Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading Treatment s1

Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

ADVANCE UNEDITED VERSION Visit to Armenia undertaken from 3 to 6 September 2013: observations and recommendations addressed to the national preventive mechanism

Report to the National Preventive Mechanism*

* * In accordance with article 16 (1) of the Optional Protocol, the present report was transmitted confidentially to the national preventive mechanism on 15 November 2013. On 8 January 2017, the national preventive mechanism requested the Subcommittee to publish the report, in accordance with article 16 (2) of the Optional Protocol.

GE.13-49152 CAT/OP/ARM/.2

Contents Paragraphs Page

I. Introduction...... 1-11 3-4

II. The national preventive mechanism...... 12-21 4-5

III. Recommendations to the national preventive mechanism...... 22-61 5-10

A. Recommendations relating to main legal, institutional and structural issues.. 22-36 5-7 B. Recommendations on main methodological issues relating to visits...... 37-61 7-10 IV. Final recommendations...... 62-66 11 Annexes I. List of Government officials and other persons with whom the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture met...... 12-14 II. List of places of detention jointly visited by the national preventive mechanism and the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture ...... 15

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I. Introduction

1. In accordance with its mandate set forth in the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter referred to as “the Optional Protocol” or OPCAT), members of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter referred to as “the SPT”) visited the Republic of Armenia (hereinafter referred to as “Armenia”) from 3 to 6 September 2013. 2. The SPT was represented by the following members: Ms. Mari Amos (Head of the delegation), Mr. Victor Madrigal-Borloz and Mr. Miguel Sarre Iguíniz. 3. The SPT was assisted by two human rights officers from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as four local interpreters. 4. The primary objective of the visit was to provide advisory services and technical assistance to the national mechanism for the prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of Armenia (hereinafter referred to as ”the NPM”), in accordance with article 11 (b), subparagraphs (ii) and (iii), of the Optional Protocol. The visit was intended to assist in strengthening the capacity and the mandate of the NPM, and in the evaluation of the needs and the means necessary to strengthen the protection of persons deprived of their liberty from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Armenia. Another objective of the visit was to assess the strategies to address the current challenges and difficulties faced by the NPM, taking due account of the SPT “Guidelines on the national preventive mechanisms.” 5. For these objectives, a number of meetings were held with the members and staff of the NPM, i.e. both the Department for the Prevention of Torture and Violence of the Human Rights Defender’s Office as well as the Expert Council on the Prevention of Torture and Violence (hereinafter referred to as “Expert Council”). This permitted the SPT to discuss the NPM’s working methods and to explore ways of strengthening and increasing its effectiveness, as explained below. To observe how the NPM applies its working methodology, the SPT also visited, together with the NPM, places of detention. The SPT wishes to express its gratitude to the NPM for its cooperation and the facilitation of the visit. 6. During the visit, the SPT also met with officials from the General Prosecutor’s Office, Ministry of Healthcare, the Standing Committee on State and Legal Affairs of the National Assembly, Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Police, Special Investigation Service, Ministry of Defence, Military Police, and the State Migration Service of the Territorial Management Ministry. It also met with representatives of the three public monitoring groups, as well as an additional civil society organization (Annex I). 7. This report sets out observations and recommendations to the “Department for the Prevention of Torture and Violence within the Human Rights Defender’s Office”, (NPM), charged with the fulfilment of the HR Defender’s NPM mandate. These recommendations are made in line with the SPT mandate to offer training and technical assistance and to advise and assist NPMs, in accordance with article 11 (b), subparagraphs (ii) and (iii), of the Optional Protocol. 8. The planning of the SPT advisory visit was a joint undertaking, as both the NPM and the SPT agreed in advance on the agenda of the joint meetings. Those meetings allowed the SPT to understand the achievements and challenges as well as the legal, structural and institutional obstacles faced by the NPM, along with its working methods.

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9. During the course of the visit, joint site visits to three places of detention were conducted (annex II). The places of deprivation of liberty were chosen by the NPM. This permitted the SPT to analyse the methodology of the visiting teams of the two components of the NPM, the NPM itself and the Expert Council. During the joint visits, members of the SPT adopted a role of observers, while members of the NPM and the Expert Council led the visits. 10. This report is being sent to the NPM on a confidential basis; it will be for the NPM to decide whether or not to make it public. 11. The SPT will send a separate confidential report to the Armenian authorities in which it will make recommendations to the State Party.

II. The national preventive mechanism

12. Armenia acceded to the Convention against Torture on 13 September 1993 and acceded to the OPCAT on 14 September 2006. On 8 April 2008, Parliament designated the Human Rights Defender’s Office (hereinafter referred to as HRDO) as NPM, through an amendment to the 2003 Human Rights Defender Act. Article 6.1 of the Act, introduced in 2008, states that the Human Rights Defender is designated as an ‘independent national mechanism’ under the OPCAT. The amendments provide no further detail on the functioning of the Ombudsman's Office as NPM. 13. The tasks and powers of the NPM therefore derive from the OPCAT, in particular articles 19 and 20, and have been further elaborated in the Internal Regulation of the NPM. 14. From 2009-2011, the NPM’s functions were carried out by a team of 3 HRDO staff and 4 NGO representatives, selected by the Human Rights Defender. Visits to places of detention were carried out on the condition that delegations comprised at least one HRDO staff member and that the Human Rights Defender was informed of every visit beforehand. Funding came from the 3-year project under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. 15. In 2011, the Human Rights Defender established the Department for the Prevention of Torture and Violence within the Human Rights Defender’s Office, which was charged with the fulfilment of the HR Defender’s NPM mandate. The Department consists of 4 professionals (the head of the department, a psychologist, a lawyer and a doctor), which partake in the visits of the NPM. As of August 2013, the position of psychologist was vacant. As to the filling of these posts, the NPM indicated to the SPT that this will depend on the budget allocations of 2014. 16. The involvement of NGOs in the NPM was formalized in 2010 with the establishment of the Expert Council on the Prevention of Torture and Violence (the Expert Council), by the Order of the Human Rights Defender (Order N 002-L). Based on article 26 of the Law on the Human Rights Defender’s Office, the Human Rights Defender may establish Expert Councils composed of individuals with respective background in human rights and fundamental freedoms, who shall be involved on a voluntary basis and perform their activities without any compensation. The Expert Council members support the HRDO in carrying out its activities as NPM through taking part in visits and compiling relevant documents on those visits, which are later included in the NPM report. The Expert Council functions in accordance with the “Regulations” confirmed by the Defender. It cannot publish its own reports, as it was established by and adjunct to the HRDO. 17. Thus, the NPM is a de facto ‘Ombudsman plus’ model (not de jure since the involvement of civil society in the work of NPM rests upon the Order of the Public Defender). The involvement was further regulated through a Memorandum of

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Understanding, signed in June 2011 between the Human Rights Defender and seven civil society organisations. 18. As of end March 2013, the Expert Council was composed of 11 members (7 NGO representatives, 3 independent experts who have expertise in psychology, sociology and law, and 1 international expert from the EU Advisory Group). Members are appointed by the Human Rights Defender. However, there may be up to 20 members, which means that there are vacant positions. 19. In February 2012, the Order was amended with the effect that the Expert Council is to perform its functions totally independently and without administrative support from the HRDO. Under the Order of Procedure of February 2012, the reports of the Expert Council are to be sent to the HRDO Department on the Prevention of Torture and Violence for review and possible additions. The reviewed reports are then returned to the Council for adoption. However, the Order of Procedure clearly states that any information received by the Expert Council is at the exclusive disposal of the Human Rights Defender. 20. The amendment to the Order in 2012 was introduced as no funding was available to pay for the expenses of the members of the Expert Council. The Expert Council continued its visits in March and April 2012 in a supporting capacity to the NPM but discontinued functioning from May/June 2012 due to a continued lack of funding. 21. The SPT welcomes the fact that NPM has been operational for more than four years and has conducted numerous visits to a variety of places of deprivation of liberty.

III. Recommendations to the national preventive pechanism

A. Recommendations relating to main legal, institutional and structural issues

22. While the Optional Protocol leaves the decision regarding the institutional format of the NPM to the State Party, it is imperative that the mechanism be structured and that it carries out its mandate in accordance with the Optional Protocol, as reflected in the SPT Guidelines on national preventive mechanisms.1 23. As a general observation, the SPT notes that the NPM does not have a distinct identity from the HRDO, not only as to its legal framework but also as to its functions, its institutional framework and guarantees of independence. The same applies to the members of the Expert Council while carrying out all NPM related activities. 24. The SPT also notes that current normative deficiencies, including a clear mandate, format and structure for the NPM, generate tensions between the NPM Department of the HRDO and the Expert Council. The SPT has witnessed the complex interaction between the NPM and its Expert Council, which does not create a complete team spirit in the NPM activities undertaken. The SPT believes that this fact undermines the functioning of the institution, jeopardizes the institutional credibility of the NPM and is not conducive to the establishment of a credible, visible and effective performing mechanism of torture prevention in Armenia. 25. However, the SPT believes that the opportunity created by the necessary amendments to the legal framework of the NPM, irrespective of the format it will take, as a separate piece of legislation or an amendment to the current one, is able to provide a definitive solution to the current legal and operational ambiguity.

1 CAT/OP/12/5.

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26. Therefore, the Subcommittee recommends that the NPM take proactive steps to submit proposals and comments concerning its legal, institutional and structural framework. In conformity with the Guidelines on the national preventive mechanisms2, the SPT recommends clearly separating the activities and functions of the NPM from those of the Human Rights Defender’s Office. Visibility and identification 27. The SPT observed that the visibility of the NPM could be improved, as a completely separate institution from the HRDO, especially as persons deprived of liberty as well as the civil society do not perceive the NPM as a separate body from the HRDO. The Subcommittee is of the view that the mechanism’s lack of visibility may have a detrimental effect on the efficiency and credibility of the NPM. 28. The SPT is also concerned about the confusion between the roles of the NPM and those of NGOs composing the Expert Council. The NPM should be clearly identified as such in all visits, meetings, written communications with the authorities, places of detention and other institutions. All members of NPM as well as experts participating in the NPM activities should refrain from taking up any other role than the ones they are supposed to according to the NPM mandate. 29. The Subcommittee recommends that the NPM enhance its institutional visibility through public awareness campaigns and other promotional activities. The Subcommittee recommends elaborating and distributing material on NPM’s mandate and activities in the places of deprivation of liberty, and to the civil society at large, clearly identified as the NPM. Finally, the NPM should disseminate its annual reports, including by transmitting them to the Subcommittee, as provided for the purposes set out in the Optional Protocol.3 Resources 30. The lack of financial resources, despite not being the NPM’s responsibility, is a major obstacle for its efficient functioning. 31. In that regard, the SPT would recommend that the evaluation of the financial needs of the NPM takes into account all its mandated activities under OPCAT. In this connection, the continuous problems of insufficient resources, including the lack of staff, will be raised by the SPT in the final report to the State party, highlighting that only through solving those problems connected with resources, the State party will be able to create the necessary pre-conditions for an effective NPM and, as such, fulfil its obligations under the OPCAT. Working methods 32. A clear normative framework of the NPM and adequate resources are not the only aspects that will improve the efficiency of the NPM. A coherent practical functioning NPM entails, from the outset, the adoption of clear working methodologies for all its functions, in accordance with the OPCAT and the Paris Principles. Better communication and an improved coordination between the NPM and the Expert Council is also a key element for them to work efficiently as a collegial body. 33. While recalling that the Optional Protocol envisages the NPM as a collegial body of experts4, the Subcommittee urges the members of the NPM to improve information sharing through regular meetings and other channels of communication

2 CAT/OP/12/5, para. 32. 3 Idem, para. 40. 4 OPCAT, article 18.

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in a collaborative attitude as well as to adopt clearly defined working methods for all its functions. Draft and existing legislation 34. The Subcommittee notes the very limited role of the NPM in terms of observations and recommendations to the authorities, including commenting on existing and draft legislation, especially the one pertinent to its mandate in accordance with article 19 (c) of the Optional Protocol. One of the reasons for this may be the lack of clear legal basis for the mechanism to comment on draft laws, and the lack of human resources within the NPM to effectively carry out this function. 35. In order to fully discharge its mandate in accordance with article 19 (c) of the Optional Protocol, the SPT recommends that the NPM take proactive steps to submit proposals and comments regarding existing or draft legislation that relates to the prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. To that end, it should have a proactive strategy, based on a comprehensive analysis of the problem detected, for setting priorities and should follow up on its comments and recommendations.5 36. In addition, the SPT also recommends to the NPM to regularly publish the results of its work, be it through its annual report, thematic report, or visits report, as well as to make public its observations with regard to existing or draft legislation.

B. Recommendations on main methodological issues relating to visits

37. In order to assist and advise the NPM in its task of protecting persons deprived of their liberty, the Subcommittee is making the following recommendations concerning preparations for visits to places of detention, the methods to be used during such visits and steps to be taken following their completion. Prior to visits Strategy 38. The SPT notes that the NPM, as a collegial body of experts, could have a better defined strategy and should agree and establish a long-term strategy of its activities as well as a subsequent annual plan of work, which would include unannounced and follow-up visits, eventually to all places of detention under the State’s jurisdiction where persons are or may be deprived of liberty, in accordance with articles 4 and 29 of the Optional Protocol. 39. The Subcommittee recommends that the NPM develop collectively criteria for selecting the facilities to be visited that will ensure that they are all visited periodically. These criteria should be based on the type and size of the institutions and the severity of the human rights issues of which the mechanism is aware, while not excluding any type of institution or any geographic area.

Planning and standard operating procedures 40. The SPT notes that the NPM is characterised by the absence of clearly defined procedures for the planning of its work and the conduct of visits to places of detention, impairing the efficiency of the visits.

5 CAT/OP/12/5, para. 35.

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41. The Subcommittee recommends that the NPM adopt standard operating procedures for visits of different types of facilities that are monitored, and to interview individually persons deprived of their liberty in all places of detention, and apply them consistently. It also recommends that the NPM divide the tasks to be completed by all its members before their arrival at the place to be visited, in order to avoid any duplication of work, allow efficient execution of the planned activities and to enable them to cover all necessary areas, and better use the limited resources. The NPM should divide tasks and have clear attribution of roles among the members of team. The division of tasks during visits should consider the professional qualification of experts and staff in order to maximize the result of such activity. 42. It also recommends that they choose specific issues to be addressed with particular attention depending on a case by case assessment of each place. Staff training on common approaches 43. While welcoming the information that all visits are unannounced, the SPT emphasizes the confidential nature of the visits, as envisaged in the Optional Protocol. Furthermore, it observed some inconsistent practices among the different members during the visits regarding the methodology used as well as approaches for conducting interviews. 44. The Subcommittee recommends that the NPM ensure that the standard operating procedures, referred to in paragraphs 41 and 42 above, are uniformly applied by all its staff and members of the Expert Council, with a view to ensuring consistency of working methods and transferal of knowledge among all. Adequate training for all persons participating in visits, including associated experts, is essential and should be sought, including through the development of handbooks and assistance of international partners. During visits Introduction to authorities 45. The Subcommittee is concerned that members of the NPM have not always made a good introduction of themselves to the authorities in the places of deprivation of liberty visited, clearly identifying themselves as NPM and not as HRDO. The SPT observed that none of the members of the team were clearly identifiable as NPM members or experts, e.g. wearing badges, which are important for the purpose of identification, as well as for the visibility of the institution. 46. The Subcommittee recommends that members of the NPM explain their mandate clearly to the authorities as well as the working methods used and indicate how interviews will be conducted. The SPT is of the opinion that an appropriate and complete presentation to the authorities, especially on the mandate and objective of the visit has a didactic effect on the authorities, and contributes to the visibility and credibility of the NPM. In addition, the visiting team should be clearly identified as the NPM, e.g. wearing badges or vests. A leaflet with information could also be provided to the authorities. Interviews 47. The SPT is also concerned that members of the NPM have rarely introduced themselves to detainees in an appropriate manner. On numerous occasions members of the team introduced themselves as coming from the HRDO rather than acting within the capacities of the NPM. The key principles of confidentiality and voluntary nature of the interview were not always mentioned. The SPT is of the opinion that an appropriate and complete presentation builds trust with the interviewees and facilitates communication and

8 CAT/OP/ARM/2 information sharing. In addition, none of the members of the visiting team were clearly identified as NPM members or experts. 48. The SPT recommends that members of NPM in charge of interviews introduce themselves to the persons deprived of liberty with their name, profession and the position they occupy within the NPM. The interviewer should explain the mandate of the NPM, placing particular emphasis on its preventive nature. He or she should also obtain the consent of the interviewee and make it clear that the interview is confidential, voluntary and can be interrupted at any time at the interviewee’s request. As indicated supra, members of the NPM visiting team should also be clearly identified for their visibility by the persons deprived of their liberty, which is important for the visibility of the mechanism. 49. It further recommends that the NPM prepare a leaflet that describes its mandate and working methods, explains the concept of informed consent and provides contact information. It should also indicate and encourage the interviewees to report any reprisal they might face subsequently to the visit. 50. The SPT noted that some interviews were done collectively; others took place with the presence of the staff of the establishment or with the doors open. Often, detainees were treated with condescendence. The interviewers should concentrate on their task; for instance, the SPT would recommend to mute mobile phones during the visits. In some occasions, members of the NPM delegation displayed acts of collusion and friendship with facility personnel, which must be absolutely avoided, as it affects the credibility of the interviews as well as of the mechanism. 51. As private interviews with persons deprived of their liberty are a basic aspect of the preventive visits, as specifically stated in the Optional Protocol, the Subcommittee recommends conducting private individual and unsupervised interviews with detainees and employees of the host institution, including with the medical personnel. In addition, the members of the visiting team must concentrate on their tasks and interviewers must be fully dedicated to the undertaking of the meeting with the detainees; no manifestation of friendship with staff of the institution visited must happen or be perceived. Finally, detainees have to be treated with humanity and their private space within the cells should be respected. 52. The Subcommittee noted that on several occasions interviewers focused on the background of the reason for the detention as well as on individual complaints and attempted to address these situations or provide recommendations. Although the intention is laudable, this is not the primary mandate of the NPM; the SPT recalls that the mandate of NPM is characterized by its preventive approach through identifying patterns and detecting systemic risks of torture. 53. The Subcommittee recalls that the mandate of the NPM is characterized by its preventive approach through identifying patterns and detecting systemic risks of torture. Instead the members of the NPM team should advise detainees on how and to whom they should address individual complaints and seek to ensure the effectiveness of complaints mechanisms as a means of prevention.

Follow-up to visits Reprisals

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54. The SPT highlights the need for better protection of interviewed persons against possible reprisals. The Subcommittee noticed that visiting teams have not mentioned to the authorities of the institutions at the final debriefing that any form of intimidation or reprisals against persons deprived of their liberty constitutes a violation of the State party’s obligation. It is particularly important as some interviews where not conducted in a complete confidential manner and some interviewees were reluctant to speak out. 55. The Subcommittee recommends the NPM to strengthen protection of persons it interviewed or met with against possible intimidation, sanctions or reprisals through, inter alia, follow-up visits, and contacts with family member. It should clearly warn the authorities of the visited detention facilities that any kind of reprisals is inadmissible and will be reported and sanctioned. The NPM needs to adopt a strategy for dealing with the threat of reprisals or reprisals. Debriefing the authorities 56. The SPT noted that while briefings were provided to the authorities after the visits, these were not conducive to resolving the issues identified. Some issues referred during the briefings were not directly relevant to the mandate of the NPM. In addition, while some interviewees did not accept to be interviewed or provided evasive reply on some matters, the NPM did not mention to the authorities of the institutions at the final meeting that any form of intimidation or reprisals against persons deprived of their liberty constitutes a violation of the State party’s obligation. 57. The SPT recommends that systematic and constructive debriefings should be provided to the responsible persons for the facilities visited, presenting preliminary observations and recommendations. Emphasis should be put on such feedback that calls for immediate action or is of a humanitarian nature. As a preventive measure, the issues of possible reprisal should be systematically mentioned. Reports 58. The SPT noted an absence of a policy with regard to the post-visit reporting to the authorities as well as of the systematic transmittal of recommendations and follow-up to them. Following the briefing to the persons responsible for the facility visited, the NPM should develop a strategy for presenting its visit reports to the authorities for publication and distribution and for using them as a platform for dialogue. 6 Its visits will be much less effective if it does not issue a report following each visit. 59. The Subcommittee recommends that the NPM prepare and make public a report on each visit it conducts.7 The report should focus on prevention and on identifying the problems that exist and proposing solutions in the form of recommendations. These recommendations must be concrete and well-founded, should be directed towards developing preventive measures to deal with shortcomings in systems and practices, and should be practicable.8 60. Pursuant to paragraph 36 of the SPT Guidelines on NPMs, the Subcommittee recommends that the NPM set up mechanisms for following up on its recommendations and that it does this, insofar as possible, in conjunction with the authorities. 61. The SPT furthermore recommends that the NPM issue an annual report describing the effectiveness of the interaction of the NPM with the Government in assessing and eradicating torture and ill-treatment in places of detention in the

6 CAT/OP/1, para. 21; CAT/OP/12/5, para. 38. 7 CAT/OP/12/5, para. 36. 8 CAT/OP/1, para. 20.

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Republic of Armenia. This report should be given wide publicity and should be distinct from other statements related to the work of the Human Rights Defenders Office.

IV. Final recommendations

62. The Subcommittee regards its recent advisory visit and the present report as the commencement of a constructive dialogue with the NPM of the Republic of Armenia. The SPT stands ready to provide technical assistance and advice to the NPM, in order to reinforce its capacity to prevent torture and ill-treatment in all places of deprivation of liberty in Armenia and to translate these common goals of prevention from commitments into reality. 63. The SPT recalls that prevention of torture constitutes an on-going and wide-ranging obligation of the State party9, which is achieved by an efficient NPM. The Subcommittee encourages the NPM to review and strengthen its working methods and avail itself of training courses in order to improve its ability to discharge its responsibilities under the Optional Protocol, including through the assistance of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in following up these recommendations. 64. In conclusion, the SPT is aware that the NPM of Armenia is facing a complex challenge at the moment and that its legal, institutional and structural framework is at a cross-roads, considering its eminent revision. However, this presents a unique opportunity that the NPM should seize to revise its framework by clarifying it and, as a consequence, to improve the efficiency of its activities. 65. The Subcommittee also encourages the NPM to transmit its annual reports to the SPT and reaffirm its readiness to do all it can to help achieve the shared aim of prevention of torture and ill-treatment and ensure that commitments translate into action. 66. Further to paragraph 10, the SPT recommends that the NPM make the present report public and requests that it be notified of the NPM decision in that regard.

9 CAT General Comment No. 2, CAT/C/GC/2, paras. 3 and 4.

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Annex I

List of Government officials and other persons with whom the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture met

A. National authorities

General Prosecutor Office Mr. Harutyun Harutyunyan – Senior Prosecutor Mr. Gagik Khachikyan – Head of Department on Crimes against Humanity Mr. Vardan Avetisyan – Head of Department on Control to the Crimes

Ministry of Healthcare Mr. Tsaghik Vardanyan – Head of Department on healthcare projects and quality management

Ministry of Education and Science of Republic of Armenia Ms. Narine Hovhannisyan – Head of Department on General Education

Ministry of Justice Ms. Narine Solomonyan – Head of International Legal Relations Department Mr. Hayk Sargsyan – Assistant to the Minister of Justice

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ms. Karine Sujyan – Head of Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues Division Police Mr. Minas Arabyan - Head of Department on guard service of headquarters of the Police

Special Investigation Service Mr. Armen Nadiryan - Deputy Head of Special Investigation Service Ministry of Defense Mr. Alik Avetisyan – Deputy Head of Intrenational Legal Unit

Military Police of Armenia Mr. Hovik Petrosyan – Deputy Head of Military Police of Armenia

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State Migration Service of the Territorial Management Ministry Mr. Petros Aghababyan – Head of Legal Division

B. Legislative branch

Ms. Lilit Yeremyan – Expert at the Standing Committee on State and Legal Affairs, Na- tional Assembly

C. National Preventive Mechanism

Human Rights Defender’s Office Mr. Karen Andreasyan, HR Defender Ms. Ani Nersisyan, Head of Torture and Violence Prevention Division Mr. Vladimir Baghdasaryan, Torture and Violence Prevention Division Mr. Sevak Mkrtchyan, Torture and Violence Prevention Division Mr. Ruben Martirosyan, Head of Criminal Procedural Rights Department Ms. Anna Voskanyan, Adviser to the Ombudsman on External Relations Ms. Erahuni Tumanyants, Expert on Prisoner and Soldier Rights

Expert Council on the Prevention of Torture and Violence Mr. Artak Kirakosyan (Civil Society Institute) Gayane Shahnazaryan (Civil Society Institute) Mr. Michael Aramyan (Foundation against violation of law) Mr. Varuzhan Sedrakyan (Children’s Association of Armenian) Ms. Mariam Martirosyan (Project harmony International) Ms. Alina Derdzyan (Collaboration for Democracy Centre) Mr. Temik Khalapyan (TRTU) Ms. Sirarpi Mughdusyan (Social Justice) Ms. Laura Gasparyan (Armenian Association of Physicians after Grigor Magistros) Mr. Artur Atanesyan (Head of Applied Sociology Department of Yerevan State University)

D. Public monitoring groups

Prison Monitoring Group Mr. Robert Revazyan (Armenian Helsinki Committee) Mr. Ruben Sargsyan

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Police Monitoring Group Ms. Hasmik Sahakyan Mr. Suren Iskandaryan

Public Monitoring Group of Special Boarding Schools

Mr. Artak Kirakosyan (Civil Society Institute) Mr. Varuzhan Sedrakyan (Children’s Association of Armenian) Ms. Mariam Martirosyan (Project Harmony International) Ms. Sirsard Mamikosyan

E. Others

Open Society Foundation

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Annex II

List of places of detention jointly visited by the national preventive mechanism and the Subcommittee of Prevention of Torture

Nubarashen Psychiatric Hospital;

Nubarashen Penitentiary Institution;

Yerevan Detention Facility