In the United States District Court s13

1IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *

v. * CRIMINAL NO. PWG-13-0249 * JEAN CLAUDE ROY, * * Defendant * * *******

JURY INSTRUCTIONS JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1 (Juror Attentiveness) Ladies and gentlemen, you are about to enter your final duty, which is to decide the fact issues in the case.

Before you do that, I will instruct you on the law. You must pay close attention to me now. I will go as slowly as I can and be as clear as possible.

I told you at the very start of the trial that your principal function during the taking of testimony would be to listen carefully and observe each witness who testified. It has been obvious to me and counsel that you have faithfully discharged this duty. Your interest never flagged, and it is evident that you followed the testimony with close attention.

I ask you to give me that same careful attention, as I instruct you on the law.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 2-1.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2 2 (Role of the Court)

You have now heard all of the evidence in the case, and you will soon hear the final arguments of the lawyers for the parties.

My duty at this point is to instruct you as to the law. It is your duty to accept these instructions of law and apply them to the facts as you determine them, just as it has been my duty to preside over the trial and decide what testimony and evidence is relevant under the law for your consideration.

On these legal matters, you must take the law as I give it to you. If any attorney states a legal principle different from any that I state to you in my instructions, it is my instructions that you must follow.

You should not single out any instruction as alone stating the law, but you should consider my instructions as a whole when you retire to deliberate in the jury room.

You should not, any of you, be concerned about the wisdom of any rule that I state.

Regardless of any opinion that you may have as to what the law may be -- or ought to be -- it would violate your sworn duty to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that which I give you.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 2-2 (modified).

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 3 (Role of the Jury)

Your final role is to pass upon and decide the factual issues that are in the case. You, the members of the jury, are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts. You pass upon the weight of the evidence; you determine the credibility of the witnesses; you resolve such conflicts as there may be in the testimony, and you draw whatever reasonable inferences you decide to draw from the facts as you have determined them.

I shall later discuss with you how to pass upon the credibility -- or believability -- of the witnesses.

In determining the facts, you must rely upon your own recollection of the evidence.

What the lawyers have said in their opening statements, in their closing arguments, in their objections, or in their questions is not evidence. In this connection, you should bear in mind that a question put to a witness is never evidence. It is only the answer which is evidence. Nor is anything I may have said during the trial or may say during these instructions with respect to a factual matter to be taken in substitution for your own independent recollection. What I say is not evidence.

The evidence before you consists of the answers given by witnesses -- the testimony they gave, as you recall it -- and the exhibits that were received in evidence.

The evidence does not include questions. Only the answers are evidence. But you may not consider any answer that I directed you to disregard or that I directed struck from the record.

Do not consider such answers.

Since you are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts, I do not mean to indicate any opinion as to the facts or what your verdict should be. The rulings I have made during the

4 trial are not any indication of my views of what your decision should be as to whether or not the guilt of the defendants has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

I also ask you to draw no inference from the fact that upon occasion I asked questions of certain witnesses. These questions were only intended for clarification or to expedite matters and certainly were not intended to suggest any opinions on my part as to the verdict you should render or whether any of the witnesses may have been more credible than any other witness.

You are expressly to understand that the Court has no opinion as to the verdict you should render in this case.

As to the facts, ladies and gentlemen, you are the exclusive judges. You are to perform the duty of finding the facts without bias or prejudice as to any party.

5 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 4 (Juror Obligations)

In determining the facts, the jury is reminded that before each member was accepted and sworn to act as a juror, he or she was asked questions concerning competency, qualifications, fairness and freedom from prejudice and bias. On the faith of those answers, the juror was accepted by the parties. Therefore, those answers are binding on each of the jurors now as they were then, and should remain so, until the jury is discharged from consideration of this case.

6 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 5 (The Government as a Party)

You are to perform the duty of finding the facts without bias or prejudice as to any party.

You are to perform your final duty in an attitude of complete fairness and impartiality.

This case is important to the government, for the enforcement of criminal laws is a matter of prime concern to the community. Equally, it is important to the defendant, who is charged with serious crimes.

The fact that the prosecution is brought in the name of the United States of America entitles the government to no greater consideration than that accorded to any other party to a litigation. By the same token, the government is entitled to no less consideration. All parties, whether government or individuals, stand as equals at the bar of justice.

7 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 6 (Conduct of Counsel)

It is the duty of the attorney for each side of a case to object when the other side offers testimony or other evidence which the attorney believes is not properly admissible. Counsel also have the right and duty to ask the Court to make rulings of law and to request conferences at the bench out of the hearing of the jury. All those questions of law must be decided by me, the

Court. You should not show any prejudice against an attorney or his or her client because the attorney objected to the admissibility of evidence, or asked for a conference out of the hearing of the jury or asked the Court for a ruling on the law.

As I already indicated, my rulings on the admissibility of evidence do not indicate any opinion about the weight or effect of such evidence. You are the sole judges of the credibility of all witnesses and the weight and effect of all evidence.

8 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 7 (Improper Considerations)

Your verdict must be based solely upon the evidence developed at trial or the lack of evidence.

It would be improper for you to consider, in reaching your decision as to whether the government sustained its burden of proof, any personal feelings you may have about the defendant’s race, religion, national origin, sex, or age. All persons are entitled to the presumption of innocence and the government has the burden of proof, as I will discuss in a moment.

It would be equally improper for you to allow any feelings you might have about the nature of the crime charged to interfere with your decision making process.

To repeat, your verdict must be based exclusively upon the evidence or the lack of evidence in the case.

9 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8 (Sympathy)

Under your oath as jurors you are not to be swayed by sympathy. You are to be guided solely by the evidence in this case, and the crucial, hard-core question that you must ask yourselves as you sift through the evidence is: Has the government proven the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt?

It is for you alone to decide whether the government has proven that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged solely on the basis of the evidence and subject to the law as I charge you. It must be clear to you that once you let fear or prejudice, or bias or sympathy interfere with your thinking there is a risk that you will not arrive at a true and just verdict.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, you should not hesitate for any reason to find a verdict of acquittal. But on the other hand, if you should find that the government has met its burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you should not hesitate because of sympathy or any other reason to render a verdict of guilty.

10 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 (Jury to Consider Only This Defendant)

You are about to be asked to decide whether or not the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of this defendant. You are not being asked whether any other person has been proven guilty. Your verdict should be based solely upon the evidence or lack of evidence as to this defendant, in accordance with my instructions and without regard to whether the guilt of other people has or has not been proven.

11 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 10 (Presumption of Innocence -- Burden of Proof)

Although the defendant has been indicted, you must remember that an indictment is only an accusation. It is not evidence. The defendant has pleaded not guilty to the second superseding indictment.

As a result of the defendant’s plea of not guilty, the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to the defendant for the simple reason that the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witness or producing any evidence.

The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of all the charges against him. I therefore instruct you that the defendant is presumed by you to be innocent throughout your deliberations until such time, if ever, you as a jury are satisfied that the government has proven him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant begins the trial here with a clean slate. This presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant unless you as jurors are unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt, after a careful and impartial consideration of all of the evidence in this case. If the government fails to sustain its burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.

This presumption was with the defendant when the trial began and remains with him even now as I speak to you and will continue with the defendant into your deliberations unless and until you are convinced that the government has proven the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

12 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 11 (Number of Witnesses and Uncontradicted Testimony)

The fact that one party called more witnesses and introduced more evidence than the other does not mean that you should necessarily find the facts in favor of the side offering the most witnesses. By the same token, you do not have to accept the testimony of any witness who has not been contradicted or impeached, if you find the witness not to be credible. You also have to decide which witnesses to believe and which facts are true. To do this you must look at all the evidence, drawing on your own common sense and personal experience. After examining all the evidence, you may decide that the party calling the most witnesses has not persuaded you because you do not believe its witnesses, or because you do believe the fewer witnesses called by the other side.

In a moment, I will discuss the criteria for evaluating credibility; for the moment, however, you should keep in mind that the burden of proof is always on the government and the defendant is not required to call any witnesses or offer any evidence, and is presumed to be innocent.

13 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 12 (Failure to Name a Defendant)

You may not draw any inference, favorable or unfavorable, towards the government or the defendant on trial, from the fact that certain persons were not named as defendants in the second superseding indictment. The fact that certain persons were not indicted must play no part in your deliberations. Whether a person should be named as a co-conspirator or indicted as a defendant is a matter within the sole discretion of the United States Attorney and the grand jury.

Therefore, you may not consider it in any way in reaching your verdict as to the defendant on trial.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 3-4 (modified). 14 15 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 13 (Multiple Counts – One Defendant)

The Second Superseding Indictment contains a total of ten counts. Each count charges the defendant with a different crime. You must consider each count separately and return a separate verdict of guilty or not guilty for each. Whether you find the defendant guilty or not guilty of one offense should not affect your verdict on any other offense charged, except as follows:

With regard to Counts Two and Three, you may not find the defendant guilty of either or both of the firearms charges unless you first have found him guilty of the sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion charge in Count One.

I will give you further limiting instructions in a few moments.

16 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 14 (Variance – Dates)

While we are on the subject of the indictment, I should draw your attention to the fact that the second superseding indictment charges that specific acts and offenses occurred on or about certain dates. The proof need not establish with any certainty the exact date of the specific acts or offenses. It is sufficient if the evidence in this case establishes that the offenses were committed on dates reasonably near the dates alleged in the second superseding indictment. The law only requires a substantial similarity between the dates alleged in the indictment and the dates established by testimony or exhibits.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 3-12 (modified); Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 13.05 (modified). 17 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 15 (Specific Investigative Techniques Not Required)

During the trial you may have heard testimony of witnesses and argument by counsel that the government did not utilize specific investigative techniques. For example, some seized items may not have been submitted for fingerprint analysis and chemical analysis may not have been done on every item seized. You may consider these facts in deciding whether the government has met its burden of proof, because as I told you, you should look to all of the evidence or lack of evidence in deciding whether a defendant is guilty. However, you also are instructed that there is no legal requirement that the government use any of these specific investigative techniques to prove its case. (For example, there is no requirement to attempt to take fingerprints, or that the government offer fingerprints in evidence.) Law enforcement techniques are not your concern. Your concern, as I have said, is to determine whether or not, on the evidence or lack of evidence, the defendant?s guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Moreover, the law does not require the prosecution to call as witnesses all persons who have been present at any time or place involved in the case, or who may appear to have some knowledge of the matters at issue in this trial. Nor does the law require the prosecution to produce as exhibits all papers and things mentioned in the evidence.

18 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 16 (Direct and Circumstantial Evidence)

There are two types of evidence which you may properly use in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.

One type of evidence is called direct evidence. Direct evidence is where a witness testifies to what he saw, heard, or observed. In other words, when a witness testifies about what is known to him of his own knowledge by virtue of his own senses -- what he sees, feels, touches or hears -- that is called direct evidence.

Circumstantial evidence is evidence which tends to prove a disputed fact by proof of other facts. There is a simple example of circumstantial evidence which is often used in this courthouse.

Assume that when you came into the courthouse this morning the sun was shining and it was a nice day. Assume that the courtroom blinds were drawn and you could not look outside.

As you were sitting here, someone walked in with an umbrella which was dripping wet.

Somebody else then walked in with a raincoat which also was dripping wet.

Now, you cannot look outside of the courtroom and you cannot see whether or not it is raining. So you have no direct evidence of that fact. But, on the combination of facts which I have asked you to assume, it would be reasonable and logical for you to conclude that it had been raining.

That is all there is to circumstantial evidence. You infer on the basis of reason and experience and common sense from an established fact the existence or the nonexistence of some other fact.

19 Circumstantial evidence is of no less value than direct evidence; for, it is a general rule that the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, but simply requires that before convicting a defendant, the jury must be satisfied of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt from all of the evidence in the case.

20 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 17

(Testimony, Exhibits, Stipulations, and Judicial Notice in General)

The evidence in this case consists of the sworn testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits received in evidence.

Exhibits which have been marked for identification but not received may not be considered by you as evidence. Only those exhibits received may be considered as evidence.

Similarly, you are to disregard any testimony when I have ordered it to be stricken. As I indicated before, only the witnesses’ answers are evidence and you are not to consider questions as evidence. Similarly, statements by counsel are not evidence.

You should consider the evidence in light of your own common sense and experience, and you may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.

Anything you may have seen or heard about this case outside the courtroom is not evidence and must be entirely disregarded.

21 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 18 (Questions)

Let me emphasize that a lawyer’s question is not evidence. At times, a lawyer on cross- examination may have incorporated into a question a statement which assumed certain facts to be true and asked the witness if the statement was true. If the witness denies the truth of a statement, and if there is no evidence in the record proving that the assumed fact is true, then you may not consider the fact to be true simply because it was contained in the lawyer’s question.

An example of this is the following lawyer’s question of a witness: “When did you stop cheating on your taxes?” You would not be permitted to consider as true the assumed fact that the witness ever cheated on his taxes, unless the witness himself indicated he had, or unless there is some other evidence in the record that he had cheated on his taxes.

In short, questions are not evidence; answers are.

22 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 19 (Search Warrants)

You have also heard testimony in this case regarding evidence seized by the government during the execution of a search warrant. You are hereby instructed that it is the responsibility of the court alone to determine the validity and legality of that search warrant and other searches, and the court has determined that the searches in this case were valid and legal. It is up to you to decide what significance, if any, the evidence seized may have in this case.

23 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 20 (Inference Defined (Presumptions))

During the trial you have heard the attorneys use the term “inference,” and in their arguments they may ask you to infer, on the basis of your reason, experience and common sense, from one or more established facts, the existence of some other fact.

An inference is not a suspicion or a guess. It is a reasoned, logical decision to conclude that a disputed fact exists on the basis of another fact which you know exists.

There are times when different inferences may be drawn from facts, whether proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. The government asks you to draw one set of inferences, while the defense asks you to draw another. It is for you, and you alone, to decide what inferences you will draw.

The process of drawing inferences from facts in evidence is not a matter of guesswork or speculation. An inference is a deduction or conclusion which you, the jury, are permitted to draw -- but not required to draw -- from the facts which have been established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. In drawing inferences, you should exercise your common sense.

So, while you are considering the evidence presented to you, you are permitted to draw, from the facts which you find to be proven, such reasonable inferences as would be justified in light of your experience.

Here again, let me remind you that, whether based upon direct or circumstantial evidence, or upon the logical, reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence, you must be satisfied of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt before you may convict the defendant.

24 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 21 (Witness Credibility -- General Instruction)

You have had an opportunity to observe all of the witnesses. It is now your job to decide how believable each witness was in his or her testimony. You are the sole judges of the credibility of each witness and of the importance of his or her testimony.

It must be clear to you by now that you are being called upon to resolve various factual issues under the Second Superseding Indictment, in the face of the very different pictures painted by the government and the defense. You will now have to decide where the truth lies, and an important part of that decision will involve making judgments about the testimony of the witnesses you have listened to and observed. In making those judgments, you should carefully scrutinize all of the testimony of each witness, the circumstances under which each witness testified, and any other matter in evidence which may help you to decide the truth and the importance of each witness’ testimony.

Your decision whether or not to believe a witness may depend on how that witness impressed you. Was the witness candid, frank, and forthright? Or, did the witness seem as if he or she was hiding something, being evasive or suspect in some way? How did the way the witness testified on direct examination compare with the way the witness testified on cross- examination? Was the witness consistent in his or her testimony or did he or she contradict himself or herself? Did the witness appear to know what he or she was talking about and did the witness strike you as someone who was trying to report his or her knowledge accurately?

How much you choose to believe a witness may be influenced by the witness’ bias.

Does the witness have a relationship with the government or the defendant which may affect how he or she testified? Does the witness have some incentive, loyalty or motive that might

25 cause him or her to shade the truth; or, does the witness have some bias, prejudice or hostility that may have caused the witness -- consciously or not -- to give you something other than a completely accurate account of the facts he or she testified to?

Even if the witness was impartial, you should consider whether the witness had an opportunity to observe the facts he or she testified about and you should also consider the witness’ ability to express himself or herself. Ask yourselves whether the witness’ recollection of the facts stands up in the light of all other evidence.

In other words, what you must try to do in deciding credibility is to size a person up in light of his or her demeanor, the explanations given, and in light of all the other evidence in the case, just as you would in any important matter where you are trying to decide if a person is truthful, straightforward and accurate in his or her recollection. In deciding the question of credibility, remember that you should use your common sense, your good judgment, and your experience.

Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness, or between the testimony of different witnesses, may or may not cause you to discredit such testimony. Two or more persons witnessing an incident or a transaction may see or hear it differently; an innocent misrecollection, like a failure of recollection, is not an uncommon experience. In weighing the effect of a discrepancy, always ask yourself whether it pertains to a matter of importance or an unimportant detail, and whether the discrepancy results from innocent error or intentional falsehood. Throughout the trial you have heard witnesses testify to facts they failed to mention or omitted in prior statements. You may consider such prior omissions as inconsistent statements when deciding the credibility of the witness. In deciding what effect to give to such an omission you should consider whether the omitted fact is an important or unimportant detail

26 and whether it is the type of matter one would normally expect another to remember when asked about an event. You should also consider any explanation offered by the witness to explain the omission and consider the explanation the same as you would any other aspect of a witness’ testimony. You should also consider whether the witness had a full and complete opportunity to explain everything on the earlier occasion. An omission from a statement, like any inconsistency in testimony, may result from an innocent failure of recollection or deliberate falsehood.

If you find that a witness has testified willfully and falsely with regard to any matter at trial, you may choose to reject any part or all of said witness’ testimony.

After making your own judgment, you should give the testimony of each witness such credibility as you think it is fairly entitled to receive, if any.

27 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 22 (Interest in Outcome)

In evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, you should take into account any evidence that the witness who testified may benefit in some way from the outcome of this case. Such an interest in the outcome creates a motive to testify falsely and may sway the witness to testify in a way that advances his or her own interests. Therefore, if you find that any witness whose testimony you are considering may have an interest in the outcome of this trial, then you should bear that factor in mind when evaluating the credibility of his or her testimony and accept it with great care.

This is not to suggest that every witness who has an interest in the outcome of a case will testify falsely. It is for you to decide to what extent, if at all, the witness’ interest has affected or colored his testimony.

28 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 23 (Defendant’s Interest if Defendant Testifies)

In a criminal case, a defendant cannot be required to testify, but, if he chooses to testify, he is, of course, permitted to take the witness stand on his own behalf. In this case, the defendant decided to testify. You should not disregard or disbelieve his testimony simply because he is charged as the defendant in this case. You should examine and evaluate his testimony just as you would the testimony of any witness with an interest in the outcome of this case.

29 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 24 (Co-Conspirator’s Plea Agreement; Immunity; Accomplice Testimony)

In this case, there has been testimony from government witnesses who have pleaded guilty and who have testified at this trial that they were actually involved in planning and carrying out the crimes charged in the Second Superseding Indictment -- that is, that they were accomplices. The government argues, as it is permitted to do, that it must take the witnesses as it finds them, and the government argues that only people who themselves take part in criminal activity have the knowledge required to show criminal behavior by others. Indeed, certain criminal conduct would never be detected without the use of accomplice testimony.

For those very reasons, the law allows the use of so-called accomplice testimony.

Indeed, it is the law in federal courts that the testimony of accomplices may be enough in and of itself for conviction, if the jury finds that the testimony establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, it is also the case that this kind of testimony is of such nature that it must be scrutinized with great care and viewed with particular caution when you decide how much of that testimony to believe.

I have given you some general considerations on credibility and I will not repeat them all here. Nor will I repeat all of the arguments made on both sides. However, let me say a few things that you may want to consider during your deliberations on the subject of accomplices and on the subject of witnesses who testified pursuant to plea agreements.

You should ask yourselves whether these witnesses would benefit more by lying, or by telling the truth. Was their testimony made up in any way because they believed or hoped that they would somehow receive favorable treatment by testifying falsely? Or did they believe that 30 their interests would be best served by testifying truthfully? If you believe that the witness was motivated by hopes of personal gain, was the motivation one which would cause him to lie, or was it one which would cause him to tell the truth? Did this motivation color his testimony?

In sum, you should look at all of the evidence in deciding what credence and what weight, if any, you will want to give to the testimony of these witnesses.

Additionally, while we are on the subject of witnesses who have testified pursuant to plea agreements, let me instruct you about the following points. There is evidence that the government agreed in those plea agreements to bring the witness’ cooperation to the attention of the sentencing court in exchange for the witness’ agreement to plead guilty and to testify truthfully, completely and fully at this trial.

The government is permitted to enter into these kinds of plea agreements and to make these kinds of promises, and the government is entitled to call as witnesses people to whom these promises are given. You, in turn, may accept the testimony of such a witness. You are instructed that you may convict the defendant on the basis of this testimony alone, if it convinces you of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

In considering such testimony, you are instructed that you are to draw no conclusion or inferences of any kind about the guilt of any defendant on trial from the mere fact that a government witness pled guilty to the same or similar charge. That witness’ decision to plead guilty was a personal decision about his own guilt.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 7-5, 7-10, 7-11 (modified).

31 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 25 (Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement)

You have heard evidence that a witness made a statement on an earlier occasion which counsel may argue is inconsistent with the witness’ trial testimony. Evidence of the prior inconsistent statement was placed before you for the limited purpose of helping you decide whether to believe the trial testimony of the witness. If you find that the witness made an earlier statement that conflicts with his or her trial testimony, you may consider that fact in deciding how much of his or her trial testimony, if any, to believe.

In making this determination, you may consider whether the witness purposely made a false statement or whether it was an innocent mistake; whether the inconsistency concerns an important fact, or whether it had to do with a small detail; whether the witness had an explanation for the inconsistency; and whether that explanation appealed to your common sense.

It is exclusively your duty, based upon all evidence and your own good judgment, to determine whether the prior statement was inconsistent, and if so how much, if any, weight to be given to the inconsistent statement in determining whether to believe all or part of the witness’ testimony.

32 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 26 (Law Enforcement Witnesses)

You have heard the testimony of law enforcement officials. The fact that a witness may be employed by a government agency as a law enforcement official does not mean that his or her testimony is necessarily deserving of more or less consideration or greater or lesser weight than that of an ordinary witness.

At the same time, it is quite legitimate for defense counsel to try to attack the credibility of a law enforcement witness on the grounds that his or her testimony may be colored by a personal or professional interest in the outcome of the case.

It is your decision, after reviewing all of the evidence, whether to accept the testimony of the law enforcement witness and to give that testimony whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves.

33 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 27 (Expert Witness)

You have heard testimony from certain witnesses, who were qualified as expert witnesses. An expert is allowed to express his or her opinion on those matters about which he or she has special knowledge and training. Expert testimony is presented to you on the theory that someone who is experienced in the field can assist you in understanding the evidence or in reaching an independent decision on the facts.

In weighing an expert’s testimony, you may consider the expert’s qualifications, his opinions, his reasons for testifying, as well as all of the other considerations that ordinarily apply when you are deciding whether or not to believe a witness’ testimony. You may give the expert testimony whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves in light of all the evidence in this case.

You should not, however, accept a witness’ testimony merely because he is an expert. Nor should you substitute it for your own reason, judgment, and common sense. The determination of the facts in this case rests solely with you.

34 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 28 (Transcripts of Recordings)

The government has been permitted to show you typed documents which it prepared containing the government’s interpretation of what appears on the tape recordings which have been received as evidence. Those were provided to you as an aid or guide to assist you in listening to the tapes. However, they are not in and of themselves evidence. Therefore, when the tapes were played I advised you to listen very carefully to the tapes themselves. You alone should make your own interpretation of what appears on the tapes based on what you heard. If you think you heard something differently than appeared on the transcript then what you heard is controlling.

Let me say again, you, the jury, are the sole judges of the facts.

35 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 29 (Introduction to the Charges)

We will next consider the crimes with which the defendant is charged in the Second

Superseding Indictment. The alleged crimes are charged in what is called a count.

I will now discuss with you the rules of law which govern whether the crimes charged have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

36 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 30 (Count One – Sex Trafficking – The Indictment and Statute)

In Count One, the defendant is charged with sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion.

The Second Superseding Indictment reads as follows:

COUNT ONE

Between no later than in or about August 2012 and in or about September 2012, in the

District of Maryland and elsewhere, the defendant,

JEAN CLAUDE ROY, a/k/a “Dredd the Don,” a/k/a “Dreddy,” did knowingly, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, obtain, and maintain by any means a person, namely, J.D., and benefit, financially and by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in such acts, knowing, and in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, fraud, and coercion, and any combination of such means, would be used to cause J.D. to engage in a commercial sex act.

The relevant statute on this subject is Title 18, United States Code, Section 1591(a), which provides: “Whoever knowingly –

(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a person, or

(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1), knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, [or] coercion ..., or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, ..., shall [be guilty of a crime].” 37 Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 47A-17.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 31 (Elements of Sex Trafficking) 38 To find a defendant guilty of sex trafficking, as charged in Counts One, you must find that the government has proven each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: The defendant knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, or maintained a person; OR the defendant knowingly benefitted (financially or by receiving something of value) from participating in a venture that recruited, enticed, transported, provided, obtained, or maintained a person;

Second: The defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion, or any combination of such means, would be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act; and

Third: The defendant’s acts were in or affecting interstate commerce.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 47A-18 (modified).

39 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 32 (First Element of Sex Trafficking – Recruiting, Enticing, Transporting, Harboring, Obtaining or Maintaining)

The first element of the crime of sex trafficking requires that the defendant either: (a) knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, or maintained a person;

OR (b) knowingly benefitted, financially or by receiving something of value, from participating in a venture that did one of these things.

Therefore, there are two different ways for the government to satisfy the first element of sex trafficking. The Government does not have to prove both ways; it is sufficient if the

Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense in one of the two ways.

The first way is by proving that the defendant himself knowingly engaged in one of a list of prohibited trafficking activities; that is, recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining, or maintaining a person.

The second, or alternative, the government only needs to prove that the defendant knowingly took part in a venture that engaged in one of those trafficking activities and that the defendant benefitted, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in that venture. The government does not have to prove that the defendant himself engaged in any of the trafficking activities.

The first way to satisfy the first element is by proving that the defendant himself knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, or maintained a person.

In considering whether a defendant did any of these things, I instruct you to use the ordinary, everyday definitions of these terms.

40 To prove the first element of sex trafficking in the second, or alternative, way, the government need not prove that the defendant himself engaged in any of the trafficking activities such as recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining, or maintaining a person. The government need only prove that there was a venture that engaged in one of those activities, that the defendant knowingly participated in some way in that venture, and that the defendant knowingly benefitted either financially or by receiving a thing of value from that venture.

In considering whether a defendant participated in such a venture, I instruct you that a venture is defined as “any group of two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not as a legal entity.” You may find that a defendant participated in a venture prohibited by the sex trafficking law if the defendant took part in that venture in any way. The defendant may be, but need not be, one of the people who formed that venture. Likewise, the defendant need not be an organizer or main participant in the venture, and need not have participated throughout the length of the venture. It is enough if the defendant took some part in the venture for any period of time while the venture was still ongoing, even if the part he played was minor, and even if it was not related to the actual recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining, or maintaining of a person for commercial sex acts.

To benefit, financially or by receiving a thing of value, from a venture, a defendant must receive some form of profit, benefit, value or advantage, no matter how minor, from the venture.

41 In deciding whether the first element of the sex trafficking statute has been satisfied, you do not all need to agree that the Government has satisfied that element the first way or the second way; you only need to agree that the Government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did one or the other of those two alternatives that I have described for you.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 47A-19 (modified).

42 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 33 (Second Element of Sex Trafficking – Use of Force, Fraud or Coercion to Cause Person to Engage in Commercial Sex Act)

The second element of sex trafficking requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion, or any combination of such means, would be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act.

The term “commercial sex act” means “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” The thing of value may be money, but does not have to be money. The thing of value may be some other tangible or intangible thing of value that may be given to or received by any person. The person who receives it does not have to be the person performing the commercial sex act.

In considering whether force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion, or any combination of such means, were used, the term “force” means any form of violence, compulsion or constraint exercised upon another person in any degree.

The term “fraud” means any act of deception or misrepresentation.

The term “coercion” means “threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; or the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.”

The term “serious harm,” which I just mentioned in the definition of coercion, means

“any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to

43 continue performing commercial sexual activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.” A threat of serious harm, therefore, need not involve any threat of physical violence, although it may include a threat of physical violence.

The words “scheme,” “plan,” and “pattern,” which I also just mentioned in the definition of coercion, are to be given their ordinary meanings. A “scheme, plan, or pattern” does not need to involve actual threats, but may involve any other words, actions, or conduct used to cause person to reasonably believe that she, her family, or any other person would suffer serious harm if she failed to continue engaging in commercial sex acts.

The term “abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process,” which I also just mentioned in the definition of coercion, means “the use or threatened use of a law or legal process, whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed, in order to exert pressure on another person to cause that person to take some action or refrain from taking some action.” Abuse of law or the legal process can include threats intended to place a person in fear that law or legal process will be used against that person and can include arrest, deportation, or other legal proceedings. For the purpose of determining whether the defendant abused or threatened to abuse the law or legal process, the question is whether the statements were made for the purpose of placing a person in fear of adverse consequences for any purpose for which the law was not designed or to pressure or compel another person, not whether the defendant’s statements about the law are correct. It is not a defense that the person threatened with legal process might actually be subject to legal action.

In considering whether force, fraud or coercion, or any combination of such means, would be sufficient to cause a person to engage in commercial sex acts, you may consider not

44 only the totality of the defendant’s conduct under all of the surrounding circumstances, but also the alleged victim’s special vulnerabilities, if any. In this regard, you may find that not all persons are of same courage or firmness. You may consider, for example, any aspect of the victim’s background, station in life, physical or mental condition, experience, education, socioeconomic status, age, immigration status, or any inequalities between the victim and the defendant, or any others working in concert with him, with respect to these considerations.

Simply put, you may ask whether the victim was vulnerable in some way such that the actions of the defendant, even if not sufficient to compel another person to engage in commercial sex acts, would have been enough to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to engage in commercial sex acts.

To prove sex trafficking, the government does not need to link each of the threats allegedly made or actions allegedly taken against an alleged victim to any particular commercial sex act performed by her. Rather, it is sufficient if the government has shown that the defendant’s use of threats, force, fraud, deception, or coercion, or any combination of such means, were sufficient to compel, or were sufficient to give rise to a climate of fear that would compel, a reasonable person in the alleged victim’s situation to comply with the defendant’s demands, in light of the totality of the defendant’s conduct, the surrounding circumstances, and any vulnerabilities of the victim. A climate of fear that compelled the victim may arise not only from a defendant's threats and other acts directed at the victim herself, but also from conduct toward others of which the victim is aware.

45 In considering whether the defendant created a climate of fear that compelled the victim to engage in commercial sex acts, you may consider not only overt threats that the defendant might have made to place the victim in fear of suffering certain consequences; you may also consider other surrounding circumstances, such as an atmosphere of violence, sexual assault, verbal abuse and insults, isolation, poor working and living conditions, denial of adequate food, water, rest, and medical care, use of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicants, withholding of pay, or any combination of these conditions, and any other techniques that the defendant might have used to intimidate the victim, weaken her resistance to the defendant’s demands, and compel her to serve.

If the victim was threatened with or made to suffer certain consequences in connection with her service to the defendant, either as punishment or to create a climate of fear that compelled her service, you may consider this evidence in determining whether the Government has proven the second element of this charge.

The government does not need to prove physical restraint – such as the use of chains, barbed wire, or locked doors – in order for you to find the defendant guilty of sex trafficking.

The fact that the victim may have had an opportunity to leave is irrelevant if the defendant placed her in such fear or circumstances that she did not reasonably believe she could leave. A victim who has been placed in such fear or circumstances is under no affirmative duty to try to escape.

In considering whether the victim’s commercial sex acts were caused by force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion, or any combination of such means, it is not a defense that the victim may have initially consented. The question is whether the victim at some time later wanted to withdraw but was then compelled by prohibited means to remain. Whether a victim is paid a salary or a wage, or given money, benefits, or gifts, is not determinative of whether that victim has been compelled to engage in commercial sex acts. In other words, you may find that the victim was compelled to engage in a commercial sex act even if the victim was paid or compensated for the commercial sex act.

Finally, whether the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion, or any combination of such means, would be used to cause victim to engage in a commercial sex act is a question of fact to be determined by you on the basis of all the evidence.

A person “recklessly disregards” a fact within the meaning of this offense when he is aware of, but consciously ignores, facts and circumstances that would reveal that force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion, or any combination of such means, would be used to cause a victim to engage in a commercial sex act. You may find that the defendant recklessly disregarded this fact if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) was aware of a high probability that force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion, or any combination of such means, would be used to cause the victim to engage in a commercial sex act, and (2) deliberately avoided learning the truth.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 47A-21 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 34 (Third Element of Sex Trafficking – Interstate and Foreign Commerce)

To satisfy the third and final element of the crime of sex trafficking, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s sex trafficking activities were, or that the activities of the sex trafficking venture in which the defendant knowingly participated either was in interstate commerce or affected interstate commerce. The government need not prove both.

“Interstate commerce” means the flow of commerce or business activities between a state and any point outside of that state. Acts and transactions which are economic in nature and cross state lines are “in” interstate commerce.

Transporting people across state lines for a commercial purpose is interstate commerce.

Acts and transactions which are economic in nature and affect the flow of money in the stream of commerce to any degree, however minimal, also “affect” interstate commerce.

To show that a defendant’s conduct affected interstate commerce, it is not necessary for the government to prove that a defendant specifically knew or intended that the recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing or obtaining of a person to engage in commercial sex acts would affect interstate commerce; it is only necessary that the natural consequences of such conduct would be to affect interstate commerce in some way, even if minor.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s recruitment, enticement, harboring, transportation, providing or obtaining of a person for the purpose of engaging in commercial sex acts involved the crossing of state lines, or was economic in nature and otherwise affected the flow of money in the stream of commerce to any degree, however minimal, you may find that the third element of the offense of sex trafficking has been satisfied.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 47A-23 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 35 (Counts Two and Three – Firearm Offense in Furtherance of a Crime of Violence – The Indictment and the Statute)

COUNT TWO

Count Two of the Second Superseding Indictment reads as follows:

In or about August 2012, in the District of Maryland and elsewhere, the defendant,

JEAN CLAUDE ROY, a/k/a “Dredd the Don,” a/k/a “Dreddy,” in Richmond, Virginia, did knowingly (1) possess a firearm in furtherance of, and (2) use, carry, and brandish a firearm during and in relation to, a crime of violence for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, that is sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591(a), as alleged in Count One of this Second Superseding Indictment, which is incorporated by reference.

COUNT THREE

Count Three of the Second Superseding Indictment reads as follows:

Between in or about August 2012 and in or about September 2012, in the District of

Maryland and elsewhere, the defendant,

JEAN CLAUDE ROY, a/k/a “Dredd the Don,” a/k/a “Dreddy,” in Alexandria, Virginia, did knowingly (1) possess a firearm in furtherance of, and (2) use, carry, and brandish a firearm during and in relation to, a crime of violence for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, that is sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591(a), as alleged in Count One of this Second Superseding Indictment, which is incorporated by reference. The relevant statute is Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c), which provides that

“any person who ... in furtherance of [any crime of violence ... for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States] ... possesses a firearm, shall [be guilty of a crime].”

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 35-85 (modified); 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 1594(a). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 36 (Firearm Offense in Furtherance of a Crime of Violence – Limiting Instruction)

Under Counts Two and Three, the defendant is charged with possessing, using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, which is charged in Count One.

If upon all of the evidence, you find that the government has failed to prove Count One beyond a reasonable doubt, then you will proceed no further as to Counts Two or Three. Counts

Two and Three are to be considered only if you first find the defendant guilty under Count One.

In reaching your verdict as to Counts Two and Three, you may consider the evidence of

Count One only for the purpose of determining whether the elements of Counts Two and Three have been satisfied.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 35-86 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 37 (Elements of Firearm Offense in Furtherance of a Crime of Violence)

In order to satisfy its burden of proof as to this count, the government must establish each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: that the defendant committed a crime of violence as charged in the Second Superseding Indictment, which is a crime for which he might be prosecuted in a court of the United States; and

Second: that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance of, or

knowingly used, carried, or brandished a firearm during and in relation to,

that crime of violence.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 35-87 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 38 (First Element of Firearm Offense in Furtherance of a Crime of Violence – Commission of the Predicate Crime)

The first element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant committed a crime of violence for which he might be prosecuted in a court of the

United States.

The defendant is charged in Count One of the Second Superseding Indictment with sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion.

I instruct you that the offense of sex trafficking is a crime of violence.

If during your deliberations, you determine that the government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as to Count One (sex trafficking), then you will proceed no further with Count Two or Count Three.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 35-88 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 39 (Second Element of Firearm Offense in Furtherance of a Crime of Violence – Possession of the Firearm in Furtherance of Crime of Violence)

The second element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance of or knowingly used or carried or brandished a firearm during and in relation to, the commission of a crime of violence.

A “firearm” is any weapon which will or is designed to or may be readily converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. To prove that a weapon is a firearm, the government need not prove that the firearm in question is operable or readily operable.

To prove that the defendant possessed the firearm in furtherance of the crime of violence, the government must prove that the defendant had possession of the firearm and that such possession was in furtherance of that crime. Possession also means that the defendant either had physical possession of the firearm on his person or that he had dominion and control over the place where the firearm was located and intention to exercise control over the firearm. To possess a firearm in furtherance of the crime means that the firearm helped forward, advance or promote the commission of this crime. The mere possession of the firearm at the scene of the crime is not sufficient under this definition. The firearm must have played some part in furthering the crime in order for this element to be satisfied.

In order to prove that the defendant used the firearm, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt an active employment of the firearm by the defendant during and in relation to the commission of the crime of violence. This does not mean that the defendant must actually fire or attempt to fire the weapon, although those would obviously constitute use of the weapon.

Brandishing, displaying, or even referring to the weapon so that others present knew that the defendant had the firearm available if needed all constitute use of the firearm. However, the mere possession of a firearm at or near the site of the crime without active employment as I just described it is not sufficient to constitute a use of the firearm.

In order to prove that the defendant carried the firearm, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the weapon within his control in such a way that it furthered the commission of the crime of violence or was an integral part of the commission of the crime. The defendant did not necessarily have to hold the firearm physically, that is, have actual possession of it on his person. If you find that the defendant had dominion and control over the place where the firearm was located, and had the power and intention to exercise control over the firearm in such a way that it furthered the commission of the crime of violence, you may find that the government has proven that the defendant carried the weapon.

To prove that the defendant brandished the firearm, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant displayed all or part of the firearm, or otherwise made the presence of the firearm known to another person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether the firearm was directly visible to that person.

Eyewitness testimony, if believed, and/or other evidence such as photographs, is sufficient to prove that a person possessed, used, carried, or brandished a firearm and that the weapon was in fact a firearm. It is not necessary that the actual firearm be recovered or introduced into evidence. For this element, you must also find that the defendant possessed, used, carried, or brandished the firearm knowingly. This means that he possessed, used, carried, or brandished the firearm purposely and voluntarily, and not by accident or mistake. It also means that he knew that the weapon was a firearm, as we commonly use the word. However, the government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that he was breaking the law.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 35-89 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 40 (Counts Four, Seven, and Nine – Interstate Transportation for Prostitution The Indictment and Statute)

In Counts Four, Seven, and Nine, the defendant is charged with transporting an individual to engage in prostitution. The Second Superseding Indictment reads as follows:

COUNT FOUR

On or about September 16, 2012, in the District of Maryland and elsewhere, the defendant,

JEAN CLAUDE ROY, a/k/a “Dredd the Don,” a/k/a “Dreddy,” knowingly transported J.D. in interstate commerce with the intent that J.D. engage in prostitution and sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.

COUNT SEVEN

On or about December 13, 2012, in the District of Maryland and elsewhere, the defendant,

JEAN CLAUDE ROY, a/k/a “Dredd the Don,” a/k/a “Dreddy,” knowingly transported D.W. in interstate commerce with the intent that D.W. engage in prostitution and sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.

COUNT NINE On or about December 23, 2012, in the District of Maryland and elsewhere, the defendant,

JEAN CLAUDE ROY, a/k/a “Dredd the Don,” a/k/a “Dreddy,” knowingly transported K.M. in interstate commerce with the intent that K.M. engage in prostitution and sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.

The relevant statute on this subject is Title 18, United States Code, Section 2421(a), which provides “Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.”

18 U.S.C. § 2421 JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 41 (Elements of Interstate Transportation for Prostitution)

In order to prove the defendant guilty of transporting an individual for the purpose of prostitution, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:

First, that the defendant knowingly transported the person in interstate commerce as alleged in the Second Superseding Indictment; and

Second, that the defendant transported the individual with the intent that said individual would engage in prostitution.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 64-2. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 42 (First Element of Interstate Transportation for Prostitution – Transport in Interstate Commerce)

The first element which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant knowingly transported an individual in interstate commerce, as alleged in the Second

Superseding Indictment.

“Interstate commerce” means simply movement between one state and another.

The government does not have to prove that the defendant personally transported the individual across a state line. It is sufficient to satisfy this element that the defendant was actively engaged in the making of the travel arrangements, such as by purchasing the tickets necessary for the individual to travel as planned.

The defendant must have knowingly transported the individual in interstate commerce.

This means that the government must prove that the defendant knew both that he was transporting the individual as I just defined that term, and that he was transporting the individual in interstate commerce. To act knowingly means to act voluntarily and intentionally and not because of accident, mistake or other innocent reason.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 64-3. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 43 (Second Element of Interstate Transportation for Prostitution – Intent to Engage in Prostitution)

The second element which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant transported the individual with the intent that the individual would engage in prostitution.

Direct proof of a person’s intent is almost never available. It would be a rare case where it could be shown that a person wrote or stated that as of a given time he committed an act with a particular intent. Such direct proof is not required. The ultimate fact of intent, though subjective, may be established by circumstantial evidence, based upon the defendant’s outward manifestations, his words, his conduct, his acts and all the surrounding circumstances disclosed by the evidence and the rational or logical inferences that may be drawn from them.

In order to establish this element, it is not necessary for the government to prove that engaging in prostitution was the sole purpose for crossing the state line. A person may have several different purposes or motives for such travel, and each may prompt in varying degrees the act of making the journey. The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, however, that a significant or motivating purpose of the travel across a state line was that the individual would engage in prostitution. In other words, that illegal activity must not have been merely incidental to the trip.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 64-4. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 44 (Count Five – Conspiracy to Commit Sex Trafficking)

In Count Five of the Second Superseding Indictment, the defendant is charged with conspiracy to commit sex trafficking beginning in or about December 2012. Specifically, the

Second Superseding Indictment alleges as follows:

COUNT FIVE (Conspiracy to Commit Sex Trafficking by Force, Fraud, and Coercion)

The Grand Jury for the District of Maryland further charges that:

The Conspiracy

1. In or about December 2012, in the District of Maryland, and elsewhere, the defendant,

JEAN CLAUDE ROY, a/k/a “Dredd the Don,” a/k/a “Dreddy,” did knowingly and voluntarily combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with Brittney Creason

(“Creason”), and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury to violate Title 18, United States

Code, Sections 1591(a)(1) and 1591(a)(2), that is, knowing, and in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, and coercion, as defined in Title 18, United States

Code, Section 1591(e)(2), and any combination of such means, would be used to cause a person to engage in a commercial sex act,

a. in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, to knowingly recruit,

entice, harbor, transport, provide, obtain, and maintain by any means a

person, and

b. to knowingly benefit financially and by receiving anything of value from

participation in a venture engaged in acts described in subparagraph 1(a). Manner and Means of the Conspiracy

2. It was part of the conspiracy that defendants ROY and Creason recruited, enticed, obtained, and transported females from Illinois to Maryland and Virginia with the intent to have those females engage in prostitution.

3. It was further part of the conspiracy that ROY and Creason used vehicles, public highways, hotels, telephones, and the Internet to facilitate prostitution.

4. It was further part of the conspiracy that defendants ROY and Creason photographed the females they transported to Maryland and used such photographs in advertisements for prostitution that they posted on various Internet websites.

5. It was further part of the conspiracy that ROY and Creason, to maintain control over the females who they recruited to prostitute, demanded that the females surrender to them personal belongings such as identifications, credit cards, cash, and pass codes to telephones.

6. It was further part of the conspiracy that Creason communicated threats to females who did not want to prostitute for ROY.

7. It was further part of the conspiracy that ROY, to coerce females to engage in prostitution, threatened physical force and death, and bragged about beating murder charges.

Overt Acts 8. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect the objects thereof, defendants

ROY and Creason, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, committed the following overt acts in the District of Maryland and elsewhere:

a. On or about December 9, 2012, Creason began communicating with D.W. on Facebook in order to recruit D.W. to come to Maryland to prostitute for ROY.

b. Between on or about December 9, 2012 and on or about December 13,

2012, Creason and ROY purchased a bus ticket for D.W. to travel from Illinois to Washington,

D.C. with the intent to have D.W. engage in prostitution.

c. On or about December 13, 2012, Creason and ROY picked D.W. up at a bus station in Washington, D.C., transported D.W. to a hotel in Maryland, and took all of the money D.W. had with her.

d. On or about December 13, 2012, Creason and ROY explained ROY’s rules of prostitution to D.W., took photos of D.W. for online advertisements offering D.W. for prostitution, and posted those ads on websites soliciting customers for prostitution.

e. On or about December 14, 2012, when D.W. indicated that she did not want to prostitute, ROY told D.W. that she would have to prostitute to earn the money back that he spent to ready her for prostitution, and threatened to kill D.W. and her family if D.W. failed to pay him back.

f. On or about December 14, 2012, Creason and ROY destroyed D.W.’s cell phone.

g. Between or about December 18, 2012 and on or about December 21,

2012, ROY and Creason recruited and enticed K.M. to travel from Illinois to Maryland for the purpose of prostitution. h. Between on or about December 18, 2012 and on or about December 21,

2012, Creason and ROY purchased a bus ticket for K.M. to travel from Illinois to Washington,

D.C. with the intent to have K.M. engage in prostitution in Maryland and elsewhere.

i. On or about December 23, 2012, Creason and ROY picked K.M. up at a bus station in Washington, D.C. and transported K.M. to a hotel in Maryland.

j. On or about December 23, 2012, Creason and ROY explained ROY’s rules of prostitution to K.M.

k. On or about December 23, 2012, ROY took photos of K.M. for online advertisements offering K.M. for prostitution, and posted those ads on websites soliciting customers for prostitution.

l. Between on or about December 23 and on or about December 25, 2012,

ROY required K.M. to turn over to him all money earned through her prostitution.

m. On or about December 24, 2012, ROY took K.M.’s driver=s license and credit card from her to intimidate K.M. and leave K.M. with no financial means of leaving him.

n. On or about December 24, 2012, ROY photographed K.M.’s driver’s license and stored the picture on his phone before returning her license to her.

o. On or about December 24, 2012, ROY bragged to K.M. that he got away with murder in an effort to intimidate her.

p. On or about December 24, 2012, Creason and ROY instructed K.M. via telephone to prevent R.C. from leaving a hotel room using force if necessary when K.M. informed Creason and ROY that R.C. wanted to leave. q. On or about December 24, 2012, in response to R.C. indicating that she wanted to leave, Creason, at ROY’s direction, ripped out R.C.’s hair extensions, took some of

R.C.’s belongings from her, and soiled R.C.’s shoes.

r. On or about December 24, 2012, ROY threatened K.M., who had observed the treatment of R.C., that if K.M. wanted to leave, she would not leave as easily as

The relevant statute on this subject is Title 18, United States Code, Section 1594(c), which provides: “Whoever conspires with another to violate section 1591 [is guilty of a crime].

18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 45 (Conspiracy – Purpose of Statute)

In this case, the defendant is accused of having been a member of a conspiracy to violate certain federal laws. A conspiracy is a kind of criminal partnership – a combination or agreement of two or more persons to join together to accomplish some unlawful purpose.

The crime of conspiracy to violate a federal law is an independent offense. It is separate and distinct from the actual violation of any specific federal laws, which the law refers to as

“substantive crimes.”

Indeed, you may find the defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States even though the substantive crime which was the object of the conspiracy was not actually committed. Moreover, you may find a defendant guilty of conspiracy despite the fact that he was incapable of committing the substantive offense.

Congress has deemed it appropriate to make conspiracy, standing alone, a separate crime even if the conspiracy is not successful. This is because collective criminal activity poses a greater threat to the public’s safety and welfare than individual conduct, and increases the likelihood of success of a particular criminal venture.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instruction No. 19-2. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 46 (Scope of Conspiracy)

An individual need not join a conspiracy at its inception or remain active in it until it ends to be found guilty of the conspiracy. Moreover, each person joining a conspiracy is taken to adopt, and is bound by, the prior acts and statements of other conspirators made in furtherance of the conspiracy and during its pendency, even if made before the individual in question may have joined the conspiracy. Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 19-3S (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 47 (Elements of Conspiracy)

In order to prove the crime of conspiracy, the government must establish the following elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, in or about December 2012, that two or more persons entered into the particular unlawful agreement charged in the conspiracy count you are considering; and

Second, that the defendant knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instruction No. 19-3 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 48 (First Element of Conspiracy – Existence of Agreement)

The first element which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the offense of conspiracy is that two or more persons entered the unlawful agreement charged in the Second Superseding Indictment.

In order for the Government to satisfy this element, you need not find that the alleged members of the conspiracy met together and entered into any express or formal agreement.

Similarly, you need not find that the alleged conspirators stated, in words or writing, what the scheme was, its object or purpose, or every precise detail of the scheme or the means by which its object or purpose was to be accomplished. Indeed, it is sufficient for the Government to show that the conspirators tacitly came to a mutual understanding to accomplish an unlawful act by means of a joint plan or common design. What the government must prove is that there was a mutual understanding, either spoken or unspoken, between two or more people to cooperate with each other to accomplish an unlawful act.

You may, of course, find that the existence of an agreement to disobey or disregard the law has been established by direct proof. However, since conspiracy is, by its very nature, characterized by secrecy, you may also infer its existence from the circumstances of this case and the conduct of the parties involved.

In a very real sense, then, in the context of conspiracy cases, actions often speak louder than words. In this regard, you may, in determining whether an agreement existed here, consider the actions and statements of all those you find to be participants as proof that a common design existed on the part of the person charged and his co-conspirators to act together for the accomplishment of an unlawful purpose.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 19-4 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 49 (Second Element of Conspiracy – Membership in the Conspiracy)

The second element which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the offense of conspiracy, is that the defendant knowingly, willfully and voluntarily became a member of the conspiracy.

If you are satisfied that the conspiracy charged in the Second Superseding Indictment existed, you must next ask yourselves who the members of each conspiracy were. In deciding whether the defendant was, in fact, a member of the conspiracy, you should consider whether the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy. Did he participate in it with knowledge of its unlawful purpose and with the specific intention of furthering its business or objective as an associate or worker?

In that regard, it has been said that in order for a defendant to be deemed a participant in a conspiracy, he must have had a stake in the venture or its outcome. You are instructed that, while proof of a financial interest in the outcome of a scheme is not essential, if you find that the defendant had such an interest, that is a factor which you may properly consider in determining whether or not the defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the Second Superseding

Indictment.

As I mentioned a moment ago, before the defendant can be found to have been a conspirator, you must first find that he knowingly joined in the unlawful agreement or plan. The key question, therefore, is whether the defendant joined the conspiracy with an awareness of at least some of the basic aims and purposes of the unlawful agreement.

It is important for you to note that the defendant’s participation in the conspiracy must be established by independent evidence of his own acts or statements and the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from them. A defendant's knowledge is a matter of inference from the facts proved. In that connection, I instruct you that to become a member of the conspiracy, a defendant need not have known the identities of each and every member, nor need he have been apprised of all of their activities. Moreover, a defendant need not have been fully informed as to all of the details, or the scope, of the conspiracy in order to justify an inference of knowledge on his part.

Furthermore, a defendant need not have joined in all of the conspiracy’s unlawful objectives.

The extent of a defendant’s participation has no bearing on the issue of a defendant’s guilt. A conspirator’s liability is not measured by the extent or duration of his participation.

Indeed, each member may perform separate and distinct acts and may perform them at different times. Some conspirators play major roles, while others play minor parts in the scheme. An equal role is not what the law requires. In fact, even a single act may be sufficient to draw the defendant within the ambit of the conspiracy.

I want to caution you, however, that a defendant’s mere association with one or more members of the conspiracy does not automatically make a defendant a member. A person may know, or be friendly with, a criminal, without being a criminal himself. Mere similarity of conduct or the fact that they may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests does not necessarily establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy.

I also want to caution you that mere knowledge or acquiescence, without participation, in the unlawful plan is not sufficient. Moreover, the fact that the acts of a defendant, without knowledge, merely happen to further the purposes or objectives of the conspiracy, does not make a defendant a member. More is required under the law. What is necessary is that the defendant must have participated with knowledge of at least some of the purposes or objectives of the conspiracy and with the intention of aiding in the accomplishment of those unlawful ends. In sum, the defendant, with an understanding of the unlawful character of the conspiracy, must have intentionally engaged, advised or assisted in it for the purpose of furthering the illegal undertaking. He thereby becomes a knowing and willing participant in the unlawful agreement -- that is to say, a conspirator.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 19-6 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 50 (Counts Six and Eight – Attempted Sex Trafficking)

In Counts Six and Eight of the Second Superseding Indictment, the defendant is charged with attempted sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion. Specifically, the Second

Superseding Indictment alleges as follows:

COUNT SIX

Between on or about December 9, 2012 and on or about December 14, 2012, in the

District of Maryland and elsewhere, the defendant,

JEAN CLAUDE ROY, a/k/a “Dredd the Don,” a/k/a “Dreddy,” did knowingly attempt, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, to recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, obtain, and maintain by any means a person, namely, D.W., and to benefit, financially and by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in such acts, knowing, and in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, fraud, and coercion, and any combination of such means, would be used to cause D.W. to engage in a commercial sex act.

COUNT EIGHT

Between at least on or about December 18, 2012, and on or about December 25, 2012, in the District of Maryland and elsewhere, the defendant,

JEAN CLAUDE ROY, a/k/a “Dredd the Don,” a/k/a “Dreddy,” did knowingly attempt, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, to recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, obtain, and maintain by any means a person, namely, K.M., and to benefit, financially and by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in such acts, knowing, and in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, fraud, and coercion, and any combination of such means, would be used to cause K.M. to engage in a commercial sex act.

The relevant statute on this subject is Title 18, United States Code, Section

1594(a), which provides: “Whoever attempts to violate section 1591 [is guilty of a crime].”

18 U.S.C. § 1594(a). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 51 (Attempted Sex Trafficking - Elements)

In order to prove the charge of attempting to commit the crime of sex trafficking, the government must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: that the defendant intended to commit the crime of sex trafficking; and

Second: that the defendant did some act that was a substantial step in an effort to bring about or accomplish the crime.

Mere intention to commit a specific crime does not amount to an attempt. In order to convict the defendant of an attempt, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to commit the crime charged, and that he took some action which was a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.

In determining whether the defendant's actions amounted to a substantial step toward the commission of the crime, it is necessary to distinguish between mere preparation on the one hand, and the actual doing of the criminal deed on the other. Mere preparation, which may consist of planning the offense, or of devising, obtaining or arranging a means for its commission, is not an attempt, although some preparations may amount to an attempt. The acts of a person who intends to commit a crime will constitute an attempt when the acts themselves clearly indicate an intent to commit the crime, and the acts are a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of the crime.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 10-1 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 52 (Proof of Intent)

Intent ordinarily may not be proved directly, because there is no way of fathoming or scrutinizing the operations of the human mind. But you may infer the defendant’s intent from the surrounding circumstances. You may consider any statements made and any acts done or omitted by the defendant, and all other facts and circumstances in evidence which indicate their state of mind.

You may infer, but you are certainly not required to infer, that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted. As I have said, it is entirely up to you to decide what facts to find from the evidence.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 6-17 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 53 (Knowingly)

In order to sustain its burden of proof, the government must prove that the defendant acted knowingly. A person acts knowingly if he acts intentionally and voluntarily, and not because of ignorance, mistake, accident, or carelessness. Whether the defendant acted knowingly may be proven by the defendant’s conduct and by all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, No. 3A-1. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 54 (Aiding and Abetting - The Indictment and Statute) In Counts One through Four and Six through Ten, the defendant is charged with not only the substantive offense charged in the count, but also with aiding and abetting the commission of that offense. The aiding and abetting statute, section 2(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides that:

“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids or abets or counsels, commands or induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”

18 U.S.C. § 2(a); Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 11-1 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 55 (Elements of Aiding and Abetting)

Under the aiding and abetting statute, it is not necessary for the government to show that a defendant himself physically committed the crime with which he is charged in order for you to find the defendant guilty.

A person who aids or abets another to commit an offense is just as guilty of that offense as if he committed it himself.

Accordingly, you may find a defendant guilty of the offense charged if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government has proved that another person actually committed the offense with which the defendant is charged, and that the defendant aided or abetted that person in the commission of the offense.

As you can see, the first requirement is that you find that another person has committed the crime charged. Obviously, no one can be convicted of aiding and abetting the criminal acts of another if no crime was committed by the other person in the first place. But if you do find that a crime was committed, then you must consider whether the defendant aided or abetted the commission of the crime.

In order to aid or abet another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the defendant willfully and knowingly associate himself in some way with the crime, and that he willfully and knowingly seek by some act to help make the crime succeed.

Participation in a crime is willful if action is taken voluntarily and intentionally, or, in the case of a failure to act, with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done; that is to say, with a bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law.

The mere presence of a defendant where a crime is being committed, even coupled with knowledge by the defendant that a crime is being committed, or the mere acquiescence by a defendant in the criminal conduct of others, even with guilty knowledge, is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting. An aider and abettor must have some interest in the criminal venture

To determine whether a defendant aided or abetted the commission of the crime with which he is charged, ask yourself these questions:

Did he participate in the crime charged as something he wished to bring about?

Did he associate himself with the criminal venture knowingly and willfully?

Did he seek by his actions to make the criminal venture succeed?

If he did, then the defendant is an aider and abettor, and therefore guilty of the offense.

If, on the other hand, your answers to this series of questions are all “no,” then the defendant is not an aider and abettor, and you must find him not guilty.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 11-1 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 56 (Count Ten – Witness and Evidence Tampering)

In Counts Ten of the Second Superseding Indictment, the defendant is charged with witness and evidence tampering. Specifically, Count Ten of the Second Superseding Indictment alleges as follows:

1. Paragraphs 2 through 8 of Count Five are incorporated here.

2. On or about December 25, 2012, ROY was arrested in Rockville, Maryland by officers of the Montgomery County Police Department.

3. On or about December 26, 2012, ROY was charged in the District Court of

Maryland for Montgomery County with violations of Maryland state criminal law, including human trafficking and prostitution offenses, in connection with his prostitution of Creason and

4. On or about December 28, 2012, federal law enforcement agents with the United

States Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Investigations began a federal investigation into possible violations of federal criminal laws relating to human trafficking, prostitution, and other offenses.

5. In or about January 2013, a federal Grand Jury in the District of Maryland initiated an investigation relating to the same matters.

6. Between on or about January 1, 2013 and on or about January 10, 2013, while an inmate at the Montgomery County Detention Center, ROY made numerous telephone calls in which he requested that Individual 1 access online accounts belonging to ROY and Creason.

These accounts included Facebook, an online social networking website; Dropbox, an online storage service that allows users to store all types of digital files, including images, videos, and documents; and iCloud, a service for hosting, storage, and sharing digital files that provides a central, internetbased storage repository for individuals to back up, store and share files created or maintained on internetaccessible Apple devices such as laptops, iPads, and iPhones.

7. On or about January 1, 2013, at approximately 7:54 p.m., ROY called

Individual 1 and discussed the sex trafficking allegations pending against him. During this call,

ROY asked Individual 1 to access the internet and go to “iCloud.com and do something for me.”

ROY also provided Individual 1 with passwords to his and Creason’s Facebook and iCloud accounts.

8. On or about January 1, 2013, at approximately 8:23 p.m., ROY called

Individual 1 again. After Individual 1 reported that Individual 1 had successfully logged on to

Creason’s iCloud account, ROY instructed Individual 1 to provide him with phone numbers of

Creason’s friends and family from Creason’s iCloud account. After receiving those phone numbers, ROY instructed Individual 1 how to “erase” the iPhone device associated with and backed up to Creason=s iCloud account. Individual 1 informed ROY that after setting the phone to erase as instructed, Individual 1 had received a message indicating that the phone would erase next time it connected to the network, to which ROY responded, “Okay, cool.” ROY then directed Individual 1 to sign out of Creason’s iCloud account, sign in to ROY’s iCloud account, and erase multiple devices that he had connected to his iCloud account, including three iPhones and a MacBook Air laptop computer.

9. Between on or about January 1, 2013 and on or about January 10, 2013, ROY called Individual 1 numerous times and asked Individual 1 to back up the contents of Creason’s iCloud account onto one of Individual 1’s own devices. On or about January 10, 2013, at approximately 10:23 a.m., ROY again called Individual 1, who reported to ROY the “good news” that Individual 1 had backed up the contents of Creason’s iCloud account onto an electronic device in Individual 1’s home. In the same call, ROY asked Individual 1 to again try to access the password-protected portion of Creason’s Facebook account, but Individual 1 indicated that she was unable to do so.

10. From on or about January 1, 2013 to on or about January 10, 2013, in the District of Maryland and elsewhere, the defendant,

JEAN CLAUDE ROY, a/k/a “Dredd the Don,” a/k/a “Dreddy,” attempted to and did knowingly corruptly persuade another person with intent to cause and induce a person to alter, destroy, mutilate, and conceal certain objects, namely the electronic data stored on certain iPhones and a MacBook Air laptop computer, belonging to ROY and Creason, to impair their integrity and availability for use in official proceedings, that is, a federal Grand

Jury investigation and any subsequent federal criminal proceedings involving defendant ROY.

The relevant statute on this subject is Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512(b)(2)

(B), which provides: (b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to-- . . .

(2) cause or induce any person to--

B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding [shall be guilty of a crime].

18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B) JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 57 (Elements of Witness and Evidence Tampering)

In order to prove the defendant guilty of the charge in the Second Superseding

Indictment, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: from on or about January 1, 2013 to on or about Janaury 10, 2013, the defendant knowingly corruptly persuaded Individual 1.

Second: that the defendant acted knowingly and with intent to cause or induce Individual 1 to alter, destroy, mutilate or conceal an object with intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official federal proceeding.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 46-30 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 58 (First Element of Witness and Evidence Tampering – Defendant Corruptly Persuades)

The first element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant corruptly persuaded Individual 1.

To “corruptly persuade” means to act knowingly with a wrongful, immoral or evil purpose to convince or induce another person to engage in certain conduct.

The law does not require that the federal proceeding be pending at the time of defendant’s (e.g. corrupt persuasion) as long as the proceeding was foreseeable such that defendant knew that his actions were likely to affect the proceeding.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 46-31 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 59

(Second Element of Witness and Evidence Tampering – Knowledge and Specific Intent)

The second element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted knowingly and with the specific intent to induce any person to withhold evidence from an official proceeding.

An act is done knowingly if it is done voluntarily and purposely, and not by accident or mistake.

By specific intent, I mean that the defendant must have acted knowingly and with the unlawful intent to induce Individual 1 to withhold evidence from an official proceeding.

In order to satisfy this element, it is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant knew he was breaking any particular criminal law. Nor need the government prove that the defendant knew that the official proceeding was before a United States judge.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 46-32 (modified). JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 60 (Punishment)

The question of possible punishment of the defendant is of no concern to the jury and should not, in any sense, enter into or influence your deliberations. The duty of imposing sentence rests exclusively upon the Court. Your function is to weigh the evidence in the case and to determine whether or not the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, solely upon the basis of such evidence. Under your oath as jurors, you cannot allow a consideration of the punishment which may be imposed upon the defendant, if he is convicted, to influence your verdict, in any way, or, in any sense, enter into your deliberations.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 9-1. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 61

(Duty to Consult and Need for Unanimity)

The government, to prevail, must prove the essential elements by the required degree of proof, as already explained in these instructions. If it succeeds, your verdict should be guilty; if it fails, it should be not guilty. To report a verdict, it must be unanimous.

Your function is to weigh the evidence in the case and determine whether or not the defendant is guilty, solely upon the basis of such evidence.

Each juror is entitled to his or her opinion; each should, however, exchange views with his or her fellow jurors. That is the very purpose of jury deliberation -- to discuss and consider the evidence; to listen to the arguments of fellow jurors; to present your individual views; to consult with one another; and to reach an agreement based solely and wholly on the evidence -- if you can do so without violence to your own individual judgment.

Each of you must decide the case for yourself, after consideration, with your fellow jurors, of the evidence in the case.

But you should not hesitate to change an opinion which, after discussion with your fellow jurors, appears erroneous.

However, if, after carefully considering all the evidence and the arguments of your fellow jurors, you entertain a conscientious view that differs from the others, you are not to yield your conviction simply because you are outnumbered.

Your final vote must reflect your conscientious conviction as to how the issues should be decided. Your verdict, whether guilty or not guilty, must be unanimous.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 62 (Foreperson – Verdict Form)

In my courtroom, Juror #1 is the foreperson. If you need to communicate with me, the foreperson will sign a note to me.

As I mentioned, a detailed verdict form has been prepared for your convenience. You will take this form to the jury room and, when you have reached unanimous agreement as to your verdict, you will have your foreperson fill it in, and then date and sign the form.

As I noted earlier, in addition to rendering a verdict on whether the defendant has or has not been proven guilty, I am asking you to make specific determinations as to all four counts about the types and amounts of controlled substances involved. Your answers to these questions must be unanimous. All of your answers will be noted on the verdict form. Please follow the instructions on the verdict form. After all of you agree on the answer to the questions on the verdict form, the foreperson should write the answer and initial and date each of the forms.

After you have completed the verdict form, please advise the Court, by sending a note through the Marshal, that you have reached a verdict. When I receive that note, I shall have you return with your verdict to the courtroom.

Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instruction, No. 9-5, 9-9 (modified).

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 63 (Communication with the Court)

If it becomes necessary during deliberations to communicate with the Court, you may send a note by a Marshal, signed by your foreperson, or by one or more members of the jury. No member of the jury should communicate with the Court by any means other than a signed writing, and the Court will not communicate with any member of the jury on any subject touching on the merits of the case, other than in writing, or orally here in open court.

You will note from the oath about to be taken by the Marshal that he, too, as well as all other persons, is forbidden to communicate in any way or manner with any member of the jury on any subject touching the merits of the case.

Bear in mind that you may not reveal to any person -- not even to the Court -- how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise, on the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused persons, until after you have reached a unanimous verdict.