Connecting the Dots

CONNECTING THE DOTS: OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL QAEDA INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM PRIOR TO 9/11

By, Joshua L. Gleis

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Joshua Gleis is a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Studies at Harvard University and a PhD Candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. As an analyst at the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at Tufts University’s Fletcher School, his areas of focus are counterterrorism, counterinsurgencies, and the Middle East.

*********************************************************************** * On the night of November 5, 1990 El Sayid Nosair walked into the Marriot East Side

Hotel, pulled out a .357 chrome plated magnum pistol and shot one bullet into the neck of

Rabbi Meir Kahane. Kahane was dead on arrival at the hospital. An engineer by trade, 34 year old Nosair had donned a knit yarmulke, a religious garment worn by many followers of Kahane, the leader of the radical extremist group known as the Jewish Defense

League. As he attempted to flee the scene Nosair shot 73 year old Irving Franklin in the leg when he tried to stop him. After jumping out of a taxi cab he had thought was his getaway car, Nosair fired once again, this time hitting a Postal Service Police Officer before being shot and wounded himself.1 Long after Kahane’s funeral, few people realized what type of person they had in custody. El Sayid Nosair was a critical connection to members of what would become Al Qaeda; a connection that was overlooked by members of the United States intelligence agencies. So began the first link in the long trail that led to the attacks on September 11th, 2001.

CONNECTING THE DOTS

The Assassination of Meir Kahane

A number of arrests were made following Meir Kahane’s assassination. Soon after

Nosair’s arrest, accomplices of his were taken into custody as well. These accomplices included an Egyptian named Bilall Alkaisi, a Palestinian named Mohammed Salameh, and the man who was supposed to be driving Nosair’s getaway car, Mahmoud

Abouhalima. All of these men were set free a short time after their arrests. The Egyptian

“Blind Sheikh” Omar Abdel Rahman, who served as Nosair’s spiritual advisor, was

1 A Lone Gunman (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.crimelibrary.com/terrorists_spies/terrorists/elsayid_nosair/index.html?sect=22.

Gleis-2 suspected of involvement but was never taken into custody. All the men discussed here would later become important members of the 1993 World Trade Center cell.2

The defense of El Sayyid Nosair became a rallying cry for jihadist extremists around the world. A defense fund was established for Nosair, with donors including the likes of

Osama bin Laden.3 In the end, despite dozens of witnesses who had viewed Kahane’s murder, Nosair was not convicted for the Rabbi’s murder. Instead, Nosair was convicted only of shooting Franklin and Postal Officer Carlos Acosta, and was sentenced to 7.5-

22.5 years in prison. The importance of the conviction (or lack thereof) was that it demonstrated to Islamic radicals that even with witnesses and strong evidence, the United

States criminal justice system was soft and could easily be overcome.4

Another noteworthy development occurred during the investigation into Nosair and his accomplices following the Kahane murder. A whole slew of important information was collected and subsequently overlooked. This included files of New York City landmarks, copies of teletypes from the Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, bomb- making manuals, and hit lists of Jewish leaders and sympathetic politicians.5

While Nosair’s files and tapes were originally confiscated by NYPD, they were never reviewed. Rather, they were collected by the FBI before they could be translated and were later sent to the Manhattan District Attorney’s office where they were misplaced.

Part of the reason for this was that there was confusion over who would lead the overall 2 John Miller and Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 76. 3 Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2004) p 79. 4 John Miller and Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 76. 5 Supra note 2, p 76.

Gleis-3 investigation. When the FBI discovered that it would not be the lead agency in charge, its interest in the investigation virtually vanished.6 Additionally, there was serious pressure within the NYPD to put an end to this affair as quickly as possible. As a result, when members of the NYPD-FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force attempted to investigate this murder as part of a larger conspiracy, their request was denied. Instead, the assassination was declared the work of a “lone, deranged gunman.”7 In the months and years that would lead to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, a number of actors involved in future attacks against the United States would visit Nosair in jail to discuss potential strikes.

1993 World Trade Center (WTC) Attack

On Feb. 26, 1993 at 12:17 PM a Ryder truck filled with fuel oil, fertilizer and nitroglycerin boosters exploded in the B-2 level of the WTC parking garage, killing six people, and injuring over 1000. The attack was planned by Ramzi Yousef with the support of Nosair’s accomplices, including Mohammed Salameh, who rented the van and was later arrested when he stupidly tried to pick up the deposit.8 Yousef had traveled to the US with Mohammed Ajaj, who attempted to enter the US with a stolen Swiss passport. A subsequent search of Ajaj’s bags found that they contained false passports, bomb making manuals, a surveillance training guide book, and instructional videos on different weaponry. For this, Ajaj was charged with six months in prison. Yousef, though, having claimed asylum from Saddam Hussein’s regime with a false Iraqi passport, was

6 John Miller and Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 55. 7 Profile: El Sayyid Nosair (accessed October 13, 2006); available from http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?id=1521846767-1826. 8 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002) p 72.

Gleis-4 released after he promised to return for a hearing — there was not enough room for him in the INS holding area.9

Yousef left JFK International Airport and met up with Nosair’s former getaway driver,

Mahmoud Abouhalima. He was given a place to live and was introduced to Nosair’s accomplices as well as Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. Nosair’s accomplices had been plotting to attack a series of Jewish targets, but the scheme, known as the “Twelve Jewish

Locations” plot, was believed by Yousef to be too limited in its scope. Having the expertise to build the necessary bombs and plan the attack, he gained the respect of the group and convinced them to instead focus on attacking the World Trade Center.10 Only after the 1993 World Trade Center bombings occurred and long after Yousef had fled the country and was on his way back to Pakistan did the US government finally translate and review the materials originally confiscated from Nosair’s apartment. It was then that the

FBI and other law enforcement agencies made the connection between the Kahane assassination and the 1993 terrorist attack.11

1998 Embassy Bombings

The 1998 U.S. embassy bombings brought the names “Osama bin Laden” and “Al

Qaeda” into the mainstream for the first time. Before 1998, only a handful of people had known much about Al Qaeda, and Bin Laden himself was seen by and large only as a terrorist financier.12 Much like the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, there were a number of events that took place before the 1998 embassy bombings that could have 9 Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2004) p 77. 10 John Miller, Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 88. 11 Al Qaeda (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://cfrterrorism.org/groups/alqaeda.html. 12 Michael Dobbs, Inside the Mind of Osama Bin Laden, Washington Post, September 20, 2001, A01.

Gleis-5 helped prevent the attacks had they been properly investigated and taken more seriously.

Perhaps the most glaring example is that of Mustafa Mahmoud Said Ahmed. In

November of 1997, Ahmed walked into the US embassy in Nairobi and warned of an impending attack; yet due to his past record, his warning was disregarded by the CIA.

The Ahmed example is just one lead that could have possibly prevented the 1998

Embassy bombings.

As previously mentioned, following the arrest of Nosair, a number of jihadists came to visit him in jail. One member central to the 1998 bombing was Ali Mohamed, a former soldier in the Egyptian Army and a US Special Forces officer at the time. Mohamed was the man who had provided Nosair with copies of teletypes from the Secretary of the

Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Another key player in the 1998 bombing was Wadih el-Hage. El-Hage was a Lebanese convert to Islam, a disciple of Abdullah Azzam (the founder and former leader of Al Qaeda), and personal secretary to Osama bin Laden for three years. El-Hage also helped secure weapons for the 1993 World Trade Center attack.13 Unlike some other members connected to the 1993 bombings, the FBI’s Joint

Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) did approach El-Hage when he was residing in Kenya and tried to convince him to discuss Al Qaeda. Soon after El-Hage rejected the JTTF offer, he returned with his family to the United States. Consequently, the surveillance “bugs” that had been planted in his home in Kenya were removed despite the fact that other members of the Kenya cell were using the home and a letter written to Al Qaeda Communications

Director Fawwaz was found in El-Hage’s files. In the letter, El-Hage discussed other cell

13 A Portrait of Wadih El-Hage, Accused Terrorist (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/elhage.html.

Gleis-6 members and the “engineers” soon to arrive in Kenya. At the same time, reports were coming in from other channels within the FBI, CIA, State Department, Mossad, and

Kenyan intelligence, all of which warned of a potential plot involving a Kenyan terrorist cell. Yet the departure of El-Hage from Kenya led the US government to believe that any potential plot had been sufficiently disrupted for the time being.14

On August 7, 1998 the United States government was proven wrong again. At 10:35 AM, a bomb-laden truck blew up outside the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 12

Americans, 201 others (mostly Kenyan), and injuring approximately 5000 people. Four minutes later on the same day, this time in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, a second bomb- laden truck blew up outside the US Embassy killing another 11 people.

2000 U.S.S. Cole Attack

Unfortunately, the connections continued: The main player in the 2000 attack on the

U.S.S. Cole was tied to the 1998 Embassy bombings. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (a.k.a

Mohammed Omar al-Harazi), was the cousin of the Nairobi suicide bomber, the organizer of the first Al Qaeda cell in South Asia, and the head of the Aden cell in

Yemen. Having failed at a first attempt to attack an American warship in the Aden

Harbor, Al Qaeda managed to get it right on October 12, 2000.15 This occurred despite a warning by a high-ranking informant in an Egyptian jihad group who had cautioned that a potential attack on a US warship in the Middle East was being planned. Nevertheless,

14 John Miller, Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) pp 201-204. 15 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Berkeley Book, 2002) p 66.

Gleis-7 since ships in the Middle East were already on high alert, no further security measures were taken.

On October 12, 2000 after pulling into Aden harbor, the U.S.S. Cole was bombed with

294 American sailors onboard. The attack was carried out with the use of a small boat and two men onboard. They simply sailed up to the warship, waved to some of the

American shipmen, and detonated the explosives on board. The explosion nearly sunk the warship, leaving a massive hole on the starboard side, killing 17 sailors and wounding another 40.16

Had another country attacked a United States warship and caused such injury, the likelihood of the US going to war with that country would have been high. Yet prior to

9/11 the mood of the United States was noticeably different. Not only did the suicide attack raise few fears of a future attack on US soil, but Ambassador Bodine, who was

America’s highest representative in Yemen at the time, actually turned down a request to send a large number of US investigators to the city, fearing a “small invasion” of

Yemen.17

AVERTED ATTACKS

While the United States suffered many terrorist attacks in the years leading up to 9/11, some of which have been listed above, a number of potentially deadly attacks were averted by American authorities. These attacks are important to discuss briefly because

16 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002) p 190. 17 The Man Who Knew (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/interviews/guenther.html.

Gleis-8 many of them were carried out and supported by the terrorists listed above. The names are underlined for reference purposes. Many of these averted attacks led to the wrong lessons being learned by US government agencies.

1993 Landmarks Plot

This plot was orchestrated directly by the Blind Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. The plan was to blow up a number of major American landmarks in New York City. These included the Lincoln Tunnel, Holland Tunnel, United Nations building, and 26 Federal

Plaza, the FBI’s New York headquarters. While the prevented strike was given relatively little coverage by the media, the plot was in its final stages when members of the cell were taken into custody. If the arrests had been planned for a few days later it is very possible that the events of 9/11 would have paled in comparison.18

1995 Bojinka Plot

This 1995 scheme, contrived by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, was designed to destroy up to twelve US-bound aircraft using undetectable explosives that had been manufactured by Yousef. A small amount of the explosives were actually tested by Yousef when he placed them in a contact lens case and boarded a passenger jet.

Having been pre-programmed to detonate on the next flight, the bomb exploded on Flight

434 from Manila to Tokyo, killing one passenger and tearing a hole through the aircraft that nearly caused the plane to crash. As planned, Yousef had safely left the plane after its earlier flight.19 Additionally, Yousef and Mohammed planned to assassinate Pope John 18The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002) p 72 and NewYork Landmarks Plot (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/new_york_landmarks_plot.htm. 19 John Miller, Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 123.

Gleis-9 Paul II during his visit to Manila. An alternative plan was to fly a plane into CIA headquarters and perhaps other US landmarks; strikingly similar to the attack on the

Pentagon on 9/11.20

1997 Subway Plot

While small when compared to the plots listed above, this scheme is reminiscent of what many Americans fear is going to take place in the future on US soil. In 1998 Gazi

Ibrahim Abu Mezer, Lafi Khalil and Abdul Rahman Mossabah had planned to blow up several major New York City subways. There was also an additional plan to hit other US and Jewish interests. When the men were arrested in a Brooklyn apartment, pipe bombs were found in the building. 21

2000 Millennium Plot

In preparation for the 2000 millennium celebrations planned around the world, intelligence agencies increased their vigilance and braced for attack. While no significant incidents took place, there were at least two averted schemes worth noting. One included

Ahmed Resam (a.k.a “Benni Norris”), who was arrested at Port Angeles, Washington while trying to enter the US from Canada. His car was loaded with 100 lbs. of explosives intended to blow up an LAX airport terminal. A suspicious US border guard discovered the explosives when asking Resam to open his trunk. Resam appeared very nervous and anxious. Additionally, Raed Hijazi (a.k.a “Abu Ahmed the American”) attempted to blow

20 Complete 9/11 Timeline (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp? warning_signs:_specific_cases=bojinka&timeline=complete_911_timeline. 21 Terrorist Plot to Bomb New York City Subway System (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.emergency.com/ternyc97.htm.

Gleis-10 up thousands of Christian pilgrims who had come to Jordan’s holy Christian sites to celebrate the millennium. Hijazi had also planned to bomb the Marriot hotel in Amman.

Jordanian intelligence agents were successful in stopping those attacks from taking place.22

WRONG LESSONS LEARNED

The averted attacks discussed above left many in the US intelligence community and the public at-large with a false sense of security. The uncovering of these plots should be commended. However, in the case of the Bojinka plot, the United States can thank the fire that broke out in Yousef’s apartment, which led to the detection of his plans.23

Regardless of how these plots were discovered, a number of wrong lessons were taken away from them. Firstly, the findings reinforced to members of the FBI and Justice

Department that they were capable of preventing acts of terrorism with the necessary tools to do so. Secondly, the findings suggested to Americans that terrorism was not a serious threat to the national security of the United States.

Another important point that needed to be taken away from the plots, one which was arguably recognized by some only after the 1998 bombings, was that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were interested in killing mass numbers of Americans. Terrorism expert

Brian Jenkins’ old idea that terrorism was only a tactic for media attention, and thus did not need mass casualties to meet its cause, was proven false by these global jihadists.24

Outlined below are two additional acts of terrorism. While not attributable to Al Qaeda 22 60 Minutes II: The Millenium Plot (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/10/03/60II/main313398.shtml. 23 Supra note 20. 24 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) p 38.

Gleis-11 per se, they are important to highlight because they further demonstrate the wrong lessons that were taken away from acts of terror prior to 9/11. As the 9/11 Comission Report stated in its analysis of US prosecution of terrorism cases, “although the bombings heightened awareness of a new terrorist danger, successful prosecutions contributed to widespread underestimations of the threat.”25

March 1, 1994: Air Halberstam Murder

Less than one week before the Halberstam murder, Brooklyn-born Baruch Goldstein murdered Muslims while they were in prayer at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, a site holy to both Jews and Muslims. Just days later, on March 1, 1994, approximately twenty vehicles carrying Hassidic Jews were returning from a visit to the Hasidic spiritual leader Rabbi Menachem Schneerson, who was recovering from surgery at the

Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital.26

Near the Brooklyn Bridge waited a Lebanese national named Rashid Baz. Armed with a submachine gun, two 9 mm pistols, and a shotgun, Baz fired upon one of the vans that was carrying fifteen students, yelling in Arabic “kill the Jews.” Sixteen year old Ari

Halberstam was killed in the attack. Three other children were shot and wounded. Rashid

Baz was sentenced to 141 years in prison. For years, the New York Police Department categorized the attack as “road rage.” Only in 2000, after more than half a decade of lobbying by politicians and Halberstam’s mother was the type of attack correctly categorized as an act of terror. The lesson learned by the law enforcement community

25 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002) p 72. 26 Sequence of Events (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.arihalberstam.com/php/1.php.

Gleis-12 from this attack was that acts of terror, especially when they are small, should be downplayed so as to not cause panic in the city.27

December 26, 1994: Air France Hijacking

On August 24, 1994, four members of the Armed Islamic Group (AIG), disguised as airport security guards, hijacked Air France Flight 8969 in Algiers, Algeria. With miniature AK-47s, hand grenades and other explosives planted on the Airbus jet, the terrorists requested permission to fly on to Marseilles. While the Algerian government was eager to launch an attack of their own, the French were adamantly against this. After over twelve hours of waiting the terrorists eventually killed a French national, and the aircraft was finally allowed to take-off.28

Once in Marseilles, an Algerian police officer and Vietnamese diplomat were dragged to the front of the plane and shot. While the terrorists said they wanted to fly to Paris, they requested enough fuel to fly three times that distance. French intelligence had reported the terrorists wanted to blow the plane up over Paris, and so the GIGN “Super

Gendarmes” chose to storm the plane. They succeeded in killing all the terrorists and rescuing all of the remaining passengers. The GIGN performed the rescue operation nearly flawlessly. It was later learned though that the terrorists were interested in either blowing up the plane over Paris or even into the Eiffel Tower.

27 Terror & Denial (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://www.meforum.org/article/pipes/431. 28 Al-Qaida plot to hijack plane in UK (accessed October 23, 2006); available from http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/969506/posts.

Gleis-13 While the US government did study the GIGN rescue operation, it did not focus on the importance of what the ultimate goals of the AIG terrorists were: to use a passenger jet as a missile to blow up a building.29 Once again, an important opportunity was missed that could have possibly led to US officials being better prepared for a 9/11-type scenario.

29 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Berkeley Book, 2002) p 164.

Gleis-14 CONNECTING THE DOTS

September 11, 2001

1998 Embassy 2000 USS Cole Bombings

Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Kenya Tanzania

1993 WTC Air France Bombing Hijacking

Meir Kahane Assassination

1994 Landmark 1995 Bojinka Plot Plot

1997 Subway 2000 Millennium Plot Plot

Gleis-15 CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this article was not simply to point out the flaws in the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States, but rather to highlight the connections that were missed so as to prevent such oversights from taking place in the future. Prior to

9/11 the main problem was not so much that the United States did not have the necessary agencies in place to detect terrorist attacks. Instead, the US did not have the proper mechanisms and laws in place to make sure that these agencies could do their jobs effectively. For example, when Wadih el-Hage returned to the U.S., the CIA was required to remove the eavesdropping devices that had been placed in his Kenyan home. Had those devices been left on, crucial information about the upcoming embassy bombings could have been collected.30

From the activity of Ramzi Yousef, law enforcement agencies should have been notified of the differences that were evident between him and other terrorists like El Sayid Nosair.

Yousef was not only a more professional terrorist in terms of his weapons expertise, but also in his overall behavior. Much like the bombers of 9/11, Yousef tended to dress more western-like in appearance, did not preach jihad to members outside of his immediate cell, and was courteous to people he met and interacted with in public.31 Such characteristics could later be used to describe 9/11 terrorist mastermind Mohammed Atta.

Following the 1998 embassy bombings, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asked US

Ambassador Bushnell to Nairobi, “How could this have happened?” The answer was

30 John Miller, Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 204. 31 John Miller, Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) p 77.

Gleis-16 really quite simple. The embassy complex had previously belonged to the Israelis, who had left it because they felt it was not sufficiently secure. Even while the FBI, CIA,

Mossad and Kenyan intelligence all warned of a Kenyan terrorist cell, the US

Ambassador’s requests for additional security from the State Department was rejected.

The ambassador was furious when asked how such a thing could happen.32

The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 transformed the national security priorities of the United States dramatically. Practically overnight, laws and security measures that had been proposed for years were implemented. Intelligence today still points to continued threat by Al Qaeda and other global jihadists. This article has attempted to highlight links that were largely ignored and culminated in the greatest terrorist attack in

U.S. history.

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Joshua Gleis is a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Studies at Harvard University and a PhD Candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. As an analyst at the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at Tufts University’s Fletcher School, his areas of focus are counterterrorism, counterinsurgencies, and the Middle East.

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32 John Miller, Michael Stone, The Cell (New York: Hyperion, 2003) pp 204-205.

Gleis-17