Policing and Social Democracy: Resuscitating a Lost Perspective

Cahiers Politiestudies Jaargang 2012-4, nr. 25 p. 91-114 © Maklu-Uitgevers ISBN 978-90-466-0504-2

Robert Reiner1

This paper analyses a sharp transformation in the problematic of police research that has occurred since the 1990s. The change is from a primary focus on sociology of the police to sociology for the police, from critical and theoretical concerns to providing practicable solutions to immediate policing problems. This is related to wider changes in the discipline of criminology, and beyond that to seismic shifts in the political economy and culture. These are the supplanting of an at least implicitly social democratic analysis of the ultimate sources and solutions of social problems including crime and disorder, to a neo-liberal one that highlights the politics of law and order. Whilst in the short run these appear to have worked as reflected in the fall in crime rates since the mid-1990s, the longer term issue is whether this has been symptom suppression, as a social democratic perspective suggests, rather than a stable basis for security which would require wider socio-economic justice. Prologue: Two Quotes in Search of an Analysis

‘We are not letting the public in on our era’s dirty little secret; that those who com- mit the crime which worries citizens most – violent street crime – are, for the most part, the products of poverty, unemployment, broken homes, rotten education, drug addiction and alcoholism, and other social and economic ills about which the police can do little, if anything. Rather than speaking up, most of us stand silent and let politicians get away with law and order rhetoric that reinforces the mistaken notion that the police – in ever greater numbers and with ever more gadgetry – can alone control crime.’ (Di Grazia 1976)

‘Crime is down: blame the police.’ (Bratton 1998)

This paper analyses the profound rupture in culture, political economy, crime, and criminal justice that is highlighted by these contrasting quotes, both from US big- city police chiefs2. It will probe the fate of social democratic sensibility in thinking about policing, crime, order and justice encapsulated by the first quote, and its subsequent suppression by the law and order toughness of the neo-liberal era that is captured by

Emeritus Professor of Criminology, Law dept., London School of Economics.Di Grazia was the Boston chief of police, and a mentor of Bill Bratton, the legendary former New York and Los Angeles chief.

the Bratton quote. The latter is redolent of neo-liberalism not only in substance but also in style: brash, bold, brief, and, above all, ‘businesslike’.

I use the term social democratic ‘sensibility’ rather than perspective, because I am referring to a set of largely tacit, taken-for-granted assumptions, rather than a consciously espoused political position. I am not suggesting Robert di Grazia, or the many other policy-makers and practitioners who thought like him, were social democrats in their politics. ‘Social democracy’ is referred to here not so much as an avowed political philosophy or party, but as an implicit sensibility, an ‘imaginary’, a cluster of taken- for-granted values, beliefs, and perspectives that was dominant in certain eras, but was repressed by the post-1970s neoliberal blitzkrieg. This is modelled on Charles Taylor’s usage of ‘social imaginary’: ‘the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on..., the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations’ (Taylor 2004: 23). As outlined below, the post-war consensus synthesising Keynesianism, welfarism, and acceptance of a mixed economy, was a version of social democracy that framed even the policies of conservative governments.

The next section of this paper will contrast the framing of crime and policing by the social democratic imaginary that was widely taken for granted until the 1970s, with the law and order perspective that displaced it3. It will then show how the police research that emerged in the heyday of social democratic sensibility produced a picture of policing that contrasted with the common-sense of popular and police culture. The law and order era has fundamentally changed the subject and reinstated the common-sense folklore of policing, with an associated change in the agenda of research, the displacement of larger scale sociological analyses (apart from a few exceptions) by pragmatic, immediate problem-solving. In a distinction that was influential in the early days of policing research, sociology of the police has mainly become sociology for the police. Finally, the conclusion of this paper will consider the prospects of a revival of the social democratic perspective in thinking about policing, following the widespread questioning of the last forty years’ neo-liberal hegemony in the wake of the 2008 financial and economic crash. 1. Social democratic criminology contra the politics of law and order

‘Social democracy’ has changed in connotation over time, and has always referred to a range of differing viewpoints. The now familiar distinction between revolutionary communist and social democratic versions of socialism developed in the early 20th century. After WWI it became usual to distinguish social democracy from Bolshevism on the Left, and from liberalism on the Right. The border disputes at the Left concern the legitimacy of means other than consensual democratic activity for achieving socialist transition to a fundamentally different political economy, ‘socialism’; at the Right border the issues are about the mix between market and State in ordering what remains – albeit reformed and regulated – capitalism. In Britain social democracy came to be associated as an intellectual perspective with the ethical socialism of Tawney, Laski, T.H.Marshall and others (Dennis and Halsey 1998).

The evidence for this is detailed in Garland 2001, Reiner 2007, Bell 2011. Some societies have resisted the trend away from social democracy better than others (Cavadino and Dignan 2006, Lacey 2008). But they are also under pressures to move towards tougher law and order policies and at least dilute their welfarism (Wacquant 2009).

Arguably its most developed and coherent exposition came in Rawls’ Theory of Justice, published in 1971 just as the post-war social democratic (or at any rate, Keynesian mixed economy welfare statist) consensus was being ousted by the neo- liberal blitzkrieg – a prime example of the Owl of Minerva flying at dusk4. Rawls himself was an avowed liberal who would have shunned the social democratic label. But his two principles – equal liberty subject only to respecting the same for others, and equal distribution of resources abridgeable only in the interests of the least well-off – are a succinct statement of the liberal egalitarianism that constitute the core of social democratic values. And his rigorous derivation of these principles offers social democrats powerful arguments in their defence (Reiner 2002).

There are of course many varieties of social democratic thinking. But I would suggest that as an ideal-type there are nine quintessential characteristics of social democracy (for a more detailed account, see Reiner 2011: Chap. 14): i) Primacy of the ethical and political, as distinct from the materialist determinism in most versions of Marxism (Berman 2006); ii) Critique of capitalism, as tending to inequality, instability, and egoistic individualism, whilst still recognising its productive power; iii) Evolutionary or Fabian gradualism, rather than sudden revolutionary transformation (Steger 1997); iv) Simultaneously respecting both Equality and Democracy as mutually reinforcing ideals (Loader and Sparks 2012); v) Tacit optimism about the ultimate achievement of social justice (Marshall 1950);.vi) A multi-dimensional concept of justice: inequalities of class, but also gender, ethnicity, sexuality matter; vii) The state as a necessary albeit potentially dangerous instrument of justice to counter the power of capital (Tawney 1931: 197, 1953: 153) ; viii) Science, physical and social, is needed to develop and test the means of progress (Popper 2011).ix) A modernist outlook, for only the modern era encouraged a widespread hope of, transforming ancient millennial values and aspirations into feasible political goals (Taylor 2004).

Social democratic values and analysis as summarized in the above ideal-type informed a particular stance towards crime and policing that was widely taken for granted in for the first three-quarters of the twentieth century. There has never been an explicitly espoused school of social democratic criminology. But a recognisably social democratic analysis of crime, its causes, and how it might be controlled, was a widespread sensibility amongst academic criminologists, opinion-formers, criminal justice practitioners and policy-makers before the 1970s. Although constantly challenged by more punitive and conservative approaches, what David Garland has labeled ‘penal welfarism’ emerged in the early twentieth century as a prevailing paradigm until its displacement in the 1970s (Garland 2001). It underpinned most debates on crime and disorder, with quintessential late examples being the official reports into the urban disorders of the 1960s in the USA and Britain in the 1980s (Kerner 1968, Scarman 1981).

In ancient mythology the ‘owl of Minerva’ represented understanding. In the 1820 Preface to The Philosophy of Right Hegel remarked that ‘The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering’. Historical eras and systems of thought are often only fully understood when they are at their apex and on the verge of being supplanted. So too with Rawls’ quintessential defence of the principles of liberal egalitarianism.

Five elements express the essence of this social democratic sensibility on crime:

. (1) Crime in its place Crime often involves acts that inflict serious harm and are morally repugnant. But most crimes pale into relative insignificance compared to the many other serious problems facing the world: economic depression, inequality, poverty, war, health, housing, education. These are the issues that should be the stuff of political argument and public concern, capable of ruining lives in a way that only the rarest crimes could. Crime and policing should not be major public issues, or matters of party political debate. During the heyday of social democratic consensus crime was never seen as a political issue, and media presentations did not portray it as a major threat (Reiner 2007: Chap.5, Downes and Morgan 2012).

. (2) Social and individual responsibility Crime is caused by a mix of social and individual processes5. The overall level of crime at different times and places is a function of political economy and culture, as explained by Robert Merton’s influential anomie theory for example (Merton 1938). But individual offenders have a degree of autonomy, and hence responsibility, that justifies punishment, although the primary purpose of this should be reconciliation and rehabilitation. Whilst policing and penal policy may be important in relation to the conduct of identified offenders and the achievement of justice in specific cases, crime control is primarily a function of social, economic and cultural processes.

. (3) Concern for offenders and victims The neglect of the plight of victims by the criminal justice system until the 1970s, and the slow development of policies to alleviate this since then, have been well charted, and this is a blot on the record of all governments and agencies (Shapland et al 1985, Pointing and Maguire 1988, Lea 2002: Chap.6, Rock 2004, Hoyle 2012). In addition to this welcome attempt to address the suffering of crime victims, with the development of the law and order politics that will be detailed later, the symbolic figure of the victim has become iconically central to media and policy discussions of crime, in a zero-sum narrative framework that represents the primary need of victims as the punishment of offenders. In the era during which the social democratic perspective flourished, sympathy for the suffering of victims, especially of unjustified violence, hardly needed spelling out. Media stories always acknowledged it, but did not revel in the details of pain, fear and gore as they do now (Reiner 2007: 141-50, 2011: Chap.11). But offenders were also subjects of concern. The intellectual puzzle was how and why someone (presumed to be of the same common human stock as non-offenders) had done wrong. Morally and practically the question was how their

New Labour’s departure from the social democratic perspective being sketched here was famously signaled by the soundbite Tony Blair promulgated in 1993: ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ (Reiner 2007: 123). This appears to continue the older concern with social causes. However, New Labour’s analysis and policies to reduce the causes of crime were directed at a neighbourhood level, completely bracketing out the macro factors that were the heart of the older theories like Merton’s. The emphasisi switched increasingly over time to individual responsibility and criminal justice control measures, explicitly denying the role of wider socio- economic causation (Reiner 2007: Chap.5, 2011: Chap.17).

behaviour could be reformed and future wrong-doing averted, for their sake as well as potential future victims.

. (4) Limits of policing and criminal justice Policing and criminal justice have serious moral and practical limitations. Policing and punishment are inherently problematic from a liberal or social democratic perspective as they involve the potential for coercion and infliction of pain, and are justifiable only if necessary and proportionate, giving rise to a rich literature of philosophical grappling with the possible justifications of punishment (Duff and Garland 1994, Hart 2008). Until the 1960s there was little explicit policy discussion or empirical research on policing, as will be documented later. But policing and punishment were not seen as the major elements in public protection because they do not and cannot reach the root causes of criminality, at best dealing only with some individual cases. Ultimately crime levels are shaped by deep social, economic and cultural processes, and can be reduced only by broader policy reforms beyond the ambit of criminal justice (as the di Grazia quote at the head of this paper indicates).

. (5) Stay calm: crime under control Although crime by definition inflicted harm on victims, the overall state of crime was not regarded as problematic until the remorseless rise in the recorded statistics after the mid-1950s (until the mid-90s). Policing was not a political issue, but a consensual symbol (rather than an instrument) of social order. Whilst crime and policing were always of great public interest, they did not register high in public anxieties until the 1970s, as indicated by opinion polls and political debate (Downes and Morgan 2012). Occasional spectacular crimes aroused considerable public concern. But the overall pattern or level of crime did not excite great alarm or moral panics – a term only introduced in the early 1970s as the cultural climate changed. Criminal justice policy was discussed by officials and experts in cool forensic terms (Loader 2006).

For most of the 20th century, social democratic criminology was both a common sensibility about crime and justice, and also a remarkable success story. The gradual and uneven spread of social citizenship from the mid-19th century to the 1970s, saw a growth of increasingly shared prosperity, security, and inclusion. For all the various setbacks – 1930s Depression, two World Wars – there was widespread optimism about greater equality and justice, bringing with them greater domestic peace and security. In criminology this has variously been analysed, for example as the ‘solidarity project’ (Garland 2001), or ‘pseudo- pacification’ (Hall and Winlow 2003, 2004, Hall et al 2008, Hall 2012). Measured crime rates were low and stable from the 1860s until WWI, and despite increase in the inter-war period there was little general alarm (Reiner 2007: Chap.3). Policing of public order also became more pacific, shifting from a ‘battle’ to a ‘match’ (Geary 1985).

Recorded crime began a seemingly inexorable rise from the mid-1950s up to the mid- 1990s (Reiner 2007: Chaps.3,4). This was stimulated by the advent of consumerism (it is symbolic that the beginning of the crime rise coincided with the launch of commercial television in Britain, with its fuelling of acquisitive aspirations). Mass affluence brought significant changes in the nature of property and in attitudes and practices concerning it. There was a proliferation of big-ticket consumer durables (such as cars and television sets) that were highly tempting and vulnerable to theft. They were also much more likely to be insured and thus reported if stolen. Rising crime rates from the 1950s to the 70s were in large part a result of a greater propensity for crime to be recorded Consumerist culture no doubt stimulated ‘criminality’ – ‘the tendency of our society to produce criminals’ (Currie 2000 p.6). Aspirations were heightened faster than legitimate opportunities to acquire the tempting goodies, exacerbating Mertonian anomie. But until the late 1970s neoliberal counter- revolution the crime rise was at least as much a recording phenomenon as a problem of enhanced criminality or victimisation.

The spread of citizenship (as analysed seminally by Marshall 1950) not only amelio- rated crime and disorder, but also underlay a civilizing transformation of criminal justice. During the century between the 1850s and 1950s, ‘policing by consent’ became established (Reiner 2010: Chaps.2,3). Police legitimacy in the sense of growing public acceptance did not mean legitimate policing practices prevailed. There was undoubtedly much corruption sub rosa, and brutal treatment of powerless ‘police property’ groups. During the same period ‘penal welfarism’ became the prevailing response to apprehended offenders, again with its own failings and abuses, but with an aspiration of benign rehabilitation (Garland 2001).

Although it had complex conditions of existence, the underlying context was the gradual incorporation of the mass of the population into social as well as civil and political citizenship6. The heyday of social democratic criminology was an era of greater justice and greater domestic peace (stimulated paradoxically in large part by the popular reaction to the Wars). And the reversal of the trend toward greater inclusion with the advent of neoliberalism over the last thirty years was a major factor in the crime and disorder explosions, as well as the harsher politics of law and order of recent times (Reiner 2007: Chaps.3,4,5).

During the 1970s the post-war Keynesian, mixed economy, welfarist consensus rapidly became displaced by a neoliberal hegemony in economic and social policy. In criminology, the social democratic sensibility was attacked head-on by a new right-wing politicisation of ‘law and order’ (Wilson 1975). The critique of penal welfarism had started with the critical and radical criminologies of the late 1960s, concerned that sentencing ostensibly motivated by rehabilitative concerns could actually result in longer or harsher sentences and bracket-out defendants’ civil rights (Garland 2001: 56). But by the mid-70s the attack on penal welfarism came predominantly from the Right, in both Britain and the US. Social democratic analysis of crime and criminal justice became an electoral ‘hostage to fortune’ for the parties of the Left, castigated as ‘soft and flabby’ if not actively encouraging of crime and disorder (Downes and Morgan 2012).

In the early 1990s the Clinton Democrats and Tony Blair’s New Labour sought to shed this electoral liability by declaring they were at least as ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’ as their right-wing opponents. A new consensus on ‘tough’ law and order rapidly emerged, reversing the five elements of the ideal-type of social democratic criminology: I am using ‘citizenship’ in terms of the sociological analysis developed by Marshall 1950 and the extensive literature inspired by that (reviewed in Reiner 2011: Chap.18), i.e. as full inclusion in civil, political, and socio- economic rights, and not as a legal or cultural concept.I argue in this paper that the development and decline of citizenship in this sense is crucial for understanding long-term trends in crime and criminal justice.

(1) Crime is Public Enemy No 1

During the 1970s crime came to be seen as a major threat to society. It is a (often the) number one concern named in public opinion polls, and is in the forefront of party political debate, which has become an auction of toughness (Reiner 2011: Chap.17).

(2) Crime is solely due to criminals

Crime is the result purely of the individual pathology or choice of offenders. To discuss social causes of crime is not only wrong analytically, it insults the law- abiding majority and encourages offenders by mitigating their guilt. In the words of Prime Minister John Major to the 1992 Conservative Party Conference: ‘To excuse crime may seem understanding. But it is wrong.... It is the fault of the individual, and no-one else’. Similar sentiments were frequently expressed by Tony Blair, as Leader of the Opposition and as PM (cf. quotes in Reiner 2007: p.125). Socio- economic explanations are played down, and macro-level analyses side-lined altogether7.

(3) The victim is iconically central to criminal justice

Criminal justice policy discussions and media narratives embody a zero-sum game of victim versus offender. Any concern, analytic or a fortiori sympathy, for offenders is deemed demeaning and insensitive to the plight of victims (Tonry 2004: 137, Reiner 2007: 125-6, 143-50). The victim’s main interest is taken to be the punishment of offenders.

(4) Policing and criminal justice work

After a period in the 1970s/80s when evaluation research questioned the efficacy of traditional criminal justice tactics, conducive to a climate of ‘nothing works’, there was a resurgence of can-do confidence amongst criminal justice agencies, supported by positive research evaluations of new tactics. Policing, prevention, and punishment came to be taken as panaceas for crime, provided they were tough and/or smart enough, as signalled by the Bratton quote at the start of this paper. There has been vigorous debate about precisely what works best in different contexts, and which strategies can claim most credit for the crime drop throughout the Western world in the last thirty years. Even those who would concede a large measure of truth to Bratton’s boast that the ‘cops’ brought down crime in New York City debate whether it was police numbers or tactics that played the most part, and amongst the latter, which particular methods: ‘broken windows’ policing, ‘zero tolerance’ of quality of life offences, or Compstat and tighter managerial accountability (Karmen 2000, Eck and Maguire 2000, Levitt 2004, Zimring 2007, 2012, Punch 2007). And the ‘cops’ have been augmented by a burgeoning private security sector and citizen responsibilisation, leading to undoubtedly more effective target-hardening and situational opportunity reduction (Garland 2001, Johnston and Shearing 2003, Tseloni et al 2010, Farrell et al 2011). The development of can-do

A vivid example occurred when a Home Office econometric analysis attributing the major part in the post-1995 crime drop to socio-economic factors was omitted from a Cabinet Office briefing, in favour of an emphasis on criminal justice factors (Reiner 2011: Chap.17).

98 optimism amongst criminal justice professionals was not only due to the success of these efforts, but a narrowing of the horizon of aspiration. Rational choice and other perspectives switched both analysis and practice away from a focus on the deeper causes of crime and towards what worked in a much more limited sense of crime reduction. Whether this in the long-run will turn out to be what the older social democratic perspective saw as symptom suppression, holding the lid down on crime and disorder, remains a moot point. There are also huge costs in the exacerbation of social exclusion behind the apparent achievements of greater security (Beckett and Herbert 2012).

(5) The conquering ‘culture of control’ (Garland 2001)

Crime and its control become the focal points of popular culture and practices. Fear, risk, insecurity govern daily life, from the design of homes and cars, to the journey to school and work, and their layout and organisation. A self-generating loop develops between fear and visible measures intended to contain risk (Zedner 2003, 2009). Sup- posed security devices symbolise and express the fears they are intended to alleviate, thus exacerbating underlying anxieties. Even if they succeed in suppressing the actual occurrence of crime they testify to the underlying persistence of criminality, so public fear survives despite the statistical drop in offending.

This new law and order consensus became gradually embedded in Britain and the USA particularly, after the 1970s, displacing social democratic or New Deal perspectives. During the 1980s Margaret Thatcher’s Tories pledged a ‘ring of steel’ against crime and disorder. But despite the tough rhetoric, hers was largely a phoney ‘war on crime’ (except in the sphere of public order, where there was a clear espousal of militaristic policing tactics). One reason for this was some division of opinion inside the Conservative cabinet; remarkably Thatcher was served by a succession of relatively liberal Home Secretaries, from William Whitelaw to Douglas Hurd (Farrall and Hay 2010).. But the major factor was continuing commitment of Labour (and indeed the Liberals and the Social Democratic Party that broke away from Labour) to a social democratic analysis of crime as socially caused. In the 1980s, as crime rates rose rapidly to record levels due to monetarist economic policies that exacerbated the causes of crime, and as the inner-cities broke out in unprecedented rioting, there was a constant threat that the social democratic analysis might become more widely plausible.

New Labour’s espousal of tough law and order politics from 1992 defused this debate, and ensured the hegemony of tough law and order in practice. In office after 1997 New Labour initially adopted a ‘third way’ combination of toughness plus smartness. The flagship 1998 Crime and Disorder Act encouraged evidence- led policy and partnership (embodied in the ensuing Crime Reduction Programme), but also minimum mandatory sentences, Anti Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs, curfews. Having condemned the policy of prison privatisation initiated by the Conservatives in the early 1990s, the New Labour government rapidly expanded it. Over time, tough on crime eclipsed tough on the causes of crime: there was a remorseless growth of police powers (without the concern for balancing safeguards as in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984, , which were watered down), and record increases in prison numbers – despite falling crime rates (Lacey 2008).

When David Cameron became Conservative leader at the end of 2005 he embarked on a series of much publicised stunts signalling the ambition of dexotifying the Tory brand. Embracing the mantle of compassionate conservatism, Cameron sought to become ‘heir to Blair’ by identifying with green and liberal issues, suggesting an image of cool modernity. Cameron even entertained a social analysis of crime, in his so-called ‘hug-a-hoodie’ speech in July 2006, suggesting that without an understanding of crime’s ‘root causes’ criminal justice policies were just sticking plaster.

The Conservative-led Coalition elected in 2010 at first stirred some hopes of change to the culture of control. Initially the government appeared as if it might reverse the trend towards remorseless expansion of police powers. Home Secretary Theresa May announced on July 8 2010 that s. 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, empowering police to stop and search anyone in a designated area without having to show reasonable suspicion, was suspended. This followed a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that the powers were unlawful because they were too broadly drawn and lacked sufficient safeguards to protect civil liberties. However the ensuing Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order March 2011 merely tightened the procedure and criteria for declaring a designated area, but retained the power to stop/search in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Furthermore, the recording requirements under Code 1 of the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) were reduced, and the requirement to record ‘stop and account’ actions was abolished, as part of a bonfire of safeguards, now castigated as ‘unnecessary’ paperwork.

After a few brief salad days during which the Coalition appeared to burnish its liberal criminal justice credentials, there has been a rapid return to form as the government has reverted to tough law and order. This has been the predictable unfolding of the consequences of its quintessentially neoliberal economic strategy. 2. Two Eras of Police Research: A Dialectic Development

Policing research has developed through several different phases (Reiner 1989, 1992; Greene this volume), but what is most apparent, looking back over the past fifty years, is a sharp break in the problematic framing policing research in the early 1990s. This reflects the much broader shifts in political economy and culture associated with ‘neo-liberal triumphalism’ and its impact on the fields of crime, criminal justice and policing, which were discussed in the previous section of the paper. While there were harbingers of these developments in the 1970s and 1980s, the early 1990s are a watershed in discourse and research on policing.

Empirical research on policing emerged in the early 1960s, in both the United States and the United Kingdom (Reiner and Newburn 2007). What is striking compared to more recent work is that the research of the 1960s and 1970s was mainly research on rather than for the police. Although many researchers were interested in policy issues (above all civil libertarian concern about police violations of the rule of law), their work was primarily aimed at understanding the nature, dynamics, sources and impact of policing through ‘thick’ ethnographic description and theoretical analysis (for contemporary col- lections of papers illustrating this, see Manning and van Maanen 1978, Holdaway 1979).

The original emergence of policing research itself reflected the epistemological break in criminology in the 1960s marked by the advent of the ‘labelling’ perspective and symbolic interactionism. These rendered intellectually problematic the practices of criminal justice, and the social construction of categories of deviance and crime. Another remarkable feature of the early classic fieldwork studies is the high proportion that originated as doctorates and other ‘lone scholar’ studies, with minimal external funding.

In the 1970s, more radical frameworks supplanted the predominantly liberal political and theoretical perspectives of the 1960s’ researchers. These drew on Marxism above all, reflecting the broader dominance of radical criminology in this period, with feminism and Foucault becoming more influential in the late 1970s.

During the 1970s and early 1980s academic research on policing began to be joined increasingly by official research undertaken by police themselves, by government agencies responsible for policing, and by specialist think tanks (e.g. the American government’s National Institute of Justice, the British Home Office, the American and British Police Foundations). This was driven, but not dictated, by policy concerns. Official research could often be sharply critical of policing, noteworthy examples being the negative assessments of the crime control effectiveness of traditional policing strategies by Ron Clarke, Mike Hough and others for the British Home Office (Clarke & Hough, 1984), following in the wake of the seminal 1974 Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment. Academic research was also increasingly commissioned and financed by official bodies, and becoming more policy-oriented (Rumbaut and Bittner 1979, Weatheritt 1989).

Following the emergence of a new consensus on tough law and order in the early 1990s, as discussed above, the police mandate was specified in narrow crime control terms, and this was to be delivered by a businesslike management regime of targets, performance measurement and financial sanctions. These policing changes reflected the broader transformation of criminal justice politics and policy, and the domination of public services in general by the ‘New Public Management’ model (McLaughlin 2007 pp. 96-9, 182-7). In turn, the criminal justice and policing developments are related to fundamental shifts in political economy and culture, above all the triumph of neo-liberalism, as discussed earlier. During the 1980s (the Reagan/Thatcher era), neo- liberalism became dominant in the West, but nonetheless was continuously challenged. Its triumph was marked above all in the early 1990s when the social democratic parties of the Western world accepted the neo-liberal economic framework as both inevitable and broadly desirable in the new era of globalization, symbolized by their espousal of ‘third way’ politics.

This expelled from the political agenda any discussion of social democratic policies to tackle the ‘root causes’ of crime at a macro-level, such as the Mertonian anomie that was fuelled by the rapid and massive increase in inequality simultaneously with the spread of consumer culture fanning aspirations throughout the social structure. New Labour did seek to alleviate the poverty and exclusion that it associated with crime and anti-social behaviour, and encouraged partnership between police, other criminal justice agencies, and local authorities, in particular in its flagship 1998 Crime and Disorder Act and the subsequent Crime Reduction Programme. Over time, however, the evidence-led and partnership approaches intended to be ‘tough on the causes of crime’ were subordinated to the perceived need to be ‘tough on crime’ in the wake of criticism from the tabloid press (for a critical evaluation of the Crime Reduction Programme see the special issue of Criminal Justice edited by Mike Hough 4/3 2004, and in particular the essays by Mike Maguire and Tim Hope). Crime had to be controlled primarily by policing and criminal justice, albeit with help from private security and responsibilised citizens.

Consequently, the police were expected to deliver what they had always symbolized but in reality had little to do with: effective protection of the public against crime. Policing research since the early 1990s has become bifurcated into two contrasting although far from unrelated modes: ‘abstracted empiricism’ and ‘grand theory’, in C. Wright Mills’s celebrated terminology (Mills, 1959). Most policing research now consists of narrowly focused evaluations of specific policy issues and initiatives. At the same time, there have been some ambitious attempts to theorize the new constellation of policing.

The classics of early research on policing in the 1960s and 1970s had built up a core set of results that implicitly call into question more recent analyses. These can be summarised as the following seven findings:

(1) Police Are Marginal to Social Order, not Sovereign

‘The police are only one among many agencies of social control’ (Banton, 1964: 1). This was the first line of the first British book reporting empirical research on policing. Pace the extensive discussions of the contemporary transformation of policing by pluralization, ending the supposed sovereign state and police monopoly of crime control (Bayley and Shearing 1996, Shearing 2007), it has always been recognized by most social theorists that order is created and reproduced by a diverse array of processes to which the formal machinery of ‘codes, courts and constables’ are marginal (Jones and Newburn 2002, Reiner 2010b).

(2) The Police Role is not Primarily Law Enforcement or Crime Control

Empirical research on calls for police help and on how patrol officers spent their time and reacted to calls showed that most police work did not involve law enforcement or crime control. Different studies agreed on that, but expressed what the police did do in somewhat different (although related) terms: peace-keeping (Banton, 1964), acting as ‘philosopher, guide and friend’ to the troubled (Cumming et al., 1965), order main- tenance or reproduction (Wilson, 1968; Ericson, 1982), ‘secret’ social service (Punch, 1979), street-corner politics (Ker Muir Jr, 1977), discretionary deployment of legitimate force to control ‘something- that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone- had-better-do-something- now!’ (Bittner, 1974). As research became more influenced by radical perspectives, these characterizations of the police role were challenged as obfuscatory and bland – the police were really servants of power, repressing challenges to ruling class dominance. Or in more sophisticated formulations they reproduced both general and specific order – ‘parking tickets and class repression’ (Marenin, 1982). What first-wave research agreed upon from all points on the political spectrum was that policing had little to do with crime, the antithesis of popular and police mythology.

(3) The Police Exercise Considerable Discretion

A key finding of early empirical work was the extent of police discretion, the routine under-enforcement of law. Police discretion, whether prohibited by law or not, was not only normal practice, but inevitable. What was problematic about the routine exercise of police discretion was that it appeared to deviate from the principles of due process of law, for example because police powers were more frequently used against the less powerful, including ethnic minorities. Much empirical work and analysis was directed at this problem of the ‘gap’ between the ‘law in action’ and the ‘law in the books’, the routine deviation of policing from the principles of legality (Skolnick, 1966; McBarnet, 1979).

(4) Police Work is Shaped by Cultural/situational Factors rather than Legal Ones

Police operations have ‘low visibility’ (Goldstein, 1960) because they are physically dispersed and their targets are weak in the politics of credibility (Box & Russell, 1975). They are thus only formally accountable to law and management. Police work is primarily influenced by police sub-culture(s) and situational factors (such as the social characteristics, location and demeanour of those encountered), not legal considerations. Legal powers were resources for police action, shaping after-the-event accounts to protect officers from sanctioning (Chatterton, 1979; Holdaway, 1979), but not influencing actual decisions.

(5) Policing Mainly Targets the Powerless

From early on, research on policing indicated that the use of police powers was directed primarily at groups who were low in the structure of power and advantage. Young, black, economically marginal men were (and remain) disproportionately subject to stop and search, arrest, detention, charge and prosecution (and, ultimately, incarceration, and in the United States, execution). There has been extensive debate about how far this is the result of police bias and discrimination as distinct from differential offending rates or other legally relevant factors (Bowling, Parmar & Phillips, 2008; Phillips & Bowling, 2012). Underlying differential policing and offending patterns are deeper structural processes that shape both, such as economic and educational disadvantage and discrimination. The basic institutions of privacy and property make the economically disadvantaged more vulnerable to police attention (Stinchcombe, 1963). Altogether, groups weak in social power and credibility become ‘police property’ (Cray, 1972; Lee, 1981). (6) Traditional Policing has Little Crime Control Effectiveness

During the 1970s, empirical research showed not only that crime was relatively marginal to policing, but that conversely traditional policing tactics (‘preventive’ uniform patrol and after-the-event investigation by detectives) had little impact on crime levels (Clarke & Hough, 1984; Reiner, 2010: Chap.5). This was not because of lack of policing skills or effort, but intrinsic to policing and the nature of crime. Preventive patrol at any feasible level of resourcing is simply too stretched in relation to the vast number of potential perpetrators and targets of crime to handle more than a tiny proportion (Clarke & Hough, 1984; Audit Commission 1996). Successful detection of offenders by investigators is heavily dependent on the quality and quantity of initial information at the scene, which is negligible for most routine crimes (Innes, 2003; Maguire, 2008). This pessimistic conclusion of studies of traditional methods has prompted the development of a variety of innovative methods, predicated primarily on more meticulous analysis of risk patterns in victimization and offending, leading to smarter, ‘intelligence-led’ prevention, investigation and ‘problem-solving’ (Sherman, 1992; Maguire, 2008; Cope, 2008; Tilley, 2008, Braga and Weisburd 2010). Coupled with a widespread trend towards lower crime rates in many countries during the 1990s, these have stimulated a new ‘can-do’ confidence about the potential for crime reduction by effective policing, as discussed above.

(7) Policing has Symbolic rather than Instrumental Value

The implications of the early empirical research on policing debunked much popular and police mythology. Crime, law and policing were marginal to each other. Policing involved a combination of mundane peacekeeping and the reproduction of unequal structures of power and advantage. This did not mean that the police were not of general and fundamental social value. They were of practical help to people who called the police in a variety of small-scale troubles and conflicts. More broadly, they have dramaturgical and symbolic significance. They represent the promise of security through the rule of law – however little they may actually contribute to it in practice because the fundamental sources of order or deviance lie in social, economic and cultural processes beyond the reach of policing (Manning, 1977; Loader & Mulcahy, 2003).

As argued above, since the early 1990s there has been a major change in the politics of law and order in the United Kingdom (paralleling similar changes in the United States), reflecting the broader triumph of neo-liberalism through its incorporation by the parties of the centre left, notably New Labour. The new consensus in law and order politics is the need and the possibility of crime control through ‘tough’ and/or ‘smart’ criminal justice. This is related to an eclipse of faith in the existence of ‘root causes’ of crime, or at any rate in the possibility of affecting them by rehabilitation or social reform. Concerns about discrimination, the rule of law and human rights do remain politically potent, although their salience relative to fears about security varies with what is the latest crisis. These issues now focus at least as much on inequalities in protection from criminal victimization as on the disproportionate targeting of particular groups as suspects, as the Stephen Lawrence case illustrated most clearly (Rowe 2007).

In this era, policing research has become increasingly bifurcated and pluralized. Most studies are policy-oriented and managerialist, focusing on evaluations of specific initiatives, strategies and developments, or emerging special areas of interest. Many are extremely valuable, and indeed continue the critical agenda of earlier work for example, the Home Office and Metropolitan Police studies of stop and search arising out of the Macpherson Report on the Stephen Lawrence murder (Fitzgerald, 1999; Miller et al., 2000; Quinton et al., 2000), the Met-sponsored partial replication of the seminal 1983 Policy Studies Institute (PSI) study (Smith et al., 1983; Fitzgerald et al., 2002; Henry and Smith 2007) and the Home-Office-sponsored evaluation of the impact of the Macpherson Report itself (Foster et al., 2005). Some are informed by theoretical work, even though they are directed at assessing very specific policy initiatives, for example, the reassurance policing studies inspired by the concept of ‘signal crimes’ (Innes & Fielding, 2002; Innes, 2003b; Hough, 2005) and the Nuffield-Foundation-sponsored research on plural policing (Crawford et al., 2005). These are all valuable and rigorous studies of particular issues, and there are many other examples. However they are focused on limited aspects of policing: specialized units, practices or initiatives. Unlike the earlier ethnographic studies, they cannot tell us much about routine policing practice or culture(s).

Co-existing with this proliferation of specific policy-oriented studies are a number of ‘grand theory’ analyses of overall trends in policing (Bayley and Shearing 1996, Ericson and Haggerty 1997, O’Malley 1997, Johnston and Shearing 2003, Rikagos 2005, Dubber and Valverde 2006, Brodeur 2010, Hoogenboom 2010, Manning 2011, Bowling and Sheptycki 2012, Brogden and Elliott 2012). These involve a partial return to the issues raised by the radical and Marxist analyses of the 1970s and 1980s (Brogden 1982, Grimshaw and Jefferson 1987), a level and form of analysis addressing questions that are still pertinent, transcending the specific politics of Marxism. They focus on the overall nature and function of the police and policing in reproducing social order, and their place in fundamental structures of power and (in)justice. They probe how policing simultaneously reproduces order in general (the conditions of existence of social order per se), and ‘specific’ order (particular structures of power, domination, advantage, inequality). This inextricably Janus-faced function of policing (Marenin 1983) is what makes analysis and policy so complex and essentially contested, rendering the current dominant concerns with crime control, risk and security one-dimensional.

The fundamental source of this change is probably a sense of hopelessness about fundamental social transformation since the political triumph of neo-liberalism in the early 1990s. This expelled ‘root cause’ analyses of crime from practical politics, as conservative criminologists such as James Q. Wilson had sought to do since the 1970s. For both conservative and liberal criminologists, however, rescue arrived at just the right time in the form of the widespread fall in crime rates after the early 1990s. There was a widespread tendency to attribute this to criminal justice and especially policing changes (Zimring 2007, 2010 offers the most comprehensive account). More conservative voices emphasized the ‘tough’ dimensions of these (‘zero-tolerance’ policing, harsher sentencing), liberals the ‘smart’ aspects (intelligence-led crime analysis, more effective targeting of prevention, problem-solving policing and punishment). The contribution of policing to the crime drop has been challenged, in particular because there does not seem to be any clear relationship between the timing and location of the crime fall throughout the Western world, and the adoption of particular police tactics (Bowling, 1999; Karmen, 2000; Eck and Maguire 2000; Levitt 2004; Punch 2007; Tseloni et al 2010; Farrell et al 2011).

The new ‘can-do’ optimism of the police and their cheerleaders in the 1990s is reflected in a paler form in the theoretical analyses of transformation, forgetting the lessons of the past. Bayley and Shearing, for example, explicitly argue that a combination of ‘the profit motive’ generating more private security and ‘smarter enforcement tactics... community policing with a hard edge’ can make policing ‘more effective in truly preventing crime’ (Bayley and Shearing 1996 pp. 716-18). The combination of market-based reforms of private and public policing is explicitly turned to because of a perceived impossibility of wider ‘root cause’ changes. The prospects of market- based solutions to disorder are like the attempts of the sharks in Finding Nemo to become vegetarian. Markets are effective means of allocating private consumer goods efficiently, and of generating innovation and overall growth. But they also have fundamental pathologies that have long been identified above all, but not only, by socialists of all varieties. Most crucially for criminological purposes, unfettered markets remorselessly generate inequality and encourage egoistic and anomic cultures, feeding crime at all levels (Reiner 2007, Hall et al 2008). To paraphrase Rosa Luxemburg, in the final analysis the only alternatives are social justice or barbarism. Unfortunately, at present, the odds seem strongly to favour barbarism; there are copious grounds for pessimism of the intellect. What prospects are there for optimism of the will, especially given the widely perceived discrediting of the neo-liberal model since the 2007 financial and economic collapse? 3. Social Democracy or Barbarism?

The vaunted intelligence-led, actuarial risk-based tactics for preventing crime largely work through ‘liddism’ (Rogers 2010), the suppression of crime and disorder by smart situational opportunity reduction and problem solving. They turn criminology from intellectual analysis of the concepts and causes of crime to ‘liddology’, the technical design of better-fitting lids with which to hold down social tensions. In so far as they are targeted pre-emptively against potential offenders they increase the exclusion or banishment (Beckett and Herbert 2012) of those predicted to be risky, exacerbating the fundamental causes of crime.

And behind recorded or unrecorded legally defined crime, the ‘zemiologists’ remind us of the multiplicity of harmful wrongs and cruelties perpetrated by the powerful, by corporations and states (Hillyard et al 2004). The respectable ‘killing fields’ of pollution, dangerous work conditions, destruction of public health and welfare in the name of fiscal prudence and private profitability, wars of choice, are also fuelled by rampant neo-liberalism (Nelken 2012; Green and Ward 2012).

Social democracy is needed if we are to avert the barbarisms of excessive crime and repressive control that flow from the deeper evils of inequality and injustice produced by neo-liberalism (Hall 2012). If there is no reversal of these drivers of egoism and exclusion, the ‘high crime’ society and culture of control will worsen.

But needing something does not mean it is attainable. It is often claimed that social democracy has been rendered impossible by neo-liberal globalisation which severely restricts the capacity of states, weakening them in the face of financial markets and multinational corporate behemoths (Crouch 2011). But such ‘impossible’ shifts have hap- pened before. Indeed, a key example is the 1970s revival of neo- liberalism, overwhelming the seemingly entrenched, necessary, and functional post-War mixed economy welfarist settlement (Harvey 2005). The impossible dream of Hayek and his associates, fantasised about in the heady air of Mount Pellerin in 1947, eventually came to be fulfilled.

Is it possible that the apparently immovable blocks in the way of social democracy and its criminological sensibility, in particular public opinion and the media, might be shifted? Opinion polls regularly portray a perspective of populist punitiveness (Pratt 2006), suggesting a public belief that policing and punishment have become too liberal, and a demand for tougher sentencing. This coexists with more nuanced views, however. When details of cases are given to people their views of the appropriate sentences are not out of line with judicial practice (Roberts 2011; Hough and Roberts 2012). Surveys also record considerable public support for social causation explanations, alongside the headline punitiveness. Against this, there is evidence that public attitudes are becoming more deeply shaped by the neo-liberal hegemony of recent decades, and that support for welfare has lessened (Park et al 2011).

Forty years ago Rawls’ theory of justice assumed plausibly as a premise that popular decision-making was strongly risk-averse and was governed by the ‘minimax’ principle of minimising the possibility of the worst possible outcome. But this has come to be replaced by cultural adulation of risk-takers and ‘edgework’. The meaning of ‘security’ has shifted from a primary focus on social welfare to crime control and terrorism. But surveys suggest some ambivalence, just as with crime. There remains considerable support for the British National Health Service for example, and a belief that inequality is too great. The post-crash furore about bankers’ bonuses indicates the potential for arousing popular sentiment in favour of greater social justice. The ambivalence in popular attitudes to criminal justice issues, and economic/social matters more generally, suggests that anxieties may be tapped to support an analysis of these problems in terms of fundamental causes, as in the heyday of social democracy.

The majority of the mass media pose a considerable stumbling block to any revival of SDC, however. Media power in the criminal justice field has been illustrated many times, most recently by the Coalition U-turn over Justice Minister Kenneth Clarke’s exploration of a more liberal penal policy. Most people derive their ‘knowledge’ of crime and criminal justice from the media rather than direct or even vicarious experience, so media (mis)representations are significant in framing and providing the agenda for popular and policy discourse (Greer and Reiner 2012), although the research literature does not support any direct impact or simple impact of media representations on either criminal behaviour or fear.

More broadly, the media are a significant factor in explaining a major mystery. How is it that despite the economic and financial collapse since late 2007, which might have been expected to have discredited the neoliberal model, its savagely deflationary prescriptions for dealing with the sovereign debt and deficit crises (resulting inter alia from governmental support for banking) remain the orthodoxy guiding government policy? This zombie neo-liberalism survives largely because most of the media support it. But media power has limits. Despite widespread media support, David Cameron failed to achieve Conservative victory in 2010, and it became necessary to form the present Coalition.

The post-2007 crisis has triggered huge self-questioning by the erstwhile bastions of belief in the virtues of unfettered economic and financial globalisation. The banks were the first to rediscover the merits of Keynesian public spending – for themselves as beneficiaries! The leaders of both the UK and the US central banks have expressed this self-questioning of: ‘Banks are global in life but national in death’ (Mervyn King); ‘I discovered a flaw in the model’ (Alan Greenspan).

There is hot pursuit of ways of regulating financial flows and excessive risk-taking by legal reforms, with fundamental assumptions of corporate and financial law being placed under the microscope: who is the lender of last resort? What are the perils of limited liability? Should a Tobin tax be introduced? Can the threat of capital flight be challenged? Global financial institutions and the markets they operate in depend uponspecial legal rules and national support structures which could and should be changed. Arguments about the impossibility of social democracy, because globalisation has terminally shackled national governments’ taxation and redistributive capacities, are challenged increasingly. The growth of UK Uncut, the international Occupy and other fair tax and anti-neo- liberalism movements, suggest increasing space for arguments about fairness. These are beginning to penetrate establishment citadels like the Church, and the FT. The stock of Keynes, and even of Marx, is rising (Zizek and Douzinas 2010; Skidelsky 2011; Eagleton 2011; Backhouse and Bateman 2011). There has been a powerful growth of economic critiques of neo-liberal arguments (Krugman 2008; Stiglitz 2010; Keen 2011) offering ways of moving to a ‘global covenant’ and not a race to the bottom. Critiques of neoliberalism are proliferating in other disciplines: e.g. political/moral philosophy (Walzer 2006; Cohen 2009, 2011; Dworkin 2011; Judt 2011), law (Benjamin 2010), and political/financial journalism (Mason 2010, 2012; Lanchester 2010; Tett 2010; Hutton 2011; Shaxson 2011; Frank 2012; Ferguson 2012).

There is so far little echo in criminology of these broader critiques of neo- liberalism, with few exceptions (Cavadino and Dignan 2005; Hall, Winlow and Ancrum 2008; Lacey 2008; Wacquant 2009; Cheliotis 2010; Bell 2011; Hall 2012; Hall and Winlow 2012). There are even fewer such critical voices in policing research. This paper points to the need to bring political economy and ethical critique back in to academic policing debate, as it was in the early years of the sub-discipline. Critical work in recent years has largely focussed on cultural analysis, or particularistic interventions into specific issues (of huge value), but within an assumption of the impossibility of attacking fundamental causes. Critical criminology must work on both levels: piecemeal intervention and political economy addressing root causes. The fundamental lesson of historical experience and empirical evidence is: ‘No justice, no peace’. References

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