Devlopment of an Early Warning System Incorporating Advanced Monitoring and Modeling For

Confidential- Draft Page 1 5/19/2018

Robert M. Clark Current Version Feb 20, 2003

DEVLOPMENT OF AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM INCORPORATING ADVANCED MONITORING AND MODELING FOR DRINKING WATER SECURITY AND SAFETY

A Proposal Submitted to …….

This is sensitive and confidential and should not be forwarded or e- mailed. The original e-mail should be immediately deleted twice (2 times) after a single copy is made for review.

February 20, 2002

1 Confidential- Draft Page 2 5/19/2018

Abstract. The events of September 11, 2002 have raised national and regional concerns over the need to protect our nation’s drinking water systems from deliberate acts of terrorism. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Region II Office and Rutgers University’s Center for Information Management, Integration and Connectivity (CIMIC), have responded to this concern by developing plans for a Water Security Consortium. The consortium consisting of the USEPA, CIMIC the American Water Works Service Company (AWWSC), the Passaic Valley Water Commission (PVWC), the North Jersey District Water Supply Commission (NJDWSC), the N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, and the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS), is called the Regional Drinking Water Security and Safety Consortium (RDWSSC). It is intended to provide a prototype institution for cooperation and communication among federal, state, and local governments in the case of a water security emergency. It will serve a number of other functions, including providing a test platform for the development of advanced and evolving monitoring technologies for maintaining water security in U.S Drinking Water Supplies. It will also facilitate modeling assessments for the verification of water security threats and the development of decision support systems for prompt response, remediation and recovery to actual or perceived threats. A proposal to support research funding for the Consortium to pursue the development of an Early Warning System to protect source and finished water is presented.

This is sensitive and confidential and should not be forwarded or e- mailed. The original e-mail should be immediately deleted twice (2 times) after a single copy is made for review.

1. INTRODUCTION

The events of September 11, 2002 raised concerns over the Nation’s critical infrastructure including water and waste water systems. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) responded by establishing a Water Protection Task Force (WPTF) composed of members of the USEPA’s Office of Water, Regional Office staff and liaisons from other USEPA programs. The WPTF was given the responsibility for improving the security of the nation’s drinking water and waste water infrastructure. Security of water systems is not a new issue and the potential for natural, accidental and purposeful contamination has been the subject of many studies. For example, in May 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 that outlined a policy on critical infrastructure protection including our nation’s water supplies. However, it wasn’t until after September 11, 2002 that the water industry truly focused on the vulnerability of the nation’s water supplies to security threats. In recognition of current water security concerns President George Bush signed The Bioterrorism Act into law in June 2002.

Water systems in the United States range from very large to very small. The WPTF is developing a program to cover all of these systems and is working in collaboration with the USEPA’s Office of Research and Development (ORD) by developing a comprehensive research agenda for water security.

One of the first tasks undertaken by the WPTF was the preparation of a State-of-the- Knowledge (SoK) report for the Office of Homeland Security. The responsibility for the report was assigned to the Task Force by the National Security Council (NSC). The report summarized the accumulated knowledge of various agencies involved in homeland security by characterizing and assessing the nature of threat agents, and prevention, protection, response and remediation strategies to counteract these threats.

In collaboration with the WPTF, EPA’s Office of Research and Development has developed a Home Land Security Research Strategy Document that covers water security research, building decontamination and rapid risk assessment. One aspect of this strategy was the development of a National Center for Homeland Security Research (NCHSR) in

Cincinnati, OH with the responsibility for furthering the development of technology to enhance homeland security. A major aspect of this research is the development of strategies and technology for protecting U.S. drinking water systems.

In June, 2002, Rutgers University and EPA’s Region II Office convened a workshop entitled “Monitoring and Modeling Drinking Water Systems for Security and Safety.” Attendees from industry, local, state and Federal agencies and members from academia discussed the state-of-the-art in the area of water system security. As a consequence of these discussions, a consortium was formed and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was drafted, proposing the establishment of a Regional Drinking Water Security and Safety Consortium (RDWSSC). The goal of the MOU was to implement the drinking water security recommendations of the workshop. The Consortium consisting of Rutgers University’s CIMIC, the American Water Works Service Company (AWWSC), the Passaic Valley Water Commission (PVWC), the North Jersey District Water Supply Commission (NJDWSC), the N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS), and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region II Office identified the development of early warning systems for source and distributed water as being of critical importance. In this context, an early warning system (EWS) is an integrated system of monitoring stations located at strategic points in a water utilities source waters or in its distribution system, designed to warn against contaminants that might threaten the health and welfare of drinking water consumers. This proposal is intended to seek funding to implement this concept on a prototype basis in the RDWSSC. As will be discussed later in this proposal, an EWS should be integrated or packaged with appropriate sensors and predictive modeling capability.

In December, 2002 a follow-up to the previous workshop was held to further refine the needs for research as related to Early Warning Systems for security in drinking water. After this meeting the Consortium representatives signed the MOU. As the organizational research arm for implementation of the recommendations, Rutgers University has agreed to establish a Laboratory for Water Security (LWS) under CIMIC to solicit research funding support for meeting the goals of the Consortium. The research team soliciting support under the leadership of LWS includes LWS, the USGS, AWWSC, PVWC, and NJDWSC. The USEPA Region II and the NJDEP, although

4 Confidential- Draft Page 5 5/19/2018 members of the Consortium, will not participate directly in the proposal. A more detailed description of the nature of the threat, the Consortium’s response to that threat, the make-up of the research team and the supporting partners and their roles are discussed in the following section.

2. NATURE OF THE THREAT There are nearly 60,000 community water supplies in the United States serving over 226 million people. Over 63 % of these systems supply water to less then 2.4 % of the population and 5.4 % supply water to 78.5 % of the population. Most of these systems provide water to less then 500 people. In addition there are 140,000 non-community water systems that serve schools, recreational areas, trailer parks, etc. Some of the common elements associated with water supply systems in the U.S. are as follows:

 A water source which may be a surface impoundment such as a lake, reservoir, river or ground water from an aquifer.  Surface supplies generally have conventional treatment facilities including filtration, which removes particulates and potentially pathogenic microorganisms, followed by disinfection.  Transmission systems which include tunnels; reservoirs and/or pumping facilities; and storage facilities.  A distribution system carrying finished water through a system of water mains and subsidiary pipes to consumers Community water supplies are designed to deliver water under pressure and generally supply most of the water for fire fighting purposes. Loss of water or a substantial loss of pressure could disable fire fighting capability, interrupt service and disrupt public confidence. This loss might result from sabotaging pumps that maintain flow and pressure, or disabling electric power sources could cause long term disruption. Many of the major pumps and power sources in water systems have custom designed equipment and could take months or longer to replace 2 .

2.1 Vulnerability of Water Systems

Water systems are spatially diverse and therefore, have an inherent potential to be vulnerable to a variety of threats —physical, chemical, and biological— that may compromise the system’s ability to reliably deliver safe water. There are several areas of vulnerability including (1) the raw water source (surface or groundwater); (2) raw water channels and pipelines; (3) raw water reservoirs; (4) treatment facilities; (5) connections to the distribution system; (6) pump stations and valves; and (7) finished water tanks and reservoirs. Each of these system elements presents unique challenges to the water utility in safeguarding the water supply2 .

2.2 Physical Disruption

The ability of a water supply system to provide water to its customers can be compromised by destroying or disrupting key physical elements of the water system. Key elements include raw water facilities (dams, reservoirs, pipes, and channels), treatment facilities, and distribution system elements (transmission lines and pump stations). Physical disruption may result in significant economic cost, inconvenience and loss of confidence by customers, but has a limited direct threat to human health. Exceptions to this generalization include (1) destruction of a dam that causes loss of life and property in the accompanying flood wave and (2) an explosive release of chlorine gas at a treatment plant.

Water utilities should examine their physical assets, determine areas of vulnerability, and increase security accordingly. An example of such as action might be to switch from chlorine gas to liquid hypochlorite, especially in less secure locations which decrease the risk of exposure to poisonous chlorine gas. Redundant system components would provide backup capability in case of accidental or purposeful damage to facilities.

2.3 Contamination

Contamination is generally viewed as the most serious potential terrorist threat to water systems. Chemical or biological agents could spread throughout a distribution system and result in sickness or death among the consumers and for some agents, the presence of

the contaminant might not be known until emergency rooms reported an increase in patients with a particular set of symptoms. Even without serious health impacts, just the knowledge that a group had breached a water system could seriously undermine customers’ confidence in the water supply. Accidental contamination of water systems has resulted in many fatalities as well. Examples of such outbreaks include cholera contamination in Peru, Cryptosporidium contamination in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (U.S.), and Salmonella contamination in Gideon, Missouri (U.S.). In Gideon, the likely culprit was identified as pigeons infected with Salmonella, that had entered a tank’s corroded vents and hatches.

The U.S. Army has conducted extensive testing and research on potential biological agents 1. Table 1 summarizes information on the agents most likely to have an impact on water systems. Though much is known about these agents, as is evident in the table, there is still research needed to fully characterize the impacts, stability and tolerance to chlorine of many of these agents.

Table 1. Potential Threat of Selected Biological Agents to Water Systems1 Agent Type Stable In Water Chlorine* Tolerance Anthrax Bacteria 2 years (spores) Spores resistant Cholera Bacteria ‘Survives well’ ‘Easily killed’ Plague Bacteria 16 days Unknown Salmonella Bacteria 8 days, fresh water Inactivated Shigellosis Bacteria 2 – 3 days Inactivated 0.05 ppm, 10 min Tuleremia Bacteria Up to 90 days Inactivated 1 ppm, 5 min Aflatoxin Biotoxin Probably stable Probably tolerant Botulinum toxins Biotoxin*** Stable Inactivated 6 ppm, 20 min Cryptosporidiosis Protozoan** Stable days or more Oocysts resistant Microcystins Biotoxin Probably stable Resistant at 100 ppm Ricin Biotoxin Unknown Resistant at 10 ppm Staph enterotoxins Biotoxin Probably stable Unknown Tetrodotoxin Biotoxin Unknown Inactivated 50 ppm T-2 mycotoxin Biotoxin Stable Resistant Hepatitus A Virus Unknown Inactivated 0.4 ppm, 30 min Saxitoxin Biotoxin Stable Resistant at 10 ppm * Ambient temperature; < 1 ppm free available chlorine for 30 minutes or as indicated ** Consisting of one cell or of a colony of like or similar cells ***Toxic to humans

Characteristics that would enhance the potential for an agent to contaminate a drinking or recreational water include:

 Resistance to disinfectants at normal concentrations  Resistance to boiling for 1 minute  A low oral infectious dose  Easy availability  Ease to culture without sophisticated equipment  Survival in water for long periods of time  Difficult to remove by common water treatment practices The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has defined three categories of potentially threatening organisms as listed below.

1. Category A Agents/Water Threat a. Variola major (smallpox) b. Bacillus antrhacis (anthrax) c. Yersinia pestis (plague) d. Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism) e. Francisella tularensis (tulararemia) f. Filoviruses . Ebola hemorrhagic fever . Marburg hemorrhagic fever and arenaviruses . lassa (Lassa fever) . Junin (Argentine hemorrhagic fever) and related viruses

2. Category B Agents/Water Threat a. Coxiella burnetti (Q fever) b. Brucella species (brucellosis) c. Burkholderia mallei (glanders) d. Alphaviruses . Venezuelan encephalomyelitis . Eastern and western equine encephalomyelitis

e. Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans) f. Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens g. Staphylococcus enterotoxin B

A subset of the List B agents includes pathogens that are food or waterborne. These pathogens include but are not limited to:

o Salmonella species o Sligella dysenteriae o Escherichia coli O157:H7 o Vibro cholerae o Cryptosporidium parvum 3. Category C Agents/Water Threats a. Nipah virus b. Hantaviruses c. tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses d. tickborne encephalitis viruses e. yellow fever f. multidrug-resistant tuberculosis Although all of the above agents (and many others) could result in very significant health impacts, the risks vary considerably. For example, Botulinus toxin because of its lethality in very small doses is considered to be among the most serious threats. There are many factors that contribute to the relative risk of the various agents including availability, lethality, stability, and tolerance to chlorine or other disinfectants.

Deininger and Meier (2000) ranked some agents and compounds in terms of their relative factor of effectiveness, R, based on lethality and solubility using the following equation3:

R = solubility in water (in mg/L) / (1000 × lethal dose (in mg/human))

Table 2 lists values of R for various biological agents and chemicals by decreasing level of effectiveness (that is, decreasing degree of lethality in water).

Many locations within the overall water supply system are vulnerable to the introduction of chemical or biological agents. In many cases, the most accessible location is in the raw surface water source.

An agent introduced in a surface water source is subject to dilution, exposure to sunlight, and treatment therefore it follows that the most serious threats are posed by an agent introduced into the finished water at a treatment facility or within the distribution system. Possible points of entry include the treatment plant clear well, distribution system storage tanks and reservoirs, pump stations, and direct connections to distribution system mains.

Table 2. Relative Toxicity of Some Poisons in Water

COMPOUND R Botulinus Toxin A 10000 VX 300 Sarin 100 Nicotine 20 Colchicine 12 Cyanide 9 Amiton 5 Fluoroethanol, Sodium, Fluoroacetate 1 Selenite 1 Arsenite, Arsenate 1 Based on Deininger and Meier (2000)

3.0 PURPOSE OF THE CONSORTIUM

The purpose of the Consortium is to provide a forum where federal, state and local government agency representatives, highly talented scientists, water utility professionals, and leaders in the area of water security can share their expertise and resources. It provides a means of communication among federal, state and local levels of government to address water security threats. The Consortium will also provide a test bed to study the advanced and still evolving technologies to monitor drinking water resources and distribution networks in order to better protect the public.

Specifically, all parties intend to:

 Participate and offer expertise as well as available facilities as appropriate,

 Collaborate on the testing and evaluation of advanced technologies to monitor and

model water quality in real-time,

 Attend periodic group meetings and participate in workshops.

It is envisioned that this Consortium may grow in the future to incorporate other universities, utilities and possibly other agencies as appropriate and mutually acceptable.

There have been inquiries from outside water utilities about joining the Consortium. The work of the Consortium will include, but not be limited to: organizing and conducting workshops; convening seminars on relevant technology applications; developing training opportunities for Consortium affiliated personnel; and conducting real time pilot studies.

This work will be carried out collaboratively with the participating Consortium members utilizing a variety of analytical, modeling, real-time prototyping field sensor experiments, and software modeling engineering approaches. It is expected that such pilot studies will benefit the security needs of the participating water utility members by leading to future operational implementation and validation of potential sensor technology applications and modeling refinements.

As an immediate objective toward achieving this goal, this proposal has been prepared to solicit funding for research that will lead to the development and implementation an end-to-end real-time monitoring and modeling early warning pilot system that:

 Consists of currently available state-of-the-art physical, chemical and bio-

chemical sensors, predictive modeling tools and information infrastructure,

 Provides decision makers and the public with reliable and timely assessments,

 Satisfies the Consortium members requirements for reliability, scalability and

accuracy under operational field conditions,

 Ensures the continued safety and security of drinking water in source waters and

in distribution networks within our region and within our nation for future

generations.

4. PROPOSED RESEARCH/SCOPE OF WORK

The proposed research will consist of three separate but closely related tasks. The first task will focus on the development of a prototype EWS based on current monitoring, sensing and modeling technology utilizing a portion of the distribution network of one of the Consortium’s utility members and the source water of two others. This task will be managed by the USGS in collaboration with the three water utilities. The second task will focus on the integration of the data generated by the monitoring stations with appropriate predictive modeling capability. Water, both in streams and reservoirs and in the distribution system moves in complex temporal and spatial patterns. Modeling provides a mechanism for understanding these complexities. This task will be managed by CIMIC. The third task focus on the development and deployment of advanced and as yet undeveloped sensors and development of “cutting edge” modeling systems using the prototype EWS data and information. This task will be the responsibility of the LWS. As mentioned previously several utilities have inquired about as the possibility of joining the Consortium. If possible these requests will be accommodated, in such a way as to not disturb ongoing research projects. A tailored collaboration between a monitoring vender and the American Water Works Association Research Foundation is also being explored and is discussed in Appendix _

4.1 REEARCH TO DEVELOP AN EWS

The consortium has been established in one of the most complex water systems in the

United States (Figure 1), consisting of three watershed management areas. Water is withdrawn from the various surface sources in the watersheds and then either used directly by a utility or distributed through a number of inter-ties to other utilities. As can be seen in Figure 1, there are numerous surface water supplies in the three watersheds.

This interconnectivity makes the water system a very good candidate for inclusion in a research program to develop an EWS. As mentioned earlier the USGS will manage this research task in collaboration with the three water utilities.

Objectives of this task include:

 Subtask 1: Define sensor installation test sites to maximize the benefit of existing monitoring stations currently operated by PVWC, American Water Works, NJDWSC, USGS and/or NJDEP. USGS monitoring stations would include river gauging, rainfall, and water quality monitoring stations.

 Subtask 2: Field test chemical and/or biological sensors that are applicable to the potential water quality issues of concern which would include the development and implementation of a Quality Assurance and Quality Control program for each sensor evaluation.

 Task 3: Develop long-term operation and maintenance costs as well as a cost-benefit analysis for successful sensor technologies evaluated as part of this project.

 Subtask 4: Evaluate existing monitoring efforts, both on-line and grab, to aid in establishing response characteristics with existing data collection efforts as well as to establish correlations with new technology sensors.  Subtask 5: Establish appropriate response procedures for mitigation of potential contamination events as identified by the early warning sensors and/or grab sample data. Because all of the utilities are regulated and have ongoing programs for monitoring there will be some unique features associated with each utilities research contribution as described in the following paragraphs.

4.1.1 NJDWSC

The North Jersey District Water Supply Commission (NJDWSC) of the State of New

Jersey (NJDWS) is a public body corporate and politic of the State of New Jersey, organized and existing pursuant to NJSA 58:5-1 et seq and is one of the largest drinking water purveyors in the State of New Jersey. NJDWSC is unique as it can provide all aspects of a water supply system (source water, pumping station, reservoir, treatment plant, storage tank, and transmission/distribution systems). This gives NJDWSC the ability to monitor and model the water supply system from source to tap.

NJDWSC provides treated water on a wholesale basis to Passaic Valley Water

Commission, as well as supplying wholesale treated water to its many contracting municipalities and raw water to United Water New Jersey (Figure 2). NJDWSC’s

Wanaque/Monksville Reservoirs System is located in northern Passaic County, New

Jersey. The Reservoir system beginning with Upper and Lower Greenwood lakes drains a 95 square mile watershed covering parts of Orange and Rockland counties in New York, and Passaic County in New Jersey. The Wanaque/Monksville Reservoirs System is New

Jersey's largest (in terms of population served) water supply system. The system provides a safe yield of 173 million gallons per day to approximately 2 million people in 90 towns and cities in the northern half of the state. Additionally, there are two pump stations designed to pump up to 250 million gallons per day of water from the Pompton/Passaic

Rivers and 150 million gallons per day from the Ramapo River into the Wanaque

Reservoir. These rivers are the supplementary sources of water supply to the

Wanaque Reservoir. NJDWSC’s Water Treatment Plant/Operations Center is located in

FIGURE 2- SCHEMATIC OF NJDWSC SYSTEM

Wanaque, NJ, where the raw water is pumped from the Wanaque Reservoir then purified and filtered to ensure its safety and potability.

Current NJDWSC Water Quality Monitory Program

This proposal is consistent with the ongoing monitoring and modeling of NJDWSC’s comprehensive reservoir water quality management plan which consists of:

o Real Time Water Quality Data Collection. Five computerized water quality sensor packages (Hydrolab© Datasonde with three Remote Underwater Sampling Stations by Apprise Technologies, Inc.) have been deployed at the following locations: Wanaque South Pump Station, Ramapo Pump Station, and three strategic points within the Wanaque Reservoir. Multiple water quality parameters

(pH, temperature, dissolved oxygen, conductivity, turbidity, chlorophylla) are collected at different depths from the surface to the bottom of the water column. o Reservoir and Stream Water Quality Test Programs. Grab sample testing consists of: . Daily lab algae and bacteria tests at the Water Treatment Plant’s intake. . Weekly lab algae species and cell count tests at various locations and depths within the Wanaque and Monksville Reservoirs during the growing seasons. . 45 strategically selected locations throughout the watershed of the reservoir system and the Ramapo/Pompton/Passaic Rivers. o Performing Monthly Wanaque Water System Flow Mass Balance and Nutrient Loading Analyses. With the information collected by the water quality monitoring programs, the monthly reservoir mass balance and nutrient loading analyses are prepared. The nutrient loading will be used as the basis for formulating a short and long-term reservoir management action plan. o Computer model simulations for forecasting (up to 12 months ahead) reservoir storage level and Ramapo/Wanaque South pumping operations. o Computer model predictions of the impounding reservoir water quality profiles. o Finished (Treated) Water Test Program. NJDWSC routinely monitors the quality of water throughout its distribution system ultimately leading to the tap. NJDWSC conducts extensive testing throughout the service area. Testing is performed at its fully NJDEP and USEPA Certified Water Quality laboratory.

NJDWSC’s Objectives

NJDWSC’s goals for the proposed research are as follows:

o Install and operate the state-of-the-art continuous monitoring systems at field locations throughout the entire water supply system. o Install, operate and evaluate the FlowCAM system. The FlowCAM is a state-of- the-art instrument that automatically counts, images, and analyzes the microorganisms in the water for providing instant detection of the existence of harmful bacteria or algal blooms, (including those associated with toxicity) and the issuance of an early warning. o Install, operate, and evaluate the ability of an automated biological monitoring system/approach that meets with the goals of the EPA’s Environmental Monitoring for Public Access and Community Tracking (EMPACT) program. o Evaluate the accuracy of the data generated by the field instruments. o Evaluate and install a data telemetry/remote control system to provide real-time access to data and allow for remote operation of the monitoring systems. o Determine if long-term operation of these monitoring systems is logistically feasible and cost-effective. o Determine that the system functions smoothly and reliably in a real-life setting. o Develop predictive models for drinking water security and safety.

The parameters to be measured include (continuous measurement) measures of water quality (pH, temperature, dissolved oxygen, specific conductivity, turbidity, and chlorophylla) as well as microorganisms species and concentration in the water. These parameters will communicate time-relevant data that will assist in making security- related and environmentally responsible decisions.

The information will provide crucial data to the improvement of water quality simulation models that will be utilized for the purpose of security. The proposed project is designed to supplement water quality monitoring activities currently in progress. This project will assist in determining baseline water quality through definition of hydrologic conditions. It will also assist in improving our understanding of water supply sources and pollutant loading. The data will support key water supply security and operation decisions. When the project is concluded, similar real-time monitoring stations could be installed at other key locations throughout the state of New Jersey and the U.S.

NJDWSC using its staff, equipment, supplies, computer software, subcontractors, etc will perform following tasks:

o Develop Monitoring and Quality Assurance Project Plan – To ensure that water quality data are collected, transferred to the LWS, and managed in a manner consistent with appropriate data quality standards. o Installation – Provide oversight on the installation of data retrieval and instrumentation. o Calibration, Operation and Maintenance – Assist in performing routine equipment maintenance at each site as stipulated by the manufacturer, verifying the water surface elevation, confirming the system is operating properly, and taking a series of measurements at the sites to develop base line. o Data Analysis will consist of reviewing the data for accuracy and consistency quarterly.

NJDWSC will maintain and assist in maintenance of monitoring stations. NJDWSC will also cooperate with the LWS and provide support to ensure real-time access to monitoring data in the

LWS database.

The Consortium will provide several unique test sites for evaluating existing and emerging sensors and monitors. This activity supports and complements the EPA in house testing program for water quality sensors and monitors.

NEED RESOURCE INFORMATION AND SPECIFIC DETAIL ON PROPOSED

RESEARCH

4.1.2 PVWC

The Passaic Valley Water Commission (PVWC) owns and operates the Little Falls Water

Treatment Plant (LFWTP) located in Totowa, New Jersey. The LFWTP is in the process of being upgraded from a conventional treatment process to a high-rate ballasted sand pretreatment process, ozone disinfection process and biological filtration. The upgrade is scheduled to be completed in the year 2004.

Three raw water sources are available to the LFWTP, including Point View

Reservoir water, Pompton River water and Passaic River water (see Figure 1). Point

View Reservoir water is obtained at the Plant intake by gravity; however, this supply can only be utilized on an emergency basis in July and August. The Point View Reservoir is refilled by pumping Pompton River water at the Jackson Avenue Pump Station.

Downstream of the Jackson Avenue Pump Station is the Wanaque South Pump Station; this pump station is utilized to pump Pompton River water to either North Jersey

District's Water Supply Commission (NJDWSC) Wanaque Reservoir and to the LFWTP intake. Passaic River water is fed by gravity to the LFWTP intake which is located downstream of the confluence of the Passaic and Pompton rivers (Figure 3).

Either, or a combination of, these raw supplies is treated at the LFWTP. In addition, finished water supplied to PVWC by NJDWSC is also distributed to the Totowa facility. The two finished water supplies, either directly or as a blend, are distributed to

PVWC's retail and wholesale customers which represent a population of over 750,000.

FIGURE 3.-SCHMATIC OF PVWC SYSTEM

PVWC’s primary goal is to participate in field tests to determine viable options for on- line sensor technology that can be utilized to predict chemical and/or biological anomalies either in the source or finished water supplies.

PVWC is in the process of completing a plant upgrade project that includes the installation of 4 sourcewater monitoring stations and 2 finished water monitoring stations.

The data collected will be routed to the LFWTP’s Supervisory Control and Data

Acquisition (SCADA) software program. The on-line monitoring stations will be utilized to supplement grab sample data collected throughout the watershed as well as for the finished water supplies.

The sourcewater monitoring stations will be located at the Jackson Avenue Pump

Station, Wanaque South Pump Station and at the Little Falls Water Treatment Plant intake. In addition, an identical monitoring station will be installed at the post-recycle stream for the LFWTP influent which represents a blend of the raw sourcewater and the plant recycle streams prior to any treatment. Each sourcewater monitoring station will include the installation of on-line sensors for the collection of the following water quality data:

 alkalinity

 temperature

 UV absorbance

 particle counts

 dissolved oxygen

 pH

 turbidity

Finished water on-line monitoring stations will also be installed at the LFWTP to monitor the quality of the LFWTP finished water as well as the quality of the finished water supplied by NJDWSC. The sensors to be installed for the LFWTP finished water include:

 total organic carbon

 dissolved oxygen

 free chlorine residual

 turbidity

 pH

 UV absorbance

 particle counts

The sensors to be installed at the LFWTP for the finished water supplied by NJDSWC include:

 free chlorine residual

 turbidity

 total organic carbon

 pH

PVWC proposes to evaluate available on-line chemical and/or biological sensors at the Wanaque South Pump Station and at the two finished water supply monitoring stations located at the LFWTP. Data collected for the field sensors can be routed through the Commission’s SCADA system for data analysis purposes. On-line data can be extracted from the SCADA Genesis software program and grab sample data can be

23 Confidential- Draft Page 24 5/19/2018 extracted from the Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS) Labworks software program to develop the proper data analysis of the field sensors and any required supplemental comparisons with PVWC’s on-line sensors or grab sample data.

PVWC is also installing a neural Network Software program manufactured by Ward

Systems, Inc. that may also be utilized to supplement the overall data analysis. The data analysis can be supplemented with rainfall, stream flow and other water quality data currently being collected by USGS.

PVWC supplies finished water to American Water Works that consists of either finished water obtained from the LFWTP, finished water obtained from NJDWSC, or a blend of the two finished supplies. It may be possible to field test sensor’s within American Water Works distribution system and/or within PVWC’s distribution system. PVWC does not have any existing on-line monitoring stations within the distribution system but does have an established grab-sample monitoring program. As part of this project PVWC will install _ sampling and monitoring systems.

NEED COST AND MANPOWER INFORMATION ON INSTALLATION OF

ADDITIONAL MONITORING

4.1.3 HADDON HEIGHTS WATER SYSTEM (AWWSC)

The Haddon Heights water system is part of the New Jersey-American Water Company which in turn part of the American Water Works Service Company, Inc. (AWWSC).

AWWSC is the largest publicly traded U.S. Corporation devoted exclusively to the business of water. Its 6,500 associates provide water, wastewater and other related services to 15 million people in 27 U.S. states and three Canadian provinces.The New

Jersey American Water Company provided an average of 43.55 mgd to approximately

91,200 customers in their combined Burlington, Camden and Haddon service areas in

2001. Of the total customers, approximately 65,700 are in the Haddon system, 19,000 are in the Burlington system, and 6,500 are in the Camden system. Approximately 90 percent of the customer base is residential, 8.4 percent is commercial, 0.5 percent is comprised of the other public authority category, and nearly 0.1 percent is industrial. The

fire service classification amounts to approximately 1 percent of the customer base.

At the end of 2001, there were 13 resale customers in the Burlington, Camden and

Gloucester Counties area that purchased water from NJAWC. The Burlington and

Haddon systems were interconnected via the regional pipeline from the Delaware

Valley Regional Water Treatment Plant in 1996. The Camden system was also connected to the regional pipeline in late 1996 via 24-inch and 30-inch transmission main that is routed through a part of the Haddon system. Therefore, the three systems are being analyzed as one combined system. The combined service area of these three systems includes portions of Burlington and Camden Counties. Many of the municipalities served directly by NJAWC have already reached build-out. Most of the remaining growth in the system is projected to occur in a few of the municipalities in

Burlington County, and in Voorhees, Gloucester and Cherry Hill Townships in

Camden County. A significant portion of the projected growth in usage is likely to occur as additional re-sale usage to the growing municipalities outside of the NJAWC service area.

The Haddon Height system will provide the basis for the distribution system monitoring research program (Figure 4).

NEED MORE DETAIL ON THE SYSTEM, AS FOLLOWS:

I. SIZE AND PRODUCTION

II. NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS

III. EXISITING MONITORING AND COMPLAINCE DETAILS

IV. CURRENT WATER QUALTIY MODELING PROGRAM

V. PLANS FOR INSTALLING ADDITIONAL MONITORING SYSTEMS AS

PART OF PROJECT

4.1.4 USGS

The role of the USGS as part of the consortium will be to work with the three water utilities, primarily NJDWSC and PVWC to conduct the following activities:

 Conduct reconnaissance of field conditions for optimal location of EWS locations. Ideally, a prototype EWS at a water utility would include at least three stations—one upstream from the surface-water intake, one near the intake, and one in the distribution system. At first, one station will be selected in order to test the proof of concept for collection of data and then be expanded to other stations as the sample collection method is resolved.  Design and construct/upgrade gaging stations to house EWS equipment. Existing structures will be used where available to minimize costs. Existing structures may need to be expanded to house all of the needed electrical equipment, plumbing, and sensors. Heating and air conditioning may be needed to ensure calibrated sensor operation at all temperatures and field conditions.  Install, operate, and maintain real time monitoring equipment using available and state-of-the-art sensors and background water-quality characteristics and for biochemical agents that may be used as threats to drinking water safety.  Continuously or intermittently monitor water quality from the EWS. The testing and evaluation monitoring design would include 3 tiers of data collection: o Level 1 would include real-time monitoring of stream elevation and/or streamflow discharge, temperature (T), pH, dissolved oxygen (DO), specific conductance (SC), turbidity, ORP, chlorophyll to monitor background conditions and to look for significant changes in background conditions. This would require at least a years worth of data collection to determine background conditions.

o Level 2 would include deployment of specific probes either continuously or just after a significant change in background levels that may suggest the presence of a contaminant from an accidental or intentional spill. o Level 3 would include the collection of a sample if a specific probe indicates the possible presence of a contaminant of concern. This sample will be collected using an automatic sampler such as refrigerated automatic ISCO sampler. This sample wouod then be obtained by USGS or the water for delivery and analysis to an appropriate laboratory for confirmation.  Field-scale testing of new sensor probes developed by Federal and State Laboratories and the private sector. As new technology becomes available, sensors will be deployed in the field alongside of the background water-quality characteristics. These sensors should be laboratory- and bench-scale tested at other locations such as the  Generate and manage a stream of high quality real time water-quality data that would benefit the water companies in making decisions regarding plant operations with respect to water pumping and treatment options. Supply the data in table and graphical format over time at appropriate intervals.  Test and evaluate different sampling and installation techniques for reliability and maintenance including (a) pumped flow through methods and (b) in situ. (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Real time continuous water-quality monitoring stations (A) pumped flow through; (B) in situ. Source: http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/wri/wri004252 or Wagner and others, 2000

 Evaluate the optimal In stream (depth and width) locations for the placement of the probes in streams to account for In stream mixing and to ensure that the water supply is being protected from potential contamination from accidental and intentional spills.  Evaluate previously conducted time of travel studies to determine optimal locations of upstream EWS stations in the source water. Make recommendations for future locations of EWS stations.  Statistical interpretation of real-time data to evaluate relations between stage, water- quality characteristics, and other sensor data to predict possible contamination of source water.  Provide technical guidance on the installation, operation, and maintenance of the real time monitoring equipment for deployment in other areas of the United States. Supporting Personnel

In order to conduct this research the USGS will require a full time hydrologist as project chief, the District Water-Quality Specialist part-time, a part-time hydrologist for technical assistance, and water-quality technicians for installation, operation, and maintenance of the various EWS stations. The work tasks for the project chief will include (1) coordination of project activities with consortium members and project staff, (2) reconnaissance of appropriate field sites, (3) design of sampling stations, (4) purchasing of appropriate equipment, (5) maintenance of QA/QC of data stream, (5) statistical interpretation of the relations of water-quality data to determine background conditions in relation to seasonal and hydrogeologic conditions, (6) developing methods to determine sampling frequency for Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 sampling protocols and (7) documenting and publishing procedures and results. See section 10.0 for more details.

5. Modeling and Information Management Research

CIMIC (Center for Information Management, Integration and Connectivity) is a research center at Rutgers-Newark whose objectives are to (i) identify, develop, and demonstrate new applications and be instrumental in the transfer of technology to sponsor organizations; (ii) foster a multi-disciplinary research program that brings together researchers from a diverse set of areas including computer science, information science, environmental sciences, geological sciences, and healthcare; (iii) sponsor technical workshops and seminars that address timely research challenges, and (iv) serve the community through outreach activities by providing education and mentor programs for inner city youths. These CIMIC objectives are consistent with the purpose of participating in a Regional Drinking Water Safety and Security Consortium for prototyping real-time monitoring and modeling systems technologies.

CIMIC will provide overall direction and project management and will conduct requirement studies utilizing the above mentioned consortium field testing sites to compare the specifications of the monitors as provided by the vendors, against actual field scale performance. Validation will be based on grab sample and other comparative techniques. A major task in this research effort will be the integration of distribution system models, with monitoring and sensing systems. NEED SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES AND RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND TIME LINES

6. SENSOR AND MODELING RESEARCH

LWS will study and help redesign the underlying information network to make use of the evolving applications of mobile wireless and satellite communication systems. Some potential spin-off research includes the following studies: a. Modeling simulation studies to determine where in the distribution system, online monitoring sensors would be most effective

b. Development of real time decision support systems for the monitoring network c. Studies on data handling and validation including:  User data requirements  Data quality objectives  Visualization and graphical representation of information  Real-time reporting and decision support  Compliance reporting d. Research on:  Predictive modeling  Expert systems and knowledge management  Coupling models with SCADA systems a. Optimal location of monitoring stations Research into the application of mobile communication and grid field computing for the integration of water quality modeling techniques with real time monitoring information from a vast array of advanced sensors to create an early warning system

There is a significant research effort being pursued by Private, Non Profit and

Government Laboratories intended to develop more robust and reliable sensors for use in water supply. The research team, through the Laboratory for Water Security will conduct workshops and symposia in an attempt to identify where this research is being conducted.

The Consortium will establish a series of study groups to evaluate the status of sensors that are close to field application. Sources of this information include: EPAs ETV program, Sandia National Labs, Battelle, the US Army, the US Airforce, and the Office of Naval Research. Promising technologies will be placed on a fast-track to assess their potential for field application in water supplies. Part of this effort will be working with vendors to develop prototype systems for testing in the selected field locations

Most of the research proposed in Task 1 and 2 are based on near term approaches to monitoring and sensing. LWS will also focus on conducing research that is “on the cutting edge”. For example, Satellite technology may prove useful for identifying chemical and biological warfare agents in source water or for rapid transmission of data from monitoring stations.

NEED LIST OF SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES AND RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND TIME LINES

7.0 PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Project management and coordination will be the overall responsibility of CIMIC/LWS in collaboration with USGS, and the associated water utilities. It is anticipated that progress meetings will be held with all the research team twice per year. In addition, to the research activities conducted as part of this proposal an advisory council will be established consisting of representatives from the US EPA, NJDEP, and organizations such as the American Water Works Association, the Association of Metropolitan Water

Agencies, National Association of Water Companies and the National Water Research

Institute. It is anticipated that the Advisory Council will meet annually and may be called together to respond to special circumstances.

CIMIC, in collaboration with the Consortium, will establish in CIMIC a research laboratory (Laboratory for Water Security, LWS) within the guidelines established by

Rutgers University. The CIMIC Director will serve as the Director of the Laboratory.

LWS’s Steering Committee which will consist of a member from each Consortium participating organization as designated by that organization’s signing body, except for

USEPA, which will not be a member of the LWS. USEPA will, however, provide a liaison to the LWS. The Steering Committee shall have the following responsibilities:

 To review programmatic policies, priorities, and research and development

objectives and make recommendations to the Consortium concerning these

matters,

 To receive an annual progress report of the LWS programs and activities from the

Director and make appropriate recommendations to CIMIC and the Consortium,

 To review and recommend revisions to this Agreement, including inclusion of

other institutions.

8.0 EXPECTED BENEFITS FROM RESEARCH

Emergency planning by water utilities is not new. The American Water Works

Association publishes a manual on emergency planning (AWWA_) and the State of

California has developed extensive emergency guidance for water utilities because of the potential devastation associated with earth quakes. Presidential Decision Directive 63 requires that federal agencies implement plans to protect the Nations Infrastructure and the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 requires that all drinking water utilities serving 100,000 people or more, must conduct vulnerability assessments. However in times of extreme crisis it is one thing to have plans in place to deal with a threat, and it is something else to have functioning systems that provide for communication with all levels of government and the resources to deal with it. The results of this research will yield a prototype institutional structure and robust hardware and software systems to assist in identifying a

32 Confidential- Draft Page 33 5/19/2018 water security threat and then to respond and mitigate it. Beyond security issues the

Federal Government is also placing increased emphasis on the need to manage water quality in distribution networks. The proposed monitoring and modeling systems will provide the potential for utilities to exercise real time control on water quality from the source water to delivery point in the network.

WILL ADD MORE DISCUSSION

9.0 REFERENCES

1. Burrows, W.D., and S.E. Renner. 1999. “Biological Warfare Agents as Threats to

Potable Water.” Environmental Health Perspectives, 107(12): 975-984.

2. Clark, R.M., and R.A. Deininger. 2000. “Protecting the Nation’s Critical

Infrastructure: The Vulnerability of U.S. Water Supply Systems.” Jour. of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 8(2): 73-80.

3. Deininger, R.A. and P.G. Meier. 2000. “Sabotage of Public Water Supply Systems.” In

Security of Public Water Supplies. Edited by R.A. Deininger, P. Literathy, and J.

Bartram. NATO Science Series, 2. Environment - Vol. 66. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic

Publishers.

4.Wagner, R.J., Mattraw, H.C., Ritz, G.FF., and Smith, B.A., 2000, Guidelines and Standard Procedures for Continuous Water-Quality Monitors: Site Selection, Field Operation, Calibration, Record Computation, and Reporting: Water-Resources Investigations Report 00-4252.

HAVE A LOT OF REFERENCES TO ADD 10.0 RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

10.1 Equipment Requirements

Manufacturer's of field sensors to be tested would need to provide the following equipment and services for each sensor to be tested:

. supply instrument and all associated appurtenances, including spare parts

. provide installation of instrument and all associated appurtenances, including

integration with existing SCADA hardware and software

. provide a Quality Assurance and Quality Control Program, including health and

safety issues

. provide training of PVWC staff for operation, maintenance and trouble shooting of

instrument

. provide data analysis

. provide on-site service for repair of instrument, including all travel expenses, labor

and equipment

10.2 In-Kind Services

The water utilities will provide the following resources:

o Technical staff review of project reports and data collection efforts

o On-going support of installed field sensors, including routine preventative

maintenance and calibration services

o Laboratory analytical support for supporting grab sample data

o Data trending support using SCADA

10.3 Summary of Required Resources

Table 1. Estimated project costs

Costs1 Item Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Human resources1 250,000 Project chief (FT) Hydrologist (PT) Water-quality specialist (PT)

Per station costs1 Installation costs for probes per $15,000 station2 to $25,000 YSI 5-parameter mini-monitor depending Chlorophyll a on number ORP and types ISCO auto sampler of probes …Communications Stage measurements Operation and maintenance of $38,000 probes and sample collection to 50.000 devices per station2

Stage measurements Installation if needed 10,000 Operation and maintenance 6,000

New construction In-situ ? Pumped flowthrough ? Upgrades to gaging house ?

Vehicles Travel

1Costs include all overhead. Costs in Year 1 and Year 2 would be adjusted due to inflation and number of stations in operation. 2Costs include human resources for technicians to install and program. These costs will be highly variable depending on the site.

Table 2. Estimated costs for equipment per station Costs1

Item Rental per year Purchase Communications Telemetry (DCP) 5,000 18,000 Telephone or cellular 500 2,000 Radio Background probes YSI 5 parameter 5,000 18,000 Chlorophyll a 1,500 Oxidation Reduction Potential ISCO refrigerated $5,500 programmable auto sampler AC and heating 2,000 Shelter NA Site specific Plumbing NA Site specific

1Costs include all overheads NEED MORE COMPLETE TABLE OF RESOURCES AND A DETAILED TIME LINE