Elections in Africa

Elections in Africa: fair, façade or failure?

Report

November 25 – 2009

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague

Evert Vermeer Stichting 1 Elections in Africa: fair, façade or failure?

25 November 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Hague (Netherlands)

Hereby we would like to thank you for attending the conference ‘Elections in Africa: fair, façade or failure?’. The main purpose of this conference was to identify the positive as well as the negative aspects of elections in Africa by examining it from a scientific, political as well as a policy point of view. Based on two keynote speeches and four parallel sessions on various African countries (Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Ghana), we analyzed if and how elections have contributed to stability and democracy. In this report you can find the minutes of the plenary and parallel sessions.

The conference of 25 November is part of a joint research programme entitled "The African State: Facade and Reality", carried out by the African Studies Centre (ASC) and the Sub-Saharan Africa Department of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DAF) and was organized together with the Evert Vermeer Foundation (EVS).

2 Elections in Africa: fair, façade or failure?

10:30-11:30 Key-note speaker Nicolas van de Walle

Lessons from two decades of multi-party elections in Africa.

Nicolas Van de Walle: Thank you ASC and Ministry of Foreign Affairs it is a pleasure to be here. I am meant to be the pessimist in this debate and usually I am a pessimist in a process of celebrating 20 years of democracy. In 1989 only two countries, Mauritius and Botswana, could be described as democracies, twenty years later there is a nice symmetry to undertake a review. The failed elections in Kenya in December 2007 started a backlash or highlighted earlier critiques. With fears increasing by the effects of the global recession, I am unsure whether I share this opinion.

Is democracy a good thing for Africa? Can one have democracy without elections? There is a sense that things are declining. In a heroic attempt in thirty minutes I will have to cover 45 countries where there is great difference in all regions and histories. One thing I hope you take out from this talk that it is less and less possible to talk of a continent.

Is democracy good for Africa? Two arguments are offered. The first that electoral democracy has brought about ethnic conflict, this is the culturalist critique. The formal Western structures don’t suit the informal African structures. The second argument is that authoritarian Africa was an unmitigated disaster. In Asia there was authoritarian governance but the trains still ran on time, giving it the name of developmental dictatorships. This was not the case in Africa where the poverty of the people was a backwater, it is very important not to forget that. Democratic Africa has seen the fastest growth in the region at 5% in the last decade. If you are critical you need to explain these outcomes. The last two years have seen poverty reduction in the region. People blame democracy for things that are not taking place in democratic Africa, citing for example the DRC. But the DRC is collapsing and elections are taking place in a most undemocratic way. They have pretended to have adapted formal democratic processes but not the real structures. We need to be careful when drawing conclusions about democracy. Was what happened in Kenya just an episode?

What about the culturalist critique? I have written much about patrimonialism and clientelism. The informal considerations are important, but don’t dismiss the formal structures; it is when these come together that is important. Structural prerequisites of democracy are weak in the region. But figuring out whether formal structures matter is an empirical matter. Surveys by Afro-Barometer suggest Africans have a relatively liberal understanding of democracy. Participation remains a high factor. Democracy matters in Africa, surveys though often create more questions than answers. Formal institutions do matter. Mauritius and Botswana are parliamentary democracies. Formal institutions do matter as they follow the same logic as well. Formal western institutions do make a difference.

3 What about the argument we should do away with elections? They are dangerous because it comes down to whom should represent the country. Earlier to the Donor community and the World Bank what mattered was public administration and development. Countries had a cruel choice between development and democracy, but this idea has died slowly. It is very tempting to set up corruption campaigns etc and do away with democracy. This is wrong and the lesson from the 1980s is that democracy should not wait. For good governance it is important to have well informed civilians to hold their governments to account. Mobutu claimed Bantu democracy, Museveni democracy without elections. These do not exist, there is only one way to do democracy, you can talk about the details but not undermine democracy. You cannot get accountability without elections. Average African leader in the 60s through to the 90s held power for over 12 years. You need alternation, democratic checks and balances. There is accumulating evidence that democracy increases social spending.

Is African democracy progressing? This is a gloomier picture. Empirical evidence matters need to look at the numbers, look at features and see some details that are missing. Don’t examine African democracy in ideal Western terms. Democracy is being institutionalised. Opposition is growing.

Using Freedom House score trends, which uses 1 for complete political freedom, Equatorial Guinea scored 14. In the whole region the average is 8. Countries without oil are doing better. When looking at the results I had hoped for better progress and was disappointed by the slope. They do point to the fact that in these countries democracy is becoming institutionalised. Three countries having only held one election whilst 21 have held four.

No sign of deterioration belies the claims that there has been deterioration. Some countries have figured out how to have elections but should be excluded. Paul Biya in Cameroon does not run a democratic system. There is always the danger that democracy can lose legitimacy. Military interjections for example in Niger in the late 90s after which aid was pulled out, but now this does not happen and this can increase coups. There is a stability of electoral autocracies with little alternation. Low party institutionalisation and need for more institutional parties. In Kenya there was a failure of party infrastructure. Parties agreed to tolerate each others’ bad behaviour. What has the government of Kenya done, they have agreed to share the pot, rather than amend the constitution. In summary I am doubly Churchillian, elections are the worst part of democracy apart from all the others. Democracy is vulgar, but there is no better alternative. There is nothing inexorable about democracy, it can still fail.

Whilst democracy might at the moment be the only game in town, this won’t always be the way. Parts of Africa will not be democratic in 50 years from now. What does this mean for Donors, whose belated discovery of civil society continues to focus their efforts on the central state. There needs to be great support for the judiciary and the executive. The US continues to support individuals, whilst they need to focus their support on institutions and democratic processes.

4 Questions

1. All these ideas sound foreign, political systems are more responsive to their own communities, what about local ideas about democracy?

Electoral democracy is a matter of formal rules that accommodate themselves to the local situation; there are many forms of civil societies and therefore not one single answer. Democracy itself it culturally fairly neutral and for example in Asia it is adapted to the demands of their own societies. But a danger remains that the formal political systems can seem irrelevant.

2. What is the link between democracy and poverty relief?

In countries where GDP is less that 3000 per year, people may see democracy as irrelevant to their lives. It is an open question whether this is enough. Democracy needs to be responsive to the needs of their own citizens. Already we can see that democracies in Africa are improving but this is a slow process.

3. Why elections, there are many other forms of democracy why do we underestimate the other forms? Many Africans have said they don’t want elections, they don’t except the average, what is required is accountability and social spending.

The best way to listen to Africans is to let them vote. I am deeply suspicious of democracy with adjectives. Some one party states were successful such as with Kenyatta in Kenya, but these are the exception.

4. You have said you don’t have many options for policy recommendations but as democracy is directly linked with Western institutions the support from external agents has changed things. Need to look at policies and what the Western institutions can do to help better formation.

The role of the outsiders has been very limited, Western conditionality has been negligible, but linkages between the institutions are to be encouraged.

5. In the context of fragile states, weak states, and failing states it should be institutionalization before liberalisation, this idea seems normative but do you recognise this policy in Donor circles?

Twenty years ago this was a standard argument of modernisation, develop first then democratise. For example Taiwan and hope remains for China, where a middle class is emerging and institutions are strong. In Africa this has not worked, Kagame in Rwanda has a chance to be Africa’s first developmental dictator with a clear project. Museveni seems to be a regular post colonial dictator highlighting the importance of alteration. Will this be true of Kagame who does seem to want to support development?

6. I am wondering how the African Union (OAU) has been invisible in your whole analysis whilst trying to be very effective in its role of democratisation.

There is a general view that African regional institutions should be strengthened. A case like NEPAD are only partly compelling. I would add African institutions as something to be encouraged. The OAU represents an effort from the whole of the continent. It would be great if the OAU played a larger role.

5 7. We need to focus on institution building. In South Sudan the institutions are very weak and whilst there is much Donor support for democracy there is very little put into institution building. In Darfur the militias are happy to go to elections; this runs the risk of putting warlords into power.

Building strong institutions is not easy, in Sudan they have not been built for at least 50 years, I am very wary about authoritarian regimes in Africa.

8. What about recognising the role of colonialism and the arbitrary drawing of borders?

You can have democracy in absence of nationalism. In countries like Sudan where the North and South do not believe they are part of the same the country. Changing the borders in Africa is not going to be a peaceful or straight forward process. Small countries are doing better, maybe there is welfare to be gained by looking more creativity at the map, but this would be a violent process.

Chairperson: Han van Dijk (ASC): In conclusion to the session some questions have been raised about Western versus African systems for democracy. We discussed questions of conditionality and coherency. What comes first, institution building or democracy? We looked at the role of regional institutions and democracy.

12:30-13:15 Key-note speaker Staffan I. Lindberg

Democratization (& Autocratization) by Elections: A new mode of transition?

Staffan Lindberg: I want to examine the role of elections in Africa and the processes of democratization and autocratization. Rather than a direct shift from authoritarian governments straight to democracies, we can observe countries stuck somewhere in the middle, known as hybrid regimes.

How do you get democracy? Increase the cost of oppression and decrease the cost of toleration. Can elections do this? We need to trick the leaders into behaving in a democratic way. Cost of oppression and cost of toleration remain subjective perceptions. Today there are many new electoral democracies, but there are still many hegemonic electoral countries. In Africa there have been a significant number of countries which have now held three or more elections. Whether these are free and fair? Perhaps half of them. Each stage of participation, increased opposition, and democracy improves with the holding of elections. The winners share reduces as elections occur. Democracy is more than elections and includes civil liberty. As R. Dahl suggests: democratic institutions constrain presidential power. In the first wave of election 35% have changed the leaders, in the second and third elections this was 12% and 19%, the fourth elections 36%. These are the ultimate constraints as leaders have to step aside.

Can elections prevent military interventions? In the 266 years of democratic regimes we have seen the lowest level of military intervention and when attempts of military intervention have been made, four out of five have failed. Almost all coups did not happen after the first election but after second, third, or fourth. This threat is dramatically reduced. Both rulers and the military are constrained by processes of repetitive elections. Elections are also associated with positive changes in civil liberties. The election period itself is associated with civil liberty and opposition demonstrations. Civil liberties are dependant variables, with other considerations such as resource curse, GDP per capita, and religion, but elections remain the most dramatic indicator of increased civil liberties. This is not an attempt to explain, but to show the relationship in Africa.

In conclusion: yes, elections, once repeated, have a self reinforcing effect, institutions have been shown to create both incentives and de-incentives, constraints and enables but does not determine. If you increase the cost of oppression the ruler will refrain in their behaviour. Rulers can claim to be democratic to buy some form of legitimacy and decrease the cost of losing. For Mugabe, the cost of losing will be extremely high. The cost for the Kenyan mafia was also very high if they lost. The theoretical conclusion is that elections can decrease oppression: holding competitive elections have increased democracy in 60-65% of countries in Africa. Whilst there is no safety in numbers, there is no safety in anything else.

7 Questions

1. This is a question of statistics, the reason authoritarian leaders appear democratic is because they have greater control over the figures.

Lindberg: Drawing on a larger body of worldwide examples, hegemonic regimes do control in this way, for example in Equatorial Guinea. In competitive elections they run a significant risk when they allow opposition to that extent, they run the risk of losing power and face a dilemma. As there are increases in press freedom and demonstrations, their dilemma remains that in the elections they might need to use new techniques to stay in power. It comes down to cost and that cost is internal. If you go in heavy handed, it can create further demonstrations and increase the pressure from the West. The cost is increased; yes, there are some hard nuts to crack but for the majority of countries, the data suggests those are the exceptions.

2. Civil liberties are an important indicator, but where is their free media et cetera, why not social democracy where the people themselves are involved?

Coming from Sweden I like democracy and social welfare but am not convinced we see social participation in our governance. Democracy is different in the US than in Sweden, France, Italy etc. Democracy is going to be different in Africa; South Africa will be different from Kenya. The more definitions you add on the greater impossibility to observe.

3. But what is your definition?

‘Institutional uncertainty’, a system of institutions which means you don’t know who will be in power.

4. Institutions are a precondition for democracy; the book by Jack Snyder shows how low institutional basis can cause conflict during democratisation. Weak institutions and strong elites create conflict and fragile states, but your advice maintains the pressure for elections.

There is little evidence in his account that it is dangerous to hold elections early. The same applies to Paul Collier, but this is a popular theory among autocrats. Power sharing arrangements before elections have not been associated with greater level of peace, but we need true competition to gain peaceful stability, but this is still in the early stages and we need to be careful and tentative.

5. Is there not a degree of self reinforcement in the donor policy?

Elections are good, they should be supported but it takes time for these processes to be worked out. It takes time to learn and institutionalise. But it makes sense; in the third and fourth elections we can observe the impacts. You need to support both parties and the church. The donor community needs to be there in big numbers. I uncovered one attempt at fiddling the computer electoral system; we did not go public because of fear of violence. There needs to be a commitment to stay for the long run.

6. African leaders reinvent themselves, leaders who are not willing to let go of power. What do you propose as a measure to prevent this?

8 This is a great but difficult question, and I am not sure of the answer. With such a range of countries and possibilities, do you want the bad guys to step down and retire in peace, should Mugabe retire on a nice island or be sent to the International Criminal Court? Yes there will be indictments but not too sure where we come down on this, should we take a long term strategy or look to the present needs of the people to get these leaders out of office. This is a policy judgement I am unable to help with.

13:30-15:00 Country case session of Ethiopia

Presentation: Prof. dr. Jan Abbink (African Studies Centre) and Anneloes Viveen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Chair: Klaas van Walraven (African Studies Centre)

Minutes: Eyob Balcha (MA student African Studies Centre)

Democracy Deferred: understanding elections in Ethiopia: summary of the major points of the workshop

After the presentations the chair of the workshop opened the floor for questions and comments on the presentations. From the two presentations it was learned that Ethiopia’s case is so unique and different from what was discussed during the morning session. Though the Ethiopian government is doing good in certain areas as education or infrastructural development, the democratic landscape is narrowing down particularly since the 2005 national election. The ruling party has made a relentless effort to make sure that its superiority will maintain and its victory will be ensured in the upcoming election by implementing different strategies. Moreover the wider public is extremely influenced by the post election violence and crisis that happened after the 2005 election and hence not willing to engage into the political system enthusiastically.

Anneloes Viveen stressed that it is not that easy for donors, as the Netherlands, to influence the Government of Ethiopia to refrain from its non-democratic actions. The presentation from Prof. Abbink also supported this fact with some historical political decisions made by the government in the past. Hence the main point that came forward during the discussion was how to strike a balance both in ensuring the smoothly going ‘development’ process and good records of the government as well as the bad records of the government on democratization as well as human rights issues. The policy recommendations from the participants were not strong enough in articulating the possible alternative ways of striking the critical balance of engaging the Government of Ethiopia thereby it continued its good record of achieving the MDGs and improving the human rights and democratizations issues of the country.

In spite of the argument forwarded at the plenary session in the morning, almost all participants of the workshop believe that the regular elections carried out in Ethiopia are not helpful in widening the political space and facilitating the democratization process, rather completely a counter-example of the cases raised (particularly Ghana). This is partly because of the political ideology of the ruling party, Revolutionary Democracy (according to Prof. Abbink), which is taken as a means of maintaining a hegemonic control of power where the ruling party/the incumbent government is drafting laws which are hindering the positive progress with respect to democracy in Ethiopia. The newly passed CSO law and the anti-terrorism law are major examples in this regard. Anneloes Viveen reiterated that for a variety of reasons, it is difficult for the international community and other international actors to positively influence democratic governance 10 in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Governement is independent-minded, ‘proud’ and not very willing to bow to the wishes and requests of donors or the international community. Besides that, governance is not the only subject on the international policy agenda: e.g. Ethiopia’s role in the region and development results. And lastly it is also partly associated with the availability of other financial sources mainly from China to the government with is compromising the influential power of the West in general on the democracy and human rights situations of African countries.

Finally, the participants could not reach an agreement about disentangling the issues of ‘development’ from ‘democracy’ with regard to the case of Ethiopia. On the other hand everyone agreed on the observation that the prospect of democracy is rather bleak in the short term in Ethiopia and the influence from the outside is not that much significant in changing the current situation.

13:30-15:00 Country case session of Ghana

Presentation: Prof. dr. Paul Nugent (University of Edinburgh) and Michiel Hendrix (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Chair: Ineke van Kessel (African Studies Centre)

Minutes: Humphrey Asamoah Agyeloum (MA student African Studies Centre)

In 2008 Ghana held general elections that led to the peaceful transition of power from the ruling party The New Patriotic Party (NPP) to the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Ghana is held up as an example in Africa because of the peaceful transition of power. Professor dr. Paul Nugent, who has been studying elections in Ghana since 1992, gave a presentation on the elections of 2008. Michiel Hendrix of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed about Dutch policy in Ghana.

The presentation was started by posing the following questions:

- what makes Ghana a fairly good example of democracy on the African continent?

- and what are the reasons for this?

Historical background

According to Nugent, Ghana has a history of good elections, which goes way back to the 1950’s. There is also a deep rooted discussion of democracy in Ghana for at least 150 years, although the west African country has been holding routinized elections only since 1992.

There are a number of factors that play a major role in the consolidation of democracy in Ghana. The first reason is that Ghana has an independent Electoral Commission (EC). The EC is chaired by dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, well-respected by politicians and seen by all political parties as being impartial. He also enjoys the confidence of all parties because they know him as someone who is resilient to pressure. Dr. Afari-Gyan also provides an important measure of continuity because he has been in office since 1992.

The EC is an important factor in the consolidation of power, but there is more: Ghana has a long tradition of a two-party system. The NPP operates in the Busia/Danquahists tradition and the NDC is affiliated to the Nkrumahists tradition. The NDC has a strong lineage with former President J.J. Rawlings.

The Ghana Elections Comparative statements about the State of Democracy

The Ghana elections are widely seen as a success story for the following reasons. Ghana has had two government changes through the ballot box (2000 and 2008). And Ghanaians are aware of the power of their vote. This shows in the so-called Skirt and Blouse voting. Nugent: “That is for the Presidential candidate of one’s preferred party, but for a parliamentarian of another party when the official candidate is unpopular or 12 regarded as an unwelcome imposition.” Ghanaians have been aware of the power of their vote since 1992. Nugent shared an anecdote he came across in the Volta Region during the elections. “I saw a slogan: No lights, no vote.”

The growing role of civil society participants is another reason. Especially the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) plays an important role. Nugent mentions that this organization was instrumental in 2008 through its parallel vote tabulation and press briefings. Lastly, the role played by the security forces of Ghana. The Armed Forces were impartial during the elections; they did not interfere with the elections.

Not all is well in Ghana

The elections in Ghana went alright this time, but not all is well. Nugent was critical of certain aspects of how the elections were held: Ghana narrowly escaped a crisis. The professor shed some light on the source of his worries. First of all, the suspicious voter turnout figures coupled to allegations of selective rigging. He presented some statistics in the Ashanti Region, where the turnout figures were implausible. In the following areas very high turnouts were registered: Bantama 93.81%, Kwadaso 94.47%, Nhyiaeso 98.29% and Suame 94.73%.

Escape plan

Ghana escaped a crisis narrowly thanks to the EC. Dr. Afari-Gyan was able to call the bluff of the NPP. Now there is a heightened atmosphere of mistrust between the NPP and NDC that does not bode well for 2012. Nugent poses the following question: “What would have happened if Afari-Gyan was not there?” “It is not an institutionalized way of getting out of a political crisis, but a personalized one. In 2012 both sides will try to fraud. That is a worrying trend.”

Dutch Policy in Ghana

Michiel Hendrix followed with his presentation on the Dutch policy in Ghana. Herein he explains the nature of the relationship between Ghana and the Netherlands. In 2015 Ghana wants to become a middle income country. Recent oil finding might help the West African country to achieve this aim. Ghana has also made some major progression, politically.

At the moment there are some 22.000 Ghanaians living in the Netherlands. And the relationship between both nations is quite broad; consular, trade and development cooperation. The Netherlands is for example the first export destination for Ghana. In the future when Ghana becomes a middle income country, Ghana will become more and more a partner of the Netherlands.

Hendrix also talked about the framework of the Dutch policy. The framework comprises of the policy letter “Our Common Concern”. Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II and Local Harmonization Agenda complete the package in Ghana.

Another part of the Dutch policy is good governance. The government of the Netherlands has set some goals concerning Ghana: increasing domestic accountability, anti- corruption and public finance management. Public finance management is most of all about budget support, with conditions attached to it. The aim of the conditions is to increase transparency.

13 The focus of the good governance policy is on the following: civil society, research and advocacy, and partner-organizations (NIMD, VNG, SNV). The intervention strategy of the Dutch government to achieve good governance in Ghana is firstly to support research and advocacy programmes in the West African country. By funding research and advocacy organizations, the Dutch government wants to assure transparency in Ghana and hopefully improve the political climate. The other aspects of the intervention strategy are cross-sectoral coherence and active participation in governance sector group (anti-corruption).

The Dutch government also explored several activities during the elections of 2008, the project Women in Law and Development in Africa, for example. The aim is to inform women of their right to vote. The government also undertook activities to sustain credibility, peace and national cohesion, but also in election observation.

Comments and questions

The participants had several comments and questions. The first question was whether or not there were enough observers during the 2008 elections in Ghana. Nugent answered this question: “Each of the parties had their own people trained to observe on the ground. Also CODEO had observers in place. So for the 22.000 polling stations, there were some 7.000 observers.” According to Nugent on elections day some of the international observers spotted some irregularities in certain regions. The professor suggested in the discussion that long term observers should be stationed in the areas where problems can be expected. Because they know the area well, so they can spot problems on time and send out the right signal. Economist and observer in Ghana Theresa Weersma, who took part in the discussion, commented that she was surprised at how the counting of the votes is done in Ghana. “It literally happens on the corner of the street. Someone can literally steal votes.”

A participant wanted to know whether there was interaction between foreign and local observers. Weersma: “Yes, you have to report on how many local observers there were. Domestic observers don’t produce any reports for anybody to read.”

Participant Heerko Dijksterhuis wanted to know about the Diaspora vote. He commented that Ghana had a problem with registering voters in the country. So how do they want to register the Diaspora? “It would definitely change the election results,” he says. Nugent responded by saying that Ghanaians are, in comparison to other migrants, very attached to their villages, towns and country. It is then no surprise that they want to have a voice in affairs affecting their villages, towns and country. “The Diaspora vote is open to abuse. The NPP has the majority now and is going to push the Diaspora vote through, because it could be used to influence the results.”

The discussion came back to what makes Ghana so different from other African countries. Nugent: “In Ghana people have memories of how it was under military reign. There is an elite consensus that this does not work: democracy may not be perfect, but works the best. So anyone who tries to stage a coup will be chased out within five minutes.”

There are other reasons that set Ghana apart from other countries. “Ghana’s political elite are equally divided on both sides of the spectrum. These people went to school together. If there are problems, they solve them the African way. They negotiate with

14 each other behind the scenes and the old leaders play an important role in this process.” “Ghanaians know where to draw the line. People rather move on. If you loose the elections today, you would get a chance in four years to try your luck again,” Nugent explains. “The political elite also look over the boundaries at countries like Ivory Coast, Liberia or Togo and they don’t like what they are seeing.”

Participant Kees Kooijmans who is an electoral observer made the following comment in support of the view of Nugent. “In Ghana people accept defeat. Ghanaians know they have a good reputation in the world and they don’t want to jeopardize that.”

Participant Jos Damen of the Africa Study Centre wanted to know which aspects of the Ghana case-study can be replicated elsewhere in Africa. The participants came up with different answers. But the most important ones were: the anti-corruption architecture and political institutions can be replicated elsewhere.

Keynote lecturer Dr. Lindberg added some more points to the answers offered by the participants. “First of all, building trust between the political agents,” he remarked. “But also distributed politics, which means counting the votes in public and then send the results to the local news paper for publication.”

Conclusions

At the end of the discussion on the Ghana elections, the following conclusions were drawn. Ghana has an independent EC, led by Dr. Afari-Gyan. This is something that can be replicated elsewhere.

Another conclusion that was drawn from the Ghana case is transparency. The counting of the votes in Ghana is done in the open. Everyone can see the number of votes the parties and candidates got from their voters.

The third conclusion is alternation. In Ghana, the politicians know that if they loose this time, they will get another chance in the next elections.

In Ghana there is also an elite consensus. The Ghanaian political elite are all too aware of the fact that if there are any changes, they are going to be the ones that are going to be affected the most by them. It is therefore in their interest to keep a status quo. The elite also look at the neighbouring countries. If they look at Ivory Coast, Liberia or Togo, they conclude that they do not want to live in an unstable country.

Another conclusion is that in Ghana there is a domestic coalition. If there are prevailing conflicts, the politicians solve them behind the scenes. The politicians, despite their political colours, are usually friends with each other. Most of them went to the same schools together. If there are differences, they solve these problems in a friendly manner. The ex-presidents also play an important role in resolving conflicts. They mediate behind the scenes.

Ghana has free press. Journalists report freely on the elections and other developments. Free press enhances the democratic process.

Recommendations:

15 Ghana is considered a stable country in the West African Region. And despite Ghana’s successful democratic elections in 2008, there are issues that have to be addressed before the elections in 2012.

The EC has to be supported and encouraged to carry out a proper audit of the 2008 elections.

Secondly, the EC has to deal with the recurring problem of the voter register. The register is contaminated. Nugent: “In the run-up to the 2008 polls, when the register was reopened to accommodate those who had recently achieved voting age, it swelled by an impossible 2 million voters. Although many names were subsequently deleted, the current voter’s register is still not credible.”

Thirdly, the parliament has to be empowered, because at the moment most parliamentarians have nothing to say to the government. The quality of the members of parliament need to be improved, but also the number of women in parliament has to go up.

Certain aspects of the electoral laws and regulations in Ghana are in desperate need of reforms. Nugent: “The EC is aware of the perils of fixing the date of the Presidential inauguration so close to the second round of voting, and believes this need to be revisited.”

Lastly, there is the issue of the Diaspora vote. What should be done with this? These votes can easily be tempered with. That is why this problem has to be dealt with before the next elections.

Elections in Africa: fair, façade or failure?

16 13:30-15:00 Country case session of Burundi

Presentation: Dr. Stef Vandeginste (University of Antwerp) and Marion Van Schaik (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Chair: Nadine van Loon (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Minutes: Pangmashi Epie Nadel Yenkong (MA student African Studies Centre)

Two main questions were dealt with in this case session:

1. Are elections beneficial to Burundi?

2. Are elections in the case of Burundi legitimizing a winner takes it all approach?

The two presenters provided an overview of their paper. Vandeginste summarized the history of Burundi’s elections. He identified some of the lessons learnt from the previous electoral processes and linked them to the challenges that lie ahead in view of the elections that will take place in 2010. The presenters reiterated on some of the points made by the two key note speakers, recalling the fact that Burundi was listed by them as a competitive electoral authoritarian regime.

In the presentation the relevance of previous elections for today’s Burundian population was discussed. Vandeginste stressed that in the collective political memory of Burundian citizens, the visionary leadership and democratic legitimacy of Prince Louis Rwagasore and his party (early nineteen sixties) are still prevalent. Rwagasore is considered to be a national hero and symbol of unity.

Furthermore, reference was made to the use of Lindbergs cost-benefit analysis as an instrument to analyse the motivations of the different parties. Vandeginste noted that in Burundi losing elections does not necessarily mean losing all political power and benefits. Burundi has a power-sharing system. Also parties that lost may take part in government. On the other hand, history has shown that in Burundi elections have never been won by the incumbent regime. Burundians apparently tend to vote for change. Note that there have hardly been peaceful alternations of power. Based on Lindbergs and vande Walles theory, the 2010 elections therefore will pose a great challenge. Vandeginste mentioned that Burundi’s political leadership see power alternation as a risk. This is partly based on objective data: they are not sure if, when they lose political power, there will be another opportunity of getting back into power after new elections held in four years time and if then they will be able to compete freely and fairly.

Burundians want peace to be translated into more economic and social welfare. Burundi has opted for a consociational political party system which means that under the constitution and the electoral law, all political parties are obliged to include Hutu and Tutsi in their leadership structures. So in other words, the ethnic divide no longer coincides with divides between political parties. It was concluded that the fact that the ethnic issue has somewhat been deprioritized in the electoral agenda was a positive aspect.

17 Van Schaik presented the Netherlands policy on peace and stabilization and the support to the electoral process. After the elaborate presentations, questions were raised by the participants.

Mr Innocent, a Burundian citizen, expressed doubts if the political competition in 2010 will be between the Frodebu and other political parties, and asked why Vandeginste stressed in his presentation that ethnicity no longer poses a problem. In reply to this question, Vandeginste made it clear that when he earlier mentioned in his presentation that ethnicity is no longer a problem, this was merely meant in the context of the electoral competition. Political competition now mainly is a matter of predominantly Hutu parties competing. The integration of ethnic elements within political parties resulted in political parties no longer opposing along a Hutu and Tutsi ethnic line; it has meant that in every predominantly Hutu party Tutsis are also represented and the other way around. Vandeginste went further to clarify that by explicitly recognizing ethnicity as a social and politically relevant element of identity, Burundi has to some extent been able to overcome the ethnic divide or been able to reduce the ethnic elements in its electoral reforms. This is in contrast with Rwanda where ethnicity has been declared politically irrelevant.

When debating whether previous elections had been beneficial to Burundi, Vandeginste reiterated the fact that when he said that Burundi doesn’t have a winner takes all approach, this is true in constitutional and legal terms. But in terms of political reality, Burundi’s leaders very much think in terms of winner takes it all. So, they haven’t internalized their own system that much. Two factors lay at the basis of this: a) Not all parties have participated in the negotiations of the consociational power sharing system in Arusha; this system was negotiated by Uprona and Frodebu. b) CNDD-FDD though having won the 2005 elections with more than 50% of the votes, was bound to work with the defeated parties because of the consociational power sharing.

Ms Stephanie mentioned there have been remarkably positive benefits in Burundi as a result of the previous elections. Most outstanding is the progress made regarding the media: these underwent a true metamorphosis. “Today in Burundi, every person can go over to the media, and provide information. You can express your feelings without fear”. She equally made mention of the birth of numerous civil society organizations in Burundi. In 1993, there were less than three civil society organizations in Burundi. As a result of the 2005 elections, now in every corner of society there are several civil society organizations. She thinks that this freedom of expression provided the citizens of Burundi with a place in the sun. Ms Stephanie pleaded for the international community to support the media and civil society organizations to boost the morale of the Burundian citizens towards the upcoming elections.

At the end of the session on Burundi, two conclusions were made:

1: Elections had been beneficial to Burundi in the sense that it resulted in more media freedom, people feeling freer to speak out, a general mentality shift.

2: On the other hand, the stability of the system to a large extent depends on an externally designed power-sharing arrangement that is not internalized by the political elite. An important stabilizing factor at the moment is the involvement of the international community.

19 13:30-15:00 Country case session of Kenya

Presentation: Dr. Marcel Rutten (African Studies Centre) and Robert-Jan Siegert (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Chair: Jos Hoenen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Minutes: Kamya Innocent Royal (MA student African Studies Centre)

The session began with two main questions that needed to be answered, and this was to be done in form of recommendations for donors/policy makers.

The questions were:

1. Does the International Community not overestimate benefits of elections in Africa countries while underestimating their dangers?

2. Whether elections conducted fairly, are they not used to legitimize the winner takes it all approach and are often a recipe for misery?

The presenter Dr. Marcel Rutten, elaborated on the political history of Kenya, in order to contextualize the post election occurrences. He gave a chronology of Kenyan elections and the systems under which they were held. For most of the time they were held under a single party system till the 1990s after the end of the cold war and civil demand for multiparty democracy.

A number of issues in the Kenyan society were highlighted as good ground for violence especially land ownership, ethnicity, income inequalities, and unbalanced share in the national resources. Land was singled out as an issue that has repeatedly come up in the politics of Kenya beginning with the settlement of the British in the Kenyan highlands, and the indigenous people put in reserves to avail labour for settler agriculturalists.

Focus was put on the 2007 post election violence which took place in Nairobi, the rift valley and Kisumu. It took the form of spontaneous looting, instigated violence, police and army violence and political murders. There was a lot of violence even before the elections but it accelerated after the Electoral Commission of Kenya declared Kibaki the winner of the elections.

The violence after the 2007 elections was not only about politics but also about land, water, and the security situation. The skewedness of land-ownership: several land commissions have been established in Kenya, but their recommendations were never implemented. Furthermore there were high levels of inequality and unemployment. There are dominant unresolved issues on power and resource sharing. It was also noted that some violence (the Mungiki flare-up) was due to unfulfilled promises.

20 It has been said that donors were naïve towards Kenyan opposition: internationally there were signals that players were not pleased with Kibaki, the donors were divided. After the election, there was a bigger degree of cooperation, the donors rallied behind the Annan initiative, and they put a lot of pressure on both sides of the conflict to reach settlement. It was not realistic to expect interference when the results were still coming in; the donors did not have the information, the mandate or the time to force the election authorities to recount.

In the Netherlands between 2002 and 2007 there was a debate on Kenyan corruption; towards the elections, the Dutch government gave support to the electoral commission, UNDP support for Civil Society Organisations to monitor elections. There was already a high awareness of the risk of violence.

After the elections

There was an interim plan to support Kenyan non state actors: contribution to the shortfall, support for the Annan process, EU diplomatic activity (European mediators) to put pressure on both sides of the conflict, discussions at the general affairs council. The donors were not surprised that there was post election violence but the more of the number of causalities.

The bilateral relations

The implementation of the Kenya National Reconciliation Accord (KNRA) is not going smoothly; politicians are reluctant, unable to formulate a common message. It is also difficult to keep Kenya on the international agenda.

• Getting the EU declaration on Kenya is difficult because it is expected to implement international agreements; Kenyan collaboration was required against the fight on piracy and international terrorism. Now it is difficult to get a consensus on Kenya.

• The Netherlands tried to discuss the European development portfolio to link it to the implementation of the KNRA. There is currently a US visa ban on some Kenyan legislators and the International Criminal Court is also increasing its pressure to ensure prosecution of those culpable in the post election violence.

Recommendations

• There should be a united international community support for post election reconciliation.

• The Kenyans themselves must find a solution, because forced solutions might result in flawed solutions.

• International observation is still important during elections and the EU and the USA are still pivotal.

• Need for support outside the government circles, support for NGOs that do civic education.

• There is need to evaluate approach of election observation, and this should be discussed by the donors.

21 • The electoral institutions should only be assisted if the Waki recommendations are implemented by the government.

Reactions from the participants

1. Elections are necessary in the development process of Kenya, the international community should strengthen observation, and the domestic observers’ recommendations should also be given attention and should be linked to international support.

2. The political struggle continues and elections should be approached in a different way at the presidential level; priority should be given to dealing with impunity, provision of mechanism to see that elections are free and fair.

3. The international community should be consistent and coherent in policies towards Kenya. International support should also be given for alternative leadership from within Kenya so that they can solve their own problems. There is need to support institutional building process, support activities that target the attitudes of the ordinary Kenyans.

4. The international community support in essential services during the transition is necessary so that local elites do not manipulate the masses for personal gain that may end in chaos.

5. There is need to pay greater attention to the socio-economic situation of Kenya and other African countries since the post elections violence is sometimes a manifestation of poor socio-economic conditions.

6. The international community should put up a concerted effort; they should not give recognition of regimes at fault.

7. It was noted that individuals contest for parliament for power, cover up of corruption, making money out of parliament. The incentive of getting to parliament should be reduced; the draft constitution does not address this. There should be a provision setting aside the cabinet positions for non politicians. The president should not retain powers as chief of general staff.

8. Importance of looking into how power is shared, the current draft constitution makes an effort to move away from the winner takes it all scenario because this has an effect on misuse of power and resources, facilitates the use of the ethnic card, there is need for a proportionate system of power sharing.

9. The trias politica has not been very successful as a check on balance of power in Kenya and there is need to focus on non state actors outside the trias: the church, the media, knowledge institutes, NGOs should be supported.

10. The international community should strike a balance between interference and home grown solutions, some donor interventions have been seen as overly biased, it was however noted that the international community never has the mandate to call of elections/ recount. They should support a system that is all inclusive.

11. Trias politica can only work well in a strong economy, a more equitable distribution of resources. A participant clearly mentioned that the international 22 community is wide and what needs to be done should be talked about in terms of the Netherlands, because the Dutch cannot speak for the rest.

Overall conclusions

• Power sharing in the country is essential: the new constitution makes an effort to get away from the winner takes it all mechanisms, misuse of land, resources. The ethnic card is played as some people are marginalized.

• There should be support for the reconciliation efforts, but Kenyans should also be able to find a solution for their problems.

• There is need to evaluate different approaches to election interventions, including local observers, assistance should only be given if the issue of electoral commission of Kenya chairmanship is addressed.

• Support for non state actors, the churches, NGOs, knowledge institutes because these reach the ordinary people, can play a strong role in averting violence. The power of the provincial administration, used by the president to manipulate elections, should be abolished by the constitution.

• There is need for a balance between the international community and home grown institutions must be taken into consideration.

• There should be use of the Diaspora for their influence to make demands, including the issue of arms. These are an important source of funds to home government, it was also noted that some of the arms that were used during the post election violence were provided by people in the Diaspora. They can have a double edged impact.

• There is need for strong civil society organizations, but this should be done in a creative way: international agencies should enable a wider reach of NGOs, which should be profit oriented and city based. These should move their activities to the rural areas as well.

• There is need for a strong economy and equitable sharing of the resources.

• Elections are necessary in Kenya and the international community is still important, though the role of local observers need also to be given recognition and support for their role.

• Priority should also be given to the ending of impunity and here the big perpetrators of violence must be targeted. There is need to ensure that the constitution process is not aborted this time round.

• The international community should be consistent and coherent in its positions on Kenya, there should also be a search for alternative leadership to allow Kenyans attempt their own solution.

23 • There is need for support of activities that target the attitudes of ordinary Kenyans, support of livelihoods so that the people can be able to say no to exploitation by self seeking politicians.

• Concerted effort, the same position should be taken by donors with regard to legitimating regimes.

• Since people go to parliament for power, cover corruption, to make money the issue of the power prize should be addressed, the new constitution should address the power of parliament, include a clause that some cabinet positions are reserved for those that do not come through elections, ministers should be professional civil servants. This may reduce the struggle to get into parliament.

• The presidential power of chief of general staff should be reduced since it makes him so powerful that he can use the police and the military to stay in power.

15:30-15:45 Presentation of conclusions of country case studies and panel discussion

Chair: Nina Tellegen (DOEN Foundation)

Minutes: Leah Llewellyn (African Studies Centre)

Ghana: This is a relative successful story. What elements of these successes can be exported or are specifically Ghanaian? The successful role of the independent electoral commission, the conceded defeat allowed for alteration. The role of the independent media can all be exported. The wish list of the last election was marked by fraud and this still needs to be investigated. The role of the middle class and elite consensus is very specific to Ghanaian culture. More attention needs to be paid to democratic culture. Questions arose about the Diaspora and their right to vote.

Ethiopia: Everybody agreed that here the perspectives of democracy remained very bleak. There has been no consolidation of democratic practise and regime survival remains the most important. Donor commitment should continue its support for development and civil society. There was minority descent that it would not be possible to reverse these outcomes by working with civil society but need for direct talks with government.

Kenya: The story of the last election is known and highly complex. The issue of land remains extremely important particularly when controlled by political parties. Winner takes all is very dangerous. Need to move towards ‘trias politica plus’, thus including strengthening civil society and the population to counteract political power. A society that has already showed strength removing 70-80% of ministers. International community needs to support checks and balances. Need to learn roots causes and conflicts and land issues. Help processes that inform and remain consistent and unified. Work closely with stake holders in Kenya.

Burundi: There have been successes in Burundi but stability is very determined by external players and not internal structures. This dependence on the international community raises questions whether this can be maintained.

Chairperson – Nina Tellegen: It seems that everybody is very happy about elections, but what about the requirements? You can hold elections in many circumstances. Political parties need to take responsibility for themselves, need public debates and knowledge of policy. For peaceful transitions what should be in place? Lindberg is a big proponent of the importance of elections; do we first need to fill these requirements or should we just hold elections?

Dr. S. I. Lindberg: We don’t need to have all the factors in place, but it is very important to support political parties. Successful democracies need strengthened parties. Start holding elections early, donors can help once the elections are there.

25 Chairperson – Nina Tellegen: How is the donor community helping?

Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation: First of all, I believe that elections are a vital part, but not the responsibility of the donor community. We need to remain country centred, as it is not up to us to judge whether to create democracy or not, but in the transition we can help. Whilst elections are essential they are not the most important part. Election commissions are vital, I agree, but they should be used to help the people express themselves. Kenya seemed for most of the donors to go in the right direction, but others knew that the country was boiling. After the outbreaks of violence I flew straight to Kofi Annan to work on the land issues. We need to be critical and support civil society and institutions. And when it does go wrong, we need to discuss it openly. When you speak of a political community that is not united, we need to be explicit.

Accountability is always a problem of the international community. When we offer budget support we realize that these governments should be accountable to their citizens. Bottom up and top down approaches need to come together. We know we cannot make democracy in other countries by military means. We require tailor-made and joined up forces but this is difficult because of geo-politics. We need to be very strict on leaders who don’t work in the interest of their citizens.

Dr. S. I. Lindberg: I find myself in agreement with everything the minister just said. Military rule should lead to a suspension of aid. Countries whose leaders term has last more than 12 years should also stop getting aid. Secondly, I am comfortable to say here in the Hague, that the donor community has been complicit in supporting bad leaders. Members of the World Bank were renting property from Kibaki in Kenya.

Question 1 from the audience: The donor community is fragmented, if the Netherlands can’t influence Brussels how can it influence Ethiopia?

Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation: It is not just about aid. Africa is a grown up continent. The issue of accountability and democracy has to play a larger role. In view of what we can see in the world though, one should not be overoptimistic about the tool of democracy. The ‘donor’ community is not working together; others are supporting African countries who do not believe in democracy. International communication need to put Kenya on the policy interests of the 27 countries of the European Union.

Roel von Meijenfeldt: What is more important, economic development or democracy? We need to do both. Institutions and the delivery of aid need to be changed. In Africa, we need to be more creative and look at the positive changes. Identify positive as well as negative insights. In the workshop on Burundi we were given a real clear picture of what was happening at the local level. What I have found particularly interesting is the relevance of alternation. It is important for governments to alternate but this also brings a whole new set of problems.

Prof. N. van de Walle: The donor community is inclined to resolve conflict through power sharing agreements, but local opposition is very important. Power sharing is second best. In Kenya it was the third solution and there remains little progress. An ‘elite

26 cartel’ has agreed to share the spoils. The biggest structural problem in Kenya is the inequality and this can still get worse.

Dr. S. I. Lindberg: We have to be country specific but there are no clear benefits of power sharing and there are clear downsides for democracy. Democracy demands competition.

Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation: Donor communities do not want power sharing agreements if there is no such thing as a sunset clause. Power sharing is really important right now but could prove to be costly. Whilst academics want theories, losing parties can claim fraud just to demand power sharing.

Question 2. Whilst elections are important they only happen every four/five years. 2005- 2010 in Ethiopia will only increase the unlevelled political ground. The focus of elections is flawed.

Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation: Elections are necessary but accountability is the key. We need to look at African versions of accountability. Ethiopia does not have a level playing field and there are not enough forms of accountability. We need to support good programs, we now have a large conflict over policy legislation in Ethiopia. What should we do?

Roel von Meijenfeldt: Some call this the ‘liberation syndrome’. We find in many countries oppression is part of the institutional design. We need to discuss and support the important steps.

Question3. What to do? We keep talking about democracy, but what we need is development, not expensive elections.

Prof. N. van de Walle: In many surveys in Africa, this is a well held view. The World Bank no longer has programs promoting agriculture and industrialisation. But those of us that promote democracy believe it is a prerequisite of development.

Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation: I understand this opinion and kind of agree with it. The money in some cases is too much. Is it really necessary? I am a social democrat, thus for me democracy is about the economy and democratic transition is about the economy. We still need to increase access to credit and development.

Question 4. In terms of instruments pulling together, in Kenya the international community managed to work well into drawing the parties into discussion. There are fears that the European community are not forward thinking to know which of these instruments will be effective

Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation: The conflict occurred because of historical and root causes. As a development partner with Kenya I am very in favour of what we managed to achieve. It was an agreement made by the Kenyans themselves. We need to support local transformation. Impunity can reign and this is something we need to be particularly strong on.

Question 5. I feel what has been missing is the gender perspective: with equality democracy cannot be achieved.

27 Question 6. We need to focus on civil society, so people don’t buy into funds offered by the government.

Prof. N. van de Walle: I don’t want to belabour the gender point, but there has been an incredible change in the strength of civil society in the developing world. There is need for patience and time.

Dr. S. I. Lindberg: We can’t expect too much too quickly, we also can stop pushing, but in two decades a great job has been done. Most of what is done after elections is down to the Africans themselves. There are always unintended consequences of intervention. The elections in Africa are not free and fair yet. They need functioning electoral processes. The rights that come with political freedoms come through the electoral process. This is when the public is political educated.

Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation: In the Netherland elections are not that good either... Investing in civil society should continue. Democracy has never been a linear process. Africa still risks being left behind in a competitive world. We need to give accountability to all our colleagues.

Chair, Nina Tellegen: This has been an interesting day of exchange between several parties. Elections have been seen as a positive step towards democratic governance. There remains a need to be country specific, be patient and be open when things go wrong. We need to support non-state actors. One final important remark was made earlier, Africa is indeed a grown up continent and needs to find its own way of institutionalising democracy.