Selective Incapacitation and Public Policy

Selective Incapacitation and Public Policy Chapter 1

The chapter is an introduction to the book on imprisonment as a form of criminal punishment. The prison system of California was selected for analysis because of the disproportionate level of incarcerations as compared to the national rate. The impact of the “Three Strikes” law and the “Truth in Sentencing” legislation are cited by the author as part of the reason for California’s incarceration rate. A simulation model noted as substantially fictitious in terms of statistical relevance provides the basis for the authors need for a new model. 450 subpopulations are defined in the author’s model that seeks to analyze the likelihood an offender will transition through any of the six categories of the California criminal justice system. The author seeks to examine the efficacy of criminal sentencing policy in terms of selective incapacitation as a penal purpose and creates a simulation model that is built on fictitious qualities of another model.

Each chapter is summarized in the remainder of this first chapter.

Chapter 2 reviews the history of criminal punishment in the United States and the recent paradigm shift toward selective incapacitation. “Incapacitation promises to reduce the effects of crime in society not by altering either offender or social context, but by rearranging the distribution of offenders in society.” (p 7) The research in this chapter will focus on the notion of dangerousness as it applies to offenders rather than previous research on risk society or abstract conceptions of risk.

Chapter 3 provides the evolution of prison reform legislation that resulted in the dramatic increase in the California prison population.

Chapter 4 thoroughly reviews selective incapacitation as policy, especially with regard to career criminals, or habitual offenders.

Chapter 5 questions the efficacy of the selective incapacitation of repeat offenders to reduce the risk of crime to society. The chapter also evaluates the issue of dangerousness of an offender. She specifically takes issue with which factors were used to categorize a person into a level of dangerousness.

Chapter 6 introduces the author’s model of evaluation of the efficacy of selective incapacitation of danger offenders. The evaluation is introduced in terms of the prison population of offenders and not one specific offender as being dangerous. Previous models for US and Canadian prison systems are reviewed. The models are named JUSSIM and CANJUS and they evaluate the process and determinants of criminal careers. The methodology of Auerhahn’s approach is summarized, and a diagram of the criminal justice system components as factors considered in the likelihood for an offender to encounter is provided. Chapter 7 provides the results of the author’s model using “actual criminal justice data.” The data will measure the pre and post reform prison population by the standard of dangerous elements of offenders.

Chapter 8 evaluates the effects of the reform legislation- California’s Three Strikes law. A review of the processes and the outcomes of particular processes are provided in the chapter. The author states her evaluation fits into a radical realist project. The data analysis reveals an ineffective policy in terms of incapacitation of the dangerous offender. A brief overview of possible solutions to the inefficiencies is provided.

The conclusion of the chapter, in one sentence, says implications of the findings are provided in Chapter 9.

The author spends a substantial amount of the chapter qualifying her approach and refuting or ignoring the volumes of existing literature on the subject of prison reform policy. This hard-sell tactic made me feel like she was just jumping on the band wagon of publishing prison reform literature.

Auerhahn Ch. 2 Review

Purpose of criminal justice in Western societies -rehabilitation -deterrence -retribution -incapacitation

Chapter focus is to trace the origins and development of the prison as an institution of criminal punishment, as well as the penal paradigms and social justifications that underlie this development.

Paradigms defined by Thomas Kuhn as a constellation of group commitments to shared beliefs about the nature of a particular phenomenon (in this case, shared beliefs about the goals and expectations of criminal punishment).

Paradigm that society long held towards prison was that of rehabilitation, once that was proven impossible it moved towards deterrence.

The chapter gives us a quick history lesson in crime and punishment. By looking at Socrates and early Roman laws it was clear that punishment was not an attempt to retaliate on a past wrong doing, but it was intended to be forward looking and warn the offender and others what will happen if they are caught committing the same offense. Early prisons served to house those awaiting trial or death sentence, never was confinement a penalty. Prisons do not meet the deterrence paradigm because average citizens do not get to see offenders locked up all day.

All modern penal practices originated as inflictions on slaves then broadened out to the entire lower class, most punishments were monetary in nature unless the offender had no money, then they became corporal punishment.

Modern punishments focus on the mind and soul of the offender. in other words their own humanity. Modern incarceration developed in England with the loss U.S. colonies since the colonies were no longer available as a place to send convicts. This posed as a major problem for England due to the increase of vagrancy as the feudal system disappeared. Modern incarceration was viewed as neither correcting nor giving retribution. “A man eating tiger locked in a cage for a year will still want to eat a man when released."

The positivist school of thought taught that crime was not a result of free choice, but rather a result of social dislocations accompanied by rapid social change in postcolonial society. They believed that offenders could be re-educated and rehabilitated.

The last forty years in American criminal justice consisted in many paradigm shifts with incapacitation emerging as the winner the rehabilitative ideal.

Determinate sentencing in America started in the 1970's. Both conservatives and liberals supported the measure, but for different reasons. Liberals saw it as an end to sentence disparity especially along racial lines and conservative saw it as a certainty of punishment, more punitive in nature.

Selective Incapacitation and Public Policy, Kathleen Auerhahn

Chapter 2: Criminal Punishment in Civil Society: Purpose and Method

The chapter traces the origins and development of the prison as an institution of criminal punishment as well as the penal paradigms and the social justification of criminal punishment. Criminal punishment in western societies has been justified as serving four possible purposes: 1) rehabilitation – to fix the criminal 2) deterrence – to scare the criminal 3) retribution – to punish the criminal 4) incapacitation – to confine the criminal

These justifications belong to paradigms on criminal punishment that are characterized as shared beliefs about the goals and expectations of criminal punishment. Implicit in these paradigms is the notions of the nature of criminal offenders (who they are) and ways to reduce crime in society (how we stop them). While the paradigms influence theories on criminal punishments, the paradigms themselves are influenced by politics, experts, and public sentiment towards crime and punishment. A paradigm shift is the result of a failure with the paradigm. When people are not seeing the outcomes that they expect, a new direction is sought and a new paradigm is accepted. For prisons, the paradigm of rehabilitation failed and policymakers went in a new direction in regards to criminal punishment.

There have been two types of paradigms for criminal punishment in western thought: 1) utilitarian: punishment serves other ends, such as protecting society or the treatment of the offender. -includes rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation

2) retribution: punishment of an offender serves as an end in itself

Historical Antecedents of the Prison

The history of penal systems show paradigm shifts accruing throughout time. The ancient societies, such as Rome and Greece, relied on punishment for utilitarian reasons. The main purpose of punishment was to deter future crimes. Imprisonment was rare, and only used to hold offenders until there punishment was to be given. Medieval England relied on the belief that criminal acts were between individuals, victims and offenders, and punishments should be made to meet repayment of the victim. Monetary punishments for crimes were mainly used, using corporal punishments for those who could not pay, with the main purpose of generating revenue. After the Norman Conquest in 1066, criminal behavior was seen as no longer between individuals, but between the offender and the state. Here, increased use of corporal punishment in the eyes of the public brought a return to the deterrence paradigm.

Prisons were established in Europe in response to a virtual epidemic of vagrancy due to several factors, including the end of feudalism, urbanization, etc. Early modern European thought relied on the classical view of crime, where crime was a personal choice of individuals. By publicly showing violent punishment, individuals would be deterred from committing crimes. This belief was applied through extreme measures, as the dead were left out in full view for the public.

The establishment of colonies allowed imperial powers to transport their criminals away. With this option, punishment began to become more of a private matter than a public showcase. The modern period also had punishments shifting away from corporal punishment. As a part of a larger civilizing process in society, punishment began to focus less on pain against the body and more on the mind and soul of offenders. This new method of punishment intended to reform as well as punish offenders; a paradigm shift from deterrence to rehabilitation.

America’s early punishment system intended to work as a deterrence, but unintentionally became a system of imprisonment and retribution. The establishment of the penitentiary system in the U.S. attempted at reform through the system of separation and silence. The belief that crime was a product of society and not individuals brought the designers of such systems to believe that individuals could be reformed to function in society when they are completely separated from regular society and human contact.

Penal Purpose in the 20 th Century

The rehabilitation paradigm in America was established in late 18th century and lasted until the 1970’s, when increasing crime rates and a loss of confidence in political and social institutions caused many to see rehabilitation as a failure. As new paradigms cannot come into being until the old paradigms are proven wrong, many attempted to prove the fruitfulness at the attempts to rehabilitate criminals. A paradigm shift occurred when determinate sentencing was considered to be a more viable option. Indeterminate sentencing left open the possibility of weak punishments that hurt the deterrence factor and allowed for discrimination to occur in sentencing. For these reasons, a new paradigm on punishment was accepted across partisan lines.

The paradigm of neo-retributionism mixed utilitarian and retribution principles, as justification for punishment cloaked itself in the desire for social justice. The use of determinate sentencing shifted the focus of crime away from the individual and placed it on the act. Punishment for crime turned into a numbers game. This can be seen with the use of mandatory minimum sentencing, where the severity of criminal punishment was decided by prison terms and not on prison life. With this new paradigm, punitive justification for punishment took a strong role in people’s beliefs.

Incapacitation: The Paradigm of Last Resort

Incapacitation has become the strongest punishment paradigm in American thought by default due to the empirical failures of the other paradigms before it. There are two methods of incapacitation:

1) Collective incapacitation: increasing the severity of prison terms for all offenders for a designated offense.

2) Selective incapacitation: focuses on identifying “dangerous” or “high-rate” offenders and detaining them for longer periods of time than those who have not been identified as so.

There are problems with both methods. Collective incapacitation would increase prison populations from anything between 300% to over 500%. Selective incapacitation questions the morality of sentencing two people who have committed similar crimes to much different prison lengths. The inability for the system to predict offenders’ future questions if this method can actually achieve its designated goal of lower crime rates. While the selective incapacitation method has been brought into question, its allure to policymakers and the general public remains strong today.

Chapter 3: Paradigm Change in California

Sources of Paradigm Change

Public Opinion: as expressed via the ballot initiative

Operational Crisis in the Penal system 1. overcrowding (parole was designed as a solution to crowding, not rehabilitation)

2. Unfettered discretion of judges under the indeterminate sentencing system

3. Increasing influence of the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), the Prison guards' union. Largest financial support of 3-strikes.

4. The prison industry itself: construction; economically depressed communities, private correction firms.

Criminal Justice in California: Beginnings

1. CA became a state in 1850, when the rehabilitative paradigm was already firmly entrenched in much of the nation.

2. 1st prison in CA was San Quentin, began receiving prisoners in 1854. Ca has a long history of criminalizing the foreign born so it is not surprising that most of the prisoners in this prison were non-citizens.

3. The prison was first run via a contract with a couple of businessmen who gained the right to use the labor of the convicts. After several years of mismanagement and widely publicized scandals, the state regained control in 1985.

4. 1880, Folsom prison was created for "hardened criminals"

5. In 1893, parole release was introduced. Its purpose was to remedy two problems: massive sentencing disparities and prison crowding. Parole, then, provided California with a mechanism for granting clemency on a wide scale.

6. From this history and some public documents, Auerhahn illustrates a paradigm that presumes that there is a class of prisoners that are "permanently dangerous." The Indeterminate Sentencing Law and the Reign of Rehabilitation in California

The indeterminate Law was passed in 1917. Served as a tool in the rehabilitation of offenders. The ever-present promise of release encouraged reform, wile indeterminacy assured that the unrepentant could be detained for long periods of time. Offenders would often be sentenced within extremely wide ranges, such as a sentence of six months to life. The offender's actual release date would be determined by the parole board, a group of experts who "fixed" the convicted offender's term at some point between the statutory minimum and maximum. The term established represented the total length of time that the offender was to be under the supervision of the state. A parole date, some time short of the maximum term, was also set. Under the Indeterminate Sentencing Law, prisoners served, on average, about one-third of the minimum term; offenders given life sentences were usually eligible for parole in seven years.

In 1944 the DOC was established in response to concern with mismanagement and conditions of confinement.

The first Director of the DOC was Richard McGee, a former elementary school teacher. He professionalized the system and established numerous inmate programs; vocational training, alcohol and drug abuse programs, and counseling, and a variety of educational programs.

This rehabilitation consensus seemed well entrenched in the system and in the population.

The Demise of Rehabilitation: Paradigm Change and the Determinate Sentencing Law

1960-1970s – Public became increasingly dissatisfied with the criminal justice system.

Soft-hearted judges Dissatisfaction with discretion Rejection of all kinds of so called "experts."

1976 saw the passage of the Determinate Sentencing Law

The political and academic discoursed changed from an emphasis on "every man has within him a germ of goodness" to an image of a sullen miscreant who failed to rehabilitated, at least in part due to his "unwillingness."

Growing interest in Victims rights.

The text of the 1976 law clearly states its intent: "The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment." Determinate sentencing still left a good deal of discretion for judges.

It also retained some indeterminate sentencing for some crimes (e.g. murder – which still remains today).

DSL also allowed for "good time" credits which could be cumulated to reduce the sentence to up to one-third.

The primary consequence of the implementation of the DSL was a dramatic increase in prison population. Why? Judges' increased willingness to sentence "marginal" defendants to a term of incarceration, now that they were assured they would not serve an unduly long sentence.

Sowing the Seeds of Vengeance: Mandatory Minimums and Retribution in California

Mandatory sentences have been a feature of California sentencing policy for many years. 1975, legislature prohibited probation sentences for some crimes. In 1979, it set up mandatory minimums for certain drug offenses and violent crimes. The 1982 Victim's rights Initiative" amended the state constitution to provide for the mandatory use of sentencing enhancements for prior felony convictions.

This push to "get tough" in California resulted in an expansion of the penal system the likes of which is unprecedented anywhere in the world. 21 prisons were created from 1984 to 2002.

The only dissenting voice was regarding fiscal responsibility

Selective Incapacitation and "Three Strikes and You're Out": California Leads the Way.

Mike Reynold's 180-year old daughter Kimber was attacked and murdered in 1992 by two parolees. The guman was killed in a shoot-out by police and the other offender received on ly 9 years. Outraged he approached two democratic assemblymen who drafted the Three Strikes bill. It died in committee. Reynolds tried to get it on the ballot but was running into trouble until October 1993 when a 12 year-old girl, Polly Klaas was abducted from her bedroom and was killed by Richard Allen Davis, a man with a lengthy criminal history. The state legislature hurriedly passed A.B. 971. Proposition 184 remained on the ballot. More than 70 percent of voters approved the measure.

Under the law, upon a second conviction of any of the "serious or violent felonies", the offender is subject to an automatic doubling of the presumptive sentence, plus any relevant enhancement. The third strike provision of the law requires that offenders with two prior convictions for "serious or violent felonies" convicted of any felony be sentenced to three times the normal presumptive term, or twenty-five years to life.

Problems Ahead?

If the purpose of mandatory sentencing is to target the most dangerous criminals then there may be inherent problems with currently sentencing policy. Three Strikes defendants generally are 10 years older than the average age of those committed to prison, and there for closer to the point of "aging out" of criminal activity.

Costs will increase because of the lengthy sentences of the older defendants will mean a larger number of elderly inmates.

CA was not the first 3-strikes law but it is one of the most punitive: because of the second strike includes a wide range of felonies and the third strike includes any felony.

Prison over crowding and overwhelmed parole system.

Selective Incapacitation and Public Policy CH. 3: “Criminal Sentencing Reform and Paradigm Change in California”

CH. 3 gives a brief history of the CA prison (reform) legislation that ultimately results in a dramatic increase in the CA prison population.

Sources of Paradigm Change in CA Criminal Justice

Public Opinion – expressed within ballot initiatives

Operational Crisis in the Penal System Overcrowding – parole was initially designed as a solution to overcrowding vs. rehabilitation

Uncontrolled discretion of judges under the indeterminate sentencing system

Influence of the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (prison guards union)

The “corporatization” of the prison, e.g. the construction of new prisons and how it benefits (struggling) communities and various interest groups.

(1) Criminal Justice In CA: Beginnings First prison was San Quentin in 1854. CA had a history of criminalizing the foreign-born and this was reflected in the San Quentin population.

The concept of parole had to be sold to the public – thus the statement, “having paid his debt to society” is used

The thought of “permanently dangerous defenders” also emerges at this time – leads to the creation of prison classifications such as Folsom Prison for “hardened criminals”

(2) The Indeterminate Sentencing Law and the Reign of Rehabilitation in California

Indeterminate Sentencing Law was enacted in 1917. Basically it states that if you behave well and show rehabilitation, you could be released. If you do not, you could be in prison for a long time (or forever). Judges still had broad discretion with sentencing. The Department of Corrections was established in 1944 (“in response to concern with mismanagement and conditions of confinement in the CA prison system)

Richard McGee was the first director of the Dept of corrections and several improvements were credited to him. (e.g. inmate programs such as vocational training, substance abuse programs, counseling services, educational services)

Interesting to point out that around this time, 1936-1974, there were no prison related ballot initiatives; by contrast, there have been several in the post rehabilitative era. In 1974, one significant ballot initiative restored the right to vote for ex-felons – representative of the rehabilitative paradigm?

(3) The Demise of Rehabilitation: Paradigm Change and the Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL)

60’s and 70’s saw increased public dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system.

1976 saw the passage of the Determinate Sentencing Law due to a greater interest on victim’s rights and a change of perception of the offender

The Law specifically states that the purpose of prison was for punishment (vs. rehabilitation)

One consequence of the DSL was a large increase in the prison population (*See Chart on p. 50)

(4) Sowing the Seeds of Vengeance: Mandatory Minimums and Retribution in CA

DSL led to increased punitive laws in CA Late 70’s and early 80’s saw several new ballot initiatives along these lines, e.g. the “Victim’s Rights Initiative”

From 1984 to 2002, 21 prisons were created (how many more since 2002?) – several more are reportedly needed to accommodate the growing #s of prisoners

(5) Selective Incapacitation and “Three Strikes and You’re Out: CA Leads the Way

Three Strikes passed due to violent crimes that were committed by parolees and ex- offenders and that were highly publicized. Passed in 1994 by 70% of the voters.

“Under the law, upon a second conviction of any of the “serious or violent felonies” the offender is subject to an automatic doubling of the presumptive sentence, plus any relevant sentence enhancements. The third strike provision of the law requires that offenders with 2 prior convictions for “serious or violent felonies” convicted of any felony be sentenced to 3 times the normal presumptive term, or 25 years to life.” (p. 55)

CA was not the first state to enact the Three Strikes law, but it is one of the most punitive because of the second strike includes a wide range of felonies and the third strike includes any felony, highlighting the inflexibility and unfairness of the law.

Interesting to note the lack of opposition to these laws against prisoners, e.g. the power granted to the governor to veto parole for certain prisoners.

Problems Ahead?

If the purpose of mandatory sentencing is to target the most dangerous criminals, then there may be inherent problems with the Three Strikes law. Three Strikes defendants are generally 10 years older than the average age of those committed to prison and therefore closer to the point of aging out of criminal activity. (p. 56)

Costs will increase because of the lengthy sentences of the older defendants will mean a larger number of elderly inmates and greater healthcare costs.

Finally, prison overcrowding and an overwhelmed parole system remain huge issues that the state has yet to deal with…

*Note: 2008 CA Ballot info. – 12 total propositions – 3 related to prison / prisoners:

Prop 5 (Fail) - NONVIOLENT DRUG OFFENSES. SENTENCING, PAROLE AND REHABILITATION. INITIATIVE STATUTE. Prop 6 (Fail) - POLICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNDING. CRIMINAL PENALTIES AND LAWS. INITIATIVE STATUTE.

Prop 9 (Pass) - CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS. PAROLE. INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND STATUTE.

PSC 723 Auerhahn Chapter 4 Selective Incapacitation

History  First coined by David Greenberg in 1975  Most comprehensive proposal was offered by Rand Corporation researchers Peter Greenwood and Allen Abrahamse in 1982 report  They proposed a predictive scale to distinguish between low-medium-and high rate offenders at the time of sentencing. Based on these predictions high-rate offenders should be given longer sentences relative to low-rate counterparts  This would reduce crime  The proposal although not implemented in any jurisdiction has had great influence. Three strike laws are an example of a policy impacted by selective incapacitation principles.  Preventive detention- example: Internment of Japanese Americans during WWII Theoretical basis “If an offender is isolated from society, then he or she cannot commit crimes in the larger society.” Three frameworks for predicting future behavior  Anamnestic prediction is based on past behavior; predictions are based on the assumption that individuals are likely to behave the way they have in the past.  Actuarial or statistical predictions are based on previously determined estimates of risk for people who share some measurable attribute with the individual who is the subject. (Example: demographics)  Clinical prediction is based on individualized assessments of risk by experts of one sort or the other. (Example: Psychiatric assessment of dangerousness) Issues with Implementation  Costly to implement  False positives devote resources inefficiently Errors in identifying high rate offenders take two forms Errors of underprediction (false negatives)  predicted to be low-rate-- but crime is actually committed at higher rates  individuals are sentenced to shorter terms based on erroneous prediction and are released sooner  public’s risk increases Overprediction errors (false positives)  offenders are erroneously predicted to be high rate  Likelihood of a successful prediction depends on the base rate of the phenomenon in the population being studied  In the case of high rate offending the relatively small percentage of high rate offenders makes their identification via statistical prediction very difficult  When the criterion behavior is extremely rare it is even more difficult  However, conversely, it is easy to correctly predict a behavior with a high base rate. Trends  Review of literature demonstrates a small percentage of criminals commit a significant amount of crimes.

 Frequency of offending declines with age  A significant number of criminals are “omnibus felons” which means they are prone to commit virtually any crime available in the environment for them to commit. Measurement issues  “shrinkage” discrepancy between goodness of fit of a predictive measure in the sample upon which it was drawn and generalizing to populations or other samples--- the instruments are subject to a great degree of shrinkage and the results are not generalizable.  Measurement limitations limit our ability to determine the effect of selective incapacitation. (examples: variability in frequency of offenses per year, skewed distribution effects, sampling issues, average career length of offenders, lack of replacement effects, Conceptual issues  Even if high-rate offenders are accurately identified and subjected to a selective incapacitation policy, the results may not yield a reduction in the crime rate. We should consider that the old high rate offenders will be replaced by new high rate offenders. Ethical issues  We cannot predict which criminals will become career criminals. A significant number of criminals drop out  False positives raise the ethical problem inherent when we incapacitate an individual to prevent them from committing crimes they probably would not commit anyway.  False positive rate is extremely high!  “Sentencing offenders for past crimes which have never been adjudicated runs counter to principles of just deserts, while sentencing them for predicted future crimes runs counter to tenets of free will and justice.” Other issue  How do we define the success of selective incapacitation? Effects  Reduce crime rate with simultaneous reduction of incarcerated offenders

Auerhahn Chapter 4 Selective Incapacitation

History Incapacitative rationale for incarceration (simplest theoretical standpoint) - if an offender is isolated form society, then he or she cannot commit crimes in the larger society Theoretically simple, in practice it is problematic Selective Incapacitation - first coined by David Greenberg in 1975 Distinguishes between low - medium - and high-rate offenders at the time of sentencing, and that based upon these predictions, high-rate offenders be given longer sentences reative to their lower-rate counterparts. Idea is to reduce crime while using penal resources in an efficient manner Theoretical basis “If an offender is isolated from society, then he or she cannot commit crimes in the larger society.” Three frameworks for predicting future behavior Anamnestic prediction is based on past behavior; predictions are based on the assumption that individuals are likely to behave the way they have in the past. Actuarial or statistical predictions are based on previously determined estimates of risk for people who share some measurable attribute with the individual who is the subject. (Example: age, race) Clinical prediction is based on individualized assessments of risk by experts of one sort or the other. (Example: Psychiatric assessment of dangerousness) Issues with Implementation False positives devote resources inefficiently Errors in identifying high rate offenders take two forms Errors of underprediction (false negatives) predicted to be low-rate-- but crime is actually committed at higher rates individuals are sentenced to shorter terms based on erroneous prediction and are released sooner public’s risk increases Overprediction errors (false positives) offenders are erroneously predicted to be high rate Likelihood of a successful prediction depends on the base rate of the phenomenon in the population being studied Ethical Problems Ethically challenging because if someone is placed at a higher rate than they should have, you are punishing them for a crime they likely would not have committed anyways Sentencing offenders for past crimes which have never been adjudicated runs counter to principles of just deserts, while sentencing them for predicted future crimes runs counter to tenets of free will and justice False positive rate is extremely high! Trends Review of literature demonstrates a small percentage of criminals commit a significant amount of crimes. Frequency of offending declines with age A significant number of criminals are “omnibus felons” which means they are prone to commit virtually any crime available in the environment for them to commit. Measurement issues “shrinkage” - refers to discrepancy between goodness of fit (accuracy) of a predictive measure in the sample upon which the measure was developed and other samples. A predictive measure will almost always exhibit a higher degree of predictive accuracy in the sample that was used to construct it. Measurement limitations limit our ability to determine the effect of selective incapacitation. (examples: variability in frequency of offenses per year, skewed distribution effects, sampling issues, average career length of offenders, lack of replacement effects, Conceptual issues Even if high-rate offenders are accurately identified and subjected to a selective incapacitation policy, the results may not yield a reduction in the crime rate. We should consider that the old high rate offenders will be replaced by new high rate offenders. Estimates of Incapacitation Effects The allure of selective incapacitation derives from the reduction in crime ostensibly offered by such a strategy Estimates of crime rate reductions vary widely Estimates of the benefits to be derived from selective incapacitation policies are sensitive to some assumptions: 1. The estimate of individual offending frequencies used in calculating crime rate impacts, 2. the average career length of offenders, 3. Crimes attributed to incapacitated offenders are presumed to be prevented by their incarceration and subtracted from the total crime rate. Success? How do we define the success of selective incapacitation? “the criminal justice system has been burdened with unrealistic expectations of solving social problems that have proven insoluble elsewhere” A more realistic evaluation of a policy based on selective incapacitation might focus on the selective success of the policy, rather than on the volume of crime presumably prevented via incapacitation. Chapter 5: Dangerousness

Danger is not an objective reality. It is extremely subjective, and people experience danger in different ways. It is “subjectively determined based on an evaluation of risk”.

Risk is relative. Something can only be more or less dangerous in comparison to another thing. There is no absolute value of dangerousness or risk.

Danger is unpredictable, which adds to the risk.

Danger is potential. Forward-looking. “Harm will occur in the future.”

Danger may appear as a cultural or economic threat, not necessarily always strictly political.

Danger is a social construct. Dangerousness is “used to characterize an intolerably high risk of the occurrence of a behavior that we believe to be unacceptable.”-not that someone acts violently or commits crimes.

In 18th and 19th centuries, idea of “dangerous classes.” Being poor causes crime. Or, mentally retarded, known as “moral imbeciles” had propensity to commit crime. Frame changes to idea of the “dangerous criminal” in late 1800’s. Rehabilitation fades as goal of incarceration. Punishment becomes more important.

Prediction of violence: Quote-“…Consider the other direction-underprediction. The correctional officer or mental health professional who predicts that a given individual will not commit a dangerous act is subject to severe unpleasantness should that act actually occur.

Baxtrom case. Man sent from Attica to home for criminally insane, because he was viewed as dangerous and insane. Man asks judge for review, judge concurs. All 967 people serving indefinite time in homes for criminally insane sent to mental health hospitals, allowed to leave. Very low recidivism, low rates of assault in hospital. These people were thought to be the most dangerous people in the world, but did not cause much trouble.

Dixon case, essentially same thing happened.

Texas death row comparison. People convicted of capital crimes then sentenced to either life in prison or death. No difference between groups in violent behavior, etc.

Prediction for parole “dangerousness” is more successful. It rates safety, rather than the most dangerous people.

Auerhan Ch 5 Dangerousness

 Danger is subjectively determined based on judgments of risk.  Factors that play a role in determining dangerousness o Intent o Relativity o Unpredictability o Potentiality  Who decides?  Dangerous Offenders- nature of harm we expect them to do, likelihood of them committing that harm o violence o repeated criminal behavior o prediction o age and gender o Past: witches (unknowable), mentally ill o Dangerous classes vs. dangerous criminal  Prediction, classification o Clinical vs. objective o “safer: to overpredict than underpredict  Cases o Backstrom v. Herold: those who had been in criminal facilities and moved to civil mental hospitals were not as dangerous as predicted o Dixon: similar results  Objective Instruments o Salient Factor Score- good for predicting safety (parole) but not dangerousness) classification

Auerhahn Chapter 6

1. The Three Strikes Law results in nonviolent offenders becoming long term inmates, which in turn leads to overcrowding, which in turn leads to the “net reduction in the level of dangerousness in the incarcerated population.” a. The assumption that is not addressed by the author is that the public does not need to be “protected” against the nonviolent offender. b. The reduction occurs because “nonviolent offenders who are not subject to mandatory minimums are released to make room for the Three Strikes and other mandatorily sentenced offenders.” 2. The research question being asked here is what the efficacy of the California Sentencing Structure is in terms of the goal of protecting the public by incapacitating the dangerous. The expected hypothesis is that tougher sentencing laws based on the objective of selective incapacitation should result in an “increasing level of dangerousness in prison populations; conversely, if the level of dangerousness decreases, then tougher sentencing populations are not effective. Thus, the dependent variable is the “dangerousness” of the prison population. 3. How is dangerousness operationalized? a. Prediction is based on aggregate measures of dangerousness, not individual levels. Dangerousness should be considered on a continuum, with relativity and with multiple dimensions, rather than a simple dichotomous dangerous- not dangerous scale. The result is based on additive answers to demographic questions (e.g., age, gender, number and type of priors, etc.). Not included in the scale is race, which the author argues leads to spuriousness. 4. The methodology is problematic because the observations are not independent of one another. In other words, because prisoners consistently interact with various components of the criminal justice system (i.e., the parole and probation, awaiting sentencing, etc.) these may have effects on their future levels of dangerousness, and also on time order effects. Thus, what happened to a criminal a year ago in the criminal justice system will have an effect on what he does this year, and that in and of itself biases the results of the statistical analysis. More simply, we can not know if the prisoner is dangerous because he is dangerous in and of himself, or if he is dangerous because of the structures of the system. a. This dynamic problem is considered solvable via “predictive evaluation” which is not really predictive, but rather, as the author explains, an attempt to “know what might happen if we act a certain way.” i. This is better known as exploratory simulation, and in this case, the prescriptive component is experimenting with the existing system. 5. The ultimate purpose is to determine if the state of California is meeting its stated goals via the Three Strikes and other reform acts.

Kathleen Auerhahn. Selective Incapacitation and Public Policy. CH.6 Summary

“Assessing the Level of Dangerousness in the Criminal Justice System”

 The protection of the public by the incapacitation of dangerous offenders has long been the aim of the California criminal justice system.  Three Strikes therefore, was designed to select the most dangerous offenders for lengthy incarceration, thus isolating them from society.  Dangerousness when used to define the most dangerous offenders comprised the following variables: age, gender, number of prior felony convictions, presence of past violent convictions, and current conviction offense.

Demographic Variables  Rates of criminal offending peak in the teenage years and decline sharply thereafter.  This is a significant fact to take into consideration when making policy to incapacitate dangerous offenders, since additional prison time past one’s teenage years could easily mean resources wasted.  Overall, female offenders tend to have less extensive criminal histories and are less likely to be convicted of violent offenses.  Race is excluded because the probability of arrest may be independent of criminal involvement to some degree, and there are also socioeconomic status concerns.

Criminal History Variables  Prior criminal behavior is the best predictor of future criminal behavior.  In evaluating a policy whose stated objectives include protection of the public, it seems only reasonable that we take into consideration the things from which the public would most like to be protected from.  Violent then is defined as all offenses involving interpersonal contact, including rape, homicide, robbery, and assault.  Violent offenses are ranked first on any sliding scale, followed by property offenses, and then drug offenses, since most drug offenders are not sophisticated ring leaders who have a dangerous impact on society.  Few would argue that they would rather see a violent rapist or murderer in jail over a burglar, and as such, a violent history receives more weight.

Evaluation  If sentencing policies were successful, then we would see an increase in dangerousness amongst the prison population, keeping the outside public safe.  The author suggests that sentencing policies are not successful, however, because dangerousness amongst prisoners has decreased.  The majority of Three Strikes defendants are convicted of nonviolent offenses at a relatively old age, since it takes years to achieve Three Strikes.  This means that they often “age out” of criminal behavior alone, regardless of acts of the criminal justice system.  Meanwhile, they may be pushing out other, much more dangerous pretrial and sentenced inmates since overcrowding forces some prisoners to be released.  Thus, prison population did become less dangerous because dangerous offenders were released to make room for basic Three Strike offenders.  Once dangerous offenders who commit violent acts are accordingly pushed out to make room, they are often forced to return on new charges and convictions, not only exacerbating system resources, but clearly placing the public in danger.

Simulation Modeling  According to the author, others have wrongly defined dangerousness in terms of violence or persistence, but not both.  Most empirical research is predicated on simple, unidirectional causal models which do not permit the analysis of complex, multidimensional processes.  Individually, non-dangerous offenders, if repeated often, achieve dangerousness by their threat to the rule of law, so dangerousness must be looked at as a continuum.  Simulation modeling is used to explain how a particular set of circumstances came about, through emergent properties.  There are multiple dimensions leading to dangerousness, so one cannot reduce tests to a simple dichotomous dangerous, not dangerous scale.  Various components of the criminal justice system, such as being on probation or waiting for sentencing, may affect an inmate’s level of dangerousness, independent upon his level of dangerousness prior to entering the system.  For his reason, the system’s goal of social engineering may in fact make someone more dangerous, and then release them back into society, rather than keep them away from harming other citizens.

Conclusion  In this project, the descriptive objective of the simulation was to assess the historical impact of sentencing reforms of the last 30 years on the average dangerousness of prison and other criminal justice populations in California.  The prescriptive component consisted in experimenting upon the existing system.  The aims of the predictive evaluation component were to estimate the likely systemic consequences of Three Strikes and other recent sentencing reforms with respect to dangerousness in the criminal justice population.  Overall, tougher selective sentencing laws did not result in an increasing level of dangerousness in prison populations, and as such, these tougher sentencing laws were not efficient.  The goal was to discover ways in which system conditions might be altered to maximize the level of dangerousness in the prison population while simultaneously minimizing the level of dangerousness in other criminal justice system populations, such as parole and probation, in order to protect the public by properly incapacitating primarily dangerous offenders.  The authors leave readers with the question of whether criminal justice systems should target certain drug or other nonviolent offenses for minimum sentences due to capacity limits.  By requiring that officials balance new admissions with releases, however, the size of the pool of inmates eligible for release would be reduced, thus reducing the average sentence length for all sentenced inmates ranking low on the dangerous scale, again leaving the outside public vulnerable to their harms.

Chapter 7 Modeling the California Justice System, Part I: Reproducing and Evaluating the Past

The author constructed several models of different prison populations (arrested population, jailed population, prison population, parole population, and probation population). She then creates a simulation model that depicts the relationships between the different populations and sub-groups, such as age and type of offense. This breakdown allows for a depiction of the components that make up the trends measuring dangerousness in the prison system.

The Baseline Model  The models constructed provided a good fit for the actual trends measured over time as shown from pages 105 to 107.

Evaluating Dangerousness in the California Criminal Justice System, 1980-1998  Dangerousness was measured by the average danger per individual in the population measured  The measures in each population should be compared to each other, not on an abstract basis in order to get a better idea of dangerousness in context

Factors Observed: Age: Broken up into 5 age groups; 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55+ Type of crime: 3 groups; violent crime, drug crime, property crime History: 2 groups; Violent and non-violent crimes Prior convictions: 3 groups; No convictions, 1 conviction, 2+ convictions

Results

Arrested Population  This population saw a drop of 9% in its dangerousness o This drop was mainly due to age and the type of offense arrested for . Age: Greater percentage of offenders arrested were older, with decreases in the number of 18-24 offenders arrested dropping . Type of crime: Offenders arrested for violent crimes and drug related offenses increased as the number of arrests for property crime decreased . The number of previous convictions and history of crimes committed were not factors

Jailed Population  Mainly the same results as the arrested population

Probation Population  This population saw the level of dangerousness increase by 19% o Contributing factors: Sentencing and Capacity . Sentencing of drug offenders pushed more violent offenders out of the prisons to make room o The number of offenders with prior violent offenses increased in this population as well o Age was not a factor

Prison Population  Interestingly, this population saw a decrease of 8% over time o Contributing factors . More drug offenders incarcerated . An aging prison population  A decrease in the number of younger offenders imprisoned and a greater number of 25 older imprisoned instead o Increase of offenders with prior convictions  Author notes that this kind of trend of decreased dangerousness in the prison population indicates a failure in the policies enacted

Parole Population  No change in the parole population level of dangerousness o Initially, there was a dramatic increase in the danger of the parole population, but it saw an increased number of drug offenders paroled over time o Number of offenders with a violent history paroled also increase

Comparing Dangerousness of Criminal Justice Populations  The comparison chart on page 127 shows, according to the measurement of dangerousness in the different populations, the greatest level of dangerous offenders are in the parole population.  The jailed population is marginally greater than the arrested population o The idea is to filter the more dangerous from the arresting process to jailing process, but it is not that effective given that the levels are nearly equal  The prison population is marginally greater than the jailed population o Again, not that effective in the filtering process

Conclusions The author, based on the models constructed, determines the policies instituted by California to curb the number of dangerous criminals in society as ineffective due to the mismatched results from the parole and prison populations. The results also cast serious doubts on the rewards from the staggering increases in spending for the California prison system and shows a disproportionate amount of drug related offenders and those with non-violent histories incarcerated in the place of more violent criminals.

Chapter 7 Auerhahn Lit Review

This Chapter reports the results of the simulation analysis that reproduces the compositional dynamics of the California criminal justice system during the period 1979- 1998. The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate the validity of the simulation model in terms of its ability to accurately reproduce historical circumstance, and to retrospectively evaluate the California criminal justice system with respect to its success at selectively incapacitating dangerous offenders. In order to do this we would calculate the values of variables in a complex system of differential and difference equations that are initialized with values based on actual data, and then iterated over time to reproduce a historical sequence of events. System states are represented by differential equations. An example of a representative equation would be to evaluate the composition of a population state with the equation: (t) current pop. = pop at time (t-1) + new arrivals – exits.

The Baseline Model Based on the baseline model, the simulated data from the time series analysis closely reflects the characteristic shapes of the actual data quite closely. Each of the simulated series fall into the allowed maximum average of difference (10 percent), of the actual population value.

Evaluating Dangerousness in the California Criminal Justice System, 1980-1998 In this study, dangerousness is measured in terms of the percentage of increases or decreases in dangerousness within populations over time. Dangerousness is specifically measured by looking at the average dangerousness of individuals in a population. The values of dangerousness are codified in a simple Burgess-type additive scale that comprises of information like age, sex, current offense, prior violence, and prior felony convictions.

Findings The average dangerousness of the arrested population declined from 7.34 in 1980 to a low of 6.7 in 1998. Since the only significant changes in the populations were a proportional increase over time in arrests of older offenders, with a corresponding decrease in proportion of young offenders, and an increase in arrests of drug offenders, the main causes of the decline may be attributed to the changes of age and offense distribution in the population of arrestees. The jailed population shared very similar results, with an older population replacing the young and drug offenders replace property offenders. The probation population had an increase in the level of dangerousness by 19%. This increase may be attributed to the changes in sentencing combined with capacity limitations in jails that occurred through the 1980s. Drug offense penalties became harsh, which increased their jail population. In turn, it may have been the case that more dangerous offenders, who might have otherwise been sent to jail, were being placed on probation. The prison population followed the trends of the arrested and jail populations, with a decrease of 8% in dangerousness over this time period. This decrease is likely attributed to the increase in incarcerated drug offenders. This may show a policy flaw, in which the more dangerous population of offenders remains on the streets. The parole population showed no changes in the amount of dangerousness in its population. Oddly, the number of dangerous offenders, and drug offenders increased over time.

Implications If a criminal justice policy is to be effective in this case, the most dangerous populations should be in jail or prison, with the least dangerous populations being on parole or probation. This is clearly not the case in California’s system where the probation population is the most dangerous, being on average 32% more dangerous than the prison population, and 35% more dangerous than the jail population! Apparently the system needs to be changed!

Selective Incapacitations and Public Policy Chapter 8 “Modeling the California Criminal Justice System, Part II – Predictive Evaluation” In the previous chapter, the author noted that California’s Three Strikes law has not yet begun to show its effects on the criminal justice system.

In Chapter 8, the study involves an approach the author calls predictive evaluation, which entails simulation of the effects of implementation of various policy schemes, and the evaluation of these schemes with respect to their success at selectively incapacitating dangerous offenders. The author also uses simulation modeling to allow us to evaluate the likely consequences of other ‘possible futures’ and projects the simulation model to the year 2015 under a variety of conditions.

Chapter 8 focuses on the demographic consequences to the prison population of the various policy options and four possible sentencing structures are examined.

Scenario 1: Three Strikes, Full Implementation

This scenario simulates the likely future consequences of the continued full implementation of California’s Three Strikes law on the prison population As written, the law provides for the mandatory doubling of the presumptive sentences for offenders with one strike and a second strikeable felony, and a mandatory tripling of the presumptive term for offenders with two strikes convicted of any felony. The author’s simulation shows the following:

1) the law will not change the overall dangerousness level of California prisons 2) the proportion of older offenders will increase substantially (prisoners aged 55 and older can increase by 33%), 45-54 by 50%) 3) the proportion of offenders incarcerated for drug offenses will increase 6% 4) property offenders will decrease by 12.5% 5) violent offenders are expected to remain at a relatively constant percentage 6) not surprisingly, the proportion of offenders with two or more prior convictions will increase by 30% (however, it may be disingenuous to attributed this to Three Strikes, this increase appears to capitalize on a preexisting trend that offenders with lengthy criminal histories has steadily increased since the early 1980s) 7) the proportions of offenders with and without histories of violence remains essentially unchanged 8) the percentage of African-American prison population increases by 3%, Hispanic by 6%, and white offenders decreased by 5%

In sum, the law appears to cause some changes in the composition of the prison population favorable to increasing the dangerousness of the population. However, these benefits appear to be all but completely offset by the aging of the prison population. In other words, the law doesn’t appreciably increase the selective success of the prison; it just keeps the same offender pool there longer.

Scenario 2: Three Strikes, Violent Offense Only This scenario involves limiting the eligibility for the Three Strikes provisions to only those offenders with a violent conviction offense.

According to the author’s simulation, the following would occur if this policy was implemented:

1) As in Scenario 1, this way similarly halts the decline in dangerousness 2) The age distribution is nearly identical 3) There is a much less dramatic increase of 7% in the proportion of offenders with lengthy criminal histories 4) The proportion of violent offenders remains essentially the same 5) The primary difference is the increase in the proportion of offenders serving sentences for violent crimes – over 50% of the prison population would be violent offenders (bring the proportion back to the 1980 levels) 6) The racial impact is similar to the previous scenario (but the author notes that these sorts of findings do not necessarily indicate that the sentencing structure is discriminatory)

Scenario 3: Three Strikes, Violent History Only

This scenario is the middle ground between full implementation and stringent restriction of eligibility to only those with a violent strike. This scenario estimates the effects of applying Three Strikes eligibility to all offenders with a prior conviction and a violent strike, and to any offender with two or more convictions and a history of violence, regardless of current conviction offense.

If the above scenario was implemented the following would occur:

1) the dangerousness level of the prison would remain at 1998 levels 2) the age distribution is virtually identical to the other scenarios 3) the proportion of violent offenders increases 11% (which is somewhat less than the 16% increase in scenario 2) 4) the proportion of drug and property offenders shows slight decreases 5) there is a 19% increase in offenders with two or more prior convictions (which is more than the 7% in the restrictive scenario but less than the 30% in the full implementation) 6) the most dramatic effect is the 13% increase in the proportion of offenders with violent histories (over half of incarcerated offenders would have histories of violence) 7) the racial composition would be similar to the other Three Strikes variants

Scenario 4: Geriatric Release This scenario entails the release of older offenders prior to the end of their minimum terms, based on the presumption that such offenders have ‘aged out’ of criminal behavior and therefore no longer represent a significant threat to society. Geriatric is defined as inmates 55 and older; criminologists are generally in agreement that 55 is well past the most active offending years. The author also points out that this policy may be financially advantageous as it can cost up to three times more yearly to maintain an elderly offender than a younger one.

The findings are as follows:

1) this scenario would have virtually all the same consequences to the dangerousness of the prison population as the full implementation plan (a dramatic slowing of the decrease of dangerousness, but no real gains in terms of increasing dangerousness relative to 1998 levels) 2) this doesn’t not dramatically change the age structure of the prison population (save for the 90% decline in the representation of prisoners 55 and older) 3) implementing a geriatric release program will manifest similar consequences to the first scenario 4) the configurations of criminal history, conviction offense, violent history, and racial composition are identical to those observed under the full implementation policy.

Comparing Possible Futures

The variant of the Three Strikes that modifies the strike zone to include all violent offenders with at least one prior conviction performs the best in terms of maximizing the level of dangerousness in the prison population. Also, either scenario 2 or 3 would perform marginally better at incapacitating dangerous offenders than the Three Strikes law as written. Geriatric release combined with full implementation has virtually no net effect on dangerousness, in fact, it slightly decreases dangerousness.

However, any of the three scenarios would still perform better than the Three Strikes law as currently written.

Conclusion

Any variant of the Three Strikes law will have two consequences:

1) increasing the proportion of offenders with substantial criminal histories in prison 2) increasing the proportion of older offenders in the prison population

However, the benefits accrued are neutralized by the aging of the prison population. If Californians decided to accept this consequence (having lengthy sentences for violent offenders), then other options (narrowing the strike zone) must be explored if dangerousness is to be maximized in the prison population. It is clear that the current policy will have disappointing results from the standpoint of selective incapacitations. It will result in a substantial growth in the prison population for relatively little benefit to the overall dangerousness of the population. The other scenarios offer (marginally) greater benefit.

However, the damage seems to be already done. The Three Strikes law will not buy much, and the most one can expect from these changes is to keep this from getting appreciably worse.

Chapter 8: Modeling the California Criminal Justice System, Part II I. Predictive Evaluation

a. The Three Strikes law has not begun to show its effects on the criminal justice system.

i. Because of this, we use predictive evaluation: simulates the effects of the implementation of various policies. Evaluates those policies with respect to their success of selectively incapacitating dangerous offenders.

ii. Can compare alternative scenarios to determine which policies are best at incapacitating dangerous offenders.

II. Continued Full Implementation of Three Strikes Law as it Stands

a. What is Three Strikes? Mandatory doubling of sentences for offenders with one strike; mandatory tripling of sentences of offenders with two strikes.

b. Simulated by reducing parole release rates for offenders with prior felony and reducing the rate of direct released for prisoners with two or more convictions

c. Result? Three Strikes Law won’t change the overall dangerousness of the prison population.

i. Proportion of older offenders will increase (by 33% for over 55).

ii. Targets mostly drug offenses, not violent offenders.

iii. Disproportionately negative effect on blacks.

III. Three Strikes, Violent Offense Only

a. Limits the eligibility of Three Strikes to only those offenders with a violent conviction offense (and the requisite number of prior felony convictions). i. Halts the decline of dangerousness (2015 levels less than 1% less than 1998 levels).

ii. Has nearly same impact on age as in the full-implementation scenario.

iii. Primary difference between this version of Three Strikes and the full- implementation is the increase in the proportion of offenders serving sentences for violent crimes (over 50% of the prison population by 2015).

iv. Small decrease in proportion of whites, with increases of blacks and Hispanics.

IV. Three Strikes, Violent History Only

a. Apply Three Strikes to offenders with prior conviction and a violent strike AND to any offender with two or more convictions and a history of violence, regardless of what their convictions were for.

i. Would keep dangerousness at the 1998 levels.

ii. Age distribution nearly identical.

iii. Wider strike eligibility zone increases proportion of violent offenders 11% (less than with the violent offenders only).

iv. 13% increase in proportion of offenders with violent histories.

V. Geriatric Release

a. Release of older offenders prior to the end of their minimum terms, based on the presumption that such offenders have “aged out” of criminal behavior.

i. Advantageous financially.

ii. Geriatric = 55 years and older.

iii. Virtually same effect as full implementation

1. Dramatic slowing of a decrease of dangerousness.

VI. Conclusions

a. Violent History best at increasing dangerousness.

b. Any three alternatives do better than full implementation at keeping the prison population low. c. Any variant of the Three Strikes Law will have two consequences:

i. Increasing the proportion of offenders with substantial criminal histories in prison.

ii. Increasing the proportion of older offenders in the prison population.

iii. To increase the dangerousness in prisons, then the strike zone must be limited.

iv. Current path of the Three Strikes Law will have disappointing consequences from the standpoint of selective incapacitation (substantial growth for little benefit in terms of overall dangerousness of prison population).

Chapter 9: Conclusion

CA policy may make us unsafer by locking up a large number of lesser dangerous felons which makes less room for keeping the truly violent criminals.

The aging prison population creates large costs that eat up resources to fight crime.

Jay W. Forrester observed "intuition is unreliable. It is worse than random because it is wrong more often than not when faced with the dynamics of complex systems.

What are the options? Narrowing the list of eligible felonies and/or a program of geriatric release.

Paradox: Most criminologist think it is a bad policy but over 70 percent of the public voted for it. Why?

Public doesn't listen to experts because experts don't speak to them. Time horizon: public short-term, focuses on recent events.

If criminologists want their views on policy taken seriously, they need to start taking seriously the beliefs, opinions, and feelings of the people that these policies ostensibly benefit.

ANALYTIC REALISM

Linking research to policy proposals. Being politically relevant. Understanding the political discourse and dialogue. But also empirical. Operationalizing, measuring.