Mock SCOTUS Oral Arguments: PERIOD 3

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Mock SCOTUS Oral Arguments: PERIOD 3

Mock SCOTUS Oral Arguments: PERIOD 3

Case Name: Evenwel v. Abbot Date of Oral Argument: MAY 18, 2016

Lead Justice: Ethan Schwartz

Attorneys representing Petitioner(s): BRYANNA ITURRIAGA and JASPREET BASRAON

Attorneys representing Respondent(s): DIANA MENDEZ and JACKIE MENJIVAR

Facts of the Case: Texas law requires that senate districts be reapportioned during the first session after the federal census. A three-judge panel in the federal district court found that the redistricting after the 2010 census violated the Voting Rights Act. Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenniger are registered Texas voters who sued; claiming the interim plan adopted for the 2012 primaries violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that the newly created districts did not adhere to the “one man, one vote” principle because they had been redistricted based on population rather than registered voters.

Constitutional Question: Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that districting take into account the number of voters rather than the total population?

Ruling:

Case Name: Bernard v. Minnesota Date of Oral Argument: MAY 17, 2016 Birchfield v. North Dakota

Lead Justice: Kaetlyn Connelly

Attorneys representing Petitioner(s): CANDE HIERRO-TERRELL and HRAG PELTEKIAN

Attorneys representing Respondent(s): DIANA ARROYO and GLENNA NGUYEN

Facts of the Case: In Minnesota, a few men were attempting to pull their boat out of the water and into their truck. Police were called to the scene and one of the men, William Robert Bernard Jr., had admittedly been drinking that night and was holding the keys to the truck, but denied driving under the influence. He refused to perform a field sobriety test and was arrested for suspicion of DWI. At the police station, he was read his rights but refused to be subjected to a chemical test. He was charged with two counts of first degree test refusal. In a similar case, Danny Birchfield of North Dakota drove his car into a ditch and when police arrived, they suspected he was intoxicated. He failed both the field sobriety test and the breath test and was arrested. He refused to take the chemical test and was charged with a misdemeanor of refusing to consent to a breath test. In another instance, Steve Beylund of North Dakota consented to a blood alcohol test after being informed it was against state law to refuse such a test. It was confirmed that he was over the legal limit and he was charged with a DUI. All three men challenged the state statutes criminalizing refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued that the statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when there was no probable cause that would support a warrant for the test. Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Constitutional Question: Whether, in the absence of a warrant, a state may make it a crime for a person to refuse to take a chemical test to detect the presence of alcohol in the person’s blood.

Ruling: Case Name: Fisher v. UT Austin Date of Oral Argument: MAY 20, 2016

Lead Justice: Ethan Schwartz

Attorneys representing Petitioner(s): CYNTHIA NGUYEN and ERYNNE LIM

Attorneys representing Respondent(s): ANDY NGUYEN and CHUDI MBANEFO

Facts of the Case: In 1997, the Texas legislature enacted a law that would require the UT system to admit all high school students who ranked in the top ten percent of their class. After noticing racial and ethnic differences between the UT’s and the state’s population, the UT modified its race-neutral policy so that race would be considered as a factor in admissions. Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied to University of Texas, Austin and was denied as she was neither in the top ten percent, nor ethnically diverse. She filed suit against the university, claiming that the use of race in admissions decisions violated the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The lower court affirmed the University’s position as did the appellate court.

Constitutional Question: Does the University of Texas’ use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Ruling:

Case Name: Friedrichs v. CTA Date of Oral Argument: MAY 16, 2016

Lead Justice: Michael Seiler

Attorneys representing Petitioner(s): CECILIA MARQUEZ and JACKIE SANCHEZ

Attorneys representing Respondent(s): DENA CHENG and JACKIE SCHIEFFER

Facts of the Case: Unions are the exclusive bargaining representative for public school employees of that district according to California law. This gives them great influence. Unions can establish an “agency shop” arrangement where a school district may require a public school employee to join the union or pay dues to the union as a “fair share service fee.” According to the first amendment, unions can only compel nonmembers to support activities directly related to bargaining representative duties, negotiations, and contract administration. The union must also send notices to nonmembers describing the possible charges. To avoid non-chargeable fees, a member must opt out each year. The petitioners are a group of public school employees that sued CTA and other related organizations and school districts and argued that the agency shop arrangement and the opt out requirement violated the 1st amendment. The District Court held that precedent upholding those practices precluded its judgment of the issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th circuit affirmed.

Constitutional Questions: 1. Do public sector agency shop arrangements violate the first amendment’s protection of freedom of speech and assembly? 2. Does the First Amendment prohibit the practice of requiring public employees to affirmatively opt-out of subsidizing non-chargeable speech rather than to affirmatively consent?

Ruling: Case Name: Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle Date of Oral Argument: MAY 23, 2016

Lead Justice: Roselynn Vargas

Attorneys representing Petitioners: SARAHI CALDERON GARCIA and JESSICA BARAHONA

Attorneys representing Respondents: SAWANI GOONATILLEKE and KEVORK KESHISHIAN

Facts of the Case: In 2008, Luis M. Sanchez Valle was charged in federal courts for illegally trafficking weapons and ammunition, thus violating the Puerto Rico Weapons Act. After being convicted in federal court, he filed a motion to dismiss claims under Puerto Rican law declaring that his protection against double jeopardy meant he could not be prosecuted in Puerto Rico. The trial court dismissed his charges since both Puerto Rico and the United States derive their authority from the United States Constitution and therefore are the same sovereign entity. The Court of Appeals held that a previous Supreme Court case (Puerto Rico v. Castro Garcia) set precedent and established that the U.S and Puerto Rico derive their authority from different sources and can punish without implicating double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed this claim and held it as incorrect and stated that all Puerto Rican charges against Sanchez Valle should be dismissed.

Constitutional Question: Are the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the U.S Federal government separate sovereigns for the purpose of double jeopardy?

Ruling:

Case Name: US V. Texas Date of Oral Argument: MAY 18, 2016

Lead Justice: Alec Vaca

Attorneys representing Petitioner(s): ANNA YOON and JESSICA DAO

Attorneys representing Respondent(s): THOMSON VO and JULIO CASTRO

Facts of the Case: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) allowed individuals who met specific requirements to be exempt from deportation and apply for citizenship. It lasted two years but could be renewed. The program was meant to protect young immigrants from being forced into a country they have little to no knowledge about. Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) expanded the DACA program by making more people eligible. Texas and other states sued the national government, claiming that DAPA violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The states also argued that DAPA violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.

Constitutional Questions: 1. Do states that provide subsidies to persons who are granted deferred action have standing to sue because the new guidelines will lead to more persons being eligible for deferred action? 2. Does DAPA violate the Take Care Clause of the Constitution?

Ruling: Case Name: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt Date of Oral Argument: MAY 20, 2016

Lead Justice: Dyani Williams

Attorneys representing Petitioner(s): AMY NGUYEN and USNAL BHAIL

Attorneys representing Respondent(s): SKYE RIVERA and STELLA RIVAS

Facts of the Case: In 2013 the Texas Legislature passed a house bill (H.B. 2) with two parts, the first required doctors who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where the abortion is performed; the second requires that a clinic that performs abortions meet standards of “ambulatory surgical centers.” The petitioners in this case are a group of abortion providers seeking to invalidate these provisions on the grounds that it denied equal protection, unlawfully delegated lawmaking authority, and constituted arbitrary and unreasonable state action. The district court dismissed equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims, and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the two provisions. The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Court District’s decision and partially reversed the injunctions because the petitioners failed to prove that they had standing, that is, that women were prevented from getting abortions.

Constitutional Question: Should a court’s ‘substantial burden’ analysis take into account the extent to which laws that restrict access to abortion services actually serve the government’s stated interest in promoting health?

Ruling:

Case Name: Zubik v. Burwell Date of Oral Argument: MAY 16, 2016

Lead Justice: Kaitlynn Jackson

Attorneys representing Petitioner(s): ARIELLE CAGAS and ROMAN LAUS

Attorneys representing Respondent(s): DARLENE MALFAVON and KEVIN LEE

Facts of the Case: In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act which required health plan groups and health insurance issuers to provide preventative care and screenings for women that are in accordance to the guidelines created by the Department of Health and Human Services. The guidelines allow women to receive approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and reproductive education and counseling. The petitioners argue that this forces religious organizations to comply with the federal mandate and thus violates their rights which are protected under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The mandate requires the organizations to make it possible for the coverage of contraceptive services, but the petitioners oppose it on religious grounds.

Constitutional Questions: 1. Does the availability of a regulatory exemption for religious employers regarding the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate eliminate the substantial burden on those organizations’ exercise of their religious freedom? 2. Do the Department of Health and Human Services’ guidelines satisfy the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s demanding test for overriding religious objections?

Ruling: Case Name: Utah v Strieff Date of Oral Argument: MAY 17, 2016

Lead Justice: Laura Verjan

Attorneys representing Petitioner(s): SCOTT SCHRAMM and BRANDON VO

Attorneys representing Respondent(s): MATTHEW PARK and FERMIN MIRANDA

Facts of the Case: Utah Detective Douglas Fackrell received an anonymous tip about drug sales at a South Salt Lake residence and after looking around he speculated there was drug activity taking place. Fackrell saw Edward Joseph Strieff, Jr. leaving the residence and stopped him for questioning. During the stop, Fackrell discovered Strieff had an outstanding warrant and arrested him. During the lawful search after his arrest, Fackrell found methamphetamine and a drug pipe on Strieff’s person. The District Court ruled that, although Fackrell did not have enough evidence to conduct an investigatory stop, the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia obtained during the lawful search incident to arrest justified the admission of that evidence for trial. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s ruling, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that the evidence should have been suppressed because the warrant that was the basis for the arrest was discovered during an unlawful investigatory stop.

Constitutional Question: Should evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest on an outstanding warrant be suppressed because the warrant was discovered during an investigatory stop later found to be unlawful?

Ruling:

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