Meeting Place: College of Nursing (CN) 317

EPISTEMOLOGY

I. Basics

Meeting time: Tuesday/Thursday 3.40-4.55P Meeting place: College of Nursing (CN) 317 Professor: E.J. Coffman E-mail address: [email protected] Course website: http://online.utk.edu Office: 816 McClung Tower Office Hours: By appointment

II. Texts

1. Richard Feldman, Epistemology (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003) 2. Course packet available through Online@UT (http://online.utk.edu)

(Recommended: Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge [Routledge])

▪ Please visit the Philosophy Department’s website (philosophy.utk.edu) and Blackboard site (online.utk.edu; access restricted to current majors) for a variety of resources helpful to those studying Philosophy as well as information about our degree programs and other opportunities for undergraduates—including our scholarships, essay contest, and Philosophy Club (all of which are open to students not in a Philosophy degree program).

III. Course Overview

A. Goals

1. Explore five central questions in Epistemology, the branch of Philosophy that focuses on the nature of knowledge and intellectually sound belief

2. Continue honing our critical thinking, reading, writing, and discussion skills

▪ Our course has two main parts. In Part 1, we’ll explore these three questions:

Q1: What does it take for a person to know something to be true? What’s involved in propositional knowledge?

Q2: What does it take for a person’s belief to be intellectually sound? What’s involved in epistemically justified belief?

Q3: Could an unjustified belief nevertheless count as knowledge? Does knowledge require justified belief?

Q1-Q3 aren’t limited to just us human thinkers; rather, they’re very general questions about the nature or essence of knowledge and justified belief, whose answers apply to any possible thinker.

1 In Part 2 of our course, we’ll explore two questions that focus on our intellectual predicament:

Q4: Do we have any knowledge about the external world?

Q5: Do we have any justified beliefs about the external world?

▪ We’ll be working to understand and assess the arguments some key historical and contemporary philosophers have developed in trying to answer these five questions. Here are the main things we’ll have a better understanding of at the end of this course:

▫ the most influential analysis of knowledge in the history of Epistemology—viz., the “Justified True Belief” analysis—, as well as the main objection to that analysis;

▫ the ways in which contemporary philosophers have attempted to refine the “Justified True Belief” analysis, and problems with those attempts;

▫ two central debates about the nature of justified belief: the (i) “Foundationalism/Coherentism” debate and the (ii) “Evidentialism/Nonevidentialism” debate;

▫ arguments for the conclusion that none of our beliefs about the external world qualify as knowledge, along with objections to these arguments; and

▫ arguments for the conclusion that none of our beliefs about the external world are justified, along with objections to these arguments.

Finally, we’ll explore a couple “less traditional” topics that have recently received significant attention:

▫ potentially important connections between epistemology and science (including a controversial argument to the conclusion that accepting naturalistic evolution renders all your beliefs unjustified); and

▫ the kinds of conditions under which people can reasonably disagree with each other.

B. Methods

1. In class: Interactive lecture; group discussion; 2 essay exams (20% each = 40% of final grade)

2. Outside class: Reading assignments; 10 Critical Notes (20% of final grade); 1 paper [8-10 pages] (40% of final grade)

▪ Reading assignments

Our readings come from two sources: (1) the online course packet and (2) a book by Richard Feldman (Professor of Philosophy, University of Rochester) called Epistemology. We’ll switch

2 back and forth between the course packet and Feldman’s book. The course packet contains some of the most important historical and contemporary essays on our five questions. Feldman’s book provides helpful explanation and critical evaluation of the readings in our course packet. (In a typical lecture, I’ll offer explanations of—and then raise some initial questions about and/or objections to—what I take to be the main arguments developed in the assigned readings for that day.)

As usual, you have three main goals when reading assigned material: (1) Identify the main claims the author is arguing for (“What are the author’s main conclusions?”); (2) Understand how the author argues for those claims (“What are the author’s arguments for her/his main conclusions? How, exactly, are those arguments supposed to go?”); and (3) Evaluate the author’s arguments (“How strong are the author’s arguments for her/his main conclusions?”). The online course packet includes three of my favorite essays (ones I still find helpful) on these fundamental skills. As we start our course, please have a look at the essays under the heading ‘Preliminaries’ in the tentative reading schedule below.

▪ Critical Notes (10 @ 2% each = 20% of final grade)

This requirement is meant to: (1) help you achieve the three reading goals mentioned above; (2) help prepare you to participate in class discussion; and (3) strengthen your ability to clearly and concisely question and/or object to all sorts of arguments (which should, among many other good things, have a positive impact on your term paper for this course).

Each Critical Note (CN) you submit will earn a grade of ‘Exemplary’, ‘Satisfactory’, or ‘Unsatisfactory’. A Satisfactory CN will be at least 200—but not more than 400—words; it will raise either a question about or an objection to something that happens in a particular assigned reading. An Exemplary CN will fall within the same word limits, and will raise a genuinely pressing question about or objection to a central part of the selected reading. To ensure that I understand how your question or objection engages the material you’re writing about, please provide some context by briefly summarizing the part of the reading your question or objection concerns. Sincere effort will usually suffice for at least a Satisfactory CN. I’ll provide brief comments (via e-mail) on CNs that I judge less than Exemplary. While you won’t be able to revise a given CN, you can submit up to twelve and I’ll only count the highest ten.

There are five important rules about CNs:

▫ CNs must be typed and include a word count.

▫ CNs must be submitted twice: electronically via e-mail and in hard copy at the next class meeting (barring truly exceptional circumstances).

▫ Each of your CNs must engage a different reading.

▫ All CNs are due at the last class meeting on Tuesday, November 30 th.

▫ You can turn in no more than 4 CNs at the last meeting.

I reserve the right to ask authors of CNs deemed at least Satisfactory to present them informally to the class. And at all times, you’re encouraged to draw on your CNs in class discussion without special prompting from me: share your questions with us, try out your objections on us, etc.

3 ▪ Essay exams (2 @ 20% each = 40% of final grade)

Each exam will consist of two essay questions drawn from a list of several possible questions. The possible questions will derive entirely from material covered in class. I’ll distribute a list of questions several days before each exam. A typical question will ask you to lay out a particular argument, present a standard objection to that argument, provide a possible reply to that objection, and (finally) offer your own reasoned verdict about this debate. ▪ Paper (40% of final grade)

I’ll soon distribute two detailed term paper assignments that concern issues raised in Part 1 of our course. You must write your term paper using one of these assignments. (So, no “original” term paper topics in this course this semester.) There’s a “re-write” option on your term paper that works like this. After I return my comments on, and overall evaluation of, the first draft you submit—which is due by 5pm on Friday, November 19 th—, you’ll have the option of submitting a second, revised draft of your paper—which will be due by 12pm on Monday, December 13 th. Papers that improve significantly as a result of revisions may rise 1 or 2 grade levels—e.g., a significantly improved paper that initially earned a B may rise to a B+ or an A-.

▪ Discussion

One of my main goals is to help us fruitfully discuss the material covered in this course. By participating in class discussion, you can do (at least) three important things:

(1) Challenge my understanding and presentation of course material by: questioning my explanations of arguments from assigned readings, or my evaluations of those arguments, or my views about what’s really important in a given reading, or …;

(2) Gain a deeper understanding of the material this course covers; and (3) Strengthen your ability to participate in all kinds of rational dialogue.

I really hope you’ll take advantage of your opportunity to discuss the ideas we’ll be exploring in this course. If you do, then in addition to benefiting in all the ways mentioned above, you’ll position yourself to get bumped into a higher grade category should you end the course on a “grade borderline”.

I understand that some of us find it easier to participate in class discussion than others. If you’re especially uncomfortable with the idea of class discussion, please talk to me about that; I may be able to suggest some relatively painless ways to get into the flow of class discussion. And keep these things in mind: (1) Nobody here knows everything; (2) Everybody here knows something (and so has something to contribute to discussion); and (3) Any question or point that occurs to you is almost certainly occurring to someone else at the same time.

IV. Grade Scale

A = 95  A- = 90  B+ = 87  B = 83  B- = 80 

4 C+ = 77  C = 73  C- = 70  D+ = 67  D = 63  D- = 60  F = Anything below 60

V. Key Dates

8/19 (R): First class meeting 10/7-10/8 (R-F): Fall Break 10/14 (R): First essay exam 11/19 (F): Paper due [by 5pm] 11/27-11/28 (R-F): Thanksgiving Break 11/30 (T): Last class meeting; all CNs due 12/7 (T): Second essay exam [5pm-7pm (!)] 12/13 (M): Revised paper due [by 12pm; remember, this is optional]

VI. Main Content Outline

Part I: The Nature of Knowledge and Justified Belief

A. The “Justified True Belief” Analysis: A Traditional Theory of Knowledge 1. Explanation 2. The main objection and some defenses

B. Three Attempts to Fine-Tune the JTB Analysis 1. The “No False Grounds” Condition 2. The “No Defeaters” Condition 3. The “No Essential Dependence on Falsehood” Condition

C. What is Justified Belief? 1. What structure must a set of justified beliefs have?: Foundationalism vs. Coherentism

2. Does justification require evidence?: Evidentialism vs. Nonevidentialism

D. Does Knowledge Require Justified Belief? 1. The Causal Analysis of Knowledge 2. The Truth-Tracking Analysis of Knowledge

Part II: The Extent of Our Knowledge and Justified Belief

A. Do we know anything about the external world? 1. Some important skeptical arguments 2. Objections

B. Do we have any justified beliefs about the external world? 1. The Problem of Induction

5 2. The Underdetermination Argument

C. Some “non-traditional” skeptical worries 1. Epistemology and Science 2. Prospects for Reasonable Disagreement

VII. Tentative Reading Schedule (CP = Course packet; Feldman = Feldman’s Epistemology)

▪ N.B.: I’ll always make official reading assignments in class, over e-mail, and at Bb.

Preliminaries: Philosophical Terminology and Methods

▪ CP: E.J. Coffman, “Finding, Clarifying, and Evaluating Arguments” ▪ CP: Jim Pryor, “Philosophical Terms & Methods” ▪ CP: Jim Pryor, “Guidelines on Reading Philosophy”

Part I: The Nature of Knowledge and Justified Belief

A. The “Justified True Belief” Analysis: A Traditional Theory of Knowledge

1. Explanation

▪ Feldman: Chapter 1 ▪ CP: Plato, excerpt from Theaetetus ▪ CP: Roderick Chisholm, “The Problem of the Criterion” ▪ CP: A.J. Ayer, “Knowing as Having the Right to be Sure” ▪ Feldman: Chapter 2

2. The main objection and some defenses

▪ CP: Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” ▪ Feldman: Chapter 3, §§I-II ▪ CP: Oswald Hanfling, “A Gettier Drama”

B. Three Attempts to Fine-Tune the JTB Analysis

1. The “No False Grounds” Condition

▪ CP: Michael Clark, “Knowledge and Grounds” ▪ Feldman: Chapter 3, §III.A

2. The “No Defeaters” Condition

▪ CP: Peter Klein, “A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge” ▪ Feldman: Chapter 3, §III.B

3. The “No Essential Dependence on Falsehood” Condition

▪ Feldman: Chapter 3, §III.D ▪ CP: Ted Warfield, “Knowledge from Falsehood”

6 C. What is Justified Belief?

1. What structure must a set of justified beliefs have?: Foundationalism vs. Coherentism

a. The “Infinite Regress Argument” for Foundationalism

▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, Introduction (i.e., material before §I) and §II

b. The Main Alternative to Foundationalism: Coherentism

▪ CP: Laurence BonJour, excerpt from The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (“A Basic Problem for Foundationalism”) ▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §V.C.1 ▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §IV.A-B ▪ CP: Laurence BonJour, excerpt from The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (“The Elements of Coherentism”)

c. Defending the Infinite Regress Argument: Objections to Coherentism

▪ Feldman, Chapter 4, §IV.C-D ▪ CP: Laurence BonJour, excerpt from The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (“Answers to Objections”) ▪ CP: Richard Fumerton, “A Critique of Coherentism”

2. Does justification require evidence?: Evidentialism vs. Nonevidentialism

a. Explanation of Evidentialism

▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §I.A-B; §III; §V ▪ CP: Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Evidentialism” (§§I-IV)

b. Objections to Evidentialism

▪ CP: Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?” (§I) ▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §I.C

c. Two Nonevidentialist Analyses of Justified Belief

i. Reliabilism

▪ CP: Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?” (§§II-III) ▪ Feldman: Chapter 5, §III ▪ CP: Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Evidentialism” (§§V-VI)

ii. Proper Function

▪ CP: Alvin Plantinga, “Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function” (Introduction, §IV) ▪ Feldman: Chapter 5, §IV ▪ CP: Linda Zagzebski, “From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology”

7 D. Does Knowledge Require Justified Belief?: Two Negative Answers

1. The Causal Analysis

▪ CP: Alvin Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing” ▪ Feldman: Chapter 5, §I

2. The Truth-Tracking Analysis

▪ CP: Robert Nozick, excerpt from Philosophical Explanations (“Conditions for Knowledge”) ▪ Feldman: Chapter 5, §II

Part II: The Extent of Our Knowledge and Justified Belief

A. Do we know anything about the external world?

▪ CP: Descartes, excerpt from Meditations on First Philosophy ▪ CP: Peter Unger, “An Argument for Skepticism” ▪ Feldman: Chapter 6, §§I-III ▪ CP: G.E. Moore, “Proof of an External World” ▪ CP: G.E. Moore, “Hume’s Theory Examined” ▪ Feldman: Chapter 6, §§IV-V

B. Do we have any justified beliefs about the external world?

1. The Problem of Induction

▪ Feldman: Chapter 7, §I

2. The Underdetermination Argument

▪ Feldman: Chapter 7, §II ▪ CP: Michael Huemer, “Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument”

C. Some “non-traditional” skeptical worries

1. Epistemology and Science

▪ Feldman: Chapter 8 ▪ CP: Alvin Plantinga, “The Self-Refutation of Naturalism”

2. Prospects for Reasonable Disagreement

▪ Feldman: Chapter 9 ▪ CP: Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”