Justice Andrew Carlin

Justice Andrew Carlin Justice Gabbie McKay Justice Lauren Shia 3:00 section

Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company Court of Appeals of New York (1928) Judge's Opinion

Judges: Ms. Gabrielle McKay, Ms. Lauren Shia, Mr. Andrew Carlin

Plaintiff seeks damages for injuries allegedly resulting from negligence on the part of the defendant.

Opinion: CARLIN, McKAY, SHIA.

The plaintiff alleges that the Long Island Railroad Co. is liable for the damages incurred on the grounds that there is nothing more the plaintiff could have done to ensure her own safety, and that the defendant acted negligently by not taking all cost effective safety precautions and not exercising due care. The defense claims it is not liable for the injuries incurred by the plaintiff because the platform on which the defendant stood had not proven itself dangerous before, the volatility of the package in question and its effect were unforeseeable, and that the agents of the Railroad demonstrated "extraordinary care" in assisting a passenger onto the train. In determining causation in this case there are three criteria that must be examined- foreseeability, the “but for” test, and proximate cause. This court will address the aforementioned concerns by both parties in presenting its decision.

The defense argues that, "At no point was the Railroad Company not performing its duties to the greatest extent possible with the situation at hand." The plaintiff asserts that the platform in question is a dangerous place and that the Railroad company did not exercise due care by keeping passengers that aren't actively boarding off of the platform.

In fact, the Railroad company has no reason to believe that the constituents and conditions of the platform should be any more unruly or dangerous than those of a bus stop. It is certainly true that the defendant should not have assumed that unprovoked explosions would dislodge weighing equipment on the platform. In this sense, the defendant did not act negligently toward anyone on the platform.

In regards to the package full of fireworks that resulted in the injury, the defense contends that there was no reason to believe that the package would be unusually dangerous. The package itself gave no indication of its contents, and many other passengers were carrying similar bundles. The defense further states that the only way to ensure that no dangerous cargo enters the platform would be the systematic screening of every package entering the terminal. This court believes that these precautions would be neither necessary nor cost-justified, and that the defendant did not act negligently in this sense.

The Railroad also claims that its agents (who dislodged the package) demonstrated "extraordinary care" immediately preceding the explosion by helping a passenger board the train. It is clear that the agents of the defendant were acting in the best interest of the passenger when they assisted him onto the train, and that the falling package could not have been prevented in the given situation. The agents acted correctly and responsibly, and the events that followed could not have been foreseen. This court will cite the precedent established in Adams v. Bullock, 227 N.Y. 208, 1919, "...No vigilance, however alert, unless fortified by the gift of prophecy, could have predicted...where such an accident would occur." It is also feasible to believe that without the agents assisting the man, he might have still tried to jump on the moving train, and, while doing so, dropped the package on his own accord. This means that even without the actions of the agents, the package could have fallen, resulting in the explosion which caused the scales to fall, leading to the harm to Ms. Palsgraf. Given this fact, the case fails the “but for” test and causation is not proven in that sense. Given the fact that the agents of the Railroad did not act negligently, the doctrine of respondeat superior, as raised by the defendant, is irrelevant.

The plaintiff claims that the defendant is solely responsible for the injury due to victim vulnerability. Victim vulnerability implies that the plaintiff could not have taken any actions to prevent her own injury. Given the previous assertion by the plaintiff that the platform is a dangerous place, it is the opinion of this court that Ms. Palsgraf could have elected to avoid this dangerous environment by remaining off of the platform until her train was due to arrive. The plaintiff's economic argument that, "A tort victim is permitted to recover his damages in full even though the extent of his injury was unforeseeable by the defendant because of the victim's unusual vulnerability," does not apply in this case.

The most important assertion by the plaintiff, and the one that will ultimately determine liability in this case, is that the Railroad did not take all precautions in accordance with the negligence rule. This rule implies negligence on the part of the defendant if they do not take all cost-justified precautions to prevent an accident. This court does not find the defendant negligent for platform hazards or the actions of the platform agents. The Railroad is negligent, however, by allowing its passengers to board moving trains (an action that any reasonable person would see as hazardous). In fact, the very existence of railway agents to prevent people from falling from moving trains verifies the dangers involved. The defendant did not exercise due care as cited in Davies v. Mann (1842), "...The defendant might, by proper care, have avoided injur[y].., and did not, he is liable for the consequences of his negligence." The defendant could have prevented the accident simply by closing the doors before the train departs. This court finds this practice to be an "accident waiting to happen," and that any injuries resulting from the negligent practice should be the sole liability of the Railroad. We also believe that the Railroad’s safety decisions were a proximate cause of the injury because the fact that they allow people to board moving trains was a “substantial factor” in the injury, and had a “direct connection” to the harm to Ms. Palsgraf. Because we find causation in the

Railroad’s actions, we find them guilty of negligence.

Decision:

Judgment is for the plaintiff, with costs.

Although the plaintiff asked for $50,000 in damages, we find that the defendants should only have to cover all medical bills, legal bills, and six years of foregone wages.

Ms. Palsgraf and her doctor, Dr. Karl Parshall, testified that the plaintiff suffers from serious injuries including shock to her nervous system and stuttering of speech that she believes to be a permanent effect of the incident. The plaintiff seeks compensation for these injuries and also for foregone wages, as she could not work after the accident and as a result her children were forced to work and support the family. The foregone wages are for the past three years, in which Ms. Palsgraf was unable to work, as well as the next three years, which is her own doctor’s estimate of the remaining recovery time.