FSTD(A) Evaluation Report

UK Civil Aviation Authority Safety & Airspace Regulation Group Flight Operations FSTD Standards Floor 1NE, Aviation House Gatwick Airport South West Sussex RH6 0YR

Tel: +44 (0) 1293 573716 Fax: +44 (0) 1293 573991 www.caa.co.uk

29th October 2013

UK CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY FSTD EVALUATION REPORT

UK CAA Code (if applicable) : FB-376

EASA FSTD Code (if applicable) : UK/FB-376

Aircraft Type, Class and/or Variant : Boeing 737-300

Engine Fit(s) Simulated : CFM56-3B1 (20K) CFM56-3B2 (22K)

Project No : N/A

1. Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) Characteristics 2. Evaluation Details 3. Supplementary Information 4. Training, Testing and Checking Considerations 5. Classification of Items 6. Results 7. Summary 8. Evaluation Team

This report is PROVISIONAL

The conclusions presented are those of the evaluation team. The UK CAA or EASA (where they are the competent authority), reserves the right to change these after internal review. The qualification certificate finalises the evaluation report, unless a modified report has been issued.

of 15 Template rev 03, 30Sept13 1 Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) Characteristics

(a) FSTD Operator: Quadrant Systems Ltd. (QSL)

(b) FSTD Location: Burgess Hill, UK

(c) FSTD Identification (UK CAA FSTD code / EASA FSTD code): FB-376 / UK/FB-376

(d) FSTD Manufacturer and FSTD serial number: CAE, 2RD4

(e) First entry into service (month / year): 2001 Palma, 2005 Gatwick, 10/2012 Burgess Hill

(f) Visual system (manufacturer and type): FSI VSS Vital VIII, (180 x 40 FoV CRT)

2 UK/FB-376 29th October 2013

(g) Motion system (manufacturer and type): CAE Series 500 (Hydraulics 6 DoF)

(h) Aircraft type and variant: Boeing 737-300

(i) Engine fit(s): CFM56-3B1 (20K) & CFM56-3B2 (22K)

(j) Engine instrumentation: EIS Flight instrumentation: EFIS FMS: Smiths U10.6 Autopilot: Collins SP300

2 Evaluation Details

(a) Date of evaluation: 29th October 2013

(b) Date of previous evaluation: 3rd to 4th October 2012

(c) Type of evaluation: initial recurrent special

(d) FSTD Qualification level recommended: FFS A B C D AG BG CG DG SC FTD 1 2 FNPT I II MCC BITD

(e) Technical criteria primary reference document: JAR-STD 1A, Amendment 1

(f) Validation Data Roadmap (VDR) ID-No.: No formal VDR exists. However, MQTG lists the following sources: Aerodynamic Data: Boeing D6-37908 Rev D (14/5/1999) Engine Model: CFM56-3B1; Boeing D6-37461 Rev M Appendix A refers to Rev N. Flight Controls: Boeing D6-37908 Rev D Also see Appendices to MQTG.

3 Supplementary Information

Company representative(s) Mr P Masters, Mr D Morris, Mr L Mansell (FSTD Operator, Main FSTD user): Capt R Thomas (QSL) Flying time: 4 hours

FSTD seats available: Flight Crew, IOS station (2) plus 3

Visual databases used during EGKK 08R, EGGW 08 & 26. evaluation:

of 15 Specific airfield(s): EGPF 05.

Other None

4 Training, Testing and Checking Considerations

CAT I RVR 550m DH 200ft YES CAT II YES RVR 300m DH 100ft CAT IIIA YES

RVR 200m DH 50 ft LVTO YES RVR 125m Recency YES IFR-Training / Checks YES/YES Type Rating YES Proficiency Checks YES/YES Auto-coupled Approach YES Autoland / Roll Out Guidance YES/N/A ACAS I / II NO/YES(v7.0) Windshear - Windshear Profiles YES Windshear Warning YES Flight Guidance YES Predictive Windshear NO WX-Radar YES HUD / HUGS N/A / N/A FANS N/A GPWS / EGPWS NO/YES ETOPS Capability N/A GPS N/A F1180 Simulator approved items N/A (Flight Engineer: as applicable) Other (describe) None

of 15 5 Guidance material 5.1 Classification of Items

UNACCEPTABLE An item which fails to comply with the required standard and therefore affects the level of qualification or the qualification itself.

If these items are not resolved or clarified within a given time limit (see 5.2), UK CAA or EASA (where they are the competent authority), may have to suspend, vary, restrict, or revoke the FSTD qualification.

RESERVATION An item where compliance with the required standard is not clearly proven and the issue will be reserved for later decision. Resolution of these items will require either:

1. A competent authority policy ruling or 2. Additional substantiation

UNSERVICEABILITY A device, which is temporarily inoperative or performing below its normal level.

RESTRICTION / LIMITATION An item which prevents the full usage of the FSTD according to the training, testing and checking considerations due to unusable devices, systems or parts thereof or due to limitations of the capability of the device as designed.

RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPROVEMENT An item which meets the required standard but where considerable improvement is strongly recommended.

COMMENT Self explanatory.

5.2 Period of Rectification

Reference: AMC2 ARA.FSTD.100(a)(1) Initial evaluation procedure - General

Following an evaluation, it is possible that a number of defects may be identified. Generally these defects should be rectified and the competent authority notified of such action within 30 days. Serious defects, which affect flight crew training, testing and checking, could result in an immediate downgrading of the qualification level, or if any defect remains unattended without good reason for period greater than 30 days, subsequent downgrading may occur or the FSTD Qualification could be revoked.

of 15 6 Results 6.1 Subjective / Functional

A Unacceptable 1 Nil.

B Reservation 1. On the engine out approach with the right engine inoperative, the aircraft appeared to require more rudder trim than one might expect (9 units of trim at an approach weight of about 50,000 Kg., Flap 15). The operator is requested to investigate and to provide more information in this area. 2. During the morning sortie, it was noted that above 30,000 ft. the climb rate was minimal. It was then noted that the OAT was -2C (ISA + 45) and this was found to be due to the temperature gradient having been modified. The operator is requested to investigate and advise how this temperature gradient had been achieved.

C Un-serviceability

1. The thrust levers appeared to be a little loose with noticeable play at idle, particularly on the No.1 throttle. There was also significant notch or series of notches at a throttle angle of about 30 degrees with the No.2 throttle being most significantly affected. 2. There were several defective filaments and these affected the right main gear (red), APU gen (blue) and leading edge device annunciator panel (1 LE Slat Ext, Nos 3 & 4 LE Flaps) 3. On the Captain’s side, the background lighting control knob spins freely and doesn’t control the background lighting. 4. The centre left emergency flood light was unserviceable. 5. The No.2 generator ammeter gauge had numerous cracks that allowed background light leakage. 6. The AFDS lighting only illuminated the centre of the MCP. 7. Both side channels seemed to be brighter than the middle and the left seemed brighter than the right. This was most apparent at night. The day scene seemed to be hazy on the ground and there was some high frequency flickering, most noticeably on the side channels. 8. There was no motion ‘ON’ light. 9. In low visibility conditions, the runway lighting appeared to be too dim and there was some red/white lighting separation.

D Restriction / Limitation 1 Nil.

E Recommendation for Improvement 1 The visuals were below that expected for a modern machine and it is hoped that the refurbished tubes will improve this situation.

F Comment 1 Nil.

6.2 Objective

A Unacceptable 1 Nil

B Reservation 1 Nil

of 15 C Recommendation for Improvement 1 MQTG does not have CAE serial number on front page and Simulator Information summary on page I does not appear to have kept up with simulator updates (e.g. FMS said to be Smiths U8.4, but believed to be Smiths U10.6 and Engine Model CFM56-3B2 has been introduced, presumably at data revision N). 2 Auto-pilot fit does not appear to be defined in the simulator information.

D Comment 1 The following tests were re-run as a current sample:- 4.1.B.5 4.1.C.5.A 4.2.A.6.B 4.2.B.1.C.2. 4.2.B.2.A. 4.2.B.4.B. All of these were satisfactory except 4.1.C.5.A which failed at the first attempt but was subsequently satisfactory. 10 UK/FB-376 29th October 2013

of 15 6.3 Management System / Compliance Monitoring System

Note: This section of the report should contain an explanation of the activity carried out to assure that a quality system is in place and effective, together with any specific quality system issues raised from that activity.

1 The most recent CMS audit of this FSTD operator was carried out by a combined team from EASA, FAA and CAA on 4th July 2013. A total of 13 findings had previously been raised in the CAA audit of December 2012 and this evaluation has confirmed that 2 of these findings currently remain Open. Of these Open findings, none are level 1 and 2 are level 2. 2. The availability and reliability report indicates a low but increasing usage in its first year of service and suggests a good reliability record during this period. As the company recording period is from May to May, the rolling assessment has yet to provide a clear trend.

7 Summary

Subject to the above, the evaluation team conclude that this FSTD is compliant with the requirements of the Qualification Basis specified in section 2e of this report and recommend that EASA issue a qualification certificate to the level indicated in section 2d.

of 15 8 Evaluation Team

Name Position Organisation Signature Technical Inspector or person Mr D A Law UK CAA designated by the UK CAA Flight Inspector or person Capt. T Ramsdale UK CAA designated by the UK CAA Mr D Morris Software Engineer Quadrant Syst. Ltd

Capt. R Thomas TRE Quadrant Syst. Ltd

Approved: ...... Name: Mr T Smith 14 UK/FB-376 29th October 2013

For the competent authority Head of FSTD Standards

Flight Operations

Date of Signature …………………………….……………...