To Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower s1

#3-291 To Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower August 24, 1942 Radio No. R-84 Washington, D.C. Secret

For General Eisenhower's eye only. Following receipt of your comments to Combined Chiefs of Staff on outline plan,1 the US Chiefs of Staff propose to submit the following revised directive to the President tomorrow Tuesday for his approval prior to submitting it to British Chiefs of Staff through their Joint Staff Mission: "The torch operation as originally conceived involves simultaneous landings at several points along the North and Northwest coasts of Africa, the ultimate objective being the complete military domination of North Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. The information now available as to troops, planes, ships, escorts and Naval support, indicates that it will not be possible to launch an attack on the West coast simultaneously with operations in the Mediterranean, and that the operations on the North coast must be conducted with very limited forces and extremely limited air support, together with the hazards involved in keeping open the Western entrance to the Mediterranean and the vital staging flying field at Gibraltar. "It therefore has become necessary, in our opinion, to prepare a new directive outlining objectives commensurate with the limited military forces available. The following is a proposed modification of the present directive: "The operation will be conducted at the earliest practicable date with a view to accomplishing as rapidly as possible the following initial, intermediate and ultimate objectives: (1) Establishment of mutually supporting lodgements in the Agidir-Marrakech-Casablanca-Rabat-Fez Area in French Morocco and in the Oran-Mostaganem-Mascara Area in Algeria. (2) Rapid exploitation in order to acquire complete control of the area including French Morocco, Spanish Morocco (if the situation requires) and Western Algeria, to facilitate the extension of effective air and ground operations to the Eastward. (3) Combined air, ground and sea operations with a view of insuring complete control by the United Nations of the entire North African Area from Rio de Oro to Tunisia inclusive, and to facilitate air operations against the enemy's forces and installations in the Mediterranean Area." Radio immediately your views as to proposed directive.2 Give us your views on practicability of utilizing 1st Division and part of 34th Division in British ships at Oran, possibly followed up by British Force at same time utilizing all or most of original US Oran Force on West Coast of Africa. Latter might be commanded by Fredendall who is familiar with project. The foregoing has in mind utilizing most of British combat loaders and so far as possible making all forces except Naval in initial enterprise purely US. Also it assumes the necessary delay to equip the 1st Division.3

Document Copy Text Format: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs (RG 165), Records of the Operations Division (OPD), Top Secret Message File [CM-OUT-7500], National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. Document Format: Typed radio message.

1. On August 23 Eisenhower had submitted his comments regarding the August 21 Outline Plan of Operation TORCH prepared by the British-American planners. In his opinion the expedition as planned was "not sufficiently powerful to accomplish, against the potential opposition in the general theater, the purpose prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." (Papers of DDE, 1: 488–90.) For more information on the August 21 plan, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941– 1942, pp. 288–89; Papers of DDE, 1: 486–88.

2. "If the primary purpose from the viewpoint of the US is to engage US ground forces at an early date and for restricted purposes only, while minimizing risks of disaster," replied Eisenhower on August 25, "the general outline of your proposal should be adopted in preference to the one proposed by me. On the other hand if the real purpose is to take a great tactical risk in the hope of gaining a worthwhile objective, we should attack somewhat as suggested in the outline plan submitted to the CCS." (Papers of DDE, 1: 493–94.) For more information, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, pp. 291–93.

3. "I consider employment of 1st Division with parts of the 34th Division and 1st Armored Division at Oran using British ships to be practicable," cabled Eisenhower later on the twenty-fifth, though he had not yet discussed this with the British. Additional amphibious training for the First Infantry Division, with British assistance providing landing craft, could be completed for an attack by November 5. Eisenhower warned that "limited United States air forces in this theater not repeat not adequate for support of attacks at both Oran and Casablanca without assistance from the RAF." (Papers of DDE, 1: 494–95.)

Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 3, “The Right Man for the Job,” December 7, 1941-May 31, 1943 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 316–318.