Trump and Russia

Trump and Russia Igor IvanovPresident of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian

Photo: REUTERS/Shannon Stapleton

Donald Trump is the 45th president of the United States. How could this happen? Politicians, experts, journalists will long be debating this question. But no matter how analysts assess this event, they all agree that American society and the US political system are experiencing serious, even fundamental shifts. The presidential election held in November, 2016 became the starting point of a new era in the American political and public life development.

Such a major shift was bound to happen sooner or later. Stagnation cannot go on forever; Russia learned this lesson first hand. The old socio-political system that has existed virtually unchanged in the United States for decades is no longer compatible with the new reality that has developed both in the United States and in the world as a whole. The electoral campaign turned into a fierce battle between those who wanted to preserve the status quo no matter what, and those who made destroying the status quo their goal. The American people opted for change in domestic and foreign policies, sometimes without realizing the exact nature of those changes.

What will be achieved during Trump’s presidency? Hardly anyone is ready to give a certain answer to this question. Judging by the President-elect’s statements, it appears that in the coming years, we will witness out-of-the-box decisions, some of which may be a success, while others may be quite the opposite. This applies both to domestic politics and economic development in the United States, as well as to the country’s foreign policy.

Speaking of the long-term foreign policy implications of the Trump “revolution,” it is likely that Washington will be forced to take a fresh look at the role the United States plays in global affairs, the parameters of the country’s leadership, and the idea of American exceptionalism as such. The process of “perestroika” induced by the new global balance of power is unlikely to be quick and easy, and will probably stretch far beyond Trump’s presidency. But, as Mikhail Gorbachev’s favourite phrase goes, “the process has started,” and it will not only affect the United States, but also the global situation as a whole. REUTERS/Mike Segar Dual Containment: Trump’s Foreign Policy Dilemmas

Russia, of course, is mostly interested in the way changes in the United States will affect relations between the two countries. Contrary to common sense, Russia all but became the primary focus of the presidential campaign. The Democrats followed the Cold War stereotypes and attempted to demonize Russia, while Donald Trump, on the other hand, spoke about his willingness to actively cooperate with Russia on a wide range of issues. Only time will tell whether he truly thought so, or whether he was just trying to distance himself and is party from the Democrats. In any case, the Washington hawks failed in their attempts to play the “Russian card.” Voting for Trump the American people showed that they were tired of anti-Russian propaganda and were less and less inclined to see Russia as a source of “evil” threatening the interests of their country.

When we think about the future of Russia–United States relations, we would first need to explain the failure of the “reset” policy announced by Barack Obama during his first presidential term. Both countries pinned significant hopes on this “reset” policy. Eight years ago, many people believed that all the conditions for the “reset” to succeed were there. Indeed, much has been done in terms of cooperation in various spheres, including security. Suffice it to mention the signing in April 2010 of the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the new START treaty) by presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama. Nevertheless, the Obama administration leaves the White House with relations between Russia and the United States at their lowest point since the long since forgotten times of the Cold War.

We can talk about certain mistakes and miscalculations made by both parties, unreasonably high expectations, and bureaucratic inertia here. All of that is true, but I believe that the “reset” policy’s historical failure occurred due to deeper, systemic reasons. Since the latest détente in relations between Russia and the United States, both parties have focused on resolving important, yet quite specific issues, without paying proper attention to developing and articulating new basic bilateral relations principles that would reflect the strategic interests of both countries. As a result, stand-alone achievements failed to take US–Russia relations to a qualitatively new level and create the necessary margin of safety. This is why the “reset” failed the test of the latest international crises – most notably the crisis in Ukraine. : Donald Trump Will Create a “Window Of Opportunity” In the Middle East

Hence the principal lesson for the future: when resolving important issues with the new US administration, Russia should initiate a serious dialogue with regard to the strategic interests of the two countries, yet considering both the existing potential and the objective limits for bilateral cooperation. During my tenure as the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, we tried to engage in such work with the George W. Bush administration, but as the United States was not ready for it, we did not achieve any viable results. However, this does not cross out the crucial importance of this task.

What questions should be made a priority? The main question that both parties have to answer – both to each other and to themselves is: “Are Russia and the United States irreconcilable enemies in the world today? Or, given all their possible differences, could they still be partners?” If the two countries are bound to be enemies, then our key task is to work out and agree on “rules of the game” that would minimize the risks of a direct confrontation between Russia and the United States in the event of a conflict, for such a confrontation would threaten international security. We could turn to the experience of the Cold War, when Moscow and Washington knew very well where the “red line” was located.

If Russia and the United States are prepared to work together as partners, in the interests of advancing stability, security, and jointly respond to global challenges, then we need to construct effective forms of dialogue at all levels – from the very top down to specific agencies and civil society – so that the relations between the two countries can be open and predictable. Thus, should any differences arise, which is natural for U.S.–Russia relations, we are able to overcome them with mutual respect, without allowing the situation to escalate into a major crisis.

Creating a multi-layered architecture of bilateral relations in this way would make these relations more stable and create opportunities for a constructive dialogue on key global issues today, which cannot be resolved without the active participation of both Russia and the United States. There is a significant pile of such issues: what the future world order should look like; how to restore manageability of international affairs; how to fight terrorism and the threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation; what to do about the increasing number of regional conflicts; etc. Being permanent members of the UN Security Council, Russia and the United States bear special responsibility for these problems’ resolution, and they have a lot of potential to do just that.

Clearly, even the most productive relations between Russia and the United States are not able to solve all the global issues. Under no circumstances will today’s international relations return to the bipolar model of the second half of the 20th century. Yet even limited success in this area would undoubtedly have a great positive impact on the overall situation in the world.

Citation style - CMOSCopy to clipboard Igor Ivanov, “Trump and Russia,” Russian International Affairs Council, 20 January 2017, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=8585 Middle East at the regional security crossroads

Photo: REUTERS/Mukhtar Kholdorbekov Participants of Syria peace talks attend meeting in Astana

Syrian civil war can be seen as the key to the stabilising the entire region. Serving as a magnet for jihadist fighters from all over the world and being the arena where interests of global, regional and local powers have been clashing for the last six years, Syria has become a crucial regional issue. This is why Syrian crisis resolution will have a huge impact on the entire region and will help to bring stability to the Middle East.

Recent Russia-Turkey rapprochement, the formation of the Ankara-Moscow-Tehran triumvirate, their cooperation in Syria and the newly negotiated ceasefire agreement–provide a good chance to create a new trend in the regional security architecture that could help to stabilise the region. Pacified Syria would bring not only peace and stability to its people and to the neighbouring countries, but would also contribute to the formation of the new Middle East security system.

Fragmentation of the Arab world and regional security system

With the fragmentation of the traditional 20th-century security system in the Middle East which was centred around three major Arab states–Egypt, Iraq and Syria–and traditional non-Arab actors–Iran and Turkey, the region became more unstable and turbulent. Since 2003 in Iraq, and later in 2011 in Egypt and Syria that system has been dismantled. With the decline of the above-mentioned traditional Arab powers, Saudi Arabia emerged as a new power broker in the region. Riyadh-led alliance of the oil-rich Gulf monarchies has significantly increased its role in the Middle Eastern affairs going beyond their domains.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar are involved in Syrian conflict financing various radical groups trying to oust the regime of Bashar al-Assad: they have already invested a lot to simply give up their efforts in Syria and let Iran enjoy its rising regional influence which only complicates the resolution of the Syrian conflict. In addition, the Saudi-led war in Yemen against Houthi rebels creates extra hot spot in the region giving radical Islamists another safe haven simultaneously undermining Gulf states’ image as they are incapable of winning the war they initiated. Besides, huge financial aid coming from the GCC countries to Egypt turned once an influential regional player into a paralysed giant with the whole set of unresolved economic, social and political issues who is largely dependent on the external financial aid and unable to influence any regional issue in a serious way. Russia’s Syria Campaign: Measuring Costs and Benefits

On the one hand, all those processes seem quite natural and logical as the Saudi-led GCC formation is filling the vacuum left by Egypt and Syria simultaneously fearing the rise of Iran. But on the other hand, it exacerbates regional confrontation along sectarian lines which put the region on the verge of collapse.

Previously, security architecture of the Middle East was based on the fragmented character of the Arab states, their inability to unite and create strong regional force, and on the balancing partnerships between them and non-Arab regional actors–Iran and Turkey. That provided the region with relatively simple and more or less working system of checks and balances. Previously, non-Arab actors played quite marginal role in the Middle East affairs if to compare to the current situation. Today, with almost entire territory between Turkey, Iran and the Gulf stuck in chaos and the only regional actor capable of being a challenger is busy fighting a war in Yemen and struggling with low oil prices, Ankara and Tehran aim at exploiting this time to their utmost advantage. They both want to beef up their positions in the Middle East by securing a place in the future regional security architecture.

As a result, we witness a significant change in regional dynamic–the role of non-Arab powers, Iran and Turkey, in the regional affairs increases putting Saudi Arabia and the GCC in a tight spot. Besides, it is happening against the gradual change of the U.S. role in the Middle East, the new U.S. administration which is likely to continue the politics of limited involvement into the region, the war in Yemen, and low oil prices. This is why Saudi Arabia is so desperate to stand for its positions in the region. The country understands that the balance of power in the region tilts not in its favour.

Huge financial aid coming from the GCC countries to Egypt turned once an influential regional player into a paralysed giant with the whole set of unresolved economic, social and political issues.

This is why the current period can be characterised as the grand transformation which will result in the new Middle East security architecture. It is going to define regional dynamics and trends.

The Grand Transformation

The war in Syria is at the epicentre of this grand transformation. The future of the new regional security system will depend on the outcomes of the Syrian conflict. The distribution of power in the aftermaths of the war will be at the core of the new system.

This is why major regional actors, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, want to stand by their interests and positions in Syria to the end. In addition, we should put US unwillingness to be involved in Syria into this context and get the situation where regional powers started to flirt with Russia trying to have Moscow by their side when it is necessary. Having conflicting interests (it does imply that they have none common), Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, attempt to improve their relations with Russia to use it against each other. In the Syrian context, Turkey and Iran have more common interests (Kurdish issue is one of the most important) than Saudi Arabia with them, which allowed Tehran and Ankara to establish a sort of a new alliance with Moscow.

2016 – Contours of the New Reality

Having Iran and Turkey on board, Russia sidelines the US and Saudi Arabia from defining Syria's fate. Moreover, Moscow gets more control over regional dynamics: Turkey enjoys quite good relations with Saudi Arabia and is a NATO member which makes it convenient interlocutor and a channel for transmitting necessary messages from Moscow.

However, new Iran-Russia-Turkey “alliance” brings in certain difficulties which might play against its members. All three countries are non-Arab states which does not add legitimacy to them in the eyes of the Arab street. According to the Zogby Research Service survey 2016 of Turkey and Iran favourability ratings among Arab states decline. What is more, strong majorities in the Arab world see Russia’s role in the region (including Moscow’s role in Syria) as negative, although in Saudi Arabia and Egypt Russia’s favourability ratings are improving. This is why the reaction from the GCC, in particular from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt will be very important. Therefore, it is quite logical to have an influential Arab state in this sort of “alliance” and Saudi Arabia might play that role. Being the most capable Arab state in terms of financial, military power and influence outside its borders, Riyadh could have been a valuable addition to the new security formation.

With the new Trump administration, Saudis feel even less comfortable than before. Trump’s approach to Syria which prioritises defeating ISIS and Jabhat an-Nusra (now Jabhat Fateh ash-Sham) while cooperating with Russia, makes Saudi Arabia worried about remaining Iranian influence there. This is why Riyadh started to look for closer ties with Russia as an alternative to make sure Iranian influence in the Middle East is in check.

It is very important that on 27, December 2016 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggested Saudi Arabia and Qatar be invited to the Syria talks to be held in the Kazakh capital Astana on 23, January 2017. On the one hand, it confirms that Arab regional powers should be part of the process, while on the other hand, it indicates Turkish willingness to have a stronger position in the new format by having Saudi Arabia and/or Qatar on board backing Ankara on anything to counterbalance Iran.

Trump’s approach to Syria which prioritises defeating ISIS and Jabhat an-Nusra (now Jabhat Fateh ash- Sham) while cooperating with Russia, makes Saudi Arabia worried about remaining Iranian influence there.

This is why the beginning of 2017 might witness the first signs of the new regional security system coming out of the Russia-Iran-Turkey initiative. Russia’s role

Although many experts prematurely argue that Russia’s role in the Middle East will continue to grow at the expense of the declining US influence in the regional affairs, it is quite far from reality. Russia’s involvement into Syrian conflict made many thinks of Russia’s big come back to the Middle East. The reality is that Russia neither wants nor has a capacity to increase its involvement in the Middle East.

Undoubtedly, Russia’s involvement in Syria and its military reinforcement (two military bases in Latakia and Tartus) should not be ignored. But in general, it does not change Russia’s overall approach of very limited involvement into the region and does not allow Moscow to pursue a pro-active foreign policy in the Middle East. Russia’s policy in the region still remains largely reactive.

Middle East Zugzwang

The Middle East has never been a priority for modern Russia. Even on the conceptual level, none of Russia’s foreign policy documents prioritised the region. The new Russian Foreign Policy Concept released on 1, December 2016 lists the Middle East as number five regional priority after the post-Soviet space, Euro-Atlantic (Europe and the US), Arctic and Asia Pacific. Latin America concludes the list.

Historically, Middle East was of the marginal importance Russia. Even during the Cold War, the region was just one of the “battlefields” where the Soviet Union tried to confront and limit American influence.

Currently, Moscow’s policy in the region is majorly driven by the security concerns with fighting terrorism among top priorities. In fact, it could be said that Russia tries to apply “lead from behind” approach in its Middle East policy once pioneered by the U.S. Russia clearly understands that it does not have enough resources and power to increase its involvement in the region and to take extra responsibility alone. It simply can’t afford it.

This is why Moscow chose to enhance its ties with the regional actors who have more capacity and power to influence the situation on the ground. Being a part of the Middle East, Turkey and Iran are naturally interested in playing a bigger role in the region as it directly affects their national security. By bringing Turkey and Iran together Moscow tries to launch a new regional format where major Middle Eastern powers could work together. As it was previously mentioned, Saudi Arabia might become next to join this format to increase its legitimacy.

Having Iran and Turkey on board, Russia sidelines the US and Saudi Arabia from defining Syria's fate.

Therefore, Russia pursues two major goals in the Middle East. First is to become a mediator in the region through creating a mechanism, capable of helping major powers to solve regional problems. Second is to be able to influence regional affairs by not being heavily involved. In the end, Russia, as well as China, are rightly driven by the question: “Why it is us who should take care of the mess the US made in the Middle East?” Taking all that into account, the limited involvement strategy with the gradually increasing role of the regional actors might become the one to ultimately work in the Middle East. With the new phase of the Syria conflict and changing dynamics in the region, this year will show whether the new security system in the Middle East will ultimately start working.

Judging the Effects: The Shaping Iranian Perspective on JCPOA and Trump's Options

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Introduction

The second year of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action implementation is marked with serious uncertainty about its future. Critics in Tehran call the agreement ineffective and Trump considers it to be a historically bad negotiation. But as election days in Tehran approach, it's becoming more important to have a look at Iranian perspective on JCPOA. Iranian Public opinion positively reacted to JCPOA. People's support for JCPOA comes from a general belief that the deal could help the economy flourish, improve living standards, sustain their security and bring other tangible benefits. President Rouhani's strategy to correlate Iran's future prospects with the success of P5+1 negotiations was a tricky idea that plays a paramount role in shaping public expectations. It has been claimed that JCPOA will have direct positive effects on people's daily life. These claims played a significant role in gaining public support for the deal and gradually became the main tool to shape the judgment about JCPOA future and draft Iranian atomic policies. In fact, Iranians consider JCPOA effects to be the main element determining their fate. Ironically, president Rouhani's fate more than ever is depends on JCPOA's fate.

The so called "positive effects" became the center of heated debates in Tehran between pro-JCPOA government authorities and skeptical conservative political elites. The former dismissed the effects’ strategic importance, arguing the deal would not have much strategic effect on Iran as it is put by government. Moreover, there are serious doubts about US determination to fulfill its commitment. Gradually questions about JCPOA effects on Iran's economy and prosperity turned out to be the nodal points of debates in Tehran. Discussions about the "effects" which were held in more technical terms between political and bureaucratic elites behind the closed doors, leaked in mid-2016 and changed the public opinion from a more general belief on the good faith of JCPOA to a more investigative approach. Iranians are asking what the real effects of JCPOA are and why over a year after implementation day the president Rouhani claims that JCPOA’s positive effects are still not tangibly sensed. President Rouhani's strategy to correlate Iran's future prospects with the success of P5+1 negotiations was a tricky idea that plays a paramount role in shaping public expectations.

The challenge of JCPOA effects becomes more serious when it is considered as a parameter to evaluate Government's policies and performance, hence acts as a pressure tool. Although it is true that hardliners are more marginalized in Iran's today's politics and benefit less from social support than before, more and more people ask about the real outcomes and effects of the nuclear deal, as do Rouhani’s rival groups. Nature of "effects" becomes yet more significant when simultaneously public opinion, parliament (Majlis) and hardline political fractions use them as an evaluation and judging tool. In this sense not only will the Iranian future atomic policies evolve around the notion of "JCPOA effectiveness", but Iranian presidential race next year will be affected as well. For Iranians, as long as the deal brings benefit to people and supports national interests, its sustainability is guaranteed but only with the commitments met by the US and European countries. Indeed even the policies of US president elect Donald Trump could be constrained within this perspective.

That is the main reason why the US and other international players need to consider "effects" of their sanction relief policies in line with maintaining JCPOA. Deal support clarifies differences between effective and formal way of meeting commitments as Iranians claim. This article is an inside view to provide a better understanding on how Iranian perception of JCPOA is shaping.

Concept of "Effects" in JCPOA

RIAC Report “Russia-Iran Partnership: an Overview and Prospects for the Future”

JCPOA’s final document introduces the concept of "Effects" as one of its main considerations. Effects are interpreted in two ways throughout the nuclear deal. E3/EU+3 side, sees its eligible effect and final outcome in dismantling weapon capabilities in Iran's nuclear program. In Iranian view, effect sought is assurance of gaining full economic benefit from sanctions relief. JCPOA will be prolonged if these two effects are met simultaneously on both sides. On E3/EU+3 side, there are defined procedures and mechanisms enforced by IAEA that could verify Iranian course of action. These verification measures enable E3/EU+3 to evaluate the level of effect achievement. To accomplish effects on the Iranian side there are certain articles including article 7 of Annex II that determines final effects of sanction’s relief in various subject areas. However there are fewer concrete objective measures to monitor and evaluate how relieved sanctions will result in intended effects. This less concrete evaluation possibility gives proper room for Iranian public and government oppositions to judge the effects based on their own interpretations rather than concrete indexes.

The fact is that there is a meaningful division between meeting commitments under article 4-6 of Annex II and reaching effects mentioned in Article 7 of Annex II. In this case, US relieved sanctions outcomes and their effects could be limited by auxiliary sanctions, remaining executive measures or other external factors outside the negotiated deal. This is exactly what many speculate as Trumps strategy for dealing with JCPOA: a twofold strategy of remaining in the deal at first but then limiting its functions and effectiveness. Thus, while formally the US is committed to JCPOA, the final effectiveness of lifted sanctions is manageable through remaining primary sanctions or other external factors.

Iranian debate, which is probably supported by analyzing OFAC course of action after implementation day, argues that even during Obama administration while the US commitments under article 4-6 of Annex II were met, the US political will remained the main factor in accomplishing effects mentioned under Article 7 of Annex II. In this perspective, Tehran considers JCPOA effects to be determining parameter for the judgment about the nuclear deal fact rather than its nominal implementation by other parties.

US Implementation of JCPOA with Limited Effects

Iranians are asking what the real effects of JCPOA are and why over a year after implementation day the president Rouhani claims that JCPOA’s positive effects are still not tangibly sensed.

For president elect Trump it could be very challenging to renegotiate a multilateral UN Security Council backed agreement like JCPOA, as it is costly to tear it up as he promised. However, as Suzanne Maloney suggests, Trump would not have to touch the deal to imperil it, but his administration is likely to adapt, using tactics aimed at intensifying pressure on Tehran across the board. If this is the case, then the main question is how the US could remain in the deal still limiting JCPOA's effects on Iran's economy to put more pressure. This is also a difficult task as it is clearly stated in JCPOA that "E3/EU+3 refrain from imposing exceptional or discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA". But is there any possibility for the US to manage and limit effects mentioned under Article 7 of Annex II? In other words, how can the USA meet its commitments under JCPOA to the extent that retains the ability to manage effects in order to put more pressure on Iran and providing limiting scale of Iran’s benefits?

In the US sanctions regime, various sanctions are systematically related to each other to form a comprehensive and complementary structure. In this interrelated structure, implementation or relieving of specified articles in certain sanction code is a dependent variable. In this sense revoking a certain article mentioned in JCPOA by OFAC depends on how they may implement other articles in another sanction code which is not directly mentioned in JCPOA. That is why achieving full effects of sanction relief under JCPOA depends on sanction codes outside the deal itself and US administration’s political choice on how to implement articles related to external sanction codes.

ANADOLU AGENCY / East News

Future Agreements on Iran’s Nuclear Program

Interactions between various elements of sanction regime may be referred to as Sanctions Structural Interactions. These interactions exist between three elements including sanctions contents, sanctions implementation/relief model and internal relations among sanction codes. Such structure enables US policy makers to achieve favored effects by maneuvering among these elements. Contents of various sanctions including statutes and executive orders are linked together in effect based network where implementation/relief models are introduced based on this linkage to optimize reaching foreign policy effects. Within this framework, accomplishing effects at JCPOA level is not only a variable of sanctions contents and implementation/relief models followed by US authorities. It also strategically depends on backdoor relations exits between various sanctions.

For example, although secondary sanctions are lifted based on the US commitments under JCPOA, non- US traders who are allowed to do business with Iran in compliance with JCPOA are still facing the risk of primary sanctions in banking transactions with their Iranian partners [1]. These interlinked relations influence the final effects obtained. Relations network among sanctions complicates judgment about the US complying with its commitments and increases assumptions that the US my use these less tangible aspects of sanctions based on its political will. This argument is gaining more support in Tehran.

That is why achieving full effects of sanction relief under JCPOA depends on sanction codes outside the deal itself and US administration’s political choice on how to implement articles related to external sanction codes.

Sanctions implementation/relief models followed by the US government contribute to JCPOA final effects. According to documents published by OFAC including FAQ and "Guidance Relating to the Lifting of Certain US Sanctions", the US authorities mostly concentrate on reaffirming persistence of remaining sanctions i.e. primary sanctions. In fact, a number of documents explain how remaining sanctions function rather than clarify ambiguities surrounding sanction relief. This secures legitimate right of the US government to secure its sanction regime and enforce it as strongly as before. However, Tehran believes this approach could create a strange environment for potential Iran's business partners. By focusing more on the remaining sanctions in documents published to lift them, they complicate Iranian partners’ anticipations about sustainability and reliability of Iran’s future. As a result, despite US compliance with the deal terms, its less transparent, non-affirmative and complex sanction relief models acts as a source of confusion for Iranian side.

JCPOA Effects and Trump’s Options

What president elect Trump can do with these three elements of Sanctions Structural Interactions model includes enriching sanctions contents with dozens of new bills against Iran, or as he previously mentioned, strengthening sanctions implementation/relief mechanism. Finally, he can use the benefit from relations between primary and secondary sanctions to put pressure on Iranian economic partners. All these measures should they prove successful, limit the effectiveness of JCPOA for Iranian side. But then the problem for the new US administration will transform into a more complex one as Iran is determined to draft its counter measures based on the concept of effectiveness. Iran could challenge the US by focusing on American failure to meet their commitments referring to article 7 of Annex II and escalate the problem. In other words, though the US in Trump era could put more pressure on Iran by reducing the effectiveness of JCPOA being still formally committed to the deal, Iran will receive a brilliant opportunity to challenge the US with the concept of "effectiveness". All this contributes to further uncertainty about the faith of the agreement.

EPA / ANGELO CARCONI / Vostock Photo Iran Is Making a Comeback The situation gets more complicated when Sanctions Structural Interactions framework shows that the US could use both network of relations among sanctions and implementation/relief models to mediate or limit final effects of JCPOA on Iranian economy without withdrawing from the deal. It means that while the US is complying with its commitments under JCPOA by revoking certain sanctions, the effects specified in Article 7 of Annex II could be partially fulfilled. However, this policy sounds tricky as both Iranian public opinion and political elites in Tehran are getting alarmed about the real outcomes and effects of nuclear deal. Trump’s aggressive options against JCPOA will probably lead to following Iranian moves:

1. Transforming effectiveness as the cornerstone of Iranian approach to JCPOA limits future US options, which are based on putting more pressure on Iran by adding new surrogate sanctions. This is due to Iranian readiness to use deal terms to prove US failure in effective relief and mark it as violation. Enforcing new sanctions on other areas like human rights or Iran's regional policies with regard to JCPOA effectiveness, would be considered violation of Article 7 of Annex II and will lead to activation of Iran's counter strategies.

Despite US compliance with the deal terms, its less transparent, non-affirmative and complex sanction relief models acts as a source of confusion for Iranian side.

2. The policy to stimulate Iran to withdraw from the deal because of its ineffectiveness is far from reality. As Iranian patience and its strategic logic show, foreign policy moves are becoming more rational and calculated. Although JCPOA being weak is a sign of failed deal for Iran, there is general consensus in Tehran that the country is not going to leave the deal unilaterally. Iran's growing awareness of an effective JCPOA importance leads to a new wave of strategies and tactics to bring back the effectiveness to the deal, a move that contradicts those who are hopeful about Iran's withdrawal under pressure.

3. Good faith on negotiations and readiness to reach compromise in lieu of direct confrontation with the West is a distinctive feature of Iranian moderate forces. JCPOA is the most significant accomplishment of the moderate discourse, which was achieved by full size national support. But JCPOA ineffectiveness which then translates into its failure is a dream for Iranian hardliners, proving their attitudes and paving their way for another reemergence on next year's presidential race. JCPOA fate will have an important impact on the dynamics of Iranian internal political forces which influence regional order.

Conclusion

Reuters Donald Trump Will Create a “Window Of Opportunity” In the Middle East

By current trend, JCPOA effects defined by Iranian side as the opportunity to gain full economic benefit of lifted sanctions is gaining more importance both among Iranian public opinion and political elite. Effects as illustrated in article 7 of Annex II are gradually turning out to be the main foundation of any judgment about the deal to the extent that Rouhani government is under pressure to adjust its policies in accordance with deal's effects rather than its formal terms. This dynamic acts as a strategic limitation both for president Rouhani and president elect Trump. It’s a limitation for Rouhani as his nuclear policies are judged by economic effects they bring for the country. Judging the effects is also a limitation for Trump as his policies to reduce the deal’s effectiveness could trigger unprecedented reactions from Tehran.

Resource balance and cost benefit calculations were the prime logic that brought Iran to negotiations. The benefits Iran receives from its cooperation within international order would be the main element that facilitates further future cooperation on wider issues, and the country's integration into world politics. This reveals the value of an effective JCPOA that encourages Iranians to cooperate with international community by facilitating their access to full benefit of lifted sanctions. This is a major counterargument against hardliners who claim that international order serves against national interests. It will prove the idea that acting within rules of international community serves Iran's national security interests better than revolutionary standings. However, less effective JCPOA is challenging this logic strategically as it may transform Iranian political rationality for years to come.

2017 Foreign Policy Outlook

Photo: Flickr / Mike Mertz CC BY-NC 2.0

Most foreign policy forecasts open with statements about the uncertainty of the international situation. This is a convenient starting point, as it allows the analyst to hide behind and avoid taking responsibility for his or her forecasts. But if we really want to get an idea about what might await us in the future, we have to understand the “corridors of certainty”, which are visible for 2017. They are far from rosy and speak about the necessity to develop fundamentally new solutions to the accumulated problems.

Where Does the Power Come From?

It is quite obvious that the tone of Russia’s foreign policy in 2017 will be dictated by the country’s relations with the United States. Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. general elections is an important factor, but it is by far not the only one. The US plays the key role in resolving all issues connected with European security. Without the US, European countries cannot make a single decision of strategic significance. And the political turbulence in Europe only strengthens the role of that country. What is more, the tangle of contradictions with regard to European security is so messy that a single “deal” or new reset would not solve the problem. The situation is aggravated by the actions of the outgoing U.S. administration, which is actively trying to push relations with Russia towards the point of no return.

The new President of the United States will be forced to start from the existing legal framework and precedents in Russia-US relations. But Donald Trump has already demonstrated his ability to break the mould. It is entirely possible that he could embark upon a path towards a complete revision of Russia-US relations, with entirely pragmatic goals. Under the Obama administration, the United States lost Russia for good. Now, the Russian government is not only hostile towards the United States, but it is also leaning towards closer cooperation with Beijing. Trump views China as a strategic challenge. After all, it will be extremely difficult for the United States to keep hold of its international dominance if the number of allies — or at least neutral states — that it has with regard to the Asia Pacific continues to decrease.

REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov Russian foreign policy: The year in review

One can blame all they want “revenge-seeking” for the collapse of US–Russia relations. To be sure, Moscow is not the easiest of partners. For the West, Russia’s strategic goals are not entirely clear. The Kremlin is following a rather tough policy, demanding that its interests be taken into account. But facts are facts. Under the previous administration, Washington failed to draw Moscow into an effective, predictable and mutually attractive model of relations. What is more, this failure of American diplomacy goes well beyond the limits of bilateral relations with Russia. Essentially, the Americans have failed as the leader of a unipolar world. After all, being a leader involves much more than accumulating aircraft carriers and warheads. At the heart of the very idea of being a leader is the ability to engage others in your system of values, beliefs, goals, institutions and models. And the fact that Moscow (among countless others) does not accept that system is another problem of the US. Sanctions cannot bring Russia round to their way of thinking. Moreover, they only strengthen the Kremlin’s determination to follow its own path. The window of opportunity for “accommodating” Russia, socializing it and turning into a partner (albeit a special partner) and ally of the United States has slammed shut. And all of this despite the fact that it was wide open 15 years ago. The loss of Russia is the major diplomatic and ideological defeat for the United States since the end of the Cold War.

The rift between Russia and the United States could have severe consequences in terms of international security. The risks of escalation increase as a result of incidents in zones where Russian and NATO forces are both engaged, as well as in response to local conflicts. Strategic stability — the predictable system of the balance and control of nuclear arms — is under threat of destruction. This is where we come to the unresolved problem of missile defence, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that is falling apart before our very eyes, and the uncertain prospects with regard to the extension of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). The mechanisms of cooperation for combating new challenges are fading into the distance. (Obama’s cyber-sanctions are a perfect illustration of the situation.) The bottom line is that the risk of an intentional or unintentional direct military confrontation between Russia and the United States is growing at an alarming rate. A local skirmish could very well turn into a full-scale conflict. For understandable reasons none of Russia, the United States and European Union is interested in this.

All this sets an important agenda for the Russia–United States dialogue. The next and most urgent task is to minimize the damage that has already been done, as well as to work together to control the risks of escalation and reverse the violent downward trend. Russia—EU Relations at a Crossroads. Common and Divergent Interests

Having a new administration opens is an opportunity for such dialog. However, it is necessary to understand the risks involved. The first problem is the fact that the new President of the United States could be disappointed with the process of normalizing relations with Russia. And the conditions exist for this to happen. The nature of the problems that exist in relations between Russia and the United States is such that painstaking and consistent work will be required to fix them. And it cannot be done overnight. It is a process, rather than a one-time solution. A marathon that at times will nevertheless require faster work. Are the leaders of Russia and the United States ready for the long haul? Are they prepared to send all the right signals to each other — signals that will come at a heavy price? After all, it is far more difficult to work to normalize relations than it is to capitulate and get caught up in a conflict.

It is entirely possible that the first friendly gestures (if any are made) could be followed by disappointment and the temptation to follow an even more hard-nosed policy. The American side is likely to act in this manner: they enjoy overwhelming superiority and have a much larger safety buffer, meaning that they have greater room for manoeuvre. The desire to “turn the screw” as far as it will go may very well prevail. Unlike Beijing, Moscow can do very little from a tactical point of view to hurt the United States outside of the very limited range of security issues. This makes Moscow a convenient target. The fact that this would weaken America itself may be ignored in favour of dealing with tactical tasks.

It would be in Russia’s best interests to take advantage of the opportunity to normalize relations with the United States. In order for this to happen, it is necessary for the sides to react calmly and with restraint to steps that may be considered unfriendly, as well as to turn the heat down on the information war that is currently being waged by both sides. Vladimir Putin’s decision to not reciprocate to the expulsion of Russian diplomats from the United States is a step in the right direction. It also confirms that the Russian leader is capable of breaking the mould as well. It may be useful to translate the US–Russia dialogue into the language of accounting: balancing what is in Russia’s interests; determining what the country will gain and lose in the event of a confrontation; deciding what exactly steps need to be taken in terms of common interests. We need a rational dialogue. Selective Engagement

REUTERS/Carlo Allegri Russia and the United States Have to Get Back to Constructive Dialogue

Russia–United States relations also influence those between Russia and the European Union. There are driving forces here too, however. There are two possible development scenarios for 2017: 1) the status quo will be maintained, with the sanctions regime continuing and the political positions adopted by the sides remaining the same; or 2) the situation will get even worse. Unfortunately, we are unlikely to see the sides softening their positions. Having said this, maintaining the status quo will be an achievement in itself. Business has adapted to the new atmosphere in relations. It is extremely important that we do not experience any new shocks, given the economic interdependence of the two countries.

An important task in relations with the European Union is to take advantage of the loopholes that have been incorporated into the new doctrinal principles of relations with Russia to move the situation towards normalization. For example, the content of the so-called “selective engagement” (one of Federica Mogherini’s five guiding principles) with Russia is by no means clear. It is possible that it could be the same old forms of relations to which we have long since grown accustomed. It could, however, include everything that has been achieved over the past 20 years. It may seem, for example, that the four common spaces diplomats agreed on during Igor Ivanov’s time as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation are impracticable. However, at its heart, this approach is entirely compatible with the “selective engagement” principle. Filling it with real projects, or promoting the development of common standards and rules will lay the foundations for the qualitative improvement of relations.

Another opportunity that has been largely underestimated is cooperation between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). There are both objective and subjective obstacles here. One of the objective obstacles is the difference in the levels of development of the two organizations. The European Union has long since turned into a political institution. The EAEU, on the other hand, positions itself as an apolitical and purely economic integration bloc. The structure of the EU and EAEU countries’ economies and the level of their development are extremely different, although the experience of the European Union was widely used when setting up the Eurasian integration project.

Subjective obstacles involve political differences between Moscow and Brussels. On the whole, the European Union sees the EAEU as a political bloc, almost as an attempt by Russia to recreate the Soviet Union. Those who would like to impede Eurasian integration have influential posts in Brussels. The sanctions regime provides the ideal conditions for this — the sanctions influence the relations between the members of the EAEU, and they force them to build relations with the European Union on a bilateral basis, bypassing the European Commission. While this is not fatal, it is painful. By keeping the sanctions regime in place, the European Union eliminates the possibility of cooperation with the EAEU. We should not expect a breakthrough on this front in 2017. But it is vital to develop possible ways to work together at the expert level and lay down the groundwork for the future. Of course, the new balance of power that will emerge in the European Union following elections in a number of countries will be very important. Many of these elections will go beyond the purely national agendas and will essentially amount to votes of confidence in the European Union. Not that this is likely to change the structure of relations that has developed with Russia. But it will most definitely influence the future of the European integration.

Russia still has the traditionally powerful instrument of European politics at its disposal, that is, constructive relations with key European capitals — Berlin, Rome and Paris. 2017 will mark the 300th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Russia and France. That is as good a reason as any to take stock and coordinate plans for the future.

Homework

Russian–Chinese Dialogue: The 2016 Model

Eurasian economic integration is an important aspect of Russia–China relations. The coming year could prove to be a serious challenge in terms of the integration of the EAEU and the “One Belt, One Road” projects. The integration project was initiated in 2015 to much pomp and circumstance. Last year was spent doing all the necessary “homework.” Now it is time to show some real results. It is the moment of truth, as many influential people are skeptical about the project both in Beijing and the EAEU capitals. Concrete results could include joint projects between major companies, infrastructural plans, and movement towards the creation of an EAEU–China trade regime. Most probably, we will also see the weak sides of the integration project in 2017: the low level of participation in the project of small and medium-sized businesses; an imbalance in the political and economic components of the project; markedly different approaches to regulating trade; and the vulnerability of the EAEU economic zone. The goal for this year and beyond is to minimize these costs.

Security will become an increasingly important part of Russia–China relations in 2017. China’s relations with the new U.S. administration, as well as other regional players’ policies, are serious risk factors in this respect. Japan will continue the course of gradually increasing its independence. North Korea’s nuclear policy is an additional destabilizing factor. The situation here will not improve, and the development of regional missile defence in South Korea will affect strategic stability in Northeast Asia. Russia and China will maintain a cautious attitude towards the situation. Moscow and Beijing will work more closely to coordinate their positions. What is more, Russia and China will consistently align their approaches to issues on the global agenda. There is no reason to expect rapid movement towards the creation of a full- fledged union between the two countries. But even now, Russia–China relations force Washington into a situation of dual containment.

Beijing has the upper hand in the Russia — China — United States triangle. The Americans will have to either accept the fact that the Chinese agenda will gradually spread through the region, or take drastic political steps, going short in its relations with China. Such a situation is highly likely. But even the hot- tempered Donald Trump and his administration will realize the price of such a step. Whatever the political landscape, the regional arms race will gradually gain momentum.

Russia’s relations with Japan will play an important role here. President Putin’s visit to the country in December of last year was full of positive results. There were signs that progress could be made with regard to the territorial dispute. However, the energy of these achievements is likely to die down somewhat in 2017. Breakthroughs in terms of economic cooperation or the territorial issue are unlikely. Having said that, even the smallest growth in economic cooperation with Japan is important for Russia is terms of diversifying its ties in the Asia Pacific Region.

2017 will mark the 70th anniversary of mutual relations between Russia and India. This symbolic occasion created the perfect opportunity to carry out a thorough revision of bilateral ties between the two countries. Both Moscow and New Delhi value their strategic partnership. But new sources of interaction beyond military-technical cooperation and the peaceful use of nuclear technology are needed. Moreover, cooperation in these spheres is not exactly going smoothly. Now is not the time for the Russian side to rest on its laurels. A paradigm shift is required in Russia–India relations — from major projects to the creation of a favourable environment for small and medium-sized businesses, universities, the media and a wide range on non-governmental organizations. Moscow has a list of “homework assignments” for its relations with India that must been handed in for marking in 2017.

Surprises in the Middle East

Flickr / Victoria Pickering CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

2016 – Contours of the New Reality

Late 2016 brought a number of surprises in the Middle East. With the help of Russia, the Syrian forces recaptured Aleppo. Russia, Turkey and Iran coordinated their efforts with regard to the resolution of the situation in Syria. The resolution proposed by Moscow and Ankara was unanimously supported by the UN Security Council. The idea to hold negotiations in Astana, Kazakhstan, was also supported. It was the first time in several decades that the United States and the West had been forced to play a supporting role, which only a few months ago would have seemed like some kind of science fiction. A new reality is being formed in the Middle East. Non-Western systems of power are being built, systems which can restore order and combat terrorism. Neither the assignation of the Russian ambassador in Ankara nor other provocations have been able to reverse this trend.

This new configuration will be tested in 2017. The question is how strong the cooperation between Moscow, Ankara and Tehran will be. Not only this, but how effective will the ceasefire prove to be? The future of Syrian statehood should begin taking shape in the coming year. It would seem that we are moving towards the federalization of the country, with each federation being under the patronized by one of the players, who will also act as guarantors of the status quo. This might not be the best option for Bashar al-Assad, but it would offer him a necessary break. Then he will be able to focus his efforts on the fight against radical Islamists. Though, victory is unlikely in this case.

The political situation in Turkey will be an important factor. A shift is taking place in Ankara’s politics, with the country striving to play an independent role in the region and distancing itself from the European project, thus increasing its leverage in Brussels. This process will be closely linked with transformations taking place inside the country and with the consolidation of the current powers. The “value of shares” in Russia–Turkey relations will grow.

By acting as a guarantor of the settlement of the Syrian conflict, Moscow will consolidate its role in the region, where it will have a long-lasting presence.

Black Swans

An inevitable characteristic of the future is the fact that it is full of events that are extremely difficult to predict. The question is what repercussions these events will have, and whether or not they will have fundamental, qualitative and irreversible consequences. Or will it all be fluff without any real catastrophic effects? The conditions are ripe for Black Swans to appear. Crossing the red lines, violating established traditions, provoking escalations — all this has become the norm in international relations today. Clashes between Russian and NATO fighter jets. Large-scale terrorist attacks and (anti-)migration rallies in Europe. Assassinations. Incidents in Syria and the Middle East. Subversive actions in Donbass. Tensions in the South China Sea. Unexpected election results. Volatility on the commodities and financial markets. Coups and regime changes. In this inevitable succession of events, we have to keep in mind that we need foreign policy to resolve our own domestic issues. One hundred years ago the world was subjected to a huge catastrophe. And we need to learn from this.

First published in Russian in Expert.ru