History Test 3: Unit 4: Paths to Independence

HISTORY TEST 3: UNIT 4: PATHS TO INDEPENDENCE (30 th April 2010)

1 How different were the roles played by nationalist leaders in [12] securing independence for their countries? Explain your answer. (You should refer to at least two of the following countries to support your answer: Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaya.)

L1 Writes about roles played by nationalist leaders but no [1] comparison Award 1m max.

L2 Identifies difference (s) AND/OR similarity (s) [2-3] Award 2 marks for one, 3 marks for both

The roles played by the nationalists in securing independence for their countries were largely similar, as they had to resist initial plans made by colonialists to re-impose colonial rule, mobilize the resistance movement and finally had to fight against the Communist threat. There were some differences however, as demonstrated by Vietnam. (3m)

L3 Explains difference (s) AND/OR similarity (s), but without [3-4] examples from at least two countries. Award 3 marks for explaining one difference/similarity and an additional mark for any supporting detail, up to a maximum of 4 marks.

The roles of the nationalist leaders were similar in that they had to resist initial plans made by the colonial powers to re-impose colonial rule, and tried to negotiate with them in order to win concessions aimed at securing independence. (3m)

In Indonesia, nationalist leaders like Sukarno and Hatta were keen to negotiate with the Dutch to secure their independence (which had been declared on 17th August 1945), and did so first with Dr van Mook and subsequently at Linggajati, where the Linggajati Peace Agreement on 1947 was signed which guaranteed the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia which included Java, Madura and Sumatra, within a greater Federation of Indonesia called the United States of Indonesia. (4m)

(General observation + example from 1 country)

No answer can achieve more than L3 if it has not drawn examples from at least two countries: Indonesia, Malaya and Vietnam.

L4 Explains difference (s) OR similarity (s), with examples from at [5-8] least two countries

1 Award 5 marks for an explained comparison, with references to at least two countries Award 8 marks max for two explained comparisons, with references to at least two countries

L5 Both elements of L4 9-11

Para 1: The roles of the nationalist leaders were largely similar in that they had to resist initial plans made by the colonial powers to re- impose colonial rule, and tried to negotiate with them in order to win concessions aimed at securing independence. This was because they were aware of the superior fighting power of their colonial masters, and wanted to avoid bloodshed which would harm their country further. (3m)

In Indonesia, nationalist leaders such as Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir were firm advocates of diplomasi, and were keen to negotiate with the Dutch to secure their independence (which had been declared on 17th August 1945), and did so first with Dr van Mook and subsequently at Linggajati, where the Linggajati Peace Agreement on 1947 was signed which guaranteed the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia which included Java, Madura and Sumatra, within a greater Federation of Indonesia called the United States of Indonesia. Although this subsequently failed, nonetheless, they were ever ready to negotiate whenever the Dutch were willing to do so and finally won independence partly through the Round Table Conference of 1949. (4m)

Moreover, Malay nationalist leaders such as Dato Onn bin Jaafar and Tunku Abdul Rahman also led the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) to negotiate with the British after the Malay Community rejected the Malayan Union as it was seen as a neo- colonialist attempt to strengthen British hand in Malaya at the expense of the Sultan and the Malays. They held a meeting with Sir Edward Gent (Governor of the Malayan Union) at Kuala Kangsar from 2nd to 4th May 1946 to put forward their proposals for a Federation of Malaya, and were subsequently successful, as the latter replaced the Malayan Union in 1948.(5m)

(Difference) Although Ho Chi Minh did attempt to negotiate with the French at first, through the 6th May 1946 Agreement, this failed, and thus nationalist leaders in Vietnam often had to take up the responsibility of bring military leaders as well, as opposed to merely being the chief negotiator as in the case of Indonesia and Malaya, as seen in the case of General Vo Nguyen Giap who was the principal commander of the Indochina war which chased the French out of Vietnam and secured North Vietnam from colonial forces

Para 2: Moreover, the role of the nationalists leaders were largely similar in that they had to prove to the colonial powers that they were

2 able to stand up to the internal threats that were facing their country – which was perceived to be the Communist threat (as these perceptions were shaped by The Cold War). It was only after they had demonstrated their ability to do so, that they were able to secure independence for their countries. (6m)

In Indonesia, Sukarno’s and Hatta’s decision to put down the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) Revolt in 1948 was crucial in showing their ‘anti-Communist’ convictions which helped to win over American support, which in turn put pressure on the Dutch to negotiate with the nationalist leaders and paved the way to the Round Table Conference. Had they not done so, America would not have intervened during the Dutch Police Actions, to secure the release of the two nationalist leaders and to force the Dutch to negotiate. (7m)

Similarly, the British were more willing to grant independence to Malaya as they gained confidence in Tunku Abdul Rahman’s governance, as he and the Alliance partners had successfully stood up to Chin Peng (the leader of the Malayan Communist Party) at the Baling Talks of 1955. They showed themselves to be reliable and effective anti-communist leaders, thus securing the trust of the British and the promise to grant independence. (8m)

However, unlike Indonesia and Malaya, Vietnam’s fight was not against Communism, but rather tried to combine the Communist struggle with that of the nationalist struggle for independence, as seen from the formation of the National Liberation Front, which amassed together nationalists under the leadership of the pro- Communists.

Para 3: A related point (to point one) would be that the nationalist leaders had similar roles in that they had to mobilize people together to resist colonialism but had to do it in different ways, due to the unique circumstances in Malaya and Vietnam. The leaders had to show the colonial powers that they did command mass support and that could claim to speak on behalf of their supporters to back up the validity of their demands for independence. (9m)

Mobilisation of the people in Malaya largely took on the form of mobilizing them to join political organizations that would campaign for the protection of their rights. This is seen clearly from the formation of UMNO in March 1946, which was the first united Malay organization (with mass support) that was established to put pressure on the British to grant greater autonomy to the natives, and showed clearly that the Malays had been politicized and were willing to go against British interests to secure their interests as a community. (10m)

However, mobilization of natives in Vietnam often took the form of mobilization of paramilitary forces as seen from the mobilization of the Vietminh to fight against the French. It was only through the successful mobilization of troops and resources (with the cooperation of the Vietnamese villagers) that the Vietnamese were able to defeat

3 the French in 1954 at the battle of Dien Bien Phu. (11m)

L5 L4 + Explain conclusion: Why more similar/more different [12]

In conclusion, despite the fact that there were specific differences that emerged as a result of the unique situation within each country, they can ultimately be said to be more similar than different. The roles played by the nationalist leaders were largely similar in that they all had to resist the attempts made by the colonial masters to re- impose their authority, mobilize the people, and to win the confidence of their supporters by dealing effectively with perceived threats. It was these common points that what made them out to be outstanding nationalist leaders and ultimately helped their countries to secure independence.

1 To what extent were the Western powers in favour of [13] decolonisation in post-war Southeast Asia? Explain your answer.

L1 Writes about Japanese occupation but without focus on the [1] question Award 1m max.

L2 Describes the given perspective and/or identifies other [2-3] perspective Award 2 marks for describing the given perspective and/or other perspectives. Award 3 marks for both perspectives.

The attitude of the Western Powers – Dutch, French, British and Americans – towards decolonization depended on their perceptions of how that influenced their national interests. For the Dutch and French the desire to use their colonies to improve the conditions in the metropolis meant that they were largely not in favour of de- colonisation. For the British and the Americans, although they were committed to decolonization on paper, in reality, national interests often determined whether or not they were in favour of decolonization. (3m)

L3 Explains perspective, but without examples from at least two [3-4] countries. Award 3 marks for explaining one perspective and an additional mark

4 for any supporting detail, up to a maximum of 4 marks.

The Dutch and the French were clearly not in favour of decolonization as they were keen to exploit the resources of their colonies to stimulate greater economic recovery in the metropolis, as their home countries had suffered from German occupation during World War II, and were thus also keen to rebuild their national pride by retaining their colonies. Hence the Dutch and the French refused to acknowledge the declarations of independence made by Indonesia and Vietnam respectively, and were quick to reimpose themselves back in their colonies and hindered genuine independence by paying lip service to the desire for self-rule and by trying to seek greater political association between the metropolis and colony. 3m

That the Dutch were not in favour of decolonization can be seen from their reluctance to grant concessions to the nationalists, and could only concede a small measure of self-governance within a Republic of Indonesia, which would be merely one out of 16 states in a proposed Federation of Indonesia, as seen from the Linggajati Peace Agreement 1947, which would thus imply continued dominance by the Dutch. Even the Round Table Conference of 1949, which the Dutch were pressured into by the Americans, did not concede genuine independence to the Indonesian nationalists, but stuck to the previous political arrangement, which illustrates clearly that they were not in favour of decolonization. 4m

(General observation + example from 1 country)

No answer can achieve more than L3 if it has not drawn examples from at least two countries: Indonesia, Malaya and Vietnam.

L4 Explains the given perspective OR other perspective, with [5-8] examples from at least two countries.

Award 5 marks for a main point, with references to at least two countries Award 8 marks max for two points, with references to at least two countries

The Dutch and the French were clearly not in favour of decolonization as they were keen to exploit the resources of their colonies to stimulate greater economic recovery in the metropolis, as their home countries had suffered from German occupation during World War II, and were thus also keen to restore their national pride by retaining their colonies. Hence the Dutch and the French refused to acknowledge the declarations of independence made by Indonesia and Vietnam respectively, and were quick to re-impose colonial rule in S.E.A colonies and hindered genuine independence by paying lip service to the desire for self-rule and by trying to seek greater political association between the metropolis and colony. 3m

That the Dutch were not in favour of decolonization can be seen from

5 their reluctance to grant concessions to the nationalists. They were only willing to concede a small measure of self-governance within a Republic of Indonesia, which would be merely one out of 16 states in a proposed Federation of Indonesia, as seen from the Linggajati Peace Agreement 1947, which would thus imply continued dominance by the Dutch. Even the Round Table Conference of 1949, which the Dutch were pressured into by the Americans, did not concede genuine independence to the Indonesian nationalists, but stuck to the previous political arrangement, which illustrates clearly that they were not in favour of decolonization. 4m

The French too showed that they were not in favour of decolonization as they would not permit an independent Vietnam, but sought to retain their control over Vietnam as seen from the 6th March 1946 Agreement where they proposed that Vietnam remained in a French Union, despite their promise to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This shows clearly the lack of sincerity towards genuine de- colonisation. 5m

Their reluctance to de-colonise is seen clearly from their willingness to use military force to re-establish their presence and to weaken the nationalist attempts at achieving independence.6m

That the Dutch had no intentions to grant genuine self-government can be seen from their attempts to quickly re-establish their military presence in economically important cities such as Batavia, Surabaya and Bandung. This tendency to use military power to crush the nationalists can also be seen through the Dutch Police Actions in 1947 and 1948, the second one in fact had captured Sukarno and Hatta, the key nationalist leaders. 7m

The French were also quick to re-establish their military presence in Vietnam through the 6th March 1946 Agreement which allowed for the return of 15,000 French troops to Hanoi, and had initiated the First Indo-China War (1946-1954) by attacking Hai Phuong in November 1946, which nullified the 6th March Agreement. That they were willing to commit much time and effort in trying to defeat the nationalists shows clearly their commitment towards colonization and that they were strongly not in favour of de-colonisation. 8m

L5 Both elements of L4 9-11 Award 9 marks for explaining the given and alternative perspective, and additional marks for any supporting detail, to a maximum of 11.

Other perspective:

Although the other Western powers, namely British and America appeared to be more in favour of decolonization as they were the key signatories of the Atlantic Charter (1941) which states as one of its clauses that all people had the right to self-determination, their

6 attitude towards de-colonisation was in reality shaped by their perceptions of national interests, and there were times when they actually hindered the progress of decolonization. (9m)

Although the British seemed to be more willing to grant Malaya independence, as seen from the Malayan Union proposal which sought to bring about a measure of self-governance. Although the centralization proposed by the Malayan Union proposal can be seen as a first step towards independence, as administrative efficiency is a pre-requisite for political stability; the Malay Community saw this as another attempt to weaken the power of the Sultans as it entailed the Sultans relinquishing their sovereignty to the British. Moreover, while the British were willing to prepare Malaya for independence, they retained tight control over Singapore which continued to be a crown colony, as they wanted to use Singapore to secure their strategic interests in the region, especially in light of Cold War tensions and the fear of Communism spreading throughout Southeast Asia. 10m

Similarly, although the Americans were instrumental in putting pressure on the Dutch to negotiate with the Indonesian nationalists as they threatened to withhold Marshall aid from the Netherlands if they continued in their Police Action against the nationalists, and tried to broker a peace agreement as seen from the Renville Agreement 1948 and subsequently the Round Table Conference 1949, they hindered the progress of Vietnamese nationalism as they had supported the French financially during the First IndoChina War (1946-1954), were instrumental in the partitioning of Vietnam at the 17th parallel during the Geneva Conference, and finally, were themselves directly involved in fighting against the ‘Communist threat’ in Vietnam in the Second Vietnam War which lasted till 1973 with the signing of the Paris Agreement whereby the Americans finally threw in the towel. Thus they succeeded in pro-longing the Vietnamese struggle for independence due to their fear of Communism, which thus illustrates their lack of a consistent stand towards decolonization. 11m

L6 Reaches a balanced conclusion based on the relative [12-13] significance of the reasons.

Ultimately, the Western Powers were largely not in favour of decolonization as it was in their national interests to retain their colonies, as seen from the case of the Dutch, French and even the British. Moreover, their commitment to de-colonisation was subjected to other considerations, such as the on-going Cold War, which made security issues of paramount importance to the British and the Americans, and thus made them less in favour of decolonization in reality although they were committed to it on paper.