'The Right to Be Forgotten: More Than a Pandora's Box?'
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The Right to Be Forgotten in the Light of the Consent of the Data Subject
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Open Repository and Bibliography - Luxembourg computer law & security review 32 (2016) 218–237 Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect www.compseconline.com/publications/prodclaw.htm The right to be forgotten in the light of the consent of the data subject Cesare Bartolini *, Lawrence Siry * University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg ABSTRACT Keywords: Recently, the Court of Justice of the European Union issued decision C-131/12, which was Data protection considered a major breakthrough in Internet data protection. The general public wel- General data protection reform comed this decision as an actualization of the controversial “right to be forgotten”, which Consent was introduced in the initial draft for a new regulation on data protection and repeatedly amended, due to objections by various Member States and major companies involved in massive processing of personal data. This paper attempts to delve into the content of that decision and examine if it indeed involves the right to be forgotten, if such a right exists at all, and to what extent it can be stated and enforced. © 2016 Cesare Bartoli & Lawrence Siry. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. forgotten is not mentioned in the current DPD provisions, yet 1. Introduction it has been statutorily introduced in the proposed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR comes from the evo- In May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) lution of the DPD interpretation in the light of technological issued a decision1 which has been regarded as the enforce- developments since its adoption in 1995. -
Issues Paper on Cyber-Crime Affecting Personal Safety, Privacy and Reputation Including Cyber-Bullying (LRC IP 6-2014)
Issues Paper on Cyber-crime affecting personal safety, privacy and reputation including cyber-bullying (LRC IP 6-2014) BACKGROUND TO THIS ISSUES PAPER AND THE QUESTIONS RAISED This Issues Paper forms part of the Commission’s Fourth Programme of Law Reform,1 which includes a project to review the law on cyber-crime affecting personal safety, privacy and reputation including cyber-bullying. The criminal law is important in this area, particularly as a deterrent, but civil remedies, including “take-down” orders, are also significant because victims of cyber-harassment need fast remedies once material has been posted online.2 The Commission seeks the views of interested parties on the following 5 issues. 1. Whether the harassment offence in section 10 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 should be amended to incorporate a specific reference to cyber-harassment, including indirect cyber-harassment (the questions for which are on page 13); 2. Whether there should be an offence that involves a single serious interference, through cyber technology, with another person’s privacy (the questions for which are on page 23); 3. Whether current law on hate crime adequately addresses activity that uses cyber technology and social media (the questions for which are on page 26); 4. Whether current penalties for offences which can apply to cyber-harassment and related behaviour are adequate (the questions for which are on page 28); 5. The adequacy of civil law remedies to protect against cyber-harassment and to safeguard the right to privacy (the questions for which are on page 35); Cyber-harassment and other harmful cyber communications The emergence of cyber technology has transformed how we communicate with others. -
Photographs in Public Places and Privacy
[2009] 2 Journal of Media Law 159–171 Photographs in Public Places and Privacy Kirsty Hughes In the last few years, the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’) has considered a number of cases relating to photographs taken in public places, and it is now clear that the jurisprudence has evolved significantly since the early cases in which no protection was afforded to the privacy interests of those photographed. The most recent cases (Reklos and Davourlis v Greece and Egeland and Hanseid v Norway) have extended the protection afforded by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) so that the right is engaged at the stage at which photographs are taken.1 The author argues that whilst this development was necessary, there are a number of problems with the Court’s approach and that further guidance from the Court is essential. THEORIES OF PRIVACY-RELATED INTERESTS To fully understand the significance of the Article 8 ECHR photography cases, one has to have some idea of how these cases relate to the protection of privacy. There are many different theories of privacy and privacy-related interests and it is beyond the scope and purpose of this commentary to examine the details of those theories here.2 However, it * Clare College, University of Cambridge. 1 (App No 1234/05) [2009] EMLR 16 and (App No 34438/04) [2009] ECHR 622, available on HUDOC. 2 The literature is extensive; a good starting point would be Ruth Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of the Law’ (1980) 89(3) Yale Law Journal 421; Hyman Gross, ‘Privacy and Autonomy’ -
A Right That Should've Been: Protection of Personal Images On
275 A RIGHT THAT SHOULD’VE BEEN: PROTECTION OF PERSONAL IMAGES ON THE INTERNET EUGENIA GEORGIADES “The right to the protection of one’s image is … one of the essential components of personal development.” Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights ABSTRACT This paper provides an overview of the current legal protection of personal images that are uploaded and shared on social networks within an Australian context. The paper outlines the problems that arise with the uploading and sharing of personal images and considers the reasons why personal images ought to be protected. In considering the various areas of law that may offer protection for personal images such as copyright, contract, privacy and the tort of breach of confidence. The paper highlights that this protection is limited and leaves the people whose image is captured bereft of protection. The paper considers scholarship on the protection of image rights in the United States and suggests that Australian law ought to incorporate an image right. The paper also suggests that the law ought to protect image rights and allow users the right to control the use of their own image. In addition, the paper highlights that a right to be forgotten may provide users with a mechanism to control the use of their image when that image has been misused. Dr. Eugenia Georgiades, Assistant Professor Faculty of Law, Bond University, the author would like to thank Professor Brad Sherman, Professor Leanne Wiseman and Dr. Allan Ardill for their feedback. Volume 61 – Number 2 276 IDEA – The Law Review of the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property Abstract .......................................................................... -
Tech Giants, Freedom of Expression and Privacy
TECH GIANTS, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRIVACY TECH GIANTS, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRIVACY Rikke Frank Jørgensen & Marya Akhtar e-ISBN: 978-87-93893-77-1 © 2020 The Danish Institute for Human Rights Wilders Plads 8K DK-1403 Copenhagen K Phone +45 3269 8888 www.humanrights.dk Provided such reproduction is for non-commercial use, this publication, or parts of it, may be reproduced if author and source are quoted. At DIHR we aim to make our publications as accessible as possible. We use large font size, short (hyphen-free) lines, left-aligned text and strong contrast for maximum legibility. For further information about accessibility please click www.humanrights.dk/accessibility 2 CONTENT 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................... 5 2 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 7 3 WHAT IS A TECH GIANT ................................................................................. 9 4 HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION ...................................................................... 11 4.1 THE UN ..................................................................................................... 11 4.1.1 binding rules.......................................................................................... 11 4.1.2 guidelines and recommendations .......................................................... 13 4.2 THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHT ........................................................................................................... -
The Failure to Define the Public Interest in Axel Springer AG V
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Volume 36 Article 5 Issue 3 Electronic Supplement 2-18-2014 Meaningful Journalism or "Infotainment"? The Failure to Define the Public nI terest in Axel Springer AG v. Germany Kathryn Manza Boston College Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr Part of the Communications Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Kathryn Manza, Meaningful Journalism or "Infotainment"? The Failure to Define the Public Interest in Axel Springer AG v. Germany, 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. E. Supp. 61 (2014), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol36/iss3/5 This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MEANINGFUL JOURNALISM OR “INFOTAINMENT”? THE FAILURE TO DEFINE THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN AXEL SPRINGER AG v. GERMANY Kathryn Manza* Abstract: Although American courts provide wide discretion for freedom of the press, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ensures that the right to privacy enjoys equal footing with freedom of expression in Europe. When navigating the grey areas between these two frequently opposing rights, the European Court of Human Rights allows private information about a public figure to be published only to the extent the information contributes to the public in- terest. -
International Association of Jewish Genealogical Societies
International Association of Jewish Genealogical Societies To: IAJGS Members-2018 Annual Session From: Jan Meisels Allen, Chairperson, IAJGS Public Records Access Monitoring Committee Re: Public Records Access Monitoring Committee-Annual Report Date: June 1, 2018 Committee Members 2017-2018 Jan Meisels Allen, Chairperson, Agoura Hills, California Bert Lazerow, San Diego, California Teven Laxer, Sacramento, California Mark Nicholls, Edgeware, Middlesex, London, UK Paul Silverstone, New York, New York Catherine Youngren, Coquitlam, British Columbia, Canada Ken Bravo, ex officio, President IAJGS, Cleveland, Ohio The Public Records Access Monitoring Committee (PRAMC) had a busy year monitoring and addressing issues affecting access to public records. The IAJGS PRAMC added a new committee member this year: Herbert “Bert” Lazerow who is a Professor of Law, University of San Diego and a member of the San Diego JGS. We are delighted to have Bert join us on the committee. He brings knowledge and expertise that greatly enhances the overall work of the committee. Access to vital records, census documents and other records is essential to the ability of genealogists to research family histories—whether as a business or a personal hobby. In some instances, PRAMC monitors legislation and regulations rather than taking action in order to assess whether action may become necessary. Information is posted on the IAJGS Records Access Alert as soon as it becomes available. JewishGen PRAMC is no longer permitted to post notices about pending matters on JewishGen as per the JewishGen Operations Committee rules, set three years ago, if the action is not a final adoption of a law, rule or court decision. -
Protecting Fundamental Rights Online in the Algorithmic Society
From Constitutional Freedoms to the Power of the Platforms: Protecting Fundamental Rights Online in the Algorithmic Society Giovanni De Gregorio* Summary: 1. Introduction. – 2. From Public to Private as from Atoms to Bits: the Reasons for a Governance Shift. – 3. Delegated Exercise of Quasi-Public Powers Online. 3.1 The Online Content Management. 3.2 The Right to Be Forgotten Online. – 4. Autonomous Exercise of Quasi- Public Powers Online. Towards a private constitutional order or an absolute regime? – 5. Solutions and Perspectives. 5.1 An Old-School Solution: Nudging Online Platforms to Behave as Public Actors. 5.2 An Innovative Solution: Enforcement of Fundamental Rights. – 6. Conclusion: Digital Humanism v Techno-Authoritarianism. 1. Introduction In recent decades, globalisation has challenged the boundaries of constitutional law by calling traditional legal categories into question.1 The internet has played a pivotal role in this process.2 On the one hand, this new protocol of communication has enabled the expanded exercise of individuals' fundamental rights such as freedom of expression.3 On the other hand, unlike other ground-breaking channels of communication, the cross-border nature of the internet has weakened the power of constitutional states, not only in terms of the territorial application of sovereign powers vis-à-vis other states but also with regard to the protection of fundamental rights in the online environment. It should come as no surprise that, from a transnational constitutional perspective, one of the main concerns of states is the limitations placed on their powers to address global phenomena occurring outside their territory.4 The development of the internet has allowed new businesses to exploit the opportunities deriving from the use of a low-cost global communication technology for delivering services without any physical burden, regardless of their location. -
Right to Be Forgotten”: Remembering Freedom of Expression
The “Right to be Forgotten”: Remembering Freedom of Expression 2016 Policy Brief Executive Summary ARTICLE 19 Free Word Centre In this policy brief, ARTICLE 19 provides comprehensive recommendations on how to 60 Farringdon Road ensure protection of the right to freedom of expression with regard to the so-called “right London to be forgotten.” EC1R 3GA United Kingdom The “right to be forgotten” usually refers to a remedy which in some circumstances enables T: +44 20 7324 2500 individuals to demand from search engines the de-listing of information about them which F: +44 20 7490 0566 appears following a search for their name. It can also refer to demands to websites’ hosts E: [email protected] to erase certain information. More broadly, it has been considered as a right of individuals W: www.article19.org "to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is Tw: @article19org communicated to others”1 or as a right that gives the individual increased control over Fb: facebook.com/article19org information about them. It has been categorised as a privacy right even though it applies to information that is, at least to some degree, public. ISBN: 978-1-910793-33-6 © ARTICLE 19, 2015 The “right to be forgotten” is expressly recognised neither in international human rights instruments nor in national constitutions. Its scope remains largely undefined: it ranges from a This work is provided under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-ShareAlike 2.5 licence. more limited right protected by existing data protection law to broader notions encompassing You are free to copy, distribute and display this work and to make derivative works, except for the images the protection of reputation, honour and dignity. -
Celebrity Privacy and the Development of the Judicial Concept of Proportionality
Celebrity privacy and the development of the judicial concept of proportionality: How English law has balanced the rights to protection and interference Robin Callender Smith Queen Mary University of London Centre for Commercial Law Studies Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Date submitted: 11 August 2014 Examined by viva 6 November 2014 External examiner: Professor Ian Lloyd (Southampton University) Internal examiner: Dr. Andrew Scott (London School of Economics) Passed without corrections Statement of Originality I, Robin Callender Smith, confirm that the research included within this thesis is my own work or that where it has been carried out in collaboration with, or supported by others, that this is duly acknowledged below and my contribution indicated. Previously published material is also acknowledged below. I attest that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge break any UK law, infringe any third party’s copyright or other Intellectual Property Right, or contain any confidential material. I accept that the College has the right to use plagiarism detection software to check the electronic version of the thesis. I confirm that this thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of a degree by this or any other university. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author. Robin Callender Smith 11 August 2014 2 Details of collaboration and publications R Callender Smith, Press Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1978). -
Handbook on European Data Protection
HANDBOOK Handbook on European data protection law © European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014 Council of Europe, 2014 The manuscript for this Handbook was completed in April 2014. Updates will become available in future on the FRA website at: fra.europa.eu, the Council of Europe website at coe.int/dataprotection, and on the European Court of Human Rights website under the Case-Law menu at: echr.coe.int. Reproduction is authorised, except for commercial purposes, provided the source is acknowledged. Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you). Photo credit (cover & inside): © iStockphoto More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014 ISBN 978-92-871-9934-8 (CoE) ISBN 978-92-9239-461-5 (FRA) doi:10.2811/69915 Printed in Belgium Printed on process chlorine-free recycled paper (PCF) This handbook was drafted in English. The Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) take no responsibility for the quality of the translations into other languages. The views expressed in this handbook do not bind the CoE and the ECtHR. The handbook refers to a selection of commentaries and manuals. The CoE and ECtHR take no responsibility for their content, nor does their inclusion on this list amount to any form of endorsement of these publications. -
The Right to Be Forgotten: a Step in the Right Direction for Cyberspace Law and Policy
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 6 · 2015 provided by Case Western Reserve University School of Law THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR CYBERSPACE LAW AND POLICY Lyndsay Cook I. BACKGROUND AND IMPLEMENTATION In 2010, a Spanish citizen filed a complaint against Google Spain and Google Inc., arguing that an auction notice of his repossessed home on Google’s search results violated his privacy rights because the repossession proceeding had been resolved long ago, and was no longer relevant.1 Believing that the outdated content was causing damage to his reputation, the citizen argued Google should be required to remove it so that it would no longer show up in a search of his name.2 The case was referred to a Court of Justice for the European Union (“EU”) who was asked to decide whether an individual has the right to request that his or her personal data be removed from accessibility via a search engine (“the right to be forgotten”).3 In a landmark decision, the EU court held that Internet search engines must remove personal information associated with an individual when the information is “inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive.”4 Simply put, the new “right to be forgotten” provides a remedy for individuals seeking to have harmful or embarrassing details about themselves removed from the Internet, when certain criteria are met. In practice, the right to be forgotten should function in a fairly straightforward manner.