Guidance for Emergency Response to Accidents Involving Aircraft Carrying Radioactive Material

Guidance for Emergency Response to Accidents Involving Aircraft Carrying Radioactive Material Consolidated Draft 26 July 2011

1. Introduction

1.1. Background Radioactive materials have vital uses throughout the world that include applications in medicine, research, industry, agriculture and energy generation. Often the production and/or manufacturing of radioactive material are not in the State where the use takes place. This requires materials to be transported between States. The United Nations has recognized the need for a consistent and harmonized legal framework for the transport of all dangerous goods.

The IAEA was entrusted with the drafting of recommendations on the safe transport of radioactive material on the understanding that the recommendations would be consistent with the principles adopted by the United Nations Committee of Experts and would be formulated in consultation with the United Nations and the relevant specialized agencies. This has led to continued co-operation between the Committee of Experts, the IAEA, the relevant specialized agencies (particularly the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)) and various other United Nations bodies.

A task of the International Civil Aviation Organization is to adopt and amend from time to time international standards, measures, practices and procedures dealing with matters concerned with the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation. The Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air is approved, issued and amended in accordance with the procedure established by the ICAO Council. The Technical Instructions are updated bienniallybiannually. In order to achieve compatibility with the regulations covering the transport of dangerous goods by other modes of transport, the provisions of the Technical Instructions are based on the recommendations of the UN UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (Model Regulations) Committee of Experts and the IAEA’s Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (TS-R-1SSR-6).The transport of radioactive material by air is an integral part of the international transport network and occurs routinely.

Implementation and compliance with these international regulations will, as far as practicable, mean that the transport of radioactive material by air is carried out safely.

However, while the transport of radioactive material has an enviable safety record, transport in general can involve accidents. This document focuses on air transport incidents and emergencies on passenger and cargo aircraft where radioactive material is present. An emergency is a non- routine situation or event that necessitates prompt action, primarily to mitigate a hazard or adverse consequences for human health and safety, quality of life, property or the environment. This includes nuclear and radiological emergencies and conventional emergencies such as fires, release of hazardous chemicals, storms or earthquakes. It includes situations for which prompt action is warranted to mitigate the effects of a perceived hazard. An incident is an unintended event, including operation errors, equipment failures, initiating events, accident precursors, near misses or other mishaps, or unauthorized act, malicious or non-malicious, the consequences or potential consequences of which are not negligible from the point of view of protection or safety.

1.2. Objectives The document is intended to be of use to those involved in the response to air transport incidents and emergencies where radioactive material is present. It is also intended to inform those involved in the carriage and handling of radioactive material in order that in the event of an incident they are able to respond appropriately.

The document describes the types of air transport incidents and emergencies at airports and provides guidance on the nature of the response

Guidance and advice is provided on the information that may be needed for the range of incidents and emergencies that may occur and where and from whom it may be obtained. Generic information is provided that may be used in the absence of specific information. The risk management principles should take into account all risks associated with air incidents and emergencies. The information collected should be of use in risk management related to the radiological aspects of dealing effectively and safely with air incidents or emergencies involving transport of radioactive material. Intervention levels provided in this document may be used by emergency responders as an indicator for the implementation of certain response actions and/or escalation of the response.

The information contained herein describes the interface between transport incident emergency response and radiological emergency response and should be incorporated into existing emergency response systems to enhance the level of preparedness to respond to transport incidents and emergency response involving radioactive material (cClass 7 dangerous goods).

Some radioactive material, especially fissile or “nuclear” material may be transported under strict security requirements. The interface between emergency response and security response (which may include armed response forces) should be considered in developing response plans for transport accidents.

The document provides guidance on the type of information that should be included in a plan, but is not in itself an emergency response plan.

1.3. Scope The guidance in this document is relevant to incidents and emergencies occurring on passenger and cargo aircraft and at airports. Aircraft may carry radioactive material, other dangerous goods, and non-dangerous cargo. This guidance considers only those specific hazards associated with the radioactive material. The IAEA recommends an all hazards approach during the planning and response to incidents and emergencies. This guidance is only applicable to response actions performed during initial and accident control phase of an incident or emergency.

1.4. Structure To be detailed on completion of the body of the document.

ABBREVIATIONS

DG Dangerous Goods

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation

ADD REFERENCE - TECDOC ON SEVERE ACCIDENT

CHECK CONSISTENCY - THIS DOCUMENT OR THIS ANNEX 2. Regulatory and EPER Guidance

Note somewhere we need to make it clear what we mean by air transports, does this include airside and airport? If so we need a section explaining this. Discuss with Katherine Rooney.

2.1. Transport regulations

2.1.1. IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials

The IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (TS-R-1) are the basis of all international regulations for the transport of radioactive materials The objective of the Transport Regulations is to establish requirements that must be satisfied to ensure safety and to protect persons, property and the environment from the effects of radiation in the transport of radioactive material. This protection is achieved by requiring: (a) Containment of the radioactive contents;

(b) Control of external radiation levels;

(c) Prevention of criticality; and

(d) Prevention of damage caused by heat.

A graded approach to safety is adopted which ensures that as the risks associated with the package contents increases so does the robustness of the packaging. Three general severity levels are considered: (a) Routine conditions of transport (incident free);

(b) Normal conditions of transport (including minor mishaps);

(c) Accident conditions of transport.

TS-R-1 specifies the requirements for several types of packages which are designed and tested to demonstrate their ability to withstand, as appropriate, these three conditions of transport. The package types appropriate carriedfor in air transport are:

 Excepted packages which are designed to withstand routine conditions of transport  Industrial (IP-1, IP-2 and IP-3) packages which are designed to withstand routine and some normal conditions of transport  Type A packages which are designed to withstand routine and normal conditions of transport  Type B packages which are designed to withstand routine, normal and accident conditions of transport  Type C packages which are designed to withstand the more severe accident forces associated with air transport

There are also specific design requirements for packages used to transport uranium hexafluoride. These design requirements take into account all the potential hazards presented by uranium hexafluoride, including its corrosive properties. These packages may be commonly referred to as “Type H” and may be marked “H(U)” or “H(M)”. Fissile material may be carried in Industrial, Type A, Type B, Type C or packages designed for the transport of uranium hexafluoride. In these circumstances the package has to be designed to withstand the conditions of transport applicable to its package type and also to take account of the additional risks associated with its fissile content. The package identification marking will include the letter F when fissile material is carried. These materials also may be subject to specific security requirements during transport, including contingency planning for attempted unauthorized removal. The regulations also identify two specific classes of material, Low Specific Activity radioactive material (LSA-I, LSA-II and LSA-III) and Surface Contaminated Objects (SCO-I and SCO-II). Generally, LSA material and SCO are transported in industrial packages. The regulations permit the use of an “overpack” which is an enclosure used by a single consignor to contain one or more packages and to form one unit for convenience of handling and stowage during transport. Typically an overpack could be a standard aircraft unit load device or a palletized group of packages. One key requirement of international regulations is that, “if it is evident that a package is damaged or leaking, or if it is suspected that the package may have leaked or been damaged, access to the package shall be restricted and a qualified person shall, as soon as possible, assess the extent of contamination and the resultant radiation level of the package. The scope of the assessment shall include the package, the conveyance, the adjacent loading and unloading areas, and, if necessary, all other material which has been carried in the conveyance. When necessary, additional steps for the protection of persons, property and the environment, in accordance with provisions established by the relevant competent authority, shall be taken to overcome and minimize the consequences of such leakage or damage.” To assist in meeting this requirement it is essential that a record be made of all persons involved in the handling and transport of the package, this may be in the form of a simple ‘log’ which would enable the people involved to be identified and dealt with at a timely manner. Where a spillage of material from packages is reported, the packages would effectively need to be re-consigned, “packages which are damaged or leaking radioactive contents in excess of allowable limits for normal conditions of transport may be removed to an acceptable interim location under supervision, but shall not be forwarded until repaired or reconditioned and decontaminated.” The provisions of TS-R-1 are intended to cover transport of packages by any mode. Modal variations to the transport regulations are covered in mode-specific documents which for air transport is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air. The IAEA has published a number of guidance documents to support the implementation of TS- R-1. For the purposes of this document the relevant IAEA guidance material is  Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material Safety Guide, IAEA Safety Standards Series, No. TS-G-1.1  Planning and Preparing for Emergency Response to Transport Accidents Involving Radioactive Material Safety Guide IAEA Safety Standards Series No. TS-G-1.2 (ST-3)

2.1.2. Information requirements for dangerous goods carried by air

There are several mandatory and advisory provisions for air transport. These may be supplemented regionally or nationally by special requirements or by the airline. There are several sources of information that can be considered for dangerous goods carried as cargo on board an aircraft.  The airline

 The cargo owner

 The aircraft crew

 The last airport

 The Consignee

 The Consignor

Each of these could have a role during an emergency, and each will have different information and different availability. Some suggestions for consideration are set out in the following paragraphs. This section concentrates on information related to the cargo – not to the event. The information in shipping documents and its relevance in an emergency are:  The identification of the consignor and consignee, including their names and addresses

o This information is very important – it allows access to extensive information from sources not directly responding to the incident.

 The UN number preceded by the letters “UN” (see Appendix III).

o The UN number gives important information regarding the nature of the material being carried and the ability of the package to withstand accidents.

 The proper shipping name. o The proper shipping name supplements the UN number and allows slightly more specific details to be known.

 The UN class number “7” (see Appendix IV).

o This simply confirms that the material is radioactive.

 The name or symbol of each radionuclide or a general description for a mixture.

o This can be useful, but it should be noted that for complex mixtures the ability to record sufficient detail is limited. For most materials moved by air, the information will be sufficient to guide much of the response.

 The physical and chemical form of the material.

o This information helps since it allows prediction of the response of the material to specific accident scenarios, and to water.

 The maximum activity of the radioactive contents (for fissile material mass may be used in place of activity).

o The maximum activity is obviously useful, and will guide the decisions on the potential hazards involved.

 The category of the package, i.e. I-WHITE, II-YELLOW, III-YELLOW (see Appendix IV).

o All packages containing radioactive material have external radiation levels. The package category is a guide to the radiation level on the surface of the package and at 1 m from the package surface.

 The transport index (TI).

o The TI is a guide to the radiation level at one meter from the surface of the package – together with the surface dose rate this enables the use of simple models to estimate dose rates at any distance from an undamaged package.

 For fissile material the criticality safety index (CSI) (see Appendix IV).

o If the material is fissile it may require special handling and loading (limits on accumulations of packages and groups of packages based on the CSI values). The higher the CSI, the more important it is to control operations with the package, including limiting accumulation of packages into groups.

 The identification mark for each competent authority approval certificate. o For any package with an identity mark this is very important information. The mark will allow tracing of certificates, safety cases, design information, approving authorities, etc.

 Where required the statement “EXCLUSIVE USE SHIPMENT”

o Where this term is used it is a sign that there are important reasons for operational control of the package – this could be due to very high radiation levels for example.

 For LSA-II, LSA-III, SCO-I and SCO-II, the total activity of the consignment as a multiple of A2.

o LSA and SCO are materials that provide degrees of protection because of their form. The scale of the potential hazard is given by the multiple of A2. Levels of 10 A2 are important as this may indicate when the radiation levels from unshielded material could require special precautions.

In addition the consignor needs to provide the carrier a statement regarding any special handling and stowage requirements as well as emergency arrangements appropriate to the consignment, but the competent authority certificates need not necessarily accompany the consignment. Instead the consignor is required to have sent copies of each applicable competent authority certificate to the competent authority of the country of origin of the shipment and to the competent authority into which the consignment is to be transported. A graded approach is taken throughout the regulations and for the most significant shipments a “Shipment Notification” is required to be made to the competent authority of each country through or into which larger consignments are to be transported. This notification is required for:  Type C packages or type B(U) packages containing radioactive material with an activity greater than 3000A1 or 3000A2, as appropriate, or 1000 TBq, whichever is lower;

 Type B(M) packages;

 Shipments under special arrangement.

The information in the notification includes sufficient information to enable the identification of the package or packages (including all applicable certificate numbers and identification marks); information on the date of shipment, the expected date of arrival and proposed routing; the names of the radioactive materials or nuclides; descriptions of the physical and chemical forms of the radioactive material; and the maximum activity of the radioactive contents (for fissile material, the mass of fissile material may be used in place of activity). 2.1.2.1. Information from the aircraft / airline

Each aircraft should must have a listinformation on the of the dangerous goods being carried as cargo. This information is important to the first responders. The information that could reasonably be provided by the aircraft or the airline would be:  The UN number

 The proper shipping name

 The class

 The number of packages, the category and if applicable, the Transport Index

 The location the packages are loaded on the aircraft

 The gross weight of the package

Additional information related to the consignor or consignee would be very valuable, since this will allow interaction with the most relevant experts on the cargo. Alternatively details of any package certification numbers will help provide information. 2.1.2.2. Information from the cargo owner, consignor or consignee

This is likely to be the best source of detailed information, and would be able to provide most of the information required for any response, whether the cargo is involved or not. The most appropriate source of information is the consignor. The consignor should be able to provide extensive information concerning the packaging package and the contents. They should be able to advice advise on what actions they consider necessary. There may be issues related to time zones that make immediate access to information difficult. 2.1.2.3. Information from the airline company

2.1.2.4. The airline company should be able to offer some information, such as the aircraf t type, nature of the cargo being transported, etc.

2.1.2.5. Information from the loading airport

2.1.2.6. To be added The airport of loading should be able to confirm the loading loc ation on the aircraft (position within a cargo hold)

2.2. Emergency Preparedness and Response

Emergency preparedness and response must follow an all hazards approach. There are several different preparedness and response events to consider:  An in flight emergency

 Crash of the aircraft  A loading or handling incident involving cargo and possibly the radioactive material packages

 A radiation emergency

 What about a loss of ‘source’ or ‘theft’? Any requirements to inform police / counter terrorist units as required by the Nation?

This document seeks to provide pointers to key aspects of each of these, all of which may be important in any one event.

2.2.1. ICAO Emergency Response GuidanceAirport Emergency Planning ICAO Emergency Response Guidance provides a basis for the rapid response required in avoiding or reducing physical and financial loss which can result from a dangerous goods incident on board an aircraft. This 92 page publication provides guidance to States and operators for developing procedures and policies for dealing with dangerous goods incidents on board aircraft.

It contains general information on the factors that may need to be considered when dealing with any dangerous goods incident and provides specific emergency response drill codes for each item listed in the Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air.

The Emergency Response Guidance manual is a useful reference source for everyone involved in the transport chain i.e. shippers, forwarders, state authorities and carriers involved in transporting dangerous goods.

2.2.2. International Convention on Search and Rescue The International Conference on Maritime Search and Rescue, in April 1979, concerned the establishment of an international maritime search and rescue (SAR) plan covering the needs for ship reporting systems, SAR services and the rescue of persons in distress at sea. Included in the publication are: • Final Act of the Conference; • International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), 1979; • Resolutions adopted by the Conference. It includes amendments to the International Convention on SAR which were adopted by resolution MSC.155(78) in May 2004. These amendments came into force on 1 July 2006. If an aircraft came down in mid-ocean would this convention apply? Would become a maritime rescue?.

2.2.2.1. INTERNATIONAL AERONAUTICAL AND MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE MANUAL (IAMSA R Manual) Jointly published by IMO and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the three- volume IAMSAR Manual provides guidelines for a common aviation and maritime approach to organizing and providing search and rescue (SAR) services. Each volume can be used as a stand- alone document or, in conjunction with the other two volumes, as a means to attain a full view of the SAR system. The three volumes of the latest edition of the IAMSAR Manual came into force on 1 June 2008. These manuals are essential to guide the risk assessment in relation to maritime emergencies following the all-hazards approach. See TABLE XXX in section 3.5.

2.2.2.2. IAMSAR MANUAL, VOLUME I – Organization and Management

Volume I discusses the global SAR system concept, establishment and improvement of national and regional SAR systems and co-operation with neighbouring States to provide effective and economical SAR services.

2.2.2.3. IAMSAR MANUAL, VOLUME II – Mission Co-ordination

Volume II assists personnel who plan and co-ordinate SAR operations and exercises.

2.2.2.4. IAMSAR MANUAL, VOLUME III – Mobile Facilities

Volume III is intended to be carried aboard rescue units, aircraft and vessels to help with performance of a search, rescue or on-scene coordinator function, and with aspects of SAR that pertain to their own emergencies.

2.2.2.5. MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE ADMINISTRATION (Model course)

This course is intended to provide an introduction to the objectives, functions and operations of a maritime search and rescue (SAR) service. It covers the administrative and operational functions of a SAR service; the governing framework of conventions, manuals, resolutions, circulars and other relevant documents; communication functions and facilities; risk analysis and risk management; the design, equipment and operation of maritime rescue co-ordination centres; SAR facilities; harmonization with aeronautical SAR services; public relations and SAR training. 2.2.3. Radioactive Material Transport Emergency Preparedness and Response

The IAEA publishes safety standards related to the transport of radioactive material. TS-G-1.2 relates, in particular, to emergency preparedness and response for radioactive material in transport.

2.2.3.1. IAEA Emergency Preparedness and Response standards and guides One of the statutory functions of the IAEA is to establish or adopt standards of safety for the protection of health, life and property in the development and application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The IAEA’s safety standards are not legally binding in Member States but may be adopted by them, at their own discretion, for use in national regulations in respect of their own activities. The IAEA is authorized under its statutes: to provide for the application of its standards for the protection of health, life and property to peaceful nuclear activities; and to foster the exchange of information relating to nuclear activities. Moreover, under the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, one of the Agency’s functions is to collect and disseminate to States Parties and Member States information concerning relevant methodologies, techniques and available results of research relating to response to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies; and to develop appropriate radiation monitoring programmes and procedures. The IAEA fulfils these functions in part through publication of, amongst others, Safety Reports (SR), Technical Reports (TR), Technical Documents (TECDOC), and Accident Reports. There is a specific series for IAEA publications in the area of emergency preparedness and response - the EPR series. All these publications are informational in nature. They may describe good practices and give practical examples and detailed methods that can be used to meet safety standards. They do not establish requirements or make recommendations.

2.2.3.2. IAEA Safety Standard Series No.GS-R-2: Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiol ogical Emergency

The Safety Requirements publication establishes the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. Their implementation is intended to minimize the consequences for people, property and the environment of any nuclear or radiological emergency. Fulfilment of the requirements will also contribute to the harmonization of arrangements in the event of a transnational emergency. The requirements are intended to be applied by authorities at the national level by means of adopting legislation, establishing regulations and assigning responsibilities. The requirements also apply to the off-site jurisdictions that may need to make an emergency intervention in a State that adopts the requirements. The types of practices and sources covered by these requirements include the transport of radioactive material. The Safety requirements describe that the practical goals of emergency response, in a nuclear or radiological emergency, are: (a) To regain control of the situation;

(b) To prevent or mitigate consequences at the scene;

(c) To prevent the occurrence of deterministic health effects in workers and the public;

(d) To render first aid and to manage the treatment of radiation injuries;

(e) To prevent, to the extent practicable, the occurrence of stochastic health effects in the population;

(f) To prevent, to the extent practicable, the occurrence of non-radiological effects on individuals and among the population;

(g) To protect, to the extent practicable, property and the environment; (h) To prepare, to the extent practicable, for the resumption of normal social and economic activity.

Taking measures towards achieving these goals (undertaking interventions) is governed at all times by the principles established in the Safety Fundamentals publication on Radiation Protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources [2] and derived from the recommendations of the ICRP [4, 5]. These principles are: “Justification of intervention: Any proposed intervention shall do more good than harm.” “ Optimization of intervention: The form, scale and duration of any intervention shall be optimized so that the net benefit is maximized.” The goals of emergency response are most likely to be achieved in accordance with the principles for intervention by having a sound programme for emergency preparedness in place as part of the infrastructure for protection and safety [3]. Emergency preparedness also helps to build confidence that an emergency response would be managed, controlled and co-ordinated effectively. The practical goal of emergency preparedness may be expressed as: To ensure that arrangements are in place for a timely, managed, controlled, co-ordinated and effective response at the scene, and at the local, regional, national and international level, to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

2.2.3.3. IAEA Safety Guide No.GS-G-2.1: Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiologic al Emergency

The primary objectives of GS-G-2.1 are:  To provide guidance on those selected elements of the Requirements (GS-R-2) for which guidance has been requested by Member States and for which there is an international consensus on the means to meet these requirements;

 To describe appropriate responses to a range of emergencies;

 To provide background information, where appropriate, on the past experience that provided a basis for the Requirements (GS-R-2), thus helping the user to better implement arrangements that address the underlying issues.

The guidance presented in GS-G-2.1 concerns emergency preparedness for a nuclear or radiological emergency. The range of possible nuclear or radiological emergencies of concern is enormous, extending from a general emergency at a nuclear power plant to emergencies involving lost, stolen or found radioactive material. The guidance presented is applicable to the entire range of emergencies, concentrated on the general aspects of emergency preparedness.

2.2.3.4. IAEA Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) series The IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) has produced the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) series. The documents are intended to provide Member States with practical guidance, and operational procedures that can be used to implement emergency response arrangements for all types of radiological and nuclear incidents and emergencies, including those associated with the transport of radioactive materials. Following are descriptions of those documents within this series that are relevant to the planning and response to transport accidents involving radioactive or nuclear materials. Relevant sections of these documents are referenced in Section 4 which describes the response to such an accident.

EPR-Method 2003

This publication provides a practical, step-by-step method for developing integrated operator, local and national capabilities for emergency response. This publication concerns preparations for radiation emergencies. The range of potential radiation emergencies of concern is enormous, extending from a major reactor emergency to emergencies involving lost or stolen radioactive material. This method covers planning for the entire range.

The method recognizes that a minimum level of preparedness is appropriate in every State, even in those without any known practices using nuclear or radioactive material, because any State could be affected by an emergency involving transport, lost or stolen sources, or trans boundary contamination.

EPR-First Responders 2006

The objective of EPR-First responders 2006 is to provide practical guidance for those responding within the first few hours of a radiological emergency. This includes the emergency service personnel who would initially respond at the local level and the national officials who would support this early response.

The publication provides guidance to the emergency services responding to radiological emergencies. EPR-First Responders 2006 is consistent with the Safety Requirements No. GS-R-2 and the concepts contained in EPR- Method 2003.

EPR-Field Manual 201X

The first responders, who would be the first to arrive on the scene of a radiological emergency, are not expected to have expertise or experience in radiation protection. If required, the local first responders would request and receive pre-planned support in the form of one or more radiation specialists provided by the national (or local) government. These radiation specialists would have the capability of assessing radiological conditions and mitigating the radiological consequences in accordance with international standards. In EPR-Field Manual 201X the radiation specialists include a national radiological assessor (RA), who would direct the radiological response and could be supported by a national radiological assessment and control team (RACT). This Field Manual provides guidance for those functions that should be performed early by the RA/RACT.

This Field Manual builds upon information in EPR-First Responders 2006 and refers to the data and instructions in EPR-Data Manual 201X. The users of EPR-Field Manual 201X are expected to be familiar with these manuals and have access to them during the response.

EPR-Field Manual 201X will be most effective if the manual is used as the basis for a national or local version that takes into account the specifics of such jurisdictions. However, it is recognized that for various reasons, the manual may not be adapted and therefore it has been designed to enable its use directly as written.

The radiological emergencies covered by this manual include transport emergencies involving radioactive material. EPR-Data Assessment 201X The manual is for use by national radiation specialists to assess data that should be available early on in the response to a radiological emergency in order to adjust the criteria being used to make response decisions and to estimate the dose to individuals in order to determine if medical evaluation and treatment are needed. EPR-Data Assessment 201X provides easy to use methods to estimate the dose received based on information that should be available early in an emergency for the purpose of determine who should receive a medical evaluation or treatment.

EPR-Medical 2005

The aim of EPR-Medical 2005 is to provide practical guidance to the medical community for medical emergency preparedness and response, describing the tasks and actions of different members of an emergency medical response organization within the national, regional or local medical infrastructure and in accordance with international guidance.

This manual provides generic response procedures for medical personnel responding to different types of radiation emergencies. The manual covers procedures of medical response applicable during radiation emergencies involving the transport of radioactive material.

The manual provides the tools, generic procedures, and data needed for initial medical response to radiation emergencies. It explains the roles and responsibilities of the members of the emergency medical response organization within the general response organization. 3. Transport of radioactive materials by air

Again do we need a section defining air transport in the scope of the document?

3.1. Types of material carried by air

There are many different types of radioactive material that may be carried by air, and they come from many different origins. They can be loosely categorized into the following types: . Radiopharmaceuticals . Industrial isotopes . Excepted packages . Fresh nuclear fuel and uranium compounds . Low specific activity and surface contaminated objects

Medical radioisotopes are extensively used around the world for the diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions. However, a feature of medical isotopes is that their short half-life requires rapid transport from manufacture to patient application. As a result they are most frequently transported by air. For example, Technetium-99m is used nearly every second in some 30 million medical imaging procedures a year, making it the most extensively used diagnostic medical isotope. Its use is seen growing three to five percent annually, especially in countries looking to expand their health care infrastructure. It affords doctors high-quality images, mapping, for example, blood flow to the heart, or the spread of cancer to bones, while delivering only low radiation doses to patients. Given its rapid rate of radioactive decay, Molybdenum-99 must be produced and distributed to hospitals every week to satisfy worldwide demand. Radioisotopes are used by many industries around the world including, for example, the offshore oil industry and in the radiographic examination of welds and castings. Air transport of industrial sealed radioactive sources is frequent and widespread. Most will be carried in competent authority approved packages. Identifying the package approval numbers provides good information for the largest of these sources. The primary risk from the sealed sources is direct radiation - airborne or surface contamination is less likely to be a significant hazard. Fuller details of these materials are included in Annex B.

3.2. Design, approval and survivability of packages

Radioactive materials are transported in packages designed to meet the regulatory requirements. The Regulations identify packages; for each type of package the Regulations specify the limit on the permitted quantity of radioactive material. A graded approach is applied.

3.2.1. Content limits for packages  Excepted packages:

o The quantity of the content is very limited and should be within regulatory limits.

 Industrial Package (IP) Type 1/2/3:

o Radioactive materials with a low specific activity as specified in the Regulations and non-radioactive materials with their surfaces contaminated with radioactive materials within the limits specified in the Regulations.

 Type A packages:

o Radioactive materials with activity not exceeding A1 / A2.

 Type B(U) / (M) packages:

o Radioactive materials with activity exceeding A1 / A2. For air transport, the activity shall not exceed: for low dispersible radioactive material - the activity authorized in the package design certificate; for special form material – 3,000 A1 or 100,000 A2 whichever is lower; for all other material - 3,000 A2.

o Type B(U)/(M) packagings are designed to be sturdy and “accident-resistant”.

 Type C packages:

o Radioactive materials with activity limit approved by competent authority, mainly important in air transport.

o Type C packagings are designed to be sturdy and “accident-resistant” including the more severe impact, thermal and other types of forces that might be encountered in an air transport accident.

3.2.2. Design requirements for excepted packages

The package design should comply with the requirements specified below. This sets out a basic level for all packages.

Handling and tie-down features

It should be easy to handle and transport the package.

Any lifting attachments on the package should not fail when used in the intended manner. Even if the lifting attachments fail, the package should continue to meet the other regulatory requirements. The design should include appropriate safety factors to cover snatch lifting.

It should be possible to properly secure the package in or on the conveyance during transport. External features

Attachments and any other features on the outer surface of the package which could be used to lift it should be able to safely support its mass without failure. Alternatively such attachments could be removable or otherwise rendered incapable of being used during transport.

The external surfaces should be free from protruding features.

It should be easy to decontaminate the external surface of the package.

The outer layer of the package should prevent the collection and the retention of water.

If any features which are not part of the package are added to the package at the time of transport they should not reduce the safety of the package.

Under routine conditions of transport the package may experience acceleration, vibration or vibration resonance. There should be no deterioration in the containment of the radioactive material nor in the integrity of the package as a whole. In particular, nuts, bolts and other securing devices should not become loose or be released unintentionally, even after repeated use.

Other features

The materials of the packaging and any components or structures should be physically and chemically compatible with each other and with the radioactive contents. Account should be taken of their behaviour under irradiation.

All valves through which the radioactive contents could escape should be protected against unauthorized operation.

The package should remain intact under the ambient temperatures and pressures that are likely to be encountered in routine conditions of transport.

For radioactive material having other dangerous properties the package design should satisfy the relevant regulations.

3.2.3. Design Requirements for Industrial packages Type IP-1

a) A Type IP-1 package should be designed to meet the requirements prescribed for excepted packages.

b) The smallest overall external dimension of the package should not be less than 10 cm.

a) A package to be qualified as a Type IP-2 should be designed to meet the requirements prescribed for Type IP-1.

b) It should comply with the requirements of the free drop test and the stacking test.

A package to be qualified as a Type IP-3 should be designed to meet the requirements prescribed for Type IP-1 and, in addition, the following requirements:

General The design and manufacturing techniques should be in accordance with national or international standards, or other requirements, acceptable to the competent authority. A feature such as a seal should be provided on the exterior of the package. The seal should not be readily breakable. While intact, it will be evidence that the package has not been opened. Under normal and accident conditions of transport the forces on the tie-down attachments on the package should not impair the ability of the package to meet the Regulatory requirements.

Package components

The components of the package should withstand temperatures ranging from –40°C to +70°C. The freezing temperatures for liquids and the potential degradation of packaging materials within the given temperature range should be taken into consideration.

Containment integrity

The containment system should be securely closed by a positive fastening device which cannot be opened unintentionally or by a pressure which might arise within the package. The containment system should retain its radioactive contents under a reduction of ambient pressure to 60 kPa. All valves, other than pressure relief valves, should be provided with an enclosure to retain any leakage from the valve. If the package is intended for the transport of liquid radioactive material it should have provision for ullage to accommodate variations in the temperature of the contents, dynamic effects and filling dynamics.

Shielding integrity

If the radiation shield encloses a component of the containment system it should prevent the unintentional release of that component from the shield.

Test requirements

The package should comply with the Type A requirements of water spray test, free drop test, stacking test and penetration test (see below).

3.2.6. Alternative requirements for Type IP-2 and Type IP-3

Packages may be used as Type IP-2 or Type IP-3 if they follow certain alternative requirements related to:

1. the United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations; or

2. the International Organization for Standardization document ISO 1496/1: “Series 1 Freight Containers — Specifications and Testing — Part 1: General Cargo Containers for General Purposes” excluding dimensions and ratings;

3. as well as alternative tests.

3.2.7. Design requirements of Type A packages

Type A packages should be designed to meet the requirements prescribed for Type IP-3 package. Note that the alternative design requirements for Type IP-3 package are not relevant to a Type A package.

The package should comply with the requirements of water spray test, free drop test, stacking test and penetration test. If a Type A package is designed to contain liquid radioactive material it should comply with the requirements of additional tests for Type A packages designed for liquids and gases prescribed in the Regulations and be provided with either:

- sufficient absorbent material to absorb twice the volume of the liquid contents; or

- a double containment system.

If a Type A package is designed to contain gases it should be subjected to additional tests for Type A packages designed for liquids and gases.

3.2.8. Design requirements for Type B(U) Packages

Type B(U) packages should be designed to meet the requirements specified for Type A packages. The additional tests for Type A packages designed for liquids and gases prescribed in the Regulations do not apply to Type B(U) packages.

Under an assumed ambient temperature of 38°C and a specified solar heat input the heat generated within the package by the radioactive contents should not, under normal conditions of transport impair the containment integrity and the shielding integrity of the package.

The package design should provide for the possible effects of the heat. If the package is not to be transported under exclusive use, the temperature of the accessible surfaces of a package should not exceed 50°C. This temperature estimate should be made assuming an ambient temperature of 38°C. Solar heat input should be ignored.

If the package is to be transported under exclusive use, the maximum temperature of any surface readily accessible should not exceed 85°C. The package design may include barriers or screens which are intended to give protection to persons. Credit should be given to the presence of such barriers and screens. The barriers or screens need not be subjected to any test.

The package should comply with the requirements of water spray test, free drop test, stacking test, the penetration test and with the requirements of the tests for demonstrating ability to withstand accident conditions of transport.

The acceptance criteria following the tests are prescribed in terms of the permitted limits of activity release.

The package design should not include a pressure relief system from the containment system which would allow the release of radioactive material to the environment during transport.

The package should not have a maximum normal operating pressure in excess of a gauge pressure of 700 kPa.

The package should be designed for an ambient temperature range from -40°C to +38°C.

3.2.9. Design requirements for Type B(M) Packages

Type B(M) packages should meet the requirements for Type B(U) packages. However, for packages to be transported solely within a specified country or solely between specified countries, some of the conditions assumed in the design may be different from those prescribed in the Regulations with the approval of the competent authorities of these countries.

Intermittent venting of Type B(M) packages may be permitted during transport (but is not common), provided that the operational controls for venting are acceptable to the relevant competent authorities. 3.2.10. Design requirements for Type C Packages

Type C packages are designed to survive tests which simulate an air accident, including the more severe impact, thermal and puncture/tearing forces that might be experienced in an air accident.

3.3. Test requirements for packages

3.3.1. Preparation of a specimen for testing

All specimens should be inspected before testing in order to identify and record faults or damage. The external features of the specimen should be clearly identified. This will help in making clear reference to any part of the specimen.

3.3.2. Tests for IP-2, IP-3 and Type A packages

Tests for demonstrating ability to withstand normal conditions of transport

The tests prescribed by the Regulations to demonstrate the ability of the package to withstand normal conditions of transport are the water spray test, the free drop test, the stacking test and the penetration test. Specimens of the package should be subjected to the free drop test, the stacking test and the penetration test, preceded in each case by the water spray test.

Water spray test

The specimen should be subjected to a water spray test that simulates exposure to rainfall of approximately 5 cm per hour for at least one hour.

Free drop test

The specimen should drop onto the target so as to suffer maximum damage in respect of the safety features to be tested. The height of drop would depend on the mass of the specimen. The target should be unyielding.

For rectangular fibreboard or cylindrical fibreboard packages or wood packages additional drops may be required.

Free drop distance for testing packages to normal conditions of transport

Package mass (kg) Free drop distance (m)

Package mass < 5000 1.2

5000 < Package mass < 10, 000 0.9

10000 < Package mass < 15, 000 0.6

15000 < Package mass 0.3

Stacking test Unless the shape of the packaging effectively prevents stacking, the specimen should be subjected, for a period of 24 h, to a compressive load. The value of the load should be the greater of the following:

- 5 times the maximum weight of the package; and

- The equivalent of 13 kPa multiplied by the vertically projected area of the package.

Penetration test

A bar of diameter 3.2 cm, with a mass of 6 kg should be dropped 1m onto the centre of the weakest part of the specimen.

Acceptance criteria for IP-2, IP-2 and Type A packages: (i) There should be no loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents; and (ii) the increase in the maximum radiation level at any external surface of the package should not be more than a 20%.

3.3.3. Tests for Type B(U) / (M) packages

3.3.3.1. Tests for demonstrating ability to withstand normal conditions of transport

The package should comply with the requirements of water spray test, free drop test, stacking test and penetration test.

–6 Acceptance criteria: The loss of radioactive contents should not be more than 10 A2 per hour.

3.3.3.2. Tests for demonstrating ability to withstand accident conditions of transport

The specimen should be subjected to the cumulative effects of the mechanical test and the thermal test in that order. Following these tests, either this specimen or a separate specimen should be subjected to the water immersion test or the enhanced water immersion test, as applicable.

 Mechanical test

The mechanical test consists of three different drop tests. Only two of the three drop tests would apply to a given package design.

o__Drop I test

The specimen should drop from a height of 9 m onto the target. The objective of the test is to cause maximum damage to the specimen.

o__Drop II

The specimen should drop from a height of 1 m onto a15cm diameter, 20cm long solid mild steel bar rigidly mounted perpendicularly on the target. The objective of the test is to cause maximum damage to the specimen.

o__Drop III

The specimen should be positioned on the target so as to suffer maximum damage by the drop of a 500 kg mass solid mild steel 1 m by 1 m plate from 9 m onto the specimen.

 Thermal test The thermal test should consist of: exposure of a specimen to a thermal environment of an average temperature of at least 800°C for a period of 30 minutes.. During and following the test the specimen should not be artificially cooled and any combustion of materials of the specimen should be permitted to proceed naturally.

 Water immersion test

The specimen should be immersed under a head of water of at least 15 m. The period of immersion should not be less than eight hours. Alternatively, the specimen may be subjected to an external gauge pressure of at least 150 kPa.

 Enhanced water immersion test

5 This test will apply only to packages designed for a radioactive content of activity more than 10 A2.

The specimen should be immersed under a head of water of at least 200 m. The period of immersion should not be less than one hour. Alternatively, the specimen may be subjected to an external gauge pressure of at least 2 MPa.

Acceptance criteria:

The radiation level at 1 m from the surface of the package should not exceed 10 mSv/h with the maximum radioactive contents that the package is designed to contain.

The accumulated loss of radioactive contents in a period of one week should not be more than A2 for most radionuclides..

Following the enhanced water immersion test there should be no rupture of the containment system.

3.3.4. Tests for Type C packages

A Type C package is required to be assessed for its response to the water spray test, the free drop test, the stacking test, the penetration test, the mechanical test, the thermal test, water immersion test, enhanced water immersion test, if applicable and also the drop I test, the drop III test and

 puncture/tearing test which impacts the package with a mild steel puncture probe (either dropping the probe on the package or dropping the package on the probe, depending on the mass of the package)

 enhanced thermal test of 800°C for 60 minutes

 impact test of 90 m/s onto an unyielding target in the most damaging orientation

Acceptance criteria:

(i) The radiation level at 1 m from the surface of the package should not exceed 10 mSv/h with the maximum radioactive contents which the package is designed to contain; and

(ii) the accumulated loss of radioactive contents in a period of one week should not be more than A 2 for most radionuclides.

3.3.5. Requirement for design approval certificates

3.3.5.1. Unilateral approval of design of special form radioactive material The special form radioactive material design, either as an indispersible solid or as a sealed capsule or sealed source, requires unilateral Competent Authority approval. Unilateral approval of a design of special form radioactive material means that the approval is required to be issued by the Competent Authority of the country of origin of the design only.

3.3.5.2. Multilateral approval of low dispersible radioactive material

The design for LDM requires multilateral approval. In this context, multilateral approval means approval issued by the concerned competent authority of the country of origin of the design, and also, approval by the competent authority of the country through or into which the consignment is to be transported.

3.3.5.3. Approval of Type B(U) and Type C package designs

The design of a Type B(U) package and of a Type C package require unilateral approval, except that a Type B(U) package design for the transport of low dispersible radioactive material requires multilateral approval.

3.3.5.4. Approval of Type B(M) package designs

Each Type B(M) package design would require multilateral approval.

3.3.5.5. Approval of other designs

There is no need to obtain the competent authority approval in the case of LSA-III radioactive material.

There is no need to obtain the competent authority approval in the case of Type IP-1/2/3 or a Type A package designed for a non-fissile or fissile-excepted radioactive material.

3.4. Types of events that may occur on an aircraft

There are many different types of accidents in an air transport environment that can involve Class 7 Cargo. The emergency planner needs to be cognizant of the different types of accidents so that contingency plans can be developed for these very unlikely events.

3.4.1. Types of aircraft accidents considered

Although air travel is one of the safest forms of transportation, accidents do happen with dramatic and terrifying results. The causes of these aviation accidents vary greatly depending on specific circumstances and problems that may develop during the flight process.

Descent and landing accidents, taxi and takeoff mishaps, mechanical failures, pilot errors, fuel mismanagement, and poor weather are only some of the many plights that can lead to aviation accidents.

Do these need expanding??

3.4.2. Consequences The consequences of an air event involving class 7 cargo are the total of the health impacts, psychosocial impacts and economic impacts. The following paragraphs examine each of these aspects. It should be noted that the guidance in the document is outside the scope of dealing with psychosocial and economic impacts; however, these aspects are important to planners and decision makers.

3.4.2.1. Health Impacts

The likelihood that any event leads to a significant radiological health risk is very low. However, if radioactive cargo is known or suspected to be present, precautions should be taken to identify any release of material or increases in radiation levels.

Excepted, IP and Type A packages contain limited radioactivity. While they may not retain their shielding and containment integrity as the result of an aircraft accident, the potential consequences of a release or loss of shielding are limited.

Type B containers are likely to retain their radioactive contents and shielding and are limited in the amount of radioactivity they can be used to transport on an aircraft.

Type C packages are expected to retain their containment and shielding integrity even in the event of a severe aircraft accident.

3.4.2.2. Psychosocial impacts

Psychosocial effects can manifest both in those involved in the event and society in general. What this means is that after an event occurs, depending on the scale and situation, those involved may experience psychological effects such as post-traumatic stress and other issues relating to fear of the unknown surrounding their exposure to radiation. Society as a whole may react with manifested fear seen as a sharp increase in worried well at hospitals and increased paranoia that another event or something worse may occur.

The psychosocial impacts for an air transport accident are deemed to be proportional to the distance from the population. If an event happens in an airport or in a highly populated area, then the impact would be higher than if the event happens at sea away from the population.

3.4.2.3. Economic impacts

Economic impact is composed of two criteria: recovery cost and lost revenue. Recovery cost is the cost incurred to recover from the event, including repair costs, replacement costs, real estate and clean-up costs. Lost revenue considers the revenue lost during the emergency and recovery phases of the event.

The economic cost would be far greater if there were a radioactive transport event in an airport or on land than for an event at sea. This is due to the impact on real estate and lost revenue for the area affected.

3.4.3. Overall risk

The overall likelihood of an event combined with the consequence of that event is the risk associated with the event. For air transport accidents involving class 7 cargo, the likelihood of an initiating event leading to class 7 cargo damage is very small and the postulated consequences are low thus giving an overall very low risk for the activity. It is not deemed necessary to have detailed plans for these types of emergencies. In general, an all hazards approach that is modified to consider some of the unique hazards of the cargo would be sufficient for most purposes. 3.5. Potential consequences following accidents involving radioactive packages (se e TSG-1.2)

Practice Threat summary Typical IAMSAR IAMSAR level IAMSAR IAEA Risk consequence threat category category

Excepted These shipments contain None D 1 Low packages only minor amounts of radioactive materials. There UN 2910 is no risk of any radiological UN 2911 consequences requiring special protective actions. UN 2909 Ground contamination resulting from the UN 2908 emergency, may require UN 3507 decontamination.

Industrial These packages contain None D 1 Low packages only qualified “low specific activity” materials or UN 2912 qualified “surface UN 3321 contaminated objects”. Urgent GILs may be UN 3322 exceeded, however, in the vicinity of a damaged UN 2913 package, since industrial packages are not designed to survive accidents and the only external radiation limit on the unshielded but qualified contents is 10mSv/h at a distance of 3m. Ground contamination resulting from the emergency may require decontamination.

Type A The activity allowed for None or E 1 Low packages Type A packages limits the IV59 UN 2915 radiological hazard. Doses in excess of urgent GILs are UN 3332 possible beyond the immediate vicinity of the

package. Ground contamination resulting from the emergency may require decontamination.

Type B Type B packages will None or F 3 Low packages normally contain large IV59 amounts of radioactive [B (U) and B material. Type B packages (M)] have been designed to UN 2916 withstand all credible land and sea transport accidents. UN 2917 The radioactive content of a Type B package shipped by air is restricted. For materials that have been certified as “low dispersible radioactive material”, the limit is as authorized by the Competent Authority for the package design. For other material, if it is special form, 3000 A1 or 100 000 A2 [24], whichever is the lower, or if it is other than special form, 3000 A2. Doses in excess of the urgent GILs are considered possible in an air accident but not credible in land or surface mode transport. However, in the event of an emergency, this should be confirmed by monitoring.

Do we need a section on an aircraft braking breaking up mid air where the radioactive material is dispersed over a wide area? RRR note: Rather, perhaps we should add some text describing the results of the CRP on air transport (TECDOC 702) which, in part, led to the Type C package requirements.

3.6. Office of Legal Affairs

Needs to be completed. 4. Emergency response to transport accidents on aircraft carrying radio active materials

This chapter deals with the response to an air transport accident involving class 7 cargo. The intent is to give planners and responders guidance on how to respond to such an emergency. An Action Guide describing the emergency response to a transport accident is presented in EPR Method 2003 (page 160). The fundamental response to an air transport accident is very similar to a response for a land transport event. For these reasons, many of the responses suggested below borrow heavily from what has already been written in other IAEA and ICAO documents. Where necessary, amplification for the air environment has been given. However reference should be made to ICAO “Airport Emergency Planning” “The Emergency Response Guidance for Aircraft Incidents Involving Dangerous Goods” (ICAO Doc.9481) Generic/basic monitoring equipment to be specified.(?)

4.1. Emergency Response Objectives for Air Emergencies

The main objective of the response is to save lives and mitigate the effects of the accident on property and the environment. In responding to transport accidents involving radioactive material the main actions to be taken are to:  Rescue and provide emergency medical aid to any victims,  Control fires and the other common consequences of transport accidents,  Identify the hazards of the material involved,  Control any radiation hazard and prevent the spread of radioactive contamination,  Recover the package or packages and transport vehicle,  Decontaminate personnel,  Decontaminate and restore the thoroughfare and delineate the borders of other contaminated areas,  Decontaminate in the vicinity and restore to a safe state.

In addition to the objectives related to the response there may be further objectives which are more related to the desires of the public in the state. These should not be underestimated. The risk to life may, in fact be vanishingly small, while the demands of society on a government to demonstrate effective control may be high. These considerations should be factored into local, regional and national plans.

4.2. Response phases

The response actions in any accident can be divided into three phases:

 The initial phase  The accident control phase  The post-emergency phase

4.3. In airport response versus in route response (This is where we need clarificatio n on what do we mean by aircraft incidents)

There are two likely accident locations: at an airport or in route (assuming a crash scene would be included in the land mode response). Some of these considerations are outlined in Table 1.

Table 1: Response considerations based on location of event

AT AIRPORT OR NEAR A POPULATION CENTRE IN ROUTE

Good - more response assets potentially - for accident at sea or in a remote Points available location, negligible health impact - easier to evacuate crew to the public - can potentially move the aircraft to an area away from the population centre Bad - psycho-social and economic impacts - fewer response assets potentially points may be significant available - difficult to evacuate crew - nothing can be done to help the aircrew

4.4. Generic response

If the incident is at an airport, the airport’s response team would deal with the situation initially. If the response is at a crash scene the land mode response would take control. If an emergency occurs in flight, there may not be a great deal of advice except to land at the nearest airport.

Figure needs to be made applicable to air transport emergency. 4.5. The initial phase

Information from the aircraft will depend on the nature of the event and on its progression. Some information will remain constant, while other information may change as the event progresses. The information available from the aircraft may range from none at all through to extensive information.

4.5.1. Initial notification, confirmation and assessment The objective of this activity is to promptly identify an accident and initiate an appropriate response. It is critical that the initial notification of an air emergency be correctly received and confirmed so that an initial assessment of severity can be made and appropriate resources can be dispatched to deal with the emergency. Once the air traffic controller has been notified of a radiological problem consider the information in instruction 22 of EPR-Field Manual 201X. Should an overview of this be included to allow the reader to understand the scope required?

4.5.2. Continual assessment

Once the rapid and detailed assessments are completed, it is important to continually update the information as the event develops.

4.6. The accident control phase

A lack of initial information should not delay the response to an emergency. It is therefore important to:  Implement an all hazards approach during the initial response  Ensure that fundamental emergency response objectives and procedures are implemented  Obtain valid information as soon as is practical.

As more information becomes available, the Emergency Controller and/or Incident Commander can modify the response to meet the actual hazards present. The generic accident response for a transport emergency is given in Method 2003 Appendix 7 (page 160). What follows is additional guidance that is specific to the marine environment.

4.6.1. Fires/explosion response

The response to a fire or explosion involving a radioactive source is well documented in EPR First Responders 2006. Planners should refer to this document for guidance on responding to these types of events.

4.6.2. Treating the injured

Medical treatment of injured personnel should not be delayed even if radiation exposure or contamination is suspected. If it is known that casualties have been exposed and/or contaminated then assess and manage appropriately. The treatment of injured people at a potential radiological event is well documented in EPR- Medical 2005i. Planners should refer to this document for guidance on responding to these types of events. Evacuation of injured personnel may not be readily available for accidents that occur at sea. In this case, consideration must be made to shelter the injured appropriately until such a time as they can be moved ashore.

4.6.3. Assessing the integrity of class 7 shipping containers or packages

Saving lives, suppressing fires and dealing with flammable, explosive and toxic materials should generally take priority before any assessment of package integrity can or should be made. A visual inspection of the cargo may indicate whether the shipping containers or packages have been damaged. The presence of fire, smoke and fumes could preclude an initial determination in this regard. External damage to a container or package of radioactive material does not necessarily mean that the interior packaging components have been breached. Leaking liquids, gases or powders may indicate that package integrity has been compromised. However, integrity may have failed with no visible indication. Table III of TS-G-1.2 (ST-3) may be used to determine if the package is damaged. Further determination of failed packaging or breaches in integrity may require expert investigation.

4.6.4. Action for damaged packaging

If class 7 packaging is damaged then experts should be consulted Should we give some note as to who / what would be considered as “experts”, and are we talking about “medical” experts or something else?. In the meantime, personnel should be removed from the immediate area IAW guidance given in Appendix 5 (Table A5) in the EPR Method 2003 (Table 14 in EPR-Field Manual 201X). Radiation control areas can be set up in accordance with Instruction 15 (Radiation Control Area Access Management) of EPR-Field Manual 201X.

4.6.5. Mitigate release/spill and start environmental monitoring

Personnel should be removed from the immediate area IAW guidance given in Appendix 5 (Table A5) in the EPR Method 2003 (Table 14 in EPR-Field Manual 201X). In the airport refer to specific airport EPR Start environmental monitoring in accordance with RACT-Action Guide 3: Environmental Monitoring and Sampling (EPR-Field Manual 201X)

4.6.6. Assess and manage exposed and/or contaminated people

Assessment of exposure may be made by using Table 16 of EPR-Field Manual 201X (Indicators of Possible Serious Overexposures Calling For Medical Action) If contamination is present then decontamination may be conducted in accordance with the guidelines in Table 14 of EPR-Field Manual 201X (Public and Emergency Worker Decontamination). Manage medical treatment in accordance with RACT-Action Guide 8: Medical Support (EPR- Field Manual 201X). The treatment of exposed and/or contaminated people at a potential radiological event is well documented in EPR-Medical 2005ii. Planners should refer to this document for guidance on responding to these types of events.

4.7. The Post-emergency phase

The accident control phase can be terminated once the objectives in paragraph 5.1 of TS-G-1.2 (ST-3) have been completed. In addition to these actions it would be prudent to have assurances that:  there will be no release of radioactive substances to the environment or that the release of radioactive substances to the environment has stopped and no further releases/spills are expected;  the source of radiation is in a stable condition and that shielding is intact or has been re-established; or  there is no known risk of fire or explosion that directly threatens class 7 cargo. Consider enacting a Recovery Working Group as per RACT – Action Guide 11 in EPR-Field Manual 201X.

4.8. Action levels Needs completing. i IAEA EPR-2005 Medical - Generic procedures for medical response during a nuclear or radiological emergency ii IAEA EPR-2005 Medical - Generic procedures for medical response during a nuclear or radiological emergency