Civic Engagement: Citizen Apathy Or Contentious Politics

CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 12 4/6/2018 15:45 a4/p4

Chapter 12

Civic engagement: citizen apathy or contentious politics

Contemporary events highlight many reasons for concern about both the state of popular support for democracy and the underlying political stability of many regimes which experienced transitions from autocracy during the third wave era. The heady hopes for the progressive spread of democracy worldwide, captured by Fukuyama’s idea of the ‘end of history’, coined immediately after the fall of the Berlin wall, have flagged over the last two decades.1 Freedom House report that the number of electoral democracies grew globally during the third wave era but that further advances stalled around the turn of the 21st century. 2 Diamond suggests that the last decade saw the onset of a democratic recession.3 Huntingdon emphasizes that previous historical waves of democratization were followed by periods of reversal.4 Elected governments have often struggled to maintain stability following inconclusive or disputed contests (for instance, in Kenya and Mexico), partisan strife and recurrent political scandals (Bangladesh and Guatemala), and persistent outbreaks of violent ethnic conflict (Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq). Setbacks for democracy have also occurred in recent years following dramatic coups against elected leaders (experienced in Honduras and Thailand), as well as creeping restrictions on human rights and fundamental freedoms (such as in Russia and Venezuela). 5

One global region where democratic governance has made sustained progress has been Latin America, but even here studies suggest that dissatisfaction with the performance of government, and lack of capacity to solve problems and to meet social needs, has encouraged political disillusionment and cynicism.6 Others have detected evidence of a Latin American backlash against the way that liberal democracy and economic neo-liberalism works, although not a rejection of democratic ideals per se. 7 In sub-Saharan Africa, younger democracies in some of the world poorest nations, such as Mali, Benin, and Ghana, have now experienced a series of multiparty competitive elections and gains in human rights, but states still lack the capacity to lift millions out of poverty and to deliver the targets for healthcare, education and welfare in the Millennium Development Goals.8 Among Arab states, some concrete but limited gains for human rights and freedoms have registered in recent years yet the rhetoric of reform runs far ahead of realities.9 Moreover Carothers suggests that during the administration of President George W. Bush, the association of the rhetoric of democracy promotion with unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan depressed public support for reform in the region, and encouraged a more general push-back by oil-rich plutocrats.10 Many traditional dictatorships, oligarchies, and autocracies continue to endure among states in Eurasia, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. 11 Occasional outbreaks of popular

1 CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 12 4/6/2018 15:45 a4/p4 dissent seeking to topple autocratic regimes have been brutally suppressed by the authorities, for example, most recently in Burma/Myanmar, Tibet, and Iran. In the light of all these developments, the initial high hopes and expectations for the further expansion and steady consolidation of democratic regimes around the world, commonly expressed in the early 1990s, have not come to fruition.

Does this mean that popular support for democratic governance has fallen worldwide? If so, this is likely to have consequences for democratic consolidation, regime stability, and government legitimacy. Cultural attitudes towards democracy are expected to be particularly important in countries which have experienced the transition from autocracy during the third wave era but which have not yet established the full panoply of institutions associated with liberal democracy. 12 Many regime transitions have occurred in cultural regions lacking historical experience of democracy, as well as in low income economies, post-conflict divided societies, and fragile states, all providing unfavorable soil for the seeds of democratization to flourish.13 Theories of legitimacy suggest that regimes will prove most politically stable where they rest on popular support.14 Hence democratic constitutions built upon cultures which strongly endorse democratic ideals and principles are expected to weather shocks arising from any sudden economic crisis, internal conflict, or elite challenge more successfully than societies where the public remains indifferent, cynical, or even hostile towards the idea of democracy. Along similar lines, autocratic regimes are expected to endure where the general public endorses the legitimacy of this form of governance, for example where citizens express deference to the authority of traditional monarchs and religious leaders, or where they are suckered by the heady appeals of populist dictators. If public legitimacy is lacking, however, regimes are thought more susceptible to mass and elite challenge. In particular democratic states remain most vulnerable to this risk, as they rely upon a reservoir of popular legitimacy and voluntary compliance to govern. By contrast, brutal autocracies, if threatened by mass movements, reform factions, and opposition dissidents, can always reassert their grip on power by calling the military out of the barracks.

Any systematic and widespread erosion of political trust raises concern about the implications for civic engagement. In particular, many believe that democratic regimes face a hazardous and difficult pathway steering between the twin dangers of political activism where the public is neither too lukewarm nor over heated, the Scylla and Charybdis of contemporary politics. One potential danger is that citizens are becoming increasingly disengaged from civic affairs. There is widespread concern that a glacial fall in electoral turnout and an erosion of grassroots party membership has occurred in many established democracies.15 In the June 2009 elections to the European parliament, for example, more

2 CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 12 4/6/2018 15:45 a4/p4 than half of the electorate (57%) stayed home, rising to almost two-thirds (61%) abstaining across the ten newest member states. Voter turnout in these elections fell to a new low of 43% in 2009, down from 62% in 1979. When asked why, the most popular reasons were that people said that they did not believe that their vote could change anything, they did not know enough about the European parliament, or they simply were not interested. 16 Similar indicators in many other countries are widely regarded as signaling public disaffection. Overall turnout in West European parliamentary elections has gradually fallen by 10 percentage points from 1960 to 2009 (see Figure 12.1).

[Figure 12.1]

The alternative risk is that citizens are indeed intensely involved but in ways which may potentially destabilize the state and undermine democratically-elected authorities. This threat is illustrated most vividly by the sudden outbreak of violent street riots, including firebombs outside of parliament and anarchist shop looting, injuring more than seventy people, which occurred for more than a week in Greece in late-2008, triggered by the death of a teenager in the hands of the police. But there are many other events which show similar outbursts, from cases of fuel strikes in London to violent riots among immigrants living in Paris suburbs, protests over the Muhammad cartoons in Copenhagen, and farmer’s dumping food on the streets of Brussels. These diverse cases may or may not have similar underlying roots. But interpretations commonly perceive contentious politics as threatening, in part because it is often seen to represent an unstable outlet for pent-up frustrations where pressures could have been expressed through electoral channels. In a thermostat model, the democratic state is commonly seen to flourish best which encourages moderate participation, especially acts channeled through the conventional mechanisms of elections and parties in liberal democracies. Threats to order and stability appear most serious in younger democracies, exemplified by outbreaks of ‘people power’ over-throwing Ramos in the Philippines, populist uprisings supporting Chavez in Venezuela, and violent rioting following the closely-fought January 2008 presidential elections in Kenya. There are few grounds to believe that this phenomenon poses a major risk today to the ultimate stability, cohesion, and unity of older democracies. Nevertheless if democratic societies lack the capacity to contain sporadic outbreaks of contentious politics, and if they are simultaneously unable to bring citizens to the ballot box, this becomes a matter of serious concern. By reexamining the impact of critical citizens, we can explore the broader implications for the health of the democratic state.

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Figure 12.1: Electoral turnout in Western Europe 1945-2009

Note: The figure shows the number of valid votes cast in 380 national parliamentary elections as a proportion of the voting age population in 24 West European nations during the post-World War II era.

Source: International IDEA. Voter Turnout since 1945. www.IDEA.int

6 1 Francis Fukuyama. 1989. ‘The end of history?’ The National Interest; Francis Fukuyama. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.

2 Arch Puddington. 2009. ‘Freedom in the world 2009: setbacks and resilience.’ Freedom in the World, 2009. Washington, DC: Freedom House.

3 Larry Diamond. 2008. The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World. New York: Times Books.

4 Samuel P. Huntington. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press.

5 Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse. 2008. The Fate of Young Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press.

6 Roderic Camp. ed. 2001. Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Marta Lagos. 2003. ‘Support for and satisfaction with democracy.’ International Journal of Public Opinion Research 15 (4): 471-487; Marta Lagos. 2003. ‘Public Opinion’ In Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael Shifter. Eds. Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press; Rodolfo Sarsfield and F. Echegaray. 2006. ‘Opening the black box: How satisfaction with democracy and its perceived efficacy affect regime preference in Latin America.’ International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18 (2): 153-173.

7 C. Graham and A. Sukhtankar. 2004. ‘Does economic crisis reduce support for markets and democracy in Latin America? Some evidence from surveys of public opinion and well being.’ Journal of Latin American Studies 36 (2): 349-377; F. Panizza. 2005. ‘Unarmed utopia revisited: The resurgence of left- of-centre politics in Latin America.’ Political Studies 53 (4): 716-734.

8 Michael Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van De Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press.

9 Marina Ottoway and Thomas Caothers. Eds. 2005. Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East. Washington DC: Carnegie; Marina Ottoway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso. Eds . 2008. Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World. Washington DC: Carnegie. 10 K. Dalacoura. 2005. ‘US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001: a critique.’ International Affairs 81(5): 963-+; Thomas Carothers. 2006. ‘The Backlash against democracy promotion.’ Foreign Affairs 85 (2): 55-68.

11 Robert Rotberg. Ed. 2007. Worst of the Worst: Dealing with Repressive and Rogue Nations. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

12 Harry Eckstein. 1961. A Theory of Stable Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson Center, Princeton University.

13 Pippa Norris. 2008. Driving Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

14 Stephen M. Weatherford. 1992. ‘Measuring political legitimacy.’ American Political Science Review 86:149-66.

15 Dalton, Russell J and Martin P. Wattenberg. (eds). 2002. Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Peter Mair. 2009. Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy. London: Verso.

16 See, Eurobarometer 2008. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion