Regime Change After the Breakup of the Japanese Empire

Regime Change after the Breakup of the Japanese Empire

As of the Fall of 1945, there were regime changes in many areas of the defeated Japanese Empire. The Kurile Islands came under Russian administration, the Ryukyus came under US administration, and “Formosa & the Pescadores” came under Chinese administration. Dokdo Island was still under dispute, but it came under Korean administration in April 1953. Later, the entire Ryukyu Islands chain came under Japanese administration again as of May 1972.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) of April 28, 1952 is currently the highest ranking document of international law dealing with legal status of these areas. Nevertheless, in the SFPT “Formosa & the Pescadores”along with the Kurile Islands were ceded by Japan without specifying any “receiving country.” This is a situation that confuses many researchers. Arguably, the island groups of Dokdo (in a border area between Japan and Korea) and the Senkakus (at the southwestern end of the Ryukyu island chain) are not specifically mentioned in the treaty. Hence, according to many scholars, the “specifications” (or “non-specifications”) in the peace treaty leave the legitimacy of the regime changes in many areas of the dismembered Japanese Empire open to serious doubt. Indeed, in the present era, scarcely a month goes by without discussion in the global news media regarding the ongoing international disputes involving competing claims to the “ownership” of these islands.

The authors have found that even a thorough reading of the Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, Commentaries of the ICRC, the content of US Army Field Manual FM 27-10, etc. are inadequate preparation to make a dissection of the complexities of regime change via the “sovereignty transfer” of territory (generally called “territorial cessions”) in a peace treaty.

Even decades after the coming into force of a peace treaty, it is often seen that there are still many arguments in the international community regarding what country is entitled to legitimately exercise sovereign rights over these areas. Moreover, there are often also wide varieties of opinion on whether some territorial cessions already meet the criteria for “statehood,” or what actions would be necessary for them to meet the criteria for “statehood” at some day in the future. Obviously, without the development of a clear and workable legal structure for appraising the many and various claims, it is impossible to evaluate the legitimacy of any regime change which “appears to have occurred.”

1 In order to solve this problem, the authors have looked at a variety of military occupations (from the late 1700’s to the latter half of the 20th century), many of which later became territorial cessions in a peace treaty. Based on this research, the authors have built a model of a supposed war between Malaysia and Indonesia which occurs in the modern era. The military occupation and final disposition of the hypothetical Indonesian island of Janipatra is then dissected. In order to explain and illustrate the basic nature of “military occupation” in general, and of “territorial cessions” in particular, a number of axioms are derived. The validity of these axioms will be shown via the Malaysian Indonesian War model as well as other historical and legal data. These axioms are all based on the law of occupation, as contained in the customary laws of warfare. (FT1)

After overviewing the developments in the hypothetical Malaysia Indonesia War, the knowledge gained and the axioms derived are then used to examine the situations of the “breakup” of the Japanese Empire after the events of August 1945. This examination covers the ensuing military occupation of Japan, her overseas territories & various other neighboring areas, the post-war San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952, and other relevant historical data. Most importantly, the authors offer a structured framework whereby a precise determination of which country should legitimately exercise sovereign rights over the Kurile Islands, the Senkakus (Diaoyutai), Dokdo (Takeshima) , and Formosa & the Pescadores (aka Taiwan) can be determined. In this way, the question of the legitimacy (or non-legitimacy) of the “regime change” in each of these disputed areas can be resolved.

PART 1 The Malaysian Indonesian War of 1992

[Major Events in the M.I. War and Scenarios 1 to 5] A preliminary description and general overview of our hypothetical war may be described as follows. In the area of water between Java, Sumatra, and Borneo, there is an island called Janipatra of approximately 50,000 sq. km. which of course is part of Indonesia. On Jan. 5, 1992, the Indonesian air force makes a surprise attack against Penang, Malaysia, and on Jan. 6, Malaysia declares war against Indonesia. During the course of the war, Indonesian troops also attack some southern areas of Thailand and Cambodia. A Malaysian general serves as Supreme Commander of the Malaysian, Thai, Cambodian, and Papua New Guinean forces. A number of military officers from other countries are hired as advisors.

2 All military attacks against installations and fortifications throughout the Indonesian archipelago (of course including Janipatra) were conducted by Malaysian military troops. Indonesia is of course a large geographic area, and due to manpower shortages, the surrender ceremonies for some areas of Indonesia were delegated to coalition forces. In particular, the handling of Janipatra island was delegated to Cambodian military troops, and some islands in the northeastern sector of the Indonesian archipelago were delegated to Thai military troops.

The King of Indonesia announced his unconditional surrender on Sept. 15, 1992, and the formal surrender ceremonies were held on Oct. 2nd in a Malaysian warship anchored off the coast of Singapore. Later, the Cambodian military commanders accepted the surrender of Indonesian troops in Junipatra on Nov. 25th.

In the post war peace treaty of 1996 (Treaty of Vladivostok), the following specifications are notable. (1) The coalition forces and other parties to the treaty recognize (a) the full sovereignty of the Indonesian people over Indonesia and its territorial waters, (b) the independence of East Timor. (2) Indonesia cedes the northern one-fifth of Sumatra island, and Malaysia is designated as the “receiving country.” (3) Indonesia renounces all right, title and claim to Janipatra island. However, no "receiving country" for Janipatra island is specified. (4) According to the geographical coordinates given in the treaty, it is unclear whether the Talamel island group, total area 6 sq. km., and located approx. 100 km. southeast of East Timor, is to be considered part of Indonesia or not.

In order to discuss the relationship between military occupation and the specifications of the peace treaty in more detail, we need to present a number of Axioms. (These axioms must be understood within the framework of the customary laws of warfare.)

[AXIOM 1] Military Occupation and Military Government Military occupation is conducted under military government. Explanatory Notes: Military government is the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises government authority over occupied territory.

The interlude under the jurisdiction of the military government of “the occupying power” is a transitional period. However, since the term "transitional" has many other uses in English, we can avoid confusion by referring to this as a period of "interim status." (See Axiom 2)

3 [AXIOM 2] Political Status Military occupation is period of "interim (political) status." The occupied territory is said to be “in interim status under the law of occupation.” Since the territory has not reached a final (political) status, it is a sub-sovereign entity. Explanatory Notes: The status of the territory can also be described as “undetermined,” or as an “independent customs area.”

For Janipatra island, in order to discuss the responsibilities of the troops conducting the military occupation, and the rights of the local populace, we need to first determine who “the occupying power” is. Unfortunately, neither the Hague nor Geneva Conventions define the terminology of “the occupying power.” However, some simple analysis can be undertaken as follows.

For occupied territory, HR 42 requires the establishment of military authority that can be exercised. In Janipatra, the Cambodian military troops have accepted the surrender of Indonesian troops, raised the Cambodian flag, established a headquarters office, taken physical control of property, and are exercising actual and effective jurisdiction over local persons, businesses, organizations, etc. The question is: Can we conclude that Cambodia “the occupying power”?

The answer is No. This is explained by looking at the evolution of the concept of military occupation. We can provide a general summary by saying that in the pre- Napoleonic era, in most parts of the world, the "conqueror" merely annexed the territory, and was recognized as the "annexor".

In the post-Napoleonic world, these customary norms began to change, so international law said that the "conqueror" could only be regarded as “the occupying power". This was more formally codified in the Hague Conventions of 1907. Moreover, it is important to recognize that the military occupation of any area can be delegated to co-belligerents (i.e. "allies" or “coalition troops”). (See Axiom 3)

[AXIOM 3] The Principal Occupying Power, (specification 1) The terminology of "the occupying power" as spoken of in the customary laws of warfare is most properly rendered as "the principal occupying power," or alternatively as "the (principal) occupying power." This is because the law of agency is always available.

4 Explanatory Notes: When the administrative authority for the military occupation of particular areas is delegated to other troops, a "principal -- agent" relationship is in effect. (FT2)

Principal occupying power may be abbreviated as p.o.p. (FT3)

(See Axiom 4)

[AXIOM 4] The Principal Occupying Power, (specification 2) The conqueror is the principal occupying power. Explanatory Notes: In regard to the geographic scope covered by a particular peace treaty, the p.o.p. can be assigned via specifications of the treaty, or it can be determined based on the historical data.

In this Malaysian Indonesian War scenario, Malaysia is the p.o.p.

The post-war peace treaty has two territorial cessions: (1) the northern one-fifth of Sumatra and (2) Janipatra. (FT4) Interestingly, for Janipatra there has been no specification of a “receiving country.” We may call this a “limbo cession.”

Next, we need to examine the criteria for determining the end of the military occupation of different areas of Indonesia. As stated in the peace treaty, the full sovereignty of Indonesia is recognized. Under international law, who has taken the principal role in making this recognition? In the event of any current or future dispute over the territorial boundaries of “Indonesia,” who has the authority to make a final decision? The answer to both questions is Malaysia, the p.o.p.

Hence, upon the coming into force of the post-war peace treaty on April 28, 1996, Indonesia’s sovereignty over its own territory, within the boundaries as defined in the peace treaty, is recognized. In practical terms, this means that a civil government for Indonesia is in place and functioning. Hence, military occupation in Indonesia proper has ended with the coming into force of the peace treaty. (FT5) (See Axiom 8)

[AXIOM 8] Peace Treaty, (specification 1) The designation of a "receiving country" for a territorial cession in a peace treaty means that the Legislative Branch of the "receiving country" is authorized to pass legislation to establish civil government in the territory.

5 Explanatory Notes: (A) It should be recognized that at the point of cession, the territory is actually being ceded to the military government of the p.o.p. (B) Before the receiving country’s civil government begins operations, the territory remains under the jurisdiction of the p.o.p. and in “interim status.” (C) Without the appropriate specifications in a treaty, there is no authorization for any “country” to establish civil government in the territory.

However, what about the situations of the northern one-fifth of Sumatra island and the entirety of Janipatra island? Has the military occupation of these two territorial cessions ceased? Has the military occupation of the undemarcated Talamel island group ceased as well?

The answer in each case is No. The fundamental “legal logic” for examining this type of problem must be obtained by looking at the establishment of civil government operations in the Spanish American War cessions of Puerto Rico and Cuba. Both of these territories originally belonged to Spain. Dates for the surrender of Spanish troops in these areas are usually given as July 17, 1898, and Aug. 12, 1898, respectively, thus providing a convenient date to mark the beginning of the belligerent occupation. In the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899), Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States. Spain also ceded Cuba but without specifying a “receiving country.”

Civil government in Puerto Rico, based on the provisions of a law (FT6) passed by the US Congress, began operations on May 1, 1900, thus supplanting United States Military Government (USMG) in the territory.

Civil government operations in Cuba began on May 20, 1902, under the name of the Republic of Cuba. These civil government operations supplanted USMG in Cuba. (FT7)

The “Isle of Pines” (with an area 3056 sq. km., located 100 km to the southwest of mainland Cuba, across the Gulf of Batabano) was not mentioned in the treaty or US Congressional resolutions which defined Cuba's boundaries. This was a source of dispute until finally resolved in 1925. (See Axiom 9)

[AXIOM 9] Peace Treaty, (specification 2) In regard to a territorial cession or undemarcated territory in a peace treaty, the military government of the principal occupying power does not end with

6 the coming into force of the treaty, but continues until supplanted by a recognized “civil government” for the area. Explanatory Notes: This so-called “recognized ‘civil government’ ” should not be confused with (i) a “civil affairs administration” of the military government of the p.o.p., (ii) a “provisional” or “transitional” civil government which is established by the local populace and operates under the military government of the p.o.p.

After the Mexican American War, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo came into force on July 4, 1848. The issue of whether the military government of the (principal) occupying power (i.e. the United States) in California had actually ended on that date was later addressed by the US Supreme Court. In Cross v. Harrison (1853) the Justices concluded that it had not. This conclusion was reaffirmed in later cases as well. (FT8)

In summary, in regard to the northern one-fifth of Sumatra, after the peace treaty comes into effect, the Parliament of Malaysia must pass a law to provide for a civil government for this area, which we can call “the relevant civil government legislation.” International practice dictates that the local populace be given a minimum of one year to decide whether to retain their original nationality, to accept the nationality of the new government, and whether or not to emigrate from the area. Military occupation of this territorial cession under the Federation of Malaysia Military Government (FMMG) continues until supplanted by civil government operations, which must be based on “the relevant civil government legislation.”

For the territorial cession of Janipatra, no “receiving country” has been designated. In other words, no country is authorized to pass “the relevant civil government legislation” for the territory. Hence, military occupation of this territorial cession under FMMG will continue until legally supplanted at some future date. Military occupation is not “annexation,” moreover the fact that the administrative authority for the military occupation of Janipatra has been delegated to Cambodian military troops should always be kept in mind. Under such an arrangement, Cambodia is serving the role of a subordinate occupying power.

Unfortunately, even after the coming into force of the peace treaty, it is often seen that the Talamel island group, or different parts thereof, now often rotates under the control of military squadrons from Indonesia, East Timor, and Papua New Guinea. Under such circumstances, the military troops of these countries can only be regarded

7 as serving in the role of subordinate occupying powers. (At some appropriate future time, this territorial dispute must be resolved by negotiations between the principal occupying power and representatives of these countries.)

With this background information, let us examine multiple scenarios for the determination of Janipatra’s final political status.

The Political Future for Janipatra Island

Indonesia ceded Janipatra in the peace treaty without designating a “receiving country.” Nevertheless, the general consensus of the world community does not support independence for Janipatra. The King of Malaysia has also stated his current opposition to any moves toward independence. However, even without independence, the status of a self-governing territory under the administrative authority of FMMG would be one possible option. Indeed, this would be one form of “self determination” for the territory.

-- INSERT CHART #1 --

Clearly, now that the peace treaty has come into effect, in order to be a self-governing territory under FMMG, Janipatra needs to form its own government.

Scenario 1 -- Tribal Governments: In one possibility, after the Malaysian Indonesian War, Janipatra has descended into a rather chaotic situation, and different areas of the island are now effectively organized into loose forms of tribal governments, which have little or no contact between one another. There appears to be no "government of Janipatra" which is coalescing.

Scenario 2 -- Dual Governments: Another possibility is that after the Malaysian Indonesian War, two different political groups have emerged in Junipatra and are now engaged in organizational activities for establishing a new government, including the writing of a Constitution, the recruiting of members for a new congress, the selection of judges, the designing of a territorial flag, the choice of a Governor-President, etc.

8 Scenario 3 -- Standard Government Formation: A more straightforward set of circumstances would be to imagine that after the Malaysian Indonesian War, a group of scholars and politicians have come together, along with the support of local NGOs, to petition the Malaysian Parliament to make a determination of their “civil rights and political status.” Next, they would petition for permission to call a constitutional convention to draft a constitution for Janipatra territory.

Scenario 4 -- Subordinate Occupying Power Influence: Another possibility is to say that the Thai authorities have repeatedly stressed to the king of Malaysia that the situation in Janipatra is unstable, and that the Cambodian military troops are incapable of administering the island in an effective manner. They have urged that Thailand be allowed to annex the island, in order to promote long-term peace throughout the South East Asian region.

Scenario 5 -- Outside Party Influence: Still another possibility is to imagine that over the past twenty years, more and more Australian businesspersons have established local businesses in Janipatra. In addition, the Australian government has offered many free study tours and sightseeing tours for the local people to live and study in Australia. As a result, the people in Janipatra have come to identify with the Australian way of life. Many persons are advocating that the island become an overseas territory of Australia.

Overview

Before entering the Malaysian Indonesian War, Malaysia renounced any intention to annex any islands except possibly Sumatra. In the post-war peace treaty, Janipatra was ceded by Indonesia, but no “receiving country” was specified. In our hypothetical example, any one of the five above scenarios might represent the reality of the situation for the “limbo cession” of Janipatra after the coming into effect of the post-war peace treaty (Indeed, even more scenarios are possible, and two additional ones are presented below.) However, at the most basic level, we must ask: Who will decide on the parameters of a future political status for Janipatra? Who will put Janipatra on a flight-path for determination of its final political status?

9 The only possible answer is that the King of Malaysia, in consultation with his Cabinet members and other experts, will decide. This is because the King of Malaysia (as “head of state”) has plenary powers over foreign affairs. After the coming into effect of the peace treaty, and when Janipatra is still in a "transitory period" (interim status) under military occupation, Janipatra's status is that of a sub-sovereign entity, and it is "foreign territory under the dominion of Malaysia." Hence, the possible outcomes for the above five scenarios can be condensed as follows:

In the event that Scenario 1 occurs, the King of Malaysia can choose for official Malaysian policy to be to nurture one of the local groups to develop into the "government of Janipatra." This government can then rule the island with a large degree of autonomy, while still being under the administrative authority of FMMG. (FT9) (FT10) Alternatively, the King can choose to look into one of the other Scenarios.

In the event that Scenario 2 occurs, the King of Malaysia can choose which of the local governments appears to be most friendly to Malaysia, and then recognize that government as legitimate. In the future, that government can rule the island with a large degree of autonomy while still being under the administrative authority of FMMG. (FT10)

In the event that Scenario 3 occurs, the Malaysian Parliament can hold hearings to determine the “civil rights and political status” of the native inhabitants. Next, it can appoint a panel of constitutional scholars and other experts to advise the Janipatran people, and then grant permission for the calling of a constitutional convention in Janipatra. (FT11)

In the event that Scenario 4 occurs, the King of Malaysia, in conjunction with the King of Thailand can meet in Pattaya and issue a Pattaya Communique, wherein it is specified that Thailand is the lawful government of Janipatra. (FT12) (FT13) The King can then wait for the Thais and the Janipatrans to determine how the annexation will proceed. When the Thai civil government is set up in Janipatra and ready to assume control, the King of Malaysia can then unfetter the sovereignty of the island to them.

In the event that Scenario 5 occurs, the King of Malaysia, in conjunction with the Governor-General of Australia can meet in Canberra and issue a Canberra Communique, wherein it is specified that Australia is the lawful government of

10 Janipatra. (FT13) (FT14) The King can then wait for the Australians and the Janipatrans to determine how the annexation will proceed. When the Australian civil government is set up in Janipatra and ready to assume control, the King of Malaysia can then unfetter the sovereignty of the island to them.

As a summary of the above five scenarios for the “limbo cession” of Janipatra, all are based on the premise that the world community does not favor Janipatra’s independence at the present time. Hence, depending on different circumstances which might develop, #1, #2, and #3 provide for the local people in Janipatra to form their own government as a largely self-governing territory under the administrative authority of FMMG. #4 provides for the people of Janipatra and the people of Thailand to reach some accord on the details of a future “unification,” then for the government of Thailand to pass legislation to establish civil government in Janipatra, with the island becoming an overseas territory of Thailand. #5 provides for the the people of Janipatra and the people of Australia to reach some accord on the details of a future “unification,” then for government of Australia to pass legislation to establish civil government in Janipatra, with the island becoming an overseas territory of Australia. Under current international practice and democratic norms, regardless of which scenario is selected, it would be expected that the people of Janipatra would still have the option of becoming independent some day in the future.

International humanitarian law says that “military occupation does not transfer sovereignty.” However, government officials in many countries are still perplexed when asked the questions: “Does the sovereignty of an area under military occupation disappear? Or where does it go?” (See Axiom 5)

[AXIOM 5] Quasi-trusteeship of Sovereignty The sovereignty of an area under military occupation is held by the principal occupying power in the form of a fiduciary relationship during the period of interim status. Explanatory Notes: This is not “ownership” in the typical sense that that term is used, but more of a “quasi-trusteeship.” In other words, the p.o.p. has disposition rights over the territory, but those rights do not include “annexation.” Military occupation is an exercise in the rights of sovereignty. A fiduciary relationship arises under the law of occupation with the p.o.p. as the trustee, and the occupied territory as trust corpus, and the future citizens of the territory (when it has achieved “final status”) as beneficiaries. The occupying power is regarded as administrator and usufructuary of the public

11 buildings, real property, forests, and agricultural works belonging to the occupied territory.

This axiom applies equally well to four types of territory. (These four types of territory are illustrated in the above M.I. War example.) [a] for territory which is not a territorial cession in a peace treaty, such as “Indonesia proper,” [b] for a territory ceded in a peace treaty, with a designated recipient, such as the northern one-fifth of Sumatra Island, [c] for a territory ceded in a peace treaty, but without a designated recipient, (i.e. “limbo cession”), such as Janipatra island, [d] for territory within the geographic scope of a peace treaty, but which is not specifically mentioned (i.e. is “undemarcated territory”), such as the Talamel island group in the above example.

These four types of territory emerge again (like phoenixes) from the military occupation. The determination of territorial boundaries is made by the p.o.p.

Let us now move on and examine further details of Janipatra’s situation. This will involve additional levels of complications.

[Major Events in the M.I. War (continued) and Scenarios 6 to 7] Formerly, in May 1992 during the heat of the war effort, an international peace conference was held in Cordoba, Spain. At the conference, it was revealed that certain religious sects in Cambodia had traditionally believed that Janipatra had once been an island located in the Gulf of Thailand directly off the Cambodian coast. However, in ages past, due to the effect of tsunamis and underwater landslides, it drifted away to its current position in Indonesia. Thus, it would be most proper that the island be awarded to Cambodia after the war. In order to secure Cambodia’s continuing cooperation in the war effort, a press release after the conference specified that “all the territories Indonesia has stolen from the Cambodians, such as Janipatra, shall be restored to the Royal Government of Cambodia.”

At an international conference in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in late Aug. 1992, a number of conclusions were announced by the Asian leaders in attendance. In Annex II, under the heading of “Proclamation Defining Terms for Indonesian Surrender,” the following specifications were particularly notable --

12 (8) The terms of the Cordoba Declaration shall be carried out and Indonesian sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Sumatra, Java, Lesser Sunda Islands, Borneo, Celebes (Sulawesi), Western New Guinea, and such minor islands as we determine.

In the Instrument of Surrender signed on Oct. 2, 1992, the representatives of Indonesia agreed to “ ….. accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued by the heads of state of the Asian nations Aug. 28, 1992 at Porto Alegre …. ”

Unfortunately, in Oct. 1994, before the post-war peace treaty was even drafted, there was a bloody coup d’etat in Cambodia. High ranking officials, military officers, and over 2 million civilians of the Royal Government of Cambodia fled to Janipatra island. A new government named “Progressive Kingdom of Cambodia” (PKC) was founded on Nov. 11 in Phnom Penh. The current population of PKC is approx. 11 million.

Neither the representatives of the RGC nor PKC were invited to sign the post war peace treaty.

During the intervening years, the government officials of “Cambodia in Janipatra” have continually claimed to be the representatives of the “sole legitimate government of Cambodia.” Indeed, they are recognized as such by the United Nations, and by over 85 world nations, (although their number of diplomatic allies is dwindling year by year). Meanwhile, representatives of the PKC continually petition the United Nations to be admitted as a new member.

Scenario 6 -- Cambodian Annexation: It has now become apparent that upon the surrender of Indonesian troops in Janipatra on Nov. 25, 1992, the Cambodian military officers immediately announced “Janipatra Retrocession Day.” This announced annexation of Janipatra territory was based on the provisions of the Cordoba Declaration, Porto Alegre Proclamation, Indonesian Surrender documents, and traditional Cambodian beliefs.

After the coming into effect of the peace treaty on April 28, 1996, the Cambodian government in Kitu-kitu (Janipatra’s capital city) further bolster their claim to Janipatra based on the principle of uti possidetis, also noting that with a [a] defined territory, [b] permanent population, [c] government, and [d] capacity to

13 engage in foreign relations, “Cambodia in Janipatra” meets the Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood.

Although the PKC has been lobbying hard for United Nations membership, the RGC has stated that there is no justification international law for it to give up its seat in the United Nations as the legal government of Cambodia. Meanwhile, Janipatra has been admitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an “independent customs area.”

Scenario 7 -- New Cambodian Government Influence: After the coming into power of the “Progressive Kingdom of Cambodia,” the entire country has modernized and has attracted much new foreign investment. Several industrial parks and commercial centers have been opened. The living standards of the local population have improved dramatically. Branches of European universities have been established in some cities. Contracts for major infrastructure improvements have been awarded to European, North American, and Malaysia firms. Local history books stress that Janipatra is an inalienable part of Cambodian territory. In respect for the country’s cultural and ethnic sensibilities, and in consideration of their common cultural background, many persons in Asia and elsewhere are now strongly advocating that Janipatra island should be “re-united” with its Cambodian motherland.

At the beginning of this paper, the authors stated that even a thorough reading of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the ICRC Commentaries, etc. is inadequate preparation to dissect the complexities of regime change due to “territorial cession” in a peace treaty. This “Cambodian annexation of Janipatra Island” provides a very good example of the difficulties involved. Without the axioms which the authors have derived above, it will be virtually impossible for any group of concerned observers to analyze the legitimacy of this regime change and reach some sort of consensus.

The simple fact of the matter is that Janipatra is still occupied territory. Malaysia is the p.o.p. International humanitarian law states that “military occupation does not transfer sovereignty.” (See Axiom 6)

[AXIOM 6] Military Occupation Does Not Equal Annexation

14 The invoking of various “legal” or “quasi-legal” doctrines in the prelude to, beginning of, or at any time during the continuation of the military occupation does not legitimatize an annexation of the territory. Explanatory Notes: (A) In the post Napoleonic period, transfer of territorial sovereignty is accomplished by treaty. Other “legal” or “quasi-legal” rationale (FT15), in and of themselves, do not accomplish transfer of territorial sovereignty. (B) Furthermore, outside the specifications of the peace treaty, such rationale cannot serve as valid justification for annexation of the territory by an occupying power. (C) Any actions of an occupying power can be evaluated from the perspective of whether or not they are leading to a “prospective” or “impending” annexation of the territory, and if so, such actions are illegal.

The Montevideo Convention and its Blindspots

To clarify this further, it must be recognized that the so-called criteria for "statehood" as outlined in the Montevideo Convention of 1934 take no notice of the extenuating circumstances of [a] governments in exile, [b] military occupation, [c] complicated situations of territorial cession with no clear transfer of title, etc.

The stated Cambodian annexation of Janipatra island given in Scenario 6 is invalid for many reasons. First, the military occupation of Janipatra has not ceased, because FMMG in Janipatra has not ended. Moreover, there has been no transfer of the title to the island to Cambodia. (FT16)

Nevertheless, since the government of “Cambodia in Janipatra” has issued Cambodian ID documents to all members of the local populace, promulgated its Cambodian Constitution as the organic law of the area, and instituted mandatory military conscription policies over local males, to all casual observers it certainly appears to be the legal government of the area. In this way, it seems that Janipatra has become a sovereign nation under the title of the “Royal Government of Cambodia.”

Additionally, most political analysts are confused that the King of Malaysia continues to recognize the current government in Janipatra as the “lawful government of Cambodia,” while at the same time saying that Janipatra is not a sovereign nation.

At some day in the future, in order to deal with this political and diplomatic problem, it would be expected that Malaysia would announce his decision to break relations

15 with the RGC, and to recognize the PKC regime in Phnom Penh. At a meeting in the historic town of Siem Reap, the head of state of the PKC, the King of Malaysia, in accompaniment with their national security advisers, etc. would meet. After their discussions, they would jointly issue an Angkor Wat Communique, wherein the following specifications would be made -- The Federal Parliamentary Democracy of Malaysia acknowledges that all Cambodians on either side of the Gulf of Thailand maintain there is but one Cambodia and that Janipatra is a part of Cambodia. The Malaysian Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Janipatra question by the Cambodians themselves ……

This Communique puts Scenario 7 into motion. (FT17) The King of Malaysia can then wait for the new Cambodian (PKC) government and the old Cambodian (RGC) government in Janipatra (FT18) to determine how the annexation will proceed. When the PKC civil government is set up in Janipatra and ready to assume control, the King of Malaysia can then unfetter the sovereignty of the island to them. (See Axiom 10)

[AXIOM 10] Peace Treaty, (specification 3) In regard to a limbo cession or undemarcated territory in a peace treaty, the principal occupying power can conclude a civil affairs agreement with another nation to make arrangements for a future intended final disposition. Explanatory Notes: With the obvious exception of the p.o.p., the other nation(s) involved in civil affairs agreement(s) are not restricted to those who are parties to the peace treaty.

When is the end of military occupation? (See Axiom 7)

[AXIOM 7] End of Military Occupation Military government continues until legally supplanted. In other words, military occupation ends when the military government of the principal occupying power is legally supplanted by a recognized “civil government” for the area. Explanatory Notes: (A) The stipulations of GC 6 regarding the end of military occupation must be understood within this context. (B) The fact that this so-called “recognized ‘civil government’ ” may itself be deemed a “provisional,” “transitional,” “interim,” etc. civil government does not affect the application of this Axiom. (C) However, the movement of

16 population via immigration into, and emigration out of, the occupied territory would invalidate the application of this Axiom. (FT19)

PART 2. Regime Change in Former Japanese Areas

Introduction

As explained in the above M.I. War example, for the territory included in the geographic scope of the peace treaty, the p.o.p. will make a determination of territorial boundaries, have disposition rights over the territory, and will hold the territorial title during the period of “interim status” under the law of occupation.

Hence, in order to analyze the situations of the limbo cessions and other undemarcated territory in the SFPT, it will first be necessary to determine who the p.o.p. is. This information is included in Article 23 of the treaty which specifies the United States as the principal occupying power.

Under the United States form of government, Senate-ratified treaties form a part of the supreme law of the land. The “territorial clause” of the US Constitution (Article 4, Sect. 3, Clause 2) states – The Congress shall have Powers to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States .....

US Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall offered this penetrating analysis in the famous American Insurance Company case 26 US 511 (1828): "The Constitution confers absolutely on the government of the Union the powers of making war and of making treaties; consequently, that government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty."

And more explicitly, in United States v. Huckabee, 83 US 414 (1872), the Court speaking through Mr. Justice Clifford, said: "Power to acquire territory either by conquest or treaty is vested by the Constitution in the United States. Conquered territory, however, is usually held as a mere military occupation until the fate of the nation from which it is conquered is determined.... "

17 The disposition of territory acquired under the principle of conquest must be conducted according to the laws of war. (FT20) In the most general terms, that will mean military occupation followed by a peace settlement. If there is a territorial cession involved, then there needs to be a formal peace treaty.

For territory which has been “acquired” by the United States under the principle of conquest, then under ideal circumstances the peace treaty specifies a final disposition. In the peace treaty in the M.I. War example, Indonesia proper was recognized as having full sovereignty. The SFPT also recognized Japan as having full sovereignty. In practical terms this means that a civil government for the area is in place and fully functioning when the peace treaty comes into effect.

For a simple territorial cession where a “receiving country” is designated, the Legislative Branch of the receiving country must pass legislation to establish a civil government in the territory. In our M.I War example, this was the northern one-fifth of Sumatra island.

For a territorial cession where no “receiving country” is designated, the p.o.p. must make arrangements for the final disposition of the territory. In our M.I. War example, this was Janipatra Island. Although the local people in the island would have preferred Scenario 3, the King of Malaysia actually adopted Scenario 7. Under the SFPT, the United States Military Government (USMG) has disposition rights over the territorial title to Article 2 and Article 3 geographic areas, and will determine the territorial boundaries. (FT21) (FT22) The Commander in Chief is head of the military arm of the US government and can represent USMG. In 1972, he completed an arrangement with the People’s Republic of China effectively stating that Formosa & the Pescadores (aka Taiwan) should be “unified” with the PRC at some unspecified future date.

No similar specifications have been made in regard to the Kurile Island group however.

For the undemarcated area of Dokdo, it is in a disputed border area between Japan and Korea, and certainly within the geographic scope of the treaty. For the undemarcated area of the Senkakus, it is in a disputed border area between “Formosa & the Pescadores” and Japan. Alternatively however, it may fall under the scope of Article 2 or Article 3 of the peace treaty.

18 USMG has the authority to decide on the parameters of a future political status for territories included in Articles 2 or 3. These areas are considered acquired by the United States under the principle of conquest, and the disposition thereof must be conducted according to the laws of war. The Commander in Chief is head of the military arm of the US government. Arguably, at this late date, the Sec. of Defense is the head of USMG. Hence, they would have the authority to make final determination of which country should be granted sovereignty over these territorial disputes. It would be expected that they would delegate the determination of these issues to, and/or coordinate closely with, the US Secretary of State. If the Executive Branch fails to act, or acts in an improper manner, then the Congress can assume jurisdiction under the territorial clause of the US Constitution.

In addition, the US Congress has the authority to make a determination of the “civil rights and political status” of native persons in territory acquired by the United States (FT23). This can serve as one form of “checks and balances” to any actions of political expediency made by the Executive Branch.

-- INSERT CHART #2 --

Five-part Overview

The following five-part overview for making sovereignty determinations for the Southern Kuriles, Northern Kuriles, Senkakus, Dokdo, and “Formosa & the Pescadores” can thus be presented (FT24) Additionally, the situation of the Kinmen and Mazu island groups is discussed separately in Item E.

Item A Island Group: Southern Kuriles or Lower Kurile Islands. (These islands include the Habomai islets, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu.) Category: SFPT limbo cession SFPT Article: 2c Alternate Japanese nomenclature: Northern Territories or Southern Chishima Original Owners (pre-WWII): Japan (via 1855 Treaty) Previous Ownership Claims: 1. Pre-1855 ownership claims are no longer recognized. In other words, upon the coming into force of the 1855 Treaty, all previous claims of other parties

19 regarding the ownership of the Kuriles, whether due to history, culture, language, race, geography, geology, etc. became null and void. 2. The Southern Kuriles were part of Japan in the WWII period Status of territory after surrender of Japanese troops: occupied territory Principal occupying power: United States of America Determination of territorial boundaries, disposition rights over territory, & interim status holding of territorial title: USMG Native Population: Yes Current passports held by native population: Russian Potentially Valid Claimants [Entity, Structure of Claims, Political Status]: 1. South Kurile people, via organization of self-governing territory under USMG, with S. Kuriles remaining in “interim status” 2. Government of Japan, as part of Japan, with S. Kuriles obtaining “final status” 3. [Other claimants could be considered if valid and coherent legal rationale could be advanced.] Complicating Factors: 1. Russia is a not a party to the SFPT, and cannot benefit from the Treaty. (FT25) 2. Many Japanese scholars maintain that in the discussions regarding the preparation of the SFPT, the “Kurile Islands” in Article 2c were intended to designate those islands beginning with Uruppu and extending further north. 3. In relation to their handling of the Southern Kuriles beginning in Sept. 1945, the Russian officials have violated the laws of war on many occasions, including (1) announced annexation of the islands, (2) forced emigration of native inhabitants from the islands, (3) immigration of Russian citizens into the islands, etc. Current local government administration & its legal status: At present, in the Southern Kuriles, Russia is a subordinate occupying power Additional Explanation: 1. The Southern Kuriles fall within the geographic boundaries covered by SFPT Article 2c. Therefore, according to Article 4b, USMG has disposition rights over the “title” to these areas. 2. Russia cannot be regarded as a potentially valid claimant for the territorial title of the South Kuriles due to the complicating factors discussed above. 3. At present, there are no prominent “independence” or “self governing

20 territory” movements in the islands. 4. In Oct. 1993, Japan and Russia agreed that " ... negotiations towards an early conclusion of a peace treaty through the solution of this issue on the basis of historical and legal facts and based on the documents produced with the two countries' agreement as well as on the principles of law and justice should continue, and that the relations between the two countries should thus be fully normalized.” 5. In consideration of all the above factors, the government of Japan is in the best position to petition the US Sec. of State to coordinate with the Commander in Chief and Sec. of Defense for resolution of this territorial dispute. Hartzell-Lin Recommendation: The sovereignty of the Southern Kuriles should be awarded to Japan.

Item B Island Group: Northern Kuriles (These islands include Uruppu and all islands lying to the north of Uruppu) Category: SFPT limbo cession SFPT Article: 2c Original Owners (pre-WWII): Russia (via 1855 Treaty) Previous Ownership Claims: 1. Pre-1855 ownership claims are no longer recognized. 2. Arguably the Northern Kuriles were under the control of Japan up through Aug. 1945. Status of territory after surrender of Japanese troops: occupied territory Principal occupying power: United States of America Determination of territorial boundaries, disposition rights over territory, & interim status holding of territorial title: USMG Native Population: Yes Current passports held by native population: Russian Potentially Valid Claimants [Entity, Structure of Claims, Political Status]: 1. Northern Kurile people, via organization of self-governing territory under USMG, with N. Kuriles remaining in “interim status” 2. Government of Russia, as part of Russia, with Northern Kuriles obtaining “final status” 3. [Other claimants could be considered if valid and coherent legal rationale could be advanced.]

21 Complicating Factors: 1. Under international law, Russian cannot claim to have undisputed sovereignty over these areas since Russia is not a party to the SFPT. 2. A peace treaty between Russian and Japan has yet to be drafted. Current local government administration & its legal status: In the disputed islands of the North Kuriles, Russia is a subordinate occupying power Additional Explanation: 1. The Northern Kuriles fall within the geographic boundaries covered by SFPT Article 2c. Therefore, according to Article 4b, USMG has disposition rights over the “title” to these areas. However, the only other possible claimant, Japan, is not known to be advancing any ownership claims over these islands in the current era. 2. At present, there are no prominent “independence” or “self governing territory” movements in the islands. 3. Hence, after agreeing to the resolution of the territorial dispute regarding the Southern Kurile islands, as specified in Item A, a peace treaty between Russia and Japan should be concluded. Territorial boundaries between the two countries can be specified in the peace treaty, and the United States can also be a party to the treaty. Hartzell-Lin Recommendation: The sovereignty of Russia over the Northern Kurile island group should be recognized in the Russian Japanese Peace Treaty.

Item C Island Group: Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Category: SFPT undemarcated territory SFPT Article: Article 3 or Article 2 or arguably undemarcated Original Owners (pre-WWII): Japan Previous Ownership Claims: 1. Pre-1895 ownership claims are no longer recognized. In other words, it is indisputable that as of closing years of the 1800’s the entire Ryukyu Island chain, stretching southwest from the Japanese island of Kyushu for over 1,050 km, plus Formosa & the Pescadores, were under Japanese sovereignty. Status of territory after surrender of Japanese troops: occupied territory Principal occupying power: United States of America (later with UN Trusteeship

22 arrangement in place as of 1947) Determination of territorial boundaries, disposition rights over territory, & interim status holding of territorial title: USMG Native Population: no Current passports held by native population: [not applicable] Potentially Valid Claimants [Entity, Structure of Claims, Political Status]: 1. Already returned to Japan as part of 1971 agreement, effective May 1972. Complicating Factors: 1. The Senkakus have no native population. 2. After a referendum, the complete return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan was completed as of May 15, 1972. According to the geographical coordinates specified, the Senkakus were/are included in the Ryukyu island chain. Current local government administration & its legal status: military garrisons of Japan, as the lawful government of the area. Additional Explanation: 1. The Ryukyus consist of three major island groups. The northern group is the Satsunan Islands, including the Osumi Islands, Tokara Islands, & Amami Islands. The central group is the Ryukyu Shoto, including the Okinawa Islands, Kerama Islands, & Daito Islands. The southern group is the Sakishima Islands, including the Miyako Islands, Yaeyama Islands, & (arguably) the Senkaku Islands.

2. A thorough overview of the SFPT strongly suggests that the Senkakus are part of the geographical area included in Article 3 territory. As such, these islands were part of the Ryukyu Island group administered as a trusteeship by USMG until the early 1970’s.

3. However, some scholars maintain a different view, arguing that the Senkakus are part of “Formosa & the Pescadores,” ceded to Japan in 1895 and “returned” to China after WWII. This argument is erroneous however because the military troops of Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) were/are only exercising delegated administrative authority for the military occupation of “Formosa & the Pescadores” beginning Oct. 25, 1945. Moreover, in the SFPT Japan ceded “Formosa & the Pescadores” without designating a “receiving country.” Hence, there was no “return” of “Formosa & the Pescadores” to China after WWII.

4. Even if the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) island group is considered as undemarcated territory under the terms of the SFPT, the determination of the territorial boundaries, disposition rights over the territory, and interim status holding

23 of the territorial title all fall in the hands of USMG.

5. Since the United States government’s official position is that the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) island group was already returned to Japan in 1972, a result has already been achieved. In summary, this island group is now properly viewed as having reached a final status as part of Japan.

Hartzell-Lin Recommendation: The sovereignty of Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) island group should be affirmed.

Item D Island Group: Dokdo (Takeshima) Category: SFPT undemarcated territory SFPT Article: undemarcated Alternate nomenclature: Liancourt Rocks Original Owners (pre-WWII): Japan Previous Ownership Claims: by Korea, as part of Korea. 1. The annexation of Dokdo from Korea by Japan was accomplished under the Shimane Prefecture Inclusion of 1905. 2. Indeed, for all effective purposes the entirety of Korea came under Japanese colonial rule by 1910. Status of territory after surrender of Japanese troops: occupied territory Principal occupying power: United States of America Determination of territorial boundaries, disposition rights over territory, & interim status holding of territorial title: USMG Native Population: no Current passports held by native population: [not applicable] Potentially Valid Claimants [Entity, Structure of Claims, Political Status]: 1. Government of South Korea, as part of South Korea, with Dokdo obtaining “final status” 2. Government of Japan, as part of Japan, with Dokdo obtaining “final status” 3. [Other claimants could be considered if valid and coherent legal rationale could be advanced.] Complicating Factors: 1. Normally speaking, a non-party to a peace treaty cannot receive any benefits from the treaty. Although “Korea” is not a party to the SFPT,

24 however Article 21 clearly outlines the benefits “Korea” is to receive. Moreover, the determination of the exact boundaries between the geographical areas of Articles 1b and 2a is up to the determination of USMG. 2. The ownership of this island group has been debated for over 50 years. 3. Territorial disputes between North and South Korea should be resolved between themselves. Current local government administration & its legal status: military garrisons of South Korea, as a subordinate occupying power Additional Explanation:

1. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) had a policy of excluding Dokdo from Japanese fishing areas and administrative control. This policy was sustained throughout the military occupation of Japan.

2. South Korean military forces have been stationed on the island since April 1953.

3. As a result of the US conquest of Japan, Dokdo can be regarded as acquired territory which to date has reached no final disposition. Since the coming into effect of the SFPT in 1952, there has been much disagreement on Dokdo’s true legal status, and the representatives of USMG (Commander in Chief and Sec. of Defense) have taken no action in making a final determination. Unfortunately, it is unclear from the terms of the treaty whether Dokdo falls within the geographic boundaries covered by Articles 1b or 2a.

4. Under these circumstances, the US Congress can assume jurisdiction based on the territorial clause of the US Constitution. The Republic of Korea should petition the members of the US Congress to make such a determination.

5. The SFPT recognizes the independence of Korea. Currently the Republic of Korea is a member of the United Nations and maintains diplomatic relations with more than 170 countries.

Hartzell-Lin Recommendation: The sovereignty of Dokdo (Takeshima) should be awarded to the Republic of Korea.

Item E

25 Island Group: Formosa & the Pescadores (aka Taiwan) Category: SFPT limbo cession SFPT Article: 2b Original Owners (pre-WWII): Japan, via 1895 Treaty Previous Ownership Claims:

1. Pre-1895 ownership claims are no longer recognized. In other words, upon the coming into force of the 1895 Treaty, all previous claims of China regarding the ownership of “Formosa & the Pescadores,” whether due to history, culture, language, race, geography, geology, etc. became null and void.

2. During the WWII period, and up to April 28, 1952, Taiwan was part of Japan. Status of territory after surrender of Japanese troops: occupied territory Principal occupying power: United States of America Determination of territorial boundaries, disposition rights over territory, & interim status holding of territorial title: USMG Native Population: Yes Current passports held by native population: Republic of China Potentially Valid Claimants [Entity, Structure of Claims, Political Status]: 1. Taiwanese people, via organization of self-governing territory under USMG, with Taiwan remaining in “interim status” 2. [Other claimants could be considered if valid and coherent legal rationale could be advanced.] Complicating Factors:

1. The Shanghai Communique as a “civil affairs agreement” necessitates the governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait first reaching an understanding in regard to “unification,” and that the “Taiwan question” be settled peacefully. Meanwhile, the PRC continues its buildup of ballistic missiles, with over 800 now pointed at the island.

2. Normally speaking, a non-party to a peace treaty cannot receive any benefits from the treaty. Although “China” is not a party to the SFPT, however Article 21 clearly outlines the benefits “China” is to receive. Taiwan is not included. The only possible conclusion is that Taiwan is not ROC territory and local Taiwanese persons are not correctly classified as

26 ROC citizens.

3. In relation to their handling of Taiwan, the Republic of China officials have violated the laws of war on many occasions, including (1) the announcement of “Taiwan Retrocession Day” on Oct. 25, 1945, (2) the announcement of the mass naturalization of native Taiwanese persons as ROC citizens in Jan. 1946, (3) mass Chinese immigration into the territory beginning in the late 1940’s, (4) the implementation of mandatory military conscription policies over local Taiwanese males beginning in the early 1950’s, etc.

4. Green Island, Lanyu (Orchid Island), and some other minor islands off of the perimeter of Formosa have always been administered by, and considered an integral part of, Taiwan. Over and above the consideration of these nearby minor islands, the territorial boundaries of Taiwan are defined in the Taiwan Relations Act, and do not include the island groups of Kinmen, Mazu, the Senkakus (Diaoyutai), or any parts of the Spratlys or the Paracels.

5. The United States derecognized the ROC as the sole legitimate government of China as of Dec. 31, 1978.

6. Under the US Constitution, the US President has plenary power over foreign affairs. At the present time, the US President is opposed to Taiwan independence. Additionally, many members of the United Nations have expressed their objections to Taiwan independence. The United Nations has repeatedly rejected any attempts to have Taiwan admitted as a member.

Current local government administration & its legal status: Republic of China is a subordinate occupying power (beginning Oct. 25, 1945) and government in exile (beginning mid-December 1949) Additional Explanation:

1. Neither the PRC nor the ROC can be regarded as potentially valid claimants for the territorial title of Taiwan due to the complicating factors discussed above.

2. The specifications of the Shanghai Communique have put Taiwan on a “flight- path” for an eventual “unification” with the PRC at some unspecified future date, and this is Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s intended disposition of the “title” of Taiwan territory in accordance with SFPT Article 4b. All successive US administrations have accepted this framework. However, before any such “unification” can take place the governments on both sides of the

27 Taiwan Strait must first reach an accord in regard to a wide range of issues regarding an envisioned “one country, two systems” model under which Taiwan will be governed. No progress on such an accord has been made in the last 30+ years.

3. Taiwan was not ceded to the United States in the SFPT. Hence, under international law, there is no authorization for the US Congress to pass the relevant legislation to provide for the establishment of “civil government” in the territory. However, this does not preclude the Taiwanese forming their own “civil government” (of a “provisional” or “transitional” nature) under USMG and thereby obtaining a large degree of autonomy over their own affairs. Indeed this would be one acceptable form of “self-determination” for the territory even when the world community at present is not disposed toward Taiwan independence.

4. The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of Aug. 5, 1952 contains no stipulations which exceed those of the SFPT.

5. The Taiwan Relations Act states that “The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.” Announcement of the termination of the subordinate occupying power and government in exile Republic of China’s jurisdiction over Taiwan, and recognition of Taiwan’s true status under the US Constitution, would be desirable upgradings to the human rights enjoyed by the Taiwanese people.

6. According to the authors’ extensive research into military occupation issues and the Insular cases of the US Supreme court, the correct classification of Taiwan’s international legal status is “unincorporated territory under USMG,” (FT26) and the local population is correctly classified as US national non-citizens. (FT27)

7. As a self-governing territory under US administrative authority, the Taiwanese people would gain most of the advantages of independence, including a new constitution, new flag, new territorial seal, etc. while effectively maintaining the “status quo” as defined by the USA. The Taiwan Relations Act remains valid. The three bilateral US-PRC Communiques remain in place. The world community’s recognition that the People’s Republic of China is “the sole legitimate government of China” is respected.

8. Notably, the Kinmen (FT28) and Mazu (FT29) Island groups (total land area approx. 185 sq. km.) which lie off of the mainland China coast are not included in the geographical definition of “Taiwan” in the Taiwan Relations Act. These islands should still be considered as territory of the Republic of China. Any

28 future regime change in these “Chinese islands” is still subject to negotiations between the representatives of the ROC and the PRC.

Hartzell-Lin Recommendation: Based on the territorial clause of the US Constitution and the customary law of treaties, the US Congress is authorized to hold hearings to determine the “civil rights and political status” of the native persons in Taiwan or other acquired territory. The Taiwanese people should petition the members of the US Congress to make such a determination. Upon verification of all relevant findings, the Congress should pass a resolution clarifying Taiwan’s international legal status, similar to the specifications made for Guam in 48 USC 1421a. (FT30)