Turkish Cypriots Stance Toward the Membership to Eu

TURKISH CYPRIOTS’ STANCE TOWARD THE MEMBERSHIP TO EU “EC membership of Cyprus will not be considered until the Cyprus question has been settled” Rauf Denktaş, TRNC President1 “Cyprus has a vocation to join the EU. But the EU does not have a vocation to take in a peace of Cyprus and to take in problems that are not its own” Jacques Chirac, French President2 1. Introduction The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has always made it known that, in accordance with the 1960 international Treaties which established the Republic of Cyprus (RC), and particularly the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, the Greek Cypriot Administration in the South can not apply for membership of Cyprus in the European Union under the usurped title of the “Republic of Cyprus” and cannot become a member of any international organization, economic and political union of which both Turkey and Greece are not members. The Turkish position on the EU membership of Cyprus is reflected in the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 20 January 1997 in Ankara which states that: "The Turkish side will consider the start of accession negotiation between the Greek Cypriot administration and the EU, based on the unilateral application of the Greek Cypriot side for full membership in contravention of international law, as the complete abolition of the framework and parameters for a solution which have emerged during the negotiating process in Cyprus. Each and every unilateral step to be taken by the Greek Cypriot Administration towards the EU membership will accelerate the integration process between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"3. The Turkish Cypriot side has strongly objected to the applications made by the Greek Cypriot side on behalf of Cyprus. The main Turkish Cypriot objections may be summarised as follows:

1. Cyprus is a bi-communal country. One of these communities cannot apply on behalf of Cyprus, or indeed ‘the Republic of

1 Cyprus News, vol. V, no. 3, April 1989, p.16. 2 The Washington Times, 3 January 1998, p.7. 3 www.kibris.gen.tr Cyprus’, for membership of the Union. The consent of both communities is essential for Cyprus to become a member of the European Union, and this is not possible until a mutually acceptable settlement is reached. The Greek Cypriot application therefore constitutes an act of mispresentation, because the Greek Cypriot side has held itself out as representing the whole of Cyprus, and as being the only community entitled to self- determination, whereas both communities, as peoples, have this right4.

2. Membership of the Union would involve a degree of participation by the Union in the affairs of Cyprus which is impracticable in the circumstance prevailing in Cyprus, pending a mutually acceptable settlement. The European Union cannot accept Cyprus as a member because the island is divided into two parts, each of which has its own exclusive government. Membership would entail free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital, which under the circumstances, would be impossible or impracticable5. Besides, Turkish Cypriot concerns of underrepresentation in European Union organs is a deeper issue. Without Turkey being a member of the European Union as a guarantor state it is not advantageous for Cypriot Turks to continue their status of being an equal partner in a “would-be federation/confederation” of Cyprus. 2. International Law Perspective Turkish side claims that the Cypriot Greek government is not a legitimate government according to 1960 Constitution. It cannot represent either the whole island or is it eligible to make decisions on behalf of Turkish Cypriots. Consequently, it does not possess any legal capacity for membership application for all of Cyprus because in the institutions of the European Union, member states can only be represented by institutions of theirs, legitimized to this end. Only institutions that were founded, exist and act in accordance with the constitution of the member state may be regarded as legitimate according to EU organizational law. There are no such institutions of a Republic of Cyprus or of "Cyprus"6. If the 1960 Constitution is considered legally valid, then the consent and the vetoing right of the Turkish side derived from the constitution must be accepted.

4 M. Tamkoç, The Turkish Cypriot State (London, 1988), 49. 5 Z. M. Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, (New York, 1998), 343-4. 6 www.kibris.gen.tr Guarantorship Agreements prevents any membership of the Greek side to any political or economic Union to which both motherlands (namely Greece and Turkey) do not belong7. The first concerned is the second article of Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee, Article 1 reads as follows: The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. With this intent it prohibits all activity tending to promote directly or indirectly either union or partition of the Island (constitution). Article 8 provides that “The President and the Vice-President, separately and conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organizations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate, or concerning defence and security as defined in Annex I.” The grammatical structure of this provision is somewhat peculiar, and some clarification can be obtained by comparing it with the French text of the draft Basic Structure in the Zurich Agreement; “Le Président et le Vice-Président auront séparément et conjointement le droit de veto définitif sur toute loi ou décision se référant aux affaires étrangéres sauf la participation de la République de Chypre à des organisations internationales et pactes d’alliance dont la Gréce et la Turquie font toutes deux parties, à la défense et à la sécurité telles que définies dans l’annexe I.” This confirms that the Vice-President (as well as the President) is to have the power of veto over all the questions of foreign affairs except the participation of Cyprus in international organizations in which both Turkey and Greece are members. In other words, he retains his veto over membership of organizations in which only one of the two States is a member-which, of course, includes the European Union8. The European Commission handed down a favourable opinion on 30 June 1993. In its opinion, the Commission referred to the challenge to the application by the “de facto authorities of the northern part of the island.” It went on: “These authorities rejected the right of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to speak for the whole of Cyprus in such an approach. They based their position on the Guarantee Treaty and the wording of the 1960 Constitution, which grants the President and Vice President (a Turkish Cypriot) a veto over any foreign policy decision, particularly any decision on joining an international organisation or alliance that does not count both Greece and Turkey among its

7 S. Ismail, Egemenlik, Avrupa Birliği ve KKTC, (Lefkoşa, 1998), 29. 8 M. H. Mendelson, EU and Cyprus: An Expert View, (1997), 6. members. They consider, accordingly, that in the prevailing circumstances the Community should not take any action on the application.” The Commission dismissed these arguments by stating that; “The Community (not Union, then), however, following the logic of its established position, which is consistent with that of the United Nations where the legitimacy of the government of the Republic of Cyprus and non-recognition of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ are concerned, felt that the application was admissible9.” There is no proper analysis of the TRNC’s argument, so it is unclear what exactly is the “logic of the Community’s established position”. What the Commission seems to have meant was that, having adopted a policy of non- recognition of the TRNC, it had to recognize the Nicosia authorities as alone entitled to represent the RC. Be that as it may, it appears, however, that the Commission’s main concern at this time was whether Cyprus met the European Community’s own requirements for membership, not whether there were any impediments to membership under the Treaties establishing the Republic, or the Republic’s own Constitution10. A very important provision in this regard is Article I(2) of the Treaty of Guarantee, by which “(The Republic of Cyprus) undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited all activity- likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other States or partition of the Island.” This language is certainly wide enough to cover the accession of the RC to the EU. Firstly, membership to the EU would amount to participation in whole, let alone in part, in an economic union. Secondly, to the extent that the EU also constitutes a political union, this part of the undertaking would also be infringed. Thirdly, membership would also be “likely to promote, directly or indirectly, union with” Greece. The very name of the organization, the European Union, bears out the fact that it is about union between the members. It might perhaps be objected that the text uses the singular “any State” in two places, whereas the union in question would be with States. However, such an objection would be unfounded. Admittedly, what the framers were particularly concerned about was union with either Greece or Turkey -single States. Nevertheless, as a matter of drafting and the ordinary use of the English (and French) language, the singular usually includes the plural and “any State (whatsoever)”. This interpretation also accords with common sense. We can

9 Ibid., 33. 10 Ibid., 34. suppose, for example, that Cyprus had joined an economic or political union whose only other members were Greece and, say, Malta. It is hard to believe that this would not have come very close to enosis (‘unification’ in Greek), and sufficiently close for the draftsmen, if asked by the proverbial “officious bystander”, to have replied that they certainly intended to prohibit such a thing. It would be no answer to this point to observe that we are here dealing with a union involving fifteen other States, not two. Cyprus is far more closely connected to Greece politically, militarily, economically, ethnically, and geographically, than it is to any other member State, and this situation would no doubt continue after accession. Furthermore, it should be noted that in Article I (2) the Republic not only undertook to refrain from participating in any political or economic union; it even promised to refrain from “any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly... union of Cyprus with any other State”11. Article 0 of the Treaty on European Union reads: “Any European state may apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members.” The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the member States and the Applicant State. All Contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements shall submit this agreement for ratification. ”European” is deliberately not defined, so as not to limit the frontiers of the European Union. The Commission in its opinion said that Cyprus had “beyond all doubt” a European identity and character. It is less convincing about whether or not the Nicosia authorities can claim to represent all the people of Cyprus and indeed the State of Cyprus, and undertake obligations on their behalf . On the one hand the Commission advises that the member States of the European Union recognise the Nicosia Government as the only legitimate government representing the Cypriot people; but on the other, the Commission acknowledges the de facto partition of the island and separation of the communities, and the consequence that; the fundamental freedoms laid down by the Treaty, and in particular freedom of movement of goods, people, services and capital, right of establishment and the universally recognized political, economic, social and cultural rights could not today be exercised over the entirety of the island’s territory. These freedoms would have to be guaranteed as part of a comprehensive settlement restoring constitutional arrangements covering the whole of the Republic of Cyprus.

11 Ibid., 35. 3. Problem of Presentation in case of Membership Leaving the judicial basis aside, political scientists should take into account the option that involves the Republic of Cyprus’ membership to the European Union. In that case many reservations arise which are completely detrimental for Turkish Cypriots both in the short-run and the long-run. To explore this idea, the institutions of the European Union must be regarded in detail. a. European Parliament: The European Parliament consists of members (MEPs) elected directly on a basis of proportional representation from across the member states. In 1978 a treaty amendment provided for direct elections12. If the complex decision making process of the European Parliament is examined in detail the impossibility of prevention of any provision or decision which is against the interests of Turkish Cypriots is quite observable13. In a parliament with, say, 700 chairs a mini-state like Cyprus can possess 6 seats. The representation rate could be either 3/3 or 4/2 between two federal states which would constitute the Republic of Cyprus. Taking into consideration the fact that Turkish Republic is not represented in the European Union and Greece having 25 chairs in the parliament Turkish Cypriots have no backing in the decision-making mechanism to counterbalance the Greek Cypriots. b. Council of European Union: The Council of the European Union is both an institution with collective EU functions and the creature of the member governments. In principle and in law there is only one Council, empowered to take decisions on any topic. Its usual members are ministers from incumbent governments in the member states, but which ministers attend meetings depends on the subjects under discussion and on how individual governments choose to be represented14. The Council tends to act as an intergovernmental conference where every member fights for his country’s interests15. Having one or two votes in ninety gives no chance to Turkish Cypriots to fight for their interests16. If the Cyprus’ incumbent government’s foreign minister (General Council consists of foreign ministers of member states) is from the Greek Cypriots than Turkish Cypriots have no possibility to be represented in the most important organ of the European Union. Within the perspective of the enlargement process it is suggested that tiny states have no chair in the General Council. It is a real concern for the Turks due to the lack of presentation in the most important institution of the European Union, which is in fact no concern for

12 H. Wallace and W. Wallace, Policy Making in the European Union, (New York, 2000), 21. 13 H. Kabaalioğlu, Avrupa Birliği ve Kıbrıs Sorunu, (Istanbul, 1997), 150. 14 Wallace, 16. 15 P.S.R.F. Mathijsen, A Guide To European Union Law, (London, 1995), 88. 16 Kabaalioğlu, 150. Greek Cypriots because there is a foreign minister from Greece which can defend all the rights of the Greek Cypriots17. The European Council is a branch, which consists of the heads of states of member states. As the 1960 constitution gives the presidency to Cypriot Greeks, and again, Turkish Cypriots have no chance to be represented in this special council. c. European Commission: The Commission was designated as both secretariat and proto-executive in the EU’s institutional system. The Commissioners themselves, two from each of the larger member states and one from each of the others, constitute a ‘college’ of high officials, currently twenty in the EU of fifteen18. The same concerns with the Council are valid in this important organ of the EU for Cypriot Turks. d. The European Court of Justice: The European Court of Justice is now composed of fifteen judges, and the nine advocates-generals who deliver preliminary opinions on cases19. The general fear is that this Court would take one-sided decisions against Turkish Community concerning human rights (as in the April 2001 decision) and property rights of the Greek citizens whose possessions were claimed to be confiscated after the Turkish peace operation in 197420. Besides, there are concerns of inefficiency of EU policies in case of a breach of human rights by the Greek Cypriots. The Treaty of Amsterdam made some amendments on the Treaty of Maastricht by adding a new article F(a) which involves an “action plan” in case of human rights breaches witnessed in the member states. It cannot be accepted as a guarantee for the Turkish Cypriots if the Greek Cypriots intend to destroy the constitutional structure as in the year of 1963 encouraged by the words of Makarios, the president of that time “unless this small Turkish community forming a part of the Turkish race is expelled, the duties of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated ”21 because EU membership appears to them to be a clever way to implement basic freedoms in the medium-term, with the consequence of an effective Greek Cypriot domination on the whole island22. To be able to implement a sanction in case of such a case, firstly a proposal should be put, which can only be done by the Commission. There, Greek (and/or Greek Cypriot) members will exhibit all efforts to prevent this in a condition where there is no member from Turkey. For

17 A. Ratip, in Ismail, 52. 18 Wallace, 15. 19 Ibid., 23. 20 P. Taylor, Radikal, 21 May 2001. 21 N. H. Shah in A.C. Gazioğlu, Cyprus, EU and Turkey, (Nicosia, 1998), 12. 22 H. Kramer, “The Cyprus Problem and European Security”, Survival, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol 39/No.3 (Autumn 1997), 27. the decision to be taken 11 votes are necessary, which is impossible in a commission without any member from Turkey. Instead of the Commission, a group of member states can apply to the Council with a proposal, which should consist of one thirds of the member states’ total number. Turkish authorities claim that it is very difficult to find 5 states, which would undertake such an action. In the second step the proposal will be discussed in the European Council by heads of government. Since the decision can only be taken with unanimity according to the article difficulty gets even bigger because Greece has the veto power which she threatens to use, for example, to freeze the whole enlargement to the east, a process expected to take well over a decade, if the Turks were “given a veto” over the accession of Cyprus23 or if Cyprus were to be rejected as a candidate24. Consequently, F (a) Article is not a guarantee for the Turkish Cypriots in case of a heavy breach of human rights as in the years of 1963-7425 when as many as 103 Turkish villages were destroyed and the total Turkish Cypriot population, controlling and owning 32% of the land, were pushed into ghetto cantons comprising only 3% of the island and when Turkish Cypriot pleas for help were ignored by the international community26. 1. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ official reaction to Greek Application for Membership: The European Union's commencement of the substantive structural negotiations with the Greek Cypriot administration on 10 November 1998 is considered as a negative development. In the face of this very grave development, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus reiterates its statement of 14 December 1997, made with regard to the Luxembourg Summit of the EU. Taking this opportunity, the TRNC government tried to clear its position by making an official statement to bring the following points to the attention of the EU, all concerned parties and the world public opinion. Firstly, the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus established in accordance with the 1959-60 Zurich and London Agreements signed by the five parties, was a sui generis Republic. This Republic was destroyed by force of arms, in 1963 by the Greek Cypriot partner. The fact that the EU has accepted as valid the unilateral and unlawful application of one of the partners of this bi-communal partnership state and started to process it, first opening accession negotiations and then substantive negotiations with it, is as much a flagrant violation of the 1959- 60 Agreements, as it is an action aimed at upsetting the internal and external balance vis a vis Cyprus established by these Agreements, to the detriment of the Turkish Cypriot people and Turkey. The development in question has also dealt a

23 C. Bremner, in Gazioğlu, 22. 24 A. Borowiec, The Washington Times, 28 March 1998. 25 Kabaalioğlu, 362-363. 26 Shah, in Gazioğlu, 13. new and destructive blow to the efforts exerted by the United Nations Secretary- General within his mission of good-offices. Here the TRNC government insistently emphasizes that the beginning of these negotiations has no validity for or binding effect on the Turkish Cypriot side. Secondly, that the Greek Cypriot side, in order to remove the internal and external balance established by the 1960 Agreements, destroyed the partnership, by force of arms, in 1963 is emphasized. Since then, there has not been a joint administration in Cyprus, and the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities have lived under their own democratically elected separate administrations. It is an undisputable fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has never exercised sovereignty over the whole of Cyprus or the Turkish Cypriot people. There is no joint administration enjoying the mandate of both peoples and capable of speaking for both, or applying for EU membership and conducting accession negotiations with the EU on behalf of the whole of the island. The EU has been allocating aid to Cyprus under financial protocols. However, the Greek Cypriot administration has been obtaining for Southern Cyprus almost all the EU aid allocated for the whole island27. For example, until now, the lion’s share of the EU-Cyprus financial protocols has come to schemes like joint water, electricity and sewerage works which benefit the whole of Cyprus in principle but which are mainly located in the (Greek) south and may not be the most economically rational projects that could have been chosen28. The basic differences between two sides in terms of macroeconomic variables arise from this misallocation of aids and the international boycott against Turkish Cypriots constructed by the Greeks. The TRNC retains many underlying ‘Cypriot’ characteristics such as a dependence on tourism and a need for structural adjustment but, as a result of its Turkish links which have had to be reinforced because of its isolation from the rest of the world, it has become dominated by a number of ‘Turkish’ characteristics, notably high inflation (through adoption of Turkish Lira) and a Turkish level of GDP29. Thirdly, for the Turkish Cypriot people agreeing to become a member of the EU of which Turkey is not a full member while Greece which has created and perpetuated the Cyprus question, since 1963 is, will mean the destruction of the balance between the two motherlands over Cyprus. This will be equivalent to an indirect unification of the island with Greece (enosis). TRNC government believes that the EU should properly evaluate the problems of accepting as a member a second Hellenic state composed of only the Greek Cypriots in the South and thus ignoring the existence of the Cyprus Turkish Republic in the North. According to the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU will aim to assert its

27 Necatigil, 342. 28 J. Redmond, The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community: Turkey, Cyprus, Malta?, (Cambridge, 1993), 78. 29 Ibid., 80. identity on the international scene, in particular, through a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which will include the eventual framing of a common defence30, which is immensely discussed in 2000 and 2001. A military union of Cyprus besides economic and political unions with the EU nullifies Turkish presence as Guarantor state and opens the way for further unification of Cyprus with Greece. Therefore, the Greek Cypriot application for EU membership had more to do with strategic (ie. security) and political considerations than with economic ones. Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides did not mince his words when he commented about the EU membership as follows: “New and stronger guarantees would be needed for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. I believe that the only stronger guarantees would be our participation in the EU.” He later added: “If Cyprus becomes an EU member within the next few years, the intervention of Turkey in an EU member country will become an imponderable action. We will thus remove the unilateral intervention right of Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee.”31 This indicates that the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots have put all their hopes in the EU to solve the Cyprus issue in favourable terms. Fourthly, from the very beginning, the TRNC Government and its people opposed the unilateral, unlawful and ill-intentioned application made by the Greek Cypriot administration for full membership to the EU. There exists an undemocratic and unlawful application which is contrary to the 1960 Agreements leading to the independence of Cyprus, as well as the principles of the UN negotiating process. Every step and decision taken on the basis of this application will not be legally or politically binding on the Turkish Cypriot side and will have no practical effect on it. The TRNC has stated many times that there is no question of it taking part in such a process. Fifthly, although the statement of four members states of the EU made on the eve of the beginning of substantive structural negotiations with the Greek Cypriot administration is worth noting, only time will show whether this will be enough in the light of the Greek veto and the policy of blackmail which has been effectively pursued by Greece within the EU. What is important at this stage are the signals that the Greek Cypriot side will get from the concrete steps being taken by the European Commission as the executive organ of the EU. The events have shown that the Greek Cypriot side is disregarding the individual or joint statements made by some of the EU members by saying we are not trying to join with those states but with the EU. Encouraged by the concrete steps taken by the executive organ of the EU, the Greek Cypriot side is displaying a more intransigent attitude with regard to the solution of the Cyprus question. Lastly, on 31 August 1998, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus put forward a confederation proposal with a view to facilitating

30 S.R. Sonyel, in Gazioğlu, 42. 31 Ibid, 45. a lasting and mutually acceptable settlement on the island. TRNC government considers this proposal, which may be the last opportunity for a solution, to be given due consideration and not to be wasted. The EU, which, with the decision it has taken at the Luxembourg Summit, has brought about a stalemate in the Cyprus question, having destroyed the parameters for a solution that had developed over the years and which, in spite of the stipulations entailed in international treaties on Cyprus, has engaged in substantial talks with the Greek Cypriot administration with a view to securing its full membership to the EU, must understand that the Turkish Cypriot people will continue to defend and protect their democracy, sovereign rights and independence with determination. TRNC Government is determined to take steps in a similar direction with motherland Turkey commensurate to the close integration process pursued by Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus with the EU and indirectly with Greece. In this process, the EU will bear the responsibility for the consolidation and perpetuation of the division of the island32. Moreover, even if it did not come to blows, there would still be a major problem for the EU. It would find it quite impossible under the Treaty of Rome to accept a closed border within a territory that bordered onto a nation, namely Turkey, with whom it has a customs union33. 2. Comparison of benefits suggested by the EU and basic concerns against them The main advantages of full EU membership for the ordinary Turkish Cypriot are as follows: 1. European citizenship, giving the freedom to travel anywhere with the protection of EU foreign services and the freedom to establish and set up business or be employed in any EU Member State. 2. Improved security for life, family, property and human and democratic rights. 3. A sharp increase in wages by more than three times the present levels. For many this increase will be immediate on the establishment of a single market for goods, labor and capital, for others wages will rise rapidly and approach those of the Government-controlled area within a relatively short period (perhaps 2 to 5 years). 4. Real living standards will increase sharply as a result of the increase in incomes and relatively moderate price changes.

32 www.pubinfo.gov.nc.tr 33 D. Lott, in Gazioğlu, 78. 5. An increase in both the quality and quantity of job opportunities available in Cyprus, as well as freedom to travel throughout the EU for employment. 6. The right of children and young people to study in EU member states free or under the same terms as other European Citizens, and subsequently to have the right to offer services or undertake employment. 7. Improvements in roads, infrastructure and services, many of which will be funded by the EU. 8. Improvements in standards for foodstuffs, other products, safety at work and the environment. 9. The reduction in emigration of Turkish Cypriots owing to the rapid improvement in living standards in Cyprus. 10.The recourse to EU Courts in cases where discrimination or other violation of EU laws is assumed34. In spite of these advantages, Turkish Cypriots insist that a membership to EU in which Turkey is not a member includes various dangers for the future. Firstly, due to the right of “free movement of citizens” within EU, not only Greek Cypriots but also Greeks from Greece would settle in the whole island which will decrease Turkish Cypriots who aim to be an equal partner in a would be “confederation” to the status of a minority. Secondly, the superiority of EU law would gradually erase the special privileges of Turkey (which is here a third country), which would accelerate the de facto enosis of the island with Greece. Thirdly, as the island comes into the economic control of the EU, all economic links of Turkish Cypriots with Turkey would be disconnected. Fourthly, in a common security and defense policy the island would enter within the military boundaries of the EU, to which Greece is a member and Turkey is not. This brings the whole island under the military control of Greece35.

CONCLUSION

In this paper all details to the membership of the Republic of Cyprus are given so that the reader can come to a point which appears to be very difficult in the first reading due to the complexity of the issue.

34 www.cyprus-eu.org.cy 35 E. Manisalı, in Ismail, 61-62. On the one hand, the willingness of the European Union to accept Republic of Cyprus whose recognized government’s sovereignty on the whole island is questionable seems evident. It is a real prospect that Cyprus administration is believed to offer a clean sheet about the entrance preconditions for the European Union. Some authorities observe it as the first country to enter the European Union in the first wave of the enlargement process latest in 2005. These authorities stress upon the fact that Republic of Cyprus is the sole country that was able to finish all the requirements necessary for EU before any other country has done so far. Some authorities claim further that the membership would bring finally a solution to this international conflict on which no progress had been achieved for more than a quarter of a century. On the other hand, Cyprus’ lack of legal capacity for application to such a Union is the dark side of the moon. Former Agreements, 1960 Constitution of the country which is theoretically valid but practically in ruins and the present situation are claimed to support this idea, thus Turkish Cypriot basic concerns about the future in case of a membership strengthen this general opinion whereas the tendency toward a tighter integration with Turkey is gaining support increasingly. The decision taken by the Court of Justice against Turkish Cypriot Administration in April 2001 which is talked about in this paper and future plans of the EU on the Common Security and Defense Identity/Policy on which it faces headaches with Turkey that threatens to veto if she is refused to take part in it are adding new dimensions to this complex issue of Cyprus. Probably, within a period of five years many answers to today’s questions would come into surface whereas new and possibly more complex questions would arise that would create an endless subject for future students who will prepare a paper on Cyprus issue. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ismail S., 150 Soruda Kıbrıs Sorunu, Kastaş, Istanbul (1998). Ismail S., Egemenlik, Avrupa Birliği ve KKTC, Dışişleri ve Savunma Bakanlığı, Tanıtma Dairesi, Lefkoşa, (1998). Kabaalioğlu H., Avrupa Birliği ve Kıbrıs Sorunu, Yeditepe Üniversitesi Yayınları, Istanbul (1997). Kramer H., “The Cyprus Problem and European Security”, Survival, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol 39/No.3 (Autumn 1997) pp 16- 32. Mathijsen P.S.R.F., A Guide To European Union Law, London (1995). Mendelson M. H., EU and Cyprus: An Expert View, London (1997). (also available at www.mfa.gov.tr) Necatigil Z. M., The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, Oxford University Press, New York (1998). Redmond J., The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community: Turkey, Cyprus, Malta?, Dartmouth, Cambridge (1993). Tamkoç M., The Turkish Cypriot State K. Rüstem, Lefkoşa (1988). Wallace H. and Wallace W., Policy Making in the European Union, Oxford University Press, New York (2000).

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