Richard Cobden: Victorian Reformer

Ronald Heller Shorecrest Preparatory School St. Petersburg, Florida

2010 NEH Seminar for School Teachers Interpretations of the Industrial Revolution in Britain

“King of Dear Corn, Time hears, with ceaseless groan, Time ever hears, sad names of hate and dread: But thou, thou only, of all monarchs known, Didst legislate against thy People’s Bread.”1

At the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the British government’s passage of a series of new Corn Laws, while viewed by it as righteous protectionist legislation in favor of the landed classes, was in fact an economic declaration of war against the working classes who were struggling against increasing post-war inflation and unemployment. The 19th century in Britain would unleash a flurry of unprecedented political and economic reforms in response to changes brought by the industrialization of its economy during the previous century. The fact that it was spared outright revolution (unlike most of Europe in 1830 and 1848) was due to two important facts: successful agitation from below and political pragmatism displayed from above. In his essay “The Anti-Corn Law League,” W.H. Chaloner argued that of all the reform movements of 19th century Britain the most consequential was that which was led by Richard Cobden and Corn Law repeal. “If there are turning points in history, the Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and the adoption of Free Trade, represented such a moment in Britain. By peaceful means the industrial forces in the nation had triumphed over the old landed interests.”2

1 Ebenezer Elliott, “The Recording Angel,” from The Poetical Works of Ebenezer Elliott, Two Volumes [Vol. I] London, 1876) 1:388 (ProQuest). Elliott was considered the eminent poet of the Anti- Corn Law Agitation. 2 W.H. Chaloner, “ The Anti-Corn Law League” (ProQuest), 196. 2

The chosen champions of the people in the crusade for repeal were Richard Cobden and the Anti-Corn Law League. In his quest to have the Corn Law repealed Cobden would gain a kind of celebrity status usually reserved for some intellectuals, military heroes and stage performers. Cobden was among the first politicians to be marketed successfully in the early advertising craze of Victorian Britain. His unswerving belief in the justice of the cause for repeal and free trade would come at a personal toll, a consequence often seen with celebrities today.3 While the wars against Napoleon further stimulated the growth of industrialization in Britain, they blinded the government to the significant social changes that were taking place. In 1815, the landed interests in Parliament moved quickly to cushion the blow that the inevitable drop in agricultural prices would have on all Britons. The post-war decrease in demand and the normalization of over-seas trade all but guaranteed price fluctuations. As the incomes of landlords and farmers decreased, the prospect of less land being cultivated significantly alarmed government officials, who attempted to keep the nation reasonably self-sufficient in food. The result was the unpopular Corn Laws of 1815, which were intended to keep foreign wheat out of the British market when the domestic price fell below 80 shillings a quarter.4 The historian, Eric Hobsbawm takes a different view of the passage of this law. He states that protection was not for prices as a magnanimous measure to the home industry, but rather for the further protection of greed. The Corn Laws of 1815 imposed on the country were not designed to save English farmers but rather to preserve the abnormally high profits of the Napoleonic war years and to safeguard farmers from the consequences of their wartime euphoria when farms had changed hands at the fairest prices and loans and mortgages had been accepted on impossible terms.5

3 Simon Morgan, “From Warehouse Clerk To Corn Law Celebrity, ”Rethinking Nineteenth-Century Liberalism: Richard Cobden Bicentenary Essays, Anthony Howe and Simon Morgan editors, (Cornwall: MPG Books, Ltd. 2006), 44. 4 Derek Beales, From Castlereagh to Gladstone 1815-1885 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 22. 5 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: The Making of English Society 1750 to the Present Day, (New York: New Press, 1999), 175. 3

The adoption of the Corn Laws (a duty on grain products) was not novel in British history, but nor were they effective. In a ceaseless effort to regulate the price of corn, successive governments since Charles II had only managed to increase it. In the early years of the repeal movement W.R. Greg commented: “ fluctuations have been so enormous as to laugh to scorn all efforts to prevent them”.6 Despite this the Corn Law was accepted as a prudent fiscal measure in light of the recent conflict with France. Through most of the following decade, the law held firm although there was growing unpopularity with it, especially among the working classes in the country. When British agricultural output slackened, attempts were in fact made to fill the gaps by the importation of lower quality grain (primarily from the Baltic states). In the middle of the decade as more bad harvests at home coincided with bad harvests on the continent and prices began to experience greater fluctuations, Parliament began to re-evaluate the law’s effectiveness. The result was a new series of Corn Laws in 1828 and it was these that Cobden and his League associates would agitate against.7 The question then arises why did Cobden wait over a decade to start his crusade for repeal and the adoption of free trade? The answer is pretty simple: in 1828, the great manufacturing centers of Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester (Cobden’s home city) did not have political representation in Parliament. It becomes obvious then that economic amelioration had to take a back seat until political reform was secured. It is important to take a look at this pressing issue, its resolution and its effect on Cobden’s agitation for reform. As early as 1819, Parliament remained unconvinced that political reform was a necessity. Even Lord Grey, whose government would eventually pass the Reform Bill of 1832, had his doubts about the worthiness of the lower classes: “Is there one among them with whom you could trust in the dark? Look at them, at their character,

6 W.R. Greg, “Sir Robert Peel’s Speech on the Corn Laws,” Westminster Review 37 (February 1842): 350. In the year 1670 the lowest price for corn was 35s 6d, the highest price was 64s 0d with a fluctuation in price of 80%. In 1689 the lowest price was 23s, the highest 81s, a fluctuation of 209%. By 1828 the lowest price was 36s, the highest 77s, a fluctuation of 114%. 7 Chaloner, “Anti-Corn Law League,” 201. 4 at their conduct. What is more base and detestable, more at variance with all tact and decency, as well as morality, truth and honour?” 8 As the debate intensified, the dangers to the aristocracy of a possible change in the status quo were expressed in conservative publications such as Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine. Articles appearing in this periodical upheld the strong belief that the upper classes were the national guardians of the people’s welfare and any alteration to the Constitution would result in an inevitable revolution similar to what occurred in France in 1830.9 Despite perceived threats of revolution and opinions so expressed, the Grey ministry passed the Reform Bill if for no other reason than political survival. The effects of the Bill were not as dramatic as most believed or hoped but it was a start. Most importantly, Manchester was given representation and Cobden was elected as one of its earliest suburban MPs (from Stockport in 1841) and he lost little time energizing the repeal movement while advocating the benefits of Free Trade practices. The passage of the Reform Bill would inspire reform, but after its immediate passage, the landed classes were determined this should be the last violation of their rights. In the end, they stood to lose much more.10

8 John W. Derry, Reaction and Reform: England in the Early Nineteenth Century 1793-1868 (London: Blandford Press, 1970), 44-45. 9 Archibald Alison, “On the French Revolution and Political Reform,”Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 29 (March 1831), 432-434. For instance, Alison stated, “No argument is frequently urged by the reformers and none is more utterly unfounded than that the Concession of Reform is the only way to prevent a revolution. In truth there is no danger whatever of such a catastrophe but from its adoption. He is but a novice in history who imagines that real grievances have much influence on revolutions. It is not experienced evil which excites the passions, but anticipated power.” 10 Ibid. Alison, 434. Alison offered the following prophecy in Blackwood’s: “ It is a trite observation, but not the less true, that the inroads of the popular ambition are like the letting out of the waters; a child’s hand can first repair the chink in the dyke, the aperture is enlarged and the flood has begun to rush through. The strength of a nation is unequal to the task.” 5

Another reason why the repeal movement had to put its agitation on hold was because the whole issue of reform was in question among the more liberal elements in Parliament. An alliance between two factions, the Whigs and Radicals, made political reform possible but this partnership began to unravel as the Whig majority began to erode as they lost more seats in the general elections of 1835 and 1837. Many Radicals began to suspect that the remaining Whigs were not passionate about further reform, so the Radicals targeted the repeal of the Corn Laws as their main political objective. They believed that successful agitation would not only strike a blow to the economic domination of the landed classes but also indirectly weaken their social and political hold over the lower orders. By 1839, the Corn Laws stood out as a visible symbol of the aristocracy and therefore a prime target to agitate.11 For most of the period between 1832 and 1846, political reform would cede its previous importance to the more pressing issue of economic reform. Political reform did not disappear; on the contrary the Chartist Movement was a force to be reckoned with by Free Traders such as Richard Cobden. 12 Cobden viewed Corn Law repeal as a starting point toward the acceptance of Free Trade. These principles were slowly gaining acceptance in international trade relations. However, they had no popular political voice in Britain, where Parliament continued to support protectionist policies. By launching an attack against the unpopular Corn Laws, the Free Trade movement would gain an organized voice.13 Cobden, like other proponents of Free Trade, viewed its adoption as a panacea for the ills of the world: wars and empires would become unnecessary and global peace and prosperity would be assured. In one of his most eloquent speeches in Parliament, Cobden espoused the adoption of free trade as consistent with Christian virtues:

11 Norman McCord The Anti-Corn Law League (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958), 16-17 12 Derek Beales from Castlereagh to Gladstone 1815-1885 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), Appendix G. The Chartist platform advocated universal male suffrage, annual Parliaments and secret ballots. 13 G. Kitson Clark “The Repeal of the Corn Laws and Politics of the Forties”, Economic History Review 4 (1951): 9. 6

I can prove that we advocate nothing but what is agreeable to the highest behests of Christianity. To buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest . . . [This] means you take the article you have the greatest abundance and obtain from others that of which they have the most to spare . . . and in doing so carrying out to the fullest extent the Christian doctrine, doing to all men as you would they should do unto you.14

With the free trade issue selected, the next step was to organize a forum from which to launch the repeal effort. As early as 1836 an Anti-Corn Law Association was established in London but it lacked the organizational capacity to expand into a national movement. Two years later a group of Manchester manufacturers, including Richard Cobden, John B. Smith and James Wilson, formed the Manchester Anti-Corn Law Association (later League).15 What developed was perhaps the best-financed and organized political pressure group that Britain had ever seen. Its rules prohibited agitation for any other purpose (such as for Chartism). Yet the idea of free trade often seemed to carry with it implication of a range of liberal and social reform.16 His role in the founding of the Free Trade League represented the most important achievement in Cobden’s political career. He was identified early on by a contemporary, Edward Baines, as “the mainspring of the movement” and also its “public face.”17 In Parliament Cobden’s optimism rarely wavered with respect to Corn Law repeal and he was so bold as to warn the landed classes that if they did not yield on this issue they would “vanish like chaff before the whirlwind.”18 When accused later of having a lack of support (as late as 1846) in the country, Cobden remarked in Parliament “Had there been such an amount of public opinion as now exists in favour of the repeal of the Corn Laws as in support for the Pretender (James III) in 1745, the dynasty of the Stuarts would now have occupied these realms.”19 What was the basis for this confidence? Cobden was fortunate that no other issue had the inherent capacity to attract the sympathy of so many diverse groups. As

14 Hansards Parliamentary Debates (London: G.Woodfall and Sons, 1846), 84:292. 15 Keith Robbins John Bright (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 22-32 16 Richard Francis Spall, Jr., “Free Trade, Foreign Relations, and the Anti-Corn Law League”, International History Review, 10 (August, 1988): 405. 17 Morgan, ”Warehouse Clerk,” 42. 18 Hansards Parliamentary Debates, 84:292 19 Hansards Parliamentary Debates, 84:281 7 a major obstacle to the adoption of free trade, the repeal issue attracted the support of the commercial and industrial classes, while the promise of cheaper bread prices won the support of the working classes. The cooperation of these groups inspired a confidence that forced the opposing forces of protectionism in Parliament to bow to popular demand.20 In its early days, the Anti-Corn Law League’s biggest success was its ability to survive. By keeping the public focus on just a handful of its popular leaders (like Cobden) “the movement avoided a descent into the kind of factionalism that eventually crippled the Chartist movement.”21 The League’s decision to rely on its leadership to give speeches, rather than to rely on paid spokesmen, also gave it the moral high ground, since they could not be accused of speaking for profit.22 With these adopted strategies, the League developed into one of the earliest reform movements to utilize modern forms of propaganda. Large amounts of money were raised through subscriptions and the League published millions of copies of books, pamphlets and handbills educating the public on Free Trade and the Corn Laws. Anti- Corn Law dances were held, League songs were sung and poems were written and recited.23 Both men and women were caught up in the energy displayed by this confident and dynamic movement. Cobden and his first lieutenant, John Bright, were practically idolized by women. At a very large League meeting held in Covent Garden in London, a young female spectator from the Quaker Mount School in York (a considerable distance away) wrote that “ Cobden and Bright were our heroes of the day” while Mary Howitt, another spectator, wrote, “It is a noble battle they have fought and Now thank Heaven! They are on the eve of their glorious and bloodless victory.”24 There were young male admirers too like Walter Bagehot (later to become

20 Nicholas C. Edsall, Richard Cobden: Independent Radical (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press1986), 106. 21 Morgan, “Warehouse Clerk,”45. 22 Ibid 23 Chaloner, 203. 24 Morgan, 46. 8 editor of the Economist) then a twenty year old who wrote to Sir Edward Fry in 1846 “ I am enthusiastic - am a worshipper - of Richard Cobden.25 In an attempt to undermine the sincerity of the League, the protectionists pressed their belief that wages rose and fell with the price of corn. Consequently they claimed that the only reason why Cobden and company would encourage repeal would be to reduce workers’ wages. Britain’s dependence on foreign foodstuffs was its Achilles heel. The ruling Conservative Prime Minister, Robert Peel, although he was leaning toward the adoption of free trade, could not ignore this fact: “It would be dangerous to depend upon foreigners for any considerable portion of our consumption of corn, for in case of scarcity, they would be unable, and in case of war, unwilling to supply us.”26 The League kept up pressure on Peel’s government to repeal the Corn Laws. Even when the government attempted to modify the sliding scale of the 1828 law, with a more reasonable scale in 1842, the League remained adamant- they would only accept outright repeal. Feeble attempts were made by the government to mount a counter-propaganda campaign to respond to the League’s arguments but this was ineffective. The Times in 1843 declared that the League was “a great fact” and a “new power in the State.”27 Peel finally bowed down to Cobden and the League in 1846. Recent scholarship reveals that Peel probably would have come to this decision eventually but that the Potato Famine in Ireland in 1845 pushed him to act sooner.28 What then of Free Trade and further reform? To some degree repeal of the Corn Laws introduced some measure of free trade principles to national economic policy. Cobden’s popularity declined in the following decade because of his objections to Britain’s involvement in the Crimean War. In 1860 Cobden negotiated the first free trade agreement with France and by mid-decade he helped to organize a grass roots campaign in the country for the extension of the political franchise.29 If, as Chaloner

25 Ibid 26 W.R. Greg, “Sir Robert Peel’s Speech,” Westminster Review 37 (April, 1842): 356-7 27 Chaloner, 204 28 Ibid 9 stated, Corn Law Repeal was the engine of 19th century reform, then Cobden was its chief engineer.

29 A.A. Iliasu, “The Cobden-Chevalier Commercial Treaty” Historical Journal, 14 (1971): 74-5 10

BIBLIOGRAPHY Alison, Archibald. “On the French Revolution and Political Reform”. Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, March 1831:429-446. Beales, Derek, From Castlereagh to Gladstone 1815-1885. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969. Derry, John W. Reaction and Reform: England in the Early Nineteenth Century 1793-1868. London: Blandford Press, 1970. Edsall, Nicholas C. Richard Cobden Independent Radical. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1986. Elliott, Ebenezer, “The Recording Angel”, from The Poetical Works of Ebenezer Elliott, Two Volumes [Vol. I] London, 1876) 1:388 www.ProQuest.k.12.com August 12,2010. Greg, W.R., “Sir Robert Peel’s Speech on the Corn Laws,” Westminster Review 37 February 1842: 348-367. ______“Hansards Parliamentary Debates,” London: G.Woodfall and Sons, 1846, 84:292. Hobsbawm, Eric J. Industry and Empire: The Making of English Society 1750 to the Present Day, New York: New Press, 1999. Howe, Anthony, et. al. editors “Rethinking Nineteenth-Century Liberalism: Richard Cobden Bicentenary Essays, Cornwall: MPG Books, Ltd. 2006. Iliasu, A.A. “The Cobden-Chevalier Commercial Treaty” Historical Journal, 14 (1971): 67-98. Kitson- Clark, G. “The Repeal of the Corn Laws and Politics of the Forties”, Economic History Review 4 (1951): 1-14. McCord, Norman. The Anti-Corn Law League London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958. Robbins, Keith John Bright (London: Routledge and Kegan, Paul, 1979. Spall, Jr. Richard Francis. “Free Trade, Foreign Relations, and the Anti-Corn Law League, ”International History Review, 10 (August, 1988): 405-33.