Russian Economy DA – Aff Answers Non Unique – No Competitiveness Now Russian economic competitiveness is low now BSR Russia, developing Moscow as a global financial centre, july.8.2011, http://www.bsr-russia.com/en/banking-a-finance/item/1772-developing-moscow-as-a-global- financial-centre-executive-perspectives.html The Russian government has been actively pushing the agenda of developing Moscow as a global financial centre, in line with London and New York. Following the financial crisis of 2008 and the global economic slowdown in 2009, the Russian economy has struggled to return to the high growth trajectory that other emerging economies of the so-called BRIC group; namely Brazil, India and China have achieved. A recent World Economic Forum (WEF) report on Russia analyzed the economic competitiveness of the country’s financial system and concluded that unless it undertakes major financial reforms, it will fall further behind the other emerging economies.

Competitiveness low now The Moscow Times, gref borrows question from lenin, june.20.2011, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/gref-borrows-question-from- lenin/439110.html Although participants at the event — which opened with a short video blaring out the theme song of U.S. blockbuster "Mission Impossible" — found it easy to agree in general about what was wrong, they were short on details for possible solutions. "As a Russian person I think Russia must be a different country," Shuvalov said, alternating between sips from an espresso and a glass of cold water. "We are at a stage," said Sergei Guriev, rector of Moscow's New Economic School, "when we need to understand that something must be changed dramatically." Billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov, who is expected to lead the pro-business Right Cause party, said the governmental system was "simply exhausted." A joint report released in conjunction with the breakfast by Sberbank and the World Economic Forum placed Russia 63rd out of 137 countries for competitiveness. China ranked 27th, and the United States came in fourth. Kudrin, who was drinking grapefruit juice, said pre-election spending would torpedo any aspirations to improve Russia's position. "Competitiveness," he added, "means less state." Kudrin also said he was in favor of lowering the social tax on payrolls, later announced by President Dmitry Medvedev during the conference opening, but warned, "If we want to lower taxes, we have to lower expenditures." The World Economic Forum and Sberbank report proposed a "3+5" approach. Russia must, it said, build on its three natural advantages — a large market, a well-educated population and natural resources — to successfully address five core challenges: rule of law, deteriorating quality of education, low levels of competitiveness, weak financial regulation and crude management practices. Non Unique – No Competitiveness Now Economic competitiveness is low now Financial Times, Medvedev seeks to roll back state, june.17.2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d726e5e-98d0-11e0-bd66-00144feab49a.html#axzz1RYtAMr9N In a speech observers said resembled a platform for a re-election bid, the Russian president warned that the country could face stagnation if it did not curb excessive state interference in the economy and boost private investment. This was the only way to ensure the Russian economy was competitive, he said. “We need to get out of old habits. It is not right to rely only on stable, gradual growth. Behind this notorious stability could lie the next stagnation,” Mr Medvedev told an auditorium packed with global and Russian business leaders at the annual St Petersburg economic forum. The term “stagnation” is evocative for Russians, a reference to the Leonid Brezhnev era in the 1970s when Soviet economic growth stalled. The potential of strengthening the state’s role in the economy had been “exhausted”, Mr Medvedev said. “We are not building state capitalism,” he said. The comments appeared a direct jab at the policies of Vladimir Putin, his predecessor who is now prime minister but still operates as Russia’s paramount leader after tightening the state’s grip over the economy during his two presidential terms. Neither man has ruled out running for president in elections next year. Mr Medvedev said the domination of state-controlled companies had led to “low entrepreneurial and investment activity” which was threatening the loss of the Russian economy’s competitiveness.

Competitiveness low now – Ruble proves Bloomberg, ruble slides to 4 week low as oil falls Greece curbs risk bets, june.20.2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-20/ruble-slides-to-4-week-low-as-oil-falls-greece- curbs-risk-bets.html The ruble depreciated to the lowest level in four weeks against the dollar before paring losses by the close as concern Greece’s debt crisis will spread curbed demand for oil and riskier emerging-market assets. The ruble fell 0.3 percent to 28.1424 per dollar by the 5 p.m. close in Moscow, the lowest level since June 16. Ruble- denominated Eurobonds due in 2018 dropped for a sixth day, their longest streak of losses since they were sold, raising the yield three basis points to 6.916 percent, the highest since May 30. Crude, Russia’s main export earner, fell as European governments failed to agree on releasing a loan payout to spare Greece from default and Japan’s exports dropped in May more than forecast. Oil lost as much as 2 percent to $91.14 a barrel, data compiled by Bloomberg show. Citigroup left its ruble forecast unchanged at 34-35 against the basket this year. Ruble downside will be “limited by central bank interventions and deposit rate hikes,” Ribakova and Novikova said. Russian government dollar bonds due 2015 were little changed, with the yield at 2.931 percent. Non Unique Russia’s economic competitiveness is low now Wall Street Journal, Moscow elite see kudrin as possible prime minister, july.8.2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2011/07/08/moscows-elite-sees-kudrin-as-possible-pm- if-putin-makes-president/?mod=google_news_blog Mr. Kudrin appears to be suited for the type of work that will be needed after the elections are over, when Russia will have to face the realities of an aging population, inadequate oil and gas revenues compared with spending plans and a lack of economic competitiveness compared with other emerging markets.

Head Russian economist indicates competitiveness is low now Voice of Russia, new directions outlined for strategy 2020, june.20.2011, http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/06/20/52109555.html Vladimir Putin is well aware that the government will have to wind up many effective but populist measures in favor of pragmatic and sometimes unpopular solutions. Among other things, Russia’s stabilization fund, which proved efficient during the crisis but is now hampering modernization, will be done away with. There are also ideas to revise the monetary policy, another developer of Strategy 2020, head of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Vladimir Mau pointed out: "We can no longer compensate for poor competitiveness by manipulating exchange rates. Curbing inflation should be accompanied by a drop in refinancing rates and so the conversion from external funds to internal ones. It is clear that without resolving this issue we will hardly manage to deal with two other challenges facing us. I mean prospects for the Russian ruble as a regional reserve currency and those for Russia’s becoming an international financial center," Vladimir Mau said. No Links – Generic Inherent barriers to Russia space leadership James Oberg, space analyst for NBC News, and Johnson Space Center Mission Control operator and orbital designer, Chapter 22: International Perspectives: Russia, Toward a Theory of Space power, Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU, 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf However, none of these intentions has much chance of success unless the Russians find a way out of the looming demographic crisis that mass mortality is confronting them with. In a society and an industry where monopolization of knowledge was power and sharing it often led to legal prosecution, behavior must change, and fast. This must be done so that space workers a decade from now, without the in-the-flesh guidance and advice of the old-timers, will be able to draw on their team knowledge that survived the passing of its original owners and was preserved in an accessible, durable form. The alternative is a return to the learning curve of more frequent oversights, mistakes, and inadequate problem solving of the dawn of the space age —with its daunting costs in time, treasure, prestige, and even human lives.

Russia cannot be competitive in the space industry and is not linked to the economy Keith Crane and Artur Usanov, director of RAND’s environment energy and economic development program, role of high technology industries, 2010, project muse Space is not a dynamic industry in the global economy . Commercial satellite launches have been fewer than expected as fiber optic cables have satisfied most of the increased demand for communications capacity despite the extraordinary growth of the internet. Most launches are still purchased by governments. The space program in the United States appears to be in a period of retrenchment, and in Europe it also faces budgetary pressures. Although China and India have expanding programs, they tend to favor their own manufacturers. Russia's good track record and budgetary pressures in the United States provide room for continued sales of launches and rockets as demand for observation satellites remains, but the industry does not show signs of dynamic growth. New rocket designs appear to be keeping Russia competitive. Civilian aviation presents a different story Within Russia, there is a debate about whether the Russian industry will be able to maintain stand-alone capacity to assemble civilian aircraft or would be better off collaborating with Western manufacturers. ‘Western companies have complimented Russian capabilities in design, precision engineering, especially turbine blades, and sophisticated materials but have difficulty in acquisitions or greenfield investments, in part because of security concerns and high levels of corruption. In our view, despite the concerns of Russia's military establishment, the answer is clear: Russian companies have done well collaborating with the international industry but have failed when they have attempted to go it alone. Russia’s successes with joint ventures and the failure of former Soviet products on international markets show the future of the industry. No Links – Generic Structural barriers prevent Russian space competitiveness James Oberg, space analyst for NBC News, and Johnson Space Center Mission Control operator and orbital designer, Chapter 22: International Perspectives: Russia, Toward a Theory of Space power, Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU, 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf At the same time, Russia shows no signs of developing a capability for major innovation in spacecraft engineering or of demonstrating more than lip-service interest in quantum advances in space operations capabilities. Incremental progress has been the watchword for decades, usually not by choice but out of necessity because all previous attempts at breakout projects (human lunar flight, advanced robotic Mars probes, the Buran shuttle, the Polyus-Skif family of orbital battle stations) ended in humiliating frustration. Providing commercial launch services for foreign customers has provided multidimensional benefits to Russia. Beyond the significant cash flow, such activities fund booster upgrades and, in the case of converted military missiles, fund validation of lifetime extension efforts for still-deployed missile weapons. Military applications of space systems remain uninspired, with critical constellations (such as the missile early warning net) still significantly degraded and likely to remain so for many years. Russian officials have evidently decided that, despite any public posturings over U.S. military threats, there is essentially no prospect of actual hostilities in the foreseeable future and hence little pressure to reconstitute military space assets to a Soviet-era level. Russia retains a nuclear-armed operational antimissile system around Moscow that, if upgraded to hit-to-kill guidance, could provide significant antisatellite capability; it is also developing small robotic rendezvous spacecraft similar to U.S. projects that have potential antisatellite capabilities at any altitude into which they can be launched. Attempts at domestic commercialization of space-related services, including communications, navigation, and mapping, remain seriously—perhaps irremediably— hamstrung by the recent resurgence of a traditional Russian top-down structure of authority. Bureaucrats are being ordered to implement wider use of space infrastructure, and after many years of rosy reports of progress, Moscow may realize that it is almost all, as usual, a sham. There is still little indication of successful exploitation of space discoveries and spacedeveloped technologies (what NASA and the Europeans call spin-offs) as a means of improving the technological skills of Russian industry. The space industry, as a component of the national defense industry, remains strictly compartmentalized from Russia's civil economy, and the resurgence of broad espionage laws (and several recent highly publicized convictions) will keep this ghettoization in force. This in turn may require other government measures, from patent purchase to industrial espionage, to acquire technologies that some Russian industries may already possess but are in practice forbidden to share internally. Link Turns – Generic Plan solves for Russian aerospace David Bernstein, engineering research associate at Stanford university’s center for international security and cooperation, commercialization of Russian technology in cooperation with American companies, 1999, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10230/bernstein99.pdf This can be illustrated by comparing subsectors of aerospace. Cooperative technology commercialization in aviation and space are very different. In the latter, American partners are utilizing major systems, such as Proton boosters, designed and manufactured in Russia. In aviation, there are two types of ventures. In the first, American companies (e.g., Boeing) are contracting for diverse elements of research, engineering, and testing, which they then incorporate into aircraft manufactured outside of Russia. In these cases, the technology transfer is largely, but not completely, from Russia to the United States. There are also projects, such as the IL96, in which U.S. companies (e.g., Pratt &Whitney, Collins) have entered into a joint venture for the production of Russian airliners utilizing U.S.-developed engines and avionics. The ultimate plan is that many of these components will be manufactured in Russia. In this case, the main technology transfer is from the United States to Russia. The financial viability of the IL96 is not yet assured as sales have been very low. The international space ventures have been a major factor in the revitalization of the Russian space industry whereas the civil aviation industry is still in a precarious financial condition with very few sales of aircraft.

Boeing proves David Bernstein, engineering research associate at Stanford university’s center for international security and cooperation, commercialization of Russian technology in cooperation with American companies, 1999, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10230/bernstein99.pdf Both Boeing’s Commercial Airplane Group (BCAG) and the Boeing Information, Space and Defense Group (BISDG) have many projects in Russia.1 In 1993–1997 Boeing funded over $1 billion worth of contracts with the Russian aerospace industry. Though it is not easy to estimate the labor effect of these programs, there is reason to believe that it is measured in tens of thousands of jobs, not counting the multiplication effect. Many of these are well- paid jobs for technical personnel. The share of Russian programs in Boeing’s outsourcing network is still relatively low, however, and does not create any dependency on either side. Boeing’s operating approach to date has been to work by contract with the Russian enterprises. In general Boeing has not taken the approach of hiring individual scientists or engineers directly and has not encouraged any of them to leave their institutes to seek employment with Boeing. Neither has Boeing encouraged any of them to start their own companies. In addition, Boeing has not hired Russian engineers to bring them to the United States. Boeing believes that its approach is the best way to help Russia maintain its core capabilities and to ensure Boeing’s access to the best technology and cooperation available without contributing to the brain drain of top Russian scientists and engineers. At every step of the way Boeing has kept the Russian government informed of its activities and plans in Russia. This, and a clear demonstration of long-term commitment, has resulted in good cooperation from the government as well as the institutes on the research projects. Fundamental differences in the activities of BCAG and BISDG lead to very different operational practices in their respective cooperative ventures. The cooperative ventures of BCAG are primarily R&D or material-certification activities that are not initially on critical paths for the design or production of Boeing aircraft, although they may achieve that status in the future. In addition, most of these activities are relatively small and do not require complex integration of the work of the two partners. BISDG’s cooperative ventures are generally large system-development projects, with critical dependence on the work of both partners. As a result, a systems-integration management approach is used. This has a profound impact on the working relationship between the partners. This situation is complicated further by the fact that some programs are commercial, and others are funded by the U.S. government and therefore have a host of different contractual requirements which Boeing (as prime contractor) must impose on its Russian partners (as subcontractors). Link Turns – Generic Plan leads to investment in Russian Aerospace David Bernstein, engineering research associate at Stanford university’s center for international security and cooperation, commercialization of Russian technology in cooperation with American companies, 1999, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10230/bernstein99.pdf Access to Technology In selected fields where the Russians possess superior technologies or the background technology to do cutting-edge R&D, U.S. companies have sought access to this technology to improve their own products’ performance and/or cost. In most of these cases the program evolves into R&D that produces still more advanced technology. The potential for the Russian partner to form a sustainable business can range from virtually zero to quite high. A sustained research relationship and a sustainable business do not always coincide, however. The long-term business depends on both the sharing of rights in the research and the involvement of the Russian partner in aspects of commercialization beyond the research work itself. Cost-effective R&D This overlaps the previous category in that some key background capability is necessary to perform cost-effective R&D; however, there need not be unique or superior technology resident in the Russian organization. In addition to the wage differential, the Russian organization may have a testing facility, for example, that would be costly to replicate and/or that can be operated at significantly lower cost than existing similar facilities in other countries, including the United States. Here too the potential for the Russian partner to form a sustainable business varies widely. Access to Qualified Personnel This overlaps the previous two categories. There are fields in which there is a shortage of qualified personnel in the United States. The primary example in the cases studied herein is software engineers and programmers. Groups of these personnel in Russia often have skills not found in their American counterparts and/or have the advantage of having worked together in teams for several years. The potential to develop a sustainable business is again variable, but can be high if the Russian partner becomes increasingly indispensable and/or of proven value to other possible U.S. partners. The population of potential U.S. partners may be very large in this case. Utilization of Proven Systems There is one sector in this study, rocket propulsion, in which the Russians have highly developed and proven systems that can have a major impact on the competitiveness of U.S. spacebased telecommunications systems. In this field the dollar volume of both sales and projects as well as the potential for building a sustainable business are high. In these ventures the U.S. partner sought to commercialize existing technology which was already embodied in working systems, even though it has also supported additional R&D. Nonproliferation and Demilitarization Private U.S. companies do not have a business motivation to inhibit proliferation and military production. The U.S. government, however, does work toward this end, and endeavors to involve private U.S. companies by providing financial and other incentives. U.S. companies interested in investing for other reasons often view U.S. government programs as a means to reduce costs and risks. Other U.S. government-sponsored programs are operated by enterprise funds and international financial institutions. The government’s objective may be economic development as opposed to or in addition to nonproliferation and demilitarization, but the concept of shared cost and risk is essentially the same. This study does not deal specifically with cases of such shared risk, although some of the cases do involve such projects. The concept is extremely important, however, and whether the U.S. government should use such mechanisms to pursue its policy objectives, and, if it should, how best to make these programs effective is a subject of considerable controversy. Link Turns - NASA US Aerospace competition is key to Russian space program Reuters, stagnation fears haunt Russian space program, april.10.2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/10/us-russia-space-gagarin- idUSTRE73910C20110410 But much of that initial rapture has now faded, leaving nostalgia among many in Russia for the days when the struggle between the two nuclear-armed superpowers fueled and financed the pursuit of new horizons in science. U.S. astronauts and Russian cosmonauts "were never enemies in space, but when we began cooperating on the ground they cut the funding," said veteran cosmonaut Georgy Grechko, 79. "Even the Americans would call us and say 'launch something new, so they'll give us money.'" With competition eclipsed by cooperation, Russia's space agency has survived over the past two decades by hiring out the third seat aboard the Soyuz to foreigners.

NASA funding key to Russian Space Program Reuters, stagnation fears haunt Russian space program, 4.10.2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/10/us-russia-space-gagarin- idUSTRE73910C20110410 Russia's space agency will receive $753 million to ferry 12 U.S. astronauts to the space station from 2014-2016, NASA announced last month. Russia raked in some $2.5 billion from NASA and partner agencies for 42 seats on Soyuz craft from 2007.Russia has increased space spending by some 40 percent per year during the last five years, according to Euroconsult, a consulting body that tracks the industry. It has earmarked 200 billion roubles ($7 billion) for space programmes from 2010- 2011. Some of the money will fund a new launch facility in Vostochny in far eastern Russia, where the first launches are anticipated in 2015 and the first manned launch in 2018. Link Turns – Private Investments Private investment key to support Russian economy and prevent war John Logsdon and James Millar, Director of the Space Policy Institute at the Elliott Schoold of International Affairs, Director, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian studies at George Washington Unviversity, U.S. –Russian Cooperation in Human Space Flight Assessing the Impacts, 2001, http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/usrussia.pdf Also, "Russia's commercial partnerships with U.S. aerospace companies play a pivotal role in complementing the ISS engagement. If the ISS project provides Russia an opportunity for highly visible international space cooperation and limited financial support, the real flow of hard currency comes from a variety of commercial contracts. They not only keep the space industry afloat but also help fulfill Russia's ISS obligations. In other words, the U.S. government-funded ISS project helped develop a mentality and infrastructure for U.S. companies to step in and engage Russian partners in their own meaningful commercial contracts." As a result, "Unlike Russia's other hi-tech sectors, the space industry has been successful in developing a degree of compatibility with Western research standards, business practices, and political sensitivities."In particular, Lockheed Martin has been a leader among the U.S. aerospace industry in developing partnerships with Russia,8 and "Lockheed Martin's pitch to promote its space partnerships with Russia is based on the need to make the world safer by engaging thousands of highly skilled Russian aerospace engineers and scientists in commercial pursuits, thereby fulfilling cooperative threat reduction objectives. Moreover, because this is being done on a company-to-company basis, there is no expenditure of public funds and the presence of meaningful opportunities to affect real change in the way business is carried out in Russia. . . . This commercial cooperation promotes accountability and adherence to the international export control regimes. Lockheed Martin's business may be more effective than U.S. diplomatic efforts and sanctions in persuading Russia to steer clear of cooperation with rogue countries." No Internal Links - Generic Oil is key to Russian competitiveness – trumps aerospace Finfacts, Russian economy dependent on energy exports and state-run large enterprises, 2009, http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article_1014508.shtml In recent years, the Russian economy has grown at an average pace of 7 percent annually. Whether this pace can be maintained if the economy continues to be regulated by the state and dependent on exports of raw materials is questionable in the opinion of Philip Hanson, Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. In a recent issue of CESifo Forum he points out the possible risks. The strong dependency on oil, especially at the currently high prices, can hamper the diversification of the economy and slow down economic growth in the long term. A further retarding factor to economic development Hanson sees in R&D policies, which are concentrated on state- run large enterprises. Technology co-operations and technology transfers of foreign firms with Russian enterprises are limited. This stands in contradiction to the intention of the Russian government to transform Russia into a modern and broadly diversified economy. In terms of patent applications, which are very modest in an international comparison, Russia is also not reaching this goal.

Russian economy is dependent upon oil not aerospace Siberian Light, Russian Economy 2011, march.25.2011, http://siberianlight.net/russiaguide/russian-economy-2011/ Russia’s economy reached its low point in the 1998 Russian financial crisis, where dramatic swings in the global price of raw materials (particularly oil and gas) destabilised the Russian economy. GDP dropped by more than half, from $404.927 billion in 1997 to $195.906 billion in 1999, and it wasn’t until 2003 that the Russian economy crept above $400 billion again. Since then, the Russian economy has grown rapidly, fuelled largely by exports of raw materials and energy resources such as oil and gas. The dramatic increases in the price of raw materials has helped to boost Russian income as well. As well as measuring raw numbers – GDP grew from $196 billion in 1999 to $1.6 trillion in 2008 – Russia’s position in the world shifted as it moved from the 22nd largest global economy to become the 11th largest economy in the world. The growth in income has led to a renewed confidence in Russia, and a much more assertive foreign policy under its last two Presidents, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. Growth seems likely through 2011, but critics continue to worry that Russia’s economy is overly dependent on the export of oil, gas and other raw materials, and that other sectors of its economy are not strong enough to pick up the slack from any downturn should the global oil and gas prices fall significantly. 2AC Answers to Brain Drain Russian scientists are looking to leave Russia – No state support Russia Times, 11-3-2009 – “Brain drain continues to plague Russia,” http://rt.com/Sci_Tech/2009-11-03/science-russia-career.html Home to many pioneers of science, Russia has always been a land of learning. But today that reputation is at risk, with a lack of opportunities at home forcing many of the best and brightest to look beyond the borders. With science and innovation still on a shoestring budget in Russia, not many youngsters dream about a career in these fields. A recent poll says about 70 percent of first year students in Russian universities are open to pursuing a career in science. But by the time they graduate, only two percent are willing to do this. What about the rest? Well, the majority – about one third – would like to work abroad, but not necessarily in the field of their degree. While Maksim Odnobludov, director of the company Optogan, specializing in nanotechnology, has been lured back with a promise of state support, his story is an exception rather than the rule. It’s been a while since Maksim last had the chance to stroll through his home town of St. Petersburg. A young scientist and successful businessman, he’s been dividing his time between Finland and Germany where his invention – special diode modules – has been put into production. But now he's ready to take his company back to where it all began. “It was a business decision”, says Maksim. “We think the time is right, the market is ready and the conditions are good to expand our business in Russia”. However the majority of young talents are dreaming about moving abroad. While stemming the brain drain has long been a policy goal in Russia, physicist Irina Arefyeva says very little is being done. For decades she’s been studying black holes and working as an academic advisor to young scientists. And she’s seen a lot of them gravitating across the ocean. “Despite all the difficulties, the number of talented students stays the same,” says Irina. “But they have only two options to succeed. To stay in Russia and go into business. Or if they want to remain in science – they need to look for positions abroad”. Andrey Bagrov is one of Irina’s most promising students. Now in his first PhD year, he’s already refused an offer to study in Germany. Yet, he says, moving abroad is just a matter of time. “If you place any Russian scientist in Stanford or Harvard, [they’ll] he’ll get far more recognition for the same work. As somebody who wants to make a name for himself in physics, I need to be in a place where I’ll be noticed,” Andrey says. A formula of success for an individual, but an unsolved problem for the country. Numerous reasons for Russia brain drain Investor’s Business Daily, long term problems mar Russia’s outlook; legal system, brain drain; vast stores of commodity wealth aren’t translating to new industries, markets”, may.9.2011, lexis Another long-term problem facing Russia is an ongoing brain drain. The flow of the country's best and brightest is not as severe as was seen in the 1990 s, Vardanian says, but it's still bad enough to worry about. What do other countries offer these mostly young, highly skilled and talented people? Vardanian says it's not so much about the salary one can command, but more about the things one needs for a family-oriented lifestyle, including health care, education and security. No Russia brain drain – visas prove Associated Press, likely brain drain puts aerospace recruitment into high gear, 2008, http://www.seattlepi.com/default/article/Likely-brain-drain-puts-aerospace-recruitment- 1266734.php At the same time, defense executives acknowledge, the sector does not exert the same patriot pull as it once did since young people today have never known a time when the U.S. was not a leader in space exploration or the world's sole superpower. The industry confronts another challenge, too. Unlike technology companies, defense companies generally have to hire American citizens because they need employees who can obtain security clearance. This eliminates foreign graduates of American universities and foreign employees in the U.S. on H-1B visas. "The talent is going to have to be homegrown," said Blakey of the aerospace association. Similarly, defense contractors cannot outsource to countries with more technical workers, such as India or China. Against this backdrop, defense companies are reaching out to American students in the earliest grades. Impact Takeouts – Russia Relations Give a Russia war impact zero probability – politics, military superiority, economic concerns, and nuclear security all check war Thomas Graham, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002- 2007, September 2007, "Russia in Global Affairs” July - September 2007, The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

Even a rapid US-Russia war would end in peace negotiations before nukes were launched – Russian generals concede. Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. July 2007 “WILL AMERICA FIGHT RUSSIA”. Defense and Security, No 78. LN Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented - demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United States that continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion. Impact Takeouts – Iran Prolif Iranian prolif doesn’t case aggression, arms races, terrorism, or lashout at Israel – experts agree a laundry list of checks prevent their impacts, even if Iran is extremist Jahangir Amuzegar, former pre-revolutionary Iranian Finance Minister and Economic Ambassador, Summer 2006, “Nuclear Iran: Perils and Prospects,” Middle East Policy, v. 13, iss. 2, pq Questioning the validity of objections to a nuclear-powered Iran, however, are a large number of experts who find the threats somewhat exaggerated, if not largely based on hysteria. First, the Islamic Republic's challenge to Washington's interests and power in the region needs no bomb for leverage, as U.S. interests and influence have already been effectively threatened since 1979 through conventional means and via financial support to groups in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Second, the chances of the Islamic Republic's engaging in adventurism or naked aggression against its neighbors are far-fetched. The last time Iran started a war was back in 1850 to liberate Herat; its last invasion of another country was in 1738. In the immediate past, even when Afghan Taliban challenged the Tehran government both militarily and ideologically, the clerical leadership showed an astonishing restraint. Third, the possibility of the Iranian nuclear program spawning a Middle East arms race is indeed ominous, but that race started decades ago, and Iran was not the one to launch it. Furthermore, Israel, Pakistan and India are already nuclear powers. Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf emirates all enjoy U.S. or NATO presence, alliance or protection and, thus, have no need of a nuclear defensive shield. No Iranian government, no matter how belligerent or stupid, would dare provoke or challenge American or NATO forces. Still further, potential candidates for the race - Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey - present technical, financial, political and security problems of their own, and their foray into the nuclear bazaar is highly circumstantial.46 Finally, Iran might hesitate to start a regional nuclear arms race because it would lose its current superiority in conventional weapons. Fourth, there is the straw-man issue of a "bold Iran" engaging in nuclear coercion through the so-called "suitcase bomb."47 But chemical and biological weapons would be much cheaper to produce, less cumbersome to pack and carry, easier to handle and more devastating in effect. Fifth, Iran's influence in OPEC, whatever it might be, will be neither augmented nor diminished by possession of the bomb, but rather by its own oil-capacity limitations. Last, and most crucial, Washington's concern about the Islamic Republic's posture toward the Jewish state seems to be a bogus argument to neutral observers. The esteemed Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld believes that, "given the balance of forces," it cannot be argued that a nuclear Iran will threaten the United States or even Israel.48 Since the chances of mutual annihilation loom large in any nuclear first strike, a nuclear Iran would not dare initiate such an attack. Visiting the Natanz centrifuge facility, President Ahmadinejad told the staff, "What enemies fear is not production of an atomic bomb because in today's world atomic weapons are not efficient."49 The new president may be a political amateur, occasionally making dimwitted statements, but he is neither a fool nor a suicide bomber. Some pundits argue that a Shiite belief in martyrdom, coupled with the Iranian regime's extremist ideology, could render deterrence meaningless.50 Such people know neither Shiite martyrdom nor the regime leaders' instinct for self-preservation, nor even the mullahs' bazaari habit of always looking for the best deal. Impact Takeouts – Russian Economy Empirics prove no doomsday risk from Russian instability or economic decline World Policy Journal, 12/22/03 Using extensive interviews with participants in all three administrations, and memoirs by former officials, they paint a compelling picture of officials often over-whelmed by the challenge of an entirely new reality. The unexpected collapse of communism and of the Soviet Union, coming just after the GulfWar, left them with no road map to understand how Russia and other post-Soviet states might develop. Nightmare scenarios suggested themselves: nuclear war between Russia and Ukraine; weapons proliferation on a terrifying scale; Yugoslav-type ethnically based civil war on the territory of the former Soviet Union; mass starvation; economic collapse--the ominous possibilities were endless. That these "dogs did not bark" is testimony to the unwillingness of people in the post-Soviet space to engage in armed conflict and to Western assistance that staved off famine and economic collapse. The failure of catastrophic scenarios to come about is one indicator of success--but if one were to measure America's contribution to transforming Russia in more positive ways, the evidence is more mixed. If a minimalist definition of success was the absence of catastrophe, the maximalist definition was the creation of a fully functioning democracy in Russia with a transparent market economy and the rule of law. That has not happened yet, and it is unclear when it will. So far, there is no consensus about what would constitute a realistic timetable for Russia's democratic development.

Demographic shifts make Russian economic decline inevitable— government statistics prove Banking and stock exchange. Finance. Economics (Russia), 2/3/2005 However, by the time it is going to happen, it can prove that there is no one in Russia to double GDP. According to Russian Statistics, beginning with 2007, number of economically active people will start shrinking by 1 million people a year. According to Mr. Sokolin, head of the Russian Statistics, demography "will be a serious economic limitation of our growth." "Then doubling of GDP will be out of the question," agrees Mr. Klepach.

Russian economic decline doesn’t cause lash out or war The New Republic, 2/7/2000 At the time and since, observers of the events of 1989-1990 in Europe have been properly amazed at what happened and at what did not happen. The Soviet empire collapsed in Eastern Europe. Divided Germany was unified. Democratic governments replaced communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union itself imploded and was reincarnated as quasi-democratic, quasi- authoritarian Russia. Yet a unified Germany has not become a menacing Fourth Reich, and Russia, despite a collapse of its economy and the spectacular loss of the Cold War, did not turn in bitterness and frustration to the alliance of nationalists and communists who were seeking to reverse the humiliations of a decade ago Impact Takeouts – Terrorism There’s virtually no threat from terrorism John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, September/October 2006, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85501/john-mueller/is-there-still- a-terrorist-threat.html?mode=print THREAT PERCEPTIONS The results of policing activity overseas suggest that the absence of results in the United States has less to do with terrorists' cleverness or with investigative incompetence than with the possibility that few, if any, terrorists exist in the country. It also suggests that al Qaeda's ubiquity and capacity to do damage may have, as with so many perceived threats, been exaggerated. Just because some terrorists may wish to do great harm does not mean that they are able to. Gerges argues that mainstream Islamists -- who make up the vast majority of the Islamist political movement -- gave up on the use of force before 9/11, except perhaps against Israel, and that the jihadists still committed to violence constitute a tiny minority. Even this small group primarily focuses on various "infidel" Muslim regimes and considers jihadists who carry out violence against the "far enemy" -- mainly Europe and the United States -- to be irresponsible, reckless adventurers who endanger the survival of the whole movement. In this view, 9/11 was a sign of al Qaeda's desperation, isolation, fragmentation, and decline, not of its strength. Those attacks demonstrated, of course, that al Qaeda -- or at least 19 of its members -- still possessed some fight. And none of this is to deny that more terrorist attacks on the United States are still possible. Nor is it to suggest that al Qaeda is anything other than a murderous movement. Moreover, after the ill-considered U.S. venture in Iraq is over, freelance jihadists trained there may seek to continue their operations elsewhere -- although they are more likely to focus on places such as Chechnya than on the United States. A unilateral American military attack against Iran could cause that country to retaliate, probably with very wide support within the Muslim world, by aiding anti-American insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and inflicting damage on Israel and on American interests worldwide. But while keeping such potential dangers in mind, it is worth remembering that the total number of people killed since 9/11 by al Qaeda or al Qaedalike operatives outside of Afghanistan and Iraq is not much higher than the number who drown in bathtubs in the United States in a single year, and that the lifetime chance of an American being killed by international terrorism is about one in 80,000 -- about the same chance of being killed by a comet or a meteor. Even if there were a 9/11-scale attack every three months for the next five years, the likelihood that an individual American would number among the dead would be two hundredths of a percent (or one in 5,000). Although it remains heretical to say so, the evidence so far suggests that fears of the omnipotent terrorist -- reminiscent of those inspired by images of the 20-foot-tall Japanese after Pearl Harbor or the 20-foot-tall Communists at various points in the Cold War (particularly after Sputnik) -- may have been overblown, the threat presented within the United States by al Qaeda greatly exaggerated. The massive and expensive homeland security apparatus erected since 9/11 may be persecuting some, spying on many, inconveniencing most, and taxing all to defend the United States against an enemy that scarcely exists.

Virtually no terrorists exist in the US John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, September/October 2006, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85501/john-mueller/is-there-still- a-terrorist-threat.html?mode=print For the past five years, Americans have been regularly regaled with dire predictions of another major al Qaeda attack in the United States. In 2003, a group of 200 senior government officials and business executives, many of them specialists in security and terrorism, pronounced it likely that a terrorist strike more devastating than 9/11 -- possibly involving weapons of mass destruction -- would occur before the end of 2004. In May 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft warned that al Qaeda could "hit hard" in the next few months and said that 90 percent of the arrangements for an attack on U.S. soil were complete. That fall, Newsweek reported that it was "practically an article of faith among counterterrorism officials" that al Qaeda would strike in the run-up to the November 2004 election. When that "October surprise" failed to materialize, the focus shifted: a taped encyclical from Osama bin Laden, it was said, demonstrated that he was too weak to attack before the election but was marshalling his resources to do so months after it. On the first page of its founding manifesto, the massively funded Department of Homeland Security intones, "Today's terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any weapon." But if it is so easy to pull off an attack and if terrorists are so demonically competent, why have they not done it? Why have they not been sniping at people in shopping centers, collapsing tunnels, poisoning the food supply, cutting electrical lines, derailing trains, blowing up oil pipelines, causing massive traffic jams, or exploiting the countless other vulnerabilities that, according to security experts, could so easily be exploited? One reasonable explanation is that almost no terrorists exist in the United States and few have the means or the inclination to strike from abroad. But this explanation is rarely offered. Impact Takeouts – Nuclear Terrorism Nuke terrorism is impossible – massive barriers that have to be completed in order John Mueller, professor of political science at Ohio State University, January 2010, “The Atomic Terrorist?” Proliferation Update from Cato, http://www.cato.org/pubs/npu/npu_january2010.pdf There are three routes through which terrorists might pursue an atomic weapon. One route would be to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad. A second option, which analysts have voiced great worry about, is “loose nukes”—weapons, “suitcase bombs” in particular, that could be stolen or bought illicitly. However, the most plausible route for terrorists would be to manufacture the device themselves from purloined materials— states with return addresses are unlikely to trust their precious bombs to groups they cannot fully control and no “loose nukes” appear, actually, to exist. This is the course identified by a majority of leading experts as the one most likely to lead to nuclear terrorism. Accordingly, this is the method evaluated here (For reasons of space, this discussion leaves out many details and assumptions that are covered in depth in Atomic Obsession). The likely product of such an effort would not be a bomb that can be dropped or hurled, since this would massively complicate its delivery. Rather, the terrorists would seek to come up with an “improvised nuclear device” of simple design, one that could be set off at the target by a suicidal detonation crew. The process is a daunting one even in this minimal case. The terrorists would confront enormous technical and logistical obstacles. In particular, the task requires that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered in sequence. To begin with, at the present time and likely for the foreseeable future, stateless groups are simply incapable of manufacturing the required fissile material for a bomb, because the process requires an effort on an industrial scale. Moreover, they are unlikely to be supplied with this material by a state, primarily due to the states’ concern for their own survival. Thus, they would need to steal or illicitly purchase this crucial component. Known thefts of highly enriched uranium have totaled less than six pounds or so. This is far less than required for an atomic explosion; for a crude bomb, over 100 pounds are required to produce a likely yield of one kiloton. If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then have to transport it hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb, and then populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, and machinists. Under the best of circumstances, the process could take months or even a year or more, and it would all, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy even while local and international security police are likely to be on the intense prowl. The finished product could weigh a ton or more. Encased in lead shield to mask radioactive emissions, it would then have to be transported to, and smuggled into, the relevant target country. However transported, the dense and remarkably heavy package would then have to be received within the target country by a group of collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. Another issue is the financial costs of the extended operation in all its cumulating, or cascading, entirety. These could easily become monumental. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be an effective ally in the project are likely as well to be at once smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. In one analysis, Peter Zimmerman and Jeffrey Lewis suggest the entire caper could be pulled off for $10 million. This seems to understate the costs wildly. The cost of the operation in bribes alone could easily become ten times this sum. And even at that, there would be a considerable risk that those so purchased would decide to take the money and run. Impact Takeouts – Warming MSU satellite data is best and proves no catastrophic warming Thomas Pearson, research analyst at CEI, 2002, in Global Warming and Other Eco-myths edited by Ronald Bailey, pg. 322 Highly accurate temperature measurements, however, have been taken from space using microwave sounding units (MSUs) aboard satellites since 1979. The data series graphed on the opposite page shows the difference between recorded temperature and the 1979 mean values. In October 2001, the average global temperature departure was 0. 1450C, with a Northern Hemisphere temperature departure of 0. 1460C and a Southern Hemisphere departure of 0. 1430C, yielding an average increase of only 0.060C per decade.. The satellite data are highly correlated with balloon temperature data taken from radiosonde instruments, strengthening the confidence in the accuracy of the satellite data. MSUs measure the temperature of the lower troposphere, the atmospheric layer from the surface to 20,000 feet. This layer of the atmosphere is important for climatic research because, according to global circulation models, global warming would be much more pronounced in the lower troposphere than on the surface. The failure of the satellite data to verify rapid global warming predictions provides a strong argument against fears that man-made global warming will result in a climate catastrophe.

We will develop new crops that can survive global warming Heidi Fritschel, The International Food Policy Research Institute Forum, December 2006 Work is already underway on developing heat- and drought-resistant varieties of staple crops. A project in Southern Africa, for instance, involving the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) and partners in the region has released drought-tolerant maize varieties that yield 34 percent more than farmers' existing varieties in Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. According to Rodomiro Ortiz, director of resource mobilization at CIMMYT, farmers can benefit by changing not only what they grow, but how they grow it. CIMMYT scientists are working on developing wheat varieties that are well suited to zero-tillage farming, as well as heat-tolerant, for farmers in the Indo-Gangetic Plain of India. By drastically reducing farmers' manipulation of the soil, zero-tillage farming helps conserve water and nutrients for crops and, as an added benefit, reduces the amount of carbon dioxide released from the soil into the atmosphere, where it contributes to climate change. The Indo-Gangetic Plain is currently a highly productive, irrigated agricultural area, but climate models show that by 2050 as much as half of the region may be reclassified from a high-potential area to a heat-stressed area with a short growing season.

Can’t save the world without China Chris Flavin, Director, Worldwatch Institute, July 6, 2007, China Climate Change Profile: No Hope for Global Climate without China, http://knowledge.allianz.com/en/globalissues/climate_profiles/climate_china/climate_profile _china_worldwatch.html China is already the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide, and its decisions in the next few years will have an enormous impact on the world’s ability to prevent dangerous climate change. If China does not shift in the near future to a new generation of environmentally friendly technology, there will be no hope for the world’s climate. Impact Takeouts – Prolif Russia will sell weapons to the Middle East no matter what The Trumpet, November 5, 2007, Putin to Continue Funneling Weapons Into Middle East Moscow will continue supplying weaponry to states hostile to the United States, the Russian president announced last week. In response to recent U.S. criticism of Russian arms exports, President Vladimir Putin said the flow of arms to the Middle East would continue. When the Commission for Military and Technical Cooperation met in Moscow October 31 to discuss this year’s arms exports, which are expected to reach $8 billion, up from $6.5 billion last year, President Putin opened the meeting by making a statement pointedly directed at the U.S. While asserting that Russia would comply with international regulations controlling arms exports, Putin stated: “[W]e cannot and will not take into consideration any attempts to impose any restrictions on us based on unilateral or politicized judgments.”

Russia will sell weapons regardless of what we do Guy Faulconbridge, Reuters, October 31, 2007, No one can limit Russian arms exports: Putin MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia will allow no one to limit its legitimate arms exports, President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday in a veiled warning to the United States over sanctions imposed on Russia's biggest arms seller. Under Putin, Russian arms firms have aggressively pushed sales abroad as the Kremlin seeks to reassert its role as a global power in the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. "Russia has always adhered, does adhere and will adhere to all international obligations in the sphere of military cooperation, including the current regime of export control," Putin was quoted as saying by Interfax news agency. "Any attempts to bind us with other limits based on unilateral or political evaluations cannot and will not be accepted by us.". Russia's drive to boost arms exports have raised tensions with the United States because the former Cold War foes -- and the world's two biggest arms exporters -- are often in direct competition for major contracts. The United States imposed sanctions last year on Russia's state arms trader Rosoboronexport for cooperating with Iran, a move Moscow has called "illegal" and "clearly illegitimate." Rosoboronexport, one of the world's biggest arms traders, is headed by an old colleague from Putin's KGB past, Sergei Chemezov. The firm's influence has soared under Putin and it has taken over major metals and car companies. Russia said this year it had completed a contract to deliver TOR-M1 anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran, which is under international sanctions for its nuclear program. Washington and Israel say Iran could use the missile systems to attack its neighbors. Russia says the TOR-M1 is a short range missile system and a purely defensive weapon. ARMS SALES Speaking to members of an arms export commission, Putin said Russian arms exports were aimed exclusively at strengthening countries' defenses and supporting regional stability. Kremlin officials regard Russia's arms industry as one of the few sectors that can compete with Western firms on equal terms after the chaos which accompanied the fall of the Soviet Union. But Putin said the quality of Russian arms had to improve. "The confidence of foreign partners in the potential of our military technology and our armed forces depends directly on this," Putin said, according to Interfax. "If the quality is better then confidence will be higher, and our arms and technology will be more in demand on the world market, and the activities of our army and navy will be more effective," Putin said.

Any proliferation will be slow Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, v1 n1, Winter/Spring 2000, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, accessed 8/11/02 It is now estimated that about twenty–five countries are in a position to make nuclear weapons rather quickly. Most countries that could have acquired nuclear military capability have refrained from doing so. Most countries do not need them. Consider Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. Argentina and Brazil were in the process of moving toward nuclear military capability, and both decided against it–wisely I believe– because neither country needs nuclear weapons. South Africa had about half a dozen warheads and decided to destroy them. You have to have an adversary against whom you think you might have to threaten retaliation, but most countries are not in this position. Germany does not face any security threats–certainly not any in which a nuclear force would be relevant. I would expect the pattern of the past to be the same as the pattern in the future, in which one or two states per decade gradually develop nuclear weapons Impact Turns – Prolif Good Nuclear weapons reduce the risk of war – statistically proven Victor Asal, Political Science Department @ University of Albany SUNY, and Kyle Beardsley, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Emory University, 2007, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” Journal of Peace Research, SAGE As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our primary independent variable, the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a negative relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the argument that nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior, as stated in H1. Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), it supports the logic in this article that nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent of aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving superpowers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of fullscale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, it significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases. As mentioned, concerns about selection effects in deterrence models, as raised by Fearon (2002), should be taken seriously. While we control for the strategic selection of serious threats within crises, we are unable to control for the non-random initial initiation of a crisis in which the actors may choose to enter a crisis based on some ex ante assessment of the outcomes. The presence of nuclear weapons has an important and pacific impact, a finding that lends support for an optimistic view of the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons. Waltz’s (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 7) contention that ‘the presence of nuclear weapons makes states exceedingly cautious’ seems to be borne out. Simply put, when nuclear actors are present, states – both nuclear and non-nuclear – resort to violence less often, because they do not want to risk the exceptional costs of a nuclear strike. Given the fact that much of the examination of this issue has been impressionistic (Geller, 2003), this finding is important for our continuing effort to better understand the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear proliferation, as well as its effects.