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Japan K Aff Case Neg DDI 2010 1

Case Neg to Okinawa K aff

ENERGY BILL 1NC (1/3)...... 2 ENERGY BILL 1NC (2/3)...... 3 ENERGY BILL 1NC (3/3)...... 4 ENERGY BILL 2NC (1/2)...... 5 ENERGY BILL 2NC (2/2)...... 6 ENERGY BILL LINK EXT...... 7 REDEPLOYMENT 1NC (1/2)...... 10 REDEPLOYMENT 1NC (2/2)...... 11 REDEPLOYMENT 2NC...... 12 REDEPLOYMENT LINK EXT...... 13 Japan Prolif 1NC (1/2)...... 14 Japan Prolif 1NC (2/2)...... 15 JAPAN PROLIF 2NC...... 16 JAPAN PROLIF UNIQUENESS 2NC...... 17 JAPAN PROLIF LINK EXT. 2NC (1/2)...... 18 JAPAN PROLIF LINK EXT. (2/2)...... 19 PATRIARCHY FRONTLINE (1/2)...... 19 PATRIARCHY FRONTLINE (2/2)...... 20 SOLVENCY FRONTLINE (1/2)...... 21 SOLVENCY FRONTLINE (2/2)...... 22 IMPERIALISM FRONTLINE (1/2)...... 24 IMPERIALISM FRONTLINE (2/2)...... 25

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ENERGY BILL 1NC (1/3)

The energy bill will pass Timothy Gardner and Thomas Ferraro, writers for Reuters, “Senate climate bill in peril as Democrats delay action” 7/23/10 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66L4L520100723 Democratic Senator John Kerry and independent Senator Joe Lieberman have crafted a bill that would impose carbon caps on utilities. Previous legislation also would have put caps on emissions from manufacturers and transportation. Some power companies such as Duke Energy want a climate bill so they can move ahead with billions of dollars in investments in new low-carbon power plants. Lieberman said the Senate could take up their bill in September. "I think there's going to be a lot of interest in doing something broader when it comes to energy independence than just oil spill," he said. Kerry was upbeat that a climate bill with carbon caps would eventually pass.

Obama must avoid heavy lifting – Congress will fight overambitious foreign policy goals. Kupchan 2010 [Charles A., Prof. Int’l Affairs @ Georgetown U, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “Enemies into Friends,” in Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr, Vol. 89, Iss 2, Proquest] DELIVERING THE GOODS IF THE Obama administration's tentative engagement with the United States' rivals is to be more than a passing flirtation, Washington will have to conduct not only deft statecraft abroad but also particularly savvy politics at home. Progress will be slow and incremental; it takes years, if not decades, to turn enmity into amity. The problem for Obama is that patience is in extraordinarily short supply in Washington. With midterm elections looming in November, critics will surely intensify their claims that Obama's outreach has yet to pay off. In preparation, Obama should push particularly hard on a single front, aiming to have at least one clear example that his strategy is working. Rapprochement with Russia arguably offers the best prospects for near-term success. Washington and Moscow are well on their way toward closing a deal on arms control, and their interests intersect on a number of other important issues, including the need for stability in Central and South Asia. Moreover, the United States can piggyback on the progress that the European Union has already made in reaching out to Russia on issues of trade, energy, and security. Obama also needs to start laying the groundwork for congressional support. To help clear the legislative hurdles ahead, Obama should consider including in his stable of special envoys a prominent Republican--such as former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, former Senator Chuck Hagel, or former Secretary of State James Baker--to lend a bipartisan imprimatur to any proposed deals that might come before Congress. He must also be careful not to overreach. For example, his call to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether, however laudable in theory, may scare off centrist senators who might otherwise be prepared to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Obama should also be mindful of the order in which he picks his fights. If advancing rapprochement with Russia is a priority for 2010, it makes sense to put off heavy lifting with Cuba until the following year. It is better to shepherd a few key items through Congress than to ask for too much--and risk coming back empty-handed.

Pushing controversial issues drains Obama’s capital Mark Seidenfeld, Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law, Iowa Law Review, October 1994 In addition, the propensity of congressional committees to engage in special-interest-oriented oversight might seriously undercut presidential efforts to implement regulatory reform through legislation. n198 On any proposed regulatory measure, the President could face opposition from powerful committee members whose ability to modify and kill legislation is well-documented. n199 This is not meant to deny that the President has significant power that he can use to bring aspects of his legislative agenda to fruition. The President's ability to focus media attention on an issue, his power to bestow benefits on the constituents of members of Congress who support his agenda, and his potential to deliver votes in congressional elections increase the likelihood of legislative success for particular programs. n200 Repeated use of such tactics, however, will impose economic costs on society and concomitantly consume the President's political capital. n201 At some point the price to the President for pushing legislation through Congress exceeds the benefit he derives from doing so. Thus, a President would be unwise to rely too heavily on legislative changes to implement his policy vision.

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ENERGY BILL 1NC (2/3)

Obama’s capital is key to getting the energy bill across the line New York Times, 6-23-10 Clean Air Watch President Frank O'Donnell said, "Obviously, it doesn't advance the cause. ... The clock is ticking. We all know that." Senate Democrats have signaled that they need presidential leadership before they can move forward in a compressed legislative schedule. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) said yesterday that his strategy for passing legislation will depend heavily on how much political capital Obama is willing to invest in the effort (E&ENews PM, June 22). Still, Obama and his staff have insisted that the White House is committed to getting a comprehensive bill across the finish line this year. "The Senate has an opportunity before the August recess and the elections to stand up and move forward on something that could have enormous, positive consequences for generations to come," Obama said yesterday after meeting with his Cabinet. Daniel Weiss, director of climate strategy at the Center for American Progress, said there is a "plus side" to the delay, because it will offer more time for Democrats to strategize prior to their meeting with the president. Senate Democrats are scheduled to hold another caucus on the issue tomorrow. "I think the White House is doing a lot behind the scenes outside of the meeting that had been planned for today, so I don't think it'll delay things," said Environment America's federal global warming program director, Nathan Willcox.

Obama’s climate agenda is key to solve global climate change Friend, SEO Staff Writer, Marketing and Newsroom, 6/23/2010 [Kristen, "Senate Democrats Wrestle over Climate Change Cap and Trade," http://www.seolawfirm.com/2010/06/senate-democrats- wrestle-over-climate-change-cap-and-trade/] Cap and trade is arguably the most contentious aspect of President Obama’s original energy plan, and it is considered to be a critical part of any new energy strategy by many environmental groups and Democrats. The idea of cap and trade is not new to American political thought, nor is it something originally envisioned by liberals or even Democrats. The policy originally gained favor in the 1980s under the first Bush administration in order to control the pollutants primarily responsible for acid rain. [8] According to supporters of a cap and trade system, two important ideas factor into the working of a market based emissions regulation system. First, pollutants have a “cost” that is not being factored into the cost of doing business. Polluters get to release pollutants for free, the cost of which is then absorbed by the public in the form of externalities like rising health care costs due to pollution based illnesses. A market based system places these costs onto the market players who are actually producing the pollution, in effect forcing the market to realize the full cost of pollutants. Second, the best way to regulate emissions is through an economy-wide approach rather than regulation of individual polluters on a plant-by-plant basis. To this end, an overall cap is set for emissions across the board that declines slowly over time, forcing polluters to find the most cost effective means of lowering emissions to meet the lower market cap. [9] A provision of the 1990 Clean Air Act aimed at reducing acid rain established such a market system with a decreasing cap placed on sulfur dioxide emissions. The provision also gave utility companies the ability to buy and sell permits in order to comply with the new caps. The EPA, environmental groups and economists have recognized the program as a success; hailing it as one of the most effective pollution control measures enacted in the U.S. to date. According to the Pacific Research institute, emissions of sulfur dioxide in 2007 were down 40 percent from 1990 levels. [8]

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ENERGY BILL 1NC (3/3) Warming causes extinction Oliver Tickell, 8/11/2008, The Guardian, journalist, author of Kyoto 2, climate expert Oliver, "On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction," http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

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Warming causes the rapid growth of starfish that suffocate 80% of Japan’s coral reefs, destroying Japan’s environment – turns case Suvendrini Kakuchi May 10, 2007 BIODIVERSITY-JAPAN Climate Change Fosters Coral-Eating Starfish http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37686

Almost 80 percent of Japan’s coral reefs are situated close to Okinawa and the surrounding islands, and these face threats from tourism and the United States military bases there. Human activities that result in the flow of red soil into the sea and warmer waters around Japan are said to be responsible for the rapid growth of starfish that, in many places, have begun to cover the reefs and suffocate them. Biologist Kazuhiko Sakai, an expert on reef larvae at the Ryukoku University’s biodiversity research section, believes that the situation of coral reefs is critical: ‘’Various problems, such as a lack of expertise on coral reefs and the effect of global warming on them, as well as reluctance to develop ecologically sound land management policies, haunt Japan’s conservation projects.” Experts at the Tokyo conference, aware of the uphill struggle before them, discussed a conservation framework based on participation by various stakeholders. For example, the involvement of the agricultural and construction industry could help check the flow of red soil into the sea. ‘The best way to combat the destruction of corals is to bring together various sectors. We hope this measure will lay the groundwork to enable Japan to play a leading role in protecting coral reefs in the Asia-Pacific region,’’ explained Takahashi. As part of the initiative, the environment ministry will soon launch a national promotion committee for the International Year of the Reef 2008, which is to embody the new conservation model. Japan is already involving experts of other relevant ecosystems such as mangroves and tropical timber, when implementing reef conservation. Japan’s 96,000 hectares of heavily damaged coral reefs illustrate how large-scale development and political issues have taken precedence over ecological concerns. Rapid economic expansion in the 1970s and 1980s caused havoc because it was not accompanied by stringent environmental protection laws, such as the establishment of protected nature reserves. An important example of cooperative work is Sango Mura (Coral Village) on a southern island close to Okinawa. This community project is a scheme jointly undertaken since 2005 by the environment ministry, officials at the Okinawa local government and World Wildlife Fund-Japan. Satoshi Maekawa, a WWF officer who works with an education project to raise awareness among local communities on the need to protect coral reefs, says success can only come from ‘’developing a balance between protecting livelihoods and protecting coral reefs’ ’.

Destruction of coral reefs leads to species extinction and biodiversity loss U.S. Newswire 5 (10/26/05, “Okinawa Air Base Deal Still Controversial; New Plan Does Not Guarantee Survival of Endangered Marine Mammal”, lexis, DH)

The plan for an air base at Henoko has faced continual demonstrations by Okinawans for more than two years and is opposed by environmental groups from around the world. The latest plan would require landfilling portions of two saltwater bays on which the endangered dugong rely for their survival. Many remain concerned that destruction of this key marine habitat could doom the last remaining Okinawan dugong to extinction and destroy essential habitat for other threatened sea life, such as sea turtles. “The Okinawa dugong, which is an endangered species, should be protected domestically and internationally,” said Sekine Takamichi an attorney with the Japan Environmental Lawyers Federation. “We call for the suspension of any relocation plans that involve Okinawa dugong habitat and Henoko Bay. We also request the governments to set up a dugong sanctuary and outline a dugong conservation plan based on the IUCN’s (World Conservation Union) recommendation.” “Construction of the new airbase, even under the new plan, would cause severe ecological damage to one of the most diverse ecosystems on earth,” said Peter Galvin of Center for Biological Diversity. “For this reason, conservation groups around the world are asking President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi to cancel the base construction plan in its entirety and protect the Okinawa dugong, a creature recognized as a national monument in Japan." The region at issue is one of the most biologically diverse areas in the Pacific. Okinawa is second only to the Great Barrier Reef in terms of marine biodiversity , and the sea grass beds in northern Okinawa are the feeding ground of the last remaining dugong in Japanese waters. The sea grass and reef also provide important habitat for numerous rare wildlife species, including three species of sea turtle. Local residents voted overwhelmingly against the airbase project in a 1997 referendum, but Japanese and US authorities have repeatedly ignored their voices. A coalition of US and Japanese conservation groups went to court in September 2003 to stop the original project. The case is currently being heard in US Federal District Court in San Francisco. The lawsuit asks the US Department of Defense to comply with the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) by publicly assessing the impacts of the proposed project on the Okinawa dugong in consultation with Okinawan communities. The NHPA requires US agencies to assess the impacts of their

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ENERGY BILL 2NC (2/2) activities on cultural icons of foreign nations. Because of their significance to Okinawan culture, dugongs are included on a Japanese government list of protected cultural properties. "The Department of Defense has a legal duty to protect the cultural resources and national monuments of other nations," said Marcello Mollo of Earthjustice, who is representing the coalition in the United States. "Now that the most destructive airstrip plan over Henoko's reef is off the table, we see momentum toward an eventual cancellation of this entire air base. The courageous protesters in Okinawa have brought the world's attention to this issue. But the fight goes on."

And, loss of biodiversity causes extinction. Diner, 94 [David, Ph.D., Planetary Science and Geology, "The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who's Endangering Whom?," Military Law Review, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161] To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew 74 could save [hu]mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to[hu]man[s] in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively . In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. 75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. 77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. 78 [*173] Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." 79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

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ENERGY BILL LINK EXT.

Polls prove the plan’s unpopular Rassmussen, long-time trusted polling company, 15 Nov. 2009 Rassmussen Reports. 2009. Web. 1 July 2010. . Twenty-six percent (26%) of Americans say the United States should remove all its military troops from Japan, a central issue in President Obama’s trip to that country Friday and Saturday. A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that 49% disagree and oppose the removal of all U.S. troops from Japan. Twenty-five percent (25%) are not sure.

Staying in Okinawa is bipartisan The Mainichi Daily News, June 23rd, 2010 U.S. Lawmakers Submit Resolution to Express Gratitude to Okinawa”, The Mainichi Daily News, June 23 rd, 2010, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20100623p2g00m0in032000c.html A group of bipartisan lawmakers submitted a resolution Tuesday to the U.S. House of Representatives to express gratitude to the Japanese people, especially to the people of Okinawa, for hosting the U.S. military. The House could take a vote on the resolution on Wednesday, the 50th anniversary of the bilateral security treaty entering into force, parliamentary sources said. The draft resolution says the "robust forward presence" of the U.S. military in Japan "provides the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of Asia-Pacific peace, prosperity and regional stability." The resolution "recognizes that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the stationing" of the U.S. military in Japan and "expresses its appreciation to the people of Japan, and especially on Okinawa, for their continued hosting" of the U.S. armed forces, it says. The text also touched on a joint statement released by the Japanese and U.S. governments in May that reconfirmed their commitment to a 2006 bilateral accord on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, which includes a plan to relocate the U.S. Marines Corps' Futenma base within Okinawa.

Congress loves bases – they want deterrence and power projection. Japan Today 2010 [Japan News and Discussion, "U.S. House offers thanks to Okinawa for hosting U.S. forces," June 25, http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/us-house-offers-thanks-to-okinawa-for-hosting-us-forces] The U.S. House of Representatives on Thursday offered thanks to the people of Japan, especially in Okinawa, for continuing to host U.S. forces, which it says provide the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of peace, prosperity and stability in Asia-Pacific region. The House passed the resolution in the day’s plenary session by an overwhelming majority of 412 to 2 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the revised Japan-U.S. security treaty, which went into force on June 23, 1960. It apparently passed the bipartisan resolution with the intention to help restore bilateral ties between Japan and the United States, which deteriorated over plans to relocate a key U.S. Marine Corps air station in Okinawa, political sources said. Okinawa, an island prefecture in southwestern Japan, hosts much of U.S. military presence in Japan and is hoping to reduce its burden. Congress also hopes to enhance ties with the Japanese government of new Prime Minister Naoto Kan, who succeeded Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. The House ‘‘recognizes Japan as an indispensable security partner of the United States in providing peace, prosperity, and stability to the Asia-Pacific region,’’ the resolution says. It also ‘‘recognizes that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the stationing of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the core element of the United States-Japan security arrangements that protect both Japan and the Asia-Pacific region from external threats and instability.

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A2 K of Cap and Trade (1/2) Monetary Value is a good tool for Environmental Issues Silvio 0. Funtowicz a , Jerome R. Ravetz, CEC-Joint Research Centre, Institute for Systems Engineering and Informatics, 1-21020 lspra (Va), Italy The Research Methods Consultancy Ltd., Gresham House, 144 High Street, Edgware, Middy HA8 7EZ, UK, Ecological Economics 10 (1994) pg. 197-207

The endangered songbird represents a new problem of valuation, one where measurements cannot pretend to be independent of methodol ogy and ethics. For some, a resource must be capable of valuation in one-dimensional and hence monetary terms in order to be treated in a rational policy debate. They might even argue that providing a market value could lead to greater use of a resource and hence greater benefit. For others, it is near to sacrilege to attach a dollar sign to a species. In the middle are those who feel for this principle, but who reluctantly accept the practical necessity for linear, one-dimensional quantification of all values. Those who strive to preserve this wetland or that interesting species find the onus placed on them to produce a hypothetical monetary value for it, so that it can be put in the scales against the calculable benefits that someone would be able to derive from its exploitation and consequent damage or destruction. Even those who reject monetary quantifica tion in principle will justify it pragmatically in the forensic context when it is the only way to secure compensation for damage that is already done (examples are Bhopal for people, and Exxon Valdez for the natural environment). Any process of valuation seems to be constrained to conform to the convention that money is its natural com mon language, and therefore appropriate for adoption and use by all stakeholders in any envi ronmental issue.

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Emissions Trading are Beneficial Michael TOMAN RAND and adjunct faculty member, Nitze School of International Studies, Johns Hopkins University and Bren School of the Environment, University of California Santa Barbara. ‘6 Values in the Economics of Climate Change Environmental Values 15 p. 368-369d

Much of the economic analysis of mitigation policy has addressed the economically quantified benefits and costs of policy options to make statements about efficient' or optimal' policy interventions. These approaches start with a monetarily quantified aggregate climate change cost function which also represents the economically measured benefits of averting or slowing impacts, ideally once adaptation has also been taken into account. Information on avoided costs, along with information on the costs of mitigation primarily through reduced net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, provide a basis for comparing economically different combinations of mitigation measures (e.g., reforestation to sequester CO 2 , renewable energy development to lessen gross emissions, and improved landfill and agricultural management to reduce emissions of CH 4 , a much more potent GHG). Typically optimal' mitigation economics is studied through application of relatively compact reduced-form integrated assessment' models that combine summary and aggregative representations of monetized climate change impacts with reduced form models of economic activity (in particular energy use) that are the sources of climate-forcing GHG emissions (see Weyant et al. 1996 for a summary of the approach and Nordhaus 1993 for a pioneering example). These models basically are examples of intertemporal cost-benefit analyses using a discounted present value criterion as a welfare measure (the present value could be of net consumption possibilities or of consumption utility depending on the model). In these models mitigation is a global public good in that GHG reductions occurring anywhere create benefits in reducing climate change damage costs everywhere. A spatially disaggregated integrated assessment analysis can indicate a globally optimal time path of emissions mitigation according to the aggregated net present value criterion employed, and allocate shares of the mitigation across national units based on cross-country relative costs (efficiencies) of mitigation. A refinement of this analytical outcome also considers any locally realisable co-benefits from GHG mitigation in allocating shares of mitigation action (e.g., different degrees of local air quality improvement). Economic analysis has made key contributions to the design of GHG mitigation policy, drawing on broader lessons for policy design identified in the general literature on environmental economics. The use of emissions trading to lower overall mitigation costs and soften political objections in the allocation of mitigation costs is reflected in the European Trading System for CO 2 emissions, which began operating in 2005. This same idea is captured in the Clean Development Mechanism of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC1999b), which provides for voluntary and mutually beneficial collaboration in project-level GHG mitigation and sustainable development by richer and poorer countries. Economic modeling has highlighted the potential for cost-saving intertemporal flexibility in GHG mitigation. As shown by Wigley, Richels and Edmonds (1996) and subsequently elaborated by others, there can be several advantages to setting ambitious medium to long term global mitigation targets while also approaching their implementation more gradually. Aside from the most immediately apparent argument that mitigation costs incurred later have a lower discounted present value, a gradual approach also allows a less costly phasing out of more GHG-intensive technology and a more opportunistic phasing in of new advances in long-lived GHG technology as they occur.

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REDEPLOYMENT 1NC (1/2)

No Guam deployment now – it is contingent upon resolution of the Futenma issue Kan and Niksch 10 (Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, Larry A. Niksch, Specialist in Asian Affairs, January 19, 2010, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments”, Congressional Research Service, Lexis |JC) In May 2006, the United States and Japan signed a detailed "roadmap" agreement to broaden military cooperation, mostly dealing with changes and additions to U.S. forces in Japan. It provides for the relocation of the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force and 8,000 U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. Approximately 7,000 marines will remain on Okinawa. The cost of the relocation is estimated at S 10.27 billion. Of this amount, Japan pledged to contribute S6.09 billion, including direct financing of facilities and infrastructure on Guam. Visiting South Korea in June 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that U.S. troops there would remain at about 28,000, instead of carrying out the plan of 2004 to restructure U.S. forces by reducing troop strength from 37,000 to 25,000 by September 2008. U.S. officials indicated that further withdrawals of Army forces would be possible, primarily to support the requirements of the Army and Marine Corps in the active theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Air Force planned to relocate expeditionary combat support units from South Korea and Japan to consolidate them on Guam. On February 5, 2009, Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM) told Reuters that the transfer of 8,000 marines to Guam might be delayed and cost more, but observers questioned his authority for the statement. Indeed, PACOM clarified the next day that the goals remain to start the related construction by 2010 and to complete relocation by 2014. Soon after, on February 17, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tokyo and signed the bilateral "Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam" that reaffirmed the "Roadmap" of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of the estimated SI 0.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the relocation, Japan would provide S6.09 billion, including up to S2.8 billion in direct cash contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United States committed to fund S3.18 billion plus about S1 billion for a road. Under the agreement, about 8,000 personnel from the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and about 9,000 of their dependents would relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In addition to Japan's financial contribution, the relocation to Guam would be dependent upon Japan's progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). In the "Roadmap," the United States and Japan agreed to replace the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma with the FRF constructed using landfill and located in another, less populated area of Okinawa (at Camp Schwab). The FRF would be part of an interconnected package that includes relocation to the FRF, return of MCAS Futenma, transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, and consolidation of facilities and return of land on Okinawa. In April 2009, the lower house of Japan's parliament, the Diet, voted to approve the bilateral agreement, and the Diet ratified it on May 13, 2009. The next day, the Department of State welcomed the Diet's ratification of the agreement and reiterated the U.S. commitment to the completion of the relocation of 8,000 marines to Guam from Okinawa, host to about 25,000 U.S. military personnel and their dependents. However, on September 16, 2009, Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan became Prime Minister, and this political change raised questions about whether Japan would seek to renegotiate the agreement even before discussions about its implementation. Hatoyama had called for the Futenma air station to be relocated outside of Okinawa, with concerns about the impact on the local people and environment. Visiting Tokyo on September 18, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell stressed that it is important to stay the course. In Tokyo on October 21, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stressed to Japan's Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa the importance of implementing the agreement by "moving forward expeditiously on the roadmap as agreed." Gates said at a news conference that "without the [FRF], there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and return of land in Okinawa." But by the time of President Obama's visit on November 13, 2009, the two leaders could only announce a "working group" to discuss differences. The U.S. side agreed to discuss the agreement's "implementation," but Japan sought to "review" the agreement. The working group met without resolution on November 17 and December 4. Still, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said on December 8 that Japan would earmark about USS535 million in the 2010 budget for the transfer of U.S. marines to Guam. At a meeting in Honolulu on January 12, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed moving on the implementation of the agreement but also acknowledged that the alliance has lots of other business to conduct. She expressed an expectation of a decision on the FRF by May, after Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada conveyed Hatoyama's promise to make a decision by that time. Visiting Tokyo on January 15, Senator Daniel Inouye said Hatoyama reiterated this promise to decide by May.

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REDEPLOYMENT 1NC (2/2)

Okinawan troops will be moved to Guam-Navy report proves. Kensei Yoshida 6/28/10, "Okinawa and Guam: In the Shadow of US and Japanese 'Global Defense Posture'", Retired U of Tokyo Professor in US Politics, author of 'Democracy Betrayed, Okinawa Under US Occupation'. http://japanfocus.org/-Yoshida-Kensei/3378 To meet the “pressing need to reduce friction on Okinawa,” the U.S. consulted allies such as Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Australia, but they were all “unwilling to allow permanent basing of U.S. forces on their soil.” “The military’s goal,” the Draft EIS continued,“is to locate forces where those forces are wanted and welcomed by the host country. Because these countries within the region have indicated their unwillingness and inability to host more U.S. forces on their lands, the U.S. military has shifted its focus to basing on U.S. sovereign soil.”Guam was “the only location for the realignment of forces” that met “all criteria”—freedom of action, response times to potential areas of conflict and U.S. security interests in the Asia-Pacific region.” It was also considered “ideally” located. Says the Joint Guam Program Office in “Why Guam - guambuildupeis.us”: “ Guam is a key piece of the strategic alignment in the Pacific and is ideally suited to support stability in the region. It is positioned to defend other U.S. territories, the homeland, and economic and political interests in the Pacific region.”

Redeployment to guam causes genocide of the Chamorro people AFP 2010 1-22 "US Military build-up on Guam worries islanders" http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/World/Story/A1Story20100122-193753.html

"This proposed military build-up, with our current political status, will result in the cultural and racial genocide of the Chamorro people," said Frank J. Schacher, chairman of the Chamorro Tribe Inc., a group representing the island's indigenous people, who make up a third of the population. "It is our island, our ancestral remains, our sacred artifacts, our waters, our culture, and our right to exist as a race that would be destroyed by these intended actions." It is a long time since the Chamorro have been masters of their own destiny: Spain controlled the island for more than two hundred years until the late 19th century, when it was taken over by the United States, and it was occupied by Japan during World War II.

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Troop redeployment go Guam destroys coral reefs and endangers diversity Natividad and Kirk ‘10 (LisaLinda Natividad, PhD is an assistant professor with the Division of Social Work at the University of Guam. She is also president of the Guahan Coalition for Peace and Justice. Gwyn Kirk, PhD is visiting faculty in Women's and Gender Studies at University of Oregon (2009-10) and a founder member of Women for Genuine Security (www.genuinesecurity.org), “Fortress Guam resists US military buildup,” Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LE14Dh04.html//DN) Another highly controversial proposal is the creation of a berth for a nuclear aircraft carrier, which will involve the detonation and removal of 70 acres of vibrant coral reef in Apra Harbor. Environmentalists and local communities oppose this on the grounds that coral provides habitat for a rich diversity of marine life and is endangered worldwide. Environmentalists also question how the disposal of huge quantities of dredged material would affect ocean life and warn that such invasive dredging may spread contaminants that have been left undisturbed in deep-water areas of the harbor. Opposition to this plan has been expressed by the Guam Fishermen's Cooperative and the US-based Center for Biological Diversity. On February 24, 2010, Guam Senator Judith Guthertz wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, reiterating her proposal that the existing fuel pier that has been used by the USS Kitty Hawk be used as the site for the additional berthing to avoid the proposed dredging of Apra Harbor. Such an alternative plan would avoid the destruction of acres of live coral.

And, loss of biodiversity causes extinction. Diner, 94 [David, Ph.D., Planetary Science and Geology, "The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who's Endangering Whom?," Military Law Review, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161] To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew 74 could save [hu]mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to[hu]man[s] in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively . In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. 75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. 77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. 78 [*173] Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." 79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 12 Japan K Aff Case Neg DDI 2010 1 REDEPLOYMENT LINK EXT.

The US is shifting to basing onto sovereign soil – Guam is the only option for Southeast Asia basing Yoshida 10 – Writer for the Global Realm (Kensei, July 14, “Okinawa and Guam: In the Shadow of U.S. and Japanese “Global Defense Posture”, http://theglobalrealm.com/2010/07/14/okinawa-and-guam-in-the-shadow-of-u-s-and-japanese-%E2%80%9Cglobal- defense-posture%E2%80%9D/ |JC) To meet the “pressing need to reduce friction on Okinawa,” the U.S. consulted allies such as Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Australia, but they were all “unwilling to allow permanent basing of U.S. forces on their soil.” “The military’s goal,” the Draft EIS continued, “is to locate forces where those forces are wanted and welcomed by the host country. Because these countries within the region have indicated their unwillingness and inability to host more U.S. forces on their lands, the U.S. military has shifted its focus to basing on U.S. sovereign soil.” Guam was “the only location for the realignment of forces” that met “all criteria”—freedom of action, response times to potential areas of conflict and U.S. security interests in the Asia-Pacific region.” It was also considered “ideally” located. Says the Joint Guam Program Office in “Why Guam – guambuildupeis.us”: “Guam is a key piece of the strategic alignment in the Pacific and is ideally suited to support stability in the region. It is positioned to defend other U.S. territories, the homeland, and economic and political interests in the Pacific region.” Accordingly, the United States, or the Pentagon, decided to “relocate approximately 8,600 Marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam,” consisting of the following four “military elements.” [9] Command element, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), known as Marine Corps’ forward-deployed Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The element will involve Headquarters and supporting organizations (Estimated personnel: 3,046); Ground combat element (GCE), 3rd Marine Division units, which will provide infantry, armor, artillery, reconnaissance, anti-tank and other combat arms (Estimated personnel: 1,100); Air combat element (ACE), 1st Aircraft Wing and subsidiary units, which operates from sea- and shore-based facilities to support MAGTF’s expeditionary operations (Estimated personnel: 1,856); Logistics combat element (LCE), 3rd Marine Logistics Group (MLG), which will provide communications, engineering support, motor transport, medical, supply, maintenance, air delivery, and landing support (Estimated personnel: 2,550). To these will be added transient forces– an infantry battalion (800 people), an artillery battery (150 people), an aviation unit (250 people) and other (800 people) – bringing the total number of Marines in Guam to more than 10,000 personnel.

3. Withdrawal means we redeploy to Guam RIVERA 2 – Colonel (JERRY, April 9, “Guam USA: America's Forward Fortress in Asia-Pacific”, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf |JC) JUSTIFICATION FOR FORWARD MILITARY PRESENCE VIA GUAM President Franklin D. Roosevelt once said: "We have learned.. .that we cannot live alone at peace. We have learned that our own well being is dependent on the well being of other nations far away. We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community.', As we enter the 2 1 st century, FDR's words still ring true even today. At this period of rapid globalization, events on the other side of the world can affect our safety and prosperity at home. Therefore, we must know what events have occurred, are occurring, or potentially will happen in the future within the Asia-Pacific region if the U.S. is going to deal with them in a manner that will produce the end result of regional stability and thus, the wellbeing so necessary for the security of the United States on the other side of the globe. There is evidence of a new focus on the Asia-Pacific region by the Department of Defense. There are plans to move weapons and other warfighting equipment from Europe to Asia. Army Secretary Thomas White left open the possibility the Army may expand or reconfigure its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. It is interesting to note that Secretary White was asked by reporters whether the Army is considering basing troops on Guam. Although he was noncommittal, he mentioned that all services are looking for opportunities for forward basing in the Pacific Rim. The Army has 29,000 soldiers based permanently in Japan and South Korea and if the U.S. puts more troops, weapons and equipment in the region, it would "cause consternation among allies and others. This seems to support the concept of relocating troops from Korea and Japan to Guam-if required by future circumstances.

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Japan Prolif 1NC (1/2)

A. Japan won’t nuclearize now but the door is open Llewelyn Hughes, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Spring 2007, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet); International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan”, International Security, Lexis | Suo Japan’s status as a nonnuclear weapons state remains of ongoing interest to policy analysts and scholars of international relations. For some, Japanese nuclearization is a question not of whether but of when. This article reassesses the state of the evidence on the nuclearization of Japan. It finds that support in Japan for the development of an independent nuclear deterrent remains negligible. Evidence demonstrates that ministries and agencies with responsibility for foreign and security policy have sought to consolidate Japan’s existing insurance policies against nuclear threats—multilateral regimes and the extension of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to Japan—rather than seeking an indigenous nuclear deterrent. The article also finds, however, that the door to independent nuclearization remains ajar. Policymakers have ensured that constitutional and other domestic legal hurdles do not significantly constrain Japan from developing an independent nuclear deterrent. Further, recent centralization of authority in the prime minister and Cabinet Office has increased the freedom of action of leaders, enabling them to overcome political opposition to changes in security policy to a degree not possible in the past. This suggests that Japan’s future position toward nuclear weapons could be more easily altered than before, should leader preferences change.

B. Troop withdrawal causes nuclearization – undermines security credibility – Cold War proves Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, “Thinking about the unthinkable: Tokyo’s nuclear option”, Summer 2009, Naval War College Review, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_3_62/ai_n32144580 | Suo

Indeed, historical precedents in Cold War Asia provide ample evidence of the proliferation-related consequences of real or perceived American indifference to the region. In the past, perceptions of declining American credibility and of weaknesses in the nuclear umbrella have spurred concerted efforts by allies to break out. In 1971, under the Nixon Doctrine, which called on allies to bear heavier burdens, Washington withdrew a combat division from the Korean Peninsula. As a consequence, according to Seung-Young Kim, “Korean leaders were not sure about U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons” despite the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil. (36) Such fears compelled President Park Chung Hee to initiate a crash nuclear-weapons program. To compound matters, President Jimmy Carter’s abortive attempt to withdraw all U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula accelerated Park’s pursuit of an independent deterrent. Similarly, China’s nuclear test in 1964 kindled “fear that Taiwan might be wiped out in a single attack, with U.S. retaliation coming too late to prevent destruction.” (37) This lack of confidence in American security guarantees impelled Chiang Kai-shek to launch a nuclear-weapons program. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement of the early 1970s further stimulated anxieties among Nationalist leaders about a potential abandonment of Taiwan. In fulfilling its pledges under the Shanghai Communique, which began the normalization process, the United States substantially reduced its troop presence on the island. As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues, “The withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan compelled the Nationalists to think more seriously about alternative ways of protecting themselves” including nuclear weapons. (38) Recently declassified materials document growing American alarm at the prospect of a nuclear breakout on the island throughout the decade. (39) In both cases, sustained American pressure, combined with reassurances, persuaded the two East Asian powers to forgo the nuclear option. The Taiwanese and South Korean experiences nonetheless show that states succumb to proliferation temptations as a result of a deteriorating security environment, heightened threat perceptions, and a lessening of confidence in the United States. While Japan certainly faces far different and less worrisome circumstances, these two case studies serve as a reminder to analysts not to casually wave away the possibility of a Japanese nuclear option.

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C. Withdrawal causes Japan to develop nuclear weapons – hedging strategy makes it inevitable Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, “Thinking about the unthinkable: Tokyo's nuclear option”, Summer 2009, Naval War College Review, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_3_62/ai_n32144580

If we have interpreted events correctly, Tokyo will hedge its bets on whether to go nuclear--if indeed it has not already embarked on such an approach. (24) Japan's leadership , that is, will postpone a decision for as long as possible , monitoring its security surroundings while quietly building up the planning and strategy-making processes, expertise, infrastructure, and materiel that would make possible the fielding of a modest arsenal within a reasonable amount of time. This is not an uncommon approach for governments. Notes Ariel Levite, "Would-be proliferants rarely make formal decisions to acquire the bomb or for that matter to give it up before they absolutely have to (e.g., before they are on the verge of attaining or eliminating a nuclear capability), if then." Having a "nuclear 'option'" often makes sense in pure realpolitik terms. (25) Evelyn Goh defines hedging in general terms as "taking action to ensure against undesirable outcomes, usually by betting on multiple alternative positions." This makes sense, says Goh, when the leadership cannot decide on "more straightforward alternatives" rating the costs of such alternatives as too high or the payoffs too low. (26) More to the point, Levite defines "'nuclear hedging' as a national strategy lying between nuclear pursuit and nuclear rollback." (27) John F. Kennedy famously predicted that fifteen to twenty nuclear-weapon states would emerge by the end of the 1960s. (28) That clearly did not happen. It nevertheless appears that hedging offers the middle way that embattled Japanese makers of policy and strategy will be looking for as they try to satisfy the interests that Scott Sagan identifies. In this scenario, much of the hedging will take place within the domestic arena. Moving beyond mere calls for debate on the nuclear question, the Japanese policy community would begin a more serious discourse on breaking out. For example, the prime minster could openly and formally revisit and reaffirm the constitutionality of nuclear armament, perhaps by appointing a blue-ribbon commission of some type. Such a move would be as much about shaping public opinion and expectations as about developing concrete plans to be implemented. A gradual, transparent, and deliberate analytical process thus would aim to move the nuclear issue inside the bounds of routine political discourse for the Japanese state and society. Llewelyn Hughes astutely observes that recent institutional reforms have centralized power in the prime minister's office, bolstering that body's ability to set and impose Japan's national security agenda. This and other reforms, Hughes concludes, have "ensured that the formal barriers to nuclearization are surmountable." (29) It is therefore conceivable that future efforts to strengthen executive authority further would signal the will and expected capability to overturn constraints on pursuing an independent nuclear option. Persuasive rhetoric toward important audiences will be critical to any hedging strategy. Japanese leaders will need to navigate among the domestic interests examined by Scott Sagan, reassure the watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community that Japan has no desire to break its NPT commitments, and concurrently apply pressure on the United States not to draw down its conventional military commitment to Japan or, worse still, fold up the nuclear umbrella under which Japan shelters. Indeed, added pressure on Washington to make its processes for making nuclear strategy and decisions more transparent to Tokyo would implicitly signal that Japan's nonnuclear posture is not absolute. In other words, if the United States fails to integrate Japan more meaningfully into its nuclear plans, Tokyo might have no choice but to pursue an independent option. Alternatively, Tokyo might modify its Three Non-Nuclear Principles, lifting its self-imposed ban on the introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japanese territory. This would represent a precursor to limited deployments of U.S. nuclear weapons to strengthen deterrence. (30) The deployment of Pershing intermediate-range missiles in Europe during the 1980s offers a useful precedent. Such a move might eventually open the way for joint management of nuclear weapons positioned in the home islands, similar to existing U.S.-NATO arrangements. (31) A strategy of calculated ambiguity that at once played up Japanese capacity to go nuclear and remained noncommittal on Japanese intentions of doing so would offer Tokyo its best diplomatic option should security conditions continue to decay in East Asia.

D. Japanese nuclearization triggers a regional arms race causing nuclear war Interfax, 06, “Nuclear Japan Would Trigger Terrible Arms Race in Asia,” http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/a-list/2006- November/063410.html | Suo The emergence of nuclear weapons in Japan would trigger an arms race in Asia and neighboring regions, Politika Foundation President Vyacheslav Nikonov said. "The situation would take a very dangerous turn should Japan take this path: the nonproliferation regime would be undermined and a terrible arms race would begin in Asia," Nikonov told Interfax on Tuesday. Nikonov made these remarks while commenting on the Japanese government's statement that Japan could legally possess nuclear weapons "however minimal the arsenal might be." "If this happens, South Korea could claim nuclear status and China would no longer put up with the

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 15 Japan K Aff Case Neg DDI 2010 1 small nuclear arsenal it has. The chain reaction would then entangle India, Pakistan and Iran," the Russian expert said. "This race could ultimately result in the use of such weapons," he sai JAPAN PROLIF 2NC

1. Disad outweighs and turns case – in a world of masculine nuclear war, patriarchy is worse than it is in the status quo.

2. Nuclear war is the highest risk for human extinction Kateb 1992 (George, The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture, “Thinking About Human Extinction (1): Nuclear Weapons and Individual Rights,” p. 111-112)

Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous, an acknowledgment hat the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons , no matter how limited or how seemingly rational or seemingly morally justified. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and certainty. But in a matter that is more than a matter, more than one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the "matter" of extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility-a genuine possibility- as a certainty. Humanity is not to take any step that contains even the slightest risk of extinction. The doctrine of no-use is based on the possibility of extinction. Schell's perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and asks us to feel continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear world is. Nuclear discourse must vividly register that distinctiveness. It is of no moral account that extinction may be only a slight possibility. No one can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet credibly denied that by some sequence or other a particular use of nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural extinction. If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: the loss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits. Abstractly put, the connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction are several. Most obviously, a sizable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature, lead to the earth's uninhabitability, to "nuclear winter," or to Schell's "republic of insects and grass." But the consideration of extinction cannot rest with the possibility of a sizable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizable exchange must not take place. A so-called tactical or "theater" use, or a so-called limited use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the possibility of immediate escalation into a sizable exchange or because, even if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use set by any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons. Add other consequences: the contagious effect on nonnuclear powers who may feel compelled by a mixture of fear and vanity to try to acquire their own weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by increasing the number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and revenge which, if not acted on immediately in the form of escalation, can be counted on to seek expression later. Other than full strategic uses are not confined, no matter how small the explosive power: each would be a cancerous transformation of the world . All nuclear roads lead to the possibility of extinction. It is true by definition, but let us make it explicit: the doctrine of no-use excludes any first or retaliatory or later use, whether sizable or not. No-use is the imperative derived from the possibility of extinction. By containing the possibility of extinction, any use is tantamount to a declaration of war against humanity . It is not merely a war crime or a single crime against humanity. Such a war is waged by the user of nuclear weapons against every human individual as individual (present and future), not as citizen of this or that country. It is not only a war against the country that is the target. To respond with nuclear weapons, where possible, only increases the chances of extinction and can never, therefore, be allowed. The use of nuclear weapons establishes the right of any person or group, acting officially or not, violently or not, to try to punish those responsible for the use. The aim of the punishment is to deter later uses and thus to try to reduce the possibility of extinction, if, by chance, the particular use in question did not directly lead to extinction. The form of the punishment cannot be specified. Of course the chaos ensuing from a sizable exchange could make punishment irrelevant. The important point, however, is to see that those who use nuclear weapons are qualitatively worse than criminals, and at the least forfeit their offices. John Locke, a principal individualist political theorist, says that in a state of nature every individual retains the right to punish transgressors or assist in the effort to punish them, whether or not one is a direct victim. Transgressors convert an otherwise tolerable condition into a state of nature which is a state of war in which all are threatened. Analogously, the use of nuclear weapons, by containing in an immediate or delayed manner the possibility of extinction, is in Locke's phrase "a trespass against the whole species" and places the users in a state of war with all people. And people, the accumulation of individuals, must be understood as of course always indefeasibly retaining the right of selfpreservation, and hence as morally allowed, perhaps enjoined, to take the appropriate preserving steps.

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JAPAN PROLIF UNIQUENESS 2NC

1. Extend our Hughes 07, it says that japan has the ability to become a nuclear country but doesn’t need to due to the US nuclear umbrella.

2. Japan is committed to non-nuclearization now – but there are no legal or institutional constraints Rajaram Panda, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, July 31, 2009, “Will Japan go Nuclear?”, http://www.idsa.in/event/WillJapanGoNuclear_rkazi_310709

The tremendous transformation in the strategic and security environment of Japan in the last decade has once again influenced the nuclearization debate in the country. North Korea’s second nuclear test followed by the launch of three short-range missiles on May 25, 2009 and the subsequent launch of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 4, has prompted widespread speculation on Japan’s principled position on non-proliferation and disarmament. The international community is worried whether Japan will abandon its nuclear abstinence and acquire a nuclear capability. In this paper, the author makes an effort to analyze circumstances under which Japan might consider crossing the nuclear Rubicon. An attempt is also been made to trace the nuclearization debate which has resurfaced in Japan periodically when the national interest seems is threatened. The Japanese position on the nuclear weapons option has been ambivalent. Japan has never made any official decision on whether or not to exercise the nuclear option. Still its pacifist constitution clearly deters the state from maintaining land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential. The right of state belligerency too has been denied in the Japanese constitution. The constitution’s stance on nuclear arms, however, remains ambiguous and it has led many pro-nuclear advocates to debate the possibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. Although the Constitution may be interpreted to allow for possession of nuclear weapons, the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 clearly emphasizes the essence of Japan’s policy in maintaining a peaceful, transparent nuclear programme. Besides, Japan has also adopted the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ expressing the policy of not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. This position was reiterated in 1976 when it ratified the NPT and committed not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. However, though the validity of these principles has been upheld by successive cabinets, the degree of restraint that these principles place on Japan’s nuclear policy remains uncertain. Most importantly, they do not represent a legal restraint, because Diet resolutions are passed as an expression of the will of the chamber and are non-binding. Further, over the years, allegations have been made regarding the violation of the third principle of the three non-nuclear principles right from the Cold War period. Still, the support for a robust nuclear weapon policy has not gained enough momentum and Japan continues to remain committed to an anti-nuclear policy. The dynamic changes in the regional and security areas of Japan have deeply influenced the revival of the nuclear debate in Tokyo. Due to factors like the expanding nuclear programme of China and North Korea; the failure of the Six Party Talks; growing suspicion among the Japanese people over the credibility of the U.S nuclear umbrella; the increasing proximity of U.S.-China bilateral relations, etc., there has emerged an open debate within Japan about whether it should adopt the policy of nuclear disarmament. At present, many security analysts are of the view that Japan may go nuclear within the next ‘ten to fifteen years’. According to the author, Japan might compromise its principled stand on nuclear armament if the following scenarios unfold: the weakening of the US-Japan alliance; a North Korean nuclear attack on Japan; a war in the Korean Peninsula; a reunified nuclear Korea; a North Korean nuclear test; Chinese nuclear expansion; U.S. withdrawal from the region; possible breakdown of the NPT; rise of a new generation of nationalistic Japanese politicians; China’s response to a sudden collapse of North Korea. Although some of the above scenarios are extreme, they cannot be disregarded altogether by Japan.

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JAPAN PROLIF LINK EXT. 2NC (1/2)

1. Extend our Yoshihara and Holmes 09, It says its empirically proven that when the US pulls troops out of a country under our nuclear umbrella they become nuclearized

2. Withdrawal causes Japan to develop nuclear weapons – hedging strategy makes it inevitable Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, “Thinking about the unthinkable: Tokyo's nuclear option”, Summer 2009, Naval War College Review, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_3_62/ai_n32144580

If we have interpreted events correctly, Tokyo will hedge its bets on whether to go nuclear--if indeed it has not already embarked on such an approach. (24) Japan's leadership, that is, will postpone a decision for as long as possible, monitoring its security surroundings while quietly building up the planning and strategy-making processes, expertise, infrastructure, and materiel that would make possible the fielding of a modest arsenal within a reasonable amount of time. This is not an uncommon approach for governments. Notes Ariel Levite, "Would-be proliferants rarely make formal decisions to acquire the bomb or for that matter to give it up before they absolutely have to (e.g., before they are on the verge of attaining or eliminating a nuclear capability), if then." Having a "nuclear 'option'" often makes sense in pure realpolitik terms. (25) Evelyn Goh defines hedging in general terms as "taking action to ensure against undesirable outcomes, usually by betting on multiple alternative positions." This makes sense, says Goh, when the leadership cannot decide on "more straightforward alternatives" rating the costs of such alternatives as too high or the payoffs too low. (26) More to the point, Levite defines "'nuclear hedging' as a national strategy lying between nuclear pursuit and nuclear rollback." (27) John F. Kennedy famously predicted that fifteen to twenty nuclear-weapon states would emerge by the end of the 1960s. (28) That clearly did not happen. It nevertheless appears that hedging offers the middle way that embattled Japanese makers of policy and strategy will be looking for as they try to satisfy the interests that Scott Sagan identifies. In this scenario, much of the hedging will take place within the domestic arena. Moving beyond mere calls for debate on the nuclear question, the Japanese policy community would begin a more serious discourse on breaking out. For example, the prime minster could openly and formally revisit and reaffirm the constitutionality of nuclear armament, perhaps by appointing a blue-ribbon commission of some type. Such a move would be as much about shaping public opinion and expectations as about developing concrete plans to be implemented. A gradual, transparent, and deliberate analytical process thus would aim to move the nuclear issue inside the bounds of routine political discourse for the Japanese state and society. Llewelyn Hughes astutely observes that recent institutional reforms have centralized power in the prime minister's office, bolstering that body's ability to set and impose Japan's national security agenda. This and other reforms, Hughes concludes, have "ensured that the formal barriers to nuclearization are surmountable." (29) It is therefore conceivable that future efforts to strengthen executive authority further would signal the will and expected capability to overturn constraints on pursuing an independent nuclear option. Persuasive rhetoric toward important audiences will be critical to any hedging strategy. Japanese leaders will need to navigate among the domestic interests examined by Scott Sagan, reassure the watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community that Japan has no desire to break its NPT commitments, and concurrently apply pressure on the United States not to draw down its conventional military commitment to Japan or, worse still, fold up the nuclear umbrella under which Japan shelters. Indeed, added pressure on Washington to make its processes for making nuclear strategy and decisions more transparent to Tokyo would implicitly signal that Japan's nonnuclear posture is not absolute. In other words, if the United States fails to integrate Japan more meaningfully into its nuclear plans, Tokyo might have no choice but to pursue an independent option. Alternatively, Tokyo might modify its Three Non-Nuclear Principles, lifting its self-imposed ban on the introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japanese territory. This would represent a precursor to limited deployments of U.S. nuclear weapons to strengthen deterrence. (30) The deployment of Pershing intermediate-range missiles in Europe during the 1980s offers a useful precedent. Such a move might eventually open the way for joint management of nuclear weapons positioned in the home islands, similar to existing U.S.-NATO arrangements. (31) A strategy of calculated ambiguity that at once played up Japanese capacity to go nuclear and remained noncommittal on Japanese intentions of doing so would offer Tokyo its best diplomatic option should security conditions continue to decay in East Asia.

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JAPAN PROLIF LINK EXT. (2/2)

3. US Japan alliance is fragile—only reasserting security commitments will prevent nuclearization Emma Chanlett-Avery, specialist in Asia affairs, and Mary B. Nikitin, Analyst in Nonproliferation 2009 (, Mary B., Analyst in Nonproliferation, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf//sb)

Perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan’s security. Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on Japan.25 U.S. officials have hinted that it would: following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Tokyo, said, “ ... the United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore full range, of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”26 Most policymakers in Japan continue to emphasize that strengthening the alliance as well as shared conventional capabilities is more sound strategy than pursuing an independent nuclear capability.27 During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a sort of perverse stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front of the U.S. containment strategy, felt confident in U.S. extended deterrence. Although the United States has reiterated its commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in Japan to question the American pledge. Some in Japan are nervous that if the United States develops a closer relationship with China, the gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment.28 These critics also point to what they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North Korea’s denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further evidence that the United States does not share Japan’s strategic perspective.29 A weakening of the bilateral alliance may strengthen the hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its own deterrence. Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, China’s rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia. If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a fundamental component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not only restate the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level consultation with Japanese leaders in order to allay concerns of alliance drift. Disagreement exists over the value of engaging in a joint dialogue on nuclear scenarios given the sensitivity of the issue to the public and the region, with some advocating the need for such formalized discussion and others insisting on the virtue on strategic ambiguity.30 U.S. behavior plays an outsized role in determining Japan’s strategic calculations, particularly in any debate on developing nuclear weapons. Security experts concerned about Japan’s nuclear option have stressed that U.S. officials or influential commentators should not signal to the Japanese any tacit approval of nuclearization.31 Threatening other countries with the possibility of Japan going nuclear, for example, could be construed as approval by some quarters in Tokyo.

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1. Withdrawing our troops from only Japan wouldn’t solve, their own Kirk and Feffer evidence says that there needs to be changes to democratic processes, as well as the changing in military contamination in the entire Asia-Pacific region.

2. Multiple alt causes- Their own Ginoza evidence indicates Withdrawing the military doesn’t solve when popular media is the basis for patriarchal policies, and here’s evidence – media portrayals and societal standards contribute to patriarchy Susan Som, 2010, “The Hidden Patriarchy: Examining Ordinary Language use and Social Explanation Reveals Patterns of Demeaning Sexism”, Chicago Maroon, April 30th, 2010, Susan Som is a second year student at The University of Chicago studying Anthropology, available online at http://www.chicagomaroon.com/2010/4/30/the-hidden-patriarchy, accessed July 7, 2010//Thur]

With the striking down of the current sexual assault policy, the student body has sent a clear message against institutionalized sexism. We should go further, however. It is easy to criticize the policies of others, but it takes real courage to take responsibility for our own actions. If the majority of the students were offended by the current sexual assault policy, then they should fight hypocrisy by putting an end to the forms of patriarchy at this campus that they themselves create. When we think about gender inequality, most people immediately think about concrete socio-economic facts. The educated majority at this University understands that there is systematic inequality for gay citizens who are unfairly discriminated against because they defy conventional, yet arbitrary, gender roles. Most of us know that women, on average, get paid less than male counterparts, in addition to being less likely to get promoted—and when they are promoted, many times unfair expectations are placed upon them. Sexual harassment, though usually not reported, is very common in the work place. One-third of women in the military have admitted to being sexually harassed, and many more cases go unreported out of fear of retribution. Few of us know that every year about 50,000 women are brought against their will to the United States for sexual exploitation. When these facts are mentioned, most people are shocked. These problems, however, are hardly new. They have persisted for decades, which indicates that the problem is much deeper. Anthropologist David Graeber gives us a telling example. He points to a popular trick among high school teachers who assign students to write an essay imagining that they were to switch genders and describe what it would be like to live for one day as a member of the opposite sex. The results are almost always exactly the same: all the girls in class write long and detailed essays demonstrating that they have spent a great deal of time thinking about such questions, while roughly half the boys refuse to write the essay entirely. Almost invariably, they express profound resentment about having to imagine what it might be like to be a woman. This phenomenon is caused by, and contributes to, the silence of women. Forms of this structural ignorance are developed in our toys, advertisements, and other forms of media (movies, music, television, pornography). These are in turn tied to the economic and political inequality of the genders. We can see many examples of this ignorance here at the University of Chicago. Why must women waste their time by shaving their legs? While there may be a slight stigma attached to growing a beard, men still have the option of growing one. Women do not have such an option. There is a common notion that as we get older, the majority of women lose their beauty while men become more distinguished. This perception is socially structured by our patriarchy. It is clear that there are higher standards of beauty for women than for men. If common UChicago bedroom practices are similar to that of the rest of the country, we would see that even in the bedroom there is inequality.

3. Rejecting sexual violence isn’t a-priori – Their rubin evidence doesn’t say anything about rejecting sexual violence, it just says we shouldn’t forget about sexuality.

4. Patriarchy can’t be solved – objectification of women will still occur because military prostitution is rooted in the US military system and takes place in nearly every country we occupy Kirk and Francis, 2k, chaired the women’s studies program at Antioch College and Ph.D. in political sociology, founder of East Asia-U.S. Women's Network Against Militarism, [Gwyn and Carolyn, “Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. Military Policy and Practice in East Asia”, 15 Berkeley Women’s LJ. 229, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page? handle=hein.journals/berkwolj15&div=11&g_sent=1&collection=journals]

Military Prostitution in all three East Asian countries under discussion here, prostitution is officially forbidden but practiced under such euphemisrns as the “hospitality industry” or “entertainment” The SOFAs do not refer to military prostitution even indirectly. However, its existence is an important element in the “GI Towns” that contributes to a general atmosphere of disrespect and objectification of women. U.S. military commanders and administrators view sexual activity as one of their troops’ basic needs. In “Central America, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Puerto Rico, the mainland United

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States, Germany, and Italy the Pentagon has operated as if prostitution were a necessary and integral part of U.S. military operations,” suggesting that militarized masculinity requires regular sexual release." Military prostitution is built into U.S. military operations-not as a perk, but as a necessary component.” Bases are refueling and repair depots for warships and planes; military personnel are also “refueled” by local women and girls. Host governments have agreed to allow the establishment of “recreation zones” near military bases or at military ports to be used by U.S. troops for R & R, or as it is sometimes jokingly called, I & I (intoxication and intercourse)." South Korea serves as a good demonstration of the impact of military prostitution. The U.S. military insists that women who work in the clubs, bars, and massage parlors of the “GI Towns” be tested regularly for sexually-transmitted diseases." In South Korea, women must obtain a weekly ID number from an official clinic as proof of their “clean” health status before being allowed to enter such bars." If they do not pass this test, they are quarantined until they do so." As further protection for U.S. military personnel, clubs and bars that employ women without ID numbers are deemed off-limits by U.S. military officials." The assumption is that the women are the source of sexually transmitted diseases, not the men. In 1989, roughly 18,000 women in South Korea were registered with the local health authorities, and, thus able to work in the bars and clubs.” ln 1999, it was estimated that “over 10,000 domestic women and 2,000 immigrant women serve[d] as sex providers in Kyiclfon” [GI Towns] in South Korea.” Typically these are women who come from poor, rural families and who move to urban areas to work in factories. They are drawn to the bars as a way of making more money than they could at factory jobs." Military prostitution “[buys] off women . . . with higher wages than they can earn in the industrial wage labor sector,”” and is, in effect, “a dumping ground . . . between the patriarchal family structure and the industrializing labor force. .

5. Patriarchy doesn’t perpetuate war — It is necessary to look at the link between patriarchy and the State and Bureaucracy Brian Martin, professor of social sciences at the University of Wollongong (Australia), 1990 “Uprooting War”, London Freedom Press, 1984, Revised 1990, available online at http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw10.html, accessed July 7, 2010//Thur]

While these connections between war and male domination are suggestive, they do not amount to a clearly defined link between the two. It is too simplistic to say that male violence against women leads directly to organised mass warfare. Many soldiers kill in combat but are tender with their families; many male doctors are dedicated professionally to relieving suffering but batter their wives. The problem of war cannot be reduced to the problem of individual violence. Rather, social relations are structured to promote particular kinds of violence in particular circumstances. While there are some important connections between individual male violence and collective violence in war (rape in war is a notable one), these connections are more symptoms than causes of the relationship between patriarchy and other war-linked structures. Even the link between overt sexism and the military is being attenuated as war becomes more bureaucratised and face-to-face combat is reduced in importance. Typical military tasks in a highly technological military force include flying a plane, servicing a computer, operating communications equipment, administering supplies and supervising launching of missiles. Such tasks are similar to duties in the civilian workforce, and the need for highly developed sexism of traditional military training is not present. Military training and activity, though still containing much emphasis on brutality and obedience, is becoming more oriented to technical competence and bureaucratic performance. To the extent that women can perform as competent technicians or bureaucrats, they too can serve the war system effectively. Furthermore, the functional value of women to the military does not demonstrate an automatic connection between war and domination over women: while women's services may be useful to the military, they are not necessarily essential to its survival. To get at the connection between patriarchy and war, it is necessary to look at the links between patriarchy and both the state and bureaucracy, as well as between patriarchy and the military.

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1. The Japanese government marginalizes the Okinawans due to the small size of their prefecture in the name of national security – withdrawing US troops doesn’t solve that mindset Deborah Mantle, Lecturer in the College of International Relations at Ritsumeikan University (Japan), 2006 (“Defending the Dugong: Redefining ‘Security’ in Okinawa and Japan,” Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, Volume 5, Available Online at http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/e-vol.5/MANTLE.pdf, p. 96-101) On Torishima, an unpopulated island, U.S. soldiers mistakenly used depleted uranium bullets in 1995. Washington did not notify Tokyo of the accident until a year later and then the central government failed to inform the prefectural government and public of Okinawa until a month after that; ‘This reveals how marginalized Okinawa is by both the U.S. and the Japanese governments ’ (Asato, 2003: 233). However, the rape of a twelve-year-old girl by three U.S. servicemen in 1995 could not be covered up or ignored and created a surge of anger and resentment resulting in the largest mass demonstration in Okinawan history. The 1996 U.S. – Japan agreement to close Futenma airbase in the middle of the heavily-populated Ginowan City and relocate to the sparsely-populated Henoko area was a direct consequence of the protests. But the ‘incidents’ do not go away. In August 2004, a U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D heavy-lift helicopter crashed into Okinawa International University injuring the three crew members, an accident that received little press coverage nationally (Simpson, 2004) leading to ‘allegations that editorial decisions ... reflected a view that events in faraway Okinawa were of little importance to the nation as a whole’ (Simpson, 1995). How is this vastly unfair situation, a state of affairs that would not be tolerated on the mainland, maintained? Politically, Okinawa has little voice and economically Okinawa has become both victim to and dependent on a base- construction economy that is difficult to give up or be weaned from. Of the 452 members of the Japanese Diet only five represent Okinawa. A NIMP (Not In My Prefecture) attitude prevails. Since other prefectures are unwilling to have U.S. bases in their own areas, and since it is accepted that if the military bases were not in Okinawa they would have to be relocated somewhere else in Japan, any Okinawan formal protests are ignored or overruled. To question the ‘need’ for American bases in Okinawa would be to question the entire framework of Japanese defence policy, and whenever there is criticism of such a policy the government takes out the trump card of ‘national security’. [end page 97] Okinawa is, of course, more than the sum of its military bases. The U.S. bases have had a profound and prolonged effect on the economy – during the U.S. occupation Okinawa was ‘in effect a provider of support services for U.S. bases’ (Hein & Selden, 2003: 6) – but this direct dependence on the bases in terms of finding employment and providing services has decreased markedly. Base-related revenue has dropped from 25.6% of the local Gross Domestic Product in 1970 to 5.7% in 1996 (Hook & Siddle, 2003: 5), while employment on the U.S. bases decreased from 40,000 to 8,000 over the same time period (McCormack, 2003: 93). In the formal political realm – the courts, committees and legislative – the Japanese state has repeatedly manipulated the system to maintain the status quo; ‘The primary requirements of the U.S. – Japan Mutual Security Treaty, that U.S. troops be stationed in Japan, has constantly taken precedence over the constitutional rights of Okinawa citizens’ (Tanji, 2003: 172). Though the legal battle ultimately failed, the Prefectural Land Expropriation Committee public hearings gave anti-war landowners a space to voice their harrowing experiences of the Battle of Okinawa and the subsequent occupation by the U.S. military, and their passionate commitment to the ideals of peace and democracy enshrined in the Japanese constitution (Tanji, 2003: 172). Thus, it is the citizens of Japan who are struggling to protect the constitution against a central government which should protect it (and them) but instead rides roughshod over the rights and interests of its people in the name of protecting Japan’s ‘national security’ defined in military terms (Tanji, 2003: 172-3). Next to the base economy, ‘development’ is the other sharp stake that keeps Okinawan dependence in place. In order to compensate the Okinawans for hosting the U.S. bases and to increase their standard of living, which had been far below the mainland at the time of reversion, the central government has invested huge sums of public money in the area10. The massive injection of funds has had its benefits, including much-needed infrastructural improvements and the establishment of five universities. Nevertheless, Okinawa remains the poorest prefecture (70% of national average per capita) with the highest unemployment (7.9% in 2000, compared to a national average of 4.7%) (Hein & Selden, 2003: 6). Furthermore, the application of modern Japanese style development has resulted in the decimation of Okinawa’s important and fragile environment; ‘riverways, beaches and land have been bulldozed and concreted. What is worse, air and water pollution, soil erosion and wider environmental degradation are ruining the [end page 99] coastline, eating away at the coral and posing a danger to marine life’ (Hook and Siddle, 2003: 5). Okinawa bears the costs of this ‘mal-development’ but gains little from its profits.

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2. The Japanese Government is responsible for the oppression faced by the Japanese people Jorene Soto, “We're Here to Protect Democracy - We're Not Here to Practice It: The U.S. Military's Involvement in Trafficking in Persons and Suggestions for the Future”, Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender 13 Cardozo J.L. & Gender, 20 07 [ http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page? handle=hein.journals/cardw13&id=8&type=text&collection=journals] Like the Philippines, women and children were trafficked to Japan from throughout Asia to fulfill the sexual desires of United States military personnel after the United States occupation at the end of World War II. The Japanese government lured hundreds of Japanese and Korean women and children to areas occupied by United States military personnel with false promises of lodging, clothing, and food.30 When the women and children arrived, they were forced to prostitute themselves to United States military personnel.3' The Japanese government spent nearly five million dollars to send approximately 70,000 women and children to areas surrounding United States military bases as an "emergency measure to protect our [pure] women and children from sex starved American soldiers."32 The Japanese Interior Ministry even recruited members of the Japanese army's women's corps to "bear the unbearable and be a shield for all Japanese women."33 Fine restaurants were turned into brothels with Japanese-government supplied prostitutes. United States military personnel paid eight cents for admission to the restaurant, a bottle of beer, and the services of a prostitute

3. Can’t remove troops – Japan’s Prime Minister wouldn’t comply Dallas News 5/4 (“Moving US base off Okinawa, Japan, 'impossible'”, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/stories/050410dnintjapanmilitary.4baa89f.html, May, 4, 2010) TOKYO – Japan's prime minister said Tuesday that it will be impossible to move all parts of a key U.S. Marine base out of Okinawa , breaking with past promises to relocate the facility outside the southern island. It was the first time since Yukio Hatoyama became prime minister in September that he officially acknowledged that at least part of Futenma U.S. Marine Corps airfield would remain in Okinawa, which hosts more than half the 47,000 American troops based in Japan under a security pact. Hatoyama had frozen a 2006 agreement with the U.S. on moving Futenma to a less crowded part of the island, saying instead he wanted to move it off Okinawa entirely – straining ties with Washington. "Realistically speaking, it is impossible. We're facing a situation that is realistically difficult to move everything out of the prefecture," he said Tuesday on his first trip to Okinawa as prime minister. Hatoyama asked residents to be open to a government plan that would keep some of Futenma's functions on the island, while possibly moving other functions outside the island. "We must ask the people of Okinawa to share the burden," he said. Hatoyama's comments, which come just weeks before his self- declared end-of-May deadline for reaching a decision on the issue, essentially signals that he is shifting back toward the 2006 agreement, forged between Washington and the previous conservative Tokyo government. Yet he faces strong local opposition to keeping Futenma on the island. Late last month, about 90,000 people gathered in the town of Yomitan to protest the proposed move. Earlier this year, an anti-base candidate was elected mayor of the northern town of Nago, the proposed site for the airfield's move. Hatoyama was expected to present to Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima and other local officials a government plan that roughly follows the 2006 deal to move Futenma to a location near Camp Schwab on the island's northeastern coast. The government is also considering moving some of Futenma's functions to Tokunoshima island, north of Okinawa, but residents held a massive protest this month and local officials rejected Tokyo's request for talks.

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1. Plan doesn’t solve Imperialism – there is no way that the presence in Japan is the center of all “US imperialism”

2. Turn - We must confront capitalism as a prereq to solving colonialism Neil Lazarus - B.A. in Political Science from the University of Wales, consultant for the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Israeli Defense Forces, the Israel Air Force, the Israeli Ministry of Tourism, Jewish Federations, Keshet Television, The World Bank, Harvard University Extension Courses in Israel, Yad Vashem, Hillel, Hadassah, Birthright, the Jewish Agency, UNESCO 2006 (“Postcolonial studies after the invasion of Iraq” http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/journals/newformations/articles/59%20lazarus.pdf)

The two-phased historical schema that I have been attempting to lay out in what I have said so far provides a necessary preamble to any consideration of the emergence and shape of the field of postcolonial studies. Despite the fact that what they think and write about in their professional capacities is the relationship between peoples, communities and cultures situated at different and differentially structured points in the modern world system, scholars in postcolonial studies have consistently failed to recognise the unremitting actuality and indeed the intensification of imperialist social relations in the times and spaces of the postcolonial world. The fault is categorical and symptomatic. One can register this in shorthand by noting that in the postcolonial discussion, the term ‘capitalism’ tends to be conspicuous largely by its absence (that is, where it is not actively disparaged as the linchpin in a Eurocentric ‘mode of production’ narrative); and the term ‘imperialism’ tends for the most part to be mobilised in description of a process of cultural and epistemological subjugation, whose material preconditions are referred to only glancingly, if at all. calling attention to intellectually and ethically grounded work on the politics of alterity’.22 My own view is that postcolonialist writing of this kind, which has always been mystificatory, has today, in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, become no longer merely mystificatory, but - in its abstraction and wilful obscurantism - actively political, and actively malign. Part of the necessary corrective is provided by the editors of another recent volume, Postcolonial Studies and Beyond, who are at least able to call domination by its name: The shadow the 2003 US invasion of Iraq casts on the twenty-first century makes it more absurd than ever to speak of ours as a postcolonial world. On the other hand, the signs of galloping US imperialism make the agenda of postcolonial studies more necessary than ever. In a context of rapidly proliferating defenses of empire (not simply de facto but de jure) by policy makers and intellectuals alike, the projects of making visible the long history of empire, of learning from those who have opposed it, and of identifying the contemporary sites of resistance and oppression that have defined postcolonial studies have, arguably, never been more urgent.23

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3. US imperialism is not the root cause of nuclear war, the START treaty makes their Jensen card irrelevant

4. They say that the only way to solve for “US Imperialism” is by dismantling the US, this takes out their solvency because they are not dismantling the US

5. The base in Okinawa was not about imperialism – it was first used to fight the Japanese and later used as a way of keeping relations with Japan.

6. The US is not Imperial, its relations with Japan are based on Economics and Relations Foreign Affairs 4 (G. John Ikenberry, 3/04, "Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order", lexis) Is the United States an empire? If so, Ferguson's liberal empire is a more persuasive portrait than is Johnson's military empire. But ultimately, the notion of empire is misleading -- and misses the distinctive aspects of the global political order that has developed around U.S. power. The United States has pursued imperial policies, especially toward weak countries in the periphery. But U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, China, and Russia cannot be described as imperial, even when "neo" or "liberal" modifies the term. The advanced democracies operate within a "secur ity community" in which the use or threat of force is unthinkable. Their economies are deeply interwoven. Together, they form a political order built on bargains, diffuse reciprocity, and an array of intergovernmental institutions and ad hoc working relationships. This is not empire; it is a U.S.-led democratic political order that has no name or historical antecedent.To be sure, the neoconservatives in Washington have trumpeted their own imperial vision: an era of global rule organized around the bold unilateral exercise of military power, gradual disentanglement from the constraints of multilateralism, and an aggressive effort to spread freedom and democracy. But this vision is founded on illusions of U.S. power. It fails to appreciate the role of cooperation and rules in the exercise and preservation of such power. Its pursuit would strip the United States of its legitimacy as the preeminent global power and severely compromise the authority that flows from such legitimacy. Ultimately, the neoconservatives are silent on the full range of global challenges and opportunities that face the United States. And as Ferguson notes, the American public has no desire to run colonies or manage a global empire. Thus, there are limits on American imperial pretensions even in a unipolar era. Ultimately, the empire debate misses the most important international development of recent years: the long peace among great powers, which some scholars argue marks the end of great-power war. Capitalism, democracy, and nuclear weapons all help explain this peace. But so too does the unique way in which the United States has gone about the business of building an international order. The United States' success stems from the creation and extension of international institutions that have limited and legitimated U.S. power.

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