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University of Newcastle upon Tyne School of Geography, Politics and Sociology
Postgraduate Study in Politics MA in International Studies
A JUST FINIAL SETTLEMENT FOR KOSOVO IS IMPERATIVE FOR THE PEACE AND STABILITY IN BALKANS
Author, BEKIM ÇOLLAKU
Tutor, Prof. DAVID CAMPBEL
August 2003
1 C O N T E N T S
A B S T R A C T 3
I N T O R D U C T I O N 4 ______CH A P T E R O N E ______1.1. Historical Background 6 1.2. Dissolution of Yugoslavia 10 ______CH A P T E R T W O ______2.1. Kosovo Albanians and Serbs: Quest for National Identity 18
______C H A P T E R T H R E E ______3.1. State Sovereignty 37 3.2. International Intervention 39 ______C H A P T E R F O U R ______4.1. Self-Determination in Theory and Practice 42 ______C H A P T E R F I V E ______5.1. Options for the Final Status of Kosovo 49 5.2. Conditional Independence 54 5.3. Independent Kosovo 57 5.4. Indefinite Protectorate 59 5.5. Partition 60 ______C O N C L U S I O N 64 ______B I B L I O G R A P H Y 66 ______APPENDICES A. GLOSSARY 73 B. MAPS 74 C. PICTURES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING AND ATROCITIES 78 D. U.N. RESOLUTION 1244 82 E. SELECTED RESULTUS OF THE OPINION POLL 89 F. INTERVIEWS 92
2 A B S T R A C T
Kosova /o, is the disputed region between Kosova's Albanian majority and Serbia. Once an autonomous federal unit of Yugoslavia, in 1989 it was stripped away of its autonomy by the government of Slobodan Milosevic, whose later actions would result in the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the ensuing wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova. Kosova borders Serbia in the north and northeast, Montenegro in the northwest, Albania in the west and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in the south. It covers a total of 10,887 squared kilometres and its population is over two million, 90 percent of which are ethnic Albanian.
From the beginning of the United Nations Mission in Kosova (UNMIK) and the deployment of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping force called Kosovo Force (KFOR) in June 1999, uncertainty over the final status of Kosova has created tension between local political actors and the representatives of the international community, and within the international community itself. United Nation (UN) Resolution 1244 committed UNMIK to prepare Kosova for substantial autonomy and self-government within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), even envisioning a continuing FRY police presence within Kosova. However, given what the Kosovar population had experienced at the hands of Serbian and Yugoslav authorities - denial of civil rights, attacks on villages, massacres, and finally wholesale expulsion- it was never realistic to expect any exercise of FRY sovereignty over Kosova.
On 4th February 2003, the two chambers of Yugoslav parliament marked the demise of the troubled Balkan federation and the birth of a new country called “Serbia and Montenegro”, as outlined in a deal brokered by the European Union (EU). Kosova Albanians seek independence, but the Serbian government-with support from the Kosova Serb minority-wants to regain sovereignty over the province. The international community is unable to decide Kosova's status, creating uncertainty among the people of Kosova.
There are thus several reasons for the widespread reluctance to address the status issue. However, leaving the issue unresolved is itself an inherently unstable option for Kosova, Serbia and the region. International community should be capable of finding a final settlement, but a settlement that will ensure long lasting peace in troubled Balkan.
3 Introduction
Four years have passed since North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened in Kosovo to halt a humanitarian catastrophe and restore peace and stability in the Balkans. NATO air campaign launched on 24 March 1999 followed more than a year of fighting within Kosovo and continuous international efforts to resolve the conflict by diplomatic means. The campaign ended on 10 June 1999 and marked the end of the war. On the same date the United Nation Security Council (UNSCR) passed Resolution 1244 welcoming the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles for a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, including an immediate end to violence and a rapid withdrawal of its military, police and paramilitary forces. UN Resolution 1244 included also deployment of an international civil and security presence in Kosovo under United Nations auspices. As agreed in the Military Technical Agreement, the deployment of the security force, Kosovo Force (KFOR), was synchronized with the departure of Serb security forces from Kosovo. By 20 June, the Serb withdrawal was complete and KFOR was well established in Kosovo. This was followed by establishing a United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) charged to run Kosovo until a political solution for the final status emerge.1
A great amount of work has been done so far by scholars to explain the historical background which brought about the conflict and war in Kosovo. This dissertation will be another attempt to bring insights into the dispute over the territory of Kosovo. Both Serb and Albanian nationalists claim Kosovo on their own grounds of history, demography and military conquest. Claims and facts coming from both sides will be represented in a balanced way in order to draw a realistic conclusion. The dissertation is divided in five chapters. Each chapter contents essential arguments related to the topic of this dissertation, and all together they will reveal the core of Kosovo’s dispute and probably the most possible option for the final status of Kosovo.
The first chapter concentrates on revealing historical facts about Kosovo Albanians and their experience of living under Serbian and later Yugoslav rule. It brings
1 Kosovo in context, (http://www.nato.int/Kosovo/history.htm#A, 21 June 2003).
4 a comprehensive account of the ethnic cleansing that Kosovo Albanians experienced for many centuries; the political and constitutional position of Kosovo until the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
Second chapter, focuses on the most sensitive matter which created conflicts not only between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs but also wider in the region. That is the quest for national identity. Differences in origin, language and religion made the conflict between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs genuinely ethnic. However, conflict over Kosovo is not only about ethnic differences, but is about control over territory.
Chapter three explains sovereignty and international intervention in the system of international affairs, but also brings insights relevant to the issue of Kosovo. The forth chapter is a presentation of the concept self-determination in theory and practice. This chapter contains some of the main claims that Kosovo Albanians have towards their right for self-determination.
The fifth chapter is the last and the most important because it makes an attempt to explore some of the most likely options for the final settlement of Kosovo. This chapter contains parts of previous chapters and explores options to the problems revealed earlier. The chapter draws on primary source information taken from interviews. In fact, it is this chapter that contributes most to drawing together a solution to the very difficult and complex issue of Kosovo.
5 Chapter I
1.1. Historical Background
International diplomacy has been considered responsible for partitioning Albanian territories since the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Further development occurred with the
Ambassadors Conference in London (1912-1913), giving to neighbouring countries
(Serbia, Montenegro and Greece) about 55% of territory which ethnic Albanians represented the majority of the population historically living there.2 Over 60% of the
Albanian population were left outside the existing borders of Albania. Albania was recognized as an independent state in 1912, whilst the remaining territories and their population were left to the mercy of other nations, fighting to preserve their national identity, language and history, and fighting to survive.3 The subject of these bitter and ugly arrangements conducted by the large European powers at that time was Kosovo, too.4 Lord Edward Grey, former British Foreign Minster who headed meetings in the
London Conference said that “Kosovo has been sacrificed for saving the peace”.5
Historical facts reveal a bitter experience of Kosovo Albanians living under
Serbian rule for centuries and argue that the Serbian policy towards Kosovo Albanians has always been one of ethnic cleansing. The roots of the ethnic cleansing committed by
Serbs against the Albanian ethnic population are historically based. Lazer Mjeda, the
Catholic Achibishop of Skopje, in a report to Rome, estimated that about 25,000 Kosovo
Albanians were massacred in 1912.6 It is worth noting that while beginning with the
2 Rexhep Qosja, Ceshtja Shqiptare:Historia dhe Politika (Tirane:Toena, 1998), 5. 3 Qosja, Ceshtja Shqipare:Historia dhe Politika, 5. 4 Historical Background, (www.alabanian.com, 11 June 2003). 5 Lulzim Mjeku, Kosovo: Neoshqiptarizma Per Shekullin e Ri (Prishtine, 2001), 84. 6 Noel Malcolm, A Short History of Kosovo, (London: Macmillan, 1998), 254.
6 creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 until the mid-1930's, the Albanian question had been a problem falling exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Serb Military, Royal Police, and especially the Colonization Commission which state responsible authority for the expulsion of Albanians and the settling of the Serb colons in Kosovo.7 During only two waves of Serbian colonisation in 1922-29 and 1933-38, over 10,877 Serbian families were settled on 120,672 hectares of land taken away from Albanian owners under the imposed state Agrarian reform. For the incoming settlers 330 settlements and villages were built with 12,689 houses, fourty-six schools and thirty-two churches.8 Hence, it is not difficult to understand what the aims of the colonisation were to change the ethnic composition of Kosovo’s towns, to change their religion, and to eradicate the Albanian language and Albanian heritage. The following is what Djordje Krstic (Chief Agrarian
Commissioner responsible for the colonisation of Kosovo) wrote:
“Among the results obtained is that of progress in towns. Urosevac is no longer the Albanian town it was before, for a large number of Hercegovines have settled there, and they will before long become the dominant element. Pristina is in a good way becoming a modern town and is making a great progress. Pec, where before it was difficult to see one of our people, is today crowded with our colonisers, who seem to give a new life to the town, and very soon they will change the town’s entire character”.9
At an official level the treatment of the Kosovo Albanian question was left at the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, and two very powerful Serb think tanks, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and the Serbian Cultural Club.
Representatives of various Serb and Yugoslav Ministries and institutions were invited to
7 Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo, (London: Hurst &Company, 1998), 105. 8 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo, 105. 9 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo, 108.
7 actively participate in the meetings organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Yugoslavia. In these meetings the question was formulated openly and clearly, “what should be done to organize and achieve the expulsion of all the Albanians without damaging further the precarious political situation of Yugoslavia”? Regardless of the differences in the projects offered and means suggested, all agreed on one point,
Albanians should be expelled and their territories colonized by Slavs once and for all.10
However, the most comprehensive program in which the means and methods of solving the Albanian question were defined was the Memorandum, “The Expulsion of
Albanians”, presented by the leading Serb historian Vasa Cubrilovic.11 Although the memorandum was presented at the Serbian Cultural Club on 7th March 1937, it would remain unknown to Albanian and Yugoslav public opinion for a long time. At the time when the memorandum was written, and for many years later, Serb policy-makers were careful to disclose its existence. They were aware of the fact that a racist project aimed at the elimination of an entire population from its ethnic territories, a rare project in the
European history, would have political consequences damaging to its international standing and reputation.12 The aim, essentially, was to push the Kosovo Albanians into exile by making their lives unbearable. The author of the project Vaso Cubrilovic wrote:
“At a time when Germany can expel tens of thousands of Jews . . . the shifting of a few hundred thousand Albanians will not lead to the outbreak of a world war. The enforcement of laws to make economic activity by Albanians impossible, the ill-treatment of their clergy, the destruction of their cemeteries, and secretly burning down their villages and city quarters are some of the immediate measures that should be imposed”.13
10 Qosja, Ceshtja Shqiptare: Historia dhe Politika, 153. 11 Qosja, Ceshtja Shqiptare: Historia dhe Politika, 153. 12 Qosja, Ceshtja Shqiptare: Historia dhe Politika, 153. 13 Fintan O'Toole, Serbian aim to kill all Kosovons is nothing new, The Irish Times (http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide.htm, April 24, 2003).
8 According to the very detailed project, the only way to provide a final solution to the Albanian question was to expel Kosovo Albanians, en masse, collectively in Turkey and Albania. An agreement between Serb and Turkish officials to expel initially over
40,000 Albanian families and later some 400, 000 Albanian families to Turkey was made in 1938.14
During World War II (1941-1945), chetnik’s according to the project of Stevan
Molevic, “Homogenous Serbia” aimed to create a ‘Greater Serbia’, opened concentration camps. According to approximate evidence, more than 47,300 Albanians were exterminated in the ethnic Albanian areas of Yugoslavia.15
The same genocide policy applied to Kosovo Albanians after World War II. To implement the intentions for segregation and discrimination, Serbia applied the policy of apartheid. Apart from killing, it passed laws to rule over the Albanian majority, depriving them of their political, citizen and human rights, and including freedom of movement, living, employment, and juridical and social protection. The Serbian police created files for 600,000 Albanians; meaning that every third Albanian was called to the police.
Additionally, both in Yugoslav regions populated by Albanians and in Kosovo around
100,000 Albanians were dismissed from work before 1989.16
Not until the open war broke out in Kosovo (1998) was the civilized world able to witness the horrible genocide crimes Kosovo Albanians had gone through. According to
14 Qosja, Ceshtja Shqiptare: Historia dhe Politika, 161. 15 Tahir Zajmi, Lidhja e Dytë e Prizrenit, ( Bruxelles, 1964), 93. 16 Expulsion of Albanians, (http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Kosovo/contents.htm,
9 a report released by the U.S. Department of State, within less than a year Serb military, paramilitary and police forces had forcibly expelled over 1 million Kosovo Albanians from their homes. In this process of ethnic cleansing, Serbian forces had conducted mass executions, separated military - aged men from their families, raped women and girls, destroyed mosques and churches, and looted and burned homes and villages.17
1.2. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia as an idea was first clearly articulated in 1830 and 1840s among small groups of intellectuals.18 Yet, it was not until the beginning of the 20th century, on 1st
December 1918, when Yugoslavia came into existence.19 The three dominant nationalities to constitute Yugoslavia, Serbs, Croats and Slovene, had distinctly separate histories and, prior to 1918, had never shared a common homeland. Divided by religion
(Orthodox Catholic and Muslim), by alphabet (Cyrillic and Latinic), by cultural tradition
(Byzantine, Ottoman and central European), by social structure (aristocratic, patriarcho- feudal, agrarian and quasi-industrial) the Yugoslavs did not constitute a distinct nation or nationality.20 The country’s population included two large non-Slav minorities, Albanians and Hungarians.21 The effectiveness of language, religion, history and tradition as cornerstones of national consciousness the later became key factors leading to the break
17 Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo, ( http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9905_ethnic_ksvo_toc.html, April 29.2003). 18 Andrew Baruch Watchel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia, (California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1. 19 Aleksandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans 2nd edition (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 2000), 3. 20 Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, Nationalism In Eastern Europe (Seattle&London: University of Washington Press, 1969), 397. 21 Jasminka Udovicki and James Ridgeway, Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia (Duram&London: Duke University Press, 1997), 11.
10 up of Yugoslavia. The outbreak of World War II (1941) led to the dissolution of
Yugoslavia and a collaborating fascist state was established on Croatian territory.22
On 29th November 1943, the wartime Partisan Parliament convened in the
Bosnian town of Jajce, voted for a new Yugoslavia that would, in its final form, be a federation of six republics with two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, attributed to Serbia. Full republic status was granted to Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.23 The first post-World War II constitution, passed by the communist dominated Constituent Assembly in January 1946, abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.24
The crisis began with the failure of the 1966 economic reforms and continued with the 1967 constitutional crisis, which led to the promulgation of the 1974
Constitution.25 Under this, Republics became "nation-states" whose relations were based on the principle of consensus amongst the eight constitutive parts of the federation. Until the very end, the concept of nationality, unclear in the Yugoslav constitutional system, remained in contrast to the concept of people. Unofficially, peoples were understood to be ethnic formations whose ethnic centers lay within the boundaries of Yugoslavia, while nationalities had their ethnic centers outside Yugoslavia. With regard to Kosovo and
Albanians, there was a glaring discrepancy because the statistics from 1981 show that there were more than 1.7 million Albanians living in Yugoslavia, but only about 570,000
22Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974(London: Royal Institute of Internal Affairs, 1977), 1 23 Udovicki and Ridgeway, Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia, 65. 24 Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 47. 25 Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, 326.
11 Montenegrins and 1.3 million Macedonians.26 In spite of this paradox, the Albanians were considered a “nationality”, while the others were classified as “peoples” and therefore endowed with correspondingly greater rights.
Tito's death in 1980 increased troubles in Kosovo, the population of which was predominantly Albanian. The Albanian uprising in 1981 demanding the status of a
Republic was suppressed militarily. According to some estimates, more than 1,000
Albanians were killed, over 2,000 arrested, and officially it was reported that 479 had been sentenced.27
The collapse of the Yugoslav economy perpetrated a form of ultra-nationalism in
Serbia and the emergence of a Milosevic-initiated "anti-bureaucratic" revolution which became connected to fighting against decentralization. The combination of a rabid nationalism and a fight against bureaucracy was what Milosevic capitalized upon.
Eliminating his adversaries in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro was easy. He broke the balance, which had merged under Tito, and one bloc emerged which controlled the federation. 28 The Serbian nationalists brought back memories of the Croatian 1941 genocidal targeting of the Serbs, and revived hatreds against the people who were involved with the massacres. The media joined in with such propaganda especially against Tito by constantly reminding the Serbian people of his oppression of them.29
The conflict had an additional geo-political factor. The European Community
(EC) also played an important part in the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic
26 Victor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise, (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), 9. 27 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, (London: Macmillan Ltd, 1998), 335. 28 Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, (London: Penguin Group and BBC Worldwide Ltd, 1995), 58-61. 29 Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, (London: Mandarin, 1994), 3-11.
12 of Yugoslavia (SFRY) primarily because of the interests of France and Germany.30 In
1991 and 1992 both the United Sates of America (USA) and the EC gradually abandoned their support for a united Yugoslavia in favor of recognizing the independence of most successor republics.31 Ethnic realities prevented Serbian ideologies from achieving the goal of "all Serbs one country" through political dialogue and therefore ethnic cleansing was used. The memory of the 1941massacres of Serbs was a useful emotional tool to justify their massacres later.32
In 1991, the parliaments of Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence.
Macedonia followed suit. In 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence and a triple war broke out between Serbs, Croats and Bosnians, finally concluding with an unstable peace agreement. On April 27 of that same year, Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the new Yugoslav Federation.33
In the case of Slovenia, its separation wasn't complicated, since it lacked distinct ethnic components, and that republic maintained its high level of development and political independence.34 Croatia's breaking away provoked an armed conflict between the Serbs in the Krajina region (overwhelmingly populated by Serbs), who preferred to unite with Serbia rather than become part of an independent Croatia.35
30 Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 148. 31 Donia and Fine, JR. Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 230. 32 Almond, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, 4. 33 Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 127-128. 34 Mark Thompson, A Paper House : The Ending of Yugoslavia, (London: Vintage, 1992), 9. 35 Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 129.
13 The "Greater Serbia"36 plan revived by Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences and ready to be executed by the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, brought about the overt distribution of arms to Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. The settlement of Serbs in ravaged and militarily occupied territories, and the formation of local governments such as "Serbian Krajina", as well as the preparations for referendums on the annexation of liberated territories to Serbian Yugoslavia occurred.37 Such practices were part of the larger plan of " all Serbs, one country" which explains their role in the subsequent events. To fulfill this goal, Milosevic managed to put under his control the
Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) which in 1991 was renamed as the Yugoslav Army.38
Serbian struggles to take over Croatian territories resulted in open war and the outcome was terrible. Although Croatia survived and achieved its independence, the war had taken a heavy toll. Over one-third of Croatia’s economy had been destroyed or damaged, 100,000 houses and apartments were demolished and looted. In addition, war created 18,000 confirmed casualties by the end of 1991 (of which 1,448 were military killed in action and over 14,000 were wounded), 14,000 missing people (presumed dead), and over 703,300 refugees.39
One could foresee, from the beginning, that the process of the dissolution of
Yugoslavia would be toughest in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It consisted of three peoples,
Muslims, Serbs and Croats, who not only lived together in the same republic, but were mixed in most districts.40 According to the last census of 1991, Muslims comprised 43.7
36 Stjepan G. Mestrovic, Genocide After Emotions: The Postemotional Balkan War, (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 55. 37 Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 129. 38 Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 79. 39 Mestrovic, Genocide After Emotions: The Postemotional Balkan War, 79. 40 Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise, 195.
14 % of the 4.36 million inhabitants of the Republics, Serbs 31.4 %, and the Croats 17.3 %.
Some 5.5 % declared themselves ethnic “Yugoslavs”. In total, there were about 2.28 million Yugoslav ethnic Muslims living in Yugoslavia, of which 1.91 million lived in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.41 National mixture of the population provided assurance that Bosnia-Herzegovina could not become independent or divided without war.
Like the governments of Slovenia and Croatia, in 1991 the Muslim and Croat parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina proposed the declaration of independence to secede from
Yugoslavia. The Serb party immediately rejected it.42 The representatives of the Bosnian
Serbs voted on October 24 1991, for a resolution to create the Serb Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. After the EC recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6th
April 1992 the Assembly of the Bosnian Serbs proclaimed the Serb Republic (Republika
Serpska) o the following day. Soon after, the Bosnian Croats also proclaimed their own state, the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosna.43
The shooting at a Serbian wedding in Sarajevo on 1st March 1992-when the revellers, some waving Serbian flags, were fired on by gunmen killing the groom’s father, marked the beginning of the bloodiest war in Yugoslavia.44 After only a few weeks of fighting, the number of refugees fleeing the Serbian onslaught grew at an astonishing rate. By the autumn of 1992 the Bosnian war had produced two million refugees. This highlights the deliberate strategy employed by Serbian and Croatian forces
41 Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise, 195. 42 Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 158. 43 Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic, Women, Violennce and War: Wartime Vicitimization of Refugees in the Balkans, (Budapest: CEU Press, 2000), 12. 44 Almond, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, 263.
15 to create ethnically monolithic in Bosnia by driving out members of unwanted ethnic group.45
The Practice of ethnic cleansing, it should be noted, has been employed by all three sides in the conflict in Bosnia, however, many groups and observers including
Helsinki Watch, Amnesty International, the US Sate Department, and the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), share the belief that Serbia has been the initiator and principal perpetrator of ethnic cleansing.46 Along with ethnic cleansing, the perpetrators of ethnic exclusivism used a variety of other terror tactics to impose their will on members of other ethnic groups. Rape as a part of ethnic cleansing and as a crime against humanity was exercised; women of all ages were raped.47 Prison camps were established for captured members of military units and for civilians; inmates were starved, beaten, or killed giving
Western television audiences’ images of emaciated prisoners not seen from Europe since
World War II.48
For almost a century, Kosovo Albanians were left in the mercy of Serbian regime, all they experienced was fear, terror, prosecution, humiliation, violence, expulsion from their homes and being killed in front of their families. However, the saying ‘The
Yugoslav crisis began in Kosovo and it will end in Kosovo’ appeared to be true49
On 24th March 1999, the eyes of the world turned to Kosovo as aircraft from the
NATO began to bomb targets in FRY. NATO went to war for the first time in its fifty-
45 Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 245. 46 Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 246. 47 Ristanovic, Women, Violennce and War: Wartime Vicitimization of Refugees in the Balkans, 200. 48 Eight Report on War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia (http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/ documents/miscres2.htm#genocide, April 15, 2003) 49 Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, xliv.
16 year history.50 The start of NATO's air war against Yugoslavia was also the beginning of the bloodiest period in Kosovo since the end of the Second World War. In the twelve weeks that followed, the Serbian and Yugoslav military, police, and paramilitaries, expelled more than 850,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, internally displaced several hundred thousand more. Many were robbed and beaten as they were forced from their homes, which were frequently looted and burned. Hundred of women were raped.
Thousands of adult males were detained, and many of them were executed, in some cases together with women, children, and the elderly, although the total number of civilians executed remains unclear. In more than a dozen sites of mass killing, government forces tried to hide the evidence by destroying or removing bodies. The brutal campaign against ethnic Albanian civilians came to a halt only after the withdrawal of Yugoslav soldiers and Serbian police and paramilitaries, and the entry of NATO forces on 12th June 1999.51
It remains to be seen whether Kosovo will be used again as a bargain in the negotiations to come regarding future status or international diplomacy will recover mistakes done in the past.
Chapter II
2.1. Kosovo Albanians and Serbs: The Quest for National Identity
In the contemporary world, inter-ethnic relations have taken on a special significance and are very often a greater priority than socio-economic processes itself.
Furthermore, on many occasions in the second half of the second century, disputes and
50 For more on the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia see, Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 1. 51 Human Rights Watch, War Crimes in Kosovo (http://www.hrw.org/research/nations.htm, April 7,2003).
17 conflicts in interethnic relations have placed states or entire regions into bloody wars bringing death and suffering for thousand of people. An example in the Balkan Peninsula, is the dissolution of Yugoslavia.52
As the ideological contest between capitalism and communism abates with the break up of the Soviet Union and its satellite regions, questions of national identity and national self-determination have come to the fore. It matters less, whether the state embraces the free market, the planned economy or something in between. It matters more where the boundaries of the state are drawn, who gets included and who gets excluded, what language is used, what religion endorsed, and what culture promoted.53 Ethnic community and identity are often associated with conflict, and more particularly political struggles in various parts of the world. However, there is no necessary connection between ethnicity and conflict. Quite apart from isolated conflicts, relations between ethnic communities and categories may be peaceful and cooperative. But, at the same time as Horowitz (1985) suggests, ‘the basis for conflict exists in the inclusion of two or more ethnic communities within a territorial state’.54
Before addressing interethnic relations that brought about the dissolution of FRY, it useful to explain briefly the concepts and definitions related to ethnicity, national identity, nation and state.
52 See, more on this, in Chirstopher Bennet, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences, (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), 83-106. 53 David Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,…?), 1. 54 John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, Ethnicity, (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3.
18 Ethnicity – seems to be a new term", state Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, who point to the fact that the term's earliest dictionary appearance is in the Oxford
English Dictionary of 1953. Its meaning is equally uncertain. It can mean ‘the essence of an ethnic group’ or ‘the quality of belonging to an ethnic community or group’, or ‘what it is you have if you are an “ethnic group”.55 The word is derived from the Greek ethnos
(which in turn derived from the word ethnikos), which originally meant heathen or pagan.
It was used in this sense in English from the mid-14th century until the mid-19th century, when it gradually began to refer to "racial" characteristics. In the United States, "ethnics" came to be used around the Second World War as a polite term referring to Jews, Italians,
Irish and other people considered inferior to the dominant group of largely British descent. In everyday language, the word ethnicity still has a ring of "minority issues" and
"race relations", but in social anthropology according to Eriksen ‘it refers to aspects of relationships between groups, which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive’.56 Although it is true that "the discourse concerning ethnicity tends to concern itself with sub-national units, or minorities of some kind or another".
Majorities and dominant peoples are no less "ethnic" than minorities57. Before the break up of Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanians were considered an ethnic minority, distinct from
Albanians living in Albania and other “majority” people who were categorised as nations.
‘Ethnic identity’ and ‘ethnic origin’ refer to the individual level of identification with a culturally defined collectivity, the sense on the part that she or he belongs to
55 Hutchinson and Smith, Ethnicity, 4. 56 Thomas Hylland Ericksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives, (London: Pluto, 1993), 4. 57 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, (http://folk.uio.no/geirthe/Ethnicity.html, July 11, 2003).
19 particular cultural community. Schermerhorn’s definition on ‘ethnic community’ states that:
An ethnic group is defined as a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their people hood. Examples of such symbolic elements are: kinship patterns, physical contiguity, religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features or any combination of these. A necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the group58.
For the purpose of the study, I draw on key ideas of four views on ethnicity and ethnic conflict to make an attempt to explain the rise of xenophobic nationalism and ethnic violence among people who had lived together cooperatively for about forty years.
There are four views on ethnicity and ethnic violence that are common. First, in the
‘primordial’ view ethnic attachments and identities are a cultural given and a natural affinity, like kinship sentiments. Applied to the former Yugoslavia, the primordialist
Kaplan (1993) believes that despite seemingly cooperative relation between nationalities in Yugoslavia, mistrust, enmity, even hatred were just below surface, as had long been true in the Balkans.59
It is important to mention that ever since its founding after World War I, and throughout several changes in both its name and social structure, Yugoslavia has had a minority problem. Simultaneously, Yugoslav legislation did not always recognize the term "minority," and it was often unclear which ethnic groups were included in the term
"minority" or alternate expressions. "Minority" was not used in the federal constitution of
58 Hutchinson and Smith, Ethnicity, 6. 59 Anthony Oberschall, “The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (6) 2000, 982 - 1001
20 1974, nor in any of the corresponding constitutions of the six Yugoslav republics and two provinces. A terminological distinction was made between "nations" (narodi) and
"nationalities" (narodnosti). "Nations" were the Slavic nations founding the Yugoslav
(South Slav) state, which included Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Moslems (Bosniaks). The other ethnic groups, Slavic and non-Slavic alike, were called "nationalities." According to a frequently used and stressed criterion,
"nationalities" were those ethnic groups that had a state outside of Yugoslavia--such as
Albanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians, or Italians--while "nations" had Yugoslavia as their only form of statehood. It was understood that "nationalities" were actually the minorities and they were treated as such. However, this criterion cannot explain all the distinctions that were actually made, since Ruthenians or Gypsies (Roma), for example, have no state anywhere, and yet were not considered "nations."60
Triggered by fierce competition for political power during the breakup of
Yugoslavia and driven by uncertainties over state boundaries and minority status, these enmities and hatreds, fuelled by fear and retribution, turned neighbor against neighbor, and district against district, in an expanding spiral of aggression and reprisals. The primordial account sounds plausible, and it true that politicians activated and manipulated latent nationalism and ethnic fears. However, ethnic cleansing was more commonly militias and military against civilians that neighbor against neighbor.61
In stark contrast to ‘primordialist’, the second, ‘instrumentalist’ view treat ethnicity as a social, political and cultural resource for different interest and status 60 Tibor Varady, Minorities, Majorities, Law, and Ethnicity: Reflections of the Yugoslav Case, Human Rights Quarterly 19 (1) 1997 9-54 61 Oberschall, “The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia”, 982 - 1001
21 groups. Brass (1991) and Cohen’s (1974) view is that it ‘ focuses on elite competition for resources and suggests that manipulation of symbols is vital for gaining support of the masses and achieving political goals’.62 Rosens (1989) suggests that ethnic sentiments and loyalties are manipulated by political leaders and intellectuals for political ends, such as state creation. For Yugoslavia, the instrumentalist explanation highlights Serb nationalists’ goal of a Greater Serbia and a similar Croat nationalism. 63 Ethnic cleansing resulted from a historical longing by Serbs for a Greater Serbia, with deep cultural roots.
Milosevic and Serb nationalists tried to implement it when the opportunity arose in the late 1980s and early 1990s.64 Greater Serbia required ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs from areas inhabited by a majority of Serbs and the corridors linking Serb population clusters.
Although there is evidence that ethnic cleansing was a state policy, orchestrated by the highest authorities in Serbia and the Bosnian Serb leadership.65
The third ‘constructionist’ view of ethnicity and ethnic conflict was originally formulated by Kuper (1977). It supplements the insights of the primordial and of the instrumentalist views. Religion or ethnicities are very real social facts, but in ordinary times they are only one of several roles and identities that matter. In the words of Linz and Stepan (1996) ‘political identities are less primordial and fixed than contingent and changing. They are amenable to being constructed or eroded by political institutions and political choices’.66
62 Hutchinson and Smith, Ethnicity, 8. 63 Oberschall, “The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia”, 982 - 1001 64 Stjepan G. Mestrovic, Genocide After Emotions: The Postemotional Balkan War, (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 55. 65 Donia, Robert and John V.A. Fine, JR. Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, (London: Hurst and Company, 1994), 245. 66 Oberschall, “The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia”, 982 – 1001.
22 Fourth model of ethnic violence (Posen 1993; Gagnon 1997) centers on state breakdown, anarchy, and the security dilemma that such conditions pose to ethnic groups who engage in defensive arming to protect their lives and property against ethnic rivals, which then stimulates arming by other ethnic groups like an arms race between states.
The driving motivations are not ethnic hatreds but fear and insecurity.67 In the Yugoslav crisis Michael Ignatieff puts it thus:
Once the Yugoslav communist state began to split into its constituent national particles the key question soon became: will the local Croat policeman protect me if I am a Serb? Will I keep my job in the soap factory if my new boss is a Serb or a Muslim? The answer to this question was no, because no state remained to enforce the old ethnic bargain 68
Ethnic nationalism according to Lukic and Lynch is ‘essentially incompatible with the idea of a federation’. For that reason they argue, ‘federal structures erected on the basis of ethnic nationalism, as were both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia’.69 A dormant crisis frame anchored in family history and collective memory of wars, ethnic atrocities and brutality, suddenly became vivid. Threats and lies that were implausible and dismissed in the normal frame could resonate when the crisis frame was switched on: they became persuasive, were believed, and inspired fear. In the waning days of
Communism, nationalists activated the crisis frame on ethnicity by playing on fears of
67 Oberschall, “The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia”, 982 – 1001. 68 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journey into the New Nationalism, (New York: Farrar Strauss, 1993a), 42. 69 Lukic and Lynch claim that the smooth functioning of multiethnic federations depends on the capacity to either create one nation out of various ethnic strands (U.S.A) or to guarantee the peaceable coexistence of the diverse ethnic groups on the basis of equal rights. See, more on Reno Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), xi.
23 ethnic annihilation and oppression in the mass media, in popular culture, in social movements, and in election campaigns. Élite crisis discourse resonated at the grass roots, made for ethnic polarization, and got nationalists elected. Once in office, nationalists suppressed and purged both moderates in their own ethnic group and other ethnics. They organized militias who perpetrated acts of extreme violence against innocent civilians.
They conducted war according to the crisis script. Without the tacit, overt or confused support of the majority, the nationalist leaders could not have escalated ethnic rivalry and conflict into massive collective violence.70
In what follows, I focus on the creation of national identity and offer an account of the re-emergence of nationalism in modern conditions of modernity with regard to the rise of nationalism in the break up of Yugoslavia. To understand what it means for someone to have a national identity, we must first get clear what states and nations are.
Definitions and concepts are various. Treitschke defines the state as ‘the people legally united as an independent power’. By people he understands ‘a plural number of families living together’. In his view, the state is the only entity capable of maintaining a monopoly of violence when he writes, ‘the right of arms distinguishes the state from all other forms of corporate life’. He argues that state is founded upon the possession of territory71. Durkheim distinguishes between what he calls ‘political society’ and the
‘state’. While the latter refers to ‘the agents of the sovereign authority’ the former refers to ‘the complex group of which the state is the highest organ. According to Durkheim, the state can be defined as a group of officials sui generic, within which representations 70 For more on the resurgence of nationalism in Serbia see on Robert Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic:Politics in the 1990s, (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), 44-52. 71 Montesrrat Guibernau, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, (Polity Press, ), 7.
24 and acts of volition involving the collectivity are worked out, although they are not the
product of collectivity.72 Max Weber defines the state as ‘a human community that
successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory’. In his view, the state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence.
Hence, he concludes:
Politics for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state73
On the other hand, the difficulty of defining a nation springs from the fact that nations comprise a mixture of objective and subjective features, a blend of cultural and political characteristics.74 In objective terms, nations are cultural entities: groups of people who speak the same language, have the same religion, are bound by a shared past. Such factors undoubtedly shape the politics of nationalism, for instance, the nationalism of the
Quebecois in Canada is largely based on language differences between French-speaking
Quebec and the predominantly English-speaking rest of Canada.75 All nations encompass a measure of cultural, ethnic and racial diversity. This emphasises the fact that, ultimately, their members can only define nations subjectively. Thus, the nation is a psycho-political construct and what sets a nation apart from any other group or collectivity is that its members regard themselves as a nation. Therefore, the nation in this sense, perceives itself to be a distinctive political community and that is exactly what distinguishes a nation from an ethnic group.76
72 Guibernau, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 21. 73 Guibernau, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 31. 74 Andrew Heywood, Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 1997), 104. 75 Heywood, Politics, 104. 76 Heywood, Politics, 104.
25 Anderson defines the nation as an ‘imagined community’, limited, sovereign and worthy of sacrifices. He writes:
Nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as against which – it came into being.77
Anderson argues that print-languages laid the basis for national consciousness in three ways: they created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars; they gave a new fixity to language, helping to build an image of antiquity, central to the subjective idea of the nation; and they created languages of power which differed from older administrative vernaculars.78 National consciousness is derived from sharing values, traditions, and memories of the past and plans for the future contained within a particular culture, which is thought and spoken in a particular language.79 For
Schleiermacher, ‘only one language is a particular mode of thought and what is cogitated in one language cane never be repeated in the same way in another…’80 From this definition it can be easily noted that language is a powerful instrument that not only can distinguish one nation from another, but also may be regarded as a medium of division and separation, though in very few cases it may, even, bridge any kind of religious difference.81
In the case of Kosovo, ethnic difference seems to have been more profound and perpetual; whereas in Croatia and Bosnia all groups share practically the same language, 77 Guibernau, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 3. 78 Ellei Kedourie, Nationalism, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993), 80. 79 Guibernau, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 66-67. 80 Language just like the church or the state is an expression of a peculiar life, which contains within it and develops through it a common body of language. See, Kedourie, Nationalism, 57. 81 This was true of Islamic, Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic Albanians in the Ottoman Empire. See, more on, Peter Alter, Nationalism, (London: E. Arnold, 1994), 7.
26 distinguishing themselves primarily through religion, Serbs and Albanians do not only belong to different faiths, they also speak two completely different tongues. This has made the conflict, a conflict between Slavs and non-Slavs, more genuinely ‘ethnic’.82 The Serbs are people who speak a Slavic language related to other Slavic languages such as Russian,
Polish, Czech, and Bulgarian. The Serbs have lived in the Balkans since about the 7th century AD. They moved in from the north and east of Europe as part of a huge wave of resettlement known as the "migration of the peoples," which occurred during and after the fall of the Western Roman Empire. This wave of settlers also included other Slavs, who would eventually become the Croats, Bosnians, and Bulgarians.83 On the other hand, though many Slav scholars refute the claim, Albanians believe they are descendants of the ancient Illyrian tribes, who until the fifth century dominated much of present-day Albania,
Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia and northern Greece. The Albanian language is Indo-
European and it is thought to be the sole survivor of ancient Illyrian, itself a direct offshoot of proto-Indo-European.84
Three religions, Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism, have long co-existed in
Kosovo. A large majority of Kosovo Albanians consider themselves, at least nominally,
Muslim. A minority of about 60,000 are Catholic. Most Kosovo Serbs, even those who are not active believers, consider Orthodoxy an important component of their national identity.
Nevertheless, despite this essential division of religious activities along ethnic lines, it
82 Ger Duijzings, The Kosovo conflict and the other ‘Yugoslav’ wars, Published as "Il conflitto nel Kosovo e altre guerre ‘Jugoslave’". In: Marco Buttino, Maria Cristina Ercolessi & Alessandro Triulzi (eds.), Uomini in armi. Costruzioni etniche e violenza politica. Napoli: L’Ancora del Mediterraneo, 2000, 25-33. 83 Who are the Serbs? ( http://www.cet.edu/earthinfo/balkans/Kosovo/KVtopic2.html, June 22, 2003)
84 Joel M. Halpern and David A. Kideckel, Neighbors at War: Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, Culture, and History, (Pennsylvania: State University Press,….), 355-360.
27 cannot be said that religion per se was an important contributing factor to the conflict between Serbs and Albanians. Kosovo Albanians do not define their national identity through religion, but through language. They have a relatively relaxed approach towards the observance of the Islamic religion. Neither Islamic leaders nor Islamic theology played a significant role in either the eight-year campaign of non-violent resistance to the Serb occupation regime, or the armed resistance of 1998-99. Islamic political and social fundamentalism, as that term is understood with respect to the Middle East, has very little resonance in Kosovo.85
Nationalism, as both ideology and a social movement, has been one of the formative processes of the modern world. In relations between established states nationalism is invoked as a basis for territorial disputes, war, or for economic advantage. In contrast to earlier periods when the emphasis in domestic and international politics was on convergence and universalization, even the creation of a single world community, there is now much more stress on the importance of what distinguishes people – tradition, identity, authenticity, the politics of difference.86 The process of globalisation, by creating a world market and flow of goods, technology, and people between states, also provokes responses and resistance by those who feel their interests are threatened. Therefore, nationalism can be seen as a reaction against globalisation but in another sense, it is also a product of globalisation. The upsurge in nationalism of the 1980s and 1990s reflects the failure of other forms of state building, above all in the former multi-ethnic countries of the communist world. After the collapse of Soviet communism in 1991 four states 85 Religion in Kosovo, ICG Balkans Report N° 105 Pristina/Brussels, (http://www.intl-crisis-group.org, July 5, 2003). 86 John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 360.
28 disintegrated along national lines – the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and
Ethiopia. Twenty-two states came into existence as result of the impact on the hitherto insulated communist world of social and economic pressures from the West.87 In a world of globalisation, peoples began to demand not integration into larger states but secession, independence, and access to the world market on their own terms. On the other hand, the collapse of communism also led to another form of nationalist drive, that for national unification – evident in Germany, Yemen, China, Korea. The link between globalisation and nationalism in the one case is fragmentation, through secession, while in the second case it was through unification.88
For Ernest Gellner, nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment, whereas, a nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind.89
Hobsbawn defines nationalism as a political programme and in historic terms a fairly recent one. It holds that groups defined as ‘nations’ have the right to, and therefore to, form territorial states of the kind that have become standard since the French
Revolution.90 Lederer argues that throughout the centuries nationalism has altered his flow,
87 Baylis and Smith, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 360. 88 Baylis and Smith, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 360. 89 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1983), 1. 90 E.J Hobsbawm, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today, Anthropology Today, Vol 8 No 1, 1992
29 as have war, revolution, social-economic transformations, and ideologies. However, nationalism has been the fact of life for nearly two hundred years.91
For the purpose of my dissertation, I will concentrate more on trying to elaborate the Serbian and Albanian nationalism. The cradle of Serbian nationalism is historical myth that goes back to the royal house of Nemanjici and their medieval state, which flourished in the twelfth and thirteen centuries on the territory of present Serbia. Within the myth, the history of the medieval Serb state was viewed primarily as a liberation of Serb territories from Byzantine and later Ottoman Rule.92 The battle of Kosovo in 1389 against the
Ottomans became the focus of another historical myth. According to the legend, the cream of the Serb nobility sacrificed their lives for their faith and liberty, ‘for the golden cross and an honourable freedom’.93 Legend says also that a Serb nobleman Milos Oblic sacrificed his life by assassinating the Ottoman Sultan. The Serb leader Prince Lazar, who lost his life in the battle, was canonised as a saint in the Serbian Orthodox Church and the day of the battle 28 June, St.Vitus’s Day (Vidovdan in Serbo-Croatian) became one of the central feast days, the day of the Kosovo martyrs.94
The Battle of Kosovo and the claim that the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church was first established in Kosovo, are the two essential myths feeding Serbian nationalism for centuries. These myths were manipulated and used to bring to power the Serbian leader
91 Sugar and Lederer, Nationalism In Eastern Europe, 396. 92 Aleksandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans 2nd edition (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 2000), 8. 93 Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 8. 94 Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 8.
30 Slobodan Milosevic, who is being held responsible for breaking up the former
Yugoslavia.95
The abantiquo argument, which has to do with the historical past of Kosovo is used extensively by foreign analysts to point out the importance of Kosovo for the Serb nation. It is often repeated that Kosovo is the central myth of Serb national consciousness, the cradle of their medieval state and their church, and just for these reasons it is being argued that it is impossible to allow Kosovo to become independent from Serbia. Shinasi
Rama brings historical arguments that contradicts these views.96 An inquiry into the past would reveal that Serbs occupied Kosovo in the thirteenth century and held it until 1457, that is, for less than two centuries. The Medieval Serb Empire was a multinational empire.
The Albanians were an important part of it. Without seeking to use here historical arguments, one cannot help but note that even in the Middle Ages, this region was inhabited predominantly by the Albanians. Studies of the available documents have revealed that even in the Middle Ages, the Serbs made up the small upper strata of the population and that Serbs were concentrated in towns and the administrative centres.
Recently, in a thorough study on this topic, Noel Malcolm has exposed the falsity of the
Serb claims. Malcolm has convincingly argued that if any people have a right to claim
Kosovo as their land, this is the Albanian people.97
95 Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, xlvii. 96 Shinasi Rama, The Serb-Albanian War, and International Community’s Miscalculations, International Journal of Albanian Studies (IJAS), vol 2, 2001, http://www.albanian.com/IJAS/vol2/is1/art1.html, 15 May 2003. 97 Noel Malcolm, “The Past Must Not Be Prologue. Kosovo Challenges the West to Learn from the Mistakes of the Past.” Time Magazine May 3, 1998.
31 Further on Rama argues tha besides the surprising fact that the international community is suddenly concerned with the historical inheritance of nations, what appears to be even more intriguing is that the international community does not give the same weight to the arguments that Kosovo was the cradle of the medieval Albanian state and the cradle of the contemporary Albanian state. The medieval state of Balshaj, “the Rulers of
Albania,” and many other Albanian principalities extended here from the mid-fourteenth century to the late fifteenth century. The Battle of Kosovo that feeds the Serb myth of victimization was not just the battle of Serbs “to save the Christendom” as we often hear.
The Battle of Kosovo was fought by a Balkan coalition. Albanian feudals were heavily involved in the Battle of Kosovo and one of the triumvirs that led the Balkan Army coalition with the Serb Prince Lazar Grebljanovic, and King Tvarko of Bosnia, was the
Albanian ruler Gjergji II Balsha. An indication of Albanian presence in the Field of
Kosovo, is that only Theodori II Muzaka, the Prince of Berat, lost more than 4000 of his
Albanian fighters in the Battle of Kosovo. Fortunately, these facts are quoted from the Serb chronicles of the time that contemporary Serb historiography has conveniently forgotten to mention.98 It is worth noting that the first National Assembly of the Albanian people in the modern times was held at the city of Prizren in 1878. The National Assembly held in the town of Peja in 1899 followed this later.99 Not to mention the numerous Albanian religious and cultural monuments in the region. It also must be said that a large number of
Albanians from Kosovo were Orthodox. Slowly, they were acculturated and became even ethnically assimilated Serbs. If the Serb Orthodox Churches and Monasteries survived five centuries of Turkish occupation of Kosovo, the explanation must be sought in their
98 Rama, The Serb-Albanian War, and International Community’s Miscalculations 99 For more on The Battle of Kosovo, see, Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, 58-81.
32 protection by the Albanians. Especially, the Catholic Churches of the Albanians in Kosovo are among the oldest religious buildings in the Balkans and are precious a part of their inheritance.
Rama thinks that the Serb past in Kosovo could be very well compared to the relationship between the Byzantine Empire, the Orthodox Patriarch Ana of Istanbul and the
Greeks of today; to Algeria as part of the France d’outre-mer or to Spain when it was occupied by Arabs. Neither Greece could openly lay claims to Asia Minor, nor France could lay claim to Algeria, nor Arabs could openly claim Spain without becoming ridiculous. Moreover, if the Serb claims on Krajina, Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia are justified only on ethnic grounds, why could not Albanians, who make up the overwhelming majority, over 93 percent of the entire population in Kosovo. This is not a recent phenomenon; eighty years ago, in 1912, when Serbs finally occupied Kosovo, over two- thirds of its population had declared themselves Albanian. While the list of arguments could go longer, it is apparent that the unconditional acceptance of the Serb “historical right” on Kosovo is unwarranted and unjustifiable except when it serves precise geopolitical reasons.100 Thus, all arguments prove that the failure of the Serbs and the
Kosovo Albanians to accommodate their respective tolerance has contributed to a history of mutual intolerance and periods of extreme repression. 101
On the other hand, the debate concerning the origin of the Albanians is still unresolved, though no one questions the fact that they are the oldest inhabitants in the
100 Rama, The Serb-Albanian War, and International Community’s Miscalculations, 101 Buckley, Mary and Sally N. Cummings, Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath, (London-New York: Continuum, 2001), 15.
33 Balkan Peninsula. Their language, customs, social organizations and traditions have very little if anything in common with those of their Slav and Greek neighbours.102 Kosovo
Albanian nationalism is based on Albanian historic rights derived from the alleged direct descent of Albanians from the ancient tribe of Illyrians who populated the Balkans before the settlement of the South Slavs. This is the argument from historical precedence:
Illyrians, that is Albanians, were the first and all the others, in particular Serbs are later conquerors who do not rightly belong to the territory inhabited by Albanians.103 Another aspect of Kosovo Albanian nationalism is their desire for unification with Albania or the creation of their own independent country, and it is this desire and struggle which inspired
Kosovo Albanians to resist and stand firm against all sorts of occupation. These struggles for freedom and an independent country culminated in a general war against the Serbian regime ruling Kosovo.104 The idea of a “Greater Albania” came onto the scene even after the war was halted in Kosovo. In the beginning of 2001, a new wave of conflict erupted in
Southern Serbia and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). This time, it was Albanian extremists and not Serbs who were blamed for causing violence in the region.105
Since the war ended and conflicts in the regions stopped, great efforts have been undertaken by the international community to reconcile these two people. Achievements are evident, but nationalism is rising again, making difficult reconciliation and achieving a final settlement for Kosovo. Recently, the highest representatives of Serbian Church came
102 Sugar and Lederer, Nationalism In Eastern Europe, 55. 103 Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 87. 104 Judah, Kosovo: War And Revenge, 135. 105 Alexandros Yannis, Ceshtja e “Shqiperise se Madhe”, Kosovo & Balkan Observer, August 2002, viti II, nr.4
34 up with another Memorandum for Kosovo. The main claim represented is the evaluation that ‘Kosovo is a matter of national, spiritual, cultural, Christian identity for Serbs’.
Kosovo for Serbs means the same as Jerusalem for Jews. And Kosovo just like Jerusalem is not just geography or demography. It is a matter of national, spiritual, cultural, Christian identity…therefore; nobody has right to give away Kosovo as undisputed part of the Serb territory, Serbian state and Church.106
This is clearly a blind nationalist approach and paradox. In no form of Christianity, including Eastern Orthodoxy, does a ‘holy place’ play any sort of theological role equivalent to the role of Jerusalem in the Theology of Judaism. The seat of Serbian
Orthodoxy Church was not founded in Kosovo; it merely moved after its original foundation, in central Serbia, was burnt down. Nor does the Patriarchate have any continuous history as an institution: it was recreated by the modern Yugoslav state in 1920 and resides mainly in Belgrade.107 The Serbian government now upholds the same nationalistic line. Serbian authorities are preparing a new constitution that includes Kosovo as an undisputed integral part of Serbia. This constitution will be represented to the
Assembly of the new loose Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Such a trend will put in danger and most probably will destroy all efforts and preparations made for the beginning of the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.108 Most analysts and observers are considering these trends as very dangerous for the security and stability situation in the region.
Refusing to participate in a conference for security matters in the Balkan region, the former
106 Naile Imami, Edhe nje “Memorandum” per Kosoven, kesaj radhe nga Kisha Serbe, Koha Ditore, 9 August 2003, 1. 107 Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, xlvii. 108 Zijadin Gashi, Kosovo do te pergaditet per bisedime si pale e barabarte pa i perfillur kushtetutat e Beogradit, Zeri, 8 August 2003, 1.
35 Albanian Prime minister and present minister of defence, Pandeli Majko, stated that ‘the constitution being prepared by Belgrade is a constitution of conflict’.109
Remains to be seen whether the international community will react against these recent actions undertaken by Serbian government, which represent direct threat for peace in
Balkan region.
Chapter Three
3.1. State Sovereignty
Sovereignty is a central political concept. A political body is sovereign in so far as it alone has the authority to be the ultimate decision maker, to have, we might say, the last word’.110 Lyons and Mastanduno argue that the concept of sovereignty has been continually evolving since first developed as an instrument for the assertion of royal authority over feudal princes and, then went through historic transition by the settlement of Westphalia in
1648-creation of independent states, each enjoying sovereignty over a given territory.111 In order to possess sovereignty, a regime must possess (1) territory, (2) population, (3) it must be able to maintain a modicum of order within its territory and among its people, and finally (4) the regime must be recognized as sovereign by states already possessing sovereignty. Under the Westphalian formula, sovereign states have three absolute prerogatives: independence (a state completely free to organize any system of government),
109 Gert Selenica, Kushtetuta qe po hartohet nga Beogradi eshte kushtetute e konfliktir, Koha Ditore, 10 August 2003, 1. 110 Gordon Graham, Ethics and International Relations, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 11. 111 Gene M.Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore&London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 5.
36 equality (every state is of equal rank with every other state), unanimity (a state is bound only if it agrees to be bound).112
Friedrich Kratochwil suggests an analogy between sovereignty and property, both in their origins and in their evolution as social constructs. He claims that ‘ownership is not absolute but is subject to limits on its use and disposition, limits that over time change in accordance with the overarching values of the society in which we live’. Thus, there are limits on sovereignty in the responsibilities that sovereign states owe to those whom they rule.113
The dramatic fragmentation and dismemberment of major states such as the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, have led to renewed questions about the location of sovereignty – whether it lies in a population, or within a contiguous territorial space – and about the criteria for recognition as a sovereign state.114 Traditionally, sovereignty has been characterized as a basic rule of coexistence within the sates system. Sovereignty provides the basis in international law for claims for state actions, and its violation is routinely invoked as a justification for the use of force in the international relations.115
The ability of authoritarian states to strip citizens of their rights to security of life, often shrouded under a thin veneer of non-interference in internal affairs of the state, is increasingly challenged on a global scale. Repressive and predatory regimes and other
112 Lawrence T. Farley, Plebiscities and Sovereignty: The Crisis of Political Illegitimacy, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 7-9 113 Lyons and Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention 7 114 Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, State Sovereignty as Social Construct (London: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1 115 Biersteker and Weber, State Sovereignty as Social Construct, 1
37 human rights violators are increasingly being exposed and made accountable for their actions.116 The United Nations Charter Article 2 (7) and the OAU Charter Article 3 (2) respectively stipulate that they will not intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. However, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the
Security Council has the power to determine what constitutes a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, and act of aggression; and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken…to maintain or restore international peace and security".117
Nowadays, the concept of sovereignty is becoming understood more in terms of conferring responsibilities on government to assist and protect all persons residing in their territories, so much so that if governments fail to meet their obligations, they risk international scrutiny, admonition, and possibly condemnation and reprisals.
3.2. International Intervention
Four cases occurred at a time when there were heightened expectations for effective collective action following the end of the Cold War. All four of them - Rwanda,
Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia - have had a profound effect on how the problem of intervention is viewed, analysed and characterized. Kosovo - where intervention did take place in 1999 –was one of the best examples to show that intervention was necessary in
116 Severine M. Rugumamu, State Sovereignty and Intervention in Africa: Nurturing New Governance (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report2-en.asp#dilemma, April 9, 2003) 117 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm, March 25, 2003)
38 order to stop ongoing bloody war.118 Vincent’s definition on humanitarian intervention sums up the traditional view:
Humanitarian intervention is an act, which seeks to intervene to stop a government murdering its own people.119
David Little observes that the recent policy of NATO of using force to protect
Albanians in Kosovo against massacre, ethnic cleansing, and other forms of gross and systematic human rights abuse by Serbian military forces raised deep legal and moral questions in regard to a general doctrine of force and humanitarian intervention. On such a complex subject, he suggests focus on three major problems attending the use of force in
Kosovo: its authorization, effects and conduct. The NATO bombing campaign was undertaken without specific authorization by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Thus NATO on this occasion ignored the very body that is invested by the U.N. Charter with final responsibility for certifying a use of force among states, because two member states, Russia and China, would surely have vetoed any solution directly supporting such military action.120 On the other hand, he argues, there is no explicit provision in the Charter for using force in the name of humanitarian causes, such as thwarting extensive human rights violations. Article 2.7 is taken to summarize the “status quo” character of the
Charter: that article prohibits the U.N. from intervening “in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. While the Charter does enunciate other objectives, such as advancing human rights, self-determination, social and economical
118 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report2-en.asp#skipnav , March 26, 2003) 119 Baylis and Smith, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 393 120William Joseph Buckley, Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Intervention, (Michigan- Cambridge:Wm.B.Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2000), 356
39 development, its overriding concern is clearly international peace and stability.121 However, the understanding has been that pursuing these additional objectives “could not justify the use of force between states; they would have to be pursued by other means. Peace was more important than progress and more important than justice”.122The “status quo bias” of the Charter has of late been sharply challenged, in part in response to situation in Kosovo.
It was the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan who, referring to the prevailing interpretation of the Charter as “old orthodoxy” called for immediate amendment. ‘The idea that the international community should have to stand by while governments are left free to do whatever they like is unacceptable’. Further on, he said that ‘sovereignty implies responsibility, not just power’.123
The effectiveness of NATO military policy in Kosovo remains highly controversial. There are allegations that the NATO campaign made matters worse, both for ethnic Albanians and for the Serbs living in Kosovo. However, the policy of massive ethnic cleansing was terminated, refugees returned back and the prospects for justice and peace have improved.124 The legitimacy of a humanitarian intervention depends not only on what happens during and immediately after the intervention, but also on the longer-term follow- up. Those who undertake humanitarian intervention have obligations to ensure that their actions contribute to a stable and productive outcome.125 Therefore, one could make a final evaluation on the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo only after finding a long lasting
121 United Nations, The Charter of the United Nation (http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm, June 10.2003) 122 Louis Henkin, Right versus Might: International Law and the Use of Force, 2nd ed. (New York: Council on Foreign relations, 1991), 38 123 Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Ditchley Lecture, (June 26, 1998, p.2) 124 Buckley, Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Intervention, 358. 125 Follow-up of the Kosovo Report: Why Conditional Independence for Kosovo?, (Sweeden: Independent Commission on Kosovo, 2001), 9.
40 solution acceptable for all sides involved in the conflict. If peace and stability will prevail in Balkans after NATO intervention, if people will not kill each other just because of different ethnic belonging, if multi-ethnicity will prevail over mono-ethnicity, then we can say that intervention in Kosovo was justifiable.
Chapter Four
4.1 Self-Determination in Theory and Practice
The doctrine of national self-determination, recently, has been regarded of
pressing importance; as since 1991 numerous multinational states have disintegrated
along national lines. Between 1947 and 1991 only one instance of secession had taken
place- Bangladesh. Nowadays, the process of secession cannot be regarded as limited to
former communist countries, nor is it about to stop there, for many successor states are as
multinational as the states they left behind.126
The history of self-determination is bound up with the history of the doctrine of
popular sovereignty proclaimed by French revolution:
Government should be based on the will of the people, not on that of the monarch, and people not content with the government of the country to which they belong should be able to secede and organise themselves as they wish.127
A thorough analysis of the evolution and present status of self-determination
leaves no doubt that it is today, and indeed has been for a long time, a core principle and
126 There are also numerous secessionist struggles across the globe: in the First World (e.g. Quebec, Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine, and, in the Third World (e.g. Sudan and Kurdish regions of Iraq and Turkey). More on this, see, Margaret Moore, National Self-Determination and Secession, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1. 127 A. Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination (Leiden: A.W.Sijthoff, 1973), 17.
41 fundamental right in international law. The principle of self-determination is prominently embodied in Article I of the Charter of the United Nations.128 Earlier it was explicitly embraced by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and others, and became the guiding principle for the reconstruction of Europe following World War I. While addressing the
League to Enforce Peace, President Wilson said:
We believe these fundamental things: first that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live…129
The principle was incorporated into the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposals, which evolved into the United Nations Charter. Its inclusion in the UN
Charter marks the universal recognition of the principle as fundamental to the maintenance of friendly relations and peace among states. It is recognised as a right of all peoples in the first article common to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which both entered into force in 1976. Paragraph 1 of this Article provides:
All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 130
It is the attempts to deny the right to self-determination that have contributed to the break up of Yugoslavia, that have inflamed and embittered this process, and that have caused the bloody tragedies and ethnic cleansing that have taken place. It is a common feature of criticism about the workability of the right of peoples to self-determination to
128 United Nations, The Charter of the United Nation (http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm, June 10.2003) 129 U.S Congressional Record, vol. 53 pt. 9, 8854. 130 The right had already been recognised in 1960 in the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514 (XV).
42 stress the lack of a competent organ in the international community to determine which people are entitled to such right.131
The international legal instruments on self-determination refer to the right of self- determination as belonging to “all peoples.” In determining who are title holders to the right of self-determination the plain meaning of the language should be taken as the starting point. It is a well-established maxim of international law, contained in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and affirmed by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), that terms in international legal instruments ordinarily are to be interpreted according to their plain meaning.132
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
International Meeting of Experts for the Elucidation of the Concepts of Rights of Peoples developed a more detailed description in 1989, specifically for the purpose of identifying the holders of the right to self-determination. This description (sometimes referred to by participants as the “Kirby definition” after its principal drafter, Justice Michael Kirby), identifies a people as:
a group of individual human beings who enjoy some or all of the following common features: (a) a common historical tradition; (b) racial or ethnic identity; (c) cultural homogeneity (d) linguistic unity; (e) religious or ideological affinity; (f) territorial connection;
131 Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination, 28. 132 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (Art. 31, para. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 ICJ 4, 8 (“If the words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is the end of the matter”).
43 (g) common economic life.133
As indigenous people, Kosovo Albanians believe they possess all above mention features that constitute people’s right for the self-determination. The exercise of self- determination requires, by its very nature, the expression of the will of the people. This was granted to the Kosovo people signing the Rambouillet Agreement. Article 3 of the amendment contained in Chapter 8 read:
Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for additional measures.134
What follows, is an examination of some of the basis for self-determination relevant to the case of Kosovo. There are those who argue that a group attains a moral right to self-determination/secession when it has suffered certain kinds of threats or grievances, including historical ones, such as previous invasion or annexation, as well as threats to its cultural preservation, threats of genocide, and finally ‘discriminatory redistribution’.135 While doing my research and taking into account different cases where right for self-determination has been applied, in no case other than Kosovo have I found
133 UNESCO, International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples: Final Report and Recommendations UNESCO doc. SHS-89/CONF.602/7, pp. 7-8. 134 Rambouillet is a place in France where sides involved in Kosovo war (Kosovo Albanians and Serbs) negotiated a peace agreement, which was signed only by Kosovo delegations. The refusal of Serbian delegation to sign this agreement was followed NATO air strikes against FRY. For more, see, Mark Weller, The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, International Affairs, 75 (2), 1999), 236. 135 It is the constructive approach. See, Moore, National Self-Determination and Secession, 80.
44 all these moral arguments that best justify the right of Kosovor people for self- determination.136
On the other hand, self-determination can be regarded as a basic right, rooted in the liberal democratic theory, available to any group the majority of whose members desire it. Here, self-determining groups have to be at least as liberal and as democratic as the state from which they are separating, to demonstrate a majority preference for self- determination, to protect minority rights, and to meet distributive justice requirements.137
Related to Kosovo and its people, it is true that the majority of people living in Kosovo
(Kosovo Albanias) have demonstrated their will through the referendum in which they decided for separation from Serbia and Yugoslavia, and favouring Kosovo’s independence.138
Analysts argue that the case of Kosovo is not just another case of secession of an unruly region but the case of Constituent Federal Unit of the Yugoslav Federation with well-defined borders, which enjoyed a high degree of sovereignty. With the dissolution of
Yugoslavia in 1991, Kosovo, as a Constituent Federal Unit of Yugoslavia, defined as such in the Constitution of the 1974, had the right to determine whether or not it wanted to remain within the rump of Yugoslavia. The formulation in the Yugoslav legalese of the
136 I support my observation with facts and figures from the history, and the policy of ethnic cleansing which has been applied against Kosovo Albanian for centuries. More about these facts, in 2nd chapter of this dissertation. 137 This is permissive approach: here threats and grievances are unnecessary to establish the claim for self- determination. Moore, National Self-Determination and Secession, 80. 138 The referendum was held on September 26-30, 1990 throughout Kosovo, 85 per cent of the Kosovo population took part (Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins boycotted), of whom 99.87 per cent voted for Kosovo’s Independence. More on the issue of self-determination and the case of Kosovo, see, Enver Hasani, Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and International Stability: The Case of Yugoslavia, (Vienna & Pristina: PfP Consortium, 2003), 237.
45 articles regarding Kosovo in the Constitution of 1974, made it abundantly clear that in the final account, Kosovo had rights recognized only to the six Republics and to the sovereign states.139 According to Rama, even the later Serb justifications for the violent revocation of the status of Kosovo were based precisely on the claims that the
Constitution of 1974 had created an independent unit that could not be controlled by
Serbia. Kosovo was not a part of Serbia but a part of Yugoslav federation extremely loosely attached to the Republic of Serbia. According to the Constitution of 1974 (until
Miloshevic forcefully changed the Constitution of Kosovo in 1989 and that of Serbia in
1990), Kosovo was a Constituent Unit of the Yugoslav Federation. It had a parliament, its government, and effectively enjoyed the same level of sovereignty as the other six
Republics. The Representatives of the Autonomous Provinces had the right to veto all the decisions taken by the Serb government. The Autonomous Provinces were represented without intermediaries at the federal level, independent of the Serb delegation. They contested at the federal level decisions taken by Serbia.140
With the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, the last legal vestige that kept
Kosovo tied to Serbia was gone. The EC, as noted, was the first international body to concern itself with Yugoslav crisis. Under its auspices, the Conference on Yugoslavia and the Arbitration Committee were set up and it was the Arbitration Commission which first officially stated that ‘FRY is in the process of dissolution’.141 The Badinter
Commission, an international committee of jurists found that what happened to
139 Marcus Brand, Kosovo under International Administration: Statehood, Constitutionalism and Human Rights, (Wien: M.Brand, 2002), 24-25. 140 Rama, The Serb-Albanian War, and International Community’s Miscalculations, but also Malcolm, A Short History of Kosovo, p.327 141 See more on Yugoslav dissolution and the role of EC in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its Creation to its Dissolution, (Hague: Martinus Niijhoff Publishers, 1995), 431-432.
46 Yugoslavia in 1991 was not “secession” but the complete dissolution of Yugoslavia into its constituent units.142 If Yugoslavia dissolved, and all the other “Constitutive Units” like
Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Slovenia had the right to self-determination, why
Kosovo that was a Constituent Federal Unit but within Serbia was an exception? The
Badinter Commission refused to recognize to Kosovo the status of the sovereign “Federal
Unit”. Only existing Republics were called to apply for international recognition.
Surprisingly, this Commission made such a decision despite the fact that Kosovo was constituted as a federal unit of Yugoslavia and had declared its independence through referendum.
The continuity of FRY was preserved regardless of the dissolution process until
February 4, 2003 when two chambers of the Yugoslav parliament marked the demise of the troubled Balkan federation and the birth of a new country called “Serbia and
Montenegro”, as outlined in a deal brokered by the EU.143 Meanwhile, Kosovo governed by UNMIK still waits for its final status. One could wonder why despite all the arguments listed so far in this dissertation, Kosovo’s fate remains still uncertain.
142 Hasani, Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and International Stability: The Case of Yugoslavia, 175. 143 Aleksander Vasovic, Yugoslavia abolished, Serbia-Montenegro created, Associated Press ((http://www.ap.org, February 6.2003)
47 Chapter Five
5.1. Options for the Final Status of Kosovo
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 1999 envisaged the withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces of FRY, whereas enabled a synchronised deployment in Kosovo of an international civil and security presence under
UN auspices, albeit under separate command UNMIK and NATO –led KFOR.
Resolution 1244 also envisaged the appointment of a Special Representative of the UN
Secretary General (SRSG) to administer Kosovo.144
Resolution 1244 did not foresee any definitive political solution for Kosovo, nor did it determine its future status. For the interim period of the international administration, Resolution 1244 reaffirmed the commitment of UN member states both to sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY on that time and to the substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration of Kosovo, while also mandating UNMIK to facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.145 It is very important to mention that Resolution 1244 was neither the product of an agreement between Kosovo
Albanians and Serbs containing a road map on how to implement a political settlement of
Kosovo conflict, nor an agreement between exhausted opponents seeking a compromise and an end to their conflict.146 Much has changed in Kosovo and in the region since the
144 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), 10 June 1999, paragraph 3, 5 and 6. (http://www.usip.org/library/pa/Kosovo/adddoc/Kosovo_unsc1244.html, June 17, 2003) 145 Detailed description of UNMIK mission in Kosovo can be found in Alexandros Yannis, Kosovo Under International Administration: An unfinished conflict, (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 2001), 11. 146 Yannis, Kosovo Under International Administration: An unfinished conflict, 32.
48 NATO bombardment of FRY (spring 1999) and subsequent arrival of UNMIK and
KFOR. One of the first challenges to the international presence in Kosovo after June
1999 was the demilitarisation of Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosoves (UÇK) as foreseen in
Resolution 1244. On 20 June 1999, the then political leader of UÇK and Prime Minister of Qeveria e Perkoshme e Kosoves (QPK), Hashim Thaçi and Agim Çeku, Chief of general Staff of UÇK, signed an “Undertaking of demilitarisation and transformation of the UÇK” with the Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR). As an outcome of this undertaking, in September 1999 Trupat Mbrojtese te Kosoves (TMK) was formally established by UNMIK Regulation as a “civilian emergency service”.147 Nowadays, TMK is perceived by majority of Kosovo Albanians as the future army of Kosovo despite the fact that its role according to UNMIK regulation and Constitutional Framework is entirely that of a civilian emergency organization.148
The international community has invested much effort and money to prepare
Kosovo for a substantial autonomy. So far, under auspices of the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) two rounds of local elections and last year general elections for central institutions have been held. The first free local elections ever held in Kosovo and internationally recognized, marked the beginning of a new era for citizens of Kosovo - that of democracy and freedom. As a result of these elections,
Kosovo today has its local governments established in all municipalities, as well as the
147 UÇK means Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was an armed liberation force that emerged in early 1997 and fought against Serbian regime in Kosovo. QPK was the Provisional Government of Kosovo established in mid-June 1999. TMK is the Albanian acronym form Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), Brand, Kosovo under International Administration: Statehood, Constitutionalism and Human Rights, 125 –126. 148 Exercising authority and control over the TMK service is a power and responsibility of SRSG according to Constitutional Framework. More on this, see Constitutional Framework, (http://www.unmikonline.org/index.html, June 21, 2003).
49 central government which was created on the basis of a political agreement signed by three major Albanian political parties- Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves (LDK)-
(Democratic League of Kosovo), Partia Demokratike e Kosoves (PDK)-(Democratic
Party of Kosovo) and Aleanca per Ardhemerine e Kosoves (AAK)-(Alliance for the
Future of Kosovo).149 The good thing about the election was the participation of all minorities living in Kosovo including the Serb minority, who had 10 seats reserved to the
Assembly of Kosovo even before the election took place. Overall, the Serbian minority holds 22 seats of the 120 seats in the assembly.150 International community together with
Kosovor institutions have made a great effort to build trust and confidence among all communities living in Kosovo and to ensure the return process of all those refugees who want to come back. Special attention has been delivered to the Serbian community who has been more reluctant to accept the new reality in Kosovo. Engaging this community in all structures of Kosovar society has often been difficult because authorities in Belgrade are still using them for their political goals in Serbia but also in Kosovo.151
The integration of Serbs and other minorities into Kosovar society, including their full participation in the political process, is one of the essential benchmarks set by
UNMIK in achieving democratic standards and building a democratic life in Kosovo. The institutions of Kosovo and their leaders are aware of the importance of this and have
149 The elections to the Kosovo Assembly were held on 17 November 2001. The Agreement on the President and the Government of Kosovo was reached on 28 February 2002 and contained a package deal according to which Bajram Rexhepi of the PDK became Prime Minister and Ibrahim Rugova of LDK, President of Kosovo. For more about elections and results see, Brand, Kosovo under International Administration: Statehood, Constitutionalism and Human Rights, 114-120. 150 Fore more, see Constitutional Framework 151 Very often happens that various crimes committed in Kosovo against Serbian minority are often being instrumentalzed by Serbian leaders in Kosovo and in Serbia. These situations provide only tension and harm fragile interethnic relations among communities.See for example, SH.Krasniqi, Serb te ndryshem kerkojne fajtore te ndryshem ne Kosove, Epoka e Re, 5 June 2003, 5.
50 spent much time, have undertaken many efforts towards this end. The letter of the main
Kosovor leaders addressed to displaced persons in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia proved the best the commitment towards solving this issue. The main message conveyed to the refugees was:
If you acknowledge Kosovo for as homeland, then it is time to come back home. Only together we can make Kosovo a place for all of us to be proud.152
Despite all efforts made so far with regard to this matter and a few positive trends marked recently, the situation on the ground remains tense. Reasons and factors are various, but the fact that UN Resolution 1244 envisaged the return of an agreed number of Serbian personnel to Kosovo is the one that creates illusions among people. The UN
Resolution 1244, Annex 2, under point 6 read:
After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions: Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence; Marking/clearing minefields; Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.153
The Serb minority in Kosovo still thinks that Serbia will regain sovereignty over territory and that is why they hesitate and refuse to integrate themselves in society. Serb authorities in Belgrade in the meantime insist that UN Resolution 1244 should be implemented completely, stressing the return of Serbian personnel and establishing
152 This was the first time for the leaders of Kosovo to undertake and to come up with this public letter appealing for the returs to come back home. Full text of this letter can be found on all daily newspapers published in Kosovo on 2 July 2003. Kthehuni ne shtepite tuaja, I therrasin lideret Kosovore te gjithe te zhvendosurit, Zeri, 2 July 2003, 5. 153 Annex 2 is taken form the UN Resolution 1244 which is the base for the functioning of the UNMIK mission in Kosovo. UN Resolution 1244, ((http://www.unmikonline.org/index.html, June 21, 2003).
51 control over territory of Kosovo. While writing this dissertation a terrible murder of two
Serbian children happened in village Gorzhdec in Peja municipality. For the first time after the war, a Serbian Prime Minster came to Kosovo to attend the funeral. Addressing the people gathered in the funeral he said that ‘Kosovo is not for sale’.154 These cases are putting in danger the whole process of reconciliation in Kosovo. Morever, the acts might endanger the beginning of the dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade. Leaders of
Kosovo have shown their willingness to move on with dialogue but the Serbian
Government does not now think it should take place.155
The question over final status remains open and according to the international community this matter cannot be solved neither in Prishtina nor Belgrade, and there will not be any acceptable unite lateral solution to the problem.156 However, the international community has not yet decided when the issue of the final status will be addressed. Until recently they have mentioned 2005 as an appropriate time to address the issue status, but this might be postponed taking into consideration current developments and increased tension in Kosovo.157
What follows now is an attempt to explore some of the options for the final status of Kosovo, which have so far been advocated by a few international outstanding institutes
154 Ne varrim, Zhivkoviq thote se Kosovo “nuk eshte per tregti”, Koha Ditore, 16 August 2003, 2. 155 Serbian Prime Minster Zoran Zhivkovic after the meeting he had with the new SRSG Harri Holker stated that ‘this is not the right time for dialogue’. Naile Mala- Imami, I Pergjigjem vetem OKB-se , thote Holkeri, Koha Ditore, 16 August 2003, 1-3. 156 Bekim Graiqevci, Kuint: Asnje akt I njeanshem nuk mund te paravendos statusin final te Kosoves, Zeri, 16 August 2003, 1-4. 157 Ekrem Krasniqi, BE nuk eshte e sigurte nese negociatat per statusin final te Kosoves do te fillojne ne vitin 2005, Zeri, 11 August 2003, 1-3.
52 and organizations. Besides this, the views of some of the main local leaders on this issue, as well as the attitude of majority of the people living in Kosovo will be presented.
5.2. Conditional Independence – is an option for the final status of Kosovo, which has been advocated by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo.158
The Commission published The Kosovo Report in October 2000 and reached two main conclusions. The first, was that the NATO intervention in Kosovo was illegal but legitimate. It was illegal, because it did not receive prior approval from the UNSC. It was legitimate because the egregious human rights violations were taking place, all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and Kosovo was liberated as a consequence of the intervention, the oppression of Kosovo Albanians was ended, and all those who had been expelled by Yugoslav forces during the war were able to return to their homes.
Second, the conclusion was that Kosovo should be given the status of "conditional independence". This means a self-governing Kosovo, outside the FRY, but within a specific international framework in which the international community retains responsibility for the security of borders and for overseeing the protection of minorities.159 The argument for conditional independence is based on a normative foundation: namely, the case for self-determination arises from the systematic abuse of the human rights of Kosovo Albanians over a long period and the consequent withdrawal of the consent of Kosovo Albanians to Serbian rule.160
158 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo was established as an initiative of the Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr Goran Persson, to provide an objective analysis of the events before, during, and after the war in Kosovo and to research the -lessons to be learned. More about the Commission, its members and reports see, www.Kosovocommission.org or read the Follow-up of the Kosovo Report: Why Conditional Independence for Kosovo?, (Sweeden: Independent Commission on Kosovo, 2001), 7-38. 159 Follow-up of the Kosovo Report: Why Conditional Independence for Kosovo, 10. 160 Follow-up of the Kosovo Report: Why Conditional Independence for Kosovo, 22.
53 Conditional independence is both a goal and a process. The goal is sovereignty and independence for the people of Kosovo, within limits prescribed by the international community - that is, provided Kosovo respects the territorial integrity of its neighbours, maintains internal peace and respect for human rights, and provides protection for the traditions and institutions of the minority community. Conditional independence does not preclude (indeed, it probably requires) developing close relations with Kosovo's neighbours, especially those in whatever entity is developed to replace the FRY. But these new relations are best developed on a voluntary basis from the starting condition of sovereign independence, and it is up to the people of Kosovo, in free negotiations with their neighbours, to decide what these should be. Conditional independence is also a process of progressive devolution, under which powers currently held by the international community, through the SRSG, are progressively transferred to locally elected officials.
The goal of conditional independence is not to keep political responsibility in the hands of the international community, but to devolve it back where it belongs, to the people of
Kosovo.161 Conditional independence is the only solution that meets all the key criteria for ensuring internal and regional stability simultaneously. With its assurance of independence from the FRY, it would enjoy legitimacy with the majority Albanian population. Economic development and foreign investment, currently hampered by the lack of a resolution of status, could proceed. With the removal of doubts – and the accompanying hopes and fears – over future status, it could be hoped that, despite the warnings of Kosovo Serb leaders, the chances for Albanians and Serbs to normalize their relations would be greater, improving the environment for return and minority rights.162
161 Follow-up of the Kosovo Report: Why Conditional Independence for Kosovo, 28. 162 A Kosovo Roadmap (I): Addressing Final Status, ICG Balkans Report N° 124, 1 March 2002, 11 – 12. (http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects, 28 May 2003)
54 There are three main arguments that are put forward against this proposal. The first concerns democracy in Serbia. Both among Serbian officials and among the international commentators, it is often argued that this is not the moment to raise the issue of Kosovo's future status for fear it might undermine the progress towards democracy - the issue could be exploited by extremist politicians and might divert attention from urgent everyday tasks. Undoubtedly, an independent Kosovo, however conditional, formally outside FRY, is a bitter pill for many Serbs to swallow. The second argument against conditional independence is the domino argument. Conditional independence, it is said, could encourage demands for the independence of Montenegro and the partition of
Bosnia or Macedonia, not to mention demands inside Serbia in Vojvidina, for example, or Sandzak. The third argument that is put forward against any change of status in
Kosovo has to do with the Security Council. It is argued that attempts to move beyond
UNSC Resolution 1244 would jeopardize the compromise with Russia - that Kosovo should remain within Yugoslav borders - which was important in ending NATO's military intervention. In the Balkans, a nineteenth-century concept of sovereignty, often espoused by nationalist leaders, is synonymous with insecurity and the renewed risk of war. A truly secure sovereignty in the Balkans - as indeed elsewhere in Europe and the world - is one that is conditional upon international agreements.163As far as Kosovo is concerned, conditional sovereignty is the only way to make independence acceptable to
Kosovo's neighbours and to enhance security.164
163 Follow-up of the Kosovo Report: Why Conditional Independence for Kosovo, 28-29. 164 Tim Judah, Greater Albania, Survival, Vol.43, No.2, 2001, 16.
55 5.2. Independent Kosovo - is another option that has been explored and strongly argued by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).165 CSIS report published in April 2003 Achieving A Final Status Settlement for Kosovo presents a rationale and roadmap for a final status agreement leading to a fully sovereign and independent Kosovo. After analyzing all the relevant factors, of all the options the report suggests that only independence offers the prospect of a promising future for Kosovo and its neighbors. The case for independence can be elaborated on the basis of political, economic, and regional security considerations.
Political A freely elected self-government will gain greater legitimacy as a sovereign organ rather than as a simple tool in the hands of international players, primarily the United Nations. Its authority and accountability to the electorate will be enhanced through the successful completion of the process leading to statehood. This will also undercut attempts to subvert or circumvent the legitimate Kosovor authorities by nondemocratic and organized criminal elements favoring a weak or uncertain state that allows for their illicit operations, not only in Kosovo, but also across the border in Macedonia. An international commitment to statehood would lessen the likelihood of a social explosion in Kosovo provoked by painful economic conditions. Public morale and discipline will also increase with the realization that independence, which is overwhelmingly favored by the majority of the population in Kosovo, is achievable, imminent, durable, and vital to preserve. The creation of an independent Kosovor government, parliament, and judicial and other institutions is the only way to develop a law-abiding society and an inclusive democracy in which all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, are granted the full array of human and civil rights, including the right to return of all legitimate Serb refugees to their homes. Most importantly, an independent government will be in a position to set social, economic, and institutional priorities and draft legislation—actions now almost entirely in the hands of UNMIK and other international organizations.
Economic There is little prospect for economic development until Kosovo is independent and self-governing, as any other status solution would lead to growing instability. Only responsible and empowered public institutions in an independent Kosovo
165 With headquarters in Washington and a staff of 190 researchers CSIS has been active for four decades providing world leaders with strategic insights on – and policy solutions- to current and emerging global issues. More about CSIS, see website: http://www.csis.org
56 will set the political priorities and invest in the infrastructure and services that will reduce the costs of production for private entrepreneurs and spur economic growth. Moreover, few, if any, foreign investors are likely to venture into a territory whose status remains unclear and whose future is ambiguous.
Regional Security Only statehood for Kosovo would ensure a more durable regional security in the Balkans—one that is not based principally on the presence of outside forces. With the development of an internal police force and a credible Kosovor military contingent, threats can be diminished and deterred, and contributions can be made to the international struggle against organized terrorism and criminality. The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), the EU’s main program for encouraging reform in the Balkans, requires participants to be, at a minimum, functioning sovereign states. As other Balkan states make progress towards the eventual goals of European integration, Kosovo is unable to participate because of its status as international protectorate. Only an independent Kosovo, not represented by UNMIK, can begin the essential process of European integration. Maintaining the de facto integrity of Kosovo will send a strong signal to extremists and ethnic agitators in Bosnia and Macedonia that partition is not an attainable goal. Dividing Kosovo along ethnic lines would only serve to encourage destabilizing elements throughout the region.166
Finally, fears have been raised that independence for Kosovo will lead to further disintegration in the region. It has been asserted, for example, that independence for
Kosovo would open the door for the Republika Sprska (RS) to secede from Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and open the door for other ethnic groups within Serbia and other countries to demand territorial separation. These fears are misplaced. The case for separating the
RS from Bosnia is frivolous, as it is an artificial entity created by ethnic cleansing and therefore undeserving of further status considerations. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the RS or any other ethnic group could make claims to independence based on the criteria laid out by the Badinter Commission. Ultimately, the international community must make it clear that the resolution of Kosovo’s status will carry no
166 For more details about this report and and the case for Independent Kosovo, see Janusz Bugajski, Bruce Hitchner and Paul Williams, Achieving a Final Status Settlement for Kosovo, (Washington: CSIS, 2003), 4-6.
57 precedents for other ethnic groups or entities in the region.167 According to the
International Crisis Group (ICG) full independence has been the expressed goal of the
Albanian majority since the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991. All Albanian political parties see the UN administration as an interim phase leading to early independence. For Albanians, the provision in the Rambouillet accords (repeated in the Constitutional Framework) for the
“will of the people” to be taken into consideration in deciding final status is vitally important, as it appears to hold out the prospect of an eventual referendum. In this scenario, the recently elected Assembly could take the initiative in organizing a referendum on independence, followed by an independence declaration and negotiations with Belgrade and the international community over the details. While the UN civil administration would be phased out, an international security presence could remain until such a time as the overall regional security situation warranted a withdrawal.168
5.3. Indefinite Protectorate – rely upon the argument of Kosovo’s unready ness for final status and the full autonomous self-government, let alone independence. Therefore, it is often argued, much more time is required to build functioning, democratic institutions before final status should be considered. The unsatisfactory security situation for minorities and the lack of adequate conditions for the return of refugees are further reasons why a continued international presence is required. It will be some time before local institutions can be entrusted with internal security and the protection of the rights of
167 Bugajski, Hitchner and Williams, Achieving a Final Status Settlement for Kosovo, 6. 168 ICG is a private, multinational organization committed to strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflict. ICG has been active in Kosovo since late 1997 and has published many reports related Kosovo but also other countries in the region. More about the reports referring options about final status, see A Kosovo Roadmap (I): Addressing Final Status, ICG Balkans Report N° 124, 1 March 2002, 11 – 12. (http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects, 28 May 2003)
58 minorities. The unstable situation in neighbouring Macedonia and southern Serbia, the fragility of Serbia’s post-Milosevic transition, fears of heightened pro-secessionism in
Bosnia’s Republika Srpska are all cited as further reasons for putting off discussion on
Kosovo’s final status.169 While analysing this option, The United States Institute of Peace
(USIP) highlights following criteria:
Regional stability: problems exist, but the risks so far have proven manageable so long as KFOR is in place. Requires KFOR vigilance in southern Serbia and Macedonia. Legitimacy: Serbs will want UN role; Albanian extremists may resist violently if final status is delayed indefinitely, UNMIK maintains authority, or European Union becomes the protector. Viability: International community prepared to stay, with the possible exception of the United States, but postponement of final status will inhibit investment and economic development. Democratization/Refugees: Current slow progress in the right direction might be halted if Albanians see indefinite postponement of final status decision. International missions: International military presence would have to be open- ended.170
This is the option implied by the new constitutional framework. Such an option is unacceptable for all the reasons given above. While it might allay uncertainty if independence were clearly ruled out, the tension between the international administration and Kosovor demands for self-determination could easily reach breaking point.171
5.4. Partition – is the idea that Kosovo might be partitioned into Serb and
Albanian entities. Nationalist groups in Belgrade have circulated it since the mid 1990s at least. Serbian deputy premier Nebojsa Covic, who heads the Coordination Centre for
Kosovo, floated the idea of such a solution in May 2001, but afterwards backtracked.
169 A Kosovo Roadmap (I): Addressing Final Status, 5. 170 The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has done many publications on Kosovo. In a special report issued in July 2002, wide range of options on final status of Kosovo has been explored. See, Kosovo Final Status Options and Cross-Border Requirements, (http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr91.html, 5 June 2003. 171 Follow-up of the Kosovo Report: Why Conditional Independence for Kosovo, 23.
59 There are different variants of this idea. One idea is for a division between a Serb- majority area in northern Kosovo, north of the Iber River, which would remain with
Serbia while the rest of Kosovo would become independent. It has also been suggested that there could be a trade-off between northern Kosovo and the Albanian-majority
Lugina e Presheves (Presheva Valley) region across the border from Kosovo in southern
Serbia.172 Representatives of local Serbs in Kosovo have worked hard to create a reality that would encourage the partitioning of Kosovo.173 In principle, border changes by agreement can be acceptable. Such peaceful agreements are allowed for in the Helsinki Final
Act. A de facto partition of Kosovo, which could conceivably form the basis for such an agreement, was affected in the aftermath of the Yugoslav withdrawal in 1999, resulting in a
Serb-controlled enclave north of the Iber. This separation of Serb and Albanian communities, including ‘ethnic cleansing’ of people caught on the wrong side of the new divide, was accepted by KFOR at the time as a means of subduing ethnic conflict. But the Albanians never accepted this state of affairs, and any agreement on such a partition in the long term would be immensely difficult to achieve.174 Such an option would violate "the normative commitment of the international community to avoid population displacement and to sustain the multi-ethnic and mixed fabric of Balkan societies". But there are also practical objections: it would never be accepted by the majority Albanian population, who regard, rightly or wrongly, the Trepca Mine complex in northern Kosovo as part of Kosovo's basic endowment, and it could easily lead to renewed violence in the Lugina e Presheves with the aim of swapping Mitrovica for Presheva.175 Further more, it would be a
172 A Kosovo Roadmap (I): Addressing Final Status, 9. 173 In a special OSCE report it has been revealed that a plan announced by Serbian municipalities in Kosovo consisted a strategy for the partition of Kosovo. More about this plan, read Lundrim Aliu, Plani i Unionit Serb, deshmi e ekzistimit te agjendes per ndarje etnike i raporton OSBE-ja Vjenes, Koha Ditore, March 3, 2002, 1-2. 174A Kosovo Roadmap (I): Addressing Final Status, 10. 175 Follow-up of the Kosovo Report: Why Conditional Independence for Kosovo, 23.
60 destabilizing precedent for Bosnia, Macedonia, and Serbia. So the partition option should be effectively ruled out as an acceptable outcome according to analysts.
Other options for the final status of Kosovo have been explored too, but the seem less realistic to occur. Therefore, I will not comment on them. What follows now is a summary of the main points expressed by key Kosovor leaders on the issue of final status. The Prime
Minister of Kosva, Mr Bajram Rexhepi in an exclusive interview conducted for the purpose of this dissertation stated that:
Full independence and sovereignty of Kosovo under recognized administrative borders is the corner stone of a solution, however we must be prepared other possible alternatives, for example, Monitored Independence for 2-3 years, to make sure that the minority rights, democratisation, the rule of law are completely met. More or less, a kind of Conditional Independence would be acceptable. Other options such as: Partition, Confederation, Federation etc are completely ruled out as unacceptable.176
The President of Kosovo, Mr Ibrahim Rugova known as a leader of peaceful movement during 1989- 1996 has a slightly different view. According to him, Kosovo is de facto independent and there is a need only for formal recognition. On one occasion he said:
For more than a decade Kosovo continues to ask for independence and the creation of this identity. I insist that a formal recognition of Kosovo’s independence would calm the region of the Southeastern Europe.177
On the other hand, the former political leader of UÇK and present President of
PDK, Mr Hashim Thaçi has been considered as very pragmatic and realistic regarding the
176 Bajram Rexhepi is the Prime Minster of Kosovo’s Government established in 28 February 2002 and he comes from PDK ranks. Remarks stated above are taken from the interview I conducted with him for the purpose of the dissertation. 177 Ibrahim Rugova is the President of Kosovo elected as result of package agreement for the establishment of Kosovo’s institutions. He holds also the position of the President of LDK. Above remarks are taken from the daily newspaper Bota Sot and even today his attitude regarding the final status remains the same. See, Idriz Morina, Shpresoj se 2 Korrikun se shpejti do ta kemi edhe Dite Nacionale, Bota Sot, 3 July 2003, 1-2.
61 final status of Kosovo. In an interview conducted by myself, he reaffirmed his view to have a moratorium on this matter for certain period of time. He argued that ‘during this phase of misunderstandings considering the political status, Kosovo and Serbia should reach an agreement, with the international mediation, on a status moratorium for a limited time to enable gradually the reaching of western standards in both places’. ‘Kosovo and the Union of Serbia and Montenegro would gradually be integrated within the European and Euro-Atlantic structures as separate entities’. On the issue of the final status he said:
Kosovo is part of Europe and will remain a partner urging European integration, but Kosovo is not part of Serbia and will not become part of any kind of new Union, Federation or Confederation. Serbia must stop dreaming of regaining sovereignty over Kosovo…The people of Kosovo will be those to decide about their future.178
In the end, I bring views expressed by the President of AAK, Mr. Ramush
Haradinaj. His personal stand which the stand of his party too, is that ‘the Independence of Kosovo is nonnegotiable’. Further more, he emphasized:
The final status of Kosovo can be solved through the implementation of the Kosovo people’s will for an Independent Kosovo. We should negotiate only to harmonise implications that might come out during the implementation of the final status.179
Conclusion
Drawing a conclusion on a complex issue such as Kosovo is very difficult and almost impossible. Complexity arises from the mere historical facts related with Kosovo, 178 Hashim Thaci is the former leader of UÇK and now President of PDK. He has been leader of Kosovor delegation during the peace conference in Ramboullet and Prime Minster of Provisional Government. 179 Ramush Haradinaj is President of AAK – the third major Albanian party in Kosovo. Remarks are taken from the interview I conducted with him for the purpose of my dissertation.
62 but also with the issue of Albanian populate living throughout the region. Of a total of over eight million Albanians on the planet, half live in Albania, one-third in Kosovo, and the reminder in Macedonia, Montenegro, and southern Serbia.180 All historical facts and arguments presented in this dissertation proved that the essence of the dispute over
Kosovo is that both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs claim historical rights and control over territory. The facts revealed suggested that Kosovo Albanians have been living in this territory for centuries; they managed to preserve their language and traditions; possess their own national identity that is almost completely distinct from that of Serbia; represent the majority of over 90 per cent of people living in Kosovo. Such facts cannot be denied nor can the will of people to decide about their future.
Taking into account the experience of ethnic cleansing and the consequences of terrible war that Kosovo Albanians went though, it will be absolutely naïve and unjust to ask from them accept the Serbia rule again. Further more, all observations, analysis and opinions expressed so far by Albanian leaders, but also from ordinary people lead to one conclusion. Kosovo Albanians will not accept anything less than independence. On the other side, Serbia claims to re-establish its rule over Kosovar territory arguing that
Kosovo is the corner stone of Serbian national and religious identity. It is a common observation that continuing international ambiguity and delay over the final status of
Kosovo is increasingly untenable. Confusion and obfuscation over whether the territory becomes a long-term UN or EU protectorate, is unilaterally handed over to Belgrade’s control, or is finally launched on a trajectory for statehood erodes the effectiveness of the
180 Halpern, Joel and David A.Kideckel, Neighbours at War: Antrapological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, Culture, and History, (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press).358.
63 UNMIK, fuels the misplaced hopes for some in Serbia that all or part of Kosovo will again come under the authority of Belgrade, postpones stability in Southeast Europe, and most disturbingly, contributes to increased tensions, political and economic stagnation.181
The issue of Kosovo’s status will not be solved independently from the establishment of the new international order in the southeastern Europe. The final goal of
IC is creation of such international order in the Balkans where peace is self-sustainable so that foreign troops can pull out from the region. Three main potential flashpoints in the southeastern Europe are Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. In devising final solution for Kosovo’s status, IC will take into account also what are consequences of particular option for the regional stability. Arguments proved that independent undivided
Kosovo is not only the most just solution for Kosovo’s status but also the best option for the wider regional stability. Therefore, if international community is really interested to impose a long lasting settlement for Kosovo and for the region, it should consider seriously first two options explored above and prepare a clear road map on how to implement it.
181 Bugajski, Hitchner and Williams, Achieving a Final Status Settlement for Kosovo, 2
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY
71 AAK Alliance for the Future of Kosovo COMFOR Commander of Kosovo Force CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies EU European Union FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia RYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia IC International Community ICG International Crisis Group ICJ International Court of Justice KFOR Kosovo Force KLA Kosovo Liberation Army KPC Kosovo Protection Corps KPS Kosovo Police Service LDK Democratic League of Kosovo, NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo QPK Qeveria e Perkoshme e Kosoves, (Provisional Government of Kosovo) RS Republica Serpska SAP Stabilization and Association Process SRSG Special Representative of the [UN] Secretary-General TMK Trupat Mbrojtese te Kosoves UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UÇK Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosoves UN United Nations UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution US United States
APPENDIX B
MAPS
72 Balkans, Ethnic Majorities, ( http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/balkans.jpg, 10 July 2003)
73 (http://www.albanian.com, 15 February 2003)
74 Former Yugoslavia - Ethnic Majorities from Former Yugoslavia: A Map Folio, 1992, (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/yugoslav.jpg,
75 Kosovo (Political), (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/kosovo_pol98.jpg, 13, May 2003)
76 APPENDIX C
PICTURES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING AND ATROCITIES
The Kosovo Catastrophe
Ethnic Albanian refugees -- among tens of thousands fleeing as a result of "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo -- peer from a truck as they arrive in Kukes, Albania, Wednesday, March 31. Photo: AFP, http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/photo/kosovo3/,
77 Children waiting to enter Macedonia at the Blace border crossing. Some 2,000 ethnic Albanians arrived at Blace Wednesday by train from Kosovo's capital, Pristina.
Photo: Damir Sagolj/REUTERS
78 Albanian American Civic League (http://aacl.com/62.html, 27 April 2003)
79 A mother and her sixth month son were killed in the massacre of Obri, Skenderaj,
(http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/cleansing/, 22 May 2003)
80 APPENDIX D
U.N. RESOLUTION 1244
Resolution 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting,
on 10 June 1999
The Security Council,
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,
81 Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2; 2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation; 3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized; 4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2; 5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences; 6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner; 7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below; 8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;
82 9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:
a. Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2; b. Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below; c. Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; d. Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task; e. Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task; f. Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence; g. Conducting border monitoring duties as required; h. Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations; 2. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo; 3. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include: a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); b. Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required; c. Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections; d. Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities; e. Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
83 f. In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; g. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction; h. Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid; i. Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; j. Protecting and promoting human rights; k. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo; 4. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid; 5. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date; 6. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; 7. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General; 8. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences; 9. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation; 10. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution; 11. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise; 12. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;
84 13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annex 1
Statement by the Chairman
on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers
held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives; Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA; Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.
Annex 2
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. 2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable. 3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives. 4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control
85 and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. 5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo. 6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
o Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence; o Marking/clearing minefields; o Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; o Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 2. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations. 3. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self- governing institutions. 4. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South- Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation. 5. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below.(1) A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:
Withdrawal
o Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;
Returning personnel
86 o Equipment associated with returning personnel; o Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities; o Timetable for their return; o Delineation of their geographical areas of operation; o Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.
Notes
1. Other required elements:
o A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours; o Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands); o Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals; o The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.
Source: United Nations Mission in Kosovo, (http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm, 21 June 2003)
87 APPENDIX E
SELECTED RESULTUS OF THE OPINION POLL
From official census data of the Kingdom of Serbia, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Total Year Ethnic composition (%) number Albanian Serb Montenegrin Turkish Muslim Other 1913 497,456 1921 439,010 65.8 26.0 6.4 1931 552,064 60.0 32.6 7.4 1948 733,034 1953 815,908 1961 963,988 67.2 23.6 3.9 2.7 0.8 1.2 1971 1,243,393 73.7 18.4 2.5 1.0 2.1 2.0 1981 1,588,400 77.5 13.2 1.7 0.8 3.7 4.1 1991* 2,000,000 90.0 8.0 2.0
* the data for 1991 is estimated, the census of that year was boycotted by the Albanian population.
Sources: Musa Limani, The Geographic Position, Natural Riches, Demographic Characteristics, and the Economical Development of Kosovo (Prishtina, Kosovo: The Association of Lawyers of Kosovo, 1992); Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
Index Kosovo, joint venture with BBSS Gallup International, conducted a public opinion poll in May 2002, where several questions were posed to Kosovor citizens about the most important things in life and trust in different institutions. The survey was concluded from 17th-23rd May throughout Kosovo with 1,000 Albanian citizens aged 18 years plus. The research was conducted with the stratified multi-staged method, a random method that ensures a representative coverage of Albanian citizens of Kosovo.
88
1 :: to have a job 6 :: to have a happy family 2 :: to get an education 7 :: to live in freedom 3 :: to be faithful to my religion 8 :: to live in a country without 4 :: to have a good standard of living violence and corruption 5 :: to live in a country with no war 9 :: to have a good health
Source: Index Kosovo, (http://www.indexKosovo.com/, 10August 2003).
Table 1.2. Perception of respondents on current economic trends in Kosovo (in percentage) Albanians Serbs Others Total* TableNot satisfied 1.1. Macroeconomic at all indicators 17.8 (values are given 27.8 in million 14.1 Euros) 18.2 Not satisfied 38.3 38.1 34.2 38.0 Neither satisfied Indicators nor dissatisfied 2001 25.1 200226.3 20002/2000228.3 25.4 Satisfied 15.2 3.6 18.5 14.7 GDPVery satisfied 1,747 0.7 1,990 0.0 2.2 113,9 % 0.7 PerDK/NA capita GDP 941 2.9 1,051 4.1 2.7 111,7 % 3.0 ConsumptionTotal 2,550 100 2,742 100 100 107,5 % 100 Family consumption 1,722 1,934 112,3 % ImportsSource: Opinion poll, November 2002, 659,8 Early Warning 432,1* System, Kosovo, Report - #2 Exports September-December 2002 10,6 14,2* - GNPThe data has been weighted based 2,434 on the percentage 2,648 of community participation 108,8 in the overall population of Kosovo (88% Albanians, 6% Serbs and 6% other Source:communities), MEF, Macroeconomic according to Unit,the 1991 Early census Warning System, Kosovo, Report #2 September-December 2002 * Values for imports and exports are given for the period January-June 2002
89 Table 1.3. The living standard of families in 2002 Perception of living standard Percentage
Poor 19.0 Below average 30.9 Average 47.0 Above average 2.7 Wealthy 0.4 Total 100
Source: Riinvest, Survey of 1,252 families, December 2002
APPENDIX F
INTERVIEWS
Three very important interviews expressing views of the three major political leaders of Kosovo have been conducting for the purpose of this dissertation. Following are the key political interviewed:
Dr. Bajram Rexhepi Prime Minister of Kosovo
Mr. Hashim Thaçi President of the Democratic Party of Kosovo
Mr. Ramush Haradinaj
90 President of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo.
Full transcript of these interviews can be obtained only upon request made in the following e-mail address: [email protected]
91