SE Attestation & Metadata

FIDO AUTHENTICATOR FIDO SERVER Signed Attestation Object

Verify using trust anchor included in Metadata

Understand Authenticator security characteristic by looking into Metadata (and potentially other sources) Metadata UAF Registration Device Relying Party

FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Prepare UAF Registration

FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Prepare Legacy Auth + 1 Initiate Reg. UAF Registration

FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Prepare Legacy Auth + 1 Initiate Reg. Reg. Request + Policy 2

UAF Registration

Pat Johnson [email protected] FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Link your fingerprint Prepare Legacy Auth + 1 Initiate Reg. Reg. Request + Policy 2

UAF Registration

Pat Johnson [email protected] FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Link your fingerprint Prepare Legacy Auth + 1 Initiate Reg. Reg. Request + Policy 2

UAF Registration

Pat Johnson [email protected] FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Link your fingerprint Prepare Legacy Auth + 1 Initiate Reg. Reg. Request + Policy 2

3 Verify User & Generate New Key Pair (specific to RP Webapp) UAF Registration

Pat Johnson [email protected] FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Link your fingerprint Prepare Legacy Auth + 1 Initiate Reg. Reg. Request + Policy 2 Reg. 4 Response

3 Verify User & Generate New Key Pair (specific to RP Webapp) UAF Registration

Pat Johnson [email protected] FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Prepare KeyLink Registration your fingerprint Data: Legacy Auth + • Hash(FinalChallenge) 1 • AAID Initiate Reg. • Public key Reg. Request • KeyID + Policy 2 • Registration Counter Reg. 4 • Signature Counter Response • Signature (attestation key)

FinalChallenge=Hash(AppID | FacetID | tlsData | challenge) 3 Verify User & Generate New Key Pair (specific to RP Webapp) UAF Registration

Pat Johnson [email protected] FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Prepare Legacy Auth + 1 Initiate Reg. Reg. Request + Policy 2 Reg. 4 Response Success 5

3 Verify User & Generate New Key Pair (specific to RP Webapp) FIDO Building Blocks

FIDO USER DEVICE TLS Server Key RELYING PARTY

BROWSER / APP UAF Protocol WEB SERVER

FIDO CLIENT Cryptographic FIDO SERVER authentication key reference DB

ASM Authentication keys

FIDO AUTHENTICATOR Attestation key

Update Authenticator Metadata & attestation trust store Metadata Service AAID & Attestation

FIDO Authenticator

Using HW based crypto AAID 1 Based on FP Sensor X

Attestation Key 1

FIDO Authenticator

Pure SW based implementation AAID 2 Based on Face Recognition alg. Y

Attestation Key 2

AAID: Authenticator Attestation ID (=model name) Privacy & Attestation

FIDO SERVER RP1

Model A

Bob’s FIDO Authenticator

Using HW based crypto Serial # Model A Based on FP Sensor X FIDO SERVER RP2

Model A Attestation & Metadata

FIDO AUTHENTICATOR FIDO SERVER Signed Attestation Object

Verify using trust anchor included in Metadata

Understand Authenticator security characteristic by looking into Metadata (and potentially other sources) Metadata Facet ID / AppID UAF Authentication

FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Prepare UAF Authentication

FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Prepare Initiate 1 Authentication UAF Authentication

FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Prepare Initiate 1 Authentication Auth. Request with Challenge 2

UAF Authentication

FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Prepare Initiate 1 Authentication Auth. Request with Challenge 2 Just a sec – our secure payment technology is working its magic. UAF Authentication

FIDO App Web FIDO Pat Johnson Authenticator App Server [email protected] 0 Prepare Initiate 1 Authentication Auth. Request with Challenge 2

3 Verify User & Sign Challenge (Key specific to RP Webapp) UAF Authentication

FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Prepare Initiate 1 Authentication Auth. Request with Challenge 2 Pat Johnson 650 Castro Street Auth. Mountain View, CA 94041 4 United States Response

3 Verify User & Sign Challenge (Key specific to RP Webapp) UAF Authentication

FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Prepare Initiate SignedData: 1 • SignatureAlg Authentication • Hash(FinalChallenge) Auth. Request • Authenticator random with Challenge 2 Pat Johnson 650• CastroSignature Street Counter Auth. Mountain View, CA 94041 4 United• StatesSignature Response

FinalChallenge=Hash(AppID | FacetID | tlsData | challenge) 3 Verify User & Sign Challenge (Key specific to RP Webapp) UAF Authentication

Pat Johnson [email protected] FIDO App Web FIDO Authenticator App Server 0 Prepare Initiate 1 Authentication Auth. Request Payment complete! 2 with Challenge Return to the merchant’s web site to Auth. continue shopping 4 Response Return to the merchant Success 5

3 Verify User & Sign Challenge (Key specific to RP Webapp) Transaction Confirmation Device Relying Party

FIDO Browser Web FIDO Authenticator or Native App Server App 1 Initiate Transaction

Authentication Request + Transaction Text 2

Authentication Response 4 + Text Hash, signed by User’s private key 5

3 Validate Display Text, Verify Response & User & Unlock Text Hash Private Key using User’s Public (specific to User + RP Webapp) Key

Transaction Confirmation Device Relying Party

FIDO Browser Web FIDO Authenticator or Native App Server App 1 Initiate Transaction

SignedData: • SignatureAlg Authentication Request 2 • Hash(FinalChallenge) + Transaction Text • Authenticator random • Signature Counter Authentication Response • Hash(Transaction4 Text) • Signature + Text Hash, signed by User’s private key 5 FinalChallenge=Hash(AppID | FacetID Validate 3 | tlsData | challenge) Display Text, Verify Response & User & Unlock Text Hash Private Key using User’s Public (specific to User + RP Webapp) Key

The FIDO Authenticator Concept

Injected at manufacturing, doesn’t change

FIDO Authenticator

User Verification / Attestation Key Presence

Transaction Confirmation Authentication Key(s) Display

Optional Generated at Components runtime (on Registration) Using Secure Hardware

FIDO Authenticator in SIM Card

SIM Card User Verification (PIN) Attestation Key

Authentication Key(s) Client Side Biometrics

Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)

FIDO Authenticator as Trusted Application (TA)

User Verification / Presence Attestation Key

Store at Enrollment

Authentication Key(s)

Compare at Authentication Unlock after comparison Combining TEE and SE

Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)

FIDO Authenticator as Trusted Application (TA)

User Secure Element Verification / Attestation Key Presence e.g. GlobalPlatform Trusted UI Transaction Confirmation Authentication Key(s) Display UAF Specifications FIDO & Federation Source: Paul Madsen, FIDO Seminar, May 2014 Source: Paul Madsen, FIDO Seminar, May 2014 Complementary

• FIDO • Federation o Insulates o Insulates applications authentication server from identity providers from specific authenticators o Does not address o Focused solely on primary authentication primary authentication o Does enable secondary o Does not support authentication & attribute sharing attribute sharing o Can communicate o Can communicate details of authentication details of from IdP to SP authentication to server

Source: Paul Madsen, FIDO Seminar, May 2014 FIDO & Federation

First Mile Second Mile

FIDO USER DEVICE IdP Service Provider

BROWSER / APP UAF Protocol FEDERATION SERVER Federation

FIDO CLIENT

Id DB

FIDO AUTHENTICATOR FIDO SERVER

Knows details about the Knows details about the Identity and its verification Authentication strength strength. FIDO & Federation High

SSO slide Assurance

federatio n No more ‘Password123‘ bump status quo Low

High Frequency of login Low Source: Paul Madsen, FIDO Seminar, May 2014 FIDO & Federation High

FIDO Continuum Assurance

federatio n

status quo Low

High Frequency of login Low Source: Paul Madsen, FIDO Seminar, May 2014 FIDO & Federation High

FIDO + FIDO federatio n Assurance

federatio n

status quo Low

High Frequency of login Low Source: Paul Madsen, FIDO Seminar, May 2014 FIDO at Industry Event – Readiness

SIM as Secure Element

Fingerprint, TEE, Mobile

Speaker Recognition

Mobile via NFC

PIN + MicroSD

USB FIDO ReadyTM Products Shipping today

OEM Enabled: Samsung Galaxy S5 smartphone & Galaxy Tab S OEM Enabled: Lenovo ThinkPads with tablets Fingerprint Sensors

Clients available for these operating systems:

Software Authenticator Examples: Aftermarket Hardware Authenticator Examples: Speaker/Face recognition, PIN, QR Code, etc. USB fingerprint scanner, MicroSD Secure Element FIDO is used Today Conclusion • Different authentication use-cases lead to different authentication requirements • Today, we have authentication silos • FIDO separates user verification from authentication protocol and hence supports all user verification methods • FIDO supports scalable security and convenience • User verification data is known to Authenticator only • FIDO complements federation è Consider developing or piloting FIDO-based authentication solutions

Dr. Rolf Lindemann, Nok Nok Labs, [email protected]