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Tartu University Faculty of Social Sciences Department of Political Science

ANNIKA AVIKSON

ESTONIA ON ITS WAY TOWARDS A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

Bachelor Thesis

Tutor: Ph.D Raivo Vetik

Tartu 2000 2

CONTENTS

Introduction 3 1. The emergence and essence of multiculturalism 6 1.1 From assimilation to integration to multiculturalism 6 1.2 The concept of multiculturalism 7 1.3 What is multiculturalism? 9 2. Western strategies towards minority integration 13 2.1 Canada 14 2.2 Sweden 19 3. Estonia 24 3.1 General background 24 3.2 Soviet legacy 25 3.3 Factors affecting integration in Estonia 28 3.3.1 Ethnic composition in contemporary Estonia 28 3.3.2 The issue of identity 30 3.3.3 The issue of citizenship 34 3.3.4 The issue of language 39 3.3.5 The issue of education 41 3.3.6 Media consumption 44 3.4 Four acculturation strategies 46 3.5 Integration of non-Estonians 47 3.5.1 Estonian version of a multicultural society 52 3.5.2 General attitude towards integration 55 3.6 Criticism towards Estonia 57 3.7 Estonia compared to the West 60 3.7.1 How does Estonia compare to Canada and Sweden? 64 Conclusion 68 References 70 Resume 75 3

Diversity is a fact of life; whether it is the “spice” or the “irritant” to people is the fundamental psychological, social, cultural and political issue of our times. (Realo 1998: 203)

INTRODUCTION

Today most countries in the world are culturally plural, with more than one ethnicity and language represented in their populations. As a result of the demographic changes and high levels of migration that occurred after World War II this applies also to Western European nation-states that earlier used to be culturally and ethnically rather homogenous. In order to guarantee normal functioning of the society it is obvious that nation states have had to develop policies towards their pluralism. Many attempt to forge some homogeneity through a process of assimilation (this was more a case immediately after World War II, now seen as not very successful or desirable), while others suffer from internal conflicts and even possibilities of break-up due to confrontation or separation movements. The policy that seems to work best in most societies is to seek to achieve mutual accommodation among the various cultural elements, through a process of integration. In this case, dominant and non-dominant populations agree to modify their behavior and institutions so that all can find a secure place in a heterogeneous society. It is important to emphasize here that integration needs to be mutual in order to succeed – it needs involvement and acceptance from both the majority and the minority(ies).

For a long time there was basically no talk about collective rights on the international arena and as minority rights fall under this category, there was not much talk about the rights of minorities as a group, either. The main reason why collective rights where not talked about for decades probably has to do with Nazi Germany. As Hitler explained his actions with the protection of collective interests – the protection of German minorities outside Germany – then after the horrors Hitler caused there was a reluctance to talk about collective rights a such, instead people preferred to talk about 4 human rights. However, now (since the beginning of 1970s and 1980s) collective rights have come to the agenda again, mainly in the context of minority rights. Or as Yasemin Nuholu Soysal has put it: ‘Collective right to self-determination and to political and cultural existence is increasingly codified as a universal human right.’ (Soysal 1994: 159)

The multicultural essence of today’s world is well described by the following figures: less than 10% of all United Nations member-states are ethnically homogeneous. Approximately in one third of all countries in the world no ethnic group exceeds 50% of the whole population. (Vetik 2000: 14)

Ethnic heterogeneity automatically means also cultural heterogeneity. Culture is a delicate matter in the sense that culture together with its traditions gives a person roots and a sense of belonging that are both essential for human existence as such. Thus it is needless to say that tearing whole communities (in this case minorities) away from their roots and making them adapt to foreign cultures by force can do no good for the society as a whole.

However, political philosopher Jürgen Habermas distinguishes between culture, broadly understood, which need not be shared by all, and a common political culture marked by mutual respect for rights. Constitutional democracy dedicates itself to this distinction by granting members of minority cultures ‘equal rights of co-existence’ with majority cultures. Habermas maintains that these are individual rights of free association and nondiscrimination, which therefore do not guarantee survival for any culture. Constitutional democracies respect a broad range of cultural democracies but they guarantee survival to none. (Gutman 1994: x)

It has become increasingly clear that minority rights are central to the future of liberal tradition throughout the world. In many countries of the world – including the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe – the status of national minorities and indigenous peoples is perhaps the most pressing issue. In this context the key questions for a democratic multinational state are whether the minorities are or are not open to multiple and complementary political identities and loyalties and, if so, whether they will be given citizenship. If minorities’ cultural and political freedoms 5 are guaranteed, might they indeed become loyal citizens, or would their primary loyalty remain to their ‘homeland’ state? (Linz & Stepan 1996: 410) Basically the question for contemporary (multi)nation-states lies in the extent to which cultural/linguistic/ethnic diversity can be tolerated and what would be the potential costs or benefits of this toleration (or lack of toleration).

The basic aim of this bachelor thesis is to find out what are the main problems Estonia has had and still has to face on its way towards a multicultural society and how these problems are dealt with. The essential question is: could multiculturalism be a suitable model for managing the minority problem in Estonia? In order to be able to decide that, the first chapter will give an overview of the emergence and essence of multiculturalism as a model of minority-integration. For the purpose of comparison the situation in two Western countries have been described in the second chapter of the bachelor thesis. These are Canada, the only country in the world to have an official act concerning its multiculturalism, and Sweden, that has had to, due to high immigration after World War II, abandon its policy of homogenization in favor of multiculturalism. The third chapter is dedicated to Estonia where aspects affecting minority integration will be analyzed and an overview of the integration process so far will be given. 6

1. THE EMERGENCE AND ESSENCE OF MULTICULTURALISM

1.1 From assimilation to integration to multiculturalism

Minority demands have been ignored by liberal democracies in history. Up to 1960s states have practiced assimilation of their immigrant minorities into the majority society. Since 1970s it has been admitted that this is unrealistic, unnecessary and unfair. It is unrealistic because no matter how much pressure is put on assimilation, immigrants will never completely lose their special identity and way of living. The idea of a ‘melting pot’ was never really realistic. Pressure on assimilation is unnecessary because experience shows that immigrants who retain their strong ethnic identities and pride can nevertheless be loyal and productive citizens. Forced assimilation is unfair as this does not guarantee equal respect towards immigrants and turns integration into a burdening process. (Kymlicka 2000, 37-38)

Instead of assimilation, the world is turning towards integration. Integration means the emergence of an integral society where members of different ethnicities participate in its different structures and spheres as rightful and equal subjects. Integration differs from assimilation mainly because ethnic minorities retain their cultural and linguistic peculiarities while being capable of successful participation in the society of the host country.

The ‘discovery’ of multiculturalism in 1970s fell on the time when it became increasingly clear that the nationalistic model of integration based on monocultural unification had not succeeded. On the other hand multiculturalism ideology presented (and presents) an accountable counterbalance to growing new-racism and national- extremist forces. (Hallik 1997: 107)

Actually discussions about multiculturalism are in fact discussions about changes in the conditions of integration of immigrants. Or to put it differently – multiculturalism can be considered as one version of integration. Immigrants demand a more tolerant 7 approach that would allow and promote the preservation of minorities’ ethnic heritage even if they do integrate into the common institutions that are based on the majority language. They want acceptance of their religious or other holidays, clothing, cuisine, traditional entertainment etc. Their claims are based on the understanding that these practices are necessary for the preservation of their identity while these do no harm to the majority culture or traditions.

Together with the shift to integration and multiculturalism, we can witness a shift from understanding of equality in terms of individualism and cultural assimilation to a politics of recognition. The notion of equality, as not having to hide or apologize for one’s origins, has gained importance. The wider society is required to show respect for minorities and adapt public attitudes and arrangements so that the heritage they represent is encouraged rather than contemptuously expected to wither away.

Today more and more countries are seeking strategies in which to best accommodate their minorities in a way that would guarantee healthy functioning of the society as a whole and also show respect towards the heritage of their minorities. Diversity, equality and due recognition have become three most important notions in the discourse of minority integration. The fact that 1995 was celebrated as the international year of multiculturalism gives sufficient proof that the world has recognized and accepted the plural essence of the majority of its countries realizing, that cultural diversity can enrich our lives.

1.2 The concept of multiculturalism

As it is with most concepts in society, ‘multiculturalism’ means different things for different people or different countries. Some authors have theorized it as a paternalistic, top-down solution to the ‘problem’ of minorities, a dangerous reification of ‘culture’, or a new way forward to a politics of ‘recognition ‘ and ‘authenticity’. (Modood: 1997: back cover) As defined by Fowers and Richardson (1996), “Multiculturalism is a social-intellectual movement that promotes the value of diversity as a core principle and insists that all cultural groups be treated with respect and as equals.” These authors maintain that multiculturalism is, “…at its core, a moral 8 movement that is intended to enhance the dignity, rights, and recognized worth of marginalized groups.” (Bond 1998: 237)

According to Berry and colleagues, “a multicultural society is a plural society in which pluralism is valued (by the population generally, by the various acculturating groups, and by government policy) and in which diversity is likely to remain”. In other words “Multiculturalism is meant to create a sociopolitical context within which individuals can develop healthy identities and mutually positive inter-group attitudes” (Realo 1998: 205).

Multiculturalism can also be defined as the impact of different cultures on individuals so that they could enrich their own behavior through contacts with representatives of other ethnicities. (Mis on multikultuurne ühiskond? 1997: 19)

According to Phil Barnett from the British Committee of Racial Equality, multiculturalism could and should mean that certain races, cultural and religious groups find their place in the world, feel secure in their identity and in relation to others. (ibid: 57)

The shortest and simplest definition of multiculturalism is offered by Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal according to whom it is ‘the right to be different and to foster one’s own culture’. (Soysal 1994: 154)

John W. Berry (Berry 1998: 218) also lists four preconditions for the maintenance of a multicultural society: 1) there needs to be a general support for multiculturalism, including acceptance of various aspects and consequences of the policy, and of cultural diversity as a valuable resource for a society; 2) there should be overall low levels of intolerance or prejudice in the population; 3) there should be generally positive attitudes among the various ethnocultural groups that constitute the society; and 4) there needs to be a degree of attachment to the larger society, but without derogation of its constituent ethnocultural groups. 9

Deriving from the definitions presented above it could be concluded that the debate of multiculturalism might be conceived of as a discussion of democracy that highlights the tension between equality and difference, homogeneity and heterogeneity. At issue is the reconciliation of the right to be different with the right to be equal, and the definition of the limits of these rights. The question is to which extent a society should foster homogenization and to what extent it should allow the existence of heterogeneity.

1.3 What is multiculturalism?

The definition of ‘integration’ offered by the British Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins in 1968, is used as a charter of egalitarian multiculturalism. Jenkins defined integration ‘not as a flattening process of uniformity, but of cultural diversity, coupled with equality of opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Rex 1996: 32)

Jenkins’ definition also argues that the concept presented above rests on the recognition of two cultural or value domains, one a shared political culture of the public domain based on the idea of equality, the other a private or communal one based upon differences of language, religion and family customs.

When drawing a distinction between the public and the private domain there appears to be four possibilities: a) One might envisage a society which is unitary in the public domain but which encourages diversity in what are though of as private and communal matters; b) A society might be unitary in the public domain and also enforce or at least encourage unity of cultural practice in private or communal matters; c) A society might allow diversity and differential rights for groups in the public domain and also encourage or insist upon diversity of cultural practice by different groups; d) A society might have diversity and differential rights in the public domain even though there is considerable unity of cultural practice between groups. (Rex 1996: 15-16) 10

The idea of multiculturalism is represented by a); b) is best exemplified by the French ideal of total assimilation; c) is common under all forms of colonialism; c) is characteristic to the southern states of the United States before the Civil Rights movement. The crucial point about multiculturalism is that it should not be confused with c). All too often it is, and those who support c) are likely to accept the slogan of multiculturalism and bend it in that direction. But in this case it would be quite difficult to guarantee proper functioning of the state together with its institutions as differential rights in the public domain are always a potential for conflict between different groups, in this case ethnic groups.

It appears that this differentiation between the public and private spheres seems to be a sensible and ‘workable’ approach in multiethnic societies that have to deal with their minorities. It is normal for any democratic country to promote or even demand unity in the public domain - there have to be common political and economic understandings and goals in order to guarantee order, there has to be a single set of laws to avoid chaos, people should be able to communicate in the same (official) language. At the same time it is essential that people be allowed to maintain their identities, cultural ties and traditions.

The basic characteristics of a multicultural society might be summarized as follows:  First of all it is important that the multicultural ideal is to be distinguished from the notion of a plural society. What all theories of plural society have in common is that they emphasize the inequalities of economic and political power between the society’s constituent groups while in the case of multiculturalism, as claims John Rex, any deviation from equality in the public domain would be a deviation from multiculturalism itself. On the other hand, we could argue against Rex’s claim that it will never be possible to guarantee 100% equality even in the public domain, especially under the conditions of present day market economy. Besides, it should be considered that while multiculturalism is based more on collective rights and group rights, then equality is more individual.  In a multicultural society we should distinguish between the public domain in which there is a single culture based upon the notion of equality between individuals and the private domain, which permits diversity between groups. 11

 The public domain includes the world of law, politics and economics. It also includes education insofar as this is concerned with selection, the transmission of skills and the perpetuation of the civic culture.  Moral education, primary socialization and the inculcation of religious belief belong to the private domain.  The structure of the private domain amongst immigrant communities includes extended kinship extending back into a homeland, a network of associations and a system of religious organization and belief. This structure provides a valuable means in an impersonal society of providing a home and source of identity for individuals. However, it has to be acknowledged that the differentiation between the two domains entails its own problem, namely, as also seen above, that education belongs to both spheres. According to Rex (Rex 1996: 21) a modern educational system has three clear functions. It selects individuals on the basis of their achievement for training for various occupational roles. It transmits important skills necessary for survival and for work in industry. And it also transmits moral values. It is this third function which brings it into conflict with the private domain and countries that decide to deal with their minorities using the model of multiculturalism have to figure how to overcome this problem.

As shown above immigrants/minorities are no longer expected to assimilate entirely to the norms and customs of the dominant culture, and indeed are encouraged to maintain some aspects of their ethnic particularity. But this commitment to multiculturalism is a shift in how immigrants integrate into the dominant culture, not whether they integrate.

What should appeal to immigrants is that multiculturalism acknowledges the fact that integration is a two-direction street. Just like immigrants are expected to tie themselves to the new society, be loyal to their new country and learn to know its language, history and institutions, the wider society has to show interest towards their minorities and adjust its institutions according to their identity and customs.

However, even under the conditions of multiculturalism, when basic rights and equality in the public sphere have been guaranteed, none the less minority 12 communities at any one time may conflict with and challenge the existing order as have communities based upon social class in the past. Just like different social classes fought for their rights before, today conflicts between different cultures and ethnicities should not be viewed as something abnormal. Or as John Rex (Rex 1996: 29) has phrased it, the new social order of the multicultural society is an emergent one, which will result from the dialogue and the conflict between cultures. 13

2. WESTERN STRATEGIES TOWARDS MINORITY INTEGRATION

It is rather probable that there are just as many different strategies to deal with the problem of minorities, as there are countries in the world. This is completely normal, as different circumstances like history, the share of minorities in the total population, wealth of the state etc. require different approaches. However, two essential characteristics Western countries’ integration policies do share in common can be pointed out. First of all it is understood that it is easier to turn minorities into loyal citizens if their ethnic identity is not attacked, if they are allowed to preserve their ethnic peculiarities. Secondly Western integration policies emphasize that integration can be successful only if it is a two-way street – both the majority and the minorities have to be supportive of and active participants in the integration policy.

According to Will Kymlicka a distinction can be made between ‘citizen-nations’ and ‘ethnic nations’. (see Kymlicka 2000) The difference between liberal ‘citizen-nations’ from non-liberal ‘ethnic nations’ lies in the fact that ethnic nations consider the reproduction of concrete culture and identity one of its most important goals while citizen-nations are neutral towards cultures and identities of their citizens. Based on this principle of neutrality Western states have often rejected claims for special rights for minorities as these rights would be outside common individual civil and political rights possessed by all citizens. Clear recognition of minority groups and giving them special rights is a clear deviation from traditional neutrality of a liberal state. However, this idea of neutrality is now more and more considered a myth. For example if a law says that all children are required to learn the official language in school, this required to better integrate people into the common public culture. In this case culture does not mean something ethnographic or traditional ties, but rather a common language and public institutions. And naturally no state can remain neutral about functioning of its public institutions and the level of unity in its society. Thus the model of ‘ethnic-cultural neutrality’ should be replaced with a new liberal- democratic state’s model – ‘model of building a nation’. 14

When we talk about Western integration strategies and multiculturalism then the two extreme approaches are represented by Germany and France. Germany is known for treating its minorities as ‘gastarbeider’ or guest workers who are expected to once leave the country and return to their country of origin. For that purpose minorities are encouraged to learn as much about their own culture, land, traditions etc. as possible, they are by no means expected to integrate into the majority society. While minorities have a claim for minimal social rights, they are denied full citizenship. France represents the opposite case – there is an attempt to assimilate all immigrants into the French society, basically make them French and this is done mainly through the educational system. According to this extreme view all should have equal citizenship regardless of ethnic origin and due to that cultural diversity of ethnic groups in not encouraged.

It can be pointed out that according to some theorists (see Berry 1998) Germany and France are not in fact multicultural countries as only those countries can be considered truly multicultural that see themselves as such. Nonetheless, these two countries are of interest when we talk about different integration policies. However, now we turn to two countries that truly are multicultural, recognizing themselves as multicultural and developing policies that suit this condition. These are Canada and Sweden.

2.1 Canada

Canada’s core political culture derives not from a long-established nation, like in Europe, but from a set of institutions established by the earliest immigrants, in which nonetheless being an immigrant, especially from the European countries, is a relatively desirable, even prestigious status. Canada’s definition of its problem of multiculturalism begins with the fact that it has to hold together the two founding nations, the British and the French.

According to the most recent census (1991) in Canada, 29% of the population was British, 24% French, and 27% of other than British or French origin: the balance (22%) were various combinations of these three origins. This “other” category has increased steadily in size. (Berry 1998: 210) These numbers alone show that Canada 15 is a multi-ethnic and thus also multicultural country. But as some political scientists have argued, a country cannot be truly multicultural unless it has not recognized itself as such. This would mean that most multiethnic countries in the world would actually not qualify as multicultural countries. As will be shown below, Canada is not one of those countries.

When we talk about integration of Canadian society, then the major problem or obstacle is the French province of Quebec that claims to be a ‘distinct society’ thus requiring differential rights and treatment.

There were brief attempts at assimilation after the conquest of Quebec in 1763 and again in the mid-nineteenth century, but for the most of Canada’s history the Quebec issue has been managed by combination of devolution and consociational accommodation. Under confederation from 1867 Quebec has had its own government with extensive powers in cultural and social matters. It retained its educational system, its religious settlement, its language and its own civil code. (Keating 1997: 172)

A society like Quebec, with collective goals and liberal values at the same time, actually violates the liberal model, according to which state should remain neutral on the view of good life, this should be up to an individual to decide. ‘It is axiomatic for Quebec governments that the survival and flourishing of French culture in Quebec is a good.’ (Taylor 1994: 58) On the other hand, in Quebec also diversity is respected and adequate safeguards for fundamental rights are created. It is not denied that there are tensions and difficulties in pursuing these objectives together, ‘but such a pursuit is not impossible, and the problems are not in principle greater than those encountered by any liberal society that has to combine, for example, liberty and equality, or prosperity and justice’. (Vetik 2000:23)

Many theorists have in fact supported at least some of the aspirations of Quebec. For example Will Kymlicka favored Canada’s concessions to Quebec, which would have allowed to pursue what he calls ‘asymmetric federalism’, meaning that the French- speaking province has powers – over immigration, schools and language – that other Canadian provinces do not have. This sort of autonomy, Mr. Kymlicka argues, is 16 justified because it does not unduly hurt the English-speaking majority but helps the French minority. (Zachary, The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2000)

Although when one speaks of multiculturalism in Canada, it is often perceived to deal with the problem of Quebec, multicultural policy in fact was a direct response to mobilization by Canada’s ethnic minorities expressing dissatisfaction with the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. This Commission issued a series of reports in the second half of the 1960s and made recommendations that were supposed to eradicate the inequalities between Canada’s two founding nations through the promotion of bilingualism and biculturalism. Although official languages legislation, recognizing Canada’s languages as English and French, was implemented in 1969, biculturalism as a policy never came into being in Canada as when the suggested policy was seen to involve the recognition of the problems of ethnically distinct societies, not only the British and the French, it appeared to government, as it did to other immigrant minorities, that these other minorities should also have rights and, importantly, government funding. In response sixteen recommendations for a government policy of multilingualism and multiculturalism was presented and a model of integration for ethnic collectivities of immigrant origin was provided. Thus a policy of multiculturalism was developed (while the idea of multilingualism was rejected) and a variety of immigrant minority cultures received funding. On the whole this policy has not had to deal with issues of a divisive political kind, but rather with fostering of languages and of symbolic ethnicity.

‘The government will support and encourage the various cultures and ethnic groups that give structure and vitality to our society. They will be encouraged to share their cultural expression and values with other Canadians and so contribute to a richer life for us all.’ So declared Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau upon announcing Canada’s multiculturalism policy in 1971. (Wayland 1997: 33) One of only three officially multicultural countries in the world (the other two being Australia and Sweden), Canada’s model is that of a ‘multicultural society within a bilingual framework’.

The policy of multiculturalism was intended to provide a sense of security for all cultural groups in Canada: in essence, it asserted that it is just fine to be culturally 17 different, and sought to find ways to avoid such difference serving as a basis for exclusion or differential treatment. Anything more ambitious would have been opposed by Quebec.

Four main elements of Canada’s multicultural policy should be pointed out: 1) The policy wishes to avoid assimilation and stresses “own group maintenance and development”; 2) To increase intergroup harmony and the mutual acceptance of all groups, “break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies”; 3) Group development by itself is not sufficient to lead to group acceptance thus “intergroup contact and sharing” are important: 4) Full participation by groups cannot be achieved if some common language is not learned; thus the “learning of official languages” is encouraged. (Berry 1998: 212, see also Wayland 1997)

However, there is a fundamental contradiction between official (English-French) bilingualism and multiculturalism - how could there be culture without language? It has been claimed that multiculturalism would lead to multilingualism and thus undermine the special and official status of French language. This has resulted in a rather widespread view that Canada is or should also be bicultural rather than multicultural.

The sanctioning of cultural pluralism went even further on July 21, 1988 when Canada’s Parliament passed the Multiculturalism Act entitled “An Act for the Preservation and Enhancement of Multiculturalism in Canada”, the only such act to exist in the world. (Wayland 1997: 33) It seeks to ‘ensure that all individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity’. (ibid: 49)

By that time the 1971 version had proven to be insufficient and already out-of-date. The 1988 Act did provide a clearer sense of direction by promoting cultural and language preservation, anti-discrimination efforts, the enhancement of intercultural awareness and understanding, and culturally sensitive institutional change at federal levels. 18

The specific clauses of the Act refer to a number of themes. Foremost among them are: a) the promotion of the freedom of all Canadians to ‘reserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage’; b) the promotion of multiculturalism as ‘a fundamental characteristic of Canadian heritage and identity’, and as an ‘invaluable resource in the shaping of Canadian future’; c) the promotion of ‘full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins’ and the ‘elimination of barriers to such participation’; d) the recognition of the contribution of Canadian cultural communities, and to ‘enhance their development’; e) ensuring ‘individuals equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity’ and f) encouraging Canadian institutions to be ‘both respectful and inclusive of Canada’s multiculturalism character’. (Berry 1998: 214) In brief, multiculturalism has moved beyond its original purpose of promoting cultural diversity.

An important aspect of the Canadian approach to multiculturalism is that the government has formally linked immigration and multiculturalism to citizenship – first with the creation of a single federal Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship in 1992, and then through the new Department of Immigration and Citizenship in 1993. (Wayland 1997: 56) This has been done in hope that citizenship may provide to be the unifying concept, as immigrants must learn either English or French in order to acquire citizenship, that at the same time allows room for recognition of the diversity within Canada. Today non-citizens in Canada may hold certain public service jobs while citizens still have priority. Non-citizens are guaranteed full civil rights, but it is impossible for them to vote even in local elections with the exception of some provinces where British and Commonwealth citizens may vote.

As a policy multiculturalism has been criticized by academics, ethnic activists and policy-makers alike for a variety of reasons. The policy has been called mere rhetoric, a tool for buying ethnic vote, and a means of perpetuating the power of English Canadian elites. It has also been argued that multiculturalism emphasizes the folkloric aspects of ethnic and racial diversity and does not address the more pressing needs of minority groups, namely equal opportunities for employment, housing, education and access to social services. (Wayland 1997: 48) Some French Canadians have opposed 19 the policy because they think that it reduces their claims of nationhood to the level of immigrant ethnicity. (Kymlicka 1995: 16)

Not surprisingly criticisms of multiculturalism are largely reflective of the differing needs of Canada’s ethnic and racial minorities. The ethnic groups that originally fought for a multicultural policy, instead of a bicultural policy, were mainly white, European and had usually lived in Canada already for generations. Their needs were principally expressive, namely cultural promotion and language retention. Canada’s newest immigrants, particularly racial minorities on the other hand, had a broader and more ambitious policy in mind. Thus there was a need to include also social problems relevant to Canada’s newest immigrants.

Critics of the Act and the policy in general maintain that there is too much emphasis on diversity and promotion of differences between people while more stress should be laid on integration and on what Canadians share in common. One possible solution that has been suggested would be for the government to place more emphasis on core Canadian values including the belief in equality and fairness in a democratic society, the importance of accommodation and dialogue, honesty, tolerance etc. The problem with these core values is that they do not provide many tools for forging a strong identity, it can be argued that these values are rather universal and not something that would emphasize the peculiarities of Canada or Canadians. Besides, like Wayland has pointed out (Wayland 1997: 56) ‘these values connote compromise rather than boldness’.

Multiculturalism in Canada should be viewed as an essential part of Canadian identity. Although the adoption of the Policy and Act of Multiculturalism do not automatically mean that problems related to ethnic diversity will be completelyunder control, at least such actions create favorable conditions for peaceful ethnic relations and help establish a secure basis for a society that recognizes and values its diverse character. The establishment of such a basis is important as multiculturalism is not to be viewed as a temporary situation in Canada.

2.2 Sweden 20

Sweden’s past as an expansionary great power in northern Europe and the extent to which it was influenced by the political culture of Prussia/Germany have shaped present-day Swedish nationalism. The notion of a ‘Greater Sweden’ was alive in influential circles way into the twentieth century – at least until the middle of World War II. Because of the strength of their state, Swedes could generally take their national identity and independence for granted. (Modood 1997: 56)

Sweden lacked extensive encounters with ethnic minorities other than Lapps and Finns before the postwar labor migration started. According to the census of 1930 less than 1% of the population, together with the Finns and Lapps, came from a ‘foreign stock’. (Runblom 1996: 72) For a long time Swedes’ viewpoint was that immigrants have to become Swedish, take over Swedish traditions and customs and harmonize with the Swedish society. In this sense the application of a multicultural policy in Sweden means a deviation from Swedish traditions that stressed unity of the Swedish nation. The timing of this change was interesting in the sense that it coincided with the reforms and debates in Canada, being also obviously influenced by them.

But resulting from the migration after World War II that caused a change in Sweden’s national composition, Sweden was compelled to move from the model of ‘swedishization’ that emphasized the importance of cultural and ethnic assimilation of immigrants to a model of multiculturalism that officially allowed cultural diversity and even promoted an encouraged it.

It can be asked what made Sweden take turn a 180 from assimilation to promotion of ethnic diversity? There are several reasons for that. First of all it was understood that it would be very difficult to integrate the immigrants from Southern Europe who came to Sweden in the 1960s. Second, it was understood in certain circles that the state bares a moral responsibility for the well being of the people who have decided to come to Sweden. And third, there was international pressure on Sweden to take a more flexible attitude towards the preservation of the language and culture of their minorities. (Runblom 1996: 73) 21

Immigrants have come to Sweden from all over the world and today there are representatives from more than one hundred ethnicities. Immigration to Sweden has continued also well after the war. From 1970 to 1995, the foreign population grew by 400,000 people, an increase of 75%. In 1997, more than 940,000 people currently living in Sweden were born in another country, that is 11% of the total population. Of these, 54% were Swedish citizens. (Ornbrant 1999: 311)

The number of naturalizations increased from 17,552 in 1985 to 42,659 in 1993, and has decreased since then. In 1996 only 25,000 persons acquired Swedish citizenship. A foreign citizen can acquire Swedish citizenship after five years of residency, except for Nordic citizens, who must only have lived two years in Sweden. It is not required that applicant speak Swedish to acquire citizenship. (ibid: 315-316) The number of those who acquire Swedish citizenship is relatively high as citizenship is viewed there rather from an instrumental standpoint.

A Swedish policy explicitly regarding migration and integration was developed at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. In 1968, the parliament declared that immigrants should live in equality in Sweden. This goal was extended in 1975 to include freedom of cultural choice and partnership.

Swedish policy developed within a benevolent social democratic tradition, and the outsider is struck by the fact that government policy discussions there tend to start, not with treating immigrants as problems, but with a concern for developing appropriate social services through which immigrants might obtain social rights. The guiding principles of this policy were said to be those of ensuring ‘freedom of choice, equality and co-operation’. (Rex 1996: 54-55)

Swedish state policies produce ‘official ethnicities’ (when their number reaches 1000) who are entitled to welfare and social rights. (Soysal 1994: 4) New migrant groups are defined by their collective ethnic identity, which is considered a ‘natural’ social grouping, and treats them like other corporate groups. All persons having a permanent residence permit are legally entitled to the same social and economic support as Swedes. Non-citizens can vote in local elections but not in national ones. Despite explicit reference to ethnic groups, the Government’s position is that Swedish policy 22 does not foresee migrant communities persisting as cohesive entities over time. Migrants are expected to integrate as individuals into Swedish society. Framework and instruments to promote this integration are collectivist and reinforce ethnicity. The Swedish model emphasizes public interest and the welfare of different social groups, including migrants. Clear top-down policies for incorporation have been developed by the state and the emphasis is on standardized protection and services which helps guarantee equality. Migrants are incorporated collectively through participation in the intermediary structures sponsored by the state. Contrary to many other countries, the Swedish migration and integration policies have, to a large extent, been implemented by the public sector without the involvement of non-government organizations. In recent years, however, the government has often stressed the importance of involving non-government organizations.

In January 1997, an amended Aliens Act came into force. This laid the foundation for a migration policy that focuses on protection and respect of human rights. (Ornbrant 1999: 319) In September 1997, the government submitted a bill to the parliament entitled ‘Sweden, the Future and the Plural Society – from Immigration Policy to Integration Policy’. (ibid: 321) The bill was mainly based on a report from the Commission on Immigrant Policy, a parliamentary committee who saw several reasons to propose a new policy: among others, a large, diverse foreign-born population; high unemployment, especially among foreign-born persons; increasing segregation; and a growing ‘we-and-them’ mentality. According to the bill, ethnic and cultural diversity and equality should be the point of departure for shaping and implementing policy in all sectors and at all levels of society. The implementation of integration policy objectives should be continuously monitored.

The primary authority for the organization and coordination of migrant affairs is the National Immigration Board under the Ministry of Labor. Besides implementing and supervising policy, it also acts as an intermediary between Swedish society and organizations of immigrants and minorities. The centralized character of integration is sustained by the constant communication and consultation that takes place between central and local levels, instead of being dictated by a top-down bureaucracy as is the case in France. There are also a large number of nation-level commissions and 23 advisory councils. A consultative council, with representatives from different interest groups, including migrants is attached to every ministry and state agency.

There is a widespread view among native Swedes that Sweden is not at all nationalistic. The Swedes’ strong identification with modernity in one of the highest developed countries in the world is a key concept of national pride and identification. This indicates that Swedes often value political identity over ethic identity. This has been defined as Swedes’ pathology of nationhood. (Kirch M. 1994: 15)

Swedes themselves think that Sweden is a tolerant country that is described by respectful treatment of questions concerning immigrants. Nonetheless nobody is happy about the emergence of the relationship between immigrants and indigenous population on the arena. Unemployment has grown, there is a tendency of segregation in schools and offices and there are also signs of public hostility.

Criticism towards Sweden has come from only a few groups, many the Lapps, who argue that Sweden delays signing international conventions that deal with human rights and minority rights. They also claim that the state refuses to react to the demands and criticism of its historical minorities. However, Swedish immigration policy has indirectly resulted in the Lapps achieving some cultural and linguistic guarantees. (Runblom 1996: 82)

It should also be mentioned that international cooperation has long played an important role in Swedish policies. The Nordic collaboration has a long tradition in the field of migration and refugee policy, as well as integration policies, and cooperation in this field has recently also been extended to the Baltic States. Nordic countries have been collaborating with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, in order to harmonize their refugee and migration policies with those in Europe. The hope is that these Eastern countries will cease to be attractive as transit countries for regular and irregular immigrants. 24

3. ESTONIA

3.1 General background

During the first half of this century Estonia was one of the most homogenous states in Eastern Europe. Victory in the War of Independence decisively changed the position of Estonians in society. The Estonian language became the official state language, and Estonian culture prevailed. Ethnic minorities who resided in Estonia before World War II had become long-time residents and were integrated into the local cultural and linguistic environment. In 1925 the Parliament of the Estonian Republic passed a ‘Law on Cultural Autonomy’, which affirmed that the state respects the right of all ethnic groups to preserve their ethnic identity, culture and religious convictions.

One of the basic contradictions in Estonia’s present-day development is that the society is simultaneously going through two stages of social evolution. On one hand, we experience the restoration of the nation state as a project of modernization characterized by a policy of seeking the homogeneity of the society. On the other hand, the ethnically interpreted nation state is being surpassed. Both stages reflect the actual situation in Estonia, which has a complicated historical heritage, and are in this sense inevitable, yet contradictory. (Vetik 1999b: 15)

According to the vision of Linz and Stepan, the contradiction in the Baltic States between democracy and the nation-state could be solved through ‘political multiculturalism’. This concept stands for the states where the Russian-speaking population would enjoy the rights of the minorities, political and cultural autonomy, in return giving up their primary loyalty to their native country. (Amato & Batt 1998) 25

Before we examine the current situation in Estonia it should be pointed out that the current ethnic composition and situation in general is the result of, if to use the term launched by former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, ‘demographic occupation’ (Vene küsimus…1998: 280-281) that occurred during the Soviet times. Due to that today a very powerful part of the nation-state discourse in Estonia concerns the dichotomy drawn between survival and extinction, or at least this is the way native Estonians see the situation. However, this is not an illegitimate concern as there are little more than a million Estonian speakers in the world and a number of closely related Finno-Ugric languages have disappeared.

Taking into account the complexity of the situation, politicians and delegations from Western Europe and North America (for example Carl Bildt and Will Kymlicka, if to mention only a couple) have offered advice on how best to integrate this large mass of mainly Russian immigrants, seeing it rightly as a major destabilizing force, especially in view of Russian political pressures and threats.

3.2 The Soviet legacy

Throughout the past century, before the period of Soviet domination, the population of Estonia remained relatively constant at approximately 1 million inhabitants. During the first period of Estonian independence the indigenous people accounted for 88% of the total population. But Estonia’s occupation by the Soviet Union in 1940 caused profound changes in its demographic makeup.

The massive influx of Russians into Estonia that occurred during the Soviet occupation was motivated by the strategic interests of Moscow top officials with their ultimate goal being to create one unified Soviet nation. Two strategic decisions were taken about migration policy. Although the top-secret documents remain unpublished, there is no doubt that they in fact do exist. The first decision concerned the creation of melting pots in the republics. Having analyzed the data of the 1970 census, the Kremlin took its second important strategic decision: the introduction of Russian as the official state language in all of its republics to reinforce the chauvinist Russian 26 positions. These decisions together with the decision to organize different forms of migration into its republics caused the situation Estonia has to deal with today.

Several factors can be pointed out that fostered immigration to Estonia - Soviet military officers and families who moved to Estonia during occupation; - A shortage of labor after WWII in industrial spheres which started with military production; - A Soviet cadre policy which favored the import of leading personnel from Russia; - A more highly developed economy and infrastructures compared to Russia or the rest of the Soviet Union; - A specially directed demographic policy from Moscow to create a new Soviet nationality, i.e. an ethnically mixed population with no historical or cultural roots other than the Soviet ones. This process should be treated a ‘classic’ example of political and economic colonization. (Kirch A. 1994: 9)

On the eve of the downfall of the Soviet Empire, in the 1989 census, there were 14 major ethnic groups in Estonia in addition to the Estonian themselves. However, at this point Estonia could not have been considered a truly multicultural society: rather it consisted of the cultural system of the Estonian nation, which was opposed to the Russian-led empire nation. The whole educational system and all the minorities’ cultural institutions had become Russian-speaking. Even the major ethnic groups in Estonia, including almost 50,000 Ukrainians, 10,000 Belorussians and 17,000 Finns, had no schools or cultural societies in their own native language. Any attempt to preserve national culture was regarded as nationalism and criminalized. This goes a long way towards explaining why the process of national awakening became an inseparable part of the struggle for democracy. Tens of ethnic minority groups joined the Estonian movement of independence. (Talv 1996: 10)

People who settled in Estonia after during the Soviet occupation formed rather closed communities in order not to assimilate among Estonians whose culture was more Western and therefore significantly different from the Slavic-Orthodox culture, and whose language and alphabet was alien to them. This is the case also today when over 90% of the non-Estonian population live in the urban areas, half in Tallinn and the 27 area immediately surrounding the capital, and 30% in the industrial northeast. Even in these areas non-Estonians tend to keep to themselves and often have very little or even no contacts with Estonians. The situation could be described as separation as there is not very much contact between the locals, meaning Estonians and the immigrants, the latter being mainly Russians. At the same time the model of living in ‘one’s own world’ has been remarkably peaceful, there have been no ethnically based conflicts or street clashes in this country.

The issue of large minorities (mostly Russian) in Estonia (accounting to almost 35% of the whole population) is made even more complicated by the fact that this minority used to be in a privileged majority position. Usually adjustment takes place with immigrants getting used to and learning to know the traditions, history and culture of their new host country. The Estonian case in the Soviet period differed from ordinary adjustment processes in that the representatives of the majority ethnicity (Estonians) had to adapt to the people who migrated here from Soviet Union, take over elements from their culture and learn their language. Thus the minority is now in a completely new and unexpected situation where they need to, in addition to other barriers, overcome the psychological barriers of all of a sudden becoming a minority whose fate is decided by ‘other’ people.

Therefore the break-up of the Soviet Union and the restoration of Estonian independence have created a completely new existential situation for Russians in Estonia, which is met by two different behavioral models: one reluctant and one adaptive one. It can be said that the general development trend of attitudes among Russians is positive towards their integration into Estonian society. Compared to the beginning of 1990s, when reluctant attitudes predominated, adaptive attitudes are now taking more and more ground. (Vetik 1994: 78-79)

In this context the art of democratic multiculturalism in Estonia, as pointed out by John Rex (Rex 1996: 148), would seem to lie not in seeking to create cultural uniformity but in developing a public political culture which is rewarding for all because it is based upon equality of opportunity and, at the same time, in encouraging the development of diverse cultures which are satisfying to those who adhere to them and yet not subversive of the essential unity of the society. 28

3.3 Factors affecting integration in Estonia

Estonian officials have been rather slow in dealing with the problem of minority integration. For a long time Estonia had no official integration program and this is probably caused by the fact that after the restoration of independence in 1991 the state was preoccupied with other, more urgent issues of governance. However, in the end of 1990s, when a more or less secure democratic order had been established, the issue of large minorities in Estonia has come to the agenda.

Obviously there are many different factors in a country that have to be taken into account when developing strategies towards minorities; factors that affect the way minorities are integrated. In Estonia’s attempt to move towards the model of multiculturalism, several peculiarities of the Estonian state have to be considered. In this bachelor thesis six issues will be discussed that are important when constructing a model of multiculturalism. These are: ethnic composition, identity, citizenship, language, education and media consumption. Needless to say, it is the ethnic composition that makes Estonia a multicultural country in the first place; identity is important because multiculturalism presumes that while preserving one’s ethnic identity it is also necessary to identify with the state you live, in order to establish a common core in the society. Citizenship, language and education are related in the sense that in order to acquire citizenship in Estonia you have to have a basic knowledge of the Estonian language and the latter can be achieved through at least partial education in Estonian. All three are significant in establishing a multicultural society in that they also help create a strong common ground. In order for the integration process to function properly it is necessary to have a common field of communication and the problems with media consumption in Estonia will be discussed in this context.

3.3.1 Ethnic composition in contemporary Estonia 29

Contemporary Estonia is ethnically a multicultural country. In September 1999 Estonians constituted 65,2% of the whole population, the rest 34,8% being different ethnic minorities. Or to put it into numbers, in the total population of 1 445 589, 942 526 were Estonians and 503 063 other ethnicities. Of these the vast majority, 506 049 it total were Russians, 36 659 Ukrainians, 21 363 Belorussians, 13 027 Finns etc, all together representatives of more than 100 ethnic groups. (Riiklik programm 2000: 44) Although the vast majority (more than 80%) of non-Estonians are Russian, there are even more Russian speakers, more than 90% of non-Estonians are using Russian as their mother tongue. (Heidmets 1998: 264)

The last few years have seen an increase in the percentage of Estonians in the population (from 61.5 in 1989 to 63.9 in 1995 to 65.2 in 1999). This is due to emigration and the relatively sharp fall in the birth rate among non-Estonians. The percentage of Estonian births has risen from 58.6 in 1986 to 66.0 in 1990 and 73.3 in 1993. (http://www.einst.ee/society/ethnicity.htm) Besides, 1999 was the first year after Estonia regained independence, when the total number of births increased compared to the previous year and exceeded the number of deaths.

The legal ties of non-Estonians with the Estonian state continue to be multi-faceted. It is estimated that, at the beginning of 1999, there were 503 000 non-Estonians in Estonia (35% of the population). Of these, 144 000 were Estonian citizens (29-30%), more than 88 000 were Russian citizens (18.7%) and almost 13 000 were citizens of other countries (3%). Therefore, every fifth non-Estonian is a citizen of a foreign country. For the remaining 250 000 or so people, there are different terms: alien, person of not determined citizenship, person without documents, stateless person. (Hallik 1999: 40).

There are two contradictory approaches in Estonian public discourse concerning the status of non-Estonians The Estonian state considers non-citizens who came to Estonia during the occupation, immigrants. The self-understanding of most non- Estonians, however, proceeds from the opinion that if one is born here and has lived here for many years or if one came here during the existence of an integral Soviet Union, there can be no talk about immigration. (Vetik 2000: 17) Both of these views 30 have their ‘point’. On one hand Estonia wants to get over its burdening past while preserving its identity and on the other the non-Estonians could have never guessed the Soviet Union would once fall apart when they came to Estonia.

Therefore today’s Estonia is largely a complex of segments of nations with different civilizational and ethnic backgrounds who have a historically negatively ‘burdened’ memory. (Ruutsoo 2000: 190) Estonian ethnos whose normal development was abruptly interrupted by the Soviet occupation is the largest and most integral of these segments and obviously is the one whose cultural standards should dominate in the society and around which integration of the society should take place. This aspiration is hindered mainly by three factors: 1) lack of resources, both human and financial; 2) the growth of a new neighboring identity that does not help strengthen the common ground with Estonia; 3) emergence of a postmodern civilization that does not foster homogenization. The shaping of a multiculturalism Estonia is taking place in rather unfavorable conditions. On one hand we have to overcome our difficult past and on the other we have to have a yet obscure idea of a future within Europe.

3.3.2 The issue of identity

When talking about identities, you must start with the assumption that identity is an inevitable part of being. Nobody can simply exist without having a notion of who or what he/she is. However, identities are not given by nature, although it is sometimes perceived so, they are constructed. To construct an identity you take a subject and delimit it from another subject. With this follows that one identity cannot exist without other identities, our identities are dependent on others, we describe ourselves referring to others. In this sense a person’s identity is multicultural in its essence. To give a very simple example, if you did not have an upper class, you would not have a lower class.

According to Charles Taylor (see Taylor 1994: 25-33) the fundamentally dialogic character is a crucial feature of human life. We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression. We learn these modes of expression through 31 exchanges with others. People do not acquire languages needed for self-definition on their own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction with other who matter to us – what George Herbert Mead called ‘significant others’. The genesis of the human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or he own, but dialogical. We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us. In this respect due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.

Identity is both a psychological and a sociological term. It may provide ‘a definition, an interpretation of the self that establishes what and where a person is in both social and psychological terms’. On the one hand it helps the individual to produce order in his or her own individual life. On the other it helps to place that individual within a group or involves ‘identification’ with a collectivity. Both these forms of identity vary independently from each other. (Guibernau & Rex 1997: 4)

Identities are not static but are constantly shaped against the surroundings. At secure times there is not so much talk about identities whereas at times when people feel that their identities are somehow threatened by external factors, identification actually becomes stronger and more important. This is probably the reason why today there is so much talk about identities as both Estonians and non-Estonians are worried, for different reasons, about losing their identities. Or like it is seen in Europe (see Amato & Batt 1998): ‘The lack of a well-established and secure framework of statehood provides the explanation for the peculiarly intense psychological anxieties of Central and East European national identities.’

According to Cepely György a national identity is ‘an actively, carefully worked out mental product that constitutes only part of an individual’s social identity, a product of a systematically organized process that society places at its members disposal to make it easier for them to comprehend their own national group.’ (Söderström 1999: 2)

It is important to draw a distinction between ethnic (cultural) identity and political identity. Political identity is mainly seen as a ‘sense of political community’, of 32 sharing a political project, being loyal to the country you live in and identifying with its institutions, while ethnic identity is a cultural, organic sentiment of being part of a larger ‘family’ and ultimately deriving one’s own identity and meaning of life from the community. Each type of identity can operate at different levels. This means that national identity can include both the ethnic or cultural-bound and the state-bound aspects. Still, it has to be understood that ethnic identity is much more stable, less easily changeable and thus it is common especially for small ethnicities like Estonians to define themselves more through their ethnicity than politically.

The problem of integration is strongly connected to the problematic of Estonian ethnic and state identity. Ideally we could perceive a situation where Russians living in Estonia have developed into a minority whose ethnic identity is ‘Estonian-Russian’ and state identity ‘Estonian citizen’. (Kirch & Kirch 1996: 60) In this context it is important for the minorities to understand that integration does not mean the change of national identity, it means obtaining elements of an additional identity.

To put the identities represented in Estonia into numbers, the picture does not look too good for the Estonian side, as a much stronger identification with the Estonian state should exist to guarantee a successful integration process. Although the situation is getting better, there is still a long way to go and considering that the model of multiculturalism assumes a strong common identity, this yet has to be created in Estonia.

A sociological study from 1986 showed that for Estonians the dominating identity was Estonian (90%) whereas Russians identified themselves mainly with the Soviet state (78%). Only a small part (14%) defined themselves as ethnic Russians. Surveys conducted in 1993 show that Estonians see themselves mostly as representatives of Estonian culture (99%) with considerable European identification (82%). Their lack of Russian (15%) and Soviet (11%) identity is evident (multiple identities was suggested as a norm). By contrast, the more manifold cultural identification of non- Estonians comes through in their responses. The acceptance of Estonian life styles and principles of everyday life is indicated by 65% of Russians identifying themselves with Estonia (96% with Russia). In comparison with Estonians only 48% of Russians identify themselves with Europe. Yet the results also appear to indicate that the idea 33 of Soviet identity as defined through ‘Soviet culture’ is still quite significant (59%). (Kirch M. 1994: 15-17, see also Table 1) According to a survey conducted by Saar Poll in March 2000, 85,2% of the non-Estonians do not feel themselves as Estonian, 76,0% feel as Russian. Which is a good indicator is that 72,6% feel as Estonian inhabitants, meaning that there is at least some identification with the state they live in. The best identity would be Estonian-Russian, but only 25,0% of the non-Estonians definitely identify themselves as such, 27,6% identify also as such and the rest, amounting to 47,4% do not feel as such. (Eesti rahvussuhete seireuuring 2000)

TABLE 1 Multi-cultural self-identification (percentage February 1993)

Cultures for identification Estonians Russians Estonian 99 65 Russian 15 96 European 82 48 World 49 38 Soviet 11 59 Other 10 18

(Source: Kirch M. 1994: 16)

In analyzing the national identity of Russians in Estonia parallels can be found with the situation in Sweden during the 1980s, when the Swedes considered themselves not at all nationalistic and preferred political identity over ethnic identity. (see Kirch M: 1994: 15-16) Of course, the situation in these two countries has always been quite different, but the attitudes are rather similar. Russians consider themselves also as not at all nationalistic but define themselves as so-called ‘internationalists’. For a long time Russians actually identified themselves with the state, the ‘all mighty’ Soviet Union, and understood their country as an advanced and progressive society, as a transnational movement, world communism. Their identity with the Soviet state was very strong whereas self-definition through Russian ethnic origins was much weaker. Considering that Russian domination of the Soviet Union defined Russian identity, their world-view and understanding of their belonging was all the more shattered by the collapse of the USSR. Soviet ideology to a large extent destroyed Russians’ ethnic consciousness. This therefore may be seen as their pathology of nationhood. 34

Until minorities refuse to see themselves rather citizens than members of an ethnic group, there is always potential for an internal conflict. (Mayall 1996: 23) In Estonia it is clear by now that cultural differences do not necessarily mean open conflict. Transformations and change of identities in contemporary Estonia sib a good example of this. In the process of changing identities our purpose should be the maintenance of peoples’ ethnic identity as well as their integration into Estonian society and a multicultural approach offers a good possibility to do exactly this.

3.3.3 The issue of citizenship

Citizenship is a mutual relationship with the state that simultaneously assumes loyalty and ‘produces’ it.

Citizenship is often compared to an agreement between the state and an individual that fixes the rights and obligations of both parties. A citizen is granted the right to participate in political life on all its levels, it is his or her duty to be loyal to the system in force and defend the state’s independence. Citizenship creates the so-called political nationality which may be the foundation of an individual’s identity. Internationally, the two main principles of granting/receiving citizenship are ius sanguinis according to which a person is granted the citizenship of his or her parents on birth, and ius soli according to which a person is granted the citizenship of the state on whose territory he or she was born. Since in reality it proves impossible to be limited to these principles only, in the interest of the state’s political stability, citizenship is also granted by the way of naturalization to those who are not citizens of the given state, whose parents were not citizens of the given state or who were born elsewhere than on the territory of the given state but who have become permanent residents of the state. (Estonian Human Development Report 1997: 62)

When Estonia restored its independence in 1991, one of the most urgent tasks was to decide what to do with the citizenship issue. The basic question was, to put it simply, whether we wanted to take the Russians in as ‘our own’ or whether we wanted to keep them out as ‘aliens’. A choice had to be made between the so-called 1940-option or the so-called zero-option. The former meant that citizenship would be granted 35 automatically to everybody who was Estonian citizen before the Soviet occupation and their descendants while the latter meant that citizenship would be granted automatically to all inhabitants of Estonia.

According to the Citizenship Law of November 1991 citizenship was granted outright only to those individuals born in Estonian before the 1940 annexation and their descendants. The decision in favor of this option was based on the concept of a ‘restored’ Estonian state. This means, for example, that Canadian or US citizens who had never been to Estonia but were the offspring of Estonians had the right to vote in elections, but the Russians who had been born in Estonia after 1940 and had lived there all their lives were not given citizenship.

The legal and moral right to restrict citizenship to pre-annexation residents of Estonia was based on the analogy of Poland’s ‘right’ to expel the Germans in Poznan, including those who Hitler had helped settle there. Under international law, occupying forces and their military personnel have no rights of citizenship. Estonian diplomats argued that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 had led to an illegal usurpation of the state and that the entire 1940-91 period should be classified as a military occupation. On these grounds, all Russians who entered the country after 1940 and their descendants were illegal occupiers with no claim to automatic citizenship. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 416)

Linz and Stepan considered this exclusion especially serious because only people who were citizens by 1992 could vote in the September 1992 parliamentary and presidential elections, organize political parties, or be elected to office. In effect, the citizenship law disenfranchised almost 40 percent of the population of Estonia during a key foundational moment of the new would-be democracy. According the Soysal a society should not deny such a large segment of its population political modes of expression. ‘The migrant’s integration – apart from economic, social and cultural aspects – involves the question of political participation, since the migrant has a political dimension as does any other human being; his status in the receiving country cannot be divorced from this fundamental dimension’. (Soysal 1994: 153) But actually basically the same (definition in terms of blood) applies in Germany where Germans living for example in Russia and speak no German whatsoever can 36 automatically receive citizenship while the Turkish who have lived in Germany for their whole life and are completely assimilated into the German culture are denied citizenship. It can also be argued that the emotional atmosphere in society was not ready to accept any more liberal solutions.

In 1992 the newly elected Riigikogu passed a law containing a three-year residency and language requirement for naturalization, modeled on the naturalization law of the interwar republic. Today applicants for citizenship have to pass two examinations. The first one is an Estonian language test, involving the ability to use approximately 2500 words in everyday conversation. The second exam was introduced in 1995 and involves a civics test based on knowledge of the Constitution and the law on citizenship. Ever since the adoption of these requirements there has been constant controversy around them. Non-Estonians, and actually even some Estonians claim that the tests are too difficult and the requirements almost impossible to meet. Foreign experts have suggested that the language requirements should be made easier and concessions should be made for older people. As Russians could have not guessed the Soviet Union would once fall apart, when they came to Estonia and resulting from that Russians will become a minority in Estonia, they claim that the Citizenship Law can be viewed as discrimination against them.

Not surprisingly the attitude towards the citizenship policy of Estonians and non- Estonians differs to a large extent: only 6,0% of the Estonian respondents consider it to harsh on the non-Estonians, discriminating their human rights, while 71,3% of the non-Estonian respondents think so. 56,0% of the Estonians consider the policy normal and in accordance with international standards, 16,9% of the non-Estonians think so. (Eesti rahvussuhete seireuuring, 2000)

While about 50,000 people have passed these exams in one form or another since 1993, the vast majority of Estonia’s 330,000 remaining non-citizens have been slow to begin this process, either because of insufficient knowledge of Estonian or sense of indignation at the denial of automatic citizenship to begin with. Another 40,000 people have been naturalized based on Estonian ethnicity or their support for Estonian’s independence drive in 1989-1990, when a special movement called the 37

Congress of Estonia registered such supporters among Soviet-era immigrants. (Lepa 1999. 72-73)

Surveys conducted in both 1996 and 1999 show that 50-60 % of Russian citizens wish to become Estonian citizens (if the conditions were less strict) and the same number would like to see their children as Estonian citizens. Most non-citizens have de facto ties with Estonia, and this is a positive precondition for their full integration into Estonian society in the future. (Hallik 1999: 43) But when asked during a survey conducted in March 2000: ‘Why have you not obtained Estonian citizenship yet?’, 68,3% answered that they are not able to learn Estonian and 65% think that citizenship requirements are humiliating. (Eesti rahvussuhete seireuuring 2000) Especially the latter percentage is alarming, as firstly it would be very difficult to eliminate such attitudes and secondly it is against a human being’s nature to do something that he/she feels would humiliate them.

In the beginning of 1999 there were approximately 190 000 persons without citizenship in Estonia that made up 13% of the population and 38% of the non- Estonians. They live in Estonia on the grounds of a temporary or permanent residency permit and foreigner’s passports. According to Estonian law most of these persons without citizenship will get a permanent residency permit instead of the temporary one within 1-2 years. (Pettai 2000: 76)

TABLE 2

Wants what kind of citizenship? Aliens without citizenship 1993 (in %) 1999 (in %) Estonian citizenship 48 71 Russian citizenship 25 14 Citizenship of some other country 2 11 Don not know yet 25 4

(Source: Pettai 2000: 82) 38

As seen, according to the data of 01.03.1999, 71% of the aliens wanted to become Estonian citizens. Thus valuation of Estonian citizenship has grown continuously. This is a good sign if there is at least will to become Estonian citizens, but unfortunately often actions do not follow thoughts and it has to be admitted that the tightening up of the naturalization requirements on the basis of the 1995 citizenship law has resulted in a severe setback for citizenship applications.

Although the citizenship issue seems to remain a problem for a number of years to come it is important to point out that Estonian legislation has kept separated the political status and civil rights of non citizens. Despite of non-citizen low political status, basic civil rights are guaranteed to everybody. The economic and social position of permanent residents who came to Estonia before July 1991, looks from a legal standpoint rather good. They share the same rights with Estonian citizens in privatization of property, privatization of housing and even have right to own land. Legal residents sojourning in Estonian Republic enjoy the same social rights as Estonian citizens in the case of old age, inability to work etc. Of course non-citizens cannot take part in national elections but they can take part in local elections although it requires a five-year residency qualification in the area to be able to do that.

One of the politicians most committed to Baltic independence, former Prime Minister of Sweden Carl Bildt, has noted the potential dangers inherent in current citizenship situation if left unresolved: ‘The Baltic countries for their part, must recognize the obvious relationship between their internal harmony and their external, long-term national security. They are wise to be substantially more inclusive and generous to their Russian inhabitants than a strict interpretation of international law dictates. The aim must be to encourage the Russian speakers of the Baltic countries to feel loyal to the states where they are now living rather than to Russia, which they for one reason or another left during the Soviet period.’ (Dreifelds 1996: 174)

The people’s genuine link with the state, which is the precondition for the growth of the citizen body, must continue to be created. The citizenship policy chosen in Estonia would have presumed the existence of a massive language learning program, and its financing. Since such a massive language instruction program did not have state 39 support, there has been silent agreement that the official language requirement will in itself restrict the growth in the citizen body. (Hallik 1999: 42)

3.3.4 The issue of language

Common language is considered necessary for the functioning of democracy – how can people govern together if they do not understand each other? Indeed, as can be seen in the case of Estonia it is a problem if the majority and the minorities get their information from different language media sources that can easily result in (and often does) their different understandings about crucial issues of the integration process or anything else that goes on in the country.

According to Kymlicka the usage of a joint language is necessary not only for the rapid development of economy but also for the development of social welfare, which in the modern society relies on solidarity and joint identity. Guaranteeing of similar possibilities to every member of the society is based on joint education obtainable by everybody which also presumes the unity of language. (http://www.ngonet.ee/integratsioon/choices.html)

National unity is a legitimate and understandable reason for language policies aiming at the promotion of one single official language. This does not mean that the use of any other languages must be eradicated though and such a policy might cause separation that ultimately might lead to distortion. It is legitimate to impose on the inhabitants of a state a duty to learn the official language. This should not however exclude the use of other languages by public authorities where a large number of people who share the same language are concentrated in one region.

Although Estonian jurisdiction does not draw a legal line between people from different nationalities, the line exists in the form of a language barrier because the main obstacle for the integration of most non-Estonians is the lack of knowledge of Estonian that is the dominating and language in Estonia. The linguistic situation in Estonia appears to correspond to the standpoint presented in the previous passage. The 40 official language of state and local government authorities is Estonian, non-Estonians are required to speak Estonian and one of the reasons for that, as has been claimed by state authorities, is to create more unity in the society. But in localities, like Ida- Virumaa, where the majority of inhabitants belong to an ethnic minority, they have the right to communicate with local and state officials in the language of that ethnic minority.

According to data 22% of non-Estonians can communicate ‘well’ in Estonian, 22% ‘fairly’, 30% ‘a little’ and 26% ‘not at all’. Non-Estonians are generally disturbed by the lack of knowledge of Estonian, 32% are ‘very disturbed’, 24% are ‘fairly disturbed’, 20% are ‘a little disturbed’ and 24% are ‘not disturbed’. (Kruusvall 2000: 135) At least there is an obvious improvement in the knowledge of language, as in 1989 85% of the non-Estonians had no knowledge at all of the Estonian language. (http://www.einst.ee/society/ethnic.issues.htm) But nevertheless it seems rather strange, that although the majority of the non-Estonians is disturbed by their lack of knowledge of Estonian, they do not seem to be very eager to do something to improve their situation. The most probable cause for this is lack of motivation.

TABLE 3 How feasible are the Estonian language requirements for you that are necessary to obtain Estonian citizenship? (in %)

Assessments 1995 1996 - Completely feasible 5 7 - More or less feasible 15 19 - Basically not feasible 15 20 - Not feasible at all 19 25 - Difficult to say 8 11 - Not answered 38 18 (Source: Proos 2000: 117)

This table indicates that language knowledge is indeed a serious problem in Estonia, as almost 50% of the respondents have indicated that they would not be able to pass the citizenship exam due to linguistic reasons. The main barriers for language learning are the following: there is no environment to practice (46%), no money to pay for 41 courses (43%), no time and the language is difficult (39%). (Hallik 1999: 45) It can be read out of these numbers that Russians do not seem to be very willing to learn Estonian, as 39% say that they do not have any time or the language is difficult. Such an answer would probably seem rather ridiculous in for instance USA, or any other Western country for that matter, as if there is desire and need to study a language then lack of time and the level of difficulty of a language can hardly be any obstacles. These are rather excuses. Many Russians still hang on to the fact that most Estonians (especially the older generations) are able to speak Russian and thus they do not feel an urgent need to learn Estonia. However, for the purpose of the integration process to function better than it has so far, it is important to motivate the Russian-speakers to learn Estonian.

The Estonian government took official action concerning the issue of language only a few years ago, when the Language Learning Strategy for Non-Estonian Population was adopted by the Estonian Government on 21 April 1998. The strategy proceeds from the standpoint that Estonian is the official language but the functioning of other relevant languages in Estonia must be guaranteed as well. The aim of the strategy is to promote integration in the society and to diminish previously dominating tendencies of separation. The strategy is planned for years 1998-2012 and it stipulates that the Estonian state will finance the language learning mainly through educational system.

It is a paradox that although the Estonian language as an official language should integrate the society, in Estonia’s multi-ethnic environment it works as a culturally, socially and politically segregating factor. Difficulties in getting Estonian citizenship that are due to poor knowledge of Estonian do not let Russians take an active part in the political life, which deepens their insecurity. Solution could be brought through the educational system. (Estonian Human Development Report 1997: 63) The non- participation of a large number of the adult population in political processes on a national level has provoked questions about the nature of democracy in Estonia. It is easy to understand that absence of a common language is also a serious obstacle for the emergence of a truly multicultural society. 42

3.3.5 The issue of education

When talking about the issue of education, according to the former Minister of Education, Peeter Kreitzberg, the question for Estonia is whether in the future we want Russians who do not have an ethnicity and a culture and whom we try by all possible means to assimilate into Estonians or we want Russians who are Estonian citizens with their own ethnic and cultural identity. (Kirch & Kirch 1996: 57) This can be interpreted as arguing that although Russians need to learn Estonian in school in order to manage better in the Estonian-language public life, an attempt at forcing only Estonian language education on the Russian-speaking population at some stage will create a situation where a large segment of the population is torn away from their roots. As such a situation would create potential threats to the orderly functioning of the Estonian society as a whole, a middle-way should be searched where non- Estonians would be able to receive a good knowledge of Estonian language while having the possibility to preserve their culture and identity through partly Russian- language education as well. This middle-way strategy would comply with John Rex’s multicultural education as well that stresses that it is important to both create equal possibilities for people competing in the public sphere and guarantee the preservation of minority traditions, culture and values.

The Elementary and Gymnasium Law (15.09.1993) stipulates that ‘Estonian is the language of instruction in schools. Other languages may be used as the language of instruction in elementary school. Curriculums should be organized in way to ensure that by the year 2007 elementary school graduates will speak Estonian fluently enough to be able to continue their education in Estonian.’ (see Vetik 1999a: 93-94) At first the intention was start transition to Estonian-language secondary education in the academic year 2000/2001. However, now it has been decided that state and municipal schools will begin the transition to Estonian instruction in the academic year 2007-2008 at the latest. This will be a gradual process by the end of which 60% of the classes should be taught in Estonian while the remaining 40% can remain in Russian. Under such a system the Estonian educational system would be able to fulfill all the three functions of a modern educational system, proposed by Rex – selection, transmission of skills and transmission of moral values. In this way it could be 43 guaranteed that after finishing secondary education Russian children would be able to continue their further education in Estonian-language establishments of higher education without language barriers while at the same time Russians would be able to study some subjects in their mother-tongue as well. Although this model would not mean totally Estonian-language education and the Russian-speaking children would be able to begin their education in Russian, the Russian-speaking population is still not happy about the planned changes. They still prefer Russian-language secondary education, which in a way can be considered rather strange because the proposed model of 60/40 would guarantee Russian youth much better educational and job possibilities in the Estonian society. However, the idea of bilingual secondary education has received support also on an international level. The European Union Commission, for instance, says in its ‘Agenda 2000’ document, ‘In the field of education, Estonia will offer state-financed Russian-language education on all levels. This system should be preserved in the future without time limits.’

Today there are approximately 110 Russian-language schools in Estonia. The level of Estonian-language training in these are poor due to lack of financial means and human resources. Approximately 50 per cent of the teachers’ staff are trained teachers. The government has taken action in order to attract teachers to these jobs by establishing a “state language teacher”-post. Higher salaries (compared to what other teachers receive) have been used to motivate employment in Russian-language schools. However, this campaign has attracted far less teachers than needed. (Jonsson 1999: 13)

In 1997 a very interesting project ‘The Education of Russian-Speaking Students Of Estonia in Public Administration’, was launched in Estonia. The project is aimed at helping the Estonian government to carry out the policy of ethnic integration, specifically the integration of the non-Estonian youth into the republican society and the formation of the local Russian-speaking elite, knowing the Estonian language, having a specialty of a civil servant and being loyal to the country. More concretely, at the beginning the project aimed at training 5 Russian-speaking students from Ida- Virumaa (North-East Estonia), supported by the government of Great Britain, and 11 Russian-speaking students from Ida-Virumaa, supported by the government of Norway for civil service at local governments within 4 years. These 16 students had to 44 go through separate entrance exams from the Estonian applicants at Tallinn University of Educational Sciences, meaning that they only had to compete among Russian- speakers. In addition to studies in public administration, the studies include intensive teaching of Estonian during the first year, so that starting from the second year Russian students would already be able to take all courses in Estonian together with Estonians. After finishing the university the young people will return to Ida-Virumaa to work at local governments.

It is important to point out that lately there has been quite a lot of self-regulating action from the side of non-Estonians in the sense that more and more parents send their children to Estonian schools in order to secure a better future for their offspring who after graduation have no problems with speaking Estonian. Such cases are very significant for integration as in this way non-Estonians get aquatinted with Estonian culture and traditions, even Estonian way of thinking which will hopefully make fears about losing their identity through integration vanish.

3.3.6 Media consumption

The consumption of media in Estonian society is characterized by a noticeable ethnic- linguistic differentiation. The most frequent orientations of media consumption among the Estonians are the local + national media and the international + national + (in most cases) local media. Among non-Estonians the predominant combination is that of the Russian media and (Russian-language) Estonian media. An overwhelming majority of the Russian-speaking population in Estonian actively watches Russian TV channels. (Vihalemm 1999: 51)

60% of non-Estonians do not read Estonian newspapers at all, 53% do not listen to Estonian radio, 49% do not watch Estonian broadcasts. At the same time 65% of non- Estonians would like it if there were more Russian-language broadcasts and broadcasts with Russian subtitles. (Kruusvall 2000:135) As only every tenth non- Estonian reads Estonian Russian-language newspapers and every third listens to Estonian Russian-language radio, they are actually more informed about what is going on in Russia than in Estonia shows a questionnaire conducted by Saar Poll. The result 45 of such media consumption is that only 1/3 of the aliens get the necessary information about for example citizenship, residency permits, new laws and changes in laws that they should through media. (Alvela, Putting, Püttsepp, Postimees, November 30, 1999)

Russians living in Estonia get their information firstly form Russian media and secondly they base their knowledge about different issues on all kinds of rumors they hear. (Zukerman, Postimees, November 30, 1999) Such a situation should be impermissible in a country that strives for the accession to the European Union as an advanced, democratic country. Estonia urgently needs a Russian-language newspaper that would simultaneously be issued in Estonian. The aim of such a newspaper would be to explain to Estonians Russian viewpoints and vice versa. Now it is a case that Estonians and Russians often receive contradictory information and reasonable integration is an extremely difficult task to achieve under such circumstances.

However, the Russian orientation, i.e. the intensive following of Russian TV channels has significantly decreased in the years 1993-1997, and has remained relatively stable in the following period, showing a small increasing tendency. The group of media users with an exclusive Russian orientation has decreased in the years 1993-1999 from 38% to 21% of Estonia’s adult population. (Vihalemm 1999: 50)

In the end of 1999 the former director of Estonian TV, Toomas Lepp, had a plan to start synchronous translation into Russian for Estonian TV broadcasts, but this idea failed due to state policy of savings. Good idea but very difficult to put in practice. The other point is that integration into Estonian society should take place on the basis of Estonian language and those who have so far refused to learn Estonian will not start because Estonian ‘issues’ are brought to them in their mother-tongue. Until it is possible in Estonia to manage in another (meaning Russian) language, fill in forms and turn to every official etc. the number of those who know Estonian will not grow significantly even among the Russian youth.

A media monitoring conducted in 1999 by the Non-Estonians’ Integration Foundation showed that from Russian-language media Estonia looked like from a distorted mirror: it was claimed that the state will begin to assimilate aliens (aliens and non- 46

Estonians have the same meaning), will destroy the Russian Orthodox church, nationalists will come to power and a crisis will start in economy. What is behind such false claims? Intentional attempt to hinder integration, clear unprofessionality or is it the fault of those in power that they have been unable to explain their actions and intentions to the non-Estonian readers? However, there is one connecting line between the two media – according to both the state is responsible for solving all integration problems. (Kõuts, Eesti Päevaleht, May 4, 2000) This does not fit the positions of the Estonian state which has taken the stand that integration is mostly up to an individual, state only has to provide favorable conditions.

3.4 Four acculturation strategies

So, taking all the above-mentioned problems into account, the question is: how should Estonia deal with its minority problem? According to Estonian sociologist Mati Heidmets, there are four different possible strategies for relating non-Estonians to the Estonian State (see also Berry 1998):

(a) Assimilation - non-Estonians become national Estonians without retaining any of their original ethnic characteristics such as language, culture, mentality, etc.; (b) Integration - non-Estonians get accustomed to Estonian language, culture and history, while at the same time preserving their own ethnic identity; (c) Separation - non-Estonians remain isolated from Estonian society and have an uncertain perception of their own and their children’s future; (d) Confrontation - non-Estonians believe that they can only improve their situation by strictly opposing the Estonian State (Vetik 2000: 10).

When deciding between these options, several aspects have to be kept in mind. First of all it has been proven in history that separation and confrontation cannot be considered effective strategies of dealing with the problem of minorities. And secondly, when deciding between assimilation and integration, it is important to bear in mind the current situation. Although it was possible in the past for Western countries to use assimilation as their nation-building strategy in creating a unified society on the basis of domination of one group, it has to be understood that the world today is not what it was a hundred 47 and more year ago. As minority rights, the value of diversity, the issue of identity etc. are becoming more and more significant, it does not seem to be very sensible to try and tear people away from their roots through a process of assimilation into the majority culture. Thus, Estonia needs to find an optimum balance between creation of unity and preservation of differences. Considering these peculiarities of Estonia’s situation the Framework document of the United Nations Development Program’s Integration Project of 1997 stated clearly that assimilation in Estonia would be undesirable for two reasons: 1) moral: we do not wish our identity to be taken away from us and thus we do not wish it for other either 2) practical: attempts at melting are often contra-productive because they cause conscious resistance and defiance. (Muulaste integratsioon…1997: 3)

It was decided that the most reasonable option for Estonia would be integration and one of the basis for the Estonian model of integration became the acceptance that Estonian society will never be as one-nation-centered as it was in 1920-30s. (Muulaste integratsioon…1997: 3)

3.5 Integration of non-Estonians

Kartin Saks has defined integration very simply (Saks, Eesti Päevaleht, March 2, 2000): ‘one country and many cultures’ or ‘integration means both Estonians and non- Estonians getting rid of the fears of losing their culture and the vanishing of their nation.’

Basically the integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society is their adaptation to the requirements of a democratic nation-state. (Pettai 2000: 69) Integration of Estonian society could be defined also as co-operation between different ethnic groups in the interests of Estonia, learning more about each other yet maintaining one’s national identity.

According to Project VERA initiated by the Ministry of Education project the aim of integration is the formation of a community of aliens who represent two cultures, 48 characterized by bilingual aliens, bilateral tolerance of differences, acceptance of the roles of minority and majority in the society, domination of state identity over national identity, domination of common interests over differences, desegregation, mutual trust. (Kirch M. 1998: 24)

Integration itself can be seen as a ‘work in progress’ rather than an achieved (achievable) project with issues of governance and citizenship are key challenges of the integration process.

Actually integration is taking place in Estonia, a number of aliens have successfully switched into the society here, but the problem is that more than eight years after independence this process has not become massive and the dominating tendency is still separation and differentiation. Integration cannot be a chain of centrally managed actions. As it is life strategy freely selected by each individual, it can be only influenced from the outside by creating either favorable conditions or barriers. Thus the state has to create a favorable political environment for integration by expressing state’s interest in the matter by adopting a concrete action plan. The state also has to create a certain favorable legal context, ensure financial resources etc. The main actor is still an individual and his/her willingness to integrate. (Laius 2000: 20-21)

Both the structural factors affecting the Estonians and non-Estonians and their divergent historical and cultural experiences, as well as having lived as rather separate communities during the Soviet period, serve to the complicity of ethnic relations in today’s Estonia and make integration process not ordinary, simple and fast.

Its is also important to point out that Estonia has to survive two integration processes: 1) the integration of local non-Estonians into the Estonian society and 2) integration of Estonia into the European Union. These two parallel integration processes will be a serious test for a such a small nation as it tries to maintain the most important features of its identity, culture and traditions. The more integrated Estonia is internally and thus the more stable state it is, the sooner will Estonia be recognized as an equal partner in Europe. 49

The Estonian-Russian sociologist, Aleksei Semenov, has made a distinction between two different ways of integration. On of the ways is ‘integration through participation’, while the other is ‘integration for participation’. According to Semenov, generally speaking, both ways can be characterized as democratic, but the difference consists in the specific attitude of the Estonian government towards the non-Estonians who did not get automatic citizenship. In the first version non- Estonians are perceived as sufficiently responsible and loyal to participate in public life, and by this way they become integrated in the Estonian society. In the second version – the one that has actually been implemented in Estonia – the non-Estonians must first prove their loyalty before they are permitted to participate in public life on equal terms with the citizens of Estonia. According to Semenov, the first version must be preferred as ‘the right to citizenship of ethnic minorities in Estonia must be the basic requirement for integration’. (Vetik 1999a: 66) But then we have to consider that many non-Estonians did not support Estonian independence and they are not necessarily loyal to the Estonian state.

Like mentioned above, Estonian officials were quite slow in developing a state policy for the integration of non-Estonians. Up to 1998, the Estonian government and state authorities had not issued any definite messages to non-Estonians about their future intentions and preferred developments. There was no official integration policy. As a result, the separation of two communities deepened. Some analysts defined the established situation as “two societies in one country”.

However, the multicultural shift in the ethnopolicy of the Estonian authorities in the second half of 1990s is creating new opportunities. In the summer of 1997 the Estonian government appointed a Minister without portfolio to be responsible for ethnic relations. The new Minister established an expert Commission to formulate proposals and suggestions on how to integrate non-Estonians. One result was the publication of Integrating non-Estonians into the Estonian Society: Setting the Course. The concerted impact of this development was that the integration of non-Estonians was placed high on the political agenda in Estonia. (Vetik 2000: 11) In 1998 the Non-Estonians’ Integration Foundation was established, that is a non-profit agency charged with implementing the integration policy of Estonian government. 50

On February 10, 1998 Estonian Government adopted a document titled the Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: The Principles of Estonia’s National Integration Policy. This was the first time since restoring independence when the State has defined its position and goals on the Russian issue. The integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society is defined there as the main goal of Estonian minority policy. The document states: ‘the changed internal and external situation requires that Estonia’s policy on non-Estonians take a new step forward. This step must be based on our current national and social interests, the goal of ensuring rapid modernization of society in the context of accession to European Union, while preserving both stability and a commitment to the protection and continued development of Estonian culture’. (Mitte-eestlaste integratsioon…1998: 1)

The goals of the policy included ‘a significant reduction in the number of persons with undetermined citizenship, a substantial breakthrough in teaching of the official language and real participation of non-Estonians in Estonian society.’ The basic idea of the document was the need of a change in attitudes; i.e. non-Estonians should no longer be viewed as a problem but rather as a resource. This was an important step as it is important from the standpoint of multiculturalism that there is willingness from the side of the majority to see their minorities as somebody who can be beneficial for the development of the society.

Integration will not come about without the active participation of the non-Estonians. It is important for the non-Estonian organizations in Estonia to be involved in the process. A number of them exist in Estonia at present, notable among which are the Estonian Association of Nationalities, the President’s Round Table of Minorities, that has been a central forum for exchanging ideas on issues concerning the non- Estonians, and a score of ethnic societies, some of which have joined under an umbrella organization called Lyra.

Up to now it has been the case that the problem of integration is dealt with by Estonian-language organizations while the Union of Ethnic Minorities (Rahvusvähemuste Ühendus) and several Russian-language organizations in Ida- Virumaa have not developed a concrete role in deepening the process of integration. Not enough integration has taken place on organizational level, the tendency is to act 51 on their own or together with same language organizations. There should be much more cooperation between the majority and minorities in order for the integration process to develop and function properly.

Integration will only be successful provided that non-Estonians are prepared and motivated to integrate, provided that Estonians are prepared to accept non-Estonians as equal members of society, and provided that the state created conditions for integration. At the moment there are shortcomings in all three aspects.

In March 2000 Estonian Government adopted a new integration program: ‘Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007’. General points of emphasis in integrating Estonian society have been laid out as follows: 1) individual centrality- free choice, state has to provide favorable conditions 2) emphasis on the youth –kindergartens, schools, youth centers, camps etc, the aim is to create a citizenry that considers Estonia home and values it. 3) Integration as challenge to development – it is important to understand that integration does not exclude conflict and contradictions, thus tolerance and openness become very important. Challenge to both Estonians and non-Estonians 4) Sense of security as the basis of integration – both, the majority and the minority have to feel that their identities are not threatened. (Riiklik programm 2000: 18- 19)

The principal idea of integration politics shaped by Estonian officials has been aiming to avoid ‘collective options’, to give for everybody a personal chance for making choices and at the same time a chance for a new state of screenings. This is a similarity with the Swedish policy where migrants are expected to make personal choices and to integrate as individuals, not as groups. Although Swedish citizenship policy does not have a language requirement, it could be argued in the Estonian case that setting language requirements is just a way to break the isolation of new residents and improve the prospects for at least partial adaptation into Estonian society.

Non-Estonians should realize that integration is not a change in ethnic identity, integration is not losing something, but obtaining new qualities necessary for managing in Estonia today. (Heidmets & Lauristin 1998: 14) If all non-Estonians 52 understood that obtaining Estonian citizenship will give them additional possibilities and also that having Estonian citizenship would not mean that they have lost or changed their identities and roots, the integration process would be much faster and less problematic. It is the task of Estonian state to get through to non-citizens and prove the above-mentioned.

Nevertheless, comparing with early 90s today the situation in Estonian society has changed. If we look at the opinion polls, one can observe more liberal and pragmatic attitudes than in early 90s. The majority of Estonians are realizing that the Russian minority will remain and that it is beneficial for both sides to have normal relations. Also majority of non-Estonians have realized that there is no alternative but to integrate into Estonian society, accepting their bilingual and bicultural status.

3.5.1 Estonian version of a multicultural society

Formation of a multiculturalism Estonia means the strengthening of a local association in quickly changing conditions. Success presumes congruity between modern public standards (nation-state and state language) and postmodern type of culture (globalization and individualization). (Ruutsoo 2000: 191)

The vision of a multicultural Estonia is one of society where there are no more legal barriers (Estonian citizenship is dominating), no substantial language barriers (almost everyone is fluent in Estonian), and the cultural differences are considered not so much as a problem but as an advantage. Barriers to be removed are - psychological ones (different attitudes toward central political issues), language barriers (knowledge of Estonian) and legal barriers (being an Estonian citizen). (Heidmets 1998: 271)

As an outcome of the integration process, some kind of Estonian version of a multicultural society might be envisioned, that is represented in the Government Program ‘Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007’. It based on John Rex’s model of multiculturalism that outlines the separation between the public sphere (where unity is required) and the private sphere (where diversity is allowed and even encouraged). The Estonian model also stresses the importance of unity in public 53 sphere (in politics, law and economics) that also means the use of the official state language while allows cultural, linguistic etc. diversity in the private sphere. This model might be characterized by three essential moments: cultural pluralism, strong common core and preserving of Estonian culture. These three characteristics could be described as follows:

1) Cultural pluralism. Non-Estonians living in Estonia have been guaranteed the possibilities for preserving their language and cultural peculiarities above all through receiving mother-tongue education and promoting the activities of cultural societies. This also involves the introduction of their cultural peculiarities and its achievements in Estonian society. Thus, one of the objectives of integration is the adaptation of the cultures of different ethnic groups into Estonian society, not their assimilation into Estonian culture. Distinction of integration from linguistic and cultural assimilation lies in two simultaneously occurring processes: the preservation of the language and cultural heritage of the ethnic group on one hand and integration around a strong common ground in Estonian society on the other. 2) Strong common core. It seems that in a small country multicultural society is effective only if there is a strong common course for all participants. By common course the shared values and attitudes, accepted behavioral and interaction models in everyday life are meant. Only having strong common course can multiculturalism survive. 3) Preservation and development of Estonian culture. In a social dialogue all cultures functioning in Estonia are equal. However, in relations with the state the position of Estonian culture differs somewhat from minority cultures as the idea of the Estonian state is to maintain and develop Estonian cultural space. Estonia is a multicultural society and should guarantee possibilities of development to minority cultures but in the sense of a common cultural space Estonia is and will remain Estonian-centered. (Riiklik programm 2000: 19-20)

As it is an important factor in the model of multiculturalism, the proportion between unity-difference, homogeneity-heterogeneity is also determined in the Estonian integration program. The government program specifies the optimum proportion between unity-difference in Estonian society as follows: Two processes shape the essence of integration of Estonian society: on one hand, social homogenization of the 54 society based on knowledge of Estonian language and acquiring Estonian citizenship, and on the other, preserving ethnic differences through recognizing minority cultural rights. Besides, the homogenization of the society is a two-sided process – the integration of both Estonians and non-Estonians around a strong common ground in Estonian society (ibid: 5).

The further description of integration processes in the program specifies what kind of unification of the society and preservation of which differences is regarded. For that purpose the following main goals of integration are distinguished:

I. Linguistic-communicative integration, meaning reproduction of a common field of information and an Estonian language environment in Estonian society under the conditions of diversity and tolerance; II. Legal-political integration, meaning molding a population that is loyal to the Estonian state and diminishing the number of people without Estonian citizenship; III. Socio-economic integration, meaning achieving an equal ability of competition and social mobility of members of Estonian society irrespective of their nationality (Riiklik programm 2000: 16).

If for Estonian newspapers integration means above all aliens’ knowledge of the state language, then the Russian-language press stresses the need for legal-political integration - to make the laws concerning non-Estonians less strict. (Kõuts, Eesti Päevaleht, May 4, 2000)

According to a media survey the frequency of occurrence of problems associated with the different spheres (in percentages) looks as follows: Estonian-language media – linguistic-communicative (49), legal-political (41), socio- economic (10) Russian-language media – linguistic-communicative (25), legal-political (61), socio- economic (14). (ibid)

This shows clearly that Estonians and non-Estonians have different understandings of the problems Estonians society is facing when integration is concerned. Under such 55 circumstances it is quite difficult to draw up and implement policies directed towards minority integration.

3.5.2 General attitude towards integration

The key to integration is a change in attitudes. First of all it means the acceptance on the part of Estonians of the idea of constructing an integrated multicultural society in Estonia in which ‘Estonian’ does not mean one’s ethnicity, but one’s nationality. For non-Estonians this means overcoming the complex of being a second-class citizen, shedding illusions which are (or at least were not so long ago) cherished by many (about joining Russia or instituting two official languages), accepting a not so cheerful prospect to the Russian spirit of having to make a serious effort. (http://www.einst.ee/society/integration.htm)

‘ … cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economical ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians…’ (Huntington 1993)

The statement of a Russian academic Nikita Moissejev supports this argument: ‘Russian integration into Estonians lifestyle and culture is proceeding with difficulty and can hardly ever be completed fully. (…) A different personality type and a different confessional tradition are to blame.’ Russians tend to be collectively-minded while Estonians are more individualists. I think Lutheranism borrowed from the Germans is ill-suited to the Russian character.’ (Kirch M. 1994: 12)

A negative evaluation to state policies so far is given also by Dmitri Klenski, an Estonian citizen and a correspondent of a Russian newspaper Den za dnjom who argues: ‘According to surveys at least half of the non-Estonians never intend to learn Estonian. On such background talks about integration seem hollow and all this creates an impression of a cheap political game. Estonians and Russians just have to learn 56 how to live better together in the Estonian Republic. I do not like that I am integrated. It should be a natural process. I am a free person in a free country and I do not like the idea of something being done with me. Before we start to talk about integration, favorable conditions should be established. It is time to stop talking about learning Estonian and do something about it, start teaching and learning. If the level of teaching Estonian in Russian schools would be the same as teaching Russian in Estonian schools during the Soviet times, the problem would be solved. In fact the attempt in Estonia is to show that Russians are not discriminated, instead of doing something to solve the so-called ‘Russian issue’. At the same time it is obvious that if Russians want to have a say in Estonia, they have to be able to do it in Estonian. Those who do not realize that, suffer themselves.’ (see Kurve, Luup, January 24, 2000)

Estonia has launched a public advertising campaign to promote the virtues of diversity. The media campaign was launched on March 1, 2000 and intended for showing that ethnicity does not matter, different people can live side by side, work happily together etc. without having problems stemming from their ethnic background.. The campaign is financed by Non-Estonians Integration Foundation, EU PHARE, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, UN Development Program and Open Estonian Foundation. Advertisements were on streets, in newspapers and on TV. The slogan reads: “Many nice people. Integrating Estonia. Estonian is home for all of us. Irregardless of nationality or ethnicity.” Attitudes towards the campaign vary largely from the very positive to the very negative side. Here are some comments to the media campaign published in Eesti Päevaleht on March 11, 2000:  ‘For me, as a Russian this is ethnically insulting. Am I toothpaste that is being sold to Estonians?’ (Aleksei, Russian).  ‘Cool! I think it worked for the masses, people started quoting the theme of many nice people and making positive jokes. And I think that there are many cool Russians.’ (Piret, Estonian)  ‘First reaction: Finally! Excellent! Estonians are finally taught that there can be no barriers within the population of Estonia. Otherwise there is no future for the country.’ (Erik, Estonian) 57

 ‘ These advertisements are pure business where Estonians become rich using Russians’ (Zoja, Russian). (Sikk, Eesti Päevaleht, March 11, 2000)

From these statements it is easy to conclude that although the campaign was intended for both target groups – Estonians and non-Estonians – it had a positive effect only on the first one. Russians’ reaction was that they are being humiliated. Although it is arguable whether it also applies to the Estonian society as a whole, these comments indicate that willingness and readiness of integration exists on the Estonian side while Russians seem to feel that they are being integrated, not that they themselves can choose to integrate and due to that they have more hostile and skeptical attitudes.

TABLE 4 How successful has the integration process been so far?

All respondents Estonians Non-Estonians No % No % No % Very successful 13 1,1 9 1,4 4 0,8 Rather successful 336 29,4 242 37,2 94 19,1 Rather unsuccessful 497 43,5 253 38,9 244 49,6 Totally unsuccessful 100 8,8 16 2,5 84 17,1 Difficult to say 196 17,2 130 20,0 66 13,4 Total 1142 100,0 650 100,0 492 100,0 (Source: Eesti rahvussuhete seireuuring, March 2000)

The table indicates the same trend as presented in the statements of Russians and Estonians above. Although the overall view is that the integration process has been rather unsuccessful that successful, nevertheless Estonians are generally more content with the way integration has proceeded while an overwhelming majority of the non- Estonians think that integration so far can be evaluated as unsuccessful. What can be concluded from the data in the table is clear: Estonian has a very long way to go before a satisfactory level of integration will be achieved.

3.6 Criticism towards Estonia 58

Ever since adopting its citizenship policy in 1991, Estonia has been under international scrutiny because of Russian Federation accusations that the policy violates the human rights of Soviet-era immigrants in Estonia and claims that Russians in Estonia are discriminated against.

In a letter to Siim Kallas, former Minister of Foreign Affiars, Max van der Stoel, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities said: ‘As applicants have to use the Estonian language in answering the questions about Estonian Constitution, I make a plea for making the examination concerning the Constitution considerably easier. As far as the Estonian language test is concerned, I have noted that knowledge of 2500 words is required. Here too, I express hope that the test will be made easier.’ (Van der Stoel 1995)

Max van der Stoel has also recommended that Estonians should give automatic citizenship to children who were born in Estonia after independence, but whose parents do not yet have any citizenship. But here a counter-argument could be that why should Estonia do something that is not common European practice, meaning that unlike for example USA, most European countries do not grant jus soli. Also he has said that the language and citizenship tests should be simplified for the elderly and handicapped. Actually Estonia has followed both of these recommendations. Since 1995 elderly people do not have to pass neither the written exam on Estonian language nor there is a requirement for an oral exam. And children of stateless parents, born in Estonia after 1991 can be recognized as citizens since 1999.

Neither international law in general, nor international human rights are entirely clear on citizenship requirements of the kind that have emerged in Estonia. While the approach taken may not directly violate any specific rule of positive international law, it runs so strongly counter to a number of principles of modern human rights that the cumulative effect must be to consider them violations. (Eide 1992) Although all international observers who have been to Estonia claim that there is no systematic abuse of the human rights in Estonia, and that if there is any discrimination at all, it can be detected only on personal, not state level, they are nonetheless concerned about the large number of non-citizens and emphasize the importance of support for their integration. 59

Regardless of the view of the observers, accusations of discrimination and human rights abuse against Russians in Estonia are common in the Russian press. However, sociologists from Moscow’s own ‘Center of Sociological Research for Studying the Situation of Compatriots’ reported that in December 1994, 83% of those questioned denied the existence of ethnic discrimination in Estonia. (http://www.einst.ee/society/ethnic.issues.htm) And considering that according to surveys there has been at least some improvement in the minority situation in Estonia, it can be expected that this percentage would be even higher today.

On a conference, arranged by the Danish Foreign Policy Institute in November 1997, the Commissioner of the CBSS on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Ole Espersen, gave expression to the fact that while in 1991 there was a general understanding among Western and Scandinavian countries for the many problems confronting the Baltic States, there is now less patience and understanding for the continued lack of solution of the citizenship problems. (Vetik 1999a: 67) The view that a change in attitudes towards non-Estonians and alterations in the citizenship policy are needed is shared also by Will Kymlicka. When he came to Estonia in October 1999 he frankly told the government it had to do more to help Russians preserve their language and culture and not fear such moves would weaken the dominant position of ethnic Estonians.

In general evaluations today differ from highly positive to extremely critical with the critical view often dominating. While Estonian politicians consider the situation, especially when reporting to foreigners, rather good, there are also quite skeptical messages. A special report by the Forced Migration Project of the Open Society Institute (1997) about Estonia and Latvia defines the situation in both countries as a “socio-political schizophrenia, which would be debilitating for any country, but it could be catastrophic for a state with fledging democratic and market economic institutions.” (Heidmets 1998: 268)

According to Anu Reaolo (1998) the difficulties relating to the ethnic problems and the steps made by Estonians to peacefully resolve the problems created by the unrestricted Soviet-era Russian migration into the Baltic countries, are often 60 underestimated and misinterpreted. From the position of Western standards and experiences, it seems easy to recommend that Estonians accept a state ‘with the multiple complementary identities’ and full guarantees for political participation to all Russian-speakers. From the inside, the question of Russian political influence on Estonian policies has a different focus: how legitimate would the state be for Estonians, if it cannot guarantee their independence from Russia and the development of an Estonian-language culture, education and public life in the Estonian state? The strict naturalization procedures in the Estonian Citizenship Law are focused in the knowledge of Estonian language and culture. Their objective is to help Estonians and Russians overcome a barrier of mutual non-recognition.

To conclude with positive tones, which can be even a bit exaggerated, a speech given by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott in Tallinn in January 2000 will be cited: ‘We, in Washington, all recognize that Estonia has made real and impressive progress on the thorny questions of citizenship and naturalization. In addition to putting new laws on the books, you are creating new facts on the ground: Russians and Russian-speakers are increasingly active all across the spectrum of Estonian political life, including in parliament and the Tallinn Town Council.’

3.7 Estonia compared to the West

Estonia is in a good position when developing its integration policy as it can learn from the mistakes states have made in the past and so it should. Taking it into account that both the described policies of Germany and France have failed as the Turks will not leave Germany and the Moslems will not become French, it is clear that it would be very unwise to expect the Russians to leave Estonia and just as unwise to try to totally assimilate them into the Estonian society. Luckily, Estonian officials have realized that and a policy of multiculturalism has been developed that falls in between these two extreme strategies.

In principle it is difficult to compare Estonia to the West as the West itself does not have one secure model of dealing with ethnic-cultural diversity. Just like it is difficult to take over policies from one country to another especially if these countries have 61 different histories and economic situations. And also, it could be argued that Estonia is an extremely peculiar case whose minority problem does not have anything in common with Western countries except the fact that it is a problem. Nevertheless, the counter-argument is that it is always possible to compare things (in this case countries) even if the final conclusion would indeed be that they have absolutely nothing in common.

According to the experiences of Western democracies the best way to guarantee the loyalty of minorities is accepting their clearly differential ethnicity instead of attacking it. This was the case when Canada adopted the federal system that gives Quebec significant linguistic rights and regional autonomy. Canada has given up the idea of eliminating minority identities and the same applies to Estonia, at least when the current integration program is rightfully implemented. It derives from a person’s psychology that if he/she does not feel threatened it is much easier to guarantee loyalty.

Estonia is similar with the western model of integration that emphasizes the fact that integration should be a two-way street. On one hand it emphasizes the need of Russians to learn the state language and participation in common public institutions. On the other hand it stresses that this does not mean giving up their traditional identities and successful integration presumes that Estonians would be more open and tolerant towards ethnic peculiarities.

According to Will Kymlicka, Estonian integration-policy is moving in the same general direction that Western democracies do. Just like in Western countries, the nation-building policy in Estonia has been altered in a way to avoid potential unfairness towards minorities. But as the case of Russians in Estonia is not really comparable to the case of immigrants or minorities in any Western countries it is most natural that Estonia has adopted a peculiar policy that does not resemble any of the known models of Western countries.

Actually the non-Estonians in Estonia do have one common characteristic with Western minorities: namely, by the time of Estonian independence they had established their more or less complete public culture. Considering this similarity one 62 of the options for Estonia would be to adopt the Western model of multiethnic federation, something like Canada where the province of Quebec has special rights. In this case Russians should be allowed to preserve their own public institutions and own language meaning that Estonia would be a bicultural and bilingual state. Needless to say, this model is completely unthinkable for the majority of Estonians and this attitude is rather justified. Bilingualism in Western countries is adopted usually in order to lessen historical injustices, while in Estonian it would do quite the opposite – strengthen the injustice done to Estonia by the Soviet occupation. Therefore such a model would be completely out of question in Estonia.

When talking about divergences between Estonia and the West, one major difference in Estonian integration policy from the West should be pointed out – the approach is from the other side. If Western immigrants have never had their own institutions or even serious ideas of creating such institutions then Russians used to have them, thinking that such a situation would last forever. Thus it is a very unexpected for them having something that has been considered completely natural being not only attacked but also put to an end. It is one thing that the state does not help create separate public institutions for its minorities and a totally different thing if the state wants to close such institutions that have existed for decades and provided work for thousands of people.

Another peculiarity of Estonia is that most Western ethnic minorities do not have a neighboring country that they would like to unite or reunite with. Considering that the neighbor, in Estonia’s case, the Russian Federation, is or at least used to be very powerful, it poses a serious obstacle to the integration process in Estonia. Before integration can take place, Russians have to start identifying with the Estonian, not the Russian state.

Will Kymlicka has pointed out 5 preconditions that have caused the successfulness or unsuccessfulness of multiculturalism policies in the West (see Kymlicka 2000, 50- 53). The shortcomings and successes of Estonian integration process so far can be evaluated using these criteria. 1. Clarity about the rules of integration – immigrants have to know what is expected from them and they have to be sure these rules will not be changed in 63

order to create new barriers for integration. This is especially necessary when there is distrust between minorities and the majority, as is the case in Estonia. Although Estonia has taken steps forward since the inception of its first integration policy in 1998, there is still a problem with clarity. The policy adopted in 2000 includes a concrete action plan, but Estonians and non- Estonians still have quite different understandings about the way integration should proceed, its preconditions, needs and outcomes. This is proven by the different attitudes in Estonian and Russian-language media and also by the surveys conducted in Estonia. 2. Conditions for integration should be ‘scarce’ – linguistic and institutional integration, not common customs, traditions, religious belief, lifestyles etc. This is the difference between assimilation and multiculturalism. Estonian approves this standpoint, however, the Estonian version of multiculturalism seems to comprise more than in the West. According to Mati Heidmets: ‘common core means shared values and attitudes, accepted everyday behavioral and communication models’. In the West one might say that if there are shared values, attitudes and behavioral patterns there is no room left for multiculturalism. Multiculturalism presumes diversity in values, attitudes and behavioral patterns at any time, or to put it differently, multiculturalism can be defined as an attempt to recognize and foster diversity in values, attitudes and behavioral styles in the framework of public institutions that are based on a common language. More comprehensive integration policy is considered rather illiberal and also rather unrealistic in the West. It would be strange if immigrants would share the same pride or shame of national history that is felt by the natives. 3. Strong protection against discrimination – immigrants have to believe that they will be accepted as equal members, not only in public affairs but also in the non-official institutions of the civil society. This is in fact very difficult to guarantee as the state cannot have control over affairs that do not fall under the public sphere, over personal relation. Estonian policy claims that ‘trust is the best basis for integration’, but this refers only to the belief of Russians, that the Estonian state will accept them, but does not say what will the state do about non-official discrimination. However, despite the accusations of the Russian press, there seem to be less and less complaints from non-Estonians about 64

discrimination on ethnic basis and besides, even the most advanced democratic states are unable to guarantee that there would be no discrimination whatsoever in the private sphere. 4. Level of state support for integration – costs have to be distributed fairly. If state wants immigrants to know the language and history, possibilities have to be guaranteed to do this. If the state is unable to create favorable conditions, it has to lessen or give up its integration demands. It can be argued that Estonia neither is able to provide all the necessary resources nor willing to give up any of its demands. Due to that international community plays an important role in Estonia, as it is unable to provide the same resources for integration as the Western countries by itself. In this respect Estonia has to be grateful especially to the Scandinavian countries, the United Nations Development Program, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and European Union PHARE program. 5. Participation of the minorities in the integration process – this guarantees trust in the goals of the policy as minorities usually think that whatever the majority does it is not in their, but only in the majority’s best interest. Like it was indicated earlier, this is still a major problem in Estonia. The fact that non- Estonians are not satisfied with the way integration is proceeding should give them enough motivation to become more active in expressing their needs and being involved in policy development.

As can be concluded from the comparison between the five preconditions for the success of multiculturalism and the actual situation in Estonia, very much has to be done before Estonia will become a truly multicultural country. However, the most important step has been taken with the state officially recognizing the principles of multiculturalism in its integration policy program. This will hopefully lay a good basis for multicultural views becoming predominant in the wider society as well.

3.7.1 How does Estonia compare to Canada and Sweden?

At first glance Estonia does not seem to have very much in common with either Canada or Sweden. Canada is a traditional immigration nation where the two major 65 ethnicities, British and French, make up respectively 29 an 24 percent of the total population of approximately 30,7 million, whereas Sweden used to be a great expansionary power that today has 11% of immigrants in its total population of about 8,9 million. What could a small country like Estonia, with a total population of less than 1,5 million of which almost 35% is immigrants, possibly have in common these two?

However, if we take a closer look at the way minority-problems have been dealt with in Canada and Sweden, we can find aspects that are rather similar to the approach taken in Estonia’s last integration program.

The main elements of Canada’s multicultural policy are in fact very similar to the ones outlined in Estonia’s Governmental Program ‘Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007’. First of all the importance to avoid assimilation has been recognized in both countries. Secondly, both Estonia and Canada emphasize in their policy documents that it important to learn official language(s) to achieve full participation of all groups in the society. When Canada stresses that inter-group harmony and mutual acceptance should be increased and discriminatory attitudes broken down, Estonia recognizes as well that integration is a two-way street that has to be accepted by Estonians and non-Estonians alike. The need to obviate discrimination is self- evident. Estonia and Canada also claim that contact and sharing between different groups in the society is necessary. In Canada it is understood that it is just fine to be culturally different and a sense of security is given to all groups. Estonia strives for the same situation but until the wider society still has cultural prejudices it is a bug challenge to give all groups a sense of security. The main difference between these two countries probably lies in the fact that while Canada does not give preferential treatment to any culture, in Estonia Estonian culture has a somewhat different status from minority cultures in relations with the state.

When we look at Canada, it can be argued that Estonia is more similar to the French province of Quebec than Canada as a whole. For both Estonia and Quebec the survival of their culture and language are essential; while Quebec stresses ‘common public culture’, Estonia means basically the same by ‘strong common core’. Both principles expect immigrants to become active participants in common, respectively 66

Estonian and French-language institutions, give their share towards the maintenance of these institutions, and through this become full-fledged members of the society. The majority and the immigrants are expected to share basic values and political principles like democracy, human rights, respect for the constitution, but it is important that these do not include individual values and attitudes.

Sweden is similar to Estonia in a sense that sudden rise in immigration occurred after World War II, although the reasons behind it were very different. Unlike in Estonia and Canada, in Sweden there is no language requirement in acquiring citizenship. This is quite understandable as there is no fear of the vanishing of Swedish language on one hand and on the other, as the number of minorities is much lower, it is inevitable that they have to learn Swedish anyway, in order to be able to participate in the society, to get work, etc.

When we turn to the main principles of Swedish multiculturalism, namely equality, freedom of cultural choice and partnership, it can be maintained that these principles are valued in Estonia as well. The Estonian state strives for the creation of equal conditions for participation in the society for all ethnicities and freedom of cultural choice can be viewed as an aspect of one of the essential moments in Estonian last integration program – that is ‘cultural pluralism’. As for partnership, it can be considered yet another goal to be achieved in Estonia through the model of multiculturalism. Like it was shown above, so far there has been a lack of partnership and cooperation in Estonian society.

Integration in Sweden is remarkably centralized whereas in Estonia, at least up to very recently, integration has taken place more on local level and local initiative. However, now Estonian officials have realized that more state involvement is needed to make integration work, and the minimum a state should do is provide the necessary conditions for integration and eliminate existing barriers. In the Estonian version of multiculturalism, individual choice in emphasized and although Sweden views its immigrants as corporatist groups, they are also expected to integrate as individuals into Swedish society. In both countries the integration process is constantly monitored in order to determine what further steps are needed. 67

If to talk about lesson-drawing there are two important things Estonia should learn from the Swedish approach to minorities. The first one is that in Sweden minorities are not viewed as a problem, but rather as a resource. Considering that this attitude is one of the prerequisites to multiculturalism, Estonia should also try to move in that direction. Of course, at the same time it has to be understood, that such a condition is rather difficult to achieve in Estonia when its historical background and minority share in the total population are taken into account. The second aspect is the high involvement of Swedish minorities in all kinds of commissions and advisory councils. It is a good precondition for successful integration that minorities have the right of speaking in policy making process as it is important to make them realize that their opinion also counts and the state does not intend to do any harm to them. In Estonia minority-involvement is quite, but hopefully the situation will improve very soon.

As can be seen from the comparison of Estonia between Canada and Sweden, in theory the Estonian version of multiculturalism does not differ very much from these two ‘world leaders’ in multiculturalism. However, reality is another thing, as Estonia has not been able to put all the principles present in its integration program into practice yet. 68

CONCLUSION

In today’s globalizing and increasingly impersonal world that has caused people to turn back to their roots in search for their identity and belonging, the model of multiculturalism seems to be the best way to integrate minorities without too much opposition. If minorities perceive that taking part in the majority culture does not entail disappearance or subordination of their own culture, they will be much more willing to integrate into the society of their country of residence.

The multicultural framework with the separation of the public and private sphere seems to be especially indispensable for countries that have large minority communities like Estonia, where it would be basically impossible to assimilate them into the majority culture. Obviously it is easier to make the private sphere function properly, because it has always ‘been there’ and functioned as an agent for primary socialization on identification whereas the biggest problem in guaranteeing good functioning of the public sphere in Estonia seems to lie in acceptance and knowledge of the official language. Yet it is natural that having a common language of communication in the public sphere is necessary as all people need to know what is going on in the society and it is best if this information comes from a common information source to avoid misunderstandings or misinterpretations. In the Estonian case an additional cause for the imposing of one state language is of course fear about the disappearance of the Estonian language.

Although the model of multiculturalism would suit a heterogeneous country like Estonia, there are nevertheless quite many serious obstacles on Estonia’s way towards a multicultural society, where diversity would be valued by the whole society and viewed rather as a resource than a problem. In order for that to happen non-Estonians would have to, among many other things, start to identify more with the Estonian state, become more willing to learn the Estonian language, show more eagerness to acquire Estonian citizenship. These conditions, in turn, can be achieved only if Estonians are able to show that they are ready to accept non-Estonians as equals, as 69 partners in building a unified, mutually respective society. The responsibility of the Estonian state in this process would be in creating favorable conditions and eliminating existing barriers.

If we take into account the four preconditions for a multicultural society, presented by Berry, according to which there needs to be general acceptance of cultural diversity as a valuable resource, overall low levels of intolerance in the population, positive attitudes between different ethnic groups and a degree of attachment to the wider society, it is easy to conclude that if Estonia wants to complete its movement towards a multicultural society successfully, it is in desperate need of a change in attitudes. Although the Estonian state has recognized the value of these preconditions in its last integration program, there is a need for such attitudes developing in the whole society as well.

The good thing is that Estonia is in a lucky position because it has the possibility to learn from other countries’ successes or failures. Despite the fact that at first glance the situation in Canada or Sweden seemed to be rather different, there are still general lessons that can be learned from how these two countries have dealt with their multicultural essence. Like mentioned before, Estonia can learn from French Quebec how to be persistent in the fight for the survival of its language and culture; and possibly introduce more state-level involvement in integration and better representation for minorities like it is common in Sweden.

The main issue in Estonia is still that both Estonians and non-Estonians need to understand the necessity of integration and that it entails more benefits than losses. Although Estonia has taken an important step forward with adopting an integration policy for the years 2000-2007, that is based on the principles of multiculturalism, there is still a very long and probably difficult way to go before Estonia can claim to be a truly multicultural country. 70

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EESTI TEEL MULTIKULTUURILISE ÜHISKONNA SUUNAS

RESÜMEE

Tänapäeval on enamus maailma riike oma olemuselt pluralistlikud, nende rahvastikus on esindatud rohkem kui üks rahvus ja keel. Seda fakti illustreerivad järgnevad numbrid: vähem kui 10% kõigist ÜRO liikmesriikidest on etniliselt homogeensed ja umbes ühes kolmandikus kogu maailma riikidest ületab üks rahvusgrupp 50% kogu rahvastikust.

Arvestades, et sellistes tingimustes osutuks varem domineerinud vähemuste assimileerimise strateegia raskesti teostatavaks kui mitte võimatuks, on riigid sunnitud otsima uusi võimalusi oma vähemuste integreerimiseks. Ühe integratsiooni allvariandina on alates 1970ndatest aastatest aina enam populaarsust võitnud multikultuurilisuse mudel, mis väärtustab mitmekesisust samal ajal rõhutades võrdsust erinevate gruppide vahel. Selle mudeli üks eripärasid on era-ja avaliku sfääri eristamine, kusjuures esimeses vaadeldakse erinevuste säilitamist positiivsena, sest need rikastavad üldist kultuuriruumi, kuid teises peab domineerima ühtsus, kuna see garanteerib ühiskonna normaalse funktsioneerimise.

Võttes arvesse, et Eesti on oma viimases integratsiooniprogrammis, ‘Integratsioon Eesti ühiskonnas 2000-2007’, võtnud suuna multikultuurlisuse poole, on käesoleva bakalaureusetöö põhiline eesmärk välja selgitada peamise probleemid, mis seisavad ees Eesti teel saamaks multikultuuriliseks ühiskonnaks. Struktuuriliselt on töö jaotatud kolmeks peatükiks.

Esimeses peatükis antakse üldine ülevaade multikultuurilisuse kui vähemuste integreerimise mudeli esilekerkimisest, esitatakse erinevate autorite definitsioone multikultuurlisuse kohta ning seletatakse lahti multikultuurlisuse olemus. 76

Teine peatükk iseloomustab integratsioonipoliitikaid lääneriikides. Võrdlusmomendina Eestile on lisatud kahe riigi - Kanada ja Rootsi - multikultuurlisuse poliitika kirjeldused.

Kolmas ja kõige ulatuslikum peatükk käsitleb Eestit. Kõigepealt antakse ülevaade Eestist kui etniliselt heterogeensest riigist ja selle taga seisvatest põhjustest. Teiseks analüüsitakse peamisi faktoreid, mis mõjutavad integratsiooni Eestis. Antud töös on neid faktoreid välja toodud kuus: rahvastiku etniline koosseis, identiteet, kodakondsus, keel, haridus ja meediatarbimine, kuid loomulikult ei ürita autor väita, et see nimekiri on lõplik. Seejärel kirjeldatakse võimalikke integratsioonistrateegiaid ja Eesti senist integratsiooniprotsessi kulgu asetades peamist rõhku 2000.aasta märtsis vastuvõetud riiklikku integratsiooniprogrammile, mis sisaldab multikultuurlisuse elemente. Lisaks tuuakse välja elanikkonna suhtumine integratsiooni ning välisekspertide kriitika Eesti aadressil. Peatükk lõpeb Eesti integratsiooniprotsessi võrdlusega Läänega ning multikultuurilisuse poliitikatega Kanadas ja Rootsis.

Kokkuvõttes leiab autor, et tänapäeva globaliseeruvas maailmas, kus pöördumine tagasi oma juurte ja identiteedi juurde muutub aina olulisemaks, on multikultuurilisuse mudel koos era-ja valiku sfääri eristamisega parimaks lahenduseks vähemuste integreerimisel, sest väärtustab nii mitmekesisust kui ka võrdsust. Eriti oluline on see mudel riikide jaoks, milledes vähemus moodustab suhteliselt suure osa rahvastikust, nagu Eestis.

Vaatamata sellele, et analüüs toob esile suure hulga probleeme, mis vajaksid kõrvaldamist enne, kui Eestist võib saada tõeliselt multikultuuriline riik, on perspektiiv siiski positiivne. Seda eelkõige seetõttu, et Eesti riik on tunnustanud oma poliitikas multikultuurlisuse põhimõtteid ja nende sobivust Eesti kontekstis. Nüüd on riigi ülesanne garanteerida, et need põhimõtted muutuksid varem või hiljem domineerivaks ka ühiskonnas tervikuna. Selleks tuleb aga enne lahendada kodakondsuse, keele, hariduse, meediatarbimise ja identiteediga seonduvad probleemid ning eelkõige luua tingimused, et muutuks eestlaste ja mitte-eestlaste suhtumine üksteisesse. Oluline on mõista, et integratsioon on kahe-poolne protsess, mille toimimine on kasulik nii eestlastele kui ka mitte-eestlastele.

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